Repolygraph Program

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000800220008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 21, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 4999/0 ? 8 000800220008-2
Deputy Director of security (PS) 21 February 1966
Interrogation Rese
_
ygraph Program
ch Division
In his memorandum of 9 February 1966, the Deputy
Director of Security requested a paper regarding the use of
the polygraph examination process in the Routine Reinvestiga
tion Program of the Office.
2. The conducting of R.R.I.P. polygraph examinations
in our opinion cannot be separated from the balance of the
repolygraph program. Although we are not handling any cases
routinely under these programs the policy is:
a. to conduct polygraph examinations on
overseas returnees if more than five
years has elapsed since the last
polygraph;
b. to conduct polygraph examinations on
overseas returnees of the Office of
Communications regardless of the
number of years since the last po y
graph. and
c, to conduct polygraph examinations as
part of the Routine Reinvestigation
Program if more than five years have
elapsed since the last polygraph.
3 For several months now, however, we have not scheduled
such cases, except by specific decision of you or the Director
or Deputy Director of Security.
Approved For Release 1999/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-04007A
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4. The returnee polygraph programs were not equitably
administered. Senior grade personnel frequently had their
repolygraph waived. Selecting Communications people over
all others for more frequent polygraphing was manifestly
unfair. The R.R.I.P. repolygraph came closest to being
applied to all levels in substantially the same manner.
5. We believe it would be a mistake to let it become
known that Security has discontinued repolygraphing except
where there are specific questions to be asked unless we
are also prepared to announce that there is no such thing
as a routine repolygraph. Each person scheduled to receive
such is polygraph interview would have to be told by the
person making the decision or someone acting for him, "1
want you to go down to take a polygraph examination on
these points. It is not voluntary, you have to go."
6. The thought that there should be a reason to repoly-
h someone is a good thought.
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La thought should be extended beyond t
R.R.I.P cases, however, to the returnee cases. The fact
that a man has been oversees does not mean he could be any
greater a security risk than a man who has never been over
sees. He suhave been more exposed to hostile forces; this
however, is speculation. It has not been established.
Actually, the reverse might be true. The overt person in
Washington may have been studied much more closely than the
semi-covert or covert person overseas. The overt person in
Headquarters usually has much more access to a greater breadth
and depth of information than the semi-covert or covert person
overseas.
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7 At the present time there appears to be little likeli
of a break in the case load which would permit the resump-
of any of the three repolygraph programs. We can expect,
some time, increasing demands on Headquarters, particularly
h a slot cut in if time should become available
e are several areas where I feel we need to apply more
Imphasts. These include the following in the indicated
approximate order of priority:
a. Spanish and language training
b. in-house research work, particularly on
validity and reliability
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6. Security raining and
a. other language training
8. At the present time we are net conducting routine
ropolygraph cases. We could (and should) continue this without
deciding anything more than not to do these cases now. This
is different from arriving at a policy not to do them at all.
recommend that we avoid making any additional decisions now.
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Adse
1 - IRD File/
1 - IRD Chrono
OS/IRD/ :tjs
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Approved For Release 1999/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-04007A000800220008-2