STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 3 No. 4, Fall 1959]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300320001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: STUDY

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CONFIDENTIAL
STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
JOB NO. h32ZL9-
BOX NO. ---3 -------
FOLDER NO. 32----
TOTAL DOGS HEREIN . /-
VOL. 3 NO. 4 FALL 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
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article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
Colonel Abel's Assistant . . . . . . . W. W. Rocafort
Story of a Soviet deep-cover operation. SECRET
Experience with Types of Agent Motivation
Paul 'I bllius 31
Saint and sinner in the nether world. SECRET
The Calculation of Soviet Helicopter Performance
Theodore A. George 43
Mathematical processing of data from photographs.
CONFIDENTIAL
Graphological Assessment in Action
James Van Stappen 49
A technical service available to intelligence opera-
tions. SECRET
SECRET 25C
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Intelligence as Foundation for Policy . . Robert Cutler
Authoritative appraisal of the community's role in
national security.
Page
59
The Lost Keys to El Alamein . . . . Wilhelm F. Flicke 73
Secret of Rommel's second sight.
Terrain Intelligence for the Pentomic Army
Clifton A. Blackburn, Jr. 81
Lay of the land in the space age.
The Alamo Scouts . . . . . . . . Eustace E. Nabbie 87
Special military intelligence in New Guinea and the
Philippines.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Military intelligence in World War 77 . . . . . . 93
Espionage and paramilitary operations . . . . . 99
In the American Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Evasions and escapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Miscellany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
W. W. Rocafort is an expert on the Soviet intelligence services.
His article is based on the official CIA study entitled The
Hayhanen/Abel Case.
Paul Tollius is a CIA officer of long and manifold experience
with agents in the field.
Theodore A. George is Aviation Technical Consultant to ACSI,
Department of the Army.
James Van Stappen administers the CIA graphological assess-
ment service.
Robert Cutler served for almost four years as President Eisen-
hower's principal assistant in matters of national security.
The late Wilhelm F. Flicke was a career officer
Clifton A. Blackburn, Jr., works in the Department of En-
gineer Intelligence of the Army Map Service.
Eustace E. Nabbie, now a CIA officer, in 1945 headed the Spe-
cial Intelligence Subsection of the Sixth Army G-2 in the
Philippines.
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The reconstructed history of a
Soviet deep-cover intelligence
operation against the United
States.
COLONEL ABEL'S ASSISTANT
W. W. Rocafort
This history ends in Paris, in the spring, two years ago. On
Monday the sixth of May, 1957, the American Embassy re-
ceived an incoherent, urgent telephone call; someone had in-
formation of importance to U.S. security. Late in the after-
noon the caller came in-a burly man wearing a blue-and-red-
striped tie, fortyish, unmistakably alcoholic but showing under
his uncertain equilibrium the remnants of a once sure military
bearing. He claimed to be a Soviet intelligence officer on his
way back from the United States to Moscow.
An American intelligence representative was called, and
questioned him for hours. The man had all the qualifications
of a crackpot, but his story, if disjointed, was circumstantial,
and he offered some concrete evidence of his profession. He
was kept in contact until his data could be checked. In re-
turn for purported information about the KGB, it developed,
he wanted to be taken back to New York, to his wife, and
hurriedly. He couldn't wait, began communicating with her
by tapping messages on his chest, his other arm held up as
an antenna. Word came, none too soon, that his facts checked
out. He was got onto a plane on May 9. In the ensuing
weeks, sustained by quantities of brandy and plied with ques-
tions in his more lucid intervals, he furnished the essential
fragments of the dismal tale that follows.*
State of Soviet State Security, 1948
Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov was exasperated.
It wasn't the endless reorganizing of the intelligence and se-
The presentation of this case as a chronological narrative has
been accomplished by filling gaps with hypothetical material, cut-
ting Gordian knots of conflicting probabilities, and manipulating
the arrangement of some facts. The circumstances of these semi-
fictional reconstructions are discussed in the numbered notes
assembled at the end of the narrative.
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
curity agencies at the top; that scarcely affected him. As
head of security's deep-cover foreign intelligence operations,
he had the same job to do whether it was under the NKVD,
the NKGB, the MGB, or, as for the past year, the KI. About
the only innovation under the KI had been the effort, now
aborted, to amalgamate the deep-cover activities of military
intelligence with his own; and the military people had shown
the same stuffy aloofness in his own shop that characterized
them before and after in the GRU. Now that that was over,
it seemed certain the KI would eventually be dissolved, and
Korotkov had already begun to think of his outfit as back
with the MGB.1
The source of Colonel Korotkov's present exasperation was
a different policy matter, one that affected operations-the
unrealistic impatience of the Big Brass, all the way up to
Stalin. He himself had been telling them for years that it
was going to be necessary to concentrate intelligence resources
on deep cover to avoid being limited more and more to purely
overt information on the West. Especially in America, just
at the time when the initials U.S. began to dominate all the
Top Priority Intelligence Objectives, the Gouzenko blow-up-
those military people, again!-had put an end to the lush years
when you could go anywhere and do anything under paper-
thin official cover. You simply couldn't run an effective agent
net while under the kind of surveillance Soviet officials were
getting in America nowadays.
But now that the Brass had finally been convinced that
things had changed since the war years, they expected you
to triple your deep-cover operations overnight. He and
Shiryayev, who was in charge of his American section, were
doing what they could, but it takes time. Shiryayev had re-
marked the other day that Comrade Beria and the men around
him must be too busy with matters of state policy-meaning
in-fighting and intrigues-to be concerned with the problem
of lead time in getting officers out under deep cover. They
couldn't understand why it should take years, even if you
had a man already trained, to establish and document a legend
to serve as a water-tight biography of his cover identity.
They had even wanted to send one of their darlings-"Big
Shot," Shiryayev called him-right off under a cheesecloth
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Colonel Abel's Assistant SECRET
and patchwork legend to take charge of deep-cover operations
in New York.
Korotkov had got that one sidetracked, anyway. In a few
months one of his veterans, Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, would
arrive in New York to handle things for a while. Colonel
Abel was not the ideal man; he was too straightforward and
inflexible-that's what had caused his trouble with the Party
a decade ago and permanently retarded his career-and now
he was getting on in years. But if he lacked pliability and
youthful zest he was as sound and solid as an old oak; he
would do a good routine job with irreproachable security, and
if worst came to worst you could depend on him. Meantime
Big Shot could be building up the documentation for a decent
legend for himself, if he still wanted to take over when Abel
retired.
You couldn't put all your powder behind one shot, though,
especially not a Big Shot who liked to cut a swathe rocking
around in fast cars.2 Someone in reserve should be readied
during the next three or four years, preferably a young officer
with initiative, intelligence, sound character, and practical
training. Korotkov studied through the personnel papers
General Baryshnikov 3 had sent him to look over; Vladimir
Yakovlevich, Deputy for Personnel in the MGB Foreign In-
telligence Directorate-or was he still in KI? No matter-
was a friend of his and especially looked out for his needs.
This batch of potential recruits was a good one. Most of
them had domestic security experience, providing an indica-
tion of their reliability and obviating some of the need for
training, and a few were bilingual in Russian and some lan-
guage which would lend itself to the establishment of a bio-
graphical legend outside the USSR.
One of these still unwitting candidates seemed outstanding.
He was a Party member of five years' standing, a senior opera-
tive at one of State Security's posts in the Karelo-Finnish
SSR, and only 28 years old. He came of good peasant stock
from the Leningrad area, where a lot of Finnish was spoken;
his elementary and secondary schooling, in fact, had been in
Finnish, and he had learned some German too. He had been
graduated with honors from the secondary school and accepted
at a teachers' college without entrance examination. After
graduation from college he had taught physics and mathe-
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
matics in his old secondary school and at the same time a
class in a nearby primary school. Called up in the regular
draft, he had been grabbed eagerly by the security service,
then under the NKVD, at the age of 19, just before the Finnish
war broke out. During that and the Great Fatherland War
he had served continuously in counterintelligence and security
duties in the north and had become expert in many opera-
tional skills, notably in the recruitment and training of
agents. He had nine years of efficiency ratings characteriz-
ing him as intelligent, energetic, resourceful, and dedicated.
The one blemish on this man's record, from Korotkov's point
of view, was his apparent devotion to the girl, Aleksandra
Ivanovna Moiseyeva, whom he had married six years ago and
to their adopted son. Well, he could learn to live without
them; others had. Korotkov consulted Shiryayev and then
asked Baryshnikov to recruit Lieutenant Reino Andrey Hay-
hanen, among others, for foreign intelligence operations under
deep cover.
Basic Training in Estonia
Family Hayhanen, riding south and west through the lake
country, in its summer greenery, to Tallin, were excited and
happy. They had done a lot of traveling during the war,
mostly in the KFSSR, but they had been stuck in Padany
for two years now, and they had never been to Estonia. Aleksa
imagined it might be less raw and wild than the northland,
more like her own quiet countryside southeast of Moscow.
Tallin, they said, was a city of about the same size as Tambov.
The boy was forever making stupendous discoveries from the
train window or getting into other people's things. Reino
thought about his three days in Moscow.
He seemed to have made a tremendous impression on them
there at No. 2 Dzerzhinskiy Square. Very important people-
Baryshnikov, Korotkov, Shiryayev and his deputy Akhmedov,
not to mention the Major Abramov who squired him about-
seemed to consider his accomplishments remarkable and to
be terribly pleased that he knew Finnish and Russian equally
well. He had enjoyed his wartime work in Finland, the land
of his father's folks, and now looked forward to a new and
more important kind of activity there. Presumably it would
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be Finland, although they double-talked it-"the country of
your future assignment."
The caginess and mystery both titillated and disturbed him.
Only one man in the MBG office at Tallin, Colonel Pavel
Panteleymonovich Pastelnyak, would know that he was train-
ing with Korotkov's outfit. Foreign intelligence was fine, a
higher-grade profession than being a glorified policeman, but
he wished it could be under official cover. The role of a clan-
destine foreign agent was bound to be an inconspicuous one,
and the compartmentation might hurt his career as a Soviet
officer. Yet General Baryshnikov had assured him that he
would advance much faster this way-captain after a year,
major in two or three more, etc. And if they were going to
put all foreign intelligence under deep cover that helped take
the curse off it. At least he had their promise that Aleksa
and the boy could accompany him. Otherwise it would be
no go. She was so dependent on him. . . .
In Tallin Hayhanen found himself spending half his time
on cover duties for the local MGB-familiar work, spotting
and evaluating agents for activity in Finland, Sweden, and
maybe other countries. The rest of the time, when he was
supposed to be on "personal assignment" to Colonel Pastel-
nyak, he was learning both the chauffeur-mechanic and the
photographer jobs, as tradecraft skills and as alternative fu-
ture cover occupations. Before long Pastelnyak told him to
start learning English: apparently he was not going to operate
in Finland, but in Britain, in America-where Pastelnyak him-
self had served-or somewhere in the Far East. He arranged
private lessons for himself and a reluctant Aleksa; she was
no linguist and was beginning to be apprehensive about ship-
ping off to some strange country far from home.
Meanwhile he had a chance to compare notes with a couple
of other Korotkov men in Tallin, and they ridiculed the notion
that a deep-cover operator could take his family along with
him. This worried him; but he was reassured within the
month when Abramov, the junior officer of those who had
interviewed him in Moscow, came to Tallin for a few days.
Abramov told him he would be going to the United States
with his wife and son, that he should read books about Amer-
ica, and that after the turn of the year he would report for
a couple of weeks to Moscow to firm up the legend for his
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cover identity, to check on his progress in English, and to
get additional briefing.
Eugene Maki Gets a Double
In Moscow, early in 1949, he found that Korotkov had two
possible cover identities ready for him. One was represented
by an American passport showing a boy of about 12 who had
arrived in Russia with his parents in 1925. But this boy would
now be some seven years older than Hayhanen, and besides
he had relatives in the United States that might prove em-
barrassing. The other was better: one Eugene Maki, born
in Idaho the year before Hayhanen, had come with his family
to Estonia in 1927 and now worked in the KFSSR as a chauf-
feur-mechanic. An MGB officer who had seen Maki thought
that Hayhanen had a sufficient likeness to him. He could
assume this American identity in Estonia, if at a sufficient
distance from Tallin where he was already known. They
would get him a mechanic's job in the government garage
in Valga, down on the Latvian border. The apparently con-
fiscated Maki birth certificate which Korotkov gave him could
be used after a while to apply to some U.S. consulate for a
passport. His English, as good as could be expected after half
a year, he should in the meantime improve by himself without
a teacher.
There was no specific provision in the Maki legend for a
family, and when Hayhanen asked about it Korotkov was
evasive: he should leave his wife and son in Tallin when he
went to Valga as Maki, at any rate; he could go up to see
them weekends. It seemed pretty clear that his superiors
were maneuvering to back out on their promise, now he was
in so deep that his whole career was involved in these plans.
He did not tell Aleksa this, but she knew it intuitively. She
stopped her English lessons, saying that she did not want to
go on with them alone. She sat tight, dreading even the par-
tial separation at opposite ends of Estonia, hoping that some-
thing would happen.
As the late winter and spring were frittered away in un-
stimulating garage work and strained weekend commuting,
the new Eugene Maki grew impatient to get on with his assign-
ment. He got the promised captaincy in May; perhaps that
meant he would be moving soon. In a month or so Abramov
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showed up in Valga; they had reviewed the Maki legend, he
said, and decided that in its present form it was clearly un-
satisfactory. It called for him to go to America after recent
residence in the USSR, thus inviting the attention of the U.S.
authorities; it required fluency in Estonian; it did not take
advantage of Hayhanen's knowledge of Finnish. Hayhanen
wondered whether these obvious considerations had really just
occurred to them.
Now in 1943, Abramov went on, when the Soviet armies were
liberating Estonia from the Germans, there had been a con-
siderable exodus of Estonians to Finland; what more logical
than that Eugene Maki had joined this migration and been
in Finland ever since? He was therefore to quit his garage
job and come to Moscow to make new plans. He would have
to spend some time in Finland to back up this amendment
to his legend. His wife and son had better stay in Tallin:
they had only a smattering of Finnish, would complicate the
legend, and would seriously inhibit his mobility. He could get
back to see them occasionally.
This was too much for Aleksa. She couldn't bear the
thought of more months alone in a strange city, without
friends, living only for an occasional weekend. She would go
back to her own country, stay with her own people, and wait
for him as so many soldiers' wives had done during the war
years, half of them in vain. Hayhanen took her to Tambov,
said goodbye with tenderness but with some sense of relief
from the strain of conflicting demands on him, and went to
Moscow for another round of conferences with Korotkov and
the staff of the American section.
The Fledgling in Finland
He was told that the several months in Finland needed to
backstop his legend would be useful experience in living his
cover in a foreign country, making contacts with a superior
under official cover and with local agents, and using drops
and communications channels. He could resume his English
lessons, too. He could even be of some operational use if he
took advantage of the opportunity to find out more about the
details of Finnish documentation. For his own documenta-
tion in Finland, aside from the Maki birth certificate and a
picture of Maki's father, he was given a KFSSR chauffeur-
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ELRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
mechanic's work certificate-this insurance against the possi-
bility that the Finns had some record of the real Maki would
also help to explain the false Maki's deficiency in Estonian-
and on his way through Tallin he was to pick up from Pastel-
ynak a card showing that as far as the MVD was concerned
Maki had no citizenship.
This documentation was not for the purpose of getting into
Finland-he was supposed to have gone in in 1943-but only
for attesting his identity while there. His entry now was
effected in simple if undignified secrecy, in the trunk of a car
belonging to the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, driven across the
border from the Soviet base at Porkkala. The visible passen-
gers were an embassy official and Ivan Mikhailovich Vorobyev,
chief correspondent in Finland for the paper Trud and Maki's
channel back to Moscow. Vorobyev was also to help him back
up the legend of his residence in Finland for the past six
years, since 1943.
In September, on Vorobyev's orders, a Finnish agent took
Maki on a "hunting" trip above the Arctic circle, in the agent's
native Lapland. He told his Lapp friends that Maki was a
deserter from the Finnish Army who needed help, and he paid
two of them to certify that Maki had lived with them suc-
cessively from 1943 to 1949. The past thus sketched, he filled
in the present by getting Maki a job as blacksmith's helper.
Working among the Lapps in this capacity into the dayless
winter, Maki was not unhappy when Vorobyev suggested that
he move closer to Helsinki where they could meet more often.
In January he got a helper's job in a steel fabricating plant
in industrial Tampere.
As 1950 dragged on, not idly but insignificantly-work at
the plant, monthly meetings with Vorobyev, reports on living
conditions in Finland, on attitudes of the population, and on
the industries around Tampere; made-work, thought Maki-
it began to seem high time that these "several months" in
Finland should be up. One late summer evening he was going
over his legend, reexamining it for flaws, trying to anticipate
Moscow's discovery of other considerations that might delay
his departure for America. He picked up the Maki birth cer-
tificate, and his eye fell on the routine Warning, "This cer-
tification is not valid if it has been altered in any way what-
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Cofone Abe's Assistant
soever. . . ." He held it up against the light. It was only
too apparent: in Moscow they had tried to erase a stamp
which recorded the real Maki's application for a Russian pass-
port, and had done a poor job of it.4 This might easily do
more damage than merely delay him. The certificate itself
was perfectly all right, if he could get a copy of the original
before it had been stamped. Why not? He sat down and
wrote a letter to the Department of Health, Enaville, Shoshone
County, Idaho: "Dear sirs, I lost my birth certificate. . . ."
He didn't tell Moscow about this right away : they would
probably tear their hair over anything so naive. They had
still said nothing about applying for a passport, and by the
time they did he'd have the new certificate. His eagerness
to be off, thus dampened for a while, was soon to be thor-
oughly quenched.
Eugene Maki Takes a Wife
The quencher was Hanna Kurikka, young, blonde, and grace-
ful, crowned Queen of the Fete in a recent beauty contest.
Maki was bewitched; this girl's gay and open spontaneity was
so different from the almost anguished affection of Aleksa,
so different from anything he had known in his life, something
from another world. He was not bothered by her lowly social
status or by the rumors about means she had used to supple-
ment her wages as a housemaid. These things only brought her
quintessence of vitality within his reach and comprehension.
Hanna, for her part, was overwhelmed. She had never aspired
to the affections of such an upstanding man, so well educated,
so generous and kind. There was a mysterious savoir faire
about him which must reflect his origins in America. She
loved him for himself, but she thrilled with half-conscious
expectations at his hints that he might some day go back
to visit his native land.
They met in September. By November they were insepa-
rable, floating through a dream-world, intoxicated. Maki
stopped going to work at the plant; it seemed a stupid waste
of time. In January the new photostated birth certificate
came. He showed it to Hanna. She kissed it. In March
they moved to Turku in order to be by the sea. Hanna began
to mention marriage wistfully once in a while. Maki was em-
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barrassed, and felt vaguely guilty about Aleksa waiting there
in Tambov.
Maki now worked off and on for some plumbing contractors,
and found odds and ends of information to report to Moscow
through Vorobyev. Of course they knew nothing about
Hanna. He had better tell them about the birth certificate,
though; he didn't much care if they did think him half-baked
now. But Moscow was pleased, seeing in his initiative a con-
firmation of their estimate of his resourcefulness, and this
maybe triggered their decision that it was time for him to
apply for his U.S. passport. He stalled a while, but filed the
application in July 1951. Fortunately there were complica-
tions-he had to show proof that he had not served in the
Finnish armed forces or registered to vote-which would serve
to delay action for some time.
Hanna was now more outspoken about her wish to get mar-
ried. She was right, of course, from her viewpoint: a woman
doesn't feel secure without that legal tie. And it really
shouldn't matter to him, he told himself; after all, he was not
Reino Hayhanen, with a wife in Tambov, but Eugene Maki,
who could marry when he chose. Some day this wild, delicious
dream would be over and he would be Reino Hayhanen again,
back in the work-a-day world. As for Moscow, they hadn't
played it very square with him; they needn't know. The Makis
moved to nearby Tammisto and were married in November.
Hayhanen Readied for the Plunge
So passed another winter, and the spring and early sum-
mer. Late in July of 1952 came the inexorable passport, and
swift on its heels the order to report to Moscow for three
weeks' training and final briefing. Hayhanen's grayed en-
thusiasm began to glow again. A business trip to France and
Italy, he told Hanna; he'd be back. He crossed to Porkkala
in the same car-trunk that had brought him in three long
years ago. He visited his mother in the KFSSR, and sent word
to Aleksa to meet him with their son in Moscow. He was back
to reality, the same vigorous career-and-family man he had
been before these ties were dissolved in Maki's dream. He
threw himself into his final intensive Moscow training.
His headquarters had moved to the KI building on the out-
skirts, although the KI itself was now defunct. Colonel Ko-
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rotkov was not in evidence. Neither was Abramov. Colonel
Vitali Gregoryevich Pavlov, who had interviewed him before
as a member of the American section staff, was now its Deputy.
But it was mostly the Training Officer, Captain Aleksey Kro-
potkin, that took charge of his TDY. The training was con-
ducted from a safe-house, with two shifts of instructors. He
learned how to use ciphers, and was issued a cipher of his own
which he was never to reveal to anyone. When in New York
he'd get one-time pads, they told him. He had a refresher in
taking photographs of documents and learned to dissolve their
hard backing, leaving only the emulsion as "soft film." He was
taught how to make and hide microdots, and how to signal
their location separately. He practiced tailing and evasion
on the Moscow streets.
He was given a full set of instructions for his American op-
erations, which he memorized in part and in part noted down.
He was introduced to the official who would be his contact and
communications channel, Mikhail Nikolayevich Svirin, about
to leave for New York as First Secretary to the Soviet UN dele-
gation. But the effort to minimize the use of official cover
was still on, and later, when he had built up his own network
of agents, he would be made assistant to the deep-cover resi-
dent in New Yorks, who would have direct communications
to Moscow. On arrival in New York he should go to a Finnish
club and get them to help him find a place to live. He could
live wherever he wished, but should keep Moscow informed.
He should let them know he had arrived safely by putting a
red thumbtack on the "Horse Carts" sign near the Tavern-
on-the-Green restaurant in Central Park. If he suspected
surveillance the thumbtack should be white.
He was not ordinarily to meet Svirin in person. He was
given a list of numbered places-"banks"-where messages
could be hidden. When he had banked a message he should
go to the railing in front of 150 Central Park West and put
a chalk mark on the horizontal bar corresponding to the num-
ber of the bank. If he needed a meeting he could mark one
of the railing posts. He should watch a different location for
the signal that Svirin had banked a message for him.
He could lay low for the first three months, establishing
his cover and making sure that he was not watched. On the
~T 11
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
twenty-eighth of each month during this period, at ten o'clock
in the morning,6 he was to be at the Prospect Park subway
station in Brooklyn and simply walk through the south exit;
thus Moscow would know that he was alive and well. After
three months he should begin to circulate, joining all the
Finnish clubs and exploring all means to build up his agent
network.
It was Major Hayhanen, this time, who ducked into the car-
trunk on the Porkkala side of the border and emerged as
Eugene Maki on the Finnish side. The promotion and his
elaborate instructions gave him a renewed sense of purpose
and responsibility, which Hanna, when he reached Tammisto,
dimmed but could not dispel. He took her to Turku, his port
of sail, in order to be with her as much as possible while com-
pleting his preparations for the voyage. It was a torn and
poignant month, the Maki idyll continually interrupted with
Hayhanen business. As soon as he got settled he would send
for her, he said, because it was the thing to say.
The Promised Land
He sailed on October 10, via Stockholm and London. From
London he sent a wish-you-were-here picture postal to his
Lapp benefactor, care of general delivery, Helsinki. It would
tell Vorobyev and Moscow he had got that far. He docked in
New York October 21, and was passed through the immigra-
tion and customs formalities without incident. He found tem-
porary lodging at a cheap hotel in Harlem. He put a red
thumbtack on the "Horse Carts" sign.
He walked the streets and rode the subways, getting used
to the dizziness of the city. He spotted his message banks-
a hole in a cement wall on Jerome Avenue, a bench in River-
side Park, the space under a lamp post in Fort Tryon Park,
the iron fence on Macombs Dam Bridge. He sampled the
night-life, thinking of Hanna's fascination with its distant
glamor. He went shopping, and because he missed Hanna he
bought a present for Aleksa, splurging on a modish fur coat.
He applied to a Finnish club and obtained room and board
with a Finnish family in Brooklyn. He left a message for
Svirin suggesting that the Jerome Avenue bank be changed
to a more convenient place in Brooklyn, a gap in a mortar
joint between some stone steps in Prospect Park, and asking
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that Svirin forward his package to Aleksa. On the twenty-
eighth, as scheduled, he walked through the Prospect Park
subway station. Svirin answered his message and gave him a
new signal location, the metal fence at the 86th St. entrance
to Central Park; by a horizontal mark on the first.post Maki
could indicate that he had left a message at Bank No. 1, etc.
In November he enciphered his first message to Moscow
since the London postcard, his Letter No. 1: He wanted to
set up a business as his cover means of livelihood; he needed
$5,000 for this purpose. He had forgotten the name of the
chemical used to dissolve the backing from soft film. Did he
have any mail, and what was going on at home generally?
He would send details about where he lived and worked later
on; when would he receive the promised one-time pads? Did
Aleksandra Ivanovna get the package, and how was she? 7
He photographed this message with his Exacta, developed
and trimmed the film, and placed it in a small round silver
case. He snapped the lid on-a Finnish 50-markka piece, its
special construction undetectable save for a tiny hole through
which a needle could push the two halves apart. He put the
coin in a magnetic change-container. He went to Riverside
Park, sat on the designated bench, and left the container fixed
to a steel brace on its under side. He put a mark across the
second post of the 86th St. fence. Every day now he walked
past a fence off New Utrecht Avenue in Brooklyn; soon a ver-
tical mark appeared on the second post there; the message had
been picked up. He went back to 86th St. and rubbed his own
mark off.
Then he waited, rather idle and lonely for Hanna, and drink-
ing perhaps too much. He got a job in a body and fender shop.
In December Moscow's reply found its way back through the
same machinery, reversed. Maki pushed a hollow American
nickel open and took out a microfilm showing ten columns of
five-figure groups. Using his own cipher, he converted it into
the Russian text of Moscow's first message:
1. We congratulate you on a safe arrival. We confirm the receipt
of your card to "V" and the reading of your Letter No. 1.
2. For organization of your cover we have given instructions that
$3,000 be transmitted to you. Consult with us prior to investing
it in any kind of business, advising the character of this busi-
ness.
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
3. According to your request we will transmit separately the
formula for the preparation of soft film and the news, together
with a letter from your mother.
4. It is too early to send you the one-time pads. Encipher short
letters, and for longer ones use inserted numbers, transmitting
separately the corresponding insertions. All the data about
yourself, place of work, address, etc. must not be transmitted
in one cipher message.
5. The package was delivered to your wife in person. Everything
is all right with the family. We wish you success.
Greetings from the comrades. No. 1, 3 December.
Maki put the film back into the coin and snapped it closed.
$3,000. Not as much as he'd asked for, but as much as he
really expected. It would cover the down payment on one of
those little neighborhood garages he'd seen advertised. He
thought of his work in the big garage at Valga, puncuated by
weekends with Aleksa. That made him think of Hanna-
everything made him think of Hanna-and how utterly un-
important all other people were. Hanna in New York, Hanna
riding in a new American car. He put the trick nickel in his
pocket and went out to buy some American vodka. Next day
when he wanted to check the message over he couldn't remem-
ber where it was. Funny, he thought, how he'd picked up
Hanna's habit of hiding things away so carefully he couldn't
find them himself. He had no premonition that on some
Brooklyn corner a newsboy would spill his change and see one
nickel spring apart."
Living was unbelievably expensive in New York; just keeping
a supply of his favorite brandy on hand put a big dent in Maki's
salary. By the time he'd made up his mind which garage to
buy he'd already let too much of the $3,000 slip through his
fingers to make the down payment. And he couldn't get out
of his head the picture of Hanna riding in a sleek American
car. He still had enough money to make the picture real.
And it was not complicated; Hanna was in preferred immi-
gration status as the wife of an American citizen. She arrived
in February 1953, and they took an apartment in Brooklyn
and bought a car.
Maki now sent Moscow his Letter No. 2, the first in a long
series of bimonthly equivocations and deceptions about his
operational activities. As he had learned in Finland, he could
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either have Hanna or pursue his operational career, not both;
and he had chosen. Of course he had to go through the mo-
tions, and sometimes these motions were considerable.? For
one thing, he had to keep a watch on Svirin's New Utrecht
Avenue signal fence. One spring day he found a number 6
chalked there. You add 2, he remembered, and that means
you meet at this Brooklyn subway station on the next eighth,
eighteenth, or twenty-eighth of the month. You both get on
a subway train, but keep apart, and ride past three stops.
Then you both get off and take one going in the opposite di-
rection. Then if you haven't been followed you transact your
business. Then you get off and Svirin keeps on going.'?
Maki thus held his first meeting with Svirin. All this to
collect your salary and a routine message, he thought; much
easier to let the old man, the courier Svirin had mentioned,
put them under the Fort Tryon lamp post in 'a hollow bolt.'1
It was complicated enough at best, this triple deception. Mos-
cow must be made to think he was busily building up an agent
net. Hanna had to have an explanation of where he got his
money and of certain mysterious activites he couldn't share
with her. (He hinted to her that illegal traffic in narcotics
was a real gold mine.) He had to have some honest source
of income in the eyes of neighbors and the U.S. authorities.
(He was fired from his body-and-fender job in May; he
watched the want-ads and worked off and on as shipping clerk,
vacuum cleaner salesman, or utility man.) He wasn't really
on the square with anyone. Least of all Aleksa. That sum-
mer he discovered that a shot of liquor before breakfast would
steady him and clear his brain.
In the fall he had his second and last meeting with Svirin
in person.12 Svirin gave him a less routine message this time.
In order to reduce his dependence on official-cover channels
he was being assigned a courier, a Finnish sailor under the
pseudonym Asko, whose ship called at New York three or four
times a year. Asko could carry messages for Moscow and
bring back hollow coins and pencils. Maki should meet him
at a certain movie theater in Brooklyn. Maki would wear a
blue tie with red stripes, Asko a blue tie with flowers. There
were greeting formulas for recognition.
SE 15
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
The appointment came off as scheduled. Maki and Asko
set up joint locations-under the seat of a telephone booth in
a New York bar, atop a partition in the men's room of a
Brooklyn bar-where Finnish notes could be tacked to signal
a meeting or to say that a message to or from Moscow had
been deposited in one of their "banks." Such a message would
be on microfilm, concealed, say, in the split cover of a match-
book. Asko had previously been using a bank in a Riverside
Park lamp post with another deep-cover man.-this man
couldn't understand Finnish, and so Asko had a hard time
doing business with him-but he and Maki agreed on a bench
in Brooklyn's Sunset Park and a place behind the toilet in
another Brooklyn bar as the most convenient banks for them.
For future meetings they chose yet a third Brooklyn bar. It
was always fun when Asko came to town.
It may have been Asko, though, who caused Maki a bit of
work once early in 1954. Normally Moscow did not trouble
him with assignments; he was supposed to be operating on his
own initiative.13 But now some agent, they notified him, had
lost contact with his principal, wasn't receiving messages, and
had posted a danger signal; Maki was to meet this man and
give him a message setting up new arrangements. He always
suspected that Asko's language difficulties with the man he'd
worked for before had something to do with this confusion.
He took care of the unwelcome chore, anyway, and never
heard any more about it. He was soon to begin getting more
assignments than he would have liked to think about.
The Master Craftsman
Colonel Rudolph Ivanovich Abel was both an artist and an
imaginative, accomplished artisan, and he took pride in his
art. Arts, rather, for intelligence tradecraft is hardly a single
craft, with its range of skills from forgery to radio repairing.
He was proud, for instance, of his forged New York certificate
attesting the birth in 1897 of one Martin Collins, an identity
he might have to fall back on some day. True, he had not
staked his present and last previous identity on his forger
skill: 14 six years ago, in 1948, it was as U.S. citizen Andrew
Kayotis that he had arrived in New York via Le Havre and
Quebec because the real Kayotis, after gambling away his
other valuables during a Copenhagen fling, with desperate
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bravado put up and lost his authentic U.S. passport in a final
game.15 And the imposter Kayotis, once he was inside the
country, had melted into Emil Goldfus, who held the photo-
stat of an authentic New York certificate of birth in 1902,
because there was no danger that the real Goldfus, having
died at the age of some fourteen months, would prove em-
barrassing. Goldfus was safer than the completely imaginary
Collins, but he would not be afraid to become Collins if neces-
sary; he did his forging meticulously well.
Another painstaking pleasure for the master craftsman was
the fabrication of the hollow containers he used to transmit
or store messages, money, and other secret valuables-the
wooden pencil inside which he kept on microfilm the letters
from his family and Moscow's radio schedule, the trick sand-
ing block where he stored his one-time pad,16 the hollow bolts,
screws, and nails with threaded heads, the cuff links with re-
movable faces, the toothpaste tubes opened at the bottom,
the matchbox with the double sliding compartment, the dry
cell with the threaded top, the metal cylinders and plugged
lengths of pipe to hold money and other bulky items. He
spent a good deal of time making these devices for himself
and his agents, and it was satisfying work, the creation of
physical projections of an orderly, inventive mind.
He had developed his own formula for secret ink and his
own method of making microdots, both improvements over
what Moscow had given him.17 He enjoyed thinking up new
ways to transmit microdots-under the staple in the binding
of a magazine mailed to an accommodation address in Paris,
say, or under the stamp on a letter to one of the "stamp deal-
ers," Vladinec and Merkulow, in Moscow. He liked to hunt
up better message banks than the usual iron fences and park
benches-a spot under the carpet in a theater, for instance,
or an aperture behind a telephone booth. He would try out a
new bank by leaving something in it for ten days to see if it
remained undisturbed.
Photography was his special hobby, and since it also pro-
vided his cover occupation he could indulge in it openly. He
now had a separate penthouse studio, on Fulton Street in
Brooklyn, after five cramped years in his earlier studio-apart-
ments on West 99th St. and on Riverside Drive. Aside from
gE ET 17
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
photographic work, the new studio was a convenient place to
keep his machine tools, his radio receivers and equipment,
and his Morse printer, rather than in his Hicks Street apart-
ment. Radio was a lesser specialty of his, but he made friends
among the neighbors by fixing their receivers for them.
Partly, perhaps, because radio was not his first love, he was
less than enthusiastic about Moscow's project that he set up
a transmitter so he could send messages to them as well as
receive their traffic. He understood the desirability of getting
communication channels independent of the official-cover peo-
ple and their diplomatic facilities, but he was at a loss for a
safe practical way to set up a powerful secret transmitter in
the crowded New York area, with radio and TV sets all around
to pick up its interference and the radio police, the so-called
FCC, keeping such a close watch. Even the proposed two-
minute bursts of ultra-high-speed Morse would not be likely
to go undetected. It might work in the open country if he
could find a sufficiently secluded high spot, but then he would
need a more portable and hidable transmitter than the ele-
phantine set proposed by Moscow.18 Perhaps he could make
one himself. He would also need an operator, if he was to
have any time for his other duties and his agents. Certainly
something had to be done, if only against the eventuality of
war, when there would be no diplomatic communications,
when one would be willing to run greater risks, and when
submarines lying off the coast could figure as relay points as
well as operational recipients.
He himself would be out of it then, unless war came sooner
than anybody expected. He was getting on toward sixty, and
in less than three years he'd have his thirty years of service
in. He looked forward more and more to his retirement. The
work was fine, but it was really quite a sacrifice to stay so long
away from his wife and daughter and from Mother Russia.
He hoped this new assistant they were giving him turned out
to be a better prospective replacement than Big Shot had.
Flamboyant character! And arrogant: thought he was the
boss already, before he was dry behind the ears. Wanted
twenty thousand dollars for a cover business. Kept running
back and forth to Moscow. Cracked up his sports car' on the
parkway; $1,800 just in doctor-bills. He'd be quite a time re-
cuperating, back in the Crimea.
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The Abel Assistant
The new man might be just the opposite-that is, over-cau-
tious-to judge by what Moscow said, that during his two
years in New York he had asked for a number of name-checks
but hadn't produced a single agent. Abel himself had spent
the first year just looking around, but after that you should
start producing. He would soon be able to form a first-hand
opinion of this man: On Labor Day, at Moscow's direction, he
was to meet this "Vic"-using for himself the code-name
"Mark"-at a movie house in Flushing, on Long Island. Vic
would be wearing a blue-and-red-striped tie and would make
certain motions with his pipe as a recognition signal. Mark
should arrange regular and frequent future meetings, pro-
vide training and supervision as necessary, and pay him a
major's salary plus expenses.
Vic-whom the reader will have recognized as Hayhanen-
Maki-agreed to meet Mark at least once a week. At each
meeting they firmed up the time and exact arrangements for
the next, with an alternate date in reserve against unfore-
seen circumstances. The usual arrangement was for Vic to
wait in his car near a specified street corner; Mark had no
car and did not drive. If contact between them were broken
each was to check the sign at the entrance to Tillary Street
Park every day for a signal from the other. It was convenient
that they both lived in Brooklyn.
Mark's developing impression of Vic was not bad, at least
by comparison with the late lamented Big Shot. He was in-
telligent, seemed interested and responsive, and caught on
quickly to new techniques. He had even done some original
work in microdot methods. On the other hand, his prepos-
terous narcotics-trade cover showed poor judgment,20 and his
reasons for not having produced any agents were thin: he
was afraid that fraternizing in the Finnish clubs might blow
him, he said; Moscow kept him too busy with specific assign-
ments; they had refused him enough capital to get started
in a garage business. Mark told him to go ahead and join the
clubs and promised that when he had some more training in
photography he could set up his own studio.
At least he was useful as a leg-man and chauffeur, and that
was a good way for Mark to get a better idea of his capabilities.
SECRET 19
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He used him a lot in those capacities during the rest of 1954
and early 1955. One of Mark's assignments, for example, was
to check secretly on the activities of a man who lived in
Queens, perhaps an agent Moscow didn't trust. He turned
this assignment over to Vic. They drove to Queens together
and Mark pointed out the man's house; whenever Vic had a
free day he should drive up and mount surveillance on it.
Mark didn't much like this counterintelligence business,
which proceeded from the assumption that no one was to be
trusted. A similar distaste subconsciously motivated his at-
tempt shortly thereafter to shunt another job to Vic, that
concerning an agent under the code-name Quebec.
One day Mark had found in his bank in the bridge-wall near
Central Park reservoir a broken slot-head bolt. He took it
to the studio, unscrewed the head, shook out a rolled and
tissue-wrapped frame of microfilm, and put it in his viewer.
He scanned the message:
QUEBEC, Roy A. Rhodes ... former employee of the US Military
Attache ... recruited to our service in January 1952 ... on the
basis of compromising materials ... is tied up to us with his
receipts and information . . . in his own handwriting. After he
left ourcountry he was to be sent to the school of communications
... at San Luis, California. He was to be trained there as a
mechanic of the coding machines.
He fully agreed to continue to cooperate with us in the States
... He was to have written . . . special letters, but we had re-
ceived none.... It has recently been learned that Quebec is
living in Red Bank, N. J., where he ownes three garages. The
garage job is being done by his wife.... His brother ... works
as an engineer at an atomic plant in Camp, Georgia ...
He had Vic drive him to Red Bank to make inquiries, and on
the way told him something about the case. In Red Bank
he found that Quebec's wife was indeed running a garage busi-
ness, but had no idea of her husband's present whereabouts;
probably he was out west somewhere. It was a wild goose
chase, thought Mark; blackmail was the least dependable of
agent motivations, especially when you weren't in a position
to exercise a continuity of psychological pressure. He re-
ported his findings to Moscow, suggesting that if they wanted
to pursue the matter they might assign it directly to Vic; the
job would increase his sense of responsibility, he wrote a little
speciously.22
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When in a few weeks Vic received Moscow's instruction to
locate Quebec, with a further lead on relatives in Howard,
Colorado, Mark turned over to him the original message in
its bolt container and gave him three weeks free of other duties
to go out west and see if the relatives knew the defaulting
agent's address. On the way Vic could make some observa-
tions Moscow had requested about certain installations in the
Chicago and Detroit areas.23 It was close on to Christmas be-
fore he got back; he had not been able to make the observa-
tions in Chicago and Detroit, he said, because he had been
sick throughout the whole trip, but he had telephoned the Que-
bec relatives and got an address in Arizona for the delinquent.
Mark told him to report direct to Moscow, hoping Moscow
might let it drop there.
As time went on Mark came to the conclusion that Vic
would perform competently if given a specific task and specific
instructions on how to go about it, but poorly if left with a
general assignment calling for his own initiative and judg-
ment. He had indiscreetly had a woman with him, Mark
learned quite by accident, on the trip west that drew the blank
in Chicago and Detroit.24 Moreover, he treated alcohol alto-
gether too much like water, even if he did carry it well. Mark
had several talks with him about that, without any lasting
effect, and so beginning in 1955 confined his independent as-
signments to the simple ones-taking a hollow pencil from
Asko in a routine reliability check and sending it back to
Moscow through one of Svirin's banks; knocking on a door at
a Boston address Moscow wanted checked and sending Moscow
a description of the man who answered it. Even on cases like
that of Quebec last year-there was this other one-time agent
Moscow wanted to reactivate, but it turned out that his own
Atlantic City relatives wouldn't trust him as far as they could
throw him-Mark was afraid Vic might encourage Moscow's
unrealistic pursuit of dubious agents, and so used him only
as chauffeur.
That's just the way the Quebec business had turned out.
In the spring Mark received instructions from Moscow to con-
tact Quebec and get him back on the job. In Arizona yet, and
separated from his wife, undoubtedly the fulcrum of the black-
mail lever. Well, he wouldn't; his home leave was coming up,
SECRET 21
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
and. talking to them in person there in Moscow he could make
them see the light. His more important business at home
would be to report on Vic, though; he would tell them that
Vic would do as an assistant, working under supervision, but
that he seemed to lack motivation and as a replacement he
would be quite inadequate for the foreseeable future. He
wanted to impress on them the urgency of getting a compe-
tent man out to take over so as not to delay his own retire-
merit.
Five Grand for Helen Sobell
Mark scheduled his departure for not later than the end of
June, so as to make the west-east transit in Vienna easy, be-
fore the Soviet forces pulled out under the terms of the new
treaty. He gave Vic the equipment and some money to set
up his promised photo shop, suggesting that he locate in New-
ark and take advantage of the relative freedom from assign-
ments to get it started during his own absence. He also re-
paired the AC-DC shortwave receiver which had burned out
when he tried to plug it in on Vic's car-not knowing that
the car had a twelve-volt battery 25-and gave it to Vic to prac-
tice reading Morse; Vic might some day have to handle the
Moscow traffic if Moscow never came through with an oper-
ator. He had things about in shape to leave when Moscow
sent him word to give $5,000 to Helen Sobell.
This was not so simple as it sounds, with Morton Sobell
serving thirty years for espionage and his wife still under sur-
veillance. It wouldn't do to simply walk up to her address,
or even telephone to arrange a meeting. Best hide the money
and then get word to her where to pick it up. He had Vic
drive him upstate to Bear Mountain Park, taking the $5,000
in two tin cans. They walked up the Major Welch trail. They
put one can under a heavy flat rock and tacked a sign like a
disused trail marker on a nearby tree. The other can they
hid in the hollow between some rocks at the root of a tree
which already carried a trail marker, and they added an
x-mark and the figure 2 to this sign.
Mark, his departure imminent, had to leave it to Vic to get
word to Helen Sobell, but he gave him detailed instructions.
Vic should go to a sympathetic friend of Helen's 26 and say that
he was Morton's brother-Mark furnished him credentials
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Colonel Abel's Assistant SECRET
to that effect-that he was lying low but anxious to help, and
that Helen should contact him at such-and-such a place and
time. Helen would know enough to be careful. Mark handed
him two photographs of her to avoid recognition complica-
tions.
This matter arranged, Mark took off. He caught a plane
to Houston, and a train from there to Mexico City. Leaving
the country this way, all you needed was a smallpox vaccina-
tion and a citizen's travel permit, and he had seen to these.
In Mexico City he chalked the letter T on the telephone pole
opposite 191 Chihvahaa St., on the street side. The next
afternoon, at three o'clock, he was outside the Balmora theater
looking at pictures of the current film. A sightseer standing
next to him was smoking a pipe and carrying a red book in
his left hand. Mark asked in English, "Is this an interesting
picture?" The man said "Yes. Do you wish to see it, Mr.
Brandt?" They went inside and transacted their business,
principally arranging another such contact in Paris, where
Mark-Goldfus-Abel should telephone the Soviet Commercial
Mission at a certain time and speak a set French phrase. In
Paris he would get his instructions for travel to Vienna and
for contact there, and then he would be off to Moscow.27
In Moscow he reported on the status of the Sobell money
and other unfinished business. He was able to persuade them
not to pursue the quest of Rhodes-Quebec as an agent, but
he was less successful in getting them to accept his evalua-
tion of Hayhanen. It was one thing to question the motiva-
tion of a debased creature of the capitalistic environment, an-
other to entertain such doubts about a Soviet citizen who had
proved himself with many years in the Service and met the
highest Party standards. They seemed to suspect rigidity
and perhaps even some professional jealousy on Abel's own
part, and pointed out that it was Abel's job to see that his
assistant's enthusiasm was maintained and his full capabili-
ties developed. The best Abel could do was to get a compro-
mise agreement that on his return to New York he should
secretly observe Hayhanen's performance for a while with-
out revealing that he was back. They disclosed to him for
this purpose the Eugene Maki cover name and his Newark
address.
S 23
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
A final point of conflict with the headquarters staff was the
matter of setting up transmitting equipment in New York.
They argued down his objections, gave him a refresher course
in radio techniques, and told him they already had an opera-
tor en route. He agreed to take more vigorous action on his
return.28 Thus settling his official business, he managed to
spend most of his time during the remainder of 1955 with his
wife and daughter, a delightful foretaste of his coming retire-
ment. Toward the end of the year there arrived a message
which Hayhanen had dispatched though his courier Asko:
he had given up attempts at surveillance of that suspect agent
whose house Mark had shown him in Queens, because surveil-
lance was too obvious in such a suburban district; but he
had delivered the $5,000 to Helen Sobell. That last was a
tricky job involving some risk, thought Abel; perhaps the
man has something in him after all.
Back in New York after the turn of 1956, Abel with some
distaste set his agents to make a full check on Eugene Maki.
They found immediately that he had indeed rented a store-
apartment suitable for a photo shop and had opened a bank
account, giving his occupation as "color photographer." But
the details of his life in Newark, as they were gradually re-
vealed, grew less and less favorable. He had made no further
attempt to activate the photographic business, as far as could
be found. He had a woman named Hanna living in the apart-
ment with him as his wife. He rarely went out alone; she was
almost always with him. They had a reputation in the neigh-
borhood for keeping a slovenly house and drinking constantly.
There were rumors that they dabbled in narcotics, perhaps
not just as stock in trade. Maki had never applied for mem-
bership in any of the Finnish clubs in the New York area.
There was no evidence of operational activity.29
Abel reported all this to Moscow in early April. Meanwhile
Moscow, as he later ? learned, having received an inquiry from
Helen Sobell about her $5,000, had sent Maki a request for full
particulars on how he had passed the money to her. Showing
continued trust in him, however, they had also furnished him
the name and photograph of a potential courier, a member
of a foreign airline crew, whom he should meet at a theater
in Queens after an exchange of notes in a message bank there.
Maki had failed to make this contact, but had sent a message
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Colonel Abel's Assistant SECRET
describing how he passed the $5,000 to Helen Sobell through
an intermediary on September 15 last year.30 Moscow had in-
structed him to make a new contact with Helen to arrange a
joint check on this intermediary, and Maki had pleaded that
it was too dangerous.
Moscow now informed Abel of all this and asked his recom-
mendations. Abel replied in May: he had checked the Bear
Mountain caches and found them empty; Maki had just moved
to Peekskill, to a house he had bought last September and
had renovated; 31 he recommended that Helen Sobell be given
another $5,000 and that Maki be recalled for interrogation
about the source of his funds for buying the house, about the
woman Hanna, and about his operational activities or lack
thereof.
Moscow was cautious. There was evidently some bad blood
between Maki and Abel. It was quite possible that the un-
proved intermediary had taken the Sobell money. The neigh-
borhood stories from Newark were inconclusive; they could be
inventions, or a smoke-screen for cover. Finally, if Maki had
indeed turned bad, it would be well to hold off and find out
what compromising associations he may have built up. Svirin
would be coming home in October; he could do some investi-
gating first. In the meantime Abel could reestablish contact
with Maki and keep him under observation. They authorized
a new payment to Helen Sobell.32
Abel was annoyed. Recontacting Maki in July, he told him
that since his photographic enterprise had flopped he had bet-
ter apply now to Moscow for home leave; he had talked to
them about it while he was there, he said. He added rather
pointedly that while waiting for an answer Maki could make
another contact with Helen Sobell so that Abel himself could
personally give her the new payment of $5,000. As Abel ex-
pected, Maki stalled around on that assignment. Abel tried
to keep him busy as a chauffeur, notably in searching out a
suitable spot for the radio transmitter, although the promised
? operator never arrived.
Exit Maki; Exit Abel
In October Moscow was convinced by Svirin's report 33 that
they had a bad egg in Maki, but they were relieved that appar-
ently no one else was involved. They now agreed with alacrity
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
to his home leave. Abel wanted him to go right away, taking
the Mexican route which didn't require a passport, but Maki,
stalling and with Hanna's security in mind, insisted on apply-
ing for one. Abel, concerned at having Maki running around
loose for more weeks or months, tried to get him to come live
with him in a hotel. Maki gave the excuse that ever since he'd
been hauled in on a traffic charge last summer he'd been de-
tecting signs of surveillance on him, probably the FBI or nar-
cotics agents, and he didn't want to risk compromising a sec-
ond man. Abel didn't believe him, but to be on the safe side
promised to forge him a birth certificate to support a new
identity in case Eugene Maki had to disappear.34
The passport was issued early in December, but Maki stalled
about leaving. He was getting worried: Mark was so curt now,
and Moscow noncommittal. As if aware of his fears, Mark
told him Moscow had sent notification that he was being pro-
moted to Lieutenant Colonel. In January 1957 Moscow, now
impatient, told Abel to get Maki under way. Abel again
wanted him to go via Mexico, but Maki, still stalling, insisted
on asking Moscow's approval for departure from New York
by ship. Moscow, leaning over backward not to alarm him,
agreed and told Abel not to see him any more; they would
handle him themselves from here on out. They were afraid
that Abel's stiff hostility might precipitate a bolt.
Abel had a final meeting with Maki in February, to give him
the forged copy of an Oregon birth certificate. In emergency
Maki would become Lauri Arnold Ermas, born in 1920 in Port-
land. On the eve of his departure from the States he should
leave notification of his ETD and mode of travel in a magnetic
container on the railing of a Prospect Park fence; Abel would
check this bank for it every Friday. They said goodbye with
forced cordiality, each with suspicion of the other in his eyes.
Maki-Hayhanen embarked, finally, on the S.S. Liberte on
April 24. Moscow watched his progress anxiously. The ship
docked at Le Havre on April 30. On May 2, as scheduled, the
Soviet Commercial Mission in Paris received a telephone query
in Russian : "Can I send two parcels to Russia through the
Morey firm?" On May 3 at 10 a.m., as scheduled and confirmed
by the telephone call, the man in the blue tie with red stripes
appeared at the Chardon Lagache Metro station. He asked
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Colonel Abel's Assistant SECRET
for a travel advance, and was given it. He was told to take a
train to Munich and thence a plane to West Berlin, where he
could cross over to the east sector on the elevated. There he
should telephone to 502805 between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. and ask
for Mr. Wojchek. Regardless of the answer, he should be at
the Kaulert photo shop at 7:00 p.m., where someone would
address him as "Andrey Stepanovich."
On the evening of May 3 Hayhanen was seen to walk, as
scheduled, down the Avenue Victor Hugo. There was no news-
paper in his pocket. Good; that meant that he would proceed
as arranged to Berlin. But in Berlin the imaginary Mr. Woj-
chek waited in vain for his telephone call on May 5. Again on
May 6 nothing. KGB officers all over Europe were alerted.
But by the time they found out where Hayhanen was he was
beyond their reach, in the solicitous hands of the Americans,
recounting his years of training that ripened to this rotten-
ness and betraying the lifetime service of another at its very
close.
Hayhanen had known his boss only as "Mark," and didn't
know where he lived in Brooklyn or the address of his studio.
But he could tell enough about the studio from his conversa-
tions with Mark for the American authorities to identify it.
Surveillance was mounted on it. When the radioed warning
came that his erstwhile assistant was missing, Emil Goldfus
disappeared. Martin Collins moved from hotel to hotel, get-
ting ready to leave the country. But the studio still had to
be made as sterile as possible: he had to take his chances and
go back to Fulton Street. Thereafter he knew he had picked
up an ineluctable tail. He couldn't shake it long enough to
board a train or ship or plane. Early on the morning of the
summer solstice, 1957, still in his nightshirt in a room at the
Latham Hotel, Collins-Abel was arrested. He hasn't talked.
In the federal penitentiary at Atlanta they prize his skill
with things electric and mechanical, his quiet helpfulness,
his paintings and designs for prison Christmas cards.
1. The Komitet Informatsyy was not dissolved until 1952, but some of
its functions were transferred back to the MOB as early as Decem-
ber 1948.
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
2. "Big Shot" was Abel's nickname for a high-level official sent to
New York early in 1953, apparently to break in as Abel's replace-
ment in the deep-cover residency. The 1948 antecedents to this
move are postulated here. Big Shot's penchant for fast cars is not
a matter of record.
3. Names and titles of RIS headquarters officials are presented here
with somewhat greater definitude than is actually established.
4. This is one of Hayhanen's several divergent explanations for having
sought a new certificate.
5. Whether Hayhanen was to start from scratch building up an agent
net or was to be turned over an existing net is a question com-
plicated by uncertainty as to his planned status in relation to
Abel. It may be that he was originally intended to report imme-
diately as Abel's assistant and take over the direction of some al-
ready active agents, but that some unforeseen circumstance-
conceivably "Big Shot's" presence-made it advisable to leave him
on his own for two years. For the purposes of this narrative it is
assumed that his independent operation was deliberately planned
as a test of his potential and as a means to build up a reserve
against the contingency that Big Shot might be ineffective or even
blow the Abel residency.
6. Hayhanen's recollection of the date and time of these monthly
appearances is not clear.
7. The contents of this message are inferred from Moscow's reply.
Hayhanen says it was a request for money without specifying the
amount or purpose.
8. Hayhanen's denial that he ever received the Moscow message
No. 1 can be viewed with some skepticism. Turned over to the
FBI after the newsboy discovered it, it was deciphered when
Hayhanen's defection provided the key.
9. Hayhanen insists that his operational activities were as slim as
herein described. Although his statement is taken at face value
for the purposes of this narrative, it is in fact open to considerable
doubt: it is hard to believe that Moscow would make so few
demands of an operative, be so entirely misled by him, or know-
ingly acquiesce in such a lack of production. Hayhanen talks
freely about many phases of his life and work, but some of the
information he did supply on operational activities had to be
elicited by repeated questioning.
10. This procedure was described for one of the meetings with Svirin,
not necessarily the first.
11. Precisely what business was transacted with Svirin is not known;
a supply of soft film may have been passed. Hayhanen did not
learn that the courier who serviced Svirin's drops was an "old
man" until Abel told him later.
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12. Hayhanen acknowledges only two meetings with Svirin but has
told conflicting stories, and the real number is uncertain. The
whole question of what role Soviet officers under official cover, like
Svirin, play with respect to deep-cover operations, whether merely
that of a communications channel or one including some kind of
supervisory function, is a critical one unresolved by the information
on this case. It is not known what business was actually transacted
at this fall meeting, either; the Asko message may have been
delivered by other means.
13. See note 9, above.
14. Although Abel is adept at graphic arts, it is questionable that he
personally did the forging herein credited to him.
15. The real Kayotis, an unstable person, it is said, won a large sum
gambling in the United States, left in mid-1947 for a three-year
European visit, and was last heard from in Lithuania. Abel says
he bought the Kayotis passport in Copenhagen for a thousand
dollars while on his way to the United States. Abel's story prob-
ably implies too casual a procedure for the documentation of
Soviet operatives: the Soviet authorities presumably acquired the
Kayotis passport by bribery, confiscation, or some such accident as
the narrative suggests, and furnished it to Abel in Moscow.
16. These things were found so concealed in 1957; they may not have
been kept thus in 1954.
17. Hayhanen says that Abel's microdots were better than his own, and
his own better than those he had been taught to make in Moscow.
But he has alluded also to smaller Moscow microdots made on a
special film of Soviet manufacture, and these may have been
the same as Abel's.
18. It was actually a year later, when Abel was in Moscow, that this
proposed transmitter was shown to him.
19. The type of car in which Big Shot had his accident is not in fact
recorded.
20. It seems illogical that Hayhanen would have admitted narcotics-
trade activity, whether as cover or not, to his new boss; but he
says that later he told Abel the fictitious story that he suspected
surveillance by narcotics agents.
21. This message, typed in English, was found in the bolt buried in
Hayhanen's basement; Hayhanen implausibly disclaims knowledge
of it. Since transmission of the message in plain text would be
irregular and insecure, this version is presumed to be Abel's
transcript from cipher, passed to Hayhanen when the case was
turned over to him. It was effective in obtaining a confession from
Sgt. Rhodes.
22. Abel's part and his motives in getting the case assigned to Hay-
hanen are a matter of supposition here.
23. Hayhanen has mentioned Chicago and Detroit installations as
general intelligence targets, not as an objective on this particular
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SECRET Colonel Abel's Assistant
24. Hayhanen had in fact taken Hanna with him, but there is no
evidence that Abel knew that he had not travelled alone.
25. Hypothetical explanation for this accident.
26. This friend is postulated as the reason for the forged credentials.
27.. The travel and contact procedure described here is reconstructed
from Abel's proposals for Hayhanen's travel and from evidence of
his own plans for escape from the country in 1957. His mode of
travel and points of contact in 1955 are not known.
28. The entire content of these Moscow discussions is hypothetical.
29. There is presumptive evidence that Abel made this investigation,
whether by agreement with headquarters or on his own initiative;
but there are considerations both in favor of the presumption and
against it. As illustrated in Hayhanen-Abel assignments and else-
where, it is Soviet practice to double-check on agents and opera-
tives. Abel was back in New York for full half a year before
getting in touch with his assistant, and did not reveal this fact
to him even afterwards. He could not have failed to become
quite suspicious of Hayhanen if only because of his alcoholism,
and it hardly seems credible that Hayhanen had kept Hanna
secret both from Abel and from Moscow all these years, as he
maintains. On the other hand, if this investigation was made and
it turned up evidence of his dissolute life with Hanna, as it would,
one might expect Moscow to have acted more promptly in recall-
ing him, and to have made sure as well that Hanna was not left in
New York free to tell whatever she knew. The narrative tries
to reconcile these opposing considerations as best it can.
30. What particulars Hayhanen actually invented to cover his em-
bezzlement is not known.
31. The dating of Hayhanen's purchase of the Peekskill house to
coincide with his exappropriation of the Sobell money is arbitrary.
He has said that he and Hanna recovered it in September and
spent it on hotels and liquor.
32. It is assumed in this narrative that the second $5,000 for Helen
Sobell was a replacement for the first, which Moscow must there-
fore have known was not received. It is possible, however, that
two different payments were intended. Under this supposition
Moscow's request for particulars on the method of passing the
first was a routine check, and a fully trusted Hayhanen was asked
to make a second contact with Helen for the purpose, presumably,
of passing more money.
33. The only positive indication that Svirin made such an investigation
and report is the apparent firming up of Moscow's decision on Hay-
hanen at the time of Svirin's return. If he did, the assignment
has a bearing on the relationship, discussed in note 12 above,
between Soviet official and deep-cover operatives.
34: See note 14.
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SECRET
On the importance of knowing
whether a foreign agent works
for money, ideals, venture, dig-
nity, or love, and what it is he
loves.
EXPERIENCE WITH TYPES OF AGENT
MOTIVATION
Paul Tollius
Late in World War II, as a young, relatively inexperienced
Chief of Station, I had an eye-opening introduction to human
motives for intelligence agentry. The young Moroccan wait-
ing in my office at the American Legation in Tangier was said
to have worked very successfully for the Germans in the past.
He was now offering to collaborate with the United States.
His motive for changing over, and indeed the condition at-
tached to his offer, he made clear, was that I do away with
his rival for the hand of a fair maiden living in Tetuan, over
in the Spanish zone. I thought he was joking, and must have
betrayed my incredulousness before I realized that he was
absolutely serious. I have to confess that our interview that
day failed to produce any plan for collaboration.
At our second meeting, however, I managed (without prom-
ising to do his unworthy rival in) to persuade him to furnish
some proof of his own worthiness, the good faith of his offer.
On the spot he tendered the information that 100 tons of
canned fish consigned to Germany were being stored under
our very noses, in a huge warehouse near the Legation. The
German intelligence services had bought it some time back,
he said, but as German and neutral ships had become scarcer
and scarcer they had not yet devised a way to get it to a Ger-
man port.
We found the fish, mostly tunny, just as he had described
it; but I never saw the agent again. The full story of his moti-
vation took some reconstructing. His original bloodthirsty
proposition may have been prompted by unwarranted conclu-
sions from the fact that another Moroccan who had worked
for the Germans had been found dead in the well on the prop-
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SECRET Agent Motivation
erty where I lived in Tangier. (I think he fell in trying to get
a drink.) When the agent realized from his first contact with
me that there was little likelihood of our literally wielding
the axe on his rival, he made us the instrument for as devas-
tating a blow as he was able to deliver him at the moment:
it was the rival's father, I learned later, when as Allied repre-
sentative I took over the German consular files in Spanish
Morocco, who had sold the fish to the Germans. They had
paid him, but left the fish for cover in his name, and he was
hoping against hope that it would never be delivered, that the
ending of the war would leave him with both the money and
the fish.
Motives and Results
The brief collaboration of my Moroccan did not justify any
great psychoanalytical effort on my part, but the motivation
of a continuing agent is, or should be, the subject of constant
study on the part of his case officer. Why is it, if we are get-
ting the desired results out of an agent, that we worry about
his motivation? Given the complexity of human behavior,
you may say, the determination of any but the most super-
ficial motives is a job for an expert, and if we like what the
agent is producing we shouldn't particularly care why he pro-
duces it.
Maybe we shouldn't, until something goes wrong; but if we
don't, by then it is likely to be too late. Results, the take from
an operation, are without question a primary consideration,
but so is the agent's possible dissaffection if it should result
in :his passing our information to the enemy. And even short
of that extreme, unless a case officer knows what it is that
drives his agent he cannot know to what lengths the man
will go, freely or under pressure, what risks he is willing to
take, at what point he will break, tell another intelligence
service what he is doing, or simply stop producing. Perhaps
nothing is really more important than learning just why an
agent is willing to take the chances entailed in clandestine
activity. And the closer the case officer comes to a true assess-
ment of his agent's motivation, the more likely that he will
be able to run a successful, long-term operation.
The experience of almost twenty years in the active han-
dling of agents has begun to provide us with a body of knowl-
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edge about their psychology from which it should be possible
to draw certain generalizations. Despite the complexity of
the subject, several types of needs or wants which lead men
to become agents can be distinguished and described. There
is the ideologically motivated agent, a kind that was not diffi-
cult to find during the war. There is the seeker for personal
security-often, after the defeat of Germany, the same agent
who had earlier been motivated by the highest principles.
There is the agent pursuing one aspect or another of financial
gain, the camp-follower of intelligence networks since primi-
tive man first spied on enemy tribes. There is the adventurer,
the hater, the criminal, the patriot, the man driven by reli-
gious zeal.
Ethically, the motives can be noble, crass, or base, and I
believe this moral scale is not without useful application in
the assessment of an agent. A few case histories may serve
to show how the value of an operation is affected by the char-
acter of the agent's motivation and by our understanding it.
The "Practical" Mercenary
The agent who is working for purely "practical" reasons-
money-can be expected to play it practical all the way. And
one eminently practical step he can take is to keep the intelli-
gence service or the police of his own country informed of
what he is doing, as a kind of insurance policy against the
chief occupational hazard of spying. This is why the "fear-
less" agent is suspect. It is not man's normal nature to be
free of fear when he is doing dangerous work. Although an
occasional agent who frightens you by his disregard for his
own-and unfortunately your own-security is fearless simply
because he is not well balanced, the lack of fear is most often
due to "reinsurance" with the local service. And it is not
long before the agent who is in touch with his own service
begins to wonder what the Russians or another Communist
service would pay for what he knows. If he doesn't get the
idea by himself, his local service is likely to give him guidance
and help in establishing contact with other services and
agents.
There may, of course, be practical reasons for not taking
out this insurance. Testing one agent who claimed, and per-
haps had convinced himself, that he was not working for the
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Agent Motivation
money but out of patriotism-many mercenaries will not ad-
mit their true motivation-I posed him a theoretical question,
ostensibly about one of my other agents. "Why," I asked,
"didn't this man, since he was working solely for money, go
to the police of his country and tell them about his activity
as a means of `reinsurance'?" "Oh," he replied, "the police
would have made him turn over most of his pay to them."
This danger, I am certain, that the police, corrupt in many
countries of the world, would demand a large cut, is the only
deterrent preventing a good many mercenary agents from
keeping the local police or intelligence service fully informed.
The Ideological Zealot
Among the ideologically inspired agents plentiful during and
for a time after the war, of particular interest were the anti-
Franco Spaniards, and especially those of Socialist bent, those
whose frustration and pent-up fury had been wreaked on the
Communists during the last grim defense of Madrid. Case
officers who recruited Spanish Socialist agents early in World
War II from the refugee camps in French Africa have at-
tested to their vitality and devotion to the Allied cause. Most
Spanish Socialists with whom I became acquainted were moti-
vated by the expectation that the Allies would finish their
wartime job by effecting Franco's downfall. A chain of these
men with whom I came in contact in 1945 lived with the hope
that their efforts would culminate in the defeat and destruc-
tion not only of Hitler but of the dictatorship in Spain. These
agents worked unsparingly and with fervor.
In 1950, when I renewed contact with groups of these agents,
I at first found their motivation cooled but their work still
sustained by the same hope. When in 1946 the U.N. countries
had recalled their ambassadors from Franco Spain, there had
been general elation and a feeling among them that their
objective was finally in sight. But in October 1950 the United
States and other U.N. powers resumed diplomatic relations
with Franco. Now the bottom fell out of these agents' moti-
vation.
Their disillusion soon began to color their work. A close
scrutiny of their efforts as reflected in their reports revealed
a substantial falling off in both the quality and the volume
of information produced. As good case officers, we made every
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effort to revitalize their spirit and motivate them anew. This
effort continued for several years, until a final assessment
convinced us that the spark was gone, the desire to work for
U.S. intelligence no longer there. Not only in these Social-
ists: other Spanish republican elements scattered around the
world, particularly in France and Latin America, had also lost
heart. Our worst problem was with those who remained
agents, in spite of having concluded that the fight was over,
for entirely practical considerations, the necessity of earning
a livelihood. Continuing to go through the motions and in
some instances camouflaging their disinterest, they were
harder to assess and more troublesome to terminate when
their contribution had become of questionable value.
The Patriot, Bound by Personal Tie
An agent whom I had inherited from another U.S. agency
seemed a questionable individual. We were in great doubt
about his true reason for working for the United States and
had some reason to believe that his close acquaintance with
Communist leaders in his country might mean, not that he
represented a penetration of the Party on our part, but that
he was a Communist agent. I was constantly pushing him
to prove by the revelation of Communist Party secrets that
he was in fact on our side. We spent the better part of a
year in close fencing over this issue, and during this time I
took great care about what leads were given him.
In 1948, a revolution, rather bloody for his peace-loving Med-
iterranean country, broke out. He was in the midst of the
fighting and obviously very close to the Communist element
which bore the brunt of the battle. Before the final scrim-
mages in which the Communist element was routed, the agent
sought refuge in my home. I hid him for some three days.
Whether because his presence was suspected or because of a
lot of sniping was coming from the direction of my house,
I was called on by armed riflemen wanting to search the house.
I told them in a voice loud enough to be heard by the agent
in hiding that I could not permit them to search the home
of an American diplomat but that as I had nothing to hide
I would be glad to have them in and talk with them. They
were young boys, obviously nervous with a rifle, more friendly
than hostile.
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SECRET Agent Motivation
They came in and I brought out a dozen cans of American
beer. The beer was a happy choice, something they had not
had and all that was needed to distract them. They were
much more interested in carrying this loot off to their com-
rades than in searching the house. They were in such a
hurry to go that one young man forgot his rifle and I had
to call him back for it. A few days later, in a jeep with license
plates bearing the American flag, I drove the agent about a
hundred miles into the back country to his father-in-law's
home. He emerged when things had quieted down and re-
turned to work.
Whatever his leanings may have been before, this agent
never forgot his rescue from a precarious situation. Before
this incident, he told me years later, he had felt that the
United States never trusted him and he therefore had little
reason to trust us. He feared that we were even capable of
exposing him to the Communists. Throughout the next ten
years he proved beyond doubt his devotion and honest intent
to serve the aims of U.S. intelligence.
Double Agent or Regenerate Adventurer?
An agent's motivation can be changed, either by circum-
stances or through the efforts of an interested and patient
case officer. Some of the less desirable motive forces-money-
hunger, hatred, love of adventure, fear-can be redirected and
tempered by a careful program of indoctrination designed to
bring out whatever finer purposes the agent has. Even the
motivation of the enemy-controlled agent can be and has been
changed through this process combined with a demonstration
of superior tradecraft. It is surprising to see the effect on a
double agent, one whose whole aim has been to serve his Rus-
sian master faithfully, when he comes to believe that the U.S.
case officer is the superior of his Russian handler. This su-
perior skill, coupled with bits of intelligence calculated to con-
vince him that we know infinitely more about him and the
Russian than he ever suspected, causes him to wonder whether
he is working for the wrong or losing side.
It is often necessary to work with an agent when the direc-
tion of his primary allegiance is not clear and his motivation
difficult to fathom. One such agent came to our attention
by virtue of his contact with a known Soviet intelligence offi-
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Agent Motivation SECRET
cer. Our preliminary investigation of him had not even
begun when it was reported from another area that the man
had come in and told the story of his work for the Soviet case
officer. He came quite clean, a fact verified by close surveil-
lance and substantiated by his willingness to help entrap the
Soviet case officer and get him declared persona non grata.
He admitted freely, however, that his walking in to confess
was mostly a means of buying insurance with the authorities
of his own and the U.S. government. It was also, although
he did not say so, a means for protecting his job with a
steamship line which regularly called at U.S. ports.
Probably the best present test for double agentry is a close
analysis of the importance of the agent's take and the sensi-
tivity of the target to which he has access. There are few
intelligence services today that willingly give a double agent
access to highly sensitive material. Now a close scrutiny of
the use of this agent by the Russians led us to believe that
they may have planned that he eventually become an un-
witting double agent. The peculiarity of the requirements
given him-the procurement of unclassified material with
limited commercial distribution, for example, material the So-
viets could get through any number of contacts-led us to
the conclusion that they were being used for test assignments.
Further, the usually penurious Soviets seemed eager to pay
exorbitant prices for this material, evidence that they believed
the agent's motivation to be monetary and were building up
in him a dependence on his new income. The superficial So-
viet conclusion that the agent was motivated by greed was
derived from his having bargained hard when first contacted,
rationalizing his act in working for an unfriendly service with
the justification that if he made them pay enough his crime
would become honorable or at least forgivable.
While it was evident that this agent needed money and that
this need motivated him, motivation is rarely simple, compris-
ing only one element. It is as complicated as human nature,
and changes with changing circumstances. This man had got
along without money for a long time, and fundamentally he
was not the type to whom money meant much. When he had
it he spent it; when broke he cut down to cigarettes and coffee.
His fixed weekly pay from the steamship line covered the sup-
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SECRET Agent Motivation
port of his estranged wife and children. He must, we thought,
be driven by some more compelling motive.
We kept the agent under close observation, using surveil-
lance and technical means. It gradually became apparent
that he considered his life to date pretty much a shambles.
His two marriages had ended in failure. Although he was
easily successful with women, now in middle age the fascina-
tion of the chase was gone. In a less than morose or despond-
ent stock-taking of his own worthwhileness, he had apparently
concluded that his ledger was heavily weighted on the debit
side.
We could only theorize, on the basis of our study, that he
wanted somehow to do something worth while for himself and
country. By chance he had become involved in a rather shady
business which he finally recognized as an opportunity to do
something against the Russians and for the West. This was
the only solid reason we could find for his decision to carry
on in the work. And if eyebrows should be raised at this con-
clusion, it can be added that he also needed money, the most
common motivation of the cold-war agent, and that he was
intrigued at the idea of being a "spy."
Was this enough to explain what made him tick? It would
have to be, for the present, until the rope from which all
agents dangle became so short as to reveal his soul. Sooner
or later we would know, but probably not for a good long time,
perhaps not until after his termination.
The Hungerer after Recognition
An intelligent European exiled from his native land had
become through his ability and hard work a kind of financial
seer in his adopted country. He was an intense, strange per-
son whose driving force permitted him no rest and whose com-
plex character defied analysis. He was recruited by a case
officer who spoke his native tongue and was able to develop
with him a personal rapport that made for successful working
relationships. Among other things, this officer didn't mind
that the agent dictated his reports, using him as secretary.
On the departure of this case officer the agent was turned
over to a younger, less experienced one, who had been born
with a silver spoon in his mouth. At bottom democratic and
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Agent Motivation C RE?
basically unaffected, he nevertheless usually left an impres-
sion of aloofness and perhaps condescension on many less well
born. This new case officer found it unpalatable to act as a
secretary. In meeting after meeting he cajoled the agent to
write out his reports. He tried every trick and gimmick to
this end. While the agent became more and more taciturn
and stubborn, the officer grew increasingly determined that
he would get him to write rather than dictate. A year of
effort along these lines ended in making a once productive
operation barren.
With a view to salvaging this operation a complete reassess-
ment of the agent was now made. A careful scrutiny led to
the conclusion that the agent's work for us was based largely on
a desire to be accepted as an equal by the service. He also
wanted to be accepted in the American community and in
diplomatic circles. He needed this recognition both for its
own sake and as a means of expanding his business contacts.
If this analysis was correct, he should respond to carefully
arranged invitations to cocktail parties of the local govern-
ment and diplomatic set. A new case officer who could ar-
range such invitations was assigned, and he effected a com-
plete about-face on the part of the agent. The question of
dictating reports was never brought up, and after each party
the reports began to flow as never before.
Motivation Misemployed
This is the case of Mr. X, exiled one-time general secretary
of a European Communist Party, who in his late fifties showed
the physical toll of a life divided between open and under-
ground struggle but remained a mental giant beside the pig-
mies then leading the Party he had led. X was a short, bent,
burly, grey-haired myopic, shambling along on his cane, whose
very quietness seemed a veil to cover the dangerous quality
lurking in a slowed and greying but still fierce bear.
He had challenged Stalin's high-handedness and come out
only slightly scarred. He had been held a prisoner for some
months in Moscow, but was finally released to return home.
Ultimately he broke with the Kremlin. His brother-in-law,
who had also been released from prison in Moscow, with con-
siderably less prudence continued his Party contacts. In a
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Agent Motivation
street rendezvous with Kremlin agents in a Western Euro-
pean city he was stabbed to death.
Now Stalin was dead and the Soviets wanted X back. Since
leaving the Communist Party he had become an important
left-wing Socialist. The Kremlin bosses, X concluded, wanted
to replace the Party leaders in his native land. These had
been hand-picked by Stalin and were undoubtedly somewhat
suspect.
A contact of mine who was a close friend of X called on me
urgently one day to report that an important Soviet official
had visited X. The Russian had offered him a trip to Moscow
to talk things over with a view to resuming the Party leader-
ship in his country. X had turned the proposition down. My
contact believed, however, that he could get him to reconsider
and accept with U.S. backing. Controlled general secretaries
are not easy to come by; X was worth a real try.
Every means we could muster and many hours of work and
planning went into this venture. It was of no avail: X would
not go back. He feared he would meet the same fate as his
brother-in-law if the Russians ever got him into the Soviet
Union. He was eager to establish himself favorably in the
eyes of the West but gave good reasons why he could not
undertake this operation:
If he went back and even became general secretary again,
he would still have to do as the Kremlin told him on all
major matters. He was sure that a general secretary
was only a puppet.
He no longer believed in Communism and would soon be
found out by the Kremlin.
He would do nothing that might reflect on his sincerity and
dedication to socialism or that could unfavorably affect
his role in a new government in his country. It was in
the cards that sooner or later a new government would
be formed in which socialism would, after an interim, play
an important if not dominant role.
He was mortally afraid of the Russians.
X did agree to another Russian proposal, a meeting in
France or Italy to discuss their plan, and was willing to go
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Agent Motivation
with U.S. backing if we had a distinct prior understanding
that he would accept no Russian proposal to return to the
fold. This opportunity to explore exactly what the Russians
had in mind was deemed not worth to the United States the
cost of a round trip for X and his wife. It was rejected, and
this was the end of the X affair.
It should have been fairly evident to us from the first meet-
ing with X that he could not be induced to go back to Com-
munism by our glowing offers. Although he worked for a
living, money was no inducement. He had no burning desire
for revenge, nor was he attracted by the possibility of deceiv-
ing the Russians. From our viewpoint his motivation was
negative. His having no children or close relatives blocked
another channel through which some agents can be enticed.
For this operation his basic interests were diametrically op-
posed to our desires.
Nevertheless we had doggedly persisted. In insisting on the
all which X refused we ended up with nothing. We failed to
develop the obviously more realistic opportunity to use X as
a key man and continuing bait for the Russians. Surely what
the Russians had really planned was to use him as a penetra-
tion of the Socialist Party; this must have been the main
reason they wished to rehabilitate him. And X had been
agreeable to a working arrangement which might even have
given us time to create a motive he did not now have. We
failed because we did not understand the motivation of the
agent; we had lost sight of the agent's own desires. If X had
been a weaker character and we had been able to persuade
him to accept the Russian offer, it would have been a sorry
affair indeed.
Ethics and Pragmatics
These cases illustrate how motives noble, crass, and base
are made to serve intelligence objectives, but not with equal
value. It can be argued that full control of an agent is more
readily achieved if he is motivated by some base desire or
want: the unprincipled man soon compromises himself, ex-
poses himself to blackmail, or falls subject to some other
hold. It is my view that no type of crook can be trusted
and that the best agents will be found among those who are
moved by the nobler purposes.
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Some intelligence officers scoff at motivation based on friend-
ship and respect, feeling that neither is necessary or even de-
sirable. As each case is a matter for the individual agent and
the individual officer, it is certainly true that operations have
been run in which even hostility was the order of the relation-
ship between them. There are agents considered so low and
despicable by the case officer that the working relationship has
been reduced to pure physical control and intimidation. In
my view, these agents won't last, are the source of many double
agents, and are intrinsically unworthy of the time and money
they cost. The crass and base desires, perhaps good enough
for the short haul, are not of the stuff that will pay off over
any prolonged period of time.
The higher motives, such as ideological zeal for U.S. objec-
tives, patriotism, a parent's aspirations for his children, or
religious devotion, are extremely reliable ones. In my own
experience the best agent motivation has been his respect for
the case officer and friendship with him, backed by an identity,
even if not a total one, between his aims and the basic aims of
the United States and its allies. There can be no question, even
among those who may think these views ingenuous, that the
case officer must know as nearly as possible what it is that
drives his agent on.
42 SEc
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CONFIDENTIAL
How a set of mathematical
curves and formulas can be
used to convert data derived
from the still photograph of a
new whirlybird to specifica-
tions for its performance in
action.
THE CALCULATION OF SOVIET HELICOPTER
PERFORMANCE
Theodore A. George
The chariness of the Soviets in disclosing facts about their
military establishment and the technical characteristics of
their equipment extends even to items not used primarily for
military purposes. Despite stringent security, however, they
are not able to continue concealing a new item once it is in
series production and has been issued in quantity to field
units. Recognizing this fact, they finally relax to the extent
of demonstrating new equipment they have in service at such
public affairs as the May Day Parade, attended by all foreign
military attaches stationed in Moscow. Or alternatively, a
picture of a new item may appear in a Soviet military journal
over some such caption as "Another Great Proletarian
Achievement" or "The Highest Performance in the World."
The U.S. technical intelligence analyst thus finds before him
one or more photographs of some new item of equipment along
with a terse Soviet description of it implying that it has suc-
cessfully passed user tests and may actually be in production.
This is of course not enough. Its performance and charac-
teristics must be determined as accurately as possible if its
influence on Soviet military capabilities is to be properly
gauged. The analyst can prod the field collector with require-
ments and wait for more information to come in. On the
basis of his appreciation of the Soviet state-of-the-art in the
new item's field, he can meanwhile make some guess as to
what its performance should be. But on many important
items he can do much more, and does. By assembling all the
available information, obtaining dimensions from an accurate
scaling of the photographs, and making certain assumptions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL Helicopter Performance
if necessary, he proceeds systematically to calculate the prob-
able performance of the new piece of Soviet military equip-
ment. This article shows by way of example how the prin-
ciples of mathematics and engineering can be applied to es-
timate the performance of a new Soviet helicopter.
Required Data
The helicopter is a very complex machine, comprising a
myriad of moving parts, black boxes, and structural members.
Since, however, the principles of helicopter engineering are
well understood and the laws of nature apply as inexorably
in the USSR as in other parts of the world, it is possible, re-
lying to some extent on U.S. developmental experience, to ar-
rive at a number of significant conclusions about a Soviet heli-
copter from its outward appearance. The first step is to ob-
tain accurate dimensions by scaling one or more good photo-
graphs. Some of the more important dimensions to be ob-
tained are the aircraft's total length, its landing gear dimen-
sions, the diameter of its rotor or rotors, and its rotor blade
root chord and tip chord length (the width of the blades at
their inner and outer ends). From these dimensions can be
derived a number of values which will be needed in subse-
quent calculations-the area of individual rotor blades, the
area of the rotor disc (the whole circle swept by the rotor),
the rotor solidity ratio (total blade area divided by disc area),
and the cross-section areas of various parts of the aircraft.
The outward appearance of the helicopter should also help to
establish whether it is powered by a gas turbine or a recipro-
cating engine and will show whether it has single, twin, co-
axial, or tandem rotors.
All information about the aircraft obtained from other
sources, overt and covert, is now assembled and recorded in
table form. Two important additional specifications needed
are engine horsepower (rating for normal continuous opera-
tion and for take-off) and the linear speed of rotor blade tips.
But if reliable information on these is not available they can
usually be estimated: the rotor disc area will usually give an
indication of the engine horsepower of a helicopter of given
size, and the speed of sound constitutes for the rotor tip speed
an upper limit which cannot be approached (even in forward
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Helicopter Performance CONFIDENTIAL
flight) without undesirable air compression and separation
effects. The type of rotor and its blade and disc area will
also show the gross weight of the aircraft.
Weights and Payload
Having assembled the above information, obtainable with
some interpolation from a good photograph, the analyst can
now calculate probable performance values. His first compu-
tation, in my judgment, should be the weight of the helicopter
empty. This he determines by aggregating the weights of its
various sections and component parts, specifically the rotor
blades, rotor hub assembly, body group, landing gear, engine
section, power plant, power plant accessories, rotor mast,
transmission drive shaft, transmission, starting system, cool-
ing system, lubrication system, fuel system, instruments,
flight control equipment, electrical system, furnishings, and
communication equipment. Established mathematical ex-
pressions for the weight of each of these components in terms
of the specifications determined above have been shown by sta-
tistical analysis to yield sufficiently accurate results. For
example, the weight of the main transmission for a single
overhead rotor powered by a reciprocating engine is 0.081
464 TIPM Rl0.88
VT J , where HPnz is the take-off horsepower rating
C
of the engine, R is the rotor disc radius, and VT is the rotor tip
speed. Similar expressions have been established for each of
the other sections, and the sum of these is the weight of the
aircraft empty.
This net weight may now be subtracted from the previously
determined gross weight to give a figure for the useful load,
comprising the load of fuel, the weight of the crew, and the
payload. The fuel weight can be calculated from the range of
the helicopter, or if this is unknown it can be assumed at
approximately 200 nautical miles, the average range of most
modern helicopters. The number of crew members, usually
one to three, can be estimated from the size of the aircraft,
and each can be taken to weigh with his personal equipment
200 pounds. The useful load less the weight of fuel and crew
is the payload, and we have thus obtained our first important
performance value.
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CONFIDENTIAL Helicopter Performance
Ceilings, Speed, and Climb
In order to establish the hover ceiling for the helicopter,
the altitude it can maintain without forward flight, it is
necessary to plot two curves, power. required against altitude
and power available against altitude; the altitude at which
these curves intersect is the hover ceiling. The power avail-
able diminishes with altitude, the gradient of the curve de-
pending on the type of engine in the aircraft. Plotting data
can be obtained from any standard propulsion handbook. The
power required, on the other hand, increases with altitude.
The same factors apply to propulsion forward, and similar
curves can be used to obtain the maximum and normal cruis-
ing speeds at any given altitude.
The graphs developed for obtaining the hover ceiling and
forward speed can also be used for calculating the vertical and
maximum rates of climb. The maximum is attained in for-
ward motion because the power required for forward flight is
less than that required for hover. The rate of climb is a
function of the surplus power available under given operating
conditions, and the maximum rate of climb can be expressed
mathematically as 33000,7 y (2_BhPMIN) , where is propulsive
efficiency, ahp is power available, W is gross weight, and BhpMIN
is the minimum power required for forward flight under any
conditions. The rate of climb thus calculated can be used
further to establish absolute and service ceilings for the craft.
The absolute ceiling is reached when the maximum rate of
further climb is zero, and the service ceiling is defined as the
point where rate of climb drops to 100 feet per minute. The
altitudes at which the available and required levels of power
satisfy the equations 33000r ahp _ BhpMIN
Y ~ (W )=0 and =100 are
therefore the absolute and service ceilings respectively.
Range and Endurance
There are a number of performance values which depend
on fuel consumption rate. These include range (longest one-
way flight), radius (round trip with stop), endurance (time
in the air), cruising speed for maximum range, and cruising
speed for maximum endurance. These values can be obtained
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from the performance curves already determined plus the
SFC/BHP curve (specific fuel consumption vs brake horse-
power developed) of the engine. Since a SFC/BHP curve for
this particular engine is not usually available, a curve typical
for its power and type (reciprocating or gas turbine) can be
obtained from a propulsion data handbook. This assumption
is not likely to lead to any serious error.
The cruise fuel rate in pounds of fuel per pound of gross
weight per hour \dd F/ can now be expressed as a curve plotted
against forward speed. The minimum value of dF will coin-
cide with the velocity (and corresponding power setting) for
maximum endurance; and a tangent to the curve from the
point of origin will indicate the velocity and fuel rate for maxi-
mum range. If the amount of fuel carried by the aircraft is
known or can be determined (e.g., from the size of the fuel
tanks), the range and radius can be calculated from these
results. Conversely, however, the range of the helicopter can
frequently be assumed to be 200 nautical miles and the amount
of fuel it must carry can then be determined by reverse proc-
ess. The radius of a helicopter is usually less than half the
range because of fuel consumption in the second warm-up and
take-off for the return trip.
There are a number of other performance values which
are of considerable importance in estimating the effectiveness
of a helicopter in service. Some of these, such as life expec-
tancy of component parts and time required for overhaul, can
not be determined by analytical methods, but only by testing
the aircraft under field operating conditions. Others, such as
stability and control values, can be found by calculation but
in my opinion do not warrant the effort required. The fact
that the Soviets have decided to mass-produce a given heli-
copter model is sufficient indication that it responds to its
control instruments with reasonable promptness and that
it does not suffer from serious aerodynamic instability.
Lengthy computations to arrive at these conclusions are
hardly necessary.
The principal calculations made in estimating Soviet heli-
copter performance are therefore those outlined above in very
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abbreviated summary. The summary outline will have been
enough, I hope, to show the reader how, with relatively little
to go on, it is possible to arrive at significant conclusions
about a new Soviet model. The performance values thus ob-
tained are of course mere approximations, which should ac-
cordingly be used only in the absence of more reliable data. As
soon as overt or covert collection media can furnish dependable
information, the calculated values should be discarded in favor
of more accurate figures based on observation or actual tests
of the aircraft.
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SECRET
Describes the system of hand-
writing analysis currently used
by intelligence for operational
assessment.
GRAPHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT IN ACTION
James Van Stappen
The two articles on handwriting analysis which appeared
in the Summer 1959 issue of the Studies' debated its validity
as an assessment technique without making reference to a
graphological service that has been most successfully ren-
dered to intelligence operations for the past several years.
The purpose of the present article is to describe the system
used in this service and indicate the nature of its results, in
the hope that a sketch of graphology in operation will help dis-
pel the confused mists which surprisingly still shroud the
whole subject.
Contrary to popular opinion, a top-flight graphologist is not
a product of the world of Swami, but rather a graduate in
psychology of at least one first-line university, probably hav-
ing done postgraduate work of a clinical nature. Usually he
has obtained this schooling in Europe.2 All German univer-
sities now make a basic course in graphology prerequisite for
"Handwriting Analysis as an Assessment Aid," by Keith Laycock,
and "The Assessment of Graphology," by E. A. Rundquist, pp. 23-51.
2 A representative international list of universities where graphology
is taught would include the following:
University of Hamburg, Germany-Prof. Dr. med. Rudolf Pophal
University of Munich, Germany-Prof. Dr. Lutz Wagner
University of Freiburg L Breisgau, Germany-Dr. F. Kaeser-Hof-
stetter. (Institut f. Psychologie & Charakterologie-Prof. Dr.
Robert Heiss.)
Instituto di Indagini Psicologiche, Milano, Italy-Prof. Marco
Marchesan
Psychiatrische Klinik der Mediz. Akademie, Duesseldorf-Grafen-
berg, Germany-Dr. Gerhard Gruenewald
Psychologisches Institut der Universitaet Wien, Austria-Dr. H.
Rohracher
Institutet foer Tillampaed Psykologi, Saltsjobaden, Sweden
University of Berlin, Germany-Dr. W. H. Mueller
SECUT or Re 49
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SECRET Graphology In Action
a degree in psychology, and for those who wish to become
specialists in the field a two-year period of directed gradu-
ate work is required. This additional time is largely spent
analyzing original specimens of handwriting, experience for
which there is no substitute.
The scientific graphologist is rapidly becoming a sought-
after man. In most European countries he has been licensed
for years, and his services are required as a part of standard
operational procedure in personnel administration. The Fed-
eral Association of German Employers is one of his larger
subscribers in the commercial field, and his findings were em-
ployed in the selection of officer material from the ranks of
the German army during World War II. Even in the United
States, a long list of regular subscribers includes the Military
Prison at Fort Leavenworth, the Manhattan Children's Court
in Brooklyn, the National Hospital for Speech Disorders in
New York, and King's County Hospital in Brooklyn. In 1949
Columbia University granted a Ph.D. in Pure Science on the
basis of a thesis devoted to the analysis of deliquent chil-
dren's handwriting.
The Lewinson Method
The system we use in servicing intelligence operations is a
slightly improved and simplified form of one developed and
validated by Thea Stein Lewinson and Joseph Zubin in a
study 3 carried out at Columbia University, where Dr. Zubin
was Professor of Psychology. Their work came as the culmi-
nation of a trend toward statistical evaluation of handwriting
begun in 1925 by the great English expert on handwriting
identification, Robert Saudek, and carried on in this country
and in England by such scholars as Gordon W. Allport at
Harvard University and Philip E. Vermon at Cambridge,3 fol-
lowed by many others. The Lewinson-Zubin study demon-
strated statistically that handwriting alone could distinguish
between normal persons in good mental health and persons
suffering from any form of mental illness, and developed fur-
ther and tested a measurement and evaluation system that
was already being used by Mrs. Lewinson.
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Graphology In Action SECRET
The procedure cannot be fully described in the space avail-
able here, but a statement of the principles used and the sim-
plified presentation of a sample case will illustrate its main
features. For purposes of analysis by this method, hand-
writing is regarded as a formed line having three dimensions
(vertical, horizontal, and depth), in each of which it exhibits
a dynamic property of contraction, balance, or release.
Twenty-one major characteristics of this line are distin-
guished and grouped for measurement and evaluation into
four components as follows:
1. FORM COMPONENT
a) Ornamentation/simplification of form.
b) Contraction/amplification of contour.
c) Contraction/amplification of connecting form.
d) Thinness/broadness of stroke.
e) Sharpness/pastiness of stroke borders.
f) Tension/flabbiness of stroke.
II. VERTICAL COMPONENT
g) Height of middle zone.
h) Proportion of upper and lower zones to middle.
i) Direction and degree of deviation from horizon-
tal line.
j) Amount of fluctuation from horizontal.
k) Space between lines.
III. HORIZONTAL COMPONENT
1) Space between letters.
m) Breadth of letters.
n) Direction and degree of slant.
o) Amount of fluctuation in slant.
p) Left/right tendency (at margins and in letter
forms).
q) Distance between words.
r) Breadth of margins.
IV. DEPTH COMPONENT
s) Increase/decrease of pressure.
t) Extent of pressure control.
u) Depth/disappearance of connections.
SECRET 51
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SECRET Graphology In Action
Each of these 21 graphological elements is graded on a
seven-point scale, from +3 (representing maximum contrac-
tion) through 0 (representing balance) to -3 (representing
maximum release). The results are entered on a standard
work-sheet, the distribution of ratings within each compo-
nent is calculated, and a figure which might be called the
efficiency quotient is obtained by dividing the number of zero
ratings in each component by the number of those above and
below the balance point. These figures are the decimals en-
tered in parentheses on the right of the work-sheets shown
in Figure 1.
The distribution of ratings in each component is also plotted
as a graph to give a better visual picture of the dynamics of
the writing in these four respects, and a composite graph
summarizes the resultant tendencies of the whole. An inter-
pretation of the personality characteristics therein indicated
is then rendered in an analytical report of considerable
length. An analyst will work ten or twelve hours, plus or
minus fifty percent, on most specimens.
A Live Illustration
The interpretive aspect of the process is best illustrated
by a real case from our files. Each of the four analytic com-
ponents reflects a different aspect of character, but here, for
simplicity's sake, we shall examine only a personality's over-
all viability as shown in his efficiency quotients and in his
composite curve. The subject is an agent, a political criminal
in the eyes of his country's government, who has demon-
strated the stamina of his character in his actions. Escap-
ing from prison, an act which made him even more a "wanted"
main in the eyes of the security police, he would make no at-
tempt to leave the country but would continue his under-
ground activities until he was arrested again. Then he would
go back to prison and escape once more, and the entire proc-
ess would be repeated.
In 1956 his letters dating from 1949 were submitted to a
graphological analysis. Figure 1 a, of the two which we used
to illustrate the work-sheet, carries his early, normal read-
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Graphology In Action SECRET
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ability to bounce back, his final letters indicated a consider-
able degree of general breakdown. Note that the parentheti-
cal efficiency quotient has dropped in every component, and
the composite from 0.18 in 1949 to 0.13 in 1956. Figure 2 is
the corresponding graphic representation, the solid curves as
SF RF 53
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SECRET Graphology In Action
CASE NUMBER 5 3 _
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54
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Graphology In Action SECRET
of 1949 and the broken lines as of 1956. The readings for an
ideally well-balanced person yield a high convex normal dis-
tribution curve. Note how here the broken lines drop at the
center and lift at the ends relative to the solid lines, showing
an excess of both relaxation and tension and a serious tend-
ency toward inversion of the normal distribution curve.
In 1957, partly as a result of this analysis, the agent was re-
moved to a safe place and began a long recuperation. During
this period he wrote an extensive diary of his entire eight
years' activity. This diary validated every statement made in
the report of graphological analysis executed two years be-
fore the diary was available.
Areas of Efficient Use
This sample case illustrates one kind of service that is being
rendered case officers, routinely but on written request only,
with respect to their agents-a periodic checking of the hand-
writing in agents' reports when, after initial assessment and
perhaps training, they have been launched on a mission. In
addition to revealing imminent physical or mental breakdown
it has sometimes exposed double agents when an incongruity
between the excited tone of their reports and the mildness of
their assignments aroused suspicion. But there are other
persons for whose assessment graphology provides not just an
efficient but the only available method-the unknown source
who supplies your agent information, the agent who refuses
to submit to ordinary assessment, the VIP who cannot be
asked to undergo tests, and the writer of anonymous letters.
These five categories are the ones on which this service
has produced great quantities of valuable information in the
past, and they seem to constitute the best area for efficient
application of the technique. Many of the intelligence serv-
ices that employ graphology-and they represent nations on
every continent of the world-use it in the selection and as-
signment of their own staff personnel; a few even go so far
as to teach case officers some of the fundamentals to help
them find the soft spots in potential defectors or recruits. I
do not endorse the use of this technique, however, on subjects
available for observation and testing by standard methods
which are much faster and easier to apply. Graphology
should not try to replace or compete with standard techniques
gE E 55
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.06IT Graphology In Action
for direct assessment, but apply itself to cases where these
cannot be used.
Reliability of the Results
The operations chiefs and case officers to whom this service
is available must have some estimate of how much they can
rely on its findings. Many smugly believe it to be infallible.
Some, on the other hand, are too skeptical even to try it out.
The truth, as usual, lies somewhere between. Graphology is
no more 100% accurate than any other means of measuring
human character. But it does render judgments more ac-
curate than can be reached by unsystematic observation, and
renders them without observation, surreptitiously or from
afar. Hundreds and hundreds of operational cases of all types
and in many languages have been successfully handled by
the service, and a large percentage of the findings have later
been confirmed by ordinary direct assessments or by the sub-
ject's actions.
The reliability of the graphologist's analysis, however, is
conditioned on the degree to which the handwriting sample
submitted to him fulfills his ideal requirements. Ideally, in
order for him to establish a working base and make all the
observations involved, he should be furnished the subject's
approximate age, sex, ethnic origin and country of elemen-
tary education, approximate extent of education, and profes-
sion or general line of work. The sample for analysis should
be an original three or four pages written on unlined paper
with a nib pen of the writer's choice. It should have been
written spontaneously and without knowledge that it would
be analyzed. A second sample, written at a different time, if
one can be obtained, aids in establishing a norm. But these
requirements are rarely all fulfilled; and it is possible, at some
disadvantage, to analyze writing done with a ballpoint pen
or graphite pencil, or a sample on lined paper. When originals
are not available, properly focused photographs, if the scale
is specified, can be made to serve with some difficulty. Least
reliable are photostats or other crude reproductions. The
lack of data on the writers of anonymous letters does not
make analysis impossible, but like these other compromises
with requirements it does qualify our confidence in the
findings.
56
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Grapho ogy In Action
The summer articles on graphology advocated a test run or
a series of studies to establish its validity. It seems to me that
anyone acquainted with the research represented in the ap-
pended bibliography-chosen from works available in Eng-
lish-and aware of the mounting number of well-validated
cases in the files of this service would feel no need for an
elementary validity test at this late date. Such a test might,
however, be useful in identifying capable analysts: there are
probably fewer than a dozen competent graphologists in the
United States.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allport, Gordon W. and Philip E. Vernon. Studies in Expressive Move-
ments. The MacMillan Company, New York. 1933.
Anderson, Harold H. and Gladys L. An Introduction to Projective
Techniques. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1951.
(Chapter on "Graphology," by Dr. Rose Wolfson, pp. 416-456)
Bell, John Elderkin. Projective Techniques. Longmans, Green & Co.,
New York, London, Toronto. (Chapter on "The Analysis of Hand-
writing," pp. 291-327)
Booth, Gotthard C. "Objective Techniques in Personality Testing."
Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Sept. 1939. Vol. 42, pp. 514-530.
Booth, Gotthard C. "The Use of Graphology in Medicine." Journal
of Nervous and Mental Disease, December 1937. Vol. 86, No. 6.
Chao, W. H. "Handwriting of Chinese Mental Patients," in Social and
Psychological Studies in Neuropsychiatry in China, (edited by Lyman,
R. S.; Maiker, V. and Liang, P.), pp. 279-314. Stechert, New York.
1939.
Diethelm, O. "The Personality Concept in Relation to Graphology
and the Rorschach Test" Proc. Ass. Res. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 14 (1934),
pp. 278-286.
Downey, June E. Graphology and the Psychology of Handwriting.
Warwick & York, Baltimore. 1919.
Epstein, Lawrence and Huntington Hartford. "Some Relationships
of Beginning Strokes in Handwriting to the Human Figure Drawing
Test." Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1 March 1959.
Freeman, F. N. The Handwriting Movement. Univ. Chicago Press.
1918.
Goldzieher Roman, Klara. "Tension and Release: Studies of Hand-
writing with the Use of the Graphodyne." Personality, No. 2. 1950.
Hearns, Rudolf S. "The Use of Graphology in Criminology." Journal
for Criminal Psychopathology, pp. 462-464. 1942.
Lewinson, Thea Stein. "Dynamic Disturbances in the Handwriting of
Psychotics" (with reference to schizophrenic, paranoid and manic
depressive psychosis). American Journal of Psychiatry, July 1940.
Vol. 97, No. 1.
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%6i$Rrh Graphology In Action
Lewinson, Thea Stein & Joseph Zubin. Handwriting Analysis. King's
Crown Press, New York. 1942.
Melcher, W. A. "Dual Personality in Handwriting." Journal of Crimi-
nal Law and Criminology, 11 (1920), pp. 209-216.
Monroe, Ruth, Thea Stein Lewinson and Trude Schmidl Waehner,
Sarah Lawrence College. "A Comparison of Three Projective
Methods." Character and Personality, Sept. 1944. Vol. XIII, No. 1.
Pascal, Gerald R. "The Analysis of Handwriting: A Test of Signifi-
cance" (A Study from Harvard University). Character and Person-
ality, 1943. Pp. 123-144.
Pascal, Gerald R. "Handwriting Pressure: Its Measurement and Sig-
nificance" (A Study from Harvard University). Character and Per-
sonality, 1943. Pp. 235-254.
Perl, William R., Capt. M.S.C. "On the Psycho-diagnostic Value of
Handwriting Analysis." American Journal of Psychiatry, February,
1955. Vol. III, No. 8.
Rabin, A. and Blair, H. "The Effects of Alcohol on Handwriting."
Journal of Clin. Psychology, 1953. 9, 284-287.
Roman, Klara G. "Handwriting and Speech: A Study of the Diag-
nostic Value of Graphic Indices for the Exploration of Speech Dis-
orders." Logos, April 1959. Volume 2, No. 1, pp. 29-39.
Roman, Klara G. "Studies on the Variability of Handwriting. The
Development of Writing Speed and Point Pressure in School Chil-
dren." Journ. f. Genetic Psychology, 1936. 49:139.
Saudek, Robert. Experiments with Handwriting. George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., London. 1954.
Tripp, Clarence A., Fritz A. Fluckiger and George H. Weinberg. "Ef-
fects of Alcohol on the Graphomotor Performances of Normals and
Chronic Alcoholics." Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1959. 9, 227-236.
Southern Universities Press.
Wolfson, Rose. A Study in Handwriting Analysis (Submitted in Par-
tial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of Pure Science, Columbia University).
Edwards Brothers Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich. 1949.
(An exhaustive bibliography of graphological works in all languages
has been compiled by Wintermantel F.: Bibliographia Graphologica.
Ruhle-Diebener Verlag KG. Stuttgart, 1957.)
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The role intelligence actually
plays in the Executive Branch's
forging of national security
policy is described and ap-
praised by an indubitable au-
thority.
INTELLIGENCE AS FOUNDATION FOR POLICY
Robert Cutler
An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of
national security policy is the latest and best intelligence
bearing on the substance of the policy to be determined. That
statement is not a theoretical truism, but a description of
what has by and large actually been practiced in the Execu-
tive Branch under the administration of President Eisen-
hower. It is based on first-hand observation: for periods
totaling almost four years I was in continuous touch with the
procedures for formulating, adopting, and coordinating the
execution of national security policies within the Executive
Branch. I assisted the President at 179 meetings of the Na-
tional Security Council-almost half of all the meetings it
held in the first dozen years of its existence. I presided at
504 meetings of the Council's Planning Board (earlier called
its Senior Staff). I was a member and for a while Vice Chair-
man of its Operations Coordinating Board; I participated in
meetings of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; I repre-
sented the President on a small group which considered spe-
cial operations. It is from this experience that the conclu-
sions of this article are drawn.'
' In 1951, in the early organizational stages of the Psychological
Strategy Board, the author served as its Deputy Director and repre-
sentative at meetings of the NSC Senior Staff, later to become
the Planning Board. In early 1953 President Eisenhower asked him
to study the organization and functioning of the NSC mechanism
and make recommendations to strengthen and vitalize its struc-
ture and operating procedures. He then became the President's
principal assistant with reference to the operations of the Council.
He was moved from the position of Administrative Assistant (Janu-
ary-March 1953) to that of Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, where he served from March 1953 to April 1955 and from
January 1957 to July 1958.
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Foundation For Policy
NSC Operating Procedures
The function of the National Security Council, as defined by
National Security Act, is "to advise the President with respect
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security, so as to enable the military
services and the other departments and agencies of Govern-
ment to cooperate more effectively in matters affecting the
national security." The Act also gives to the Council the
duty of "assessing and appraising the objectives, commit-
ments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual
and potential military power." The Council advises the Presi-
dent both on policy and on plans for its execution, but its pri-
mary statutory function thus lies in the formation of policy.
The role of the Council as a planning body is subordinate to
its policy function.
The Council and its subsidiary Planning Board 2 and Opera-
tions Coordinating Board 3 constitute an apparatus available
to the President to help him reach policy decisions on national
security. The National Security Act is sufficiently flexible to
allow each President to use this personal aid as best suits his
convenience. One President may use the Council mechanism
in one way, another in another. The best use is made of it
when a President uses it in a way that satisfies his personal
requirements. It has never been felt necessary to test
The NSC Planning Board, chaired by the President's Special Assist-
ant for National Security Affairs, is composed of officials of the
departments and agencies which are represented at the Council
table with reference to a policy matter there under consideration.
These officials have a rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary or
higher. Each is supported by a departmental or agency staff. Each
has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands
all the resources of his department or agency for the performance
of his duties.
The NSC Operations Coordinating Board, of which the President's
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination is Vice Chair-
man, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies con-
cerned with the policies referred to the Board by the President for
assistance in the coordination of planning. These officials have a
rank equivalent to Under Secretary or higher. Each is supported
by a small departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to
his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of
his department or agency for the performance of his duties.
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Foundation For Policy
whether the Congress can constitutionally require by statute
that a President consult with specified persons or follow spec-
ified procedures in coming to a policy decision in this field.
Under President Eisenhower, the normal procedure for op-
erating the policy-making aspects of the NSC mechanism has
involved three main steps. First, the NSC Planning Board
formulates recommendations as to national security policy
and circulates them to Council members and advisers well in
advance of the Council meeting at which they are scheduled
to be considered. Then the Council considers and approves or
modifies or rejects these recommendations, and submits to
the President such as it approves or modifies. Finally, the
President approves, modifies, or rejects the Council's recom-
mendations, transmits those policies which he approves to the
departments and agencies responsible for planning their exe-
cution, and-as a rule where international affairs are con-
cerned-requests the NSC Operations Coordinating Board to
assist these departments and agencies in coordinating their
respective planning for action under the approved policies.
Thus a policy is first determined by the President, and then
the departments and agencies plan how to carry out their re-
sponsibilities to the President under it, being assisted in the
coordination of this planning by the OCB. It is, of course,
fundamental that the planning to execute policy responsibili-
ties be carried out by the respective departments and agen-
cies which are directly charged by the President with such
responsibilities. No person or body should intervene, at a
lower level, between the President and the department head
directly responsible to him.
During the period 1953-1958, with which I am familiar, the
great bulk of national security policy determinations were
made by the President through the operations of the NSC
mechanism just described. Because this method of policy for-
mulation was the usual one, such policies were commonly but
erroneously referred to as "NSC policies." Since it is the
function of the President to determine policy in all areas un-
der his executive control and responsibility, and national se-
curity policy may be formed in any way which he finds con-
venient and appropriate, the policies so formed, whatever body
or individual may submit the recommendations therefor, are
the President's policies.
61
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Foundation For Policy
There were occasions during this period when national se-
curity policy was determined by the President as a result of
Cabinet deliberations (though this was a rare occurrence) or
by his executive decision based on conferences with one or
more of his principal department or agency heads, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, or others within whose special competence
some particular subject would naturally fall. There should
always be complete flexibility for every President to determine
however he elects the matters of high policy which it is his
responsibility to decide. Because of the utility and conven-
ience of the NSC mechanism, however, and because the pres-
ent; Chief Executive values the advantages of integrated rec-
ommendations and joint deliberations based on them, it has
been the more or less standard operating procedure during
his tenure to seek to form national security policies through
the procedures outlined above.
Factual Intelligence and Estimates
In this article the term "intelligence" is used to embrace
both factual intelligence and estimates based thereon. In
forming national security policy both are of prime importance.
The gathering of intelligence facts is today a matter of
enormous scope and hardly conceivable complexity, bearing no
resemblance to the simple if hazardous personal mission of
a Mata Hari. There are, indeed, many individuals working in
the field of intelligence, in and out of formal government
service, who must exhibit personal bravery and rare ingenu-
ity, taking risks beyond the ordinary call of duty. Because
all is grist that comes to the intelligence mill, one need not
seek to measure the results of these individual efforts against
the results of the world-wide scientific and technological op-
erations employed in modern intelligence gathering.
In our continuing confrontation by a power openly dedi-
cated to swallowing all mankind in the maw of Communism,
the rapid gathering of germane intelligence on the activities
of other nations in every field of endeavor has put the United
States into an electronic business that is world-wide, highly
scientific, incredibly complicated, and extremely expensive. It
is staggering to realize the limitless ramifications of current
technological procedures, the almost overwhelming amount of
raw material that comes flooding in every hour of the day
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and night to be sifted, analyzed, codified, and-most urgent of
all-communicated clearly to the decision-makers. For in
the last analysis the valid use of intelligence is to build in-
tellectual platforms upon which decisions can be made. It is
not gathered to be stored away like a harvest. It must be
delivered, succinct and unequivocal, within the shortest time
feasible to focal points for use.
This prompt delivery is essential both to those who conduct
our foreign affairs or direct our defensive military mecha-
nisms and to those who frame our decisions of high policy.
The sound concept that the national intelligence effort should
be centralized is not inconsistent with a demonstrable need
that each of the several departments have its own intelli-
gence arm. The man who may have to dispatch a SAC
bomber, an ICBM, a Polaris submarine, or a Pentomic task
force has a dual function with regard to intelligence: he has
a part in acquiring the latest intelligence for use at central
headquarters, all the way up to the President; he also must
himself have and use the latest intelligence in carrying out
his crucial responsibilities.
It is for these reasons that the National Security Act in
1947 created a Central Intelligence Agency and a Director of
Central Intelligence, who at one and the same time is chief
officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the
United States Intelligence Board, and Foreign Intelligence
Adviser to the President and National Security Council.
Through the series of NSC Intelligence Directives the Presi-
dent has sought to make the gathering and dissemination of
intelligence more rapid and efficient. These Directives put
emphasis on the centralization of authority and responsibility
in the intelligence field, on making the separate intelligence
organizations of the armed services and other departments
and agencies contributory to, and not independent of, such
central authority, while still allowing them to meet their spe-
cialized needs.
The President has shown a constant awareness of the ur-
gency of perfecting the national intelligence effort. He gave
close attention to the reports on this effort made by the com-
mittee under General James A. Doolittle (October 1954) and
by the Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activi-
ties under General Mark Clark (May 1955). In February 1956
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he formally established a President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities, first chaired by Dr. James R.
Killian and now by General John E. Hull. He gave this Board
the continuing mission of reviewing the conduct of our for-
eign intelligence activities and reporting thereon periodically
to the Chief Executive.
The operation of the many intelligence arms in the critical
field of intelligence gathering and dissemination at all levels
involves a truly vast annual expenditure. But in terms of
national survival, the prompt delivery of correct intelligence
to the President, the ultimate decision-maker, is an undebat-
able necessity.
:Beyond this requirement for current factual intelligence
there is an additional requirement for intelligence estimates.
These estimates may be addressed to a particular country,
area, situation, armament, or function and set forth both the
pertinent facts and the likely future actions predicable
thereon, or they may seek to arrange logically and with pre-
cision the broadest spectrum of intelligence materials into a
considered appraisal of what over-all developments may be in
future time.
:Both types of intelligence estimates can be of the greatest
possible help to policy-makers and planners. Their prepara-
tion requires expert competence and their coordination calls
for objective thinking by those who have the authority to
agree or differ on behalf of their organizations. Because of
the prophetic nature of any estimate, it is of great conse-
quence that the final text should seek not compromise but
clarity. Many of the coordinated national intelligence esti-
mates with which I worked during these four years clearly
and fully set forth dissenting views held by competent mem-
bers of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
Intelligence Orientation for the Makers of High Policy
The prompt circulation of daily bulletins and special and
national estimates as basic orientation for those who make
the recommendations and decisions on high policy is an ob-
vious necessity. The Planning Board, responsible for doing
the spade-work in forming policy, needs to review the special
and national estimates in detail, dissecting them and arguing
over them until they become familiar material. And Security
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Council members need to get them in time to study and weigh
them before the subjects to which they relate are taken up
at the Council level. Both Planning Board and Council mem-
bers should be inseminated with their contents, as I once told
one of the chiefs of British Intelligence. In the Planning
Board this insemination has been a feature of its standard
operating procedure since 1953, as I will illustrate in a mo-
ment. At the Council level the education of the members is
carried on in several ways.
In the NSC. The Council members receive daily, weekly,
special, and general intelligence publications, and their func-
tion requires that they be familiar with this material. In
1953, moreover, in order to insure that Council members are
kept fully acquainted with current intelligence, an innova-
tion was introduced at their meetings. Until then, the oral
briefing on current intelligence was given each day in the
President's office to him alone. Now it became a part of the
Council's established procedure to make the first agenda item
at each meeting a briefing by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
This oral briefing, assisted by the visual presentation of
maps and charts on easels behind the Director's seat, reviews
the latest important intelligence throughout the world but
focuses on the areas which are to be taken up later in the
meeting. It normally consumes from fifteen to twenty-five
per cent of the meeting time, being frequently interrupted by
specific questions from the President and other Council mem-
bers. These questions often give rise to colloquies and ex-
temporaneous expressions of views which are of consequence
to the policy recommendations that are to be discussed. I
have always believed this direct confrontation of the Council
each week with current and special intelligence to be an im-
portant aid to policy consideration and formulation. Yet the
British Cabinet and the War Cabinet under Sir Winston
Churchill, to the best of my knowledge, carried on their policy
deliberations without the benefit of this stimulating and
thought-focussing device.
There are other ways in which the Council, as the super-
visory body to which the Director of Central Intelligence re-
ports, is kept informed about intelligence problems. The Di-
rector submits annually to the Council a summation of the
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problems that have faced the intelligence community in the
preceding period and the measures and means adopted for
dealing with them. The President and Council must also
from time to time review and revise the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, which constitute the charter
for the operations of the intelligence community.
The revision of one of these detailed and often complicated
NSCID's, especially in relation to the functional gathering and
rapid dissemination of intelligence, may require months of
prior study by a panel of specialists-perhaps scientists,
technologists, or communications experts, persons of the
highest intellectual and scientific standing-brought together
to advise on methods and procedures. Many of the panel
studies necessary for the purposes of the experts involve most
carefully guarded secrets. Yet it is important that the Coun-
cil understand, in general terms, how the vast intelligence
community of modern days is organized, administered, and
operated. The principles which emerge from the findings and
recommendations of these highly classified studies are matters
for action by the Council, and especially by the President.
In times of particular crisis the function of intelligence is
conspicuous in its importance. In such historical crises as
Indo-China in 1954, the Chinese off-shore islands in 1954-1955,
and Lebanon in 1958-to cite a few at random--the intelli-
gence appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence, the
foreign policy appraisal by the Secretary of State, and the
military appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were indispen-
sable ingredients in the deliberations held before the die was
cast and the policy set by the President.
In the Planning Board. The Planning Board necessarily
probes deeply into the latest intelligence on each subject that
comes before it. A CIA Deputy Director is in regular attend-
ance at the Board table, bringing to its deliberations an in-
formed knowledge of the contents of special and general in-
telligence estimates. He participates from his point of view
in the debate on current matters, and it would be as unthink-
able to overlook his views as to overlook those of the repre-
sentative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is seated at the table
as adviser on military issues.
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The CIA Deputy Director and the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs seek to coordinate the
preparation of intelligence estimates with the forward agenda
of the Planning Board. To that end the agenda is tenta-
tively scheduled for a period of two months or more ahead so
that the flow of intelligence materials can be arranged to meet
the policy-makers' demands. Of course, history sometimes
takes a hand, and the scheduled forward agenda has to be sus-
pended for the immediate consideration of a special estimate
that has been urgently called for. There can be nothing static
or cut-and-dried in scheduling ahead the Planning Board's
work-load (and consequently the Council's forward agenda) ;
it is entirely unpredictable how long a time may be consumed
in the preparation of particular policy recommendations or
what interruptions may be forced by extrinsic happenings.
Whatever the order of business, however, one factor is essen-
tial: a foundation of the latest and best intelligence to build
upon and a constant rechecking of intelligence material as
time marches on to the Council deliberation and the Presiden-
tial decision.
In the OCB. Turning for a moment from policy formula-
tion to the coordination of plans for carrying out approved
policy, we find that in this work of the Operations Coordinat-
ing Board current intelligence is again a necessary ingredient.
At the weekly meetings of the OCB over which the Under Sec-
retary of State presides, there are in regular attendance senior
representatives of Defense, Treasury, Budget, USIA, AEC, and
ICA, and the two cognizant Special Assistants to the Presi-
dent. At the informal Wednesday luncheon which always
precedes the OCB meeting the Director of Central Intelligence
has an opportunity to thrash out problems of a sensitive na-
ture. At the more formal Board meetings which follow he is
a full participant. The coordination of planning in the respon-
sible departments and agencies for the execution of a policy
which the President has approved requires the same up-to-the-
minute intelligence that the making of the policy did.
The Annual Policy Review. The annual Estimate of the
World Situation produced by USIB member agencies is awaited
each year with the greatest interest-and anxiety-by those
in the policy-making apparatus. It is an invaluable produc-
tion, presenting as it does a distillation of the painstaking
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efforts of the entire intelligence community to state as of the
year-end the dimensions of the foreign threat to our national
security. It is written with scrupulous care, it is well docu-
mented, and it sets forth with clear distinction, where differ-
ences of opinion occur, the opposing views of the experts who
cannot agree with the majority estimate. I conceive this an-
nual basic estimate to be of great consequence-as a stimu-
lant, as a guide, as a frank expression of differing views on
matters which may be of highest significance. It is this es-
timate which constitutes each spring the point of departure
for the recurring review of our basic national security policy.
The first step in this review is to schedule the Estimate of
the World Situation for discussion at two or three meet-
ings of the NSC Planning Board. At these meetings it is sub-
jected to 7 to 10 hours of controversial discussion in a search
for better understanding. Its contents are analyzed and dis-
sected so that attention can be focussed upon its most im-
portant conclusions. In some years distinguished consult-
ants from "outside of government," such men as General
Gruenther, John J. McCloy, Arthur W. Burns, Karl R. Ben-
detsen, and Robert R. Bowie, have been invited to these Plan-
ning Board meetings. They have been asked, after study and
review of the high points in the Estimate, to discuss them with
the Planning Board at a meeting of several hours' duration.
Then these points, together with the consultants' and the
Planning Board's reaction to them, have been brought before
the National Security Council at several meetings wholly de-
voted to their consideration. Short papers presenting the pol-
icy issues and their implications are prepared by the Planning
Board as a basis for Council discussion at these meetings.
The purpose of the procedure just described is not, of course,
to try at the Planning Board or Council level to change or
modify any part of the annual Estimate. The purpose is to
sharpen understanding of the important aspects of the Esti-
mate and to study and discuss in open meeting the policy im-
plications thereof. Through this procedure the Council mem-
bers become sharply aware of the high points in the Estimate
and the differences in view regarding them, and can join in
a give-and-take discussion without feeling bound by the more
formal presentation of carefully prepared policy recommenda-
tions. Almost as important as the ultimate policy decision
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itself is the intellectual controversy which precedes it, the
educative and consolidating effect of full and frank discussion,
the exposure of views which have not become fully formed
in departmental exercise, the emergence of novel and inter-
esting ideas at the highest level.
The way in which this product of the intelligence commu-
nity serves as a regular precursor to the Planning Board's an-
nual review of basic policy is a cogent illustration of the com-
munity's essential role in the shaping of national security
decisions.
A Model Case
It may be appropriate, at the close, to describe what in my
view is the ideal procedure for formulating a national se-
curity policy. Let us take as an example not the annual
broad policy review which may consume several months, but
a national policy on the State of Ruritania.
First, the Ruritania item is scheduled far ahead on the Plan-
ning Board agenda, with three to five or more sessions devoted
to it. At the first of these sessions the Board will have be-
fore it a national intelligence estimate on Ruritania. It will
also have before it a factual and analytical statement, pre-
pared by the responsible department or departments or by
an interdepartmental committee, on the military, economic,
political, and other germane aspects of the Ruritania policy
problem. To this compilation of factual data and analysis,
whether supplied in separate memoranda or as a staff study,
have contributed the vast resources of the informed depart-
ments and agencies of government, the brains and experience
of the operating personnel who work day after day in the
particular area of Ruritania and have learned at first hand
the strengths and limitations involved, the very persons who
staff the departments and agencies that will be called upon
to implement this policy they are working on when and if it
receives Presidential approval.
The intelligence estimate and the departmental material
are explained, discussed, and chewed over in one or more meet-
ings of the Planning Board. A senior representative of a re-
sponsible department is likely asked to attend at the Board
table and be questioned and cross-questioned about the
factual information and tentative policy recommendations
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submitted by his department. The Board seeks to squeeze out
of the material all the juice that it contains.
After these proceedings, a draft policy statement is prepared
by the responsible department or by an interdepartmental or
special committee. This draft will consist of a set of "general
considerations" (drawn from the intelligence estimate and the
factual and analytical material as a basis for policy recom-
mendations), a statement of the "general objectives" of the
proposed U.S. policy toward Ruritania, a more detailed pro-
posal for "policy guidance" in the several areas of U.S.-Ruri-
tania relations, and appendices covering anticipated financial
costs of the proposed policy and comparison of military and
economic expenditures and other data for past and future
years.
At as many Planning Board meetings as required this draft
statement is discussed, torn apart, revised. In the intervals
between the meetings revised texts are drafted by the Plan-
ning Board assistants for consideration at the next meeting.
Finally, from this arduous intellectual process emerges either
full agreement on the correctness of the facts, the validity
of the recommendations, and the clarity and accuracy of the
text, or-as is often the case-sharp differences of opinion on
certain major statements or recommendations. In the latter
case, the draft policy statement will clearly and succinctly
set forth, perhaps in parallel columns, these opposing views.
When the draft policy has been thus shaped, reshaped, cor-
rected, revised, and finally stated, it is circulated to the Coun-
cil at least ten days before the meeting which is to take up
policy on Ruritania. Council members will thus have suffi-
cient time to be briefed on the subject and familiarize them-
selves with the contents of the draft, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff will have time to express in writing and circulate to
Council members their formal military views on the exact
text which the Council is to consider.
That is my concept of how the integrating procedure of
the NSC mechanism should work when it is working at its
best. Some such procedure is the desired goal, a goal often ap-
proximated in actual performance. The views of all who have
a legitimate interest in the subject are heard, digested, and
combined, or in the case of disagreement stated separately.
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In a good many instances the views of experts or knowledge-
able people from "outside of government" are sought and
worked into the fabric at the Planning Board level. The in-
telligence estimates, the military views, the political views,
the economic views, the fiscal views, views on the psychological
impact-all are canvassed and integrated before the President
is asked to hear the case argued and comes to his decision.
It is certainly true that human beings are fallible and that
the instruments which they create are always susceptible of
improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and its
operation, can and will be improved as time goes on. But the
main course of this integrative process seems to me mechani-
cally and operatively sound. And it must be grounded on
the firm base of the best and latest intelligence.
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A German cryptanalyst pre-
sents his own version of the
reason Rommel was beaten at
the gates of Egypt.
THE LOST KEYS TO EL ALAMEIN'
Wilhelm F. Flicke
How slight and unimpressive are often the initial causes
which lead to great changes in the course of events; how our
picture of great men varies according to what we know about
them and the point of view from which we regard them; how
easily the fame of great generals grows pale when we know
the secret of their successes!
Any history of World War II will doubtless mention one
name on the German side with particular respect-Rommel.
This name has become a symbol of German generalship. In
the deserts of North Africa Rommel and his men won aston-
ishing victories and boldly chased the British to the gates of
Alexandria. But his real aim had been to chase them further-
out of Alexandria, across the Nile, across the Suez Canal-and
suddenly his victorious march stopped. At El Alamein, almost
within sight of Alexandria, it was unexpectedly all over.
What had happened? What was the secret of his unex-
ampled victories, and what was the secret of their sudden end?
There is no doubt that Rommel was a man of great energy
and distinguished military capacity. It would have been hard
to find a better general early in 1941 when it became a ques-
1 Excerpted from an unpublished manuscript, War Secrets in the
Ether, which tells in popular form the history of the German and
other communications intercept services. The author habitually
attributes to the intelligence product of these services an exagger-
ated and often decisive influence on the course of world history.
Moreover, writing shortly after the end of the war, he apparently
did not have at his disposal the authoritative testimony now avail-
able which blames the German failure to take Egypt and Suez pri-
marily on the High Command's unwillingness to give Rommel the
numbers of tanks and guns he needed. This account can therefore
be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the inter-
cepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is
attested in other sources, notably in Ciano's Diaries.
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Keys To El Alamein
tion of stopping Wavell in Africa. There is no doubt the
British fought stubbornly on the Delta's edge in the summer
of 1942. But that is not the whole story.
Cairo Calling Washington
In the fall of 1940 the Italians had crossed the Egyptian
frontier and advanced east to Marsa Matruh. There they had
been forced to halt. On 9 December 1940 General Wavell
started his counteroffensive and by mid-March 1941 had
thrown them back to the border of Tripolitania. Meanwhile
the German Afrika Korps had been formed and transported to
Tripolitania, and General Rommel now assumed command over
all German and Italian forces in Italian North Africa.
Rommel went to work with great energy. On 24 March 1941
his Afrika Korps and some fresh Italian divisions attacked the
British, who were weakened by three months of combat and
an extremely long supply line, and within 18 days drove them
out of Cyrenaica. This operation came to a standstill approxi-
mately on the Sollum-Djarabub line, and from early April 1941
the front was generally calm. Nothing noteworthy occurred.
At least nothing outwardly noteworthy. In reality, something
was being prepared quietly which belongs among the most
interesting chapters in the history of this war.
An officer whom, for reasons which will become apparent,
I shall call General Garrulus was stationed in Cairo as U.S.
military attache. Experience has shown that often when
people get a lively interest in a new field of endeavor they
merely cause mischief. For Garrulus, in his new post, the
significance of the North African theatre was dramatized by
Rommel's actions, and the entire Near East seemed about to
become the focal point of the war. For an ambitious man
Cairo seemed just the right place to be. So Garrulus decided
to act. But how can a military attache act? He writes re-
ports. And how are these reports conveyed nowadays? By
radio.
So Garrulus set to and sent one radiogram after another to
Washington-reports on the political situation and, above all
else, reports on everything connected with the British military
preparations and operations. They were enciphered, of course,
but the death of any cryptographic system lies in its frequent
use. All these radiograms were intercepted by the Germans.
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They bore the address MILID WASH or AGWAR WASH and
hence were easily recognized. By early July the system had
been solved in essence and parts of the messages could be
read.2 They proved to be a mine of important information.
Garrulus reported to the War Department in Washington on
the reinforcement of the British forces in western Egypt, on
their equipment with modern arms, on each transport of. war
materiel that arrived, on the withdrawal of the Australian
9th Division from Tobruk and its replacement by British and
Polish units, and on preparations for an offensive aimed at
encircling and annihilating the Axis troops.
All these reports were passed currently to General Rom-
mel. They were not yet complete, to be sure, for the crypto-
graphic system had not been solved in its entirety, but,they
were adequate to keep him posted. Hence it was no surprise
to him when in the grey dawn of 18 November 1941 the
The wartime chief of Italian military intelligence, General Cesare
Ame, credits his service with both the initiative and the execution of.
this operation. The following is translated from his Guerra Segreta
in Italia, 1940-43, pp. 96 ff:
"In the period immediately preceding the declaration of war
against the U.S., the Military Intelligence Service, by means of
a happy initiative carried out in the. greatest secrecy, succeeded.
in entering into possession of precious American cryptographic
material (codes and deciphering tables in active use).
"During the military action ... in North Africa the British
headquarters each evening forwarded a summary of the principal
operations of the day to the American representative in.Cairo.
The summary included information and situation details of great
interest. This summary, enciphered in the American code,, was
immediately transmitted to Washington.
"Because the American command had committed the grave
error of not replacing its codes immediately after war began, as
would have been good practice, our service intercepted the dis-
patches, deciphered them rapidly, and during the same night
retransmitted them in our own cipher not only to the Supreme
Command but also to the Headquarters of the North Africa troops,
thus making it knowledgeable of the most delicate and interesting
information on the adversary."
An Italian employee of the U.S. embassy in Rome had in fact stolen
the basic code, and German and Italian cryptanalysts were left
only the problem of working out successive reencipherments. Some
years after the war this employee had the sang froid to come back
and ask for his old job again.
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Keys To El Alamein
British offensive under General Sir Alan Cunningham broke
loose along the entire front. Rommel had made good prepara-
tions and was able to hold his front for a time, but he could
not prevent the British from making a break south of Sidi
Omar and thus throwing his southern flank off balance. On
19 November the British took Sidi Rezegh and on the same
day Churchill proclaimed the impending destruction of the
Axis troops in North Africa.
Both sides brought up all the troops they had. Slowly but
surely the British drew a ring around the Axis divisions.
Nevertheless, despite all tactical successes, the onslaught of
the British did not achieve decisive results. Wherever the
British started an action, Rommel immediately sent forces
to oppose them. He even sent a column behind the British
in the direction of Halfaya and cut their line of supply. He
always did the right thing at the right time.
Small wonder, for Garrulus was sending one telegram after
another to Washington. He ranged all over the battle area,
saw and heard everything, knew all preparations, every in-
tention, every movement of the British forces, and he trans-
mitted it all to the United States. The German intercept sta-
tion copied each message and sent it promptly by teletype to
Berlin, where it was deciphered and forwarded by the speediest
possible means to Rommel. The whole thing took only a few
hours. By now the cryptosystem had been completely solved.
The British were much surprised. Preparations for the of-
fensive had been so thorough that destruction of the Axis
troops in its very first phase had been considered certain.
Something had not clicked. General Auchinleck, Commander
in Chief in the Near East and Wavell's successor, flew from
Cairo to Cunningham's headquarters and on 26 November re-
lieved him of his post. A young general of 44 years, Ritchie,
was appointed commander of the British Eighth Army. On
8 December Rommel pushed through a weak point in the Brit-
ish encirclement, disengaging his troops without being de-
tected. Before the British recovered from their surprise he
had escaped to the westward. On 11 December Churchill
stated in the House of Commons that the Libyan campaign
had not gone as expected.
In the days that followed, the victorious British occupied
several towns and captured some 25,000 men. But mean-
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while Rommel had established his shattered units near El
Agheila. He had also received dependable information regard-
ing his opponent; Garrulus had seen to that. On 21 January
he advanced 16 kilometers into the British line with 3 armored
columns. The British were taken by surprise and had to re-
treat. On the 27th Rommel was north and northeast of
Msus. On that day Churchill declared "We are facing a very
bold and clever foe, and I may well say a great general!" On
the 29th Benghazi was taken. Rommel was promoted to Col-
onel General. On 10 February operations came to a stand-
still 100 kilometers west of Tobruk. Rommel was not strong
enough to break through the new defensive front of his op-
ponent.
Intercept Procedure
Two great stations had been copying the Garrulus mes-
sages since the beginning of the year to make sure that none
should be missed, and their intercepts were transmitted with
"urgent" precedence by direct wire to Berlin. I should like
to illustrate by example the effectiveness of this German op-
eration. The British had carefully planned and prepared an
action against Rommel's airfields. They meant to drop para-
chutists during the night with explosives to destroy the
facilities. The action had been so carefully planned that it
could not have failed its objective. Garrulus, radiant with
joy, reported this to Washington. The message was sent about
eight o'clock in the morning by the station in Cairo; it was
received in Lauf immediately and transmitted to Berlin. At
nine o'clock it was on the cryptanalyst's desk; at ten o'clock
it was deciphered; at 10:30 it was in the Fiihrer's Headquar-
ters; and an hour later Rommel had it. He had half a day to
warn his airfields. The British project was executed shortly
after midnight. The parachutists got a warm reception; the
action miscarried. Only at one airfield which disregarded the
warning the British met with success.
February, March, and April passed quietly on the front.
Rommel knew precisely how matters stood on the British
side: their supplies and equipment, their strength, their plans.
Both sides were bringing in reinforcements. After the mid-
dle of May the British began to spot extensive German move-
ments and counted on an offensive in the near future.
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Keys To El Alamein
On 26 May Rommel's famous offensive began. German
tanks broke through at Bir Hakim and heavy tank battles
raged for days near Acroma. Approximately 1,000 tanks and
2,000 to 2,500 self-propelled guns were engaged on the two
sides. On 10 June Bir Hakim, the key to the British defense
system, was taken. The Axis troops drove through in three
columns. Sidi Rezegh was taken, and on the 19th the Egyp-
tian frontier was reached. On the 21st encircled Tobruk was
taken, along with 25,000 prisoners. This had been a bold mas-
terstroke.
By 25 June Rommel had occupied Sollum, the Halfaya Pass,
and Sidi Omar, and was in front of Sidi Barrani. Garrulus
was still radioing his reports and Rommel was receiving pre-
cise information every hour. The British were amazed; Rom-
mel seemed to have second sight. No matter what the British
undertook he always anticipated it as if the British High
Command had been keeping him posted.3 On 27 June General
Ritchie was relieved as commander of the Eighth Army and
Auchinleck assumed command in person.
Quickly the British retreated to Marsa Matruh. Here were
the fortifications Wavell had laid out when Graziani was at
the gates of Egypt. Now Rommel was at the gates of Egypt.
In less than four weeks he had chased the British out of all
Cyrenaica. Their only hope lay in the Qattara depression
which stretches 60 kilometers inland from the coast between
Marsa Matruh and Alexandria. The British were resolved to
hold the rectangle Alexandria-Port Said-Suez-Cairo. Would
they succeed? They were determined to hold Singapore, but
had lost it. They were determined to hold the Balkans, but
had to withdraw. Now Rommel was near El Alamein, and
British domination in the Near East was threatened.
The Propagandists Blow a Source
Then the miracle occurred. No, it was no miracle; it was
a tragicomedy. It was as idiotically funny as a passage from
a dime novel. It was Saturday, 27 June 1942. I tuned in the
Deutschlandsender's six p.m. broadcast. "We are offering a
aAme (loc. cit.) says, "On 20 June we had a complete picture of the
sharp crisis which gripped the British forces .... Demoralized
and badly led, they would not have been in a position to oppose
Axis troops if these had exploited the favorable conditions offered
and had pointed decisively toward the Delta."
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Keys To El Alamein
drama with scenes from the British or American information
bureau," the announcer said. "This is going to be some stuff,"
I thought, but left the receiver on while I went ahead with
some work.
Suddenly I pricked up my ears: the drama had as its sub-
ject "Events in North Africa" and was commenting on politi-
cal and military matters. One of the characters represented
the American military attache in Cairo, and now there fol-
lowed a discussion of his extensive supply of information and
the way he sent it to Washington. I was speechless. To
think that the German broadcast was putting on something
that countless people were trying to keep secure! The drama
was authentic, and only too well played.
On 29 June, 36 hours after this radio drama, the messages
from Garrulus to Washington suddenly ceased. The German
intercept operators listened and searched in vain. No further
MILID or AGWAR message was ever heard.4 When messages
began to flow again, the Americans were using a system which
defied all our efforts at solution.
4 Ame (loc. cit.) says only that "from 25 June on the intercepts, al-
though they contained noteworthy considerations and observations,
no longer gave a wide vision of the adversary situation." He ap-
parently attributed the falling off of the channel to tightened Brit-
ish security on information passed to the Americans. But Leonard
Mosley's The Cat and the Mice (London, 1958) carries a quite differ-
ent account of how this source was lost. Mosley has it (pp. 80-84)
that British interrogation of signal officers captured in an early
June attack on Rommel's mobile monitoring unit disclosed that one
of the unit's tasks was to copy the regular evening message from
the U.S. military attache in Cairo and decipher it, using the code
which had been stolen by the Italians. On getting this information
the British also monitored these "long, detailed, and extremely
pessimistic" messages for ten days, and then let the sender know
that they were being intercepted.
It may be supposed, not inconsistently with Flicke's or Ame's story,
that Rommel was at this stage doing his own monitoring to short-
cut the communications lag. It seems reasonable also that the
British were instrumental in stopping the messages, but Mosley's
version of the method used is even less credible than Flicke's tale :
11 'And now tell me, General [Garrulus], what do you think of
the Ambassador's wife?T
'She's a honey,' said the general. `Beautiful, too.'
`Then why,' asked his hostess, `did you tell Washington last
night that she looked like a horse?"'
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Keys To El Alamein
Rommel, on the Egyptian threshold, remained without in-
formation. The British regrouped their forces; he knew noth-
ing about it. They introduced new units; he was not told.
New weapons were unloaded in Alexandria and Port Said; Rom-
mel did not find out about them. The great general now had
to rely upon himself and his reconnaissance at the front.
On 3 July Rommel tried a strong thrust to the south. It
failed. The next day, using all available troops, he mounted
a major attack near El Alamein. After heavy fighting and
initial successes he had to withdraw. Since 26 May the Brit-
ish Eighth Army had lost 75,000 men, plus 1,100 tanks and 450
planes. It was in bad shape, but now it held.
Both sides dug in, and began to build up reinforcements.
Decisions of great historical moment seemed to be impending.
Mussolini betook himself to the Egyptian front in order to be
present at the entry into Cairo. Churchill visited Cairo on
his way back from Moscow. Lieutenant General Montgomery
was made commander of the British Eighth Army, and Gen-
eral Alexander the successor to Auchinleck. Rommel was ap-
pointed General Field Marshall. All eyes were on him.
Rommel finally decided to attack. In the morning hours
of 31 August he advanced against the southern flank of the
British position at El Alamein but immediately encountered
strong resistance. He threw in all his tanks and used his
old trick of having trucks drive around in the rear to kick
up a dust and simulate another strong tank force advancing.
There was hard fighting, but after two days Rommel had to
withdraw. He had 12 divisions and at least 600 tanks, but
he had no Garrulus telegrams. His operations came to a
standstill, soon to turn into retreat. The dream of a cam-
paign through Asia Minor was at an end. Mussolini returned
to Italy. The period of Rommel's great victories was over.
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The capabilities of terrain
intelligence rethought for
promptness and precision in
the age of missiles.
TERRAIN INTELLIGENCE FOR THE
PENTOMIC ARMY*
Clifton A. Blackburn, Jr.
Over the Mulde River, behind the Iron Curtain in East Ger-
many, there is a highway bridge. This bridge has a load
classification of 50 tons. The national highway it carries has
a concrete surface 26 feet wide. The approaches to the bridge
are unusually steep (11% grade) and the roadway across it
is unusually narrow (12 feet). The bridge has 3 spans and
2 piers. The piers are made of stone and contain demolition
chambers. The spans are approximately 62 feet long, and the
center span clears the surface of the water by 16 feet at nor-
mal high water, which occurs in May.
About 25 miles north of this bridge the national highway
passes through a forest. About 600 acres in extent, the forest
is composed of old beech and oak trees. The trees are in full
leaf by about the middle of May and lose their leaves about
the middle of November. During the foliation period, more
than 90% of the ground within the forest is completely con-
cealed from aerial observation. The ground is covered with
forest litter but there is no underbrush. The larger trees in
the forest have trunks ranging from about 16 to 25 inches in
diameter at shoulder height and are spaced about 12 to 15
feet apart.
How do we know all this about a relatively obscure bridge
and forest behind the Iron Curtain? A former German Army
engineer interrogated at a refugee camp in 1955 reported that
the bridge had demolition chambers. A photograph taken by
a barge operator in 1949 was found to show these chambers,
Based on two articles which have been copyrighted by the Society
of American Military Engineers and printed in the July-August
1958 and November-December 1959 issues of The Military Engineer.
They are used thus by permission.
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Terrain Intelligence
as well as the number of spans and the steep grade of the
approach to the bridge. A German waterway publication pro-
vided the clearance figure, the time of high water, and the
clearance between the central piers. The barge operator's
photograph showed the spans to be of equal length and the
piers to be made of stone. An aerial photograph taken in
1951 showed the width of the roadway and its surface
material.
A large-scale German topographic map, revised in 1939, lo-
cated the forest and provided an accurate idea of its size.
Three refugees from separate villages on the outskirts of the
forest reported on separate occasions in 1950, 195:L, and 1956
that the forest was composed of beech and oak trees. They
also gave estimates of the trunk diameters and foliation pe-
riods that were in general agreement. A 1955 aerial photo-
graph showed that only small changes had occurred in the
forest's acreage. This photograph, taken in June, also showed
the extent of the canopy and partially confirmed the species
of its trees. A ground photograph from a pre-war tourist
guide corroborated and refined the refugee information as to
trunk diameters, showed trunk spacing, and showed the forest
floor to be clear of underbrush. The lack of underbrush was
confirmed by one of the refugees who had hidden there in his
escape to the West in 1956.
Now add to this bridge and this forest all the other natural
and man-made features of the East German countryside-
rivers, roads, towns, hedgerows, soils, railroads, and land-
forms, to name only a few. Then multiply East Germany by
all the other countries of the world to get some idea of the
hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of items of data which
must be identified, evaluated, and organized to make up the
dossiers of long-range terrain intelligence. In these dossiers
are stored the preconditions of the battles of the future. For
battles are not fought in a vacuum but on a jungle-covered
Guadalcanal, on a barren Heartbreak Ridge, or in flooded
Pripet Marshes. They are fought along a Rhine flowing
through fertile farmland, around minute Saharan oases, on a
tiny Iwo Jima, or on the subcontinents of a Festung Europa.
It is these rivers and ridges, forests and floods, islands and
oases, swamps and sand dunes that are the subject matter
of terrain intelligence.
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errain n e igence
Terrain and the Space Age
The new and cataclysmic spectre of a decisive two-day stra-
tegic air battle or two-hour missile war has not exorcised the
old implacable military need for terrain intelligence; on the
contrary. The air age and even the space age will not divorce
future military action from the ground. Lieutenant General
James M. Gavin, the man so intimately associated with the
age of missiles even in the popular mind, has written un-
equivocally:
The frontiers of the free world must ... be firmly defended on
the ground. For this is where freedom begins. It begins where
men will stand and fight. It begins today along the 38th Parallel
in Korea and the 17th Parallel in Indochina and at the Branden-
burger Gate in Berlin.
Finally ... one thing stands out quite clearly: the control of
land areas will be decisive in this period and through control of
land areas we will provide the reassuring confidence in its own
survival that the Western world needs. And from control of the
land areas we will be in a position, if the need arises, and I believe
it most certainly will, to command space.'
The task of the terrain intelligence producer, never an easy
one, becomes yet more demanding in this age. Changes are
taking place in the organization, equipment, and tactics of his
old customer, the U.S. Army. Indeed, these changes are re-
placing his old customer with a new one, a Pentomic Army
of vast mobility, ready to place powerful forces anywhere in
the world in a minimum of time. The new customer is a
modern and streamlined striking force with nuclear capacity
to engage in a general war or win a small war quickly.
This enormous strategic and tactical mobility demands
greater amounts of terrain intelligence and simultaneously
gives the producer less time to prepare it. A striking force
may leave today for the Middle East or tomorrow for central
Europe or the next day for Africa or the islands of Indonesia.
When this force reaches the battle area its battlefield mobility
will make it a voracious consumer of terrain intelligence; and
this intelligence has to be supplied before it sets out on its
mission.
As things stand today, however, it could not be so supplied.
If an airborne Pentomic division were alerted today to leave
' "Why Missiles," in Army, November 1957.
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errain intelligence
tomorrow on a "no drill" strike mission, it could not take with
it adequate operational terrain intelligence on its objective.
An airborne division is not itself capable of collecting, evalu-
ating, and storing terrain information or of producing ade-
quate terrain intelligence on a world-wide basis-or even on a
selective basis-for operational planning.
The capability does exist elsewhere. It exists within an al-
ready established and operating group of terrain intelligence
producers in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There is no
reason, from the standpoint of capability, that this group
could not begin today to support the Pentomic Army with
operational terrain intelligence on individual, carefully se-
lected potential trouble spots of the world. A package could
be put into the hands of the planners before trouble starts
and into the hands of the strike force as it leaves for the
battle area-a package of basic terrain intelligence that needs
only the veneer of weather data and enemy disposition and
capabilities to make it a complete operational planning docu-
ment.
Why Not Now?
Before he can provide this support, the terrain intelligence
producer must turn from encyclopedist to eclectic. His ideal
goal is to know the whole world as intimately as his own
back yard; but he cannot plot for the Pentomic Army com-
mander all the anthills and dandelions in all the earth's back
yards. He must select with foresight, with care, and above
all on good advice, first, the areas where operations may oc-
cur, and second, the kinds of terrain intelligence likely to be
needed.
For guidance on the where's he can consult the considered
judgment of the whole intelligence community about po-
tential trouble spots in the world of 1959, 1960, or 1961. Not
the spots where diplomats will be arrayed in battle or those
where economic conditions will gradually increase the influ-
ence of Communism, but those that might reasonably become
the objectives of a Pentomic striking force landing for a shoot-
ing war-trouble spots like the 17th parallel in Indochina in
1954, the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950, the western border of
Poland in 1939. The guidance he gets may not be uniform and
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construction possibilities, but he will know which bridges will
accommodate his Honest John missile launcher and which
will not. The package must not include unneeded trappings,
but it should permit few if any terrain surprises for the com-
mander of the striking force.
For many years, long-range terrain intelligence efforts have
been expended on bulky, small-scale,2 generalized, strategic-
level studies designed with no clearly identifiable user in mind.
The time is long since ripe for redirecting these efforts to
produce streamlined, large- or medium-scale, detailed, opera-
tional-level intelligence packages specifically designed for a
Pentomic Army ready to leave tomorrow to fight anything
from a minor police action to a world-wide nuclear war.
The need clearly exists. The capability to answer it exists.
The "tooling up" has begun within the Corps of Engineers,
and prototypes are being circulated for user reaction. It is a
laborious process, but next year's model must show that the
long-range terrain intelligence producer has begun to as-
semble a modern package.
I I.e., scaled down at high ratio.
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errain me igence
cannot of course be sure, but it can provide a sufficient basis
for selecting the priority areas for terrain intelligence.
Deciding what terrain intelligence to produce on each of
the priority areas is a matter of knowing the consumer's re-
quirements. A superior product can be designed by tailoring
the supplier's capabilities to the user's needs. Let the user
and the producer get together at the working level and find
out what the one needs and what the other can do. But even
without this intimate guidance, the producer can formulate
some general ideas about what he can do to help.
For one thing, an airborne striking force must get back to
the ground to accomplish its mission. With existing capabili-
ties, the battle group commander can be furnished far in ad-
vance a clear idea of the limitations imposed by forests, slopes,
and soils upon successful landing of a battle-ready force.
In operations after landing, whole Corps may have to cross
a river in a single night, making multiple stream crossings on
a very wide front. The commander can have in his possession,
before he even leaves for the battle area, intelligence on the
river's banks, velocities, widths, and other features that will
affect his use or placement of amphibious personnel carriers,
light tactical bridges, and air-mobile assault bridges.
The Pentomic Army commander will be firing atomic mis-
siles, but not every part of the area will be suitable for em-
placement of missile launchers. There is no reason why he
should not know in advance the location, physical advantages
and disadvantages, and access possibilities of all the potential
missile launching sites within his battle area.
To provide the Pentomic Army with long-range intelligence
such as this, a new and specially designed product will be re-
quired. It must be a lean and efficient package, yet contain-
ing all the basic terrain intelligence a commander needs for
the early phases of his operation. There should be no broad
and meaningless generalizations. There should be no extra-
neous matter and no omissions, because the user will have
had a voice in its planning and it will have been designed with
his specific needs in mind. The tank commander will not be
burdened with information on airdrop sites, but he will know
where the bogs are that can swallow up his tanks. The air-
borne commander will not be furnished a survey of urban re-
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History of special intelligence
operations with the Sixth
Army in New Guinea and the
Philippines.
THE ALAMO SCOUTS
Eustace E. Nabbie
Colonel Allison Ind's recent book, Allied Intelligence Bu-
reau,' which described a number of the unorthodox recon-
naissance and raider activities carried out in the World War
II South West Pacific Area, failed to mention a small intrepid
group of men called "Alamo Scouts" who performed for the
U.S. Sixth Army services similar to those rendered by OSS de-
tachments in other overseas commands. It is the purpose of
this article to bridge a gap thus left in the intelligence his-
tory of that Area and time.
Origin and Training
General Walter Krueger, whose Sixth Army was then called
simply the "Alamo Force" in deference to Australian General
Blarney's seniority under MacArthur, was personally the
originator of this group of Scouts bearing the name of the
famous Texas shrine. It is my belief that his main aim in
creating them was to insure that in his area of responsibility
there would be no fiasco like that of Kiska island in the
Aleutians, which, it will be recalled, U.S. Navy and Army air
forces bombarded for more than 20 days in ignorance of the
fact that the Japanese troops had already been withdrawn,
and which was then taken by an assault landing with self-
inflicted casualties. The Scouts' principal mission was there-
fore reconnaissance behind enemy lines, an activity which in
this Area meant torture and death for any of them that were
captured. They were volunteers, hand-picked for their in-
telligence, spirit, and physical stamina.
The first volunteers "for an unusual mission" did not know
exactly what they would be called upon to do; it was only as
the exploits of the Scouts became more generally known that
' New York: David Mackay, 1958. Reviewed in Studies, Vol. III, No. 1.
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e Alamo ,Scouts
secrecy was lifted from the nature of the work. It was spe-
cified, however, in General Krueger's order of 28 November
1943 setting forth a charter for the Scouts:
1. The Alamo Scouts Training Center (ASTC) is hereby estab-
lished under the supervision of Headquarters Alamo Force at the
earliest practicable date prior to 1 January 1944, and at a location
in the vicinity of the present Headquarters [Goodenough Island,
off the southeastern tip of New Guinea].
2. The training center will train selected volunteers in recon-
naissance and raider work. The course will cover a six-week
period. Specially selected graduates will be grouped into teams
at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alamo Force, and will
be designated "Alamo Scouts"; the remainder will be returned to
their respective commands for similar use by their commanders.
3. Commanders of combat units will be called upon from time
to time to furnish personnel for the above training. Personnel so
selected must possess the highest qualifications as to courage,
stamina, intelligence and adaptability.
The instructors for this Training Center were to be drawn
from the Army members of an all-service organization known
as the Amphibious Scouts, to which I happened to have been
assigned. This group, originally formed in the Solomons by
the Navy, had moved to Fergusson Island, south and east of
Goodenough, on a beautiful bay well protected from the sea-
sonal wind. There it had a training site which served also
as a base for PT boats making the run to New Britain Island.
Early in December, Lt. Col. Frederick Bradshaw, Deputy
G-2 of the Sixth Army, who was to become the first com-
manding officer of the ASTC, and I learned through grape-
vine channels that the Navy unit was being disbanded. We
immediately made arrangements to move into the established
camp and take over its rather crude facilities in being. With
native work teams and assistance from the U.S. Army Engi-
neers we then pushed back the jungle and built better facili-
ties. By about 1 January 1944 we were ready to receive the
first class of potential Scouts.
Members of the first class came from the 158th Regiment
(the Bushmasters), formerly stationed in Panama and adept
at jungle fighting, and from the 32nd Infantry Division, vet-
erans of Buna and Gona in New Guinea. Succeeding classes
were drawn from the dismounted 1st Cavalry Division, the
33rd Division, and the 41st Division. The instructor force was
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Far Release cu s
augmented by graduates from the first class, and several Aus-
tralian army officers were attached to the Center at one time
or another to train the Scouts in jungle fighting and sur-
vival. U.S. Marine or Army Air Corps officers were sometimes
added to a team if its mission called for specialized personnel
not available in the Training Center.
Eyes for Island-Hopping
The Scouts' first reconnaissance mission was carried out by
Lt. John R. C. McGowan and five men on 27 February 1944.
The team was put ashore by Catalina and rubber boat on the
southeast tip of Los Negros island in the Admiralty group.
Air reconnaissance during the previous two weeks had de-
tected no activity on the island, and the Army Air Corps had
concluded that the Japanese had been evacuated. McGowan's
team nevertheless found Japanese troops there and were able,
unobserved, to ascertain that they were healthy and ap-
parently well fed. The Scouts returned safely to the point
where their rubber landing boat had been cached and were
picked up by the "Cat" at daybreak the following morning.
McGowan was taken by PT boat from the Catalina base to
the task force commander, who, on the strength of his re-
port, ordered reinforcements for the "reconnaissance in
force" of the island being conducted by the dismounted 1st
Cavalry Division. On the morning of 29 February a success-
ful troop landing was made on the northeast coast of Los
Negros.
This operation established a pattern that came to be al-
most routine. Before each landing of U.S. and allied troops,
sometimes as early as D-day minus 14, an Alamo Scout team
would be put ashore by PT, Catalina, Mariner, or submarine.
After Los Negros came Madang and Wewak on the coast of
New Guinea. Then when Hollandia (where an Australian
team sent in by Theater Headquarters was betrayed by un-
friendly natives and killed by the Japanese) had been taken,
Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, Sansapor, and Japan Island followed
in quick succession. In advance of each of these actions an
Alamo Scout team made a pre-landing reconnaissance or con-
ducted line-crossing operations to establish the strength and
disposition of the enemy forces, and its reports enabled the
Army G-3 to complete his plans for the assault. In one case,
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The Alamo Scouts
at Sansapor on the north coast of New Guinea, the planned
pre-landing bombardment and aerial strikes were called off
because so few Japanese were found in the area.
As the Sixth Army moved northward the ASTC moved with
it, setting up nearby headquarters and keeping in close per-
sonal touch with the Army G-2. For the later New Guinea
operations the Center was located at Mange Point, south of
Finschafen. In the Philippines, while the Sixth Army was
near the beach on Leyte the Center was in Abuyog. On Luzon
it followed the Sixth Army down the Lingayan Plain toward
Manila, arriving finally at Subic Bay about 1 March 1945,
where it set up shop on the east side of the bay four or five
miles south of Olongopau. It was here that teams were
trained and held until time for their operational briefing by
Sixth Army G-2 officers at San Fernando, Pampanga.
The Philippine Guerrillas
During the Luzon campaign the work of the Alamo Scouts
was broadened and diversified into two general types, first,
the collection of information from guerrilla and civilian
sources and by personal reconnaissance, and second, the or-
ganization of guerrilla activities. The Philippine guerrillas,
nurtured and developed since 1942, had already for some time
been in radio contact with General MacArthur's Philippine
Regional Section. Now those in areas assigned to the Sixth
Army were turned over to General Krueger, and the Sixth
Army G-2 controlled all contact with them and the direction
of their activities. For this purpose a Special Intelligence
subsection of G-2 manned by Alamo Scout officers was es-
tablished.
Alamo Scout teams thus made the initial personal contact
with guerrilla units and remained the instrument for organ-
izing their actions in support of the regular forces. The
guerrilla effort had been inadequately coordinated, various po-
litical frictions hampered teamwork, and some units had no
recognized leader. The Scout teams became coordinating
agencies, mediating quarrels, appealing for unity of effort, ex-
pelling chronic agitators. Where leadership was lacking or
disputed, Scout officers assumed command.
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he Alamocouts
From the outset, a troublesome obstacle to the organiza-
tion of efficient guerrilla operations was the undefined status
of the many autonomous guerrilla units with respect to cen-
tral authority. Since little was known concerning the com-
position and activities of many of these units, there being no
overall command as in Mindanao or the Visayas, several
months passed during which scores of Filipino fighting groups
were neither fish nor fowl, neither bandits nor allies. The
confusion and resultant dissatisfaction among cooperating
groups were resolved by a decision to recognize bona fide units
as components of the Philippine Army and give their officers
and men formal status and proper pay.
This decision gave to us in the Special Intelligence subsec-
tion the lever we needed to extend control, through Scout
teams in the field, to those guerrilla leaders who had not
acknowledged our authority. Some of them, as might be ex-
pected, attempted to play off General MacArthur's Theater
Headquarters against the Sixth Army, but with little suc-
cess. Effective liaison was established between the two eche-
lons, and guerrilla leaders attempting this gambit were soon
put in their place.
The policy of official recognition also brought us problems.
No sooner had it been announced than a flood of claims for
pay and status threatened to inundate the Special Intelli-
gence section. Many of these were clearly spurious, and pro-
cedures had to be set up to determine the legitimacy of each
claim. American units employing guerrillas submitted rosters
to the Sixth Army G-1, who referred them to the Special In-
telligence section for verification. Upon verification and after
formal approval by United States Army Force, Far East, lists
of recognized units were published.
For radio communication with the guerrillas on Leyte and
Luzon, a Filipino Message Center was set up adjacent to the
U.S. Army Message Center, staffed with members of the U.S.
Filipino Regiment and with former local employees of the
Philippine Government's Bureau of Posts and Roads. These
latter, given a minimum of training, made ideal communica-
tors: every Philippine postmaster of pre-war days had to be
able to operate a telegraph key. Many of the guerrillas with
whom they were in contact were also former postal employees
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The Alamo Scouts
trained in radio communications. The more than 70 guerrilla
radios with which General MacArthur's Headquarters was in
contact at the time of the Luzon landings were put gradually
under the control of this Filipino Message Center and their
messages fed into Army channels via Sixth Army G-2.
As the situation on Luzon became more stable the guerrilla
network came to be a sort of general-utility coded telegraph
service. The newly established Philippine Government was in
dire need of some of its experienced officials still hiding out in
the hills and jungle. It would telephone the Headquarters at
San Fernando, and we would send its messages to the out-
lying provinces directing such-and-such persons to report to
Manila. Finally, as the war ended, I arranged with the Di-
rector of Posts and Roads for the transfer of the whole net-
work to the Philippine Government.
A Tidy Record
General Krueger's experiment with the Alamo Scouts was
designed to give Army Headquarters what every division and
lower command already had-an organized reconnaissance
agency. Its purpose was to obtain strategic and tactical in-
formation primarily for the Army G-2, but at the same time
for units being employed or about to be employed in combat.
It accomplished this and more.
That the idea was sound and that this new application of
standard principles was practical and valuable is attested by
the results of more than 60 missions. The commanders who
were beneficiary of these missions recognized that informa-
tion provided by the Alamo Scouts saved lives, changed plans
of attack, and led to the destruction of enemy positions and
enemy shipping. Scouts made two successful prisoner-rescue
raids, and they brought in 60 Japanese prisoners for ques-
tioning.
The experiment was a success; and remarkably, thanks to
thorough planning, careful selection of personnel, conscien-
tious training, and luck, its cost in lives was zero. On all
these missions not a single Alamo Scout was killed.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
SPILLET OM NORGE (The Gamble for Norway). By Sverre
Hartmann. (Oslo: Ernst G. Mortensens Forlag. 1958. Pp.
244. In Norwegian).
This account of Hitler's gamble in ordering that the in-
vasion of Denmark and Norway be mounted on less than three
months' notice and without any real military intelligence
groundwork is a byproduct of the author's research for a
broader scholarly work on the Scandinavian entry into World
War II. In the course of investigating the reasons Denmark
and Norway were drawn into the war, his publisher explains,
Mr. Hartmann assembled much material on the military
preparations made by the German staffs. He also held de-
tailed talks with General Erich Buschenhagen, von Falken-
horst's former Chief of Staff, with Lt. Colonel Erich Pruck,
former head of Abwehrstelle Norwegen, and with Lt. Colonel
Berthold Benecke, former director of Kriegsorganisation Nor-
wegen and then head of Abwehrstelle Norwegen's intelligence
section. The book seems, on internal evidence, to be based
chiefly on these interviews.
Although Germany carried on extensive espionage in many
countries before World War II, Norway was considered, like
Switzerland, Portugal and Sweden, a base for intelligence and
counterespionage work against third countries and not a
major intelligence target itself:
The German Legation in Oslo kept Berlin informed on Norwegian
affairs only through overt sources, primarily by following the Nor-
wegian press and sending in representative clippings of articles,
interviews and official notices. The documents from the German
Foreign Ministry show that they were able to obtain a remarkably
good insight into the situation through studying the newspapers.
These were often extremely frank, and in many fields it was quite
unnecessary to set up any particular intelligence operations on
political and military affairs.
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Until the turn of the year 1939/40 there had been no work
whatever by the German General Staff on even a routine hy-
pothetical plan for the invasion of Norway.
The German Navy drew up a few study plans in October 1939.
That was all. The conquest of Norway was largely improvised.
Another time, if there should be another time, the preparations
would certainly be far more solid and systematic. In 1940 the
:invasion succeeded in spite of the improvisation, because the
country was militarily unprepared.
The first third of Spillet om Norge, apparently based chiefly
on Colonel Benecke's reminiscences, is a rather disorganized
set of notes and anecdotes about German intelligence opera-
tions in Norway against England and the USSR from 1937
through 1939, touching upon personalities, cover arrange-
ments, communications methods, interservice and personal
rivalries, and so forth. In its mid-section the book switches to
the memories of General Buschenhagen, and the story comes
alive. It tells of the frantic scramble to mount the invasion
ahead of expected British/French occupation. One of the
greatest problems, of course, was maintaining secrecy up to
the moment of attack. The elaborate precautions worked out
and the air of general snafu which prevailed are illustrated
in examples that would be hilariously funny if the reader
could forget that the operation succeeded because the Allies
were even less well prepared.
A typical story is that of the guidebooks. The best collec-
tion of reference material available to von Falkenhorst's staff
was the Baedeker guide on Norway. With elaborate security
precautions the staff therefore bought a small number of
copies, not more than one in any single town or single section
of a, large city: a sudden demand for the book in Germany
might come to the attention of Allied agents. As a blind,
rumors were circulated that the invasion of other areas was
impending. Thus when a battalion of mountain troops began
intensive training in the Berlin Fronau area, their command-
ing officer was told that they were to be sent to Scotland,
but that this must under no circumstances be divulged to
anyone. When the whole battalion swarmed into the book-
shops and bought up every Norwegian Baedeker in the area,
von Falkenhorst's staff learned to its collective horror that
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the battalion leader, in order to safeguard the plan for in-
vading Scotland, had prudently misinformed a few of his
closest colleagues, in strictest secrecy, that they were train-
ing for an attack on Norway.
Written for a popular audience, the book is nevertheless a
useful contribution to the literature on the early phase of
World War II. Its anecdotal form and lack of chronological
continuity are somewhat frustrating to the serious reader,
but it does add up to a fairly clear picture of German intelli-
gence operations (with occasional comment on psychological
warfare and false-intelligence operations) in Norway and of the
intelligence and security problems encountered in the hasty
mounting of the invasion.
SECOND BUREAU. By Philip John Stead. (London : Evans
Brothers Limited. 1959. Pp. 212. 18/-.)
Much has been written about three aspects of intelligence
activities in France during World War II-the work of the
Free French intelligence service; the activities of the French
Resistance, with its intelligence overtones; and the operations
of the French Section .of the British Special Operations Execu-
tive, which infiltrated agents back into France to work with
the. Resistance. Second Bureau takes up yet a fourth aspect,
the wartime history of the regular French ; military intelli-
gence service, comprising the Deuxieme Bureau and its sup-
porting organizations for clandestine collection and counter-
espionage. Its British author has written several books on
specialized French themes, notably the biography of the great
detective Vidocq and a history of The Police of Paris.
While Second Bureau is the first comprehensive book in
English on this topic, a number of works published in French
provided not disinterested sources on which the author could
draw.-' He also talked with several senior officers of the serv-
In particular, one should note Le Deuxieme Bureau au Travail by
General Gauche (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953), Chemins Secrets by
Colonel Georges Groussard (Paris: Bader-Dufour, 1948), and the
three volumes published under the collective title Mes Camarades
Sont Morts by Pierre Nord (Colonel Brouillard) (Librairie des
Champs-Elysees, 1947-1949). Stead also had access to the Bulletin
de l'Amicale des Anciens Membres des Services de Securite Militaire
et des Reseaux T. R.
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ice, among them Colonel Paul Paillole, General Louis Rivet,
and Colonel Georges Groussard. His thus apparent reliance
on sources whose reputations are professionally at stake gives
his book an extreme bias in assessing the value of the con-
tribution made by the French military intelligence services
in the war, and it must in this sense be received with caution.
This warning can be given without in any way deprecating
the skill and devotion of the officers of the regular French
military establishment who carried on its intelligence activi-
ties under incredibly difficult conditions, both in Metropolitan
France and in North Africa.
After examining the reports of the Deuxieme Bureau dating
from immediately before the French declaration of war up to
the fall of France and concluding that "the failure of 1940
was not a failure of Intelligence," Mr. Stead begins his most
interesting account of the tremendous difficulty of maintain-
ing any French military intelligence at all after the imposed
armistice. Although the service preserved many of its assets
and held them together in unoccupied France, it had for the
most part to function in double clandestinity, kept secret not
only from the Germans but also from the Vichy government.
This was particularly true with respect to counterespionage
and its attempts to eliminate and neutralize German agents
in the face of continuous German pressure on Vichy. Then
in 1942, at the time of the North African landings, the serv-
ice's main assets in files and leadership had to be transferred
to North Africa, where they were committed to General
Giraud, with his strong anti-Gaullist propensity. Stead is all
on the side of the military "professionals" when he writes of
their ultimate merger with the "amateurs" under Jacques
Soustelle.
This book's treatment of problems of organization and keep-
ing an intelligence service afloat in times of bitter adversity,
its account of operational difficulties such as that of maintain-
ing communications, and its description of particular opera-
tional successes in France and North Africa are recommended
as valuable reading, but they should be read with a full appre-
ciation of the author's bias.
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THE SECRET INVADERS. By Bill Strutton and Michael Pear-
son. (London: Hodder and Stroughton. 1958. Pp. 287.
16/-.) In paperback abridgement as THE BEACHHEAD
SPIES (New York: Ace Books. 1958. Pp. 191).
Story of the British Combined Operations Pilotage Parties
which collected intelligence for World War II invasions by sea,
sending swimmers in to observe and report on beach gradients
and composition, shoals, land contours, and defenses. Writ-
ten from the perspective of Lt. Commander Nigel Willmott,
who organized the project, carried out its first reconnaissance
on the island of Rhodes, and finally participated in the intelli-
gence scrutiny of the Normandy beaches.
THE SECRET CAPTURE. By S. W. Roskill. (London: Col-
lins. 1959. Pp. 156. 16/-.)
A documentary account of the May 1941 voyage of North
Atlantic convoy OB 318 westbound from England, centering
on its escort's capture of the German submarine U 110. Re-
buts the "first" claim of USN Rear Admiral D. V. Gallery in
his We Captured a U-boat and stresses the intelligence value
of the U 110's documents and instruments taken intact.
Painstaking detail makes the story a vivid and authentic vi-
gnette from the Battle of the Atlantic; its intelligence inter-
est lies only in the Admiralty's feat of keeping the capture
secret both from the Germans and from all but a few British
officers.
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THE SPRINGING TIGER. By Hugh Toye. (London: Cassell.
1959. Pp. 238. 25/-.)
Subhas Chandra Bose bore watching in World War II, and
his story is still of interest, featuring an unhinged extreme
of Asian nationalism, mistaken about practically everything.
This study of the Azad Hind leader and his Indian National
Army, apparently the result of Mr. Toye's pursuit as an his-
torian of a subject which was once his concern as a British in-
telligence officer, is faithful to the facts; but the author lacks
the poetic gift for treating madness.
The Indian National Army, which Bose built up and sup-
ported in Southeast Asia with a furious activity-political, dip-
lomatic, and economic-was an extraordinary instrument, in
fact an ideal instrument, for intelligence operations of all
sorts, if not for the direct combat which Bose of course pre-
ferred it undertake. It is therefore noteworthy that this in-
strument accomplished very little of significance for the Japa-
nese or for itself during the course of the war. In the field of
propaganda, where Bose's opportunities seemed as unlimited
as his ambitions, he could not break the British policy of
silence, a response which he found bitterly exasperating. In
espionage and subversion he had two minor successes, the de-
fection of a British Indian outpost and the establishment of
communications with a party of spies landed in India by sub-
marine.
These little triumphs so exalted Bose that his visions began
to blind the Japanese as well, and they withdrew their earlier
objections to his control of the spy schools and networks for
India. The great moment for the Azad Hind came with the
invasion of India, wherein INA irregulars attached to the Jap-
anese divisions were to unlock the floodgates of imprisoned
nationalism. Bose was so involved in enthusiastic prepara-
tions for the administration of liberated India that he did not
recognize the failure of the invasion until after the disaster
was complete.
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WORLD WITHIN. By Tom Harrisson. (London: Cresset.
1959. Pp. 349. 30/-.)
This is an authentic story of the virtual reoccupation in
1944 and 1945 of the interior wilderness of Borneo: a small
group of paramilitary officers of the Australian SRD (Z Spe-
cial) parachuted into the inaccessible uplands won the sup-
port of the overwhelming mass of the natives without reveal-
ing their activities to the coastbound Japanese until after the
Allied landings at Brunei Bay, Tarakan, and Balikpapan. The
author, an anthropologist who had tardily become an officer
of the British SOE and been seconded to Z Special for this
purpose, was the first of the group to drop among the head-
hunters and the one who directed its most important opera-
tions.
The account of these unique events, fabulous as it is, carries
no area or tradecraft lessons for the intelligence officer of
today, who will never have occasion to master the intricacies
of polite behavior in the communal longhouse or devise tac-
tics appropriate to a platoon of poison-dart blowpipers. Even
in 1944 there was no other place in the world like Borneo, and
today that Borneo is gone. What is of permanent value, for
the intelligence officer as well as all others concerned with
establishing viable relations with unfamiliar segments of man-
kind, is the example of the author's appreciative understand-
ing of outlandish peoples, his penetration through the super-
ficialities of their cultures to their underlying humanity, his
affection for their individuals as men.
The first third of World Within describes from intimate as-
sociation the pre-1944 life and people of the Kelabit longhouse
at Bario on the Plain of Bah. This description, an anthropo-
logical masterpiece, is free of the stilted jargon and pat gen-
eralizations which characterize much anthropological writing.
It is also free of the infection which in some measure mars the
rest of the book (like many in which authors relive the impu-
dence and glory of their exploits in unorthodox warfare)-
ill-concealed self-satisfaction and a compulsion to allot praise
and blame to former colleagues and superiors, settling old
scores by appeal to posterity.
The reader of this third, before Mr. Harrisson gets involved
in his personal and operational biography, will learn how an
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economy with no gold and little goods accumulation can be
rich, how a society with no calendar and little formal system
can be efficient, how a culture streaked with superstition can
nevertheless cleave to fundamental values. Further, he will
be led subtly to the author's implied conclusion that once you
live with them you find the samenesses among men, whether
wild men of Borneo or British aristocracy, more important
than the curious differences which our impersonal studies are
likely so to highlight that we cannot see behind them.
KNIGHTS OF THE FLOATING SILK. By George Langelaan.
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd. 1959. Pp. 320. 21/-.)
The early days of World War II found George Langelaan a
corporal in the British Field Security police, and these mem-
oirs of his work as an intelligence agent begin with his unit's
activities in unmasking German agents among the refugees
who clogged the Belgian highways ahead of the retreating
Allied armies. Back in England after Dunkirk, his familiarity
with France and mastery of the language-he was born in
Paris and had a good deal of French schooling-made him a
natural selection for intelligence assignment as secret agent
in France. His book touches lightly on his agent training, a
subject which has been better covered elsewhere.
The episodes he relates from his activities in France carry
a number of object lessons in security-the unreliability of
plastic surgery in keeping your voice unrecognized over the
telephone, the need to have a ration card forged well enough
to pass scrutiny when submitted for exchange, the danger
of keeping a British Red Cross flag pinned under your vest
lapel. They also describe some painful and painstaking tech-
niques for escape from detention, telling how an agent con-
fined in a Vichy prison drank soapy water day after day until
he was vomiting blood in order to obtain transfer to a hos-
pital, then after being operated on for ulcer escaped and
dragged himself across the Pyrenees, and how the author him-
self was helped by the French Resistance to escape with sev-
eral others from a prison camp. After he returned to Eng-
land, Langelaan was posted to Algiers, but his short chapter
on intelligence and psychological warfare there, notable for his
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admiration of C. D. Jackson and newspapermen as practition-
ers of the psychological warfare art, has very little depth.
Several chapters are devoted to British security and coun-
terespionage activities during the war, telling for example how
a German agent sent to England to learn about the state of
British defenses was allowed to sight concentrations of air-
craft and naval ships repeatedly moved up along his route.
The help of everyday people in trapping spies in Britain is en-
tertainingly described, as well as the careful, detailed work put
into developing several counterespionage cases which turned
out to be false.
It is to be regretted that several of the chapters on coun-
terespionage cases have been left out of The Masks of War,2
the American edition of Knights of the Floating Silk. The
British version faithfully follows its French original, pub-
lished in 1950 under the title Un Nomme Langdon,3 except for
the elimination of a few pages at the end.
HISTOIRE DE LA LIBERATION DE LA FRANCE. By Robert
Aron. (Paris: Fayard. 1959. Pp. 779.)
This excellent book is not a history of military or resistance
operations, but of the confrontation and counterplay of politi-
cal forces exerted between D-day and VE-day to determine
what sort of country France liberee would be. From the view-
point of intelligence operations, however, its account of the
abortive rising in the Vercors in June-July 1944 does make
manifest the capabilities and limitations of a resistance move-
ment. It perceptively portrays the divergent motives of the
actors-the allied high command, de Gaulle, the FFI, the
Communists-which help to explain, perhaps even to justify,
this tragedy.
SISTERS OF DELILAH. By E. H. Cookridge. (London: Old-
bourne Press. 1959. Pp. 224. 16/-.)
This collection of short accounts (some true and some in
whole or part imagined) of female spies of the past quarter-
2 Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959. $3.95.
'Paris: Robert Laffont. 420 frs.
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century auspiciously claims that its "facts will show better
than any theory how and why women spy." The "why," the
author states, is "the supreme satisfaction of exerting power
over men through physical attraction"; but the twelve major
and innumerable minor examples he cites do not sustain this
titillating thesis. The twelve must be taken one at a time;
that is about as far as the "facts" permit Samson's brothers
to generalize if they would avoid his fate.
Nine of Cookridge's heroines have been described before in
greater or less detail by other writers, notably by Kurt
Singer.4 Two of his ladies appear to be unique products of
his own experience in English newspaper and intelligence serv-
ice work-Marikka Revay, Lisbon spitzelin and specialist in
the entrapment of British seamen as of 1941, and "Anita,"
alias Anna Vavrinova Ignatiev, allegedly a crude MVD opera-
tive in a Levantine fly-trap. On another, Josephine Baker,
whose World War II intelligence work had previously been
acknowledged, Cookridge has added operational details, attrib-
uting them to her French case officer.
Following Singer, Cookridge accredits the story of Banda
Wilhelmina Van Deeren, allegedly the illegitimate Javanese
offspring of World War I agent Gertrud Margarete Zelle Mac-
Leod-Mata Hari. Banda, a CIA (Cookridge has Central In-
telligence Office) agent pursued by her mother's nemesis, is
claimed to have been executed in December 1950 by the Chi-
nese Communists in North Korea. The elements which make
this illegitimate mother-daughter story a natural for press
In The World's Greatest Women Spies (London, 1951) and Spies
over Asia (London, 1956) Singer reviews the following cases: Lydia
von Stahl, Soviet agent in Paris in the mid-thirties, German double
agent, and possibly a Soviet redouble after the war; Malvina von
Bluecher, alias Mrs. Valvalie Dickenson, agent of Canaris under
doll-vendor cover in New York City; Ruth von Kuehn, joint Ger-
man-Japanese agent in Honolulu from 1935 to 1941; Mathilde Carre
alias the Cat, nee Micheline Ballard; Baroness Anna Wolkoff, in-
credibly mis- or unmanaged Sicherheitsdienst agent in London in
1939-40 who subverted the chief of the U.S. Embassy's cipher office,
Tyler Kent; and Banda Wilhelmina Van Deeren, alleged illegitimate
daughter of Mata Hari. The cases of Jenny Hoffman, German oper-
ative in New York in 1938, and Baroness von Falkenhayn and Renate
von Natzner, who lost their heads for a Polish intelligence service
man in 1935 in Berlin, have been described by other writers.
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agents will undoubtedly enshrine it in the literature of the
spy-writers for so long as they credulously borrow from each
other. There is of course no trace whatever of a CIA agent
of Banda's name, description, or career.
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SECRET MISSIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Philip Van
Doren Stern. (New York: Rand McNally. 1959. Pp.
320. $5.)
Mr. Stern's wide research into the background of the Civil
War and the assassination of President Lincoln focussed his
attention on the wealth of material he describes as "the con-
spiratorial aspects" of the conflict. These range, in present-
day terms, from clandestine acquisition of intelligence
through counterespionage to maritime operations, political ac-
tion, and psychological warfare. They include, almost as an
ironic forecast, a bit about the bureaucratic struggles for
domination of the Northern secret service from Allan Pink-
erton's appearance on the scene through Lafayette C. Baker's
rise to power. Baker's own work, History of the United States
Secret Service, is described as "filled with much valuable ma-
terial but marred by the sensationalism, charlatanism and
shameless mendacity that characterized the man himself."
What the author-anthologist has done is to sift from the
mass of material available (some of it finally released as late
as 1953 by the National Archives) the better-written dramatic
stories of espionage, plotted sabotage, and heroic endeavors
on behalf of both South and North. He has also excellently
interpolated his own concepts of the relationships of these to
the chronology and fortunes of the war. The acquisition and
transmission of intelligence where it counted; the South's de-
vising and trying to carry out such schemes as the Copper-
head plot, plots in Canada, and the firing of New York City;
its many maritime ventures for economic survival, with its
bold ships such as the Sumter, the Fingal, and the Shenan-
doah, successor to the Alabama, and its Torpedo Service; the
stories of female spies-all these personal accounts of develop-
ments in the area of espionage and unconventional warfare
foreshadow much that has been done in subsequent wars by
the United States and, for that matter, a number of other
nations.
The book includes a brief but informative postscript, or ap-
hers of the Civil War. The author
i
p
, On codes and c
pendix
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credits Major Albert J. Meyer (who at the beginning of the
war constituted the entire U.S. Signal Corps) with much of
the North's beginning in this field and, with a characteris-
tically human bit of historic illumination, notes that one of
Meyer's best students was J. E. B. Stuart, who went over to
the Confederates.
It is true that in some form or other the material in Secret
Missions of the Civil War can be found elsewhere, but Stern
has created a helpful, entertaining, and instructive product in
bringing it together and weaving in his own brief but mean-
ingful interpretations.
QUANTRILL AND HIS CIVIL WAR GUERRILLAS. By Carl
W. Breihan. (Denver: Sage Books. 1959. Pp. 174. $3.50.)
A depraved, misanthropic exhibitionist using the guise of
the Civil War to glut himself on brigandage, retribution, and
murder, William Clarke Quantrill was an extremely able and
consistently successful guerrilla leader. Of a high degree of
intelligence and originality, he conceived of a guerrilla ethic
compounded of light and darkness, of God and the devil, and
he combined in his own nature dual sets of attributes-cour-
age, daring, imagination, and loyalty alongside vindictiveness,
brutality, and complete amorality.
Early in the conflict Quantrill developed a concept of total
war and Schrecklichkeit which he outlined to the Confederate
Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, when they met in Rich-
mond in the fall of 1861: "I would cover the armies of the
Confederacy all over with blood! . . . I would break up foreign
enlistments by indiscriminate massacre. . . . There would be
no prisoners. . . . Kansas should be laid waste at once! . . .
Hated and made blacker than a dozen devils, I add to my hoofs
the swiftness of the horse and to my horns the terror of a
savage following."
In his guerrilla depredations his deeds supported these
words. According to General Tom Hindman, at one time
Quantrill's superior and commander of the Confederate Trans-
Mississippi Department, Quantrill destroyed wagon trains and
transports, tore up railways, broke telegraph lines, captured
towns, and compelled the Union to keep active in Missouri a
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large force that might have been employed elsewhere. More
than 60,000 Federal troops were thus tied up fighting an
enemy that never exceeded 3,000 to 4,000 men. Several thou-
sand of the Union troops engaged against the guerrillas were
killed outright; other thousands were put permanently hors
de combat with physical wounds or battle fatigue in the en-
gagements against Quantrill and his chief lieutenants, Wil-
liam C. "Bloody Bill" Anderson and George Todd. In addi-
tion to the damage they inflicted on military objectives, Quan-
trill and his men murdered thousands of civilians, many in
cold blood, destroyed millions of dollars worth of private prop-
erty, and leveled settlements in Kansas ranging from ham-
lets like Olathe and Shawneetown to towns as large as Law-
rence, with a population of 1,200.
Quantrill's tactics provide a lesson in guerrilla warfare. Op-
erating out of territory generally sympathetic, mounted on
the best horses available in the area, and armed with the ad-
vanced Colt revolving pistol,' Quantrill's men were invincible
when they employed hit-and-run techniques. A prearranged
signal would assemble the guerrillas from the countryside;
they would rendezvous, strike, and scatter back into the coun-
tryside, taking up farming tools or going into hiding. The
only important guerrilla defeats occurred when the guerrillas
attempted to storm fortified stone or brick buildings in
towns-when they violated Quantrill's creed of fighting only
when he had the advantage and even then running if things
became too hot. Another important tactic utilized by the
western guerrillas in the later years of the war was the wear-
ing of complete Federal blue uniforms at all times, confusing
the enemy and sometimes deceiving him into costly confi-
dence.
After the winter of 1863/64 Anderson and Todd led bands of guer-
rillas independent of Quantrill.
? The guerrillas customarily carried in their belts and on their saddles
from two to eight 5- and 6-shot pistols and a Sharps carbine, which
together gave them a tremendous volume of firepower. In the early Yankee
Kansas years of the Wartyty th single shotamu le-load ng carbinesoorrmuskets
was armed ed only
and sabers. 107
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Quantrill's treatment of the civilian population where he
operated also provides a stern model for guerrilla troops. A
civilian population will generally divide into three segments-
a small group friendly to the guerrillas,' another small group
friendly to the invaders, and a great, lethargic mass neutral
and passive, seeking merely to be left alone. Quantrill did not
recognize this third category. If anyone were not actively
for him, he was against him and would be treated as a com-
plete enemy. Intimidation thus brought many neutrals reluc-
tantly to Quantrill's side. Or some particularly vicious act
of Quantrill's would arouse the Federals to violent counterac-
tion, frequently against the neutral masses, which with the
help of clever propaganda would turn them loathingly to
Quantrill as the lesser of two evils.
The question often arises as to whether a depraved, amoral
bandit such as Quantrill hurts or helps the cause with which
he sides. Certainly it is an aid to propaganda for one's guer-
rillas to be dashing men of principle such as John Singleton
Mosby or John Hunt Morgan. But against this must be
weighed the tremendous military advantage gained by having
a Quantrill, an Anderson, or even a Jesse James as an ally.
Quantrill's military contribution to the Confederacy was of
inestimable value in spite of the moral burden of his black
name and dark deeds.
Mr. Breihan's book does not do justice to the fascination of
its subject. The author uses the style of popular pulp writers,
stressing and repeating the lurid details of murder and rapine
and overwriting to the point of absurdity. He frequently dis-
agrees with another recent book on Quantrill, Richard S.
Brownlee's Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy,' denying for ex-
ample that Jefferson Davis gave Quantrill a commission, as
Brownlee says, and speaking of George Todd as a man of patri-
otic conviction, whereas Brownlee calls him "a murderous
killer." In assessing the value of the rival interpretations
one is influenced by the fact that Breihan's Quantrill has no
documentation, no bibliography, and no index, whereas Brown-
lee's Gray Ghosts is completely documented and has a fine
bibliography and a detailed index.
'Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1958.
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THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES IN
EUROPE. By James Dunwody Bulloch. (New York: Thomas
Yoseloff. 1959. Vol. I. pp. 460; Vol. II, pp. 459. $15.) Re-
print of original publication by G P. Putnam's Sons. (New
York. 1884.)
This is a detailed account of the author's years spent in
Europe purchasing the ships that became Confederate block-
ade runners during the Civil War. In addition to the ships,
he obtained the arms for them and arranged to evade British
law by having them mounted at neutral ports. After the de-
feat of the Confederacy he was exiled from the United States.
An unreconstructed rebel, Bullock was very bitter about the
defeat and over the implication that his operations had been
of a reprehensible nature, and his book was written as a de-
fense of these activities.
From the intelligence point of view these volumes are an
admirably circumstantial description of the technique used by
an undercover purchasing agent who gave remarkable assist-
ance in the Confederate prosecution of the war. Although
such an activity was considerably simpler in those days than
it is today, they remain in this sense exceedingly valuable.
109
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EVASIONS AND ESCAPES s
THE TUNNELLERS OF SANDBORSTAL. By Lt. Cmdr. John
Chrisp. (London: Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 172. 15/-.)
Cmdr. Chrisp was one of the British officers who could not
be evacuated from Crete in May 1941, and his attempt to evade
German capture and make a get-away with a few compan-
ions in a small boat ended in failure. Taken prisoner of war,
he and about two dozen others were marched some hundred
miles to their first holding area on the north shore of Crete,
a camp inadequately guarded and poorly fenced, with a
friendly population outside. Looking back on this period,
Chrisp recalls the escape opportunities that were squandered.
Had he and his companions been seasoned prisoners, many
of them could have escaped, but no attempts were made: the
first phase of reaction to capture had set in, and their will
to escape had given way to apathy and resignation. Then as
the prisoners were transported through Greece most of them
were still mentally unprepared, and several more opportuni-
ties were wasted by all but two commando officers. The moral
is one which instructors in evasion and escape have tried to
teach-that the best opportunities often arise in the earliest
periods of capture, before the captive is lodged in his perma-
nent prison. The psychological let-down on first capture can
be forestalled by proper training.
Brought to the German POW camp of Sandborstal near the
Baltic, Chrisp found the usual POW escape committee active,
but notes in retrospect that most prisoners of war become so
obsessed with the all-important problem of getting out of the
camp that they give too little thought to the difficulties of
the further journey home. After months of planning and dig-
ging Chrisp and a group of fellow-prisoners managed to tun-
nel their way out in the spring of 1942. All were recaptured
through indiscretion or when their luck failed, Chrisp a hun-
dred miles away on the Weser, and one officer within a hun-
dred yards of the Kiel Canal. Later Chrisp and two other
son this subject see also the review of Knights of the Floating Silk
on page 101 of this issue.
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officers smuggled themselves into a baggage truck and were
driven out of the main gate, but were then discovered and re-
turned to camp. Now considered dangerous escapees, they
were transferred to the toughest prison of all, Colditz Castle.
There Chrisp worked with the escape committee and aided
in several escape attempts before the war ran out.
BID THE SOLDIERS SHOOT. By John Lodwick. (London:
William Heinemann. 1958. Pp. 296. $4.50.)
A sophisticated and glittering autobiography of World War
II adventure in the French Foreign Legion and British sabo-
tage forces, featuring a dozen incarcerations and a number
of escapes from confinement, some of them ingenious.
112
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COMMANDER BURT OF SCOTLAND YARD. By himself
(Leonard Burt). (London: William Heinemann. 1959.
Pp. 246. 18/-.)
These episodes from the author's career include several of
peripheral intelligence interest-the repatriation, interroga-
tion, and character analysis of the wartime traitors William
Joyce and John Amery; the interrogation and character
analysis of the atom spies Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs;
some not very impressive operations against frogmen sabo-
teurs at Gibraltar; and the security measures for the Khru-
shchev-Bulganin visit to England, with personal recollections
of a human General Serov. There are also some sensible tips
on the art of interrogation, not well illustrated, however, in
the excerpts from interrogations actually quoted.
"Rodionov: A Case-Study in Wartime Redefection." By Alex-
ander Dallin and Ralph S. Mavrogordato. In The American
Slavic and East European Review, Volume XVIII, Number 1,
February 1959, pp. 25-33. (New York: Columbia University
Press [for The American Association of Slavic Studies,
Inc.])
Vladimir Rodionov was a Red Army lieutenant colonel cap-
tured by the Germans in the summer of 1941. Under the bat-
tle name Gil' he headed a SS-sponsored unit, Druzhina I, in
front line and German anti-partisan operations in 1942 and
early 1943. In August 1943 he and his entire group suddenly
rejoined the Soviets. Thereafter this unit fought its former
German sponsors with conspicuous success. Apparently Ro-
dionov himself was killed in April 1944.
From fragmentary German documentary sources and other
material the authors piece together these activities and at-
tempt to analyze the motivational complexities of Rodionov's
double defection. The available documentation is not suffi-
cient to establish the hypothesis that Rodionov may have been
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from the beginning a Soviet provocation agent, although there
is a strong presumption that this was the case.
"The Top-Secret Label." By J. Yudin. (Moscow: New Times,
No. 16. April 1959. Pp. 10-13.)
Yudin uses H. H. Ransom's Central Intelligence and Na-
tional Security and other recently published material to dem-
onstrate in typical fashion that the intelligence community,
which "has brought all branches of government into its world-
wide web of intrigue and subversion," plays a crucial part in
formulating the U.S. national policy of "cold war and constant
threat to peace."
SUPPLEMENT TO CUMULATIVE INDEX to Publications of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities; 1955 and
.L956 (84th Congress). (December 1958. Pp. 334.)
Adds to the Cumulative Index, which covered the Commit-
tee's publications from 1938 to 1954, the references for the
years 1955 and 1956. They are listed in three categories-
individuals, publications, and organizations.
A Man Escaped, by Andre Devigny. (New York: Berkley Pub-
lishing Corp., 1959. Pp. 222. 50 cents.) One of the better
books on escape.
The Coast Watchers, by Commander Eric A. Feldt. (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1959. Pp. 240. 50 cents.) Copies
of the original 1946 edition are scarce.
10,000 Eyes, by Richard Collier. (New York: Pyramid Books,
August 1959. Pp. 320. 50 cents.) Probably the best book
on intelligence activities of the French Resistance.
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 CON FI DENTI?A
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`~RRL~-
Articles and book reviews on the following pages are un-
classified and may for convenience be detached from the
classified body of the Studies if their origin therein is pro-
tected.
The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelli-
gence Collection, in scanning current public literature for in-
telligence materials, and of Mr. Pforzheimer and many other
intelligence officers in preparing reviews for this issue of the
Studies. Most noteworthy in this respect are the reviews of
Spillet om Norge, done by I I and Quantrill
and His Civil War Guerrillas, done by
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