Security Survey - Department of State Service Office - Government Printing Office

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A001000030043-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1998
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: July 10, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE FOR INSPECTION & SECURITY
SUBJECT: Security Survey -- Department of State Service Office -
Government Printing Office
I. GENERAL
1. The survey reported upon hereinafter was predicated upon request of the
Executive for Inspection and, Security in a memorandum to Chiefs of Branches and
Staff, I&S, dated 7 July 1917, subject: Projects, Plans and Policies.
2. Information was obtained through interview with Mr. Robert J. LeFebvre,,
Room 4 Basement, South Building, 25th and E Streets, N. W. Mr. LeFebvre is
Chief of the Department of State Service Office and has acted in the capacity
of Chief of Office under the various previous administrations of this activity,
Information was also obtained from Chief, Reproduction 25X1 A9a
Division, CIG, and from an inspection of the premises of the printing plant
in South Buildin .
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
3. The printing plant, identified as Department of State Service Office -
Government Printing Office, engages primarily in composition, printing, binding,
and photography. In its previous status the printing plant was set up as an
emergency measure to print highly classified maps, plans, policies, and other
documents for certain Federal departments and agencies. It was established as
an activity of OSS by General Donovan who was instrumental in obtaining a war-
time exception to the Federal law which requires that all Federal Government
printing be done by the Government Printing Office.
11. The'activity continued under the direction of O:S for the duration of
World.ti"rar IIWand until OSS was liquidated. In addition to OSS work the plant
also served War Department, Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
White House, and Navy Department in the printing of highly classified matter.
5. When OSS was liquidated JCS, Admiral Leahy (White House), State, and
War Departments (SSU) desired that the service be continued and considerable
discussions transpired to determine which agency would assume responsibility
for operations. Since t toly 80% of the work then being performed
was for Department of State this agency took over control on 1 April 1916
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quested control of thee; State Department resisted and later agreed that the
with the understanding that the arrangement might be changed when Central In-
telligence Group was established. A short time later CIG became active and re-
Bureau of the Budget should decide the matter. This Office (Bureau of the
Budget) decided that Government Printing office should operate the activity
(thereby reestablishing compliance with the law) on a requisition basis,
serving the printing needs of the Department of State, Central Intelligence
Group, the White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other authorized departments
and agencies. The Government Printing Office assumed jurisdiction on 1 February
1947 and since that time has been responsible for all administrative responsi-
bilities.
III. CIG SERVICE
.6. Certain types of printing, particularly color work, maps, and layouts
exceeding 22 inches in size must be performed for CIG by outside facilities.
The subject plant is used exclusively for this work. When work is to be done
a requisition form (GPO Form No. 3028) is completed in triplicate and submitted
together with necessary drafts or copy to the Chief the GPO Office, or his
assistant Such requisitions and material have in all cases
heretofore been delivered in person by authorized CIG courier or messenger,
by f the Reproduction Division, or an assistant duly au-
thorized by At the time of delivery of the requisition order,
which contains detailed information concerning the job, the order is dated and
signed by the recipient and one.copy returned to the CIG representative making
delivery. Upon completion of the order, the finished product is returned to
the appropriate CIG office by either a CIG or a GPO messenger or, in cases where
the order is large or bulky, is returned by CIG or GPO conveyance accompanied
by guards or messengers of one or both of these organizations.
7. In recent weeks the work performed on CIG requisition has comprised
approximately 10 to 20 per cent of the total work perfonred by the subject
GPO office.
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IV. SECURITY PRACTICE
8.. Personnel
a. The present personnel complement of the subject office is com-
prised of less than With one exception all have been the
subjects of at least 2 loyalty investigations and have either been
"security cleared" by CIG or are now in process of being so cleared.
With the exception of one new employee added to the organization since
it was operated by OS5 all personnel were investigated by OSS and also
by Department of State after 1 April 1946. Mr. LeFobvre reports that
the CIG Security Division has "dossiers" on all personnel. All are con-
sidered completely loyal by Mr. Leb'ebvre.
9. Security Discipline
a. At the present time security policy and regulations prescribed
by the Department of State are in force at the subject office, a hold-
over from the time this Department exercised control.
b. Storage facilities of an approved type are amply available;
there are 3 vaults, and 3-combination type safes in all rooms. All
classified material is kept under 3-combination lock when not actually
being worked upon.
c. At present entrance to the premises may be gained by two means --
the main basement door (loading dock) and the.stairway from the first
floor of the South Building. The latter means of entrance will be dis-
continued as soon as necessary building alterations.are made. In the
very near future use of the main basement door will be discontinued and
a secondary basement door (more strategically located from the standpoint
of security and provided with lock, heavy screen, and signal bell) will
be put into use. A guard of long experience with the organization and
well acquainted with all personnel employed neets all persons gaining
entrance. He ascert.ins names, nature of business, etc. on all visitors
and after checking with person with whom interview is desired escorts
the visitor, if acceptable, to that person. After interview visitors
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are returned to the guard or to the entrance by the person interviewed.
At the present time a CIG guard and receptionist check on all persons
using the stairway to South basement. This procedure will be discon-
tinued when the stairway is closed. The GPO guard maintains record of
all visitors entering the premises.
d. Visitors are not permitted in any press room or work room.
All customers or other visitors must discuss work changes or other
matters in one of the two offices where, all visitors are interviewed.
e. When it is necessary for maintenance personnel to enter the
plant for repairs or installations all classified work is removed
from view and workmen are kept under surveillance during their
necessary stay,
f. When a requisition or work order is received in the plant a
Job Production Report is immediately prepared and a copy of the requisition
stapled to it. .This report, approved by Government Printing Office and
the Joint Committee on Printing, is so constituted that it provides a
record of each job. processed in the plant from exact time of its re-
ceipt until the completed order is delivered. While the form was de-
signed primarily to furnish data from which to compile time studies,
expenses, and changes to be made, it also serves as an effective
security check inasmuch as it discloses each individual to which
material is entrusted for necessary processing and the exact amount
of time such material was in his possession. These forms may not be
released since they disclose confidential methods of arriving at
costs, but in event of a breach of security information from them
might be made available for investigative purposes.
g. Mr. leFebvre gives the impression of having a very clear
conception of the necessity for strict security measures and seems
to be exceptionally "security conscious". He stated that his former
experience in security work with private drug manufacturing firms,
the Chemical Warfare Service, the Army, G-2 of the War Department
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General Staff, OSS, and State Department has made him well aware of
security needs and has developed his sense of security practice.,
is the designated Safety and Security Officer for the
plant and, according to Mr. LeFebvre, is a very alert and conscientious
administrator of security measures. Mr. Julian McWhorter, Director of
Field Operations, Government Printing Office, who is Mr. LeFebvre's
superior, is.also said to be a strong advocate of strict security
measures.
V. SECURITY POLICY
10. During the course of discussion with Mr. LeFebvre certain signi-
ficant questions were raised with respect to the advisability of resolving
security policy for the plant at the earliest possible time. Mr. LeFebvre
stated that, according to information furnished him by f CIG, 25X1A9a
there exists in writing an agreement providing for the formation of a committee
to establish security policy for the subject activity, the appointed msmbers
being Mr. William Wright, Department of State, . Chairman, Mr. Julian McWhorter,
Government Printing Office, and
Central Intelligence Croup 25X1 A9a
Apparently this corunittee has never held a meeting. It is Mr. LeFebvre's
opinion that efficient function of this committee would result in th
resolution of nis principal current problems. These problems result principally
from a lack of formal guidance in such matters as acceptable practices in the
use of forms, activity logs, receipts, etc; absence of uniform statements of
requirements with respect to physical standards acceptable to all parties con-
cerned (doors, guards, alarm, visitor control); and statements of provisions
to permit discretionary flexibility in security measures to preclude retarding
of operations through the interference of security bookkeepi.nrg.
ll. .~Peci#ic instances of policy needs wore suggested as follows:
a. The Atomic Energy Commission is the newest customer of the
plant. Representatives of the Commission have asked for a "show-down's
on the security policy of the +b. While, the security is not directly
questioned it is considered reasonable to. expect that formal policies
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and regulations should be available for review in the security interest
b. Additional personnel is needed in the bindery if peak work
loads are to be expeditiously handled. This additional personnel is
not required at all times. It is believed advisable to establish a
pool of personnel who have been cleared for loyalty and who may remain
on a stand-by or on-call basis for immediate use when they are needed.
r.. In the absence of definitely prescrib security regulations
one agency having a contract in the plant insisted that 4 material
be accompanied into the plant by two security officers and that these
officers remain.with the work during its entire processing. No objection
was offered when this instance occurred, but the thought was suggested
that the classified work of other agencies which may have been in process.
in the same press. rooms could possibly have been compromised through its
exposure to personnel of another agency even though these personnel
happened to be authorized security officers.
d. The outstanding security need within the subject facility is
for a uniform comprehensive security policy (with necessary implementation
which would be acceptable to all users of the plant).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
12. The subject facility is not provided with satisfactory security policy
its
or with unifor ly acceptable safeguarding measures applicable to fair sensitive
operations.
13. No'serious threat to security appears to exist under the present Chief
of Office. His personal knowledge and experience and his appreciation of res-
ponsibilities are responsible for the employment of adequate safeguards --
applied as circumstances appear to dictate rather than in compliance with strict
procedural requirements and regulations.
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VII. RFCOG^? END TIONS
14. It is recommended that the agreement reportedby Mr. LeFebvre as
having been entered into by the Departanent of?State and the Central Intelligence
Group (reference paragraph 10, SecUg4 V above) be examined and that, if this
agreement is in effect substantially as it has been reported and is not contrary
in other respects to the best interests of the Central Intelligence Group,, a
meeting of the designated committee members (or other authorized representatives)
be called for the purpose of establishing appropriate security policies, measures,
and procedures relating to the operations of the subject activity.
15. It is further recommended that representatives from the Atomic Energy
Commission, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and any other appropriate using agencies be
invited to participate in the considerations of the corruY-ittee with a view toward
adoption of policy and procedures satisfactory to all parties concerned.
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