STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 4 No. 3, Summer 1960]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300290001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 141
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: STUDY

FILE #29
CONFIDENTIAL
STUDIES
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VOL. 4 NO. 3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community or,
upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be
submitted directly to the Editor Studies in Intelligence, Room
I I and need not be coordinated
or submitted through channels. They should be typed in
duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following the
line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified
through Secret.
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CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Pa
ge
The Validity of Soviet Economic Statistics
Edward L. Allen
1
Figures are not fudged or fabricated but neverthe-
less call for expert interpretation. SECRET
The Interrogation of Defectors . . Stanley B. Farndon
9
The psychology and mechanics of making a subject
cooperative, be he authentic fugitive or hostile
agent. SECRET
The Polygraph in Agent Interrogation
Chester C. Crawford
31
Balance sheet on the results produced with a coun-
terintelligence instrument. SECRET
Audiosurveillance . . . . . . . . . . Alfred Hubest
39
Instruments and plan of operations for eaves-
dropping on the adversary. SECRET
Laboratory Analysis of Suspect Documents
James Van Stappen
47
Role of the test tube and microscope in probing the
authenticity of written material or identifying the
writer.
Postal Forgeries
SECRET
in Two World Wars
Gordon Torrey and Donald Avery
57
The philate
tions. S
Obstacle Course
list sees through some intelligence opera-
ECRET
for Attaches . . . Thomas W. Wolfe
71
Devious So
viet techniques to block the overt ob-
servation
Communication
s of foreign experts. OFFICIAL USE
s to the Editors . . . . . . . . . . .
79
On the mili
Assessment
tary attaches;
by graphology; and
Jet-age reporting. SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101
Page
W. R. Peers Al
Blazing a trail for allied forces on the road to Man-
dalay and beyond.
For. College Courses in Intelligence. A15
Learning the bases for decision-making as aid to
effective action in many fields.
Soviet Publicists Talk About U.S. Intelligence
A19
All-embracing octopus of espionage and terror that
keeps the cold war going.
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Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Intelligence and Economic Theory . . .
. .
. . .
A27
Intelligence and Military Strategy . . .
. .
. . .
A32
Clandestine Operations . . . . .
. . .
. .
. . .
A35
Propaganda . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
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. . .
A40
Miscellany . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. .
. . .
A43
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Edward L. Allen is CIA's Chief of Economic Research.
Stanley B. Farndon is a senior CIA interrogations supervisor.
Chester C. Crawford directs a section of the CIA security staff.
Alfred Hubest is an instructor in audio operations.
James Van Stappen directs a CIA headquarters facility for the
technical examination of questioned documents.
Gordon Torrey and Donald Avery are current intelligence
analysts and members of the Royal Philatelic Society.
Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe served from 1956 to 1958 as Air
Attache of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. At time of writ-
ing he was a member of the U.S. delegation at the ten-
nation disarmament conference in Geneva.
Colonel W. R. Peers, now with Defense Department's Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group, commanded OSS Detachment
101 during World War II.
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An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Win-
ter) of each volume for articles submitted during the preced-
ing calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers'
nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive com-
petence in the decision.
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SECRET
Evidence that Soviet plan ful-
fillment figures are not seriously
fudged or fabricated, but need
be interpreted with care.
THE VALIDITY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC STATISTICS
Edward L. Allen
The publication, beginning in 1956, of a variety of Soviet
statistical handbooks on the economy of the USSR signalled
the end of a twenty-year data drought. This shift from the
Stalin-imposed era of virtually complete concealment, when
even a report on the production of samovars was considered a
state secret, has been most welcome. No longer is the student
of the Soviet economy forced to function like an archeologist,
spending most of his time digging for individual isolated facts.
He now can start with figures which, while far from complete,
indeed quite skimpy by comparison with data published on the
U.S. economy, provide a sufficient basis for serious analysis.
A sufficient basis, if a valid one. Can we accept these So-
viet-supplied data as reliable and bona fide? Has the Central
Statistical Agency at the bidding of N. S. Khrushchev per-
haps erected a Potemkin village of false figures, deliberately
fabricated to deceive the West? Or, alternatively, are the data
so distorted at their source on the enterprise level as to be
meaningless when aggregated? Both these possibilities are
briefly examined in this paper.
Checks at the Enterprise Level
First, let us look at the possibility of falsification at the
source. Consider at the outset the environment in which the
enterprise director works. He is an instrument of the centrally
directed, government-owned and -operated economy. The gov-
ernment collects economic data in order to facilitate planning
and as a basis for the allocation system which channels ma-
terials and supplies where they are needed to fulfill its ob-
jectives. The operation of an economy through a system of
material balances, by allocation, requires accurate data. It
is therefore to the interest of the central control authorities
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SECRET Soviet Statistics
that enterprises provide accurate statistics, and falsification
has been made subject to severe punishment.
Yet plant managers do manipulate output and inventory
data, at the risk of their careers and stiff jail terms, as evi-
denced by the many horrible examples cited in the Soviet
press and technical journals. Why is it they resort to extra-
legal practices? The usual reason is that the centrally de-
termined production goal for the enterprise is very high; and
also the director is at the mercy of his suppliers in his efforts
to fulfill the plan. The successful industrial leader in the
Soviet Union, as in the United States, plays the game by the
rules which are actually in force, not according to a strict in-
terpretation of legal statutes. The question is whether these
manipulations are so widespread or of such a magnitude as
to invalidate production figures across the board.
There are a number of in-built controls over the director
within the enterprise itself. The chief accountant is responsi-
ble to the state for refusing to execute any orders from the
director or other senior officials to fudge his accounts and for
reporting such demands "up the line." Another plant official,
the chief of the quality control department, is subject to im-
prisonment if he falsely certifies substandard products as meet-
ing stipulated technical requirements. A more knowledgeable
representative of central authority within the enterprise is the
secretary of the Party organization in the plant, and his salary
is paid from Party funds, not by the enterprise. The role
of the Party apparatus in guiding and monitoring the activities
of enterprises has been greatly increased since Stalin's death.
Another completely independent plant official is the chief of
the "special section," or secret police, who is extremely well
paid and who maintains dossiers on all key enterprise per-
sonnel. This enforcement officer is almost certainly aware,
through his network of informers, of any shady or illegal ac-
tivities being carried on in the plant. If some such activities,
however, are necessary to carry out the government's plans-
black-market purchase of materials needed to meet the cur-
rent production goals of the enterprise, for example-he may
decide to tolerate them.
Finally, the books of the enterprise are subject to inspec-
tion by outside agencies reporting directly to the Council of
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Ministers. Representatives of the Ministry of Finance, period-
ically collecting profits and taxes, check this aspect of the en-
terprise's financial performance against the plan. The Min-
istry of State Control polices all enterprises charged with carry-
ing out the decrees of the Council of Ministers and has broad
powers to subpoena the records of any unit under suspicion.
The State Bank also plays an important role as a control
and inspection arm of the Council of Ministers. Virtually
all financial activities of an enterprise-its purchases, wage
payments, sales, etc.-are reflected in the transactions re-
corded in its account at the Bank's local branch. The Bank
is responsible for auditing these transactions to insure that
they correspond in detail to the specifications of the plan for
production. Capital expenditures of the enterprise are sim-
ilarly controlled and reviewed by the Construction Bank of the
Ministry of Finance, which disburses investment funds.
As long as the enterprise is functioning successfully, the
watchdogs of the central authorities permit the director
legal elbow-room. Thus, if he needs to "borrow" one percent
of next month's expected output to reach this month's plan
goal no one is likely to object to his reporting the plan as ful-
filled. But this borrowed production must be made up in the
next accounting period by subtraction from the then current
production. If the director continues to fall behind, one or an-
other of the enterprise watchdogs will denounce him to the
higher authorities and receive credit for uncovering the
"skandal."
The system, as it is reported by hundreds of Soviet refugees
to operate in practice, thus lets only marginal and discontinu-
ous manipulation of output data go unpunished. The error
introduced into Soviet production figures by such distortions,
one would then conclude, is in all likelihood too small to in-
terfere with their usefulness.
Intelligence Verifications
We in intelligence have further means to check the reason-
ableness of individual enterprise reports. Military and civilian
embassy officials have been engaged in observational report-
ing from iron curtain countries for many years.
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SECRET Soviet Statistics
Within the past few years, opportunities for observational
reporting have been multiplied as a result of the East-West
exchange program. Visits to the USSR by U.S. experts which
followed the signing of the Lacy-Zaroubin agreement of 27
January 1958 have been particularly valuable in providing a
check on official reports of industrial production. In 1958 and
1959, U.S. technical personnel visited Soviet factories in the
iron and steel, electronics, plastics, electric power, and anti-
biotics industries. Similar exchanges have taken place be-
tween USSR and United Kingdom experts.
1See H. H. Hemenway's
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Soviet Statistics SECRET
In some cases, though not in all, the Western experts have
been able to check production records against observed plant
capacities. In the Soviet iron and steel industry such a check
was extensively carried out, plants representing 40 percent
of total Soviet capacity being included on the itineraries. No
case of falsification has been reported, although some data
given the U.S. delegates by the Soviets are regarded with
skepticism.
Agricultural Enterprise
Special mention should be made of particular problems
which affect the collection of agricultural statistics. First of
all, there is the problem of the competence of the rural col-
lector. Despite the sweeping claims made for Soviet educa-
tion, only 40 percent of the adult population in 1959 had had
eight years of schooling, and the proportion in the rural areas
was undoubtedly lower than this nation-wide average. The
quality of Soviet agricultural statistics has suffered from the
consequent lack of adequate training given the collectors.
Secondly, the typical peasant expertise at ochkovtiratel'-
stvo-throwing dust in the eyes-had developed to a fine art
in response to the challenge of the Tsar's tax collectors. That
it continued to be practiced long after the Communist take-
over was shown by the 1951 Soviet decree that no report of a
collective farm claiming the death of an animal from natural
causes would be accepted without a veterinary's corroboration.
Through most of the years of the Soviet regime, the final
authority for estimating crop production lay with the Office
of the Chief Inspector for Estimating Crop Yields, attached
to the Council of Ministers. This office relied on a staff of
local agents to inspect reports and used historical correlations
of weather conditions with crop yields to check the validity of
local reports and determine output. It is interesting that U.S.
intelligence officers now use this same technique to judge the
reasonableness of official Soviet claims for agricultural crop pro-
duction. Agricultural output statistics are still regarded as
generally less reliable than industrial production data, and the
agricultural delegations which have gone to the USSR under
the exchange program have provided few, if any, checks on
the published figures.
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Soviet Statistics
There are, however, a number of current developments fa-
vorable to improved agricultural reporting, to wit:
The rapidly increasing size and decreasing numbers of col-
lective farms-from 250,000 in 1950 to about 55,000 in
1959-must be resulting in the assignment of better quali-
fied personnel to prepare statistical reports.
The increasing percentage of agricultural output given food-
industry processing before going to consumers requires
that the center receive relatively accurate data in order to
plan for the food processing plants.
The progressive substitution of money wages for payments
in kind to labor will reduce independent marketing of col-
lective farm produce, putting more of it under state con-
trol and facilitating the spread of economic accounta-
bility.
Integrity at the Center
We can move now from the origination of statistics at the
farm or factory to their collation and publication at the cen-
ter. Statistics are an essential operating tool for an economy
that relies on allocation rather than a market price system
as its controlling mechanism. Lenin's decree of 1918 set up
the first Soviet statistical organization, and an industrial census
was taken the same year. Since 1948 the Central Statistical
Administration has been an independent agency reporting to
the Council of Ministers, with jurisdiction over reporting forms
and authority to check on the accuracy of reports received
from subordinate echelons. The CSA runs its own schools
for training accountants and statisticians, writes textbooks,
anti develops calculating machinery. It receives quantities of
reports covering quarterly, monthly, ten-day, and, if the sub-
ject is important enough, even daily results.
The reports that CSA receives must be reasonably accurate
if the central system of allocations is to work. Despite cut-
backs, from 700 to 800 commodities were still reported under
centralized distribution in 1959, including the most important
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fuels, chemicals, and machin-
ery. The question of the integrity of the CSA statistics is thus
reduced to whether it publishes total production figures unre-
lated to the sum of the plant production figures it receives.
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Soviet Statistics SECRET
In other words, does it keep two sets of books, one for the
internal operation of the economy, and another to throw dust
in Western eyes?
Our most comprehensive check on centralized reporting be-
came available at the close of World War II. The German
Army, in its penetration of the USSR, had captured a 750-
page statistical document carrying the official Soviet security
classification Not for Publication and entitled "State Plan for
the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in
1941." This document was recovered from the Germans by
U.S. intelligence personnel, and the data contained in it were
compared with openly published statistics, particularly those
given at the 18th Party Congress. It was found that the
openly published data were identical, except for minor dis-
crepancies that could be accounted for, with those in the
classified document intended for the official use of Soviet
planners.
It should also be remembered that Soviet officials need not
falsify data to keep the West uninformed. The USSR can
easily withhold information either for security reasons or be-
cause it would reflect unfavorably on the regime. Since the
Communists first came into power they have followed a policy
of selective release of data. The controlled release of informa-
tion, although usually designed to mislead, is conceptually
and practically quite different from falsification.
One of the best examples of Soviet manipulation of data
for propaganda purposes was in reporting grain production,
when they shifted, for the years 1933-1954, from quantity har-
vested (barn yield) to the larger figures for the size of the
crop in the field (biological yield). Although they made no
secret of this switch from standard world-wide procedure, some
unsuspecting and careless Western writers accepted the bio-
logical yield figures without correction for comparison with
Western barn yields.
Need for Interpretation
The interpretation of Soviet commodity statistics, in com-
mon with those of other countries, depends upon definition
of the categories being measured. Soviet definitions and usage
are often different from those commonly accepted in the United
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SECRET Soviet Statistics
States. Some such lack of direct statistical comparability
exists, of course, in the economic data of any two countries,
but the reconciliation of Western data is usually an easy task
because of explanatory notes appended or explanations avail-
able in convenient source books.
Such is not the case in the USSR. Often terms are not
explicitly defined, and their meaning must be determined by
laborious cross-checking. For these reasons, the statistics re-
leased by the Soviet Union must be screened very carefully
and not assumed to be comparable to U.S. figures unless so
proved by rigorous analysis.
Finally, Soviet aggregate statistics, such as those stating
total industrial and agricultural production and national in-
come, whatever merits they may have for internal measure-
ment of progress or external propaganda purposes, cannot be
compared with similar measures of total economic activity re-
leased by Western nations. The conceptual differences be-
tween East and West are too great. For example, the Soviet
definition of national income is one of physical production,
excluding most of the governmental, professional, and domestic
services included in Western income definitions. Variant meth-
ods of pricing manufactured products probably introduce an-
other area of noncomparability.
The Soviets have released enough data on physical produc-
tion, however, to enable us, by augmenting it with additional
commodity figures obtained through intelligence research, to
compute reasonably satisfactory indexes of both industrial
production and national income in terms of Western concepts.
These computations will remain a necessity: no matter how
liberal the data disclosures of the Soviet leadership in the
future, it is unlikely that they will supply us with computa-
tions of aggregate indexes based on non-Marxist definitions.
We can be reasonably sure that economic data presented
by the Soviet Union will continue to have both meaning and
significance. The major research problem will remain in the
future what it has been in the past-to find out just what
this meaning and significance is.
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Description and empirical anal-
ysis of the interrogation process
as applied to East European de-
fectors, bona fide and mala.
THE INTERROGATION OF DEFECTORS
Stanley B. Farndon
In time of war the most massive source of information re-
garding the enemy is the flow of prisoners and deserters from
his ranks. In a cold war era an important segment of positive
and operational intelligence is similarly derived from defectors,
refugees, and would-be agents. Their offering of information,
however, is not laid freely and untainted at our feet. It must
be extracted from them, sometimes against the utmost resist-
ance, and the authentic sorted out from the deceptive, the
useless from what fills our needs. This process, the job of
the interrogator, is made less difficult in wartime by our hav-
ing the prisoner wholly at our mercy for the duration; over
peacetime enemy sources the equivalent control must for the
most part be achieved by psychological means.
Particularly the critical first phase of an interrogation-
that undertaken to determine whether the defector is genuine,
an enemy agent, or just a swindler-demands much poise,
knowledge, human understanding, dexterity, and perseverance.
The interrogator must have the manner and bearing to im-
press his subject as a person of authority. His knowledge
of the subject's country should be such as to evoke respect,
and his command of the language so fluent as to permit easy,
natural conversation and an instant grasp of subtleties. He
needs to sense the kind of person he is dealing with and dis-
cern quickly any change of attitude reflecting uneasiness, re-
lief, reserve, or unrestraint. He must be able to convince the
subject of his deep personal interest in his welfare. He must
be tactically skilled and flexible in his approach, keeping the
spun threads of the story effortlessly in mind, spotting in-
consistencies, exploiting openings, recognizing significant in-
formation, learning without revealing his interest. With some
subjects he needs inordinate patience and determination.
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SECRET Interrogation
Aims and Precepts
In all three types of defector interrogation-the initial coun-
terintelligence probing of the subject's bona fides, debriefing a
bona fide defector of his knowledge useful to intelligence, and
the extraction of operational information from the purported
defector in intelligence employ-the interrogator's aim is to
get the subject to give information willingly and without re-
serve. This he can accomplish best by achieving a harmonious
atmosphere and creating a close personal rapport with the
subject, a rapport based on the subject's respect for the in-
terrogator and confidence in his good will. To this end he
must on the one hand be understanding, just, and friendly, and
on the other maintain the psychological superiority essen-
tial to control.
During the early stages of an interrogation, the interro-
gator's main objective is to discover exactly what sort of per-
son he is dealing with, and so how best to use his own per-
sonality to get the subject to answer questions willingly and
truthfully. But the subject also tries to use his personality.
He usually assumes a number of poses by means of which
he hopes to gain the good will and trust of his interrogator
in order to assure his own future well-being, or if he is an
agent, in order to pass safely through the security channel
and end up in position to fulfill his mission. Regardless of
the capability of the interrogator and the character of the
subject, these assumed poses make it very difficult to achieve
frankness and sincerity during the initial interrogation periods.
The process can be hastened, however, by preparation in ad-
vance, and the interrogator should try to forearm himself
with all available information on the subject's professional in-
terests and the details of his everyday existence in his home-
land. Thus he can start a flow of conversation on topics within
the range of the subject's knowledge and interest. Then as
he senses the subject's outlook on life and his views on mat-
ters discussed, his sympathetic understanding of these will
lead the subject to talk more freely. Every effort should be
made to induce him to speak freely rather than merely an-
swer questions. Uninterrupted privacy is an important con-
dition at this stage. Once the interrogator has gained his own
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Interrogation tt
impressions of the subject's personality and character, his
background knowledge of the case and his first-hand observa-
tions will enable him to sort out the various poses from his
true characteristics, motives, and intentions.
The tension of the interrogation situation makes the sub-
ject wide awake and perceptive to everything that goes on.
The interrogator must therefore also maintain a state of keen
perceptiveness in the battle of wits, fitting his observations
quickly into the emerging picture as the interrogation pro-
gresses. An interrogator not physically rested and mentally
alert will have a most difficult time gaining psychological su-
periority. Even intellectually inferior defectors have a fine
instinct for sensing the interrogator's qualities and spotting
flaws in his attitude or reasoning which tend to destroy the
respect necessary for psychological control.
The fact that a defector is dependent on the West's good
will for his future well-being is a lever which the interrogator
can utilize to control him; it does not take a defector long to
realize that he enjoys favors in direct proportion to his co-
operation. Yet the prospective source may be under physical
control and still fight the interrogator with his brains and
spirit. At least he may be sizing the interrogator up, care-
fully observing his statements and mannerisms, in order to
find an area for maneuvering. And if he should be an agent,
he can be expected to have been carefully trained and briefed
in anticipation of questions he'll be asked. The problem is
one of motivating the subject to cooperate, usually of de-
veloping confidence in the integrity of the interrogator and
assurance that his future will be adequately taken care of in
resettlement.
The best results are obtained when the subject is impressed
with his interrogator's good judgment and sense of justice.
The interrogator should make only such commitments as lie
within his authority and ability to keep. One of the worst
possible practices is that of making promises that he cannot
or knows he will not keep. The reversal of promises indis-
criminately made destroys the subject's respect for him and
the rapport between them. The interrogator should have
enough authority and latitude to approve or disapprove most
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of the requests made by a subject; he needs to create the
impression that he is a person of consequence, not just a lin-
guist who must check everything out with his boss. When
faced with a request beyond his authority he should give the
subject a logical reason for delay without revealing that he
must ask permission from above, explaining perhaps that this
is a matter to which he must give some thought before decid-
ing. In rejecting a request he should be careful not to leave
any suspicion that he is discriminating against the subject
(unless he is using this tactic as a device in the process of
breaking an agent subject).
It is best for the subject to be brought into the interroga-
tion room after the interrogator is already seated there in
a good position to observe him during the interrogation. A
common error made by some interrogators is to keep the sub-
ject waiting for some time for them in the interrogation
room: waiting gives the subject too much chance to get a
comfortable familiarity with his surroundings. The question-
ing should be done in carefully chosen phrases on the subject's
own language and vocabulary level. The questions should be
clear, direct, and simple: a subject is often unwilling to ex-
pose his ignorance by asking for clarification of intricate ones.
Leading questions should be avoided; they generally result
in the subject's giving an answer he thinks is wanted, and so,
frequently, to a good deal of fabrication.
The subject's behavior must be interpreted in the light of
the interrogator's observations of his personality. A funda-
mental point is whether he is naturally communicative or
hard to draw out. If an inhibited man is taciturn when ques-
tioned on personal aspects of his life, that reticence is sig-
nificant only in showing the interrogator that he must work
the harder to gain his confidence. But if an uninhibited sub-
ject becomes suddenly taciturn, the interrogator can conclude
that his reticence, not being characteristic of his personality,
hides deception. Some subjects, particularly Russians, pre-
tend to be quite simple-minded and stupid in order to avoid
talking too much, but reveal their native intelligence once
they are induced to talk freely.
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Defector Behavior Patterns
With the hazards that always attend thinking in terms of
types and with the reservation that the essential thing is to
understand the individual subject's background and psychol-
ogy, it is helpful to have in mind some behavior patterns ob-
served in the East European defector and several distinct
variant types of personality which occur among the Slavs.
Like all human beings, Slavs are particularly talkative after
a harrowing experience such as that which they have usually
had in escaping from their homeland. Whatever their beliefs
and loyalties may have been in the past, the treatment they
experience in the West creates a tremendous psychological im-
pact. They realize how much better Western standards of life
are than those in the Soviet orbit. Since self-preservation is a
strong factor in defection motivation, they can be expected to
try to ingratiate themselves with their interrogators in the
hope of getting special consideration in their resettlement.
They are susceptible to flattery and can readily be convinced
that sincerity and cooperation will exonerate them from any
guilt in defecting. They tend to undervalue the importance
of any information they have, especially if it appears that the
West already has some knowledge along the same lines.
Slavs are inclined to be cooperative when confronted by su-
perior authority. They are particularly sensitive at having
outsiders belittle their national heroes. They respond hu-
manly and well to kindness, consideration, and understanding.
Once induced to talk, it is a simple matter to keep them talk-
ing on subjects of interest to intelligence.
I have found it advantageous, in my experience with East
European defectors, to conceive of four variant types of per-
sonality requiring distinctively different approaches in inter-
rogation. Two or more of these conceptual types, of course,
can mingle and modify one another in a concrete individual,
and the interrogation must be adjusted accordingly. The per-
sonality structure predominant in the four types is respec-
tively what I shall call rational, vital, emotional, And ,tense.,
'Cf. Guide for Intelligence Interrogators, 707 European Command
Intelligence Center, April 1948, col. 10ff.
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The rational-structure personality is one under superior
control by the mind and will. It is characterized by natural
assurance and reserve, with very little outward display of emo-
tions such as fear, surprise, joy, or sadness. An individual of
this type is attentive during interrogation, frankly curious,
and privately he is estimating the situation with objectivity.
His speech is well controlled and modulated. There is little
difficulty in establishing points of contact for conversation
with him, but it soon becomes evident that there is a well-
defined area of personal matters to which he uncompromis-
ingly denies access.
The interrogator must recognize these characteristics in
time to avoid using an inappropriate approach that would
spoil all chance of achieving any degree of psychological su-
periority. He must be something of a rational type himself
to cope with one, adopting an objective, cause-and-effect at-
titude. He must recognize the logical validity of the moral or
material considerations that underlie the subject's behavior.
It is rarely that a rational-structure personality turns out to
be an agent.
The vital-structure personality, characterized by self-asser-
tive `energy and resilient vitality, is most often found in Rus-
sian subjects. Its intense energy often gives it charm and the
momentum of great self-confidence, but it is likely to be
driven by instinctive urges without deliberate rational pur-
pose. It can endure long suffering and emerge with vigor and
self-assurance.
If a subject of this type is met with inconsiderate harsh-
ness, he will defend himself with tenacity and resilience. He
patiently stores up his emotions to react when he finds a vul-
nerable spot in his interrogator. On the other hand, any soft,
sentimental approach makes him suspicious. He is shrewd and
adaptable, and can conceal his true character by playing any
part assigned him or one to support some theory he feels the
interrogator has formed. Then he can reverse the field and
produce an entirely different story, rendering the results of
all previous interrogation useless, in order to gain time and a
fresh stand for resisting the investigation.
Psychological superiority over the vital-structure type is
hard to attain. The interrogator must likewise display a
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strong and assured personality, with similar vitality and re-
silience. He must avoid any effort to play on the emotions, be-
cause these subjects do not soften up in their attitude. Under
no conditions should he attempt to bluff one of them; all his
declared intentions must be meticulously carried out. Pa-
tience is an important virtue for the interrogator dealing with
a vital-structure personality, and he should do more listening
than questioning. The best method of establishing rapport
with such a subject is by showing an interest in the details
of his life history, his environment, profession, family, and
his desires for the future.
The emotional-structure personality is dominated by ill-
controlled emotion, rather than mind and will or the drive of
ebullient energy. It is manifested by visible or audible expres-
sion of any joy, excitement, pleasure, depression, defiance, or
other feeling caused it, by sensitive or violent reaction to any
changes of treatment, by emotional exaggeration and plead-
ing, and by general sentimentality of outlook. Emotion may
drive this type to overflowing recklessness and the senseless
risk of his whole career and life, or to a blind beating of his
head against obstructions and limitations. He usually has a
basic yearning to escape the realities of life and a tendency to
lean emotionally on another person, and so to hero-worship.
The emotional type, being easily impressed, is susceptible to
almost any skillful approach employed by the interrogator.
But the interrogator must be particularly alert, self-con-
trolled, and quick on his feet in dealing with these subjects in
order to take full psychological advantage of their changes of
mood. They tend toward extremes, and the interrogator must
catch them at the right extreme. , Logical arguments and per-
suasion can rarely bring about a change in their mood, and
delving into their emotional depths should also be avoided.
They should be made to feel at ease in conversation on some
objective topic, and a rapport established with developing ac-
quaintance on the basis of confidence and respect for. the in-
terrogator.
It is particularly advantageous with this type. that the in-
terrogator..be presented as a person of rank and dignity.. He
can take full advantage of the subject's characteristic need
~~EEr~[
S
or
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for another person to lean on, one in whom he has a feeling of
personal confidence. Under no circumstances should the in-
terrogator be persistently cool to the subject when he seeks
support. This is the proper psychological moment for him to
show not only strength and firmness but sufficient benev-
olence and interest in the subject's future to warrant the
subject's putting himself in his hands.
An intelligence agent with an emotional-structure person-
ality normally does not bear up well under long strain. It is
often possible to catch him off guard by deliberately arousing
certain emotions. After tenaciously holding out for some
time he may suddenly abandon his position, having decided
that it is senseless to continue his deception, and in a display
of characteristic recklessness confess that he is an agent.
This breakdown usually follows an inner struggle that is some-
times obvious or at least noticeable in an attitude of gloom,
brooding, and apathy. The interrogator should be sufficiently
sensitive to recognize that such an inner struggle is going on
and not be too aggressive: overvigorous handling could cause
stubbornness and an increased will to resist. He should ob-
serve perceptively the source's moods and calculate what
steps he can tactfully take to remove the last obstacles of
reason and will power. Then a little prompting at the right
moment can often bring on the spontaneous outburst with a
full confession. Sometimes a change of quarters and treat-
ment produces the additional momentum needed. This spon-
taneous self-abandonment is usually genuine in an emotional-
structure personality, but is sometimes simulated by others,
most successfully by the vital-structure type, in order to get
the pressure off and feed the interrogator a new cover story.
The tense-structure personality results from an irreconcil-
able discord of psychological forces which prevents the subject
from achieving a satisfying dignity and meaning for his life.
His behavior manifests his desperate striving for such dignity
and meaning; he is strongly egocentric, with a tendency to-
ward absurd boasting and exaggeration. He often appears to
act from contradictory motives. His artificial poses and un-
natural attitudes may sometimes genuinely express his per-
sonality, but even then they appear insincere and inappropri-
ate to his true character.
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Most such subjects act diffident and are difficult to ap-
proach. They are unlikely to have any appreciable reserve of
vitality. Close scrutiny of a subject's life history may reveal
symptoms of a tense-structure personality in advance-fre-
quent personal quarrels with superiors and equals, claims of
intrigues and plots against him, evidence of difficulty in
adapting himself to social environments, explanation of his
failures as the result of vicious actions of others, or pretended
resignation to the whims of fate.
Subjects of tense-structure personality are most difficult to
interrogate. By nature distrustful of people, they shy away
from the interrogator's efforts to win their confidence. It is
hard to find a thread of continuity on which to build rapport
with them when they deny obvious truths stubbornly and
senselessly, becoming subjectively convinced of the plausibility
of their stand. In their constant striving to protect their
own egos, they lose the normal instinct to tell the truth. All
facts obtained from them have to be checked out carefully
against other sources of information. It is quite often im-
possible to establish their bona fides, and even when they have
confessed to being agents the truth of their accounts must
be constantly rechecked.
The CI Interrogation Center
A safehouse should be established in a somewhat isolated
area for exclusive use as a CI interrogation facility. If it is
used as a holding area where several defectors are handled at
the same time, its internal arrangement should be such that
no one of them can ever see or contact another. Quarters
for the defectors should be of three types-ordinary rooms
furnished with a bed, small table, and a dresser; a more elab-
orate room for high-level defectors or for those who, their
bona fides established, are awaiting transfer for positive in-
telligence debriefing; and a cell with only cot and mattress, a
small indirect light, and a slop bucket-no furniture, no wash
basin, no conveniences.
There should be at least two ordinary interrogation rooms
and one special isolation room for obstinate cases. One of the
two ordinary ones must have an adjoining room for making
recordings and visual observations unseen. They should be
furnished formally, with facilities for either a friendly or an
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unfriendly atmosphere, for example with a desk and executive
chair, one or two easy chairs, a small table, one ordinary
straight-back chair, and one uncomfortable straight-back
chair. There should be a buzzer to summon the guard.
On the wall behind the interrogator's desk there should be
a one-way mirror, in which the interrogator, ostensibly not
watching the subject as he asks a key question, can observe
his unguarded reaction. The mirror also provides for observa-
tions from the adjacent room: agents who, for example, after
a particularly strong session the image of abused innocence,
are left alone, have been seen through it to smile slyly and
preen themselves at having put their act over on the inter-
rogator.
The Establishment of Bona Fides
The defector is brought to the safehouse at night, on a
roundabout route and wearing dark glasses, to protect its lo-
cation. He spends most of the first day in administrative for-
malities, being photographed and fingerprinted, taking a medi-
cal examination and an IQ test, and filling out a questionnaire
that covers the salient facts of his life history and defection.
He also begins to get acquainted with his interrogator before
the day is over, at an informal dinner on the first night. The
interrogator encourages his subject to relax and talk freely on
topics of his own choosing. Recorded for later comparison
with statements made during the formal interrogation, this
spontaneous talk immediately after the shock experience of
successful defection often provides valuable leads. Even pene-
tration agents are affected by the informal atmosphere and
let slip clues that prove useful in unmasking them.
The interrogator studies his subject's personal history
questionnaire for further clues to his personality, as a basis
for planning conversation and the sequence of investigation
topics, and to spot items that appear illogical or vulnerable.
Then on the second day the formal but friendly CI interroga-
tion sessions begin. The initial phase is important. The in-
terrogator should be formal but not officious, sympathetic but
not maudlin. He should strive to be the subject's superior and
yet his good friend, an investigator and yet a defense counsel.
This attitude produces good results even when the subject
turns out to be an agent.
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There are many psychological burdens weighing heavily on
a defector. Regardless of his motivation for coming over, his
spirits are low at this stage of what might be called defection
shock. Guilty about his desertion and apprehensive over his
future, he feels lost and friendless in a foreign land. Above
all else, he wants to be understood. The interrogator can
profit from his feeling of loneliness by showing the friendli-
ness and solicitude he needs and thus earning his gratitude.
This moral support is probably more important to him at this
time than any possible material considerations. An atmos-
phere of relaxed, natural orderliness will help to eliminate his
fears and increase his desire to cooperate with his benefactor.
If he is an agent, the growing sense of relaxation may still
throw him off guard and cause slips that can be exploited
later.
Natural behavior on the part of the interrogator often in-
duces his subject to drop any feigned idiosyncrasies by which
he had hoped to keep the interrogator from prying too deeply
into his background or extracting information of such signifi-
cance as to aggravate his guilt in deserting his native country.
Slavs seem to feel a deeper devotion than some other peoples
to their native land, but most of them do readily adjust their
psychological outlook. Often they are receptive to the sug-
gestion that in cooperating with their interrogator they are
not traitors to their country but rather fighters against its
alien Communist rulers.
The approach of the friendly interrogation can be slanted
to take advantage of the subject's, individual propensities. If
he has deep religious convictions he can often be made coop-
erative by pointing out the great harm done to religion by the
preachings of Communism. Even agents, if they have been
coerced into espionage by fear of reprisal against themselves
or their families, can be helped by religious convictions to
throw off this fear and cooperate in a crusade against Commu-
nism. With vain subjects, and ones in lowly status accustomed
to being ignored, the interrogator can successfully employ a
subtle flattery, building up their egos to the point where they
brag about the things they know to show what big men they
were in their own country.
RE
r
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It takes from one to four weeks to establish the bona fides
of a legitimate defector. Most of them are thus cleared for
positive exploitation within two weeks or so, but when they
stubbornly refuse to talk about details of their biographies
that happen to be embarrassing to them, more time is re-
quired to clarify discrepancies. After each session the inter-
rogator should write a report of the interrogation and analyze
the data obtained, particularly with respect to those aspects
of the subject's biography, stated motivation for defection, and
escape story which experience has shown to be vulnerable
points in an agent's legend.
A good biographical legend for an agent is likely to follow
quite faithfully his true life story, omitting only his recruit-
ment and intelligence activity. It is to this point we look for
danger flags in a defector's story. Certain incidents he de-
scribes may be ones which normally would be followed by
some kind of security service investigation and involvement
with him. If he claims there were no such consequences, the
suspicion arises that this purported lack of security service
action is attributable to a relationship between him and the
service. Unless he can explain any such flags, the defector
must be considered suspect and be subjected to more intensive
interrogation. No single flag is necessarily an indication that
he is controlled by the hostile service, but several such flags
establish a strong prejudice. Some important flags are the
following:
Contact with foreigners which the security service is claimed
not to have investigated or questioned. (Makers of such
contacts are usually interrogated and warned.)
Mere reprimands for anti-regime activities while a student.
(Such activities usually call for severe punishment.)
Blackmarketeering or embezzlement.
Arrest and periods of imprisonment for criminal or anti-
Soviet activity. (Often used to account for a long gap in
employment history actually devoted to thorough agent
training.)
Inability to account for any period of time.
Membership in anti-Soviet elements during World War II,
including German POW labor force and any underground
movements.
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Membership in an ethnic underground movement.
Success in having lived under a false name.
Admitted informant activities for the security service. (A
tactic to gain the interrogator's confidence and lull suspi-
cions, as well as to account for any reactions that may
show up on the polygraph.)
Manifestations of security service interest in him, but no
approach. No recollection of topics, events, and people
that he obviously should remember.
Indications of high standard of living or educational ad-
vantages but denial of Party membership.
No normal fear of the security service while planning de-
fection and escaping.
Residence in the United States and return to the Soviet
Orbit in the early thirties.
Relatives living in the United States.
Understanding of terms normally known only to persons
familiar with intelligence activities.
The subject's real motivation for defection is an important
determination in establishing his bona fides. Agents under
defector cover usually claim to be anti-Communists, saying
that regime reprisals against family members, for example,
caused their defection, or that they escaped to take up the
fight against Communism through Western emigre organiza-
tions. Questionable motivation claims, however, do not con-
stitute evidence of espionage, since most genuine defectors also
claim to be ideologically motivated. A detailed probing with
a follow-up polygraph test is often necessary to obtain the
truth. Under searching interrogation many of them reveal
that they escaped to avoid prosecution for a crime, because
they had family trouble or an unfaithful wife, or because they
had violated some decree and feared exposure.
In analyzing motivation for defection, a careful look at the
defector's financial status is important. It is unlikely that a,
man of ample financial means occupying a position of dignity
and a satisfying station in life would give all this up for an
unpredictable future in the unfamiliar competition of the
Western world.
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The defector's escape story also provides a number of flags
signaling the possibility of an agent legend. Some points to
be considered suspicious and in need of clarification are the
following:
The claim that he burned or buried all his documents be-
fore crossing the border, or that he does not remember
what documents he used to pass known security check
points.
The claim that he encountered no patrols, barbed wiring, or
other border controls at places known to have them.
The claim that a person he met by chance willingly aided
him in spite of the risk.
Implausibility of escape with respect to weather conditions,
mode of transportation, border guard, or internal secu-
rity measures.
Physical condition inconsistent with declared hardships of
escape.
Condition of clothing, especially shoes, inconsistent with es-
cape story.
Inadequate explanation for having large sums in money or
jewelry.
Participation in tourist group trip while under investigation
for anti-regime sentiment.
Inadequate explanation for success in escaping from the
main body of the tourist group and its security officer.
In a careful review with the subject of all the information
and background furnished by him, the interrogator must keep
in mind that people's lives in Communist countries are deeply
and directly affected by the internal security services. Above
all, a defector fears reprisals against his family if the regime
authorities learn that he has escaped to the West and is coop-
erating with the American intelligence service. This fear is
often sufficient reason for a bona fide defector to give evasive
and misleading answers. By showing full understanding of
this and using every means at his command, the interrogator
must convince him that truthfulness and cooperation will not
cause hardship to his family, since the information he gives
will never be disclosed.
The defector's story is checked out against every available
record and all other sources of information, care being taken
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not to divulge to him any information received from other
sources. Then, after analysis of all this material and its im-
plications, a series of questions designed to resolve all discrep-
ancies is composed and presented to the defector in a poly-
graph examination.
The moment of polygraph soul-searching is one of the most
strategically valuable parts of a CI interrogation. The poly-
graph should not be used, however, until the interrogator is
certain that he has obtained all pertinent information or has
reached an impasse. It should be used not to reach but to
substantiate conclusions. When working with a suspected
agent source, the interrogator should try to obtain a confes-
sion before polygraphing. In borderline cases the polygraph
will usually pinpoint the area of sensitivity and perhaps help
to resolve doubts, but it should not be allowed to become a
crutch. The psychological approach by the polygraph opera-
tor plays an important part; when feasible he should be pro-
ficient in the required language, so that the interrogator can
remain outside the room and monitor the test by listening
in and by one-way mirror.
Quite often, the defector clarifies the discrepancies in his
story during or immediately after the polygraph examination.
If a re-examination verifies these explanations, and if the pre-
ponderance of the interrogation material indicates that the
defector is genuine, a statement of his bona fides is issued and
he is removed, at night, from the CI safehouse to an overt
residence for positive intelligence exploitation.
Positive Intelligence Debriefing
The newly assigned PI interrogator normally needs only a
very short time to get into rapport with his source. He picks
up where the CI interrogator left off, and his task is made
much simpler by his being able to approach the source with-
out suspicion. Since his duties call for promoting his well-
being, he should be able to gain his full confidence and respect
and elicit whatever information he has. Nevertheless he
should put some effort into cultivating a friendly relationship
before jumping into direct questions, and he should continue.
to emphasize that all information divulged will be carefully
insulated from the authorities of the source's homeland.
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As a bona fide source, the defector enjoys a comfortable life
in which he receives lodging, excellent meals, clothes, toilet
articles, and a small salary. In return for this support, he
has to report for work five days a week, or oftener if neces-
sary, and give his full cooperation in the PI interrogation.
Although he is a free man in the West, he is thus immediately
dependent upon the intelligence service for lodging, suste-
nance, and clothing, and ultimately for documentation to
legalize his immigration and for assistance in resettlement.
Because of these controls and because he is no longer under
any suspicion, it is assumed with reasonable certitude that
he will be truthful in the information he furnishes.
Before beginning his debriefing, the interrogator should
study carefully the report of the CI interrogation in order
to provide himself with all available background information
and foreknowledge of the source's psychological characteris-
tics, his special fields of knowledge, and the extent to which
he can be exploited. Familiarity with the details of the
source's past life will also be of immense help in establishing
quick rapport.
The aim of the PI interrogation is to fill consumer require-
ments without revealing to the source what specific informa-
tion is sought. It is most important that the interrogator
know exactly what information is required. The more he
learns about the customer's needs, the more flexible and in-
genious he can be in the interrogation. On his broad under-
standing of requirements depends also the degree to which
wandering off from specified topics is permissible. Such wan-
dering sometimes leads to topics of even greater value than
the requirements being serviced, but the interrogator must
be capable of distinguishing useless drivel from worthwhile
information. The amount of research he needs to do in any
particular case depends upon the subject matter and what
the particular source is likely to know; but the interrogator's
chief weapon is knowledge, and his effectiveness is directly pro-
portional to its readiness.
The debriefing will usually proceed much more smoothly if
the questions asked are worded in such a manner as to elicit
specific answers. Each topic should be thoroughly explored
and completed before going off into another area. The inter-
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rogator should never accept a negative response to a question
until he has covered all possible variations on it: quite often
a source knows things which he does not even realize he knows
until a probing question brings them to the surface. His
first answer covers what immediately comes to mind, but his
thoughts can be channeled to surface further observations
by brief follow-up questions-"Can you explain that in more
detail?" "Can you give an example?" "How did you learn
this?" Under no circumstances, however, should the inter-
rogator ask leading questions or make hints which might in-
fluence the substance of the replies.
The PI interrogation is usually not recorded verbatim; a
record is written up from the interrogator's notes. These
are best transcribed on the same day as the interrogation ses-
sion. Then if they are found to be incoherent or incomplete
at any point, they can be clarified at the next session.
In most respects the PI interrogation of a bona fide defec-
tor parallels ordinary debriefing and interviewing procedures.
Let us return now to the CI interrogation which does not issue
in the establishment of bona fides.
The Extraction of Confessions
When the CI interrogator feels that a preponderance of
evidence turned up by interrogation and polygraph examina-
tion indicates that the defector is an intelligence agent, he
begins a more intensive interrogation. This intensive ap-
proach to the clarification of existing discrepancies must be
carefully planned. The methods that may be used are com-
plex and varied, depending among other factors on the char-
acter of the subject and the capabilities of the interrogator.
If the interrogator decides that drastic measures and strong
control are necessary, he must be sure that he can play the
tough disciplinarian's role.
The variety of techniques for unfriendly interrogation run
from mildly unpleasant ones to measures just short of vio-
lence. In one type of approach the subject may be made to
feel it futile to protect information that apparently is already
in the interrogator's hands, especially if he has to experience
discomfort and unpleasantness to do so. The interrogator
must be thoroughly briefed for this approach; he begins by
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SECRET Interrogation
posing questions to which he already has the answers. When
the subject hesitates to reply, the interrogator then scorn-
fully gives the answer himself, until the subject feels foolish
at trying to hide things that appear to be common knowledge
when by cooperating he would become eligible for better treat-
ment.
The interrogator may exploit the subject's emotional en-
tanglement in personal problems and desires, playing up his
anger, jealousy, homesickness, or other passions until he has
developed a state of emotional confusion and instability. He
may create in the subject a sense of insecurity and anxiety
by becoming vociferous, kicking furniture around, banging
on the table, and giving vent to well-acted rage, until the sub-
ject is willing to talk simply to escape this wrath. He can
let the subject know that he is fully familiar with Soviet in-
terrogation tactics and could practice them himself if pro-
voked by continued lack of response to humane methods. He
can bluff with specific threats if he is sure the bluff won't be
called.
Sometimes it is decided to use two interrogators with two
completely different approaches, the first displaying a great
deal of aggressiveness, discourtesy, bluster, and threat, the
second soft-spoken, kind, and sympathetic. The subject often
comes to look to the second man for sympathy and protec-
tion from the first, and eventually converses freely with him.
If the subject is especially stubborn, he may be moved to
the windowless room with only a small light built into the
wall. He is deprived of most of his cigarette rations and read-
ing materials. Only his underwear is left for clothing. He
has very little chance for suicide with no light cord and little
clothing. He is not permitted to shave. He is deprived of all
human contact and attention except for being brought basic
sustenance. The interrogator keeps reminding him that he
wants to be a friend, that he would like to ease the discomfort,
that he could make everything all right if only he had a state-
ment of the full truth, whatever it might be. Most people,
and especially the gregarious and talkative Slav, cannot en-
dure this prolonged confinement in utter loneliness, and in
time become willing and eager to talk freely, resorting to the
interrogator as their only friend.
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Interrogation SECRET
If the bewilderment of loneliness does not produce results,
however, two or more interrogators familiar with all of the
facts of the case may take turns at continuous interrogating,
so that the subject cannot rest and keep his mind clear. His
resulting confusion leads to slips that disclose new evidence.
Under further continuous questioning he usually reaches in
time a point where he sees no sense in resistance and makes
a confession. When the confession is reduced to writing and
signed, a probing for details should commence immediately,
tempered only by the subject's condition at the time.
Among the psychological pressures that can be brought to
bear at various phases of these techniques are the following:
Pointing out the subject's untenable position, the fallacy of
his story, persuading him that his service sold him down
the river by providing him with such a stupid legend; em-
phasizing that American intelligence has no interest in
punishing him, but does have interest in his cooperation
in the future.
Isolation in a dark, sound-proofed room, depriving him of
sight, hearing, and mobility; consequent development of
claustrophobia. (A psychiatrist should check to ensure
that his sanity does not reach the breaking point.) Re-
turn to isolation after removal and requestioning with-
out response.
Irregular scheduling of interrogation, waking subject say at
2 a.m. for a six-hour debriefing and on the following day
at 1 a.m. for a 12-hour session.
Alternating light and dark, preventing rest and sleep.
Sound waves.
Creation of terror illusions.
Raising or lowering temperatures to point of discomfort.
Limiting washing and latrine facilities.
Cutting food ration to minimum sustenance. Manipulat-
ing cigarette ration.
Jostling without actual physical harm.
Heavy physical training exercises.
Medical examination disclosing fictitious dread disease;
treatment to depend entirely upon the good will of the
interrogator.
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SECRET Interrogation
If all else fails, the interrogator may request permission
to use drugs and narco-hypnosis or hostile methods that may
endanger the subject's mental and physical health. The need
to apply hostile methods represents a degree of moral victory
for the suspect even though he may subsequently confess.
Before making such a request the interrogator must have
exhausted all other means, must be convinced beyond rea-
sonable doubt that the subject is an agent, and must have
reason to believe that his confession would reveal informa-
tion of critical importance to the national security.
The severer methods seldom need be used. Agents some-
times follow instructions to be insubordinate and insolent if
pressure is brought to bear on them, an attitude which bol-
sters their self-confidence and may also incite an interroga-
tor into thoughtless punitive action that in turn reinforces
the agent's resentment and increases his will to resist. But
the exceedingly stubborn agent suspects are relatively few.
Most suspects, after a period of shocked innocence and steady
denials, suddenly and recklessly confess. When the interroga-
tion first became unfriendly they realized that they were sus-
pect, and their worry, loss of sleep, and fear of the future
began eroding their will to resist, especially if they had been
forcibly recruited by the intelligence service, having neither
stomach for espionage nor patriotic motivation.
Under these conditions the interrogator can utilize his
subtlest weapon, his art of asking just the right question at
just the right moment, and in just the manner to elicit an
answer that may lead to a confession. The questioning may
either aim directly at the discrepancies in the defector's story
or search roundabout and apparently random paths for clues
to concealed facts.
When a confession comes too quickly, a thorough and probing
inquiry for detail should be made. The hostile services know
that a man cannot be successfully prosecuted for spying against
the Americans in Europe, and that if an agent confesses he
may before long be legitimately documented and free to carry
on any line of activity he wishes. The interrogator should
obtain as much information as possible about the ready con-
fessor's service and his purported intelligence activities.
When he seems to have told all he knows, he should be poly-
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Interrogation
graphed again. If discrepancies still exist, the interrogation
must be continued until they are clarified or until the per-
missible period of confinement is exhausted.
Operational Interrogation
In any case, the debriefing of a confessed agent for opera-
tional information should normally be conducted by the CI
interrogator. A confessed agent will frequently try to con-
ceal certain elements of his mission and training, and it is a
relatively simple matter for the CI interrogator to switch
from debriefing back to his old technique to impress the agent
with the error of his ways and obtain his subsequent coopera-
tion. When all operational information has been obtained
he can be transferred if desired for regular PI debriefing.
The CI debriefing should cover:
Name, rank, position, unit, personality description, and all
details regarding his case officer and any other intelli-
gence personnel with whom he has been associated.
Assigned mission, in detail, and time limit for completion.
Area in which the mission is to be performed and main
target field-American intelligence, military installa-
tions, political organizations, emigre groups, economic in-
formation.
Exact method of crossing border and passing various check
points.
Communications, i.e., radio, codes, dead drops, courier, secret
writing, rendezvous points.
When recruited, how, and by whom.
Remuneration.
Intelligence training, i.e., location of school, names of in-
structors, kinds of courses taken, duration, number and
names of other students, unit sponsoring the school.
Documents, currency, equipment, and clothing furnished
for his mission.
Names of any persons who may have assisted him to cross
the border.
Method of accomplishing his mission.
Extent to which the mission has been accomplished.
Knowledge about his own intelligence service, its organiza-
tion, command structure, personnel.
Knowledge about American intelligence.
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SECRET Interrogation
Any special knowledge he may have.
Overall positive and operational intelligence knowledge.
Extreme caution must be exercised when a confessed agent
discloses his knowledge readily, divulges important-appearing
information, and offers his services as a double agent. It is
quite possible that, acting according to the hostile intelligence
service's plans, he is making a play to gain the confidence of
American intelligence. The authenticity and completeness of
his operational statements should be rigorously checked on
the polygraph.
If the results of probing operational interrogation and of
the polygraph examination are compatible, then a double-
agent play may be considered. Upon the man's agreement
to work for American intelligence, his true intentions must
be examined again by polygraph with extreme care. It is de-
sirable to place him under careful surveillance and closely
evaluate the take resulting from his activities. He should be
checked periodically by all possible means.
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Some past results and future
prospects for technical instru-
ments to sense deception.
THE POLYGRAPH IN AGENT INTERROGATION
Chester C. Crawford
Philosophers and psychologists, and indeed most of man-
kind, have always been fascinated with the phenomenon of
lying as an aspect of human behavior. It is only during the
past sixty years, however, that researchers and investigators
have proceeded beyond the study of its cognitive phase (the
decision to lie) and behavioral phase (the overt act which de-
ceives) to examine its emotional phase (the ensuing bodily agi-
tation), which is the most significant of the three for purposes
of detection. It is therefore only recently that attempts to
detect deception have advanced from the uncertainty of per-
sonal judgment and the brutality of primitive physical ordeals
and torture to the use of scientific aids in humane interroga-
tion. The "lie detector" or polygraph in use today, a simple
but sensitive device for tracing blood pressure, respiration,
and perspiration, is the most advanced instrument thus far
developed for the detection of deception.
Deception is intrinsic to espionage activity: the ability of a
clandestine operator to deceive his opponent is his most critical
qualification. Conversely, however, the ability to detect the
deceptions of the opposition is the most critical requirement
of a counterintelligence force, and it was inevitable that the
polygraph would become a counterintelligence aid. Although
the use of this instrumental technique is associated in the
popular mind primarily with criminal apprehension, the his-
tory of its application in clandestine government operations
is almost as long as that of its connection with police matters.
One of the first plans for instrumental means to detect. de-
ception was in connection with clandestine operations. In
October 1917, at the request of the Psychological Committee
of the National Research Council, research was undertaken
at Harvard University to investigate the value of using instru-
MORI/HRP
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The Polygraph
ments in deception tests on World War I court-martial cases
and in Military Intelligence Department investigations of sus-
pected enemy agents. Early in World War II an officer of the
Berkeley Police Department in California advocated the use
of the lie detector in the interests of national defense. In
1945 Leonarde Keeler carried out polygraphic experimenta-
tion on several hundred prisoners of war in Rhode Island with
an eye to assessing the practicability of lie detection programs
in government agencies.
Successes of a CIA Program
On 12 August 1948 CIA ran its first polygraph case-the
routine security screening of an applicant. In 1949 it began
planning the use, of the technique in Europe to test the hon-
esty of agents recruited for clandestine operations. In 1951
it conducted polygraph experiments in the Far East. By 1952
the CIA- polygraph program was. operating on a world-wide
basis. Its effectiveness in practice has firmly established it
as a valuable adjunct to clandestine operations.
Its achievements can be illustrated in three studies analyz-
ing the results of polygraphic interrogation over sample pe-
riods of ' time in operational cases from particular geographi-
cal areas. The first, covering the period ? from inauguration
to 1953, is based on the area interrogators' reports for some
three hundred cases. The use of the polygraphic technique
elicited not otherwise obtainable admissions of deception in
the following categories from the indicated numbers of the
300 agents.
Falsification of vital statistics (age, birthplace, employment,
education, etc.) ........................................ 32
Concealment of past membership in Communist and Com-
munist-front organizations ............................... 16
Concealment of other past Communist activities .......... 23
Deception regarding past association with hostile or friendly
foreign intelligence services 18
Deception regarding past criminal arrests .................. 22
Concealment of past undetected crimes ................... 17
Concealment of aliases ................................... 11
Deception regarding security violations 23
Deception regarding medical or mental treatment ........ 4
The filing of false reports ................................ 4
Deception regarding use of drugs .......................... 21
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In addition, 21 instances of deception indicated by the poly-
graph but not admitted were later confirmed through other
sources. Only 6 instances of indicated deception remained
unconfirmed.
Thus more than one in ten of the agents and prospective
agents had deliberately falsified his biographic data; honest
biographic mistakes were not counted as deception. More sig-
nificantly, six percent of them had hidden their past connec-
tions with other intelligence services. It is obvious that with-
out polygraphic interrogation this sample of 300 could not
have been properly assessed.
In another study 123 agent interrogation reports made in
a different geographic area from January to December 1958
were carefully examined. With the aid of the polygraph the
interrogators had obtained previously unknown information
in the following categories from the indicated numbers of the
123 subjects:
Biographic information .................................. 61
Counterespionage information 17
Past employment by a foreign intelligence service .......... 8
Present employment by a foreign intelligence service ...... 4
Fabrication of reports .................................... 5
Hidden ideological affiliations .............................. 5
This time at least half the agents were shown to have prac-
ticed deception of some kind, and the percentage is still higher
if the 61 listed as having misrepresented their biographies
does not include all the deceivers in other categories. Six
percent had worked for foreign intelligence services, and three
percent were still so employed. At least ten agents were ter-
minated as a result of these polygraph interviews. But about
fifty-and this is an important positive product of the poly-
graph technique-were cleared of allegations that had been
made against them.
The third study covers 70 agents interrogated between Jan-
uary and June 1959, who revealed previously unknown infor-
mation as follows:
Biographic information .................................. 24
Counterespionage information ............................ 2
Past employment by another service ..................... 10
Current employment by another service .................. 5
Fabrication of operational reports ........................ 11
Hidden ideological affiliations (usually Communistic) ...... 6
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SECRET The Polygraph
Here at least one agent in every three was shown to have
practiced deception of some kind. One in seven was found
to have had past connections with other intelligence services
and one in fourteen to have current affiliations. The poly-
graph interrogations led to the termination of at least five
of them, and twenty-three were cleared of allegations against
them.
In summary, out of about five hundred agents and pros-
pects whose polygraphic interrogations were analyzed in these
three studies, from ten to fifty percent revealed deceptions of
some significance. A total of thirty-six agents were shown
to have previously unknown connections with other intelli-
gence services, some of them current affiliations which pre-
sumably made them instruments of infiltration.
Procedures and Limitations
It should be strongly emphasized that these results, al-
though unobtainable without the polygraph, must not be cred-
ited to the polygraph in vacuo. They were achieved by pro-
fessional interrogators using the instrument as an aid to diag-
nose deception in their agent subjects. The interrogator is
thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the subject's personality,
from sense of humor to skill at sports, on all available bio-
graphic data, on questionable and verified items in the sub-
ject's account of his background, and on the extent of his
access to other intelligence services. He studies the reports
from any previous medical or psychiatric examinations and
from any previous interrogations, particularly any previous
polygraph tests. In consultation with the case officer he de-
termines the topics to be covered in the test and constructs
questions designed to elicit information on them. He is pre-
pared to probe for detail regarding the modus operandi, per-
sonnel, and tradecraft of a foreign intelligence service with
which the subject is suspected of having past or present con-
tacts.
The examination begins with a pre-test period in which the
interrogator and the subject preview the questions for dis-
cussion and qualification. The examiner often takes advan-
tage of this opportunity to make his own first-hand assess-
ment of the subject, chatting about apparently unimportant
matters and watching for any tell-tale reactions or idiosyn-
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The Polygraph
cracies that may be exploited in the test. The polygraph is
then connected and the test itself administered-perhaps
twice, four times, or on occasion many more. Then, when indi-
cated by a study of the charts, there follows a post-test inter-
rogation wherein an explanation, admission, or clarification
of recorded emotional responses is sought.
The polygraph lays no claim to one-hundred-percent reli-
ability. Test results can be as varied as the individuals tested,
and the interpretation of the charts is not a simple question
of deciding whether the subject reacted or did not react.
Many charts are quite definitive; but some indicate only a
probability, and from two to five percent of the cases tested
end up being classified as inconclusive, with crucial areas left
unresolved.
Although sources of error in the instrument itself can be
eliminated-it is not hard to maintain a perfectly function-
ing machine-the human variables in the interrogator and
the subject are less easily controlled. And while error poten-
tial in the interrogator can be reduced by careful selection
and long training, the endless variety of human subjects and
their endless variety of reactions to human situations will
not ever be subject to measurement with infallible precision.
Different subjects tend to put different weights on the value
of individual questions; deceivers may show emotional disturb-
ance only at the points where they know their fabrication is
weakest, and sometimes not even then.
For all this reservation, the polygraph technique has estab-
lished its place in clandestine operations. Although in many
situations there is no need for polygraphic scrutiny, the prob-
lem of veracity being more easily resoluble through other
sources, in many others, as these studies show, the duplicity
of an agent cannot be discovered without, the use of the poly-
graph. Add to these revelations the previously unknown in-
formation of a positive nature that is a by-product of an
agent's polygraph test and the many cases of confirmed ve-
racity that enable a. project to get under way, and the value
of the technique to clandestine operations becomes a thing
beyond debate.
A more general dividend realized from the polygraph is its
disciplinary effect on the agent. He is usually a better clan-
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The Polygraph
destine operator after being polygraphed. He realizes that
he is working for a highly professional service, concerned
about security for itself and for him. He sees that he will
be expected to account for his activities. Loyal agents almost
always appreciate this attitude and look with greater respect
on the American service after their "ordeal."
An even greater role may be played by the technical detec-
tion of deception in clandestine operations of the future.
There are indications that sensational developments are about
to occur in its instrumentation, and drastic changes in tech-
nique made possible by the utilization of new recording de-
vices. The polygraph of the future may require no physical
attachments on the subject, perhaps utilizing electronic cir-
cuitry to tap physiological phenomena far more subtle but
every bit as diagnostic as the currently used blood pressure
tracings, respiration recordings, etc. It. is unlikely that im-
provements will ever fully eliminate the human variables that
make any technical assessment less than infallible, but a
paper written on this subject ten years from now may show
the uncertainties and limitations still further reduced.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barioux, M., Method for the Selection, Training and Evaluation of
Interviewers. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1:128-130, 1952.
Benfield, Wilder, The Interpretive Cortex, Science, 26 June 1959, Vol. 129,
No. 3365, pp. 1719-1725.
Best, Charles Herbert and Taylor, Norman Burke, The Physiological
Basis of Medical Practice, Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore,
1955, Sixth Edition, pp. 1096-4098.
Biderman, A. D., Communist Techniques of Coercive Interrogation, Air
Intelligence Digest, 8:12-17, July 1955.
Bledsoe, Anthony H., The Lie Detector and National Defense, San
Francisco Police & Peace Officers Journal, 12 February 1941.
Conklin, E. S., Principles of Abnormal Psychology, Henry Holt & Com-
pany, 1944.
Dana, Homer J. and Barnett, Claude C., A More Sensitive Means of
Detecting and Recording Various Physiological Changes, a paper
presented before the meeting of the Instrument Society at Los
Angeles, September 12 to 16, 1955.
Dunbar, F., Emotions and Bodily Changes, New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1947.
Ellson, D. G., Detection of Deception, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana, 1952, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N6-ONR-180.
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The Polygraph
Fitzgerald, M. J., Handbook of Criminal Investigation, New York,
Greenberg, 1951.
Giogiade, C., Magic as the Origin of Lying and the Genesis of Thought,
Psychological Abstracts, Vol. 15, 1941, Abstr. No. 948.
Gray, H., Anatomy of the Human Body, Philadelphia, Lea & Febiger,
1954.
Hubbard, A. W., Phrasing Questions; The Question of Bias in Inter-
viewing, Journal of Marketing, 15:48-56, July 1950.
Inbau, Fred E. and Reid, J., Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation,
Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins Company, Third Edition, 1953.
Karpman, Benjamin, Lying-Ethics of Neurotic and Psychopathic
Behavior, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, July-August
1959, Vol. XL, No. 2.
Keeler, Leonarde, Debunking the "Lie Detector," Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, Vol. XXV, No. 1, May-June 1934.
Lamott, K., Memoirs of a Brainwasher, Harpers, 212:73-76, June 1956.
Larson, John A., Lying and Its Detection, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1938.
Levitt, Eugene E., Scientific Evaluation of the Lie Detector, Iowa Law
Review, 1955, Vol. 40, pp. 440-458.
Marston, William M., The Lie Detector Test, New York, Richard R.
Smith Company, 1938.
Marston, William M., Psychological Possibilities in Deception Tests,
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. XI, No. 4, 552-553, 1921.
Munn, N. L., Psychology, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951.
Reymert, M. L., Feelings and Emotions, New York, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1950.
Trovillo, P. V., A History of Lie Detection, Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 29 (6) 848 (1939).
Trovillo, Paul V., Report on Chatham Polygraph Program, Russell
Chatham Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April 14, 1951.
U. S. Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, Advanced Interrogation
Techniques, 1954.
U. S. Army, Provost Marshal General's School, Interviews and Interro-
gations, Camp Gordon, Georgia, 1953.
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SECRET
Technical devices and plan of
operations for eavesdropping on
the adversary.
AUDIOSURVEILLANCE
Alfred Hubest
The relatively modern art of technical audiosurveillance is
the counterpart of audiocommunications, following like a
shadow close on the heels of every development in the latter's
techniques. Shortly after the first telegraph for commercial
purposes was installed between Washington and Baltimore in
1844, private individuals began intercepting its messages in
order to grab profits in east-west marketing manipulations,
to steal exclusive news stories, and to further other unlawful
purposes. By 1862 public concern over the interception of
telegraph messages was shown in California's enactment of
legislation prohibiting the practice. Extensive military use
of wire-tapping during the Civil War established it as a recog-
nized tool of the intelligence services of both armies.
Similarly, telephone tapping had its beginning soon after
the first commercial telephones were installed in 1878 in New
Haven, Connecticut. During the early 1890's it was practiced
to some extent throughout the entire country by private in-
dividuals, and police services had adopted it for active use. In
1892 New York State made telephone tapping a felony.
The clandestine installation of concealed microphones-
"bugging"-was not long in following. Newspaper files and
court records have for years been full of scandals and expo-
sures featuring not only the tapping of telephones and wires
but also the bugging of rooms, both by the police and by pri-
vate citizens. The records of intelligence services are less
readily available, but there is abundant evidence that even
in World War I intelligence made extensive use of microphones
along with other forms of clandestine eavesdropping. During
this period the monitoring of all kinds of communications
media, including radio, came into its own with the establish-
ment of large organized systems of illegal listening-in and
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SECRET Audiosurveillance
cryptanalysis as necessary arms of the military and political
intelligence services.'
During the past 10 years there has been a great new surge
in the use of audiosurveillance by intelligence services. This
phenomenon can be attributed in large part to the develop-
ment of improved listening, transmitting, and recording de-
vices, new installation tools and techniques, a systematized
operational approach to making audio installations, and ad-
vances in rapid processing and full exploitation of the take.
Technical Developments
All the many methods of audiosurveillance are variations of
three basic forms. First, both in frequency of use and in
volume of take obtained, is the telephone tap; second comes
the concealed microphone connected by wires with a recorder;
and third, the microphonic pick-up of a concealed wireless
transmitter in circuit with a monitoring receiver. There is
no mystery about any of these methods; the principles in-
volved are common knowledge among communications and
electronic engineers, and they are employed in practice to a
greater or less extent by all intelligence and policing agen-
cies and by private investigators. There is considerable varia-
tion, however, in the technical sophistication of these devices
and in techniques of using them for audio operations. Many
inventions for the development of hearing aids, radio com-
munications, broadcasting, and recording have been adopted
or adapted for use in organized eavesdropping. The men-
tion of only a few of these that have had an especially great
impact on audiosurveillance will serve to convey an idea of
the technical advances recently achieved.
It is now virtually impossible to detect when a telephone
is tapped by the most sophisticated methods without visually
inspecting every inch of the wires and every element servicing
it, down to the last screw connection. Only crudely placed
taps cause give-away noises such as clicks or crackling or pro-
duce easily detectable changes in line voltage. Electronic
search has been frustrated by the use of new devices. And
the tap can be made more productive by any of several effec-
'See Wilhelm F. Flicke, "The Early Development of Communications
Intelligence," Studies III 1, p. 99.
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tive techniques for "hot miking" which convert the telephone
into a microphone for general eavesdropping when it is not
being used to make a call.
For telephone calls an instrument known as the Dial Re-
corder automatically starts a recording on magnetic tape as
soon as the earpiece of the tapped phone is picked up. It
records the number of the outgoing call being dialed. It
transfers the conversation from the tap to the recorder at a
constant output level, so that a play-back of the tape will
show no volume variations with the distance of the answer-
ing telephone. When the earpiece is returned to its cradle
the recording is stopped. The electrical characteristics of the
Recorder's input section can be made such that an electronic
check of the line will not reveal the presence of a tap.
Developments in the hearing-aid field, together with the
invention of the transistor, have opened new horizons in the
design of miniature microphones, amplifiers, and recorders.
Highly efficient microphones only half an inch square and a
quarter-inch thick, small enough to hide behind a dime, are
now commercially available. Wires and shielding for them
have also been vastly improved, made stronger, more resist-
ant to weather and bruising, and at the same time thinner:
some of them are no thicker than a human hair. Miniature
pre-amplifiers combine with the high-quality microphones and
new mike wire to make possible runs to greater distances with-
out loss of signal, deterioration from moisture, or rupture un-
der stress. Telephone lines have also been turned to use as
clandestine carriers.
Transmitters have undergone a similarly tremendous
change with the advent of transistors. The small size of
these elements and the fact that they generate no heat have
opened the way to miniaturization, and their low current re-
quirements have made it possible to design smaller and bet-
ter batteries for use with them. We now have self-powered
transmitters only slightly larger than a package of cigarettes.
Both these and current-powered transmitters can be equipped
with remote-control switches to turn them off during inspec-
tions by countermeasures technicians or simply to prolong
their service life. They are made in a variety of different
shapes to facilitate concealment.
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There has also been considerable improvement in the tools
and materials for making audio installations-quiet drills,
pipe-pushers, collapsible ladders, acoustic plasters that need
no audio opening, better paints and paint-matching methods,
and an array of new techniques for installing microphones
without actually entering the target area. The countermeas-
ures technician can only hope to find traces by examining all
wail surfaces for merest pinpricks and exploring behind every
crack in the walls and floors, as well as every fixture and elec-
trical outlet.
Important corollary advances have been made in the de-
velopment of recorders. The first magnetic recorders, pat-
ented in 1898, used wire as the storage medium. They were
inefficient, however, and further development was slow. It
was not until 1935 that tape coated to retain magnetic im-
pressions was successfully, if still cumbersomely, used for audio
recording, and not until 1948 that it was developed to the
point that it revolutionized broadcasting practices.
Up to that time the effectiveness of audiosurveillance in in-
telligence operations had been limited by its dependence on
bulky and inefficient equipment and, more importantly, by the
requirement that a monitor familiar with the language, dia-
lect, and terminology actually listen to the live conversation
and with the help of notes retain the desired information
from this single hearing. The advent of an efficient tape re-
corder brought a completely new concept of audio operations.
Recordings could now be taken to a processing point for full
transcription and thorough analysis. The fact that three or
four hours are now devoted to processing each hour of tape,
and considerably more if there are several different languages
on it, gives some measure *of the limitations from which audio
operations have been freed by the availability of a compact,
dependable recorder of high fidelity.
Effective systems of processing the recorded material have
been evolved in order to extract quickly items of immediate
intelligence or operational value. These systems feature
both technical advances and other processing devices. Fun-
damental factors are the improved fidelity of the take and
the training of personnel in translating and evaluating it.
The accumulation of voice libraries and aids like lists of dou-
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ble meanings have also helped to get more out of the raw
material. IBM machines and other electronic classification
devices are being used increasingly to speed up analysis and
tabulation of the product.
Organizing an Audio Operation
Viewed from an operational standpoint, the setting up of an
audio installation must be the execution of a "perfect crime."
It must be perfect not only in that you don't get caught, but
also in that you give no inkling, from the inception of an op-
eration until its termination sometimes five years later, that
such an operation was even contemplated: any show of in-
terest in your target would alert the opposition to lay on
countermeasures. This secrecy and smooth dispatch require
much foreknowledge, a well-laid plan, and the synchronized
coordination of a many-talented team.
Today's audio operations are a far cry from those of the
very recent past, when the responsibility for making an in-
stallation would simply be turned over to a technician. The
audio installation team now includes operational officers who
are experts on the area, skilled in the tradecraft necessary
for the particular operation, and professionally committed to
the success of the job. They work in unison with technicians
who take pride in demanding of themselves that each job show
the flawless perfection of a masterpiece and who have the ver-
satility to become at different times master carpenters, plumb-
ers, masons, plasterers, painters, gardeners, laborers, and
artists.
Since most audio operations are directed against targets of
opportunity, they must be got under way on short notice.
It is therefore necessary, in any given locality, to have accu-
mulated data in advance regarding local building practices,
radio frequencies in use for civilian and military purposes, tele-
graph, telephone, power, and water plants, equipment, meth-
ods, and service practices, traffic patterns and regulations,
local policing capabilities, and other pertinent conditions. A
capability for covert casing and surveillance must also have
been established in advance. Then when an opportunity for
making an audio installation presents itself, the local opera-
tional officers, having this background information on hand,
can concentrate on casing the target and collecting the spe-
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SECRET Audiosurverllance
cific information necessary to plan the operation while they
are awaiting the arrival of technicians.
When all the required information, together with photos,
sketches, and floor plans of the target in its orientation to
the listening post, has been assembled and screened, the op-
erational officers and technicians together formulate a plan
that covers in detail all the facets of the coming operation,
however complex it may be. In every case the plan will con-
tain the following elements:
Cover and method for approaching and entering the target
to be bugged or the place where a line is to be tapped.
Preparation of the required tools and equipment and
method of packaging and delivering.
Protective surveillance prior to and during the operation,
with a primary and an alternate means of communica-
tion between the surveillance team and those inside the
target.
Membership of the team assigned to the job, its chain of
command and distribution of responsibility.
The specific assignment for each man, and how it is to be
executed. For example: planting the mike or transmit-
ter and the exact method to be used; digging a channel
in the garden; manning the communications link with
the surveillance team; checking for any tell-tale traces
of the work done-scuff marks, scratches, bits of wire,
etc. No detail is left unassigned.
Manner and timing of departure from the target on com-
pletion of the job, and alternatively in the event of emer-
gency.
The operational plan is set forth on a master sketch of the
area, so that each move is marked out much as in the diagram
of a football play. When the action begins every man will
know exactly what he is to do and when.
Equal care is exercised in renting and establishing a listen-
ing post to monitor the target: a never so perfect installa-
tion would be useless if compromised before activation by at-
tracting attention to the listening post or the monitors being
quartered there. These arrangements must usually be so han-
dled as to assure secure operation over a long period of time,
sometimes years. And finally, with the greatest circumspec-
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tion of all, communications are established from the listen-
ing post to the intelligence center receiving the take; the ex-
posure of this link would not only spoil a particular operation
but set off a compromising chain reaction that might have
far-reaching effects on the intelligence service itself. The
whole operation is undertaken in full awareness that it. will
be only as successful as its weakest point, and no foreseeable
circumstance is left to an on-the-spot decision.
Countermeasures
Our Sino-Soviet bloc adversaries are aware of the danger
of audiosurveillance-more so, unfortunately, then we-and
accordingly take elaborate precautions to thwart our efforts.
In selecting new quarters for diplomatic or trade mission
offices, they regularly make it a point to show equal interest
in as many as eight or ten different buildings at the same
time, and at the last minute close a deal for one on terms of
immediate occupancy. They then post a guard and closely
supervise any alterations or improvements to be made, in
most cases selecting their own contractors. They are likely
to import their own equipment and technicians to set up the
internal telephone switchboards. In some cases they have
dug a trench six feet deep around the entire building, and
have severed and inspected every pipe and wire servicing the
installation. Their technicians "sweep" the premises imme-
diately upon occupation and periodically thereafter. They
take similarly great pains to protect the residences of their
officials abroad.
Despite these extreme preventive countermeasures, we have
continued to operate successfully against them. Our opera-
tions, profitable during normal periods, sometimes become
even more productive during crises when security is sacrificed
for speed and clarity.
Our success in the face of such vigilance makes dubious the
security of our own overseas offices against hostile audio op-
erations. Although it is not proposed to treat here the coun-
termeasures we should take, it should be noted that we are
mere sitting ducks by comparison. Since March 1949, when
the first hostile audio device was found in the Prague residence
of our military attache, several hundred have turned up in
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many locations, mostly behind the iron curtain; and their
advanced technical sophistication is illustrated in the Great
Seal installation recently publicized by Ambassador Lodge.
Yet, even after more than 100 devices were discovered in the
first few months of 1956 and the National Security Council
alerted the intelligence community to take countermeasures,
U.S. installations overseas have tended to be complacent about
being targets of hostile audio operations. A thorough exposi-
tion of the dangers and of the possibilities for countermeasures
should be the subject of an article in a future issue of this
journal.
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Some of the possibilities, meth-
ods, and results of submitting
written materials to examina-
tion by test tube and micro-
scope.
LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF SUSPECT DOCUMENTS
James Van Stappen
Seven or eight years ago an intelligence officer came into
possession, under circumstances which aroused his profes-
sional ardor, of a small scrap of notepaper bearing only an
address and a very common first name scribbled underneath
it. For two years he persisted in trying to identify the writer
of this note, collecting handwriting specimens from a num-
ber of likely places and submitting them for laboratory com-
parison. Some of them matched the original. The points
of venue of these marked the writer's trail through several
trouble-ridden countries, but none identified him. Finally,
back in his own country, the traveler wrote to one of the pro-
spectively useful acquaintances he had made on the trip, and
this correspondent was careless enough to let the letter fall
into our intelligence officer's hands. Verified as the same
handwriting, it gave a complete name and home address. A
search of visa records and other materials on file now yielded
the true identity of the writer, his cover story, background,
and even photographs of him. He is a Soviet intelligence offi-
cer, who since then, thanks to this identification, has unwit-
tingly kept us informed by his presence of certain activities
of his organization.
For twelve years, beginning during World War II, an agent
in Europe had provided generous and significant reports from
around and behind the iron curtain. He had apparently: built
up a network of informants extending deep into the denied
areas. But now a sharp-eyed postal intelligence officer no-
ticed an incorrect postal cachet on one of his envelopes, and
his whole file of 300-odd reports was therefore brought to the
questioned document laboratory. Analysis showed that, the
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reports were written by eight different typewriters, which
might correspond to eight different informants; but some re-
ports from widely separated places had been produced on the
same day by the same machine, and the principal agent's own
correspondence turned out to have been written on one or
another of the typewriters supposedly used by his secret in-
formants behind the curtain. It was not a crude paper mill,
but careless enough to get caught, finally.
At a time when one of the countries that are pulled between
East :and West was negotiating for a tremendous Western
loan, one of its pro-U.S. representatives, a personage interna-
tionally well known, offered a letter typed on blue stationery
as a sample of the Communist blandishments which he was
trying to resist. An awkward signature prompted the sub-
mission of this letter to the questioned document laboratory.
The signature was found to be indeed a crude attempt at
handwriting disguise, executed in American-made fountain-
pen ink, Waterman's Blue Black. The blue watermarked sta-
tionery could have been bought only in Australia or New Zea-
land, on the other side of the world from the purported Com-
munist writer. Moreover, the Communist's letter was typed
on the same machine-a 1927 Underwood Standard rebuilt
after 1940-that this Friend of America had some time before
used to address an envelope to us. A file of miscellaneous doc-
uments our Friend had turned over to us in the past was now
examined, and all were found to be forgeries. Upon interroga-
tion .he admitted his duplicity and begged not to be exposed.
These are three of the more startling questioned document
cases of the 1,500-odd on file, some of them not worth to
anyone the paper they were written on, some of international
consequence. They include analyses of propaganda leaflets
which led to the very presses that printed them. They in-
elude restorations of charred documents, erased and obliter-
ated writings, carbon paper impressions, and writings in-
dented on sheets of paper underneath the ones used by the
writer. They include the investigation of crank letters and
of forgeries using both Dulles brothers' names. They include
examinations of credentials, complementing the work of the
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identity document analyst 1; in one outstanding case a sus-
pected hostile agent's passport was found to have 27 record-
able errors in make-up, and a complete physical analysis dis-
closed its probable area of origin and a considerable amount
of information on adversary capabilities and modus operandi
in agent documentation.
Of the tell-tale manifestations by which any intelligence
operation necessarily runs the risk of exposing itself, docu-
ments constitute one of the most rewarding to the investi-
gator. Being as they are a permanent, physical item, they
are devoid of the human foibles which so often bear uncer-
tain witness-poor observation, bad judgment, opinion and
hearsay, insincerity, malice. Used to support duplicity, they
often, under expert analysis, tell the truth, and in many
cases much more, not only exposing the particular operation
that occasioned them but supplying intelligence of far-reach-
ing significance. By laboratory examination it may be pos-
sible to develop the complete text of indented or other im-
perfect writings, establish the validity of a document, detect
any alterations or erasures, identify the author by analysis of
the handwriting or typewriting, determine the kind, specific
type, origin, and approximate age of the paper and ink used,
and find the kind, specific type, and origin of the writing in-
struments.
Analysis of Paper
Although a document is legally defined as being of any ma-
terial on which marks may be inscribed, including gravestones
and in a recent case a silver goblet engraved with Josef Sta-
lin's true signature, the material used for most documents is
of course paper. The laboratory analysis of paper must take
into account its color and opacity, the size of the sheet, its
weight and thickness, its fiber content, the direction of the
grain, the finish, and the watermark. Comparison in these
respects with exhaustive files of domestic and foreign paper
stock samples serves to identify most papers. If the paper is
a common, low-grade type, it will yield no clues to the origi-
nator of the document except perhaps his area of operation.
For a description of this field see David V. Brigane's "Credentials-
Bona Fide or False?" in Studies IV 1, p. 37ff.
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But if it is a rarer and more expensive one, with few dealers
and retail outlets, it may be possible to trace through these
the limited number of people who had access to it. A unique
paper may be, and in actual cases has been, traced to a single
individual. The secret markings that identify paper used by
governments, banks, and other official organizations are also
many of them on file along with the paper stocks, as an aid
in checking the authenticity of official documents.
It can be established that a document is forged by showing
that its paper is not as old as its purported date. Sometimes
the age of the paper can be determined from its composition
or watermark, by referring to a file of manufacturers' for-
mulas and watermarks in use at different dates. More often
it is necessary to measure the effects of age on its chemical
content and color, taking into consideration the type of fiber
in the paper and the climatic conditions under which it was
stored. Using chemical reagents and a tintometer or similar
instrument for gauging shades of color, the expert can usually
determine the approximate age of the paper. If the paper
has been artificially aged, a practice forgers often try, the age
test will not be valid; but the false aging can often be de-
tected and the document thus proved a forgery.
Analysis of Inks
The identification of an ink is begun by determining the
type to which it belongs. The three chief types in use today
are gallotannic (the most common), chromic, and anilin.
Others are China ink, the colored vegetable-dye inks, a few
dark ones like those made from wolfram and vanadium, and
those for special application as for mimeograph and stamp
pads. Chemical differences enable the laboratory to identify
these types.
The age of the ink, which has the same bearing as paper age
on the validity of a document, may sometimes be determined
through data on file regarding changes in the manufacturers'
formulas. Waterman, for example, has changed formula four
times in ten years, so that a sample of Waterman's may often
be associated with a particular period of manufacture. An-
other test is color. Permanent inks contain a temporary dye
which soon fades, an iron and sulphur compound, and a weak
acid. The action of the acid, oxygen, and humidity produces
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first a dark color and then over a period of years a slow fading
to a weak stain. By using chemical reagents, the age of the
ink can be approximated by comparing its color, taking into
consideration the color of the paper, with standard color
charts. If ink has been artificially aged the age test is im-
possible, but the induced aging itself is sometimes detectable.
Writing Instruments
When a stroke of ink writing is magnified fifteen or more
? times, the .two tracks made by the point of the pen stand out
much clearer than the line of ink between them. If the pen
is new, the width of these tracks, compared with standard-
brand widths shown in test charts, sometimes serves to
identify the type of pen. When a well-worn pen has been
used, the difference in width and appearance between the two
tracks usually indicates whether the user is right- or left-
handed. If a pen is worn badly enough, it may leave regular,
easily identified scratches which provide positive identification
of the very pen itself. The fact that most people fill their
fountain pens with different kinds of ink at different times
may also serve to identify an individual pen through the
unique combination of inks in it.
The ball-point pen is more easily identified than an ordinary
one. It uses a unique ink, there is a specific width of the ball
point for each brand, and the surface of the ball, smooth as it
may seem to the unaided eye, is really full of scratches which.
leave a pattern on the paper-the pen's own fingerprints.
Any non-standard type of pen is the more readily identified
because of its scarcity.
If a document is written in pencil or crayon, the laboratory
may be able to determine the formula of the material and
through file comparisons perhaps identify the manufacturer.
The age of pencil or crayon writing can be determined only as
to whether it was done within the last ten or fifteen days. A
unique or unusual pencil or crayon may possibly be traced
to the individual who used it.
Identification of Handwriting
Handwriting, like other physical acts performed by adults,
is characteristic of the individual writer; there is probably no
act more characteristic of an adult than his writing. It can
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therefore be used for positive identification of the writer
through comparison of the unknown specimen with known
writings. This comparison is a matter not only of letter forms
but also of many other characteristics, among them move-
ment, muscular habits, pen position, line quality, shading, re-
trace, proportion, connections, spacing, and embellishments.
If a sufficient number of similarities are found between a
known handwriting and the questioned specimen, with no dis-
similarities which cannot reasonably be accounted for, it can
be concluded that both were written by the same person.
A person's handwriting is developed by constant repetition
over the years until it becomes second nature to him, a suc-
cession of deeply ingrained habits. The obstacles which con-
front a forger or a disguiser of his own writing are therefore
manifold and great. It is practically impossible for a writer to
divorce himself from certain inherent characteristics mani-
fested in pressure points, pen lifts, the shading of strokes, etc.,
of which he is not even aware. In order to succeed in a forgery
he needs not only to throw off his own characteristics but to
assume the inherent characteristics manifested in another
person's writing, also a virtual impossibility. Handwriting
comparison, however, should not be attempted by an amateur.
Its most difficult aspect is evaluating the weight to be given
each of the various distinguishing characteristics.
Typographical Identification
The identification of typewriting is similarly based on a
sufficient combination of peculiar characteristics. Some of
the more outstanding of these characteristics are the defects
in type faces, the design of the type, misalignment due to mal-
adjusted type bars, and uneven printing due to twisted type
faces. The make and model of a typewriter can be determined
by an examination of its product, and a used typewriter can
be individually identified with certainty. Since manufactur-
ers change type design from time to time, a document may
also be proved fraudulent by showing that its type was not
yet manufactured at the. time of its purported date.
Aside from type design and the individual peculiarities of
used type, the machine may be identified as one on which worn
type has been removed and replaced with a new set. This
new "retread type" may be distinguishable by its sharp, angu-
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lax corners, by special retread designs, or by comparison with
the type faces of the numerals, which get little use and are
rarely changed, and therefore will not match the retread font
used for the other characters.
It is occasionally possible to identify the individual who
typed a document from his habit of using particular pressure
on certain keys, making unique mistakes, and in some in-
stances using unique spacings. If a suspect is made to type
a dozen copies of the questioned document on the same ma-
chine, he will follow the same psychological patterns each
time, and a comparison of the test specimens under magnifi-
cation with the original document will make it apparent that
they were typed by the same person. A person who uses the
"hunt and peck" system, for example, characteristically hits
the period so hard that he punctures or almost punctures the
paper. Many people put much more pressure on combina-
tions of letters found in their own names than on the other
letters they type.
The Submission of Questioned Documents
The fruits of this analysis are available, of course, only
when documents have been questioned or found suspect and
submitted to the laboratory. This questioning is generally
the obligation of the intelligence officer who first receives a
document or of some staff analyst who finds that it does not fit
well into the pattern of things already known about a case.
The decision to request technical aid for analysis of written
materials connected with an operation has in retrospect often
turned out to be the most important decision made during its
course. The use of this facility for counterintelligence pur-
poses has been a steadily growing thing, for every find encour-
ages other intelligence officers to bring dead files back to life
for comparison with the newly identified material. Different
areas have on numerous occasions found, when certain docu-
ments were compared, that they were host to the same ad-
versary agent.
Many intelligence officers, however, still overlook the very
evidence which might successfully terminate a case for them.
It is often thought, for example, that a handwriting expert's
services are necessary only when a document is suspected of
being forged, whereas the results of expert examination may
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be much more far-reaching in identification cases. The hand-
writing on an automobile ownership certificate, a piece of pa-
per found at the scene of a meeting, an ink offset on a blotter,
notations in a memorandum book, or any of a multitude of
other writings may upon analysis prove to be of value to an
operation. In clandestine operations where secret writing is
used as a means of communications, it is often advisable to
have the developed secret writing, as well as the cover letter,
checked in the questioned document laboratory against the
possibility that the agent has been killed, captured, or
doubled and his communications taken over by the adversary.
An earlier article in the Studies 2 showed the value of this pro-
cedure also for the purpose of assessing the agent's stability
under strain.
In order to obtain a maximum benefit from the laboratory
analysis, the intelligence officer should exercise great care in
collecting and preserving the documents he submits. He
should make every attempt to get samples of a suspect's hand-
writing without his knowledge-his signature on pay vouchers,
for example, or reports or letters in his natural writing. The
highest quality of evidence is an uncontaminated original doc-
ument. Anything less than that, such as a photocopy, is bet-
ter than nothing, but still yields only qualified results. When
it is known in advance that a document is to be submitted to
the laboratory, it should be enclosed in a transparent plastic
envelope large enough that folding is unnecessary. Thus pro-
tected, it can be read in transit on both sides and handled
without soiling, wetting, or any physical alteration that might
modify or destroy elements of the evidence.
This brief review should be sufficient to show that the sci-
ence of questioned document analysis requires highly qualified
professionals and, like surgery, should not be attempted by do-
it-yourselfers. Among the cases on file that attest to the haz-
ards of self-service in this matter is that of the 12-year-old
paper mill cited above; it would have been detected at least
two years sooner if the case officer involved had not imagined
he could train himself in the technique. Even the experts
employed in Washington are professionally impotent if sepa-
2 "Graphological Assessment in Action," III 4, p. 49fi.
54 gOU030RET
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rated from their standards, specimens, files, reference ma-
terial, and technical facilities. Therefore this work cannot
be done on a local basis in the field with any assurance of suc-
cess.
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The sharp-eyed philatelist spots
vestiges of wartime intelligence
operations and learns some-
thing of their nature.
POSTAL FORGERIES IN TWO WORLD WARS
Gordon Torrey and Donald Avery
The history and high state of development of stamp collect-
ing has long since made collectors alert to forgeries of postal
stamps. Not long after the first stamp appeared in 1840
forgery began to plague collectors, and as early as 1862 a
Brussels dealer published a treatise on the subject. As
stamps proliferated and the rarer early issues brought a
higher price, the forgers' techniques improved. Collectors
were forced to educate themselves in methods of production,
papers used, postal rates, and cancellations. Today thousands
of collectors in all countries can differentiate at a glance
among fine color shadings, perforation gauges, papers, and
printing methods.
Government-sponsored postal forgery for intelligence pur-
poses began near the end of the first world war. Thereafter,
and again after World War II, collectors found on the philatelic
bourses of Europe both forgeries and political parodies of war-
time postage stamps. Although the intended or actual use
of these stamps is obscured from the public by government
secrecy, serious devotees of philately were able to identify the
origin of many issues by deductions from sketchy evidence and
a comparison of production techniques. They found that in
both wars stamp forgery proper was done only by the western
allies, and that of these the British were by far the most ac-
tive. For intelligence officers, the archives of the Central In-
telligence Agency contain definitive operational information
on American forged printings and reveal by analogy the prob-
able purposes of those sponsored by Great Britain.
Purposes and Problems
Postal forgery was done for purposes of psychological war-
fare rather than of espionage. Agent communications are in
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SECRET Postal Forgeries
such small volume that genuine stamps could be obtained and
used without risk. But the mass nature of psywar mailing op-
erations precluded purchase of genuine stamps from legiti-
mate dealers in neutral countries, once hostilities were un-
der way. A sudden demand in Sweden or Switzerland, for in-
stance, for 100,000 12-pfennig German stamps of the regular
1941 issue would have betrayed the probability of a mass mail-
ing operation, which then might have been traced to its
source before it started. Thus large-scale forging was the
only feasible approach.
Also to psychological warfare belonged the political parodies
of enemy postage stamps. Whereas the forgeries were a
means for disseminating black propaganda through the en-
emy postal services, the political parodies were themselves
black propaganda. The production of both kinds of stamps
was a sub-operation of complex and varied clandestine print-
ing enterprises that included stickers, leaflets, music, pornog-
raphy, newspapers, surrender passes, and false documents.
The elaborate stamp operation also usually produced forged
envelopes, addresses, postmarks, and sometimes even mailbags.
The quality of the intelligence forgeries varied considerably.
The British were by far the best because they were done by
regular postage stamp production facilities in England. Those
of the Americans and the French resistance were a good deal
poorer, reflecting the cruder production facilities available in
the field. It was apparently considered unnecessary to create
exact reproductions for mass mailing purposes, and imperfec-
tions were probably unavoidable because of wartime short-
ages of material and technicians. A major problem in some
British and all American issues was color control, achieving
and maintaining precisely the right mixture of the printing
ink; in wartime this is a problem even for legitimate postal
administrations. Field production required substitute print-
ing methods as well, with photolithography replacing en-
gravure. Paper shortages and the apparent lack of suitable
perforating machines led to other major technical discrepan-
cies. But the imitation of watermarks on postal paper
proved unnecessary: the watermark is undetectable once the
stamp is affixed to an envelope.
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Postal Forgeries SECRET
The production and operational use of postal forgeries
reached a climax toward the end of World War II. British
production, judging from the relative quantities of stamps that
eventually reached collectors and the time periods during
which the German and French originals were in use, appears
to fall roughly into two stages-a few issues of high quality
during the first years of the war, and more varieties of a
slightly poorer quality in later years. American postal for-
geries were first used in full scale in early 1945. Political
parodies also multiplied as the war went on, the intensifica-
tion of effort paralleling the social disintegration of Germany.
Opportunities to use the intelligence forgeries increased as
enemy postal services were increasingly disrupted, and the
divisive potential of the political parodies was augmented with
the growing prospect of Axis defeat.
Britain Takes the Lead
In 1918 the British, having decided to organize a propaganda
system to undermine the enemy will to resist, mounted from
Crewe House, their propaganda headquarters, an operation for
distributing antiregime pamphlets, leaflets, and newspapers in
the territory of the Central Powers. They planned to use
air drops but also to post propaganda to selected addresses
through the enemy mails. For this purpose they reproduced
regular-issue common-denomination stamps-the German of
10 and 15 pfennig, the Bavarian of 5, 10, and 15 pfennig, and
the Austrian of 5, 10, and 25 heller. All of these were probably
printed within the same period of a few months, and the die
proof of one shows the date "25 September 1918." The end
of the war overtook the project before it became operational,
but it is worth noting that it contained all the basic ingredi-
ents used by the allies during World War II.
When copies of these stamps appeared on the philatelic mar-
ket in 1921 the philatelists soon discovered where and by
whom they had been printed. They found, by comparing the
papers, printing methods, gums, and perforations, that they
could have been produced only in England, and only in the
plant of De La Rue and Company, one of the three printers
then making stamps for the British post office. The British
government, pleading the Official Secrets Act, has never ad-
mitted to authorship of these issues.
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British forgeries of
German stamps, 1918
French stamps
produced in the
U.K. in World
War II
"Cornflakes"
stamped envelope
and meter mark
taatanlt
(5eeh~udlukro~,l
E. BAEUMEL
~n
WIEN, 1
KANTVAISE. !
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Examples of many of the stamps described
in this article are currently on exhibit in
the CIA Administration Building.
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Postal Forgeries
In World War II the first reported instance of postal for-
gery was a German operation: in December 1939 British
newspapers said envelopes containing German propaganda had
been delivered to British householders. These, franked with
stamps of neutral countries, had forged postmarks and had
not passed through the mails. But this early case is the only
evidence that the Germans were at all active with postal for-
geries, and the British held their lead.
The British origin of many forged French and German
stamps could be conclusively established by virtue of a slightly
misplaced pin in the perforation machine used in their pro-
duction. The resultant perforation drop at a certain posi-
tion in the second vertical row of stamps in each sheet is ex-
actly the same as that occurring in the regular British 1937
issues printed by the government's contract printer, Harrison
and Sons of London. It is therefore virtually certain that
Harrison's produced the stamps; they were definitely perfo-
rated on a machine owned by that firm.
French Stamps
Forgeries of French stamps used during the Petain regime
are practically all British in origin. Earliest were the 25- and
30-centimes values of the 1938 "Mercury" regular issue,
which was in use until 1942. The forgeries are typographed,
like the originals, and the color matching is very good. But
aside from minute but definite printing variations, they differ
from the originals in the gauge of their perforations. The
forgeries of the Petain issues could pass scrutiny the more
readily because of a wide variation in the printings of the genu-
ine French stamps resulting from the scarcity of proper paper
and inks.
The British also forged a single value of the "Iris" issue of
1939 and eight varieties of the Petain regular issue used from
1942 until the invasion. While no samples of the forgeries
have turned up in used condition, it is likely they were widely
and successfully used in the extensive agent operations run
against France from the United Kingdom.
A single forgery of the Petain issue was produced in France
itself by the French resistance movement at the so-called
"Atelier des Faux de Defense de la France" on the Rue Scribe
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Postal Forgeries
in Paris. Its actual use in mailing operations is questionable:
it is ungummed, printed on poor quality paper, obviously per-
forated differently from the originals, and lithographed in-
stead of typographed; the whole design is clogged with color.
Remainders were exhibited in November 1945 as part of the
production of the Atelier.
German Stamps
. Both the United States and Great Britain forged German
regular issues. That the British started early in the war is
evident in the existence of a forged 12-pfennig stamp of the
1933-36 issue with a portrait of President Hindenburg: by the
end of 1942 all stamps of this type had been superseded by
those with Hitler's portrait. This stamp is technically, the
most deceptive forgery of the Second World War; single copies
almost defy detection. It is identical with the original in
color, paper, perforation, and method of reproduction. It was
printed in sheets of four, however, and examples with sheet
margins are readily distinguished by a wide colored band not
seen on the margins of original sheets. It was used on en-
velopes, probably dropped inside Germany. An envelope with
stamp uncancelled, containing a propaganda leaflet and ad-
dressed to Munich, is extant. None showing postal usage
have been discovered.
I The British subsequently forged the 3-, 4-, 6-, and 8-pfen-
nigvalues of the Hitler head regular issue current from 1941
until the end of the war. They: were printed in accurately
perforated sheets of twenty (5x4) with plain margins, but the
forgery has no watermark and . the gum is yellowish rather
than clear. The engraving also can readily be differentiated
from the original by highlights on the portrait. It is fairly
certain that these saw operational use, probably in airdrops.
Military franchise labels for German army field mail were
also reproduced by the British and apparently used in dis-
seminating propaganda to troops on active duty. Except for
some small discrepancies of color and perforation the repro-
duction is quite passable. They were printed in sheets of
twenty with plain margins, rather than the colored and num-
bered margins of original sheets.
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American forgery of German stamps was first made public
with the sale of President Roosevelt's stamp collection after
the war. The examples in this collection were accompanied by
a letter from OSS head General Donovan saying they had been
"printed in Switzerland by O.W.I. representatives" and used
since November 1942 in cross-border mailing of the Frankfurt
Zeitung and other propaganda material.
These forgeries are rather poor in quality and easily dis-
tinguished from the originals by a great difference in perfora-
tion, a poor cloth match, and in the case of the 12-pfennig
stamp by the fact that they were done by photolithography
while the originals were recess printed (engraved). In one
case the reproduction was reportedly so poor that a second
printing was necessary before it could be used.
Italian and Dutch Stamps
Only one forgery of an Italian stamp is known; details of
its production suggest that it is British. It is an unwater-
marked reproduction of the 25-centisimi green of the 1929-42
regular issue bearing the portrait of. King Victor Emanuel. It
is extremely deceptive, being readily distinguishable only by
sheet size (20) and the lack of a watermark. Like the origi-
nal, it was produced by photogravure, and its perforation
differed only very slightly from the original. In 1941 the only
printers among the allies with facilities and experience in the
photogravure process were Harrison and Sons, the owners of
the faulty perforation machine. The absence of further
Italian issues is probably accounted for by Italy's early sur-
render.
There was a very poor forgery of unknown origin of the
11/2-cent stamp of the 1934-46 Netherlands issue, used during
the war to mail printed papers. The reproduction was pre-
sumably intended for propaganda papers and leaflets. Its
poor technical quality suggests that it may have been done
by the Dutch underground in the Netherlands itself or with
makeshift facilities abroad. The color, paper, perforation, and
even size are wrong. The ink is a bluish gray, not the clear
gray of the original, and sunk into the paper. It could have
passed in a dim light, but it is doubtful that any postal clerk
used to handling the genuine article would be deceived.
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Operation Cornflakes
In mid-1944 the Office of Strategic Services began planning
that led to the production of forged 6- and 12-pfennig stamps
of the regular German issue to be used for mass mailing of
anti-Nazi propaganda. Earlier attempts to disseminate propa-
ganda widely in the Reich had been frustrated by lack of ac-
cess. A complicated operation was devised by which the Army
Air Force, after shooting up enemy mail trains, would drop
faked German mail sacks containing subversive material in
forged envelopes alongside them.
During the first four months of 1945, 21 people in the OSS
Morale Operations unit attached to the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations were occupied in carrying out this
scheme, labeled "Operation Cornflakes." Their task was to
exploit the disintegration of German administrative functions
in the last weeks of the war by infiltrating printed prop-
aganda-principally the "underground" newspaper Das Neue
Deutschland-into the Reichspost. Their objectives were to
weaken further the will of the German people to fight, to in-
crease confusion in the communication and transport serv-
ices, and to convince the German people that there was an
anti-Nazi underground in Germany especially active in busi-
ness and banking circles.
"Cornflakes" was built up from scratch. Interrogators, un-
der cover of "administrative research," debriefed former mail
clerks among the German prisoners on postal procedures and
packing and labeling methods. The MO unit studied the lat-
est German postal regulations and reproduced German
stamps, postal cancellations, business stationery, and mail
sacks. A special unit in Rome culled from German telephone
books more than two million names and addresses in cities
all over the Reich, and typists addressed forged envelopes at
the rate of 15,000 a week. Some envelopes were addressed by
hand to provide a plausible mix in each bag.
The drops were executed by the 14th Fighter Group of the
15th Air Force, a unit which was successfully conducting low-
level air attacks against rail traffic in southern Germany and
Austria. The letters to be dropped on each bomb run had to
be so addressed that they would have been carried to, from, or
through towns on one of the rail lines on the day's hunt;
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and this meant that postal cancellations, prepared and pre-
dated in Rome, had to be stamped on the envelopes at the air-
field immediately prior to takeoff. In order to avoid the tell-
tale traces left by the ordinary leaflet bomb, a special bomb
was developed that would eject the mail sack from the canis-
ter on signal from a control button on the pilot's panel.
The 14th Fighter Group worked out its technique for the
mixed mailbag and high explosive bomb runs in several prac-
tice sessions and began operations in early 1945. The Group
would seek out an enemy train, preferably with a mail car at-
tached, moving north from southern Austria, and attack and
demolish it. The mailbags would be ejected from fifty feet
above the train, so that they would drop undamaged. In the
resulting confusion the bags would be picked up from the
debris and forwarded to the nearest post office.
In February and March 1945 ten sorties were successfully
run and about 120 mail sacks dropped. Prisoners interviewed
following the surrender of the German army in Italy verified
the receipt of Das Neue Deutschland through the military
post and said the paper was known as far north as the Baltic
ports. They reported it widely rumored in Germany that an
underground movement called "Das Neue Deutschland" ex-
isted in Austria and parts of Germany.
"Cornflakes" was not executed without mishaps, however.
At least one bag, dropped near St. Poelten, Austria, in Febru-
ary 1945, was neutralized by the misspelling of a return ad-
dress printed on an envelope. A German postal clerk noticed
the substitution of C for K in the word "Kassenverein," and
postal inspection followed. The project was also endangered
at one time by attempts of the screened German prisoners em-
ployed for hand addressing to use it for their own purposes.
They were discovered addressing envelopes for letters written
home.
Propaganda Stamps
Propaganda variations of enemy postage stamps resulted
naturally from combining the practice of stamp forgery with
the simultaneous production of miscellaneous propaganda
stickers and labels. They can be considered in two classes-
comparatively subtle changes meant to serve specific propa-
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Osa es
Goering and Himmler
substitutions
Liberation
propaganda
Hitler
skulls
!IN V(HV RF;[TF~y W(T T
66 SECRET
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os a orgerles
ganda ends, and broad propagandistic parodies probably in-
tended for world philatelic markets.
In the first category, several stamps produced by the British
and apparently intended to promote divisions within the Nazi
leadership may represent different facets of a single opera-
tion launched late in the war. They all follow the principle of
removing Hitler's portrait from a regular stamp and substitu-
ting that of another Nazi leader. The Hitler birthday com-
memorative was used as the prototype for a souvenir sheet of
six stamps showing Field Marshal Goering and commemorat-
ing his birthday on 12 January 1944. The frequently forged
6-pfennig Hitler head regular issue was changed to show Himm-
ler. (Harrison's perforating machine is again in evidence
on sheets of the Himmler stamp.) Hitler's head was also re-
moved from one value of the Polish occupation issue and re-
placed with that of Governor Frank. This stamp was repro-
duced by Harrison's photogravure method.
Two efforts, one German and one British, were made in sup-
port of national liberation and resistance movements. In
1944, when the leader of the Azad Hind movement, Subhas
Chandra Bose, followed the Japanese into India, the state
printing works in Berlin issued a series of ten Azad Hind
stamps which were never used. And the British, some time
after the August 1944 execution of General Erich von Witzle-
ben, one of the chief conspirators in the 20 July bomb plot,
substituted his portrait for Hitler's on a German stamp is-
sued in November 1943 to mark the 20th anniversary of the
Munich uprising. Changing also the legend on the original,
they retained its color and design.
The broad propaganda parodies are chiefly American and
German. American production centered around a reworking
of the 12-pfennig Hitler head stamp to show a Hitler skull, un-
der which "Futsches" (Collapsed) was substituted in the
legend "Deutsches Reich." One important item in this pro-
duction was a photolithographed parody of a Hitler Souvenir
sheet with four skulls resembling Hitler.
German efforts were late, amateurish, and ineffective.
Himmler reportedly broached the idea of philatelic parodies to
Hitler in February 1944 in answer to the Fuehrer's complaints
that the German foreign propaganda organs had failed to tell
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SECRET Postal Forgeries
the world how completely Britain had sold out to the Rus-
sians. He was authorized to market parodies throughout the
philatelic world to deliver this message and use the proceeds to
finance SS development.
Parodies were made of one value of the 1935 issue commem-
orating the Silver Jubilee of King George V, of a single stamp
issued for the Coronation of George VI, and of six low values
of the then current regular British issue. Himmler's design
ideas are reflected in liberal use of the Star of Zion and the
substitution of Stalin's head for those of the British mon-
archs. Some of the regular issues were overprinted to adver-
tise the "Liquidation of Empire." The German parodies were
printed on the watermarked paper used for ration books. Few
examples are extant.because the idea never got far beyond pilot
production.
Himmler's scheme met with widespread resistance from of-
ficials of the intelligence services, who regarded it as a waste
of time. Attempts to market the stamps through the "Op-
eration Bernhard" network, already engaged in forging and
selling British banknotes, and through agents of the foreign
Sicherheitsdienst never panned out. Himmler, at last thor-
oughly frustrated by the failure of his idea, ordered that the
stamps be given to Sir Oswald Mosley's Black Shirts for dis-
semination in England, but with the incipient collapse of Ger-
many the confusion in Berlin overtook this final alternative
as well.
The Outlook
Forgery of postage stamps for intelligence purposes may be
unnecessary in future operations. Postage meter marks have
already largely replaced stamps for commercial mailing pur-
poses in most countries of the world. The most widespread
use of meters is for bulk mail and newspapers, printed matter,
precisely the medium through which written propaganda is
most easily disseminated. Meter marks eliminate the need
for both stamp and cancellation forgeries, and reproduction
of the simple red-inked double-purpose impression should
be quite easy and effective. In any one country, meter im-
pressions are to a high degree standardized in design, differ-
ing only in the letter and serial number of the machine. Un-
like postage stamps, moreover, which are changed every few
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Postal Forgeries
years, meters remain in use for long periods of time, the
widespread distribution of all sizes of machines in post offices
and business firms precluding frequent change. The Ameri-
can directors of Operation Cornflakes anticipated this develop-
ment in including a meter mark-the only meter mark known
to have been forged in wartime-in their mailbag mix.
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The Soviet system of devious
techniques to circumscribe the
overt observations of foreign
experts.
? OBSTACLE COURSE FOR ATTACHES
Thomas W. Wolfe
It may be useful, now that it seems possible the Soviet Union
may one of these days agree to admit nuclear inspection teams
to its territory, to review the kinds of obstacles it regularly
strews in the path of other legitimate trained foreign observers,
the military attaches. As Soviet officials have already given
voice to their suspicion that any nuclear inspectors will be
bent on spying, so they have taken the attitude, in their ob-
session with secrecy, that the attaches are spies when they
exhibit an interest in matters which in most other countries
lie open in the public domain. Hence, although as a bow to
international usage they accept the military attaches of for-
eign diplomatic missions, they severely circumscribe their op-
portunities to travel and make observations-a traditional at-
tache activity ever since the system came into being during
the Napoleonic era.
Soviet measures to limit the observations of military at-
taches fall into two categories. First, there are express legal
proscriptions on attache movement and activities-off-limits
areas, travel registration, prohibitions on photography, etc.
Second, there is a large body of unannounced restraints-ad-
ministrative, psychological, and physical-which take up where
the legal obstacles leave off. It is this second category of ob-
structive techniques over and above the formal restrictions
which I shall illustrate from my own experience in Russia as
American Air Attache from October 1956 to October 1958.
Manipulating transportation. This is one of the most com-
mon methods of interference through administrative meas-
ures after an attache has obtained formal permission to travel.
For example, you have made reservations for a flight in day-
time from Moscow to Baku, but at the last minute you find
that your seat has been switched to a night plane. If you
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY Obstacles for Attaches
announce your intention of waiting for the first available day-
time flight, you are informed that all day flights are sold out
"for the indefinite future." The same thing happens on trains.
Sometimes the schedules are altered to keep you from pass-
ing points of interest in daylight. I have been on trains
which for no apparent reason pulled into a siding and waited
until dark, to the bewilderment of Russian fellow-passengers
and even some members of the crew. Similarly, civil air flights
have altered their routes or skipped scheduled stops in per-
fectly good weather for no other reason than to deny us obser-
vation of some inconveniently located installation.
Compartment companions. Rarely are attaches able to se-
cure a compartment to themselves on a Soviet train, no mat-
ter how far in advance they book transportation. The So-
viet citizens who turn up to share a compartment are in most
cases readily identifiable as security agents. They keep the
attache under constant scrutiny during waking hours and
occasionally can be found going through his belongings in the
middle of the night. An auxiliary practice is that of splitting
up foreign travellers: even American husbands (including my-
self) have on occasion been obliged to spend the night in one
compartment and their wives in another with male Russian
companions. This sort of thing naturally does nothing to en-
dear the watchdogs of Soviet security to members of the at-
tache corps, and run-ins with them have been frequent. After
one such skirmish with a particularly obnoxious security type
in the Caucasus, I was called a "hooligan" and other uncom-
plimentary names in the Soviet press, a publicity measure
which serves to put psychological pressure on the attaches as
well as to foster among the Soviet populace the desired at-
titude of suspicious vigilance toward foreigners.
Timely interruption technique. Even if an attache and his
friends or family have managed to secure a train compart-
ment without Soviet company, their privacy is seldom re-
spected for long. Whenever the train approaches the indus-
trial section of a city, for example, the car attendants suddenly
find it necessary to tidy up your compartment. If the door
happens to be locked they let themselves in with a pass key,
so great is their urge to look after your comfort. The win-
dow always seems to need the most attention, and they swipe
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Obstacles for Attaches USE
away at it with a dust-rag, effectually blocking the view, un-
til you have passed through the factory district.
If this routine cannot be stretched out long enough, there
is a variation which I encountered once while travelling
through a large industrial city on the Volga. Factories were
strung out for several miles on the outskirts of the city, among
them a big aircraft plant. It stood alongside the tracks, of-
fering about the same view you get from a train of the Martin
plant in Baltimore, except that the Soviet plant was boxed
in by a high board fence. On this occasion I found the view
spoiled not only by the fence and the customary activity of
the car attendant. Making doubly sure that I would have
no chance to observe this particular stretch of industrial
scenery, the attendant rubbed the window down with a greasy
rag.
Frosted window routine. On train trips in winter, nature
often cooperates with the Soviet authorities by frosting over
the windows of your car. When nature fails to do the trick,
however, there is usually someone around to lend a hand, as
I found once when boarding a train in Rostov. It was a clear,
cold day and every window in the train was completely free
of frost and ice, with one exception. The window of my com-
partment, in the middle of a car, had been sprayed on the
outside until it was covered with a quarter-inch glaze of ice.
When I attempted to chip some of the ice away, I was im-
mediately stopped by a detail of militiamen. "You are vio-
lating Soviet regulations," they said. "You might scratch the
glass."
Helpful hostess. When attaches board an airplane for a
trip in the Soviet Union, word is passed along to the crew
that foreigners are aboard. The hostess then makes it her
business to distract the attention of the foreign traveller at
moments when he might observe installations of military or
industrial significance. A favorite technique when an air-
plane is taking off or approaching an airport is for the hostess
to lean over your seat with an offering of reading material.
Somehow she usually manages to hold a magazine in front of
your face so you can't see out the window. If you wave the
solicitous girl away at such a moment you are of course be-
ing rude and unappreciative.
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Smoke screen. When the Soviets are particularly anxious
to conceal some installation from foreign eyes, they may use
this standard military device. It takes a certain amount of
preparation and good communications to time a smoke screen
to go up just as an attache drives down the highway or passes
on the train, but they usually pull it off without a hitch.
This technique, however, has the disadvantage of calling at-
tention to the very object they wish to hide. On one train
trip in central Russia an airfield we passed at a distance of
three or four miles was ringed with upwards of 50, smoke
generators belching away. "What's going on over. there?" I
asked one of the Russians who had been assigned to keep an
eye on me during this journey. "It looks as though that air-
field is on fire." I got a blank stare in return. "Airfield?
Fire? I don't see anything," said the Russian, as though he
could persuade me thus that there was nothing in sight but
the natural Russian landscape.
Highway escort. When attaches undertake an automobile
trip in the Soviet Union, they are accompanied by several cars
of plain-clothes security agents. These keep shifting the order
of their line-up along the highway. to preserve the fiction that
there is no surveillance of foreigners; but since auto traffic on
most out-of-town roads in the Soviet Union is very light, the
pretense is bound to wear thin as the same "protective" caval-
cade of Pobedas and Zims rolls along behind you hour after
hour. When you stop by the roadside to stretch your legs,
the cavalcade pulls up a hundred yards or so' away. For
some reason, the security personnel always make a minute
inspection of your stopping place after you have moved on.
Perhaps they imagine that attaches may plant nefarious de-
vices or hide messages to conspirators along the highways.
Roadside reception committees. Should an auto trip take
you through a region in which military or industrial installa-
tions are located, the motor escort is usually deemed inade-
quate to keep a proper curb on your curiosity, and the local
militia and troops from the nearest military base are turned
out en masse. They stand guard at every intersection to pre-
vent you from turning off the designated route. Along some
stretches of road they are posted at 10-yard intervals to keep
you from making an "unauthorized" stop, thus often calling
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attention, like the smoke screen, to the very installation you
are supposed not to observe. Running the gauntlet of such
reception committees is generally bothersome, however, es-
pecially when they bar access to the only decent roads in the
vicinity and require you to detour along rutted backcountry
wagon trails to get to your destination. Frequently the only
satisfaction an attache gets from such a trip is the knowledge
that the Soviets have tied up an inordinate amount of man-
power to control his itinerary.
Phoney militiaman routine. Around cities it is not always
feasible to have a guard posted at every corner when attaches
happen to be in town, and a portable militiaman must be im-
provised. The militia are the uniformed police, whom you
are legally required to obey when they flag your car down
and tell you to turn around. Not so the security agent in
plain clothes unless he shows his credentials, a revelation which
security operatives are loath to make. To get around this
difficulty, each auto-load of security men has in its kit a militia
uniform which one of the operatives may put on as occasion
demands. The car speeds ahead, the phoney militiaman jumps
out still buttoning up his jacket, and you are hailed to a
stop.. This technique more or less effectively confines attache
sightseeing in the environs of a Soviet city to churches, ceme-
teries, and other approved cultural attractions.
Frequent interceptions on a drive about a large city may
produce the curious result that you keep encountering the
same phoney militiaman at widely separated points. Once in
Leningrad an agent with a torn shoulder strap on his militia-
man's uniform flagged us down several times in the same
afternoon. As the crowd of onlookers would gather around we
would ask him, each time a bit more caustically: "So it's you
again. Haven't you got that strap fixed yet? Bozhe moi!
you sure are setting a sloppy example for all the genuine
militiamen in Leningrad! " His wrathful frustration was a
pleasure to behold, for no one wants less than a security
agent to become the butt of attention in front of a crowd
of fellow-citizens: his next assignment might involve check-
ing up on one of those same citizens.
"Road under Repair" routine. The pretense that a bridge
is out or that a particular stretch of road is under repair is
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often used to keep motoring attaches from reaching a destina-
tion the authorities do not want to declare formally out of
bounds. On one occasion, when some travellers were told by
local Soviet officials that they could not proceed to the town
of Pskov because a bridge en route "had been washed out in
a storm," they insisted on going ahead anyway. They had not
got very far along the road when a truck full of soldiers sped
past. A few minutes later they came to a small wooden bridge
in time to see the soldiers beginning to take it apart plank by
plank.
Kerosene in the crankcase. When other devices fail to dis-
courage attaches from an undesirable motoring itinerary,
there is always the alternative of a little midnight attention
to their automobile. Cars which had passed a searching in-
spection before the start of a trip sometimes used to develop
peculiar ailments after having been parked overnight in the
courtyard of a Soviet hotel. I had a brand-new automobile,
mileage still under 3,000, break down with burned-out engine
bearings on a trip in southern Russia. Kerosene in the crank-
case-hardly the work of a mere prankster-turned out to be
the cause.
Indignant citizen act. The attitude of ordinary Soviet citi-
zens toward foreigners is generally a combination of curiosity
and friendliness. Deliberately hostile behavior is quite out
of character, for ordinary citizens are aware that they can
get into trouble by unsanctioned demonstrations of ill will.
It is an obvious artifice, therefore, when planted agitators at-
tempt to incite a crowd of Soviet citizens against attache
travellers. I recall a typical instance wherein two attaches
were set upon while visiting the historic Kremlin of the city
of Kazan.
The Kremlin, sitting on high ground, affords a distant view
of the city's industrial suburbs. Apparently the Soviet au-
thorities thought it best to deny this view to foreign attaches,
but since the Kremlin was open to the public they had no
plausible excuse for barring admittance. Professional agita-
tors were therefore called into action to create a scene. They
collected a crowd, ranted at the travellers, and threatened to
shoot them if they did not leave the premises at once. When
the agitators were asked to show their credentials, they
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s or
claimed to be "indignant citizens" who did not have to identify
themselves. This tactic usually proves effective, for attaches
cannot afford to become involved in altercations with Soviet
citizens, however strong the provocation, lest they be officially
accused of violating Soviet order. As on many similar oc-
casions, the attaches in this case were harried off the streets
and obliged to take refuge in their hotel room until time to
catch the next train out of town.
The foregoing provides a sample of the harassments and
petty subterfuges by which Soviet authorities prevent military
attaches travelling in nominally open areas from making the
most commonplace observations, observations of a kind which
Soviet representatives in Western countries are perfectly free
to make without hindrance. It seems reasonable to expect
that nuclear inspectors, if they are admitted, will be faced with
the frustration of these and similar obstructive contrivances.
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SECRET
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
The Military Attaches
Dear Sirs:
Lyman Kirkpatrick's "Unrecognized Potential in the Mili-
tary Attaches"1 is such a good summary of important con-
siderations with which I have been closely concerned over
quite a period of time, as a former G-2 and Army attache
now with CIA, that I cannot resist the temptation to comment
on it. The article, affirming that attaches contribute heavily
to our national intelligence and defending them against some
of their critics, notes deficiencies resulting from the cross ac-
creditation system; but its main burden is that attaches in
many countries have a natural entree, one that should be
more fully exploited, to political leaders with a military back-
ground, and especially to junior officers who are likely to be-
come the country's future leaders. In an extension of this
thesis the author notes that of the many foreign officers that
come to the United States for training a number have later
turned out to be political leaders in their countries; he sug-
gests that there is a great potential for intelligence and, covert
action operations in this situation.
Mr. Kirkpatrick's observations are all sound. If anything
they are too conservative. The distressing thing about them
is that they need to be made at this late stage of the in-
telligence community's development. For this reason I make
bold to amplify his views, speaking in perhaps painfully plain
terms, and make some further suggestions, particularly with
reference to the role CIA should play.
The attache system is recognized, at least in military in-
telligence circles, as an effective collection arm. As in any
system, there are some weak individuals and features and some
reportorial sins of omission and commission, but it is my ob-
servation that the percentage of these is very low indeed,
comparing most favorably with that of any other group of
U.S. intelligence collectors. Certainly there is continuous at-
tention to the selection and training of attaches, to the guid-
ance of collection, and to the evaluation of performance: the
MORI/HRP
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SECRET To the Editors: Attaches
important practice of commenting on reports is, at least in
the Army, on a sound and effective basis.
In the matter of distribution of attaches and the problems
of cross accreditation, it would seem wise in the long run to
work out a scheme of joint service representation by an at-
tache in residence. Most observers recognize that an em-
bassy without a service attache lacks an important compo-
nent. Although in some cases the attache's value will lie more
in prestige considerations than in intelligence collection, that
value is nevertheless a real one. The services have repeatedly
wrestled with this problem and sought various joint ways of
meeting it. I agree that the results of these efforts have not
been quite adequate; but at least they have been made. Budg-
etary and personnel considerations may be at the root of the
trouble. There is a role that CIA could play in this matter
that is worthy of reconsideration.
Mr. Kirkpatrick is too diffident about the practicability of
attache contact with junior officers for assessing their poten-
tial. He need have no qualms on this point. Such contact is,
as a matter of fact, a part of basic attache guidance. While
the situation varies in each country, a study of reports will
show that most attaches can and do make these contacts.
In friendly countries junior officers can be cultivated through
all sorts of activities: one attache organized an annual golf
tournament between officers from two areas; one used to make
it a point to attend any amateur dramatic presentations; an
air attache arranged that a delegation including junior of-
ficers visit U.S. military installations. Arrangements like these
are difficult or perhaps even precluded where the atmosphere
is unfriendly, but something can generally be developed.
One of the more disturbing aspects of Mr. Kirkpatrick's
comments is that he finds it necessary to emphasize the po-
litical intelligence value of contacts with the military. This
potential is recognized and stressed in guidance to Army and
Air Force attaches, and although I do not know about the
Navy, which has not combined its attache training with that
of the other services, I assume that its position is similar.
Perhaps the civilian agencies need to be prodded; but to my
knowledge the importance of military contacts has more than
once been raised in CIA. If the needed U.S. interdepartmental
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o e ors: ac es
coordination is not in effect, the proper steps to capitalize on
this important opportunity should be taken by command de-
cision.
It is similarly disturbing that there should be a need to
point out the intelligence potential of foreign officers study-
ing in the United States. I know that the Army is alert to
the situation, and I know that it has been brought to the
attention of responsible persons in CIA. I know of cases where
individual attaches have worked along these lines. But I also
know of efforts to take advantage of this opportunity which
failed to gain support. After a British officer, formerly a
Leavenworth instructor, had spent time, money, and effort
establishing informal contacts between UK and U.S. Leaven-
worth graduates in England, the expected U.S. help fell
through. Remarking on Iranian and other foreign officers
who wore with pride the badges of the U.S. schools they had
attended, I was told there were no measures, not even subtle
ones, being taken to keep alive this alma mater spirit. A
project to provide a periodic news letter to foreign officers
failed to win support. A regularized system for getting the
kind of biographic data on foreign military students that Mr.
Kirkpatrick advocates was deemed comparatively unproductive
when proposed a few years ago.
It should be evident that activities like these would be
highly useful and that they can be accomplished cheaply.
We can, however, not rely on the armed services alone to
carry them out. They constitute a project that needs cen-
tralized development and coordinated execution both in the
interest of full coverage and for the sake of efficiency. Such
a venture could advantageously be coordinated with other
programs involving foreign officers that come to the United
States for school and other purposes. CIA has the intelligence
coordinating job. This is one part of it it should pursue.
Mr. Kirkpatrick's analysis does not cover three other aspects
of the military attache program which are of significance
for the intelligence community-attache-MAAG relations, CIA
briefing of attaches, and collection coordination in the field.
In the first, the ball is only partly in our CIA court, but in
the others the next move is squarely up to us.
SECRET
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o e hors: Attaches
There are a great many papers and doctrines treating the
relationship between attaches and MAAG's in the matter of
intelligence collection, but their application is no simple mat-
ter; certainly it is not uniformly successful. While both our
friends and our enemies assume that MAAG's as well as at-
taches collect information, we must maintain the fiction that
MAAG's do not. Open recognition of their collection mission
would in fact result in many embarrassments, because MAAG
personnel lack understanding and skill in intelligence collec-
tion. Although a MAAG is for obvious reasons the dominat-
ing U.S. military influence in a nation while it is there, its
job is to work itself out of business; and we cannot afford to
let misguided views on intelligence collection damage the at-
tache collection system, the permanent mechanism upon which
we will have to rely when the MAAG's are gone. It would be
most logical that the attache be given responsibility for co-
ordinating the MAAG's collection activity with his own. A
standing operating procedure covering the subject might be es-
tablished whenever the attache or MAAG chief is changed.
One item on which we can and should take action is the
matter of CIA briefing of attaches. There are good Agency
directives on this point, but the follow-through is spotty. We
leave too much to busy and often too security-conscious per-
sons who may lack confidence in the discretion or understand-
ing of military personnel. It is to our advantage to make good
briefings, and in my experience any personal foibles are
evenly distributed: neither military nor civilian intelligence
operators have a corner on good sense or on blundering.
Another place CIA can help is in better collection coordina-
tion in the field; this will be particularly needful under the
new DCID's. Here the onus is strictly on us and on the em-
bassy. One aspect of this coordination should be the develop-
merit of a process for adjusting NIS collection responsibilities
to the facts of the collection situation in the field. Responsi-
bilities for formulating the different NIS sections, established
after long and thoughtful study, fit the U.S. intelligence and
government structure quite well. The same distribution of
responsibility for collecting the information, however, does not
always meet conditions in the field, sometimes because the
82 gE RET
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structure of the foreign government differs from ours, some-
times for other reasons.
To illustrate, the Army is supposed to collect information on
railroads; but railroads often come under a part of the foreign
government with which military liaison is impracticable or
unwise. The supply and finance aspects of many foreign mili-
tary. forces are controlled by civilian agencies to which State
might have best entree. On the other hand, matters for which
State is assigned responsibility are sometimes to be found in
agencies with which the service attaches have unusually good
contact. In addition, it often happens that personal relation-
ships are such as to give opportunities for collection in fields
outside assigned areas: one attache had a golfing companion
who gave good economic and political information, while a
colleague in the political section of the same embassy had a
lucrative contact in the general staff, and a USIS officer had
one in the troop information service. Surely such opportuni-
ties should be exploited in disregard of bureaucratic alloca-
tions of responsibility. Finally, no matter how wise Wash-
ington may be, it often turns out that what seemed at head-
quarters to require covert collection in fact does not, and
vice versa.
There is no reason why the collection responsibilities at each
embassy should not be adjusted periodically to the facts of life.
If necessary, agreements on this point could be reduced to
writing and forwarded for official approval. Or if Parkinson's
Law and other bureaucratic propensities make such flexibility
too difficult in Washington, the collectors should perhaps just
go ahead and collect as convenient for them, give each other
the appropriate credit in their reports, and let it go at that.
Either from Washington or through its Chief of Mission, CIA
should play a leading role in such a coordinating process. It
can be done without prejudice to security if we are as skillful
as we ought to be.
In summary, I agree with Mr. Kirkpatrick's views on the
attache system and its new horizons, with the reservation that
what is needed in order to reach those horizons and certain
further ends is for CIA to get moving. We have the men and
the resources. All we need is the decision to act.
Peter J. Dorondo
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SECRET To the Editors: Graphology
Assessment by Graphology
Dear Sirs:
Keith Laycock's extravagant article in your journal on the
use of handwriting analysis in character assessment,' which
claimed for graphology the capability of disclosing personality
traits ranging from talkativeness through capacity for ab-
stract thinking to sex difficulties, was answered by Dr. Rund-
quist's skeptical appeal for scientific evaluation;2 but you have
now left the last word with James Van Stappen, who writes
that there is no need for such scientific proof.3 As a layman
to both psychology and graphology but a professional in in-
telligence, I should like to take up the cudgels for science on
behalf of all intelligence officers who refuse to be seduced by
untested claims.
I note with pleasure that Mr. Van Stappen does not claim
the swamiesque capabilities listed by Laycock. But neither
does he deny them; and his smokescreen of European uni-
versity citations and long bibliography do nothing to lift the
veil of swami from graphology. That graphologists are some-
times the product of European rather than Indian universi-
ties does not preclude their being charlatans. A number of
fakers have held degrees from first-line universities, especially
from European ones; European schooling in psychology runs
the gamut from excellence to pure fakery. Phrenology and
astrology have had their day there, and physiognomies (the
art of determining character by facial contours) is still in
vogue in European police schools and seriously studied at
leading universities. Only two years ago, the Chief of Train-
ing of a European intelligence service asked which American
university he should write to for a bibliography of American
scholarly works on physiognomies! The fact that graphology
is seriously studied in Europe does not make it a valid science.
Nor does a long bibliography make it valid: there are exten-
sive bibliographies on astrology, phrenology, and physiognomies
too.
' Studies III 3, p. 23. -
2 Studies III 3, p. 45. MORI/HRP
9 Studies III 4, p. 49. from pg.
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To the Editors: Graphology
The live illustration given in the Van Stappen article dem-
onstrates changes in a single individual's handwriting as that
individual underwent a disturbance. Even in the United
States, where graphology has not been generally accepted be-
cause scientific testing has not validated its claims, psychiatrists
in some cases use graphology as one of many tools in their at-
tempts to probe the roots of a mental disturbance. Van Stap-
pen's case is a valid example of such use. Periodic testing of
an agent's handwriting by competent psychiatrists may tell
whether he is undergoing emotional strain.
It is also possible that graphology, used as a tool by pro-
fessional psychologists, may have a place in agent assessment;
but the Van Stappen article does not show this, and by fail-
ing to deny the claims made by Laycock it implies acceptance
of them. Its description of the Lewinson method is interest-
ing, illustrating a device for graphic representation of differ-
ences in samples of handwriting. But it leaves us in the dark
as to the next step-how one can determine an individual's
"disposition to talk," for example, from a single sample of
handwriting. Its silence in this respect leads one to suspect
that the author is afraid to lay his cards on the table or sub-
mit graphology to scientific checks.
The article lists four other categories of cases where graph-
ology may be of assistance because it is the "only available
method-the unknown source who supplies your agent in-
formation, the agent who refuses to submit to ordinary assess-
ment, the VIP who cannot be asked to undergo tests, and
the writer of anonymous letters." These are cases in which
we are interested, but no examples of how successful graph-
ology may be in such cases are offered. The fact is that these
are situations where no controls for scientific investigation
are available, and operations chiefs and case officers who use
this "service" therefore have nothing upon which to base
an estimate of its value. With Dr. Rundquist, I am afraid of
unwarranted credence in graphological findings until we
have a statistically valid comparison of the performance rec-
ords and standard assessments of individual agents matched
against their graphological assessments under controlled cir-
cumstances.
85
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To the Editors: Graphology
:[ am not one of those too skeptical to try out graphology.
But I will refuse to consider it seriously until a methodical
validation of its use for intelligence purposes is carried out.
I have had experience with its misuse and the dangerous con-
sequences thereof, and sincerely hope that its advocates will
have the courage to submit it to scientific tests instead of
appealing to the "authority" of European universities and a
bibliography which beclouds the question by citing a number
of works that have absolutely no application to the points at
issue.
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To the Editors: Jet Age SECR T
Jet-Age Reporting
Dear Sirs:
A well-known Washington plumber once answered an irate
housewife's complaint that after his ministrations the water
tasted terrible, "Dear lady, all I do is handle the pipe. What
goes in and comes out ain't my department." Like the
plumber, the designer of our jet-age reporting system' has de-
signed a many-splendored network of pipes without adequate
attention to either input or outflow. He has made only a
half-hearted attack on the real problem vexing intelligence
collectors and users since Eve failed to recognize the signifi-
cance of the biological intelligence she received from the first
E-5 source, SERPENT (fnu).
In his system overt, marginal information, or information
responsive to a parochial request not even remotely related
to a set of priorities, is carefully reproduced by the perforator
unit of a standard M-19 teletype machine, with its rows of
up to five holes in different position combinations, each rep-
resenting a letter or function punched on the keyboard of
the machine. This is then fed with loving care into a flexo-
writer, by-passing all intelligence criteria, and sent on its
mechanistic way to a staff communications group, where it is
put into permanent form and disseminated. Bilge is thus min-
gled indiscriminately into the untreated effluent of the pipeline.
One can imagine that over every automatic machine in this
vast jet-age system there hangs mockingly a sign which reads
"THINK."
The jet-age contraption really reaches its ionospheric apogee
when the afterburners are turned on. The feedback to dis-
seminators (machines!) and the feedback to collectors are the
Vernier burners which are supposed to impart the correct azi-
muthal attitude control. Every analyst can then influence
directly the orbit of our intelligence missile, and every punch-
card nuance can have its impact in space. We can confi-
dently look forward to some analyst's query as to whether the MORI/HRP
moon is really made of green cheese; and we can'be sure that, from pg.
in the absence of any critical control, the green cheese re- 87-90
= quirements will carry priorities equivalent to those on the ca-
I William Earling, "Design for Jet-Age Reporting," Studies IV 2, p. 7.
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apufflET To the Editors: Jet Age
pability of submarines lurking in the Chesapeake Bay. Bilge,
untreated effluent, and green cheese in the feed-back hold
great promise of causing a flame-out in our intelligence missile
in outer space.
Francis Tempone
Dear Sirs:
Even in the jet age there are still areas in which the analyst
does not need to get his field report within a week, areas in
which pouch reporting is adequate and even preferable to
more rapid channels. Much economic intelligence falls in this
category. Among the very best economic reports are detailed
documentary lists and studies which are best presented in
upper and lower case, with full punctuation and adequate at-
tention to proofreading. Speed of transmission is only a minor
factor in presenting such information to the proper customer.
A great deal of other good information is being reported
satisfactorily by pouch. True, there is much marginal and
bad information arriving daily by pouch, to be disposed of at
leisure by area desks, not rushed to customer analysts. We
should be well advised to leave this pouch channel open and
allow the inevitable flow of marginal information to settle
there. Faster channels will not improve the judgments of field
reporters, and unless there is a careful screening of incoming
information by officers with specialized area knowledge there
is real danger that more speed will not mean more quality,
but rather the opposite.
Your jet-age writer, conceding that "formal collection re-
quirements alone cannot do the job" of controlling quality,
seems to believe that formal requirements plus numerous rap-
idly transmitted evaluations can. No one would deny the use-
fulness of requirements, especially in fields where collectors
need support from technical specialists; but already too much
effort has been devoted to generating requirements which any
red-blooded intelligence officer would take for granted or which
bear no relation to existing collection potential. There are
fields-politics, for example-where requirements are feeble
aids indeed and where one politically alert case officer is
worth more than volumes of questions unrelated to the facts
of any specific operation.
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OUNFIDENTIAL
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To the Editors: Jet Age
As for his "new system for rapid and frequent user criticism
of individual reports in order to point up good material and
weed out at the source any information below the level of sig-
nificance for the intelligence community," those who have ob-
served the impact of customer evaluations on field operations
will be unimpressed. While evaluations from customer analysts
range from very useful to counterproductive, their net effec-
tiveness in guiding the collection effort is not very high. Fur-
thermore, because they are normally prepared by persons un-
aware of what access and potential the producing sources
have, even good evaluations of a report at hand are not very
helpful regarding problems of further exploitation. With re-
spect to significance of information, customer evaluations in
general are not thorough enough in their review nor well
enough coordinated with the scale of priorities to provide a
reliable guide. On the big question of which sources to ter-
minate and which to encourage, their impact, if any, is diffi-
cult to detect.
Bad evaluations, on the other hand, can have a negative
effect. And so many evaluations are prepared cursorily, in
haste, that perhaps we should try rather for fewer evalua-
tions to which more time could be devoted. It is not uncom-
mon that evaluations indifferently prepared or unrelated to
existing priorities serve to encourage the marginal operational
activity which we are striving to eliminate. The prospect that
they might be fired indiscriminately to the field in greater
numbers is frightening to contemplate. It would certainly do
more harm than good.
In any age, information from a source with real access to
a good target looks impressive even when it is a few weeks old;
but in the horse-and-buggy age, the marginal product from
not-very-well-placed spies must have looked like old lettuce
leaves by the time it finally arrived at headquarters. Possibly
we have been somewhat slow in eliminating marginal opera-
tions because rapid communications have given their product
enough timeliness to make them appear worth while. Why
don't we try reporting all but the very best information by
pouch for a few months and see which sources are being up-
held just by the rapid transmission of their marginal output?
Sources with no real access will wither and grow cold in the
"Fe"Mr Or'U -A 89 NTI
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CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDE)'TJA
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To the Editors: rs: Jet et Age
weeks required for a pouch report, and it will be easy to ter-
minate them. This practical approach offers better prospects
for refining intelligence collection than a mechanistic scheme
for greater speed.
E. H. Maydalle
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Intelligence Articles IV 3
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Aspects of a classical scouting
and resistance-leading unit be-
hind Japanese lines in Burma,
from the viewpoint of its com-
mander.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF OSS
DETACHMENT 101
W. R. Peers
For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mis-
sion. The Detachment did plan and carry out espionage op-
erations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical in-
formation, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its
other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, and
psychological measures. Its intelligence activities were there-
fore augmented rather than decreased when large-scale guer-
rilla operations were initiated in the spring of 1944.
Early Operations
The history of Detachment 101 began in the spring of 1942,
when a small group of officers and men was assembled in Wash-
ington under the Office of the Coordinator of Information.
Captain (later Colonel) Carl Eifier was the first commander.
After a short period of training and equipping, the unit shipped
overseas to the China-Burma-India Theater. In the summer of
1942 it received its first directive from General Stilwell, short
and to the point: "Establish a base camp in northeast India
and from there plan and conduct operations against the roads
and railroad leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the Jap-
anese the use of the Myitkyina airfield. Establish liaison with
the British authorities to effect coordination with their opera-
tions."
The remainder of the year was spent in locating and de-
veloping a base camp in Assam Province of northeast India
and in recruiting and training agent personnel for subsequent
operations. An office was established in Calcutta to receive
supplies from headquarters in the United States and to procure
MORI/HRP
from pg.
A01-A13
Al
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Detachment 101
bulk goods from the Army Service of Supply. At that time
there was available no small, portable military or commercial
radio capable of transmitting from northern Burma to As-
sam, a distance of 200 to 500 miles. Accordingly it was nec-
essary for the unit to design and construct its own radio set.
The result was crude, but it worked well. It became the model
from which the SSTR series of sets was built by OSS, which
by now had succeeded to the intelligence and paramilitary
function of COI.
In 1943 exploratory field operations were carried out in
Burma on a trial-and-error basis. Some of them were failures;
but they taught us many lessons as to what could be done
and, even more important, what should not be done. By the
end of the year six base camps had been established behind
the lines in northern Burma, three east of the Irrawaddy River
and three to the west. Each of these had recruited and
trained a small group of indigenous Kachin personnel for local
protection and to perform limited operations, principally sim-
ple sabotage and small ambushes. Each also trained a few
native personnel as low-level intelligence agents, who reported
their information by means of runners or via the bamboo
grapevine. From the field bases this information was for-
warded to the base camp in India by radio. By the end of
the year it was possible to assemble a fairly comprehensive
picture of Japanese strengths and dispositions in northern
Burma.
The field bases also selected native recruits for more in-
tensive intelligence training. These were flown by light air-
craft or infiltrated through the Japanese lines to the airfield
at Fort Hertz in the northern tip of Burma and thence flown
to the base camp in India. Their training, of three to five
months duration, followed the normal curriculum for intelli-
gence agents. The Kachins were particularly adept at CW
radio communications; by the end of the course most of them
were able to operate at 25 to 45 words per minute. When their
training was completed, some of them were returned to their
field bases to expand local information procurement and others
were parachuted into Burma for independent operations.
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etachment
The Myitkyina Campaign
With the initiation of orthodox military operations in the
winter of 1943-44 by the Chinese ground forces, later aug-
mented by Merrill's Marauders, General Stilwell directed the
Detachment to expand its guerrilla force to a strength of ap-
proximately 3,000 in order to assist in the drive down the
Hukawng Valley and the eventual attack on Myitkyina, and
also to extend its intelligence operations south of Myitkyina
at least to the area of Bhamo and Katha. He made available
the arms, ammunition, personnel, and airlift necessary to ful-
fill this directive. He also stated that should the Detachment
be successful in providing this clandestine support to the com-
bat forces, approval would be forthcoming to expand its guer-
rilla forces to a strength of 10,000, with a commensurate in-
crease in intelligence and other operations.
That the Detachment was indeed successful in this assign-
ment can be illustrated by several incidents from the
Hukawng-Myitkyina campaign. The final drive on Myitkyina
was made in May 1944 by the Galahad Force (Merrill's Ma-
rauders and two Chinese regiments) across the Kumon Range
and thence south through Arang to the Myitkyina airfield.
Detachment 101 assisted this movement by providing two
companies of Kachin guerrillas to reconnoiter and screen the
front and flanks. When the Galahad forces reached Arang
they picked up additional guides and scouts from a Detach-
ment field base located there. One of the scouts, who had
been bitten by a poisonous snake and was so weak that he had
to ride horseback, nevertheless led the Galahad Force to the
airfield over some old unused trails, completely surprising the
Japanese. The airstrip was thus occupied with but little re-
sistance. The part played by the Detachment in this opera-
tion points up the interrelationship between its intelligence
and other activities.
A day or so before the Galahad Force seized the airfield,
Detachment 101 had some of its agent personnel in and out of
Myitkyina town. They estimated the Japanese strength there
at that time to be only approximately 300, and this informa-
tion was given to the Northern Combat Area Command and
the Galahad Force. After the airstrip was seized, two Chinese
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Detachment 101
units were therefore assigned to secure the town. It was to be
a double envelopment, one Chinese unit moving north along
the Irrawaddy River and the other attacking from the west.
All went well until the two converged on the railway station
in the center of town at about dusk. It has been reported that
Japanese snipers between them started picking them off.
Whatever the reason, they soon became heavily engaged with
each other and inflicted such severe mutual casualties that
they had to be withdrawn. The attempt at an early seizure of
the town thus came to nought.
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Detachment 101
It was two days before the forces were reorganized and
made another assault on the town, and when they did they
encountered a hornets' nest. In the interim the Japanese
had reinforced the town from every direction. They came by
road and railroad from Mogaung to the west, from the supply
installations to the north along the Irrawaddy, from Maingna
and Seniku across the river from the town, and from else-
where. Within two days, it was estimated, Japanese strength
in the town had been augmented to over 1,500, by the end of a
week it exceeded 3,000, and it still continued to grow.
This build-up was so rapid as to create for a while the feel-
ing in some quarters that our original strength estimates must
have been wrong. But Detachment intelligence agents and
guerrilla patrols placed along all the access roads and trails
leading into the city confirmed by observation the frantic ef-
fort of the Japanese to reinforce the garrison. And subse-
quently the interrogation of Japanese POW's by NCAC and
Galahad intelligence staffs verified as proximately accurate
the 300 figure which had been provided by the Detachment.
The only discrepancy was in the other direction: an original
strength figure of 275 for the Myitkyina garrison was obtained
through the interrogations.
The battle for Myitkyina town continued beyond June and
into the monsoon. Meanwhile Detachment 101 had expanded
its activities to the south as directed by General Stilwell and
was providing intelligence and operational support to the com-
bat forces. By the time Myitkyina fell to the allied forces in
August 1944, the Detachment had organized its guerrilla forces
across an area generally 100 miles farther south and was well
on its way toward its ultimate strength of 10,000. Intelligence
operations were also increased, and espionage groups were de-
ployed along Japanese lines of communication as far south as
Toungoo, approximately 400 miles away.
Mandalay and Beyond
In the fall of 1944 the allied forces in northern Burma opened
their drive from Myitkyina toward central Burma. Detach-
ment 101 moved its guerrilla operating area to a line generally
through Lashio to Mandalay and thence to the Chindwin
River and the India border. At that time it reached its great-
est strength and highest stage of development. In the area
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Detachment 101
of Lashio there were seven separate battalions, each capable
of independent operations. North of Mandalay there were ap-
proximately 2,500 guerrillas, organized into units of varying
size, depending upon the local situation. To the west, between
the railway corridor and the British 14th Army in the Imphal
area near the India-Burma border, lay a stretch of over 250
miles in which no allied combat forces were operating.
Through this gap ran a series of parallel corridors, excellent
natural approaches for the enemy to the Ledo Road being
constructed behind the allied combat forces. General Sul-
tan, who had succeeded General Stilwell as Commanding
General NCAC, directed Detachment 101 to utilize its guerrilla
and intelligence resources to block these several approaches.
Guerrilla forces were accordingly deployed in each of them,
and with information supplied through intelligence activities
were able-although not without some severe fighting-to fend
off several Japanese probes through the area.
Intelligence operations during this phase of the campaign
were widely developed and reached their greatest degree of re-
liability. There were over 100 operations involving in excess
of 350 agent personnel. Through these and the collection of
information by the guerrilla forces, Detachment 101 was able
to stay abreast of the changing organization, deployments,
and strengths of the Japanese forces. In fact, its intelligence
officers probably knew at least as much about the Japanese
tactical organization and capabilities as the Japanese them-
selves did.
When Lashio and Mandalay were captured by allied forces,
the Detachment was directed to withdraw its forces from the
field and inactivate. Soon, however, the combat situation in
southern China became extremely critical, and it was necessary
to withdraw all Chinese and American combat forces from
northern and central Burma to try to stem the Japanese drive
there. General Sultan therefore directed the Detachment to
reconstitute whatever force was necessary to conduct a mop-
ping-up operation in the southern Shan States and seize the
Taunggyi-Kengtung road, the Japanese escape route to Thai-
land. Most of our intelligence operations had been retained,
fortunately, so there was a sound basis for embarking on this
assignment: with some of the Kachin guerrillas as a nucleus,
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Detachment 101
a force approximately 3,000 strong was organized into four
battalions. The Japanese, however, had evidently not been
told that this was to be a mopping-up operation; it resulted
in some of our bloodiest fighting of the war. In less than
three months the Detachment's forces killed over 1,200 Jap-
anese and suffered more than 300 killed in action themselves,
far more than in any other period. When the escape route
to Thailand had been secured, Detachment 101 was inacti-
vated. This was 12 July 1945.
Requirements and Collection
Intelligence requirements on the Detachment stemmed from
a variety of sources. Tactical information was required chiefly
by Headquarters NCAC, its subordinate commands, and the
10th Air Force, but requests were also received from the Brit-
ish 14th Army and Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-
east Asia. Information of a strategic type would be re-
quested by higher OSS headquarters, CBI Theater Headquar-
ters, and the allied Strategic Air Command under General
Stratemeyer in Calcutta. Detachment 101 itself required in-
formation of all varieties for planning and conducting its field
operations.
With the NCAC, broad intelligence requirements were nor-
mally received from the Commanding General in conference.
Specific requests came through the Detachment's liaison of-
ficer maintained on his G-2 staff. The same general proce-
dures obtained with the 10th Air Force. On the basis of these
requirements, along with all others, an intelligence plan would
be drawn up, outlining the information to be obtained, the
probable target areas, and the likely sources. If sources were
already available in the target area, they could simply be asked
for the information through normal communication channels.
When sources were not available, it was necessary either to
adjust operations to obtain the information or to plan new
intelligence operations, for which indigenous personnel would
have to be recruited, trained, and infiltrated.
The infiltration of agent personnel into proposed areas of
operation was effected by parachute or light aircraft or along
land routes. The infiltration procedures were in general simi-
lar to those used in other theaters of war; but there was one
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Detachment 101
device we employed that involved a unique use of pigeons.
Each agent parachuted behind the lines had attached to him
a small bamboo cage just large enough to hold a pigeon by
which he could report the condition of the radio that had
been dropped along with him. After the agent had landed,
cleared the drop zone, and had an opportunity to test his radio,
he would release the pigeon, preferably near daylight, with a
coded message either indicating that all was well or giving in-
structions when and where to drop another one. For ranges
up to two or three hundred miles the pigeons were highly re-
liable; beyond 400 miles their dependability decreased rapidly.
The intelligence requirements levied on the Detachment
were such that almost anything taking place behind the enemy
lines was of interest. Primary emphasis was placed upon mili-
tary information, such items as the strength, identity, and
movement of Japanese units, details on supply installations,
airfields, and equipment, and whatever else was required to
provide a continuous, composite picture of the enemy situa-
tion. Much terrain information was also reported, principally
on the condition of roads and railroads, the water level and
fordability of streams, and the location of potential airfields
and drop zones. Since most of the Detachment's personnel
were indigenous to the area and intimately familiar with its
physiography, this information was rather easy to assemble
and report. Economic, sociological, and political intelligence
was also in great demand in higher OSS headquarters in the
theater, in such agencies as OWI for psychological warfare op-
erations, and in air units for pilot briefing and survival train-
ing. It was also needed by the Detachment itself both for
morale operations aimed at psychological subversion and for
developing agent cover.
The main sources of information were the numerous intel-
ligence agents trained at the Assam base or in the field. Each
major field unit had an intelligence officer, usually an Ameri-
can but in some instances a foreign officer or an indigenous re-
cruit trained for the position, whose principal duties were to
interrogate captured enemy soldiers or agents, debrief guer-
rilla personnel, and direct the activities of the espionage
agents assigned to the unit. Intelligence personnel at the
forward operational headquarters and at the base camp were
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also engaged in collecting information, principally through
interrogation of prisoners and debriefing of operational per-
sonnel returned from the field.
Weather and Air Targets
In conjunction with Air Weather Service of 10th Air Force,
the Detachment developed a capability for collecting and re-
porting weather data. The Weather Service provided the
equipment, instruction, and weather codes. These were given
to selected agents who were then so dispersed, singly or with
other groups, that in the aggregate they provided coverage
of all of central and northern Burma. According to the A-2,
10th Air Force, this service was of considerable assistance in
developing meteorological forecasts for cargo flights over the
"hump" and for tactical air operations in northern Burma.
Of especial interest were some of the procedures used in re-
porting air targets for the 10th Air Force. In the lower
reaches of the Hukawng Valley an intelligence agent worked
out some simple but ingenious ways to pinpoint and report
Japanese supply installations concealed by dense jungle foli-
age. One method was to select a landmark such as a trail
junction, bridge, or prominent tree which could be identified
readily on an air photo or by the pilot of the fighter-bomber
aircraft. From the landmark the location of the target was
given by polar coordinates (distance along a given azimuth).
Another method was to lead the pilot from such a landmark
to the target by a series of reference points.
Numerous Japanese installations located by these means
were bombed or strafed without the pilot being able to see his
target; huge explosions or fires erupting through the trees
would indicate a successful attack. The Japanese knew that
something was amiss. Since the targets were completely hid-
den from the air, they deduced that the attacks were being
directed from the ground and suspected the Kachins. They
accordingly restricted entry to their supply areas and would
shoot a Kachin on sight. To protect the Kachins these opera-
tions had to be suspended for a time.
In the later phase of the Burma campaign procedures were
worked out with the 10th Air Force for immediate air strikes
against targets of opportunity. Pilots flying air alert and
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Detachment 101
agents on the ground were given duplicate sets of air photos
with a special grid superimposed. To obtain action against
a target the agent would send a coded radio message specify-
ing the type of target and its grid location to the Detachment's
forward operations headquarters, located in the immediate vi-
cinity of Headquarters NCAC and the 10th Air Force. 10th
Air Force would relay this to the pilot in the aircraft, and
after a normal elapsed time of 20 to 30 minutes from the
origination of the message an air strike would be made on the
target.
Transmission Channels
To expedite the flow of intelligence to user agencies the De-
tachment established comprehensive handling and transmis-
sion procedures. All messages from the field came in to the
forward operations headquarters, where field operations were
coordinated by an operations officer and a staff including mem-
bers of the morale operations, intelligence, resistance, and
other sections. The intelligence personnel on the operations
staff screened all incoming information. If it was of an urgent
nature, it was given a hasty evaluation and immediately dis-
patched to the using agency. Other intelligence messages
were routed to the intelligence section for review and subse-
quent transmission to user agencies ona routine basis.
Detachment 101 had liaison groups with each of the major
combat commands it supported-NCAC, 10th Air Force, Brit-
ish 14th Army, and ALFSEA. These officers represented the
Detachment in all operational matters, an arrangement that
served to enhance their stature and give them considerable
prestige in their intelligence dealings within the headquarters.
Intelligence-wise, they were responsible for accepting infor-
mation requests from the headquarters and forwarding them
to the Detachment, for passing information and intelligence
received from the Detachment on to the intelligence staff, and
for representing the Detachment in all other intelligence mat-
ters. Information was transmitted to NCAC and the 10th
Air Force by teletype and could be moved most rapidly. The
communication link with 14th Army and ALFSEA was radio,
which required additional time for coding and transmission;
the elapsed time, however, was sufficiently small that it could
be measured in terms of minutes.
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Detachment 101
Field liaison groups were also maintained with the Chinese
1st and 6th Armies, the British 36th Division, and the Mars
Task Force, which had succeeded Merrill's Marauders. These
liaison groups were small, normally consisting of one officer
(generally one with considerable field experience) and a radio
operator. They performed intelligence functions comparable
to those of the higher headquarters liaison groups.
The intelligence transmitted via radio and teletype was sum-
marized and supplemented in the Detachment's weekly and
monthly situation reports, distributed through ordinary mili-
tary messenger service. These were given fairly wide distribu-
tion in the theater, going to approximately 100 agencies.
Reliability and Security
Detachment personnel concerned with the evaluation of in-
formation arrived at some unusual conclusions. They found,
for example, that information reported by the Kachins was
generally highly accurate, but that their reports of enemy
strength were almost invariably about three times the actual
figures. Strength reporting was then stressed in the training
program to the extent that the pendulum swung the other
way, and the strengths given in Kachin agent reports were so
underestimated that they had to be increased by a factor of
three. It was not until the winter of 1944-45 that it was pos-
sible to obtain reliable strength figures from Kachin person-
nel. Other ethnic groups were found to have comparable
traits, more or less uniform within each group. The evalua-
tors developed correction factors for the Shans, Chins, Bur-
mese, Padaungs, and even the remnants which had remained
behind in Burma from the original Chinese Expeditionary
Force. All of these groups overestimated strengths, but the
Chinese grossly exaggerated them. Their strength figures had
to be reduced approximately ten times, and this practice re-
mained constant to the end of the campaign.
The Detachment's counterintelligence operations were
purely defensive, designed to protect it and its field operations
from infiltration by enemy agents. The number of counterin-
telligence personnel assigned was consistently small,. 3 to 5.
They arranged for the physical security of base installations
and for the indoctrination of U.S. and indigenous personnel.
All
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The indoctrination was concerned principally with the meth-
ods used by Japanese agents to penetrate and mislead allied
clandestine operations and with means for isolating such
agents. Counterintelligence functions in the field were the
responsibility of the Area Commander or Group Leader in
charge of a unit. As a general rule the commander relied
mainly on his intelligence officer to ferret out enemy agents,
uncover double agents, and of course determine what should
be done with them. The Detachment attempted to make all
personnel security- and counterintelligence-conscious for their
own benefit and to avoid attracting undue attention to the
clandestine activity. As a result, the security of the Detach-
ment and its operations, despite some minor infractions, was
very good. Not a single agent or operation was known to
have been eliminated through enemy intelligence penetration.
Appraisal
Detachment 101's two principal intelligence consumers
made attempts to weigh its intelligence contribution to the
northern Burma campaign. G-2, NCAC, estimated that it
provided between 80% and 90% of all of the combat intelli-
gence utilized by that headquarters. The 10th Air Force re-
ported that it furnished up to 70% of its usable information
and designated between 90% and 95% of its air targets. In
addition, the Detachment was one of the principal sources
of bomb damage assessment information for the 10th Air Force
and for SAC. No attempts were made to measure the intelli-
gence contributed to other headquarters, but letters of appre-
ciation showed that it was welcome and considerable. This
intelligence was also an indispensable ingredient in the de-
velopment of the Detachment's own resistance and other clan-
destine operations.
Units comparable to Detachment 101 collected information
behind the lines in France, Italy, the Philippines, China, and
other areas. In the aggregate they represented an immense
intelligence capability of a type for which, if there should be
another war, there would in all probability be a strong re-
quirement. Each of these operations, however, experienced
growing pains, and there was a lag time of from one to two
years before they were able to produce tangible results. It
would be highly desirable, therefore, that the personnel who
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Detachhment 101
may be used in such operations in the future should be so
oriented, trained, and organized that this critical lag could
be minimized. How this is to be accomplished appears as a
pressing and continuous problem for the intelligence com-
munity.
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Academic studies in interna-
tional relations might usefully
be supplemented by a course in
intelligence processes.
FOR COLLEGE COURSES IN INTELLIGENCE
The transition in the U.S. national posture accomplished
during the first half of this century, from a seeking of security
in isolation to recognition that our national welfare depends
upon active participation in international politics, had its
corollary in the academic world. Many non-government or-
ganizations, foundations, universities, and colleges have
played an important role in increasing the public knowledge
and administrative skills prerequisite to effective U.S. action
in the international arena. A wide variety of new courses and
entire schools have been devoted to foreign affairs and inter-
national relations, and additional ones still continue to be es-
tablished.
The new public interest in global matters has by and large,
however, not been extended to intelligence and the principles
and processes by which it is prepared. At the end of World
War II there was, to be sure, the debate about Allied intelli-
gence in the Bulge, the congressional inquiry ' into the Pearl
Harbor surprise, and a good deal of general regret for the lack
of pre-war interest in intelligence, to which General Eisen-
hower contributed with comments in Crusade in Europe. But
this kind of soul-searching was confined largely to official cir-
cles. In the academic world, I believe, U.S. intelligence is
treated only in its strictly military aspect, in specialized ROTC
courses. There have been academic studies dramatizing busi-
ness espionage 1 and some pedagogical treatment of research
methods applicable in intelligence, but no college training in
the subject as a coordinated whole.
There are good reasons why this has been so. Intelligence
traditionally and for the most part necessarily does its work
behind the scenes, and its influence on the national welfare
seldom strikes the public eye. Nor does this country have be-
For example Competitive Intelligence, by students at the Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, reviewed in
Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A46.
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courses in intelligence
hind it the centuries of international leadership which devel-
oped the acknowledged British competence in intelligence and
made the British public proud of it. Now that the United
States has come to occupy the center of the international
scene, the role of intelligence is well recognized among offi-
cials of the government; public interest and academic con-
cern have yet to be awakened.
There are signs of a public awakening, however. Commen-
tators showed concern over faltering intelligence on Chinese
Communist participation in the Korean War, on the strength
of the Ho Chi Minh forces in Indochina, and on the British-
French-Israeli Suez venture. More recently a persistent and
widespread discussion of intelligence processes has been set off
by the Senate inquiry into the "missiles gap." Cartoonist
Berryman's J. Q. Public, worried by the intelligence estimates
controversy and saying, "I wish someone would explain it to
me," seems to represent truly a deep interest and a legitimate
requirement of the U.S. citizen. The U-2 incident and its re-
percussions at the summit are certain to give this interest a
new impetus.
It is the thesis of this paper that the awakening public
concern with intelligence offers our universities and colleges
an opportunity and a challenge-the opportunity to take ad-
vantage of a rising interest and to meet a clear need, and the
challenge to meet it effectively and thereby ultimately con-
tribute to improving U.S. intelligence doctrine and competence.
It is suggested that a good beginning could be made by es-
tablishing a basic course of study in the meaning of intelli-
gence, its significance as the foundation for policy planning
and a guide for operations, how it plays those roles, and the
principles and processes by which it is produced and formu-
lated. Such a course should not be narrowed to the specialties
of political or military intelligence, but develop broad princi-
ples applicable in all fields. It should highlight the concept
of intelligence and intelligence processes as a critical factor
in almost every form of human social endeavor-economic,
scientific, and cultural, as well as military and political-be-
ing essentially a processing and use of facts and a making of
judgments in a logical program for a specific purpose.
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Courses in Intelligence
The intelligence course would apply the teachings of many
academic disciplines. Specialists in economics, politics, sociol-
ogy, and logic, in written, oral, and visual presentation could
among others be used in the instruction. The program should
be framed and guided, however, by a competent teacher with
extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience, not merely
a few years in some particular intelligence field. The course
would need to run through two semesters at three class hours
per week, and should be offered to students at the graduate or
at least immediately pregraduate level. Lectures should be
minimized in favor of reading, discussion, conferences, and
practical exercises. It would not be proposed in this basic
course to cover the history of intelligence or to go deeply into
special problems involved in the guiding of the intelligence ef-
fort by its users and its application in the conduct of opera-
tions. Some of these subjects could be incorporated into exist-
ing courses in international affairs, others would be left to
separate advanced courses as the program developed.
The course in intelligence fundamentals, taken by the stu-
dent at point of maturity, would have the broad educational:
advantage of employing and expanding his earlier learning and
making it meaningful within a single coordinated, purposeful
program. It would be of direct value to students contemplat-
ing government service, whether in intelligence or elsewhere,
and of cogent interest to the intellectually inquisitive heading
for careers in most fields of private enterprise. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, since our government is one responsive to
the will of informed citizens, it would provide an indispensable
ingredient to those studies of the policy-making and decision-
reaching process which presently loom so centrally in univer-
sity courses devoted to creating an informed citizenry in the
fields of public administration, foreign affairs, and interna-
tional relations.
All too generally such courses treat only the policies made
and the mechanisms through which they are effected. The
heart of effectiveness, however, in public administration or the
conduct of international affairs is the making of sound deci-
sions, and these must be based on what in broad sense we
call intelligence. In present curricula the student seldom
has the opportunity to learn what kinds of raw materials are
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Courses in Intelligence
needed or how they are collected and consolidated to give the
unitary understanding essential in formulating sound plans
and guiding their execution.
Even a prospective business executive should learn not only
the principles of economics, commercial and industrial organi-
zation, corporate finance, and the other usual subjects, but
also what kinds of facts he needs to know in applying these
principles and how such facts can be collected, evaluated, and
consolidated for use in planning. Study of the intelligence
process can bring home to him the need to take into consid-
eration kinds of factors of which he might otherwise not be
aware. For the student in foreign relations the study of the
production and use of intelligence is of more immediate ap-
plication, bringing out the importance of factors such as cul-
tural differences, economics, and religion, which present col-
lege courses rarely treat in a meaningful way. In short, such
study should round out a student's understanding of his
chosen field, no matter whether it lies in sociology, politics,
or business, and help him to become the kind of citizen de-
manded by the role this country must now play on the stormy
international scene.
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The Soviets see in us an un-
differentiated and repugnant
threat to their security, much
like Soviet espionage and sub-
version in U.S. eyes.
SOVIET PUBLICISTS TALK ABOUT
U. S. INTELLIGENCE
Peter Deriabin, in The Secret World,' recalls that an old So-
viet pamphlet on the subject of U.S. intelligence treats the
CIA, CIC, Naval and Air Intelligence, and even the FBI as com-
ponents of a single organization. This concept is entirely in
accord with the standard Soviet public attitude, which regards
U.S. intelligence as a distinct service or function in which
many different U.S. government and private agencies may par-
ticipate at one phase or another. The Soviets most often,
therefore, refer generically to "U.S. intelligence," ignoring the
niceties of bureaucratic organization. When they do men-
tion individual components of the intelligence community,
they are likely to blur or confuse their operational roles. If
this imprecision seems a deliberate device to permit indiscrimi-
nate name-calling or to hide what they do know about U.S.
intelligence organization, one should recall that U.S. citi-
zens, officials, and even intelligence officers are likely to dis-
criminate poorly among the several Soviet intelligence agen-
cies, which have nevertheless been thoroughly described in
Deriabin's book and others.
Spies of the State Department
The espionage activities of U.S. intelligence are generally
depicted as being carried out under the guidance and direction
of the State Department by virtually every group or individual
that deals in any way with foreign governments or peoples.
Several Soviet sources have recently described the State De-
partment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research as "the liai-
son link between striped-pants diplomats and the cloak-and-
dagger personnel abroad." All U.S. embassy personnel are
presumed to be involved in espionage activities directed against
the Soviet Bloc. A Kozev article in Pravda alleged that Gen-
'Doubleday, 1959. Reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 109.
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eral Bedell "Smith's guidance [of the Moscow Embassy] was
notably distinguished by the fact that he forced literally
every single member of the staff, down to the last clerk and
regardless of the department in which he was employed, to en-
gage in intelligence work."
The Soviets see verification of the relationship between di-
plomacy and espionage in such facts as General Smith's hav-
ing been posted, after his tenure as Ambassador to the USSR,
first to CIA and then to State, in Admiral Kirk's position in
Naval Intelligence prior to his assignment as Ambassador to
Moscow and his subsequent chairmanship of the American
Committee for Liberation, and of course in the teaming of the
Dulles brothers at the head of the twin foreign affairs agen-
cies. Over the past eight years Soviet spokesmen have fre-
quently quoted Annabelle Bucar's The Truth about American
Diplomats,2 particularly the examples she gives to show that
"intelligence agents are sent to the USSR under various
.guises: as counsellors, second and third secretaries, attaches,
and even ordinary clerks." Khrushchev's 9 May 1960 remark
at the Czechoslovak Embassy exculpating Ambassador Thomp-
son. of complicity in the U-2 incident was a benign exception
to the general view that there is no cleavage between U.S.
diplomats and U.S. espionage.
A book by I. Nikitinsky, The Perfidious Methods of the Sub-
versive Activity of Imperialist Intelligence Services,3 com-
ments on the excellent espionage training given U.S. diplo-
mats. It says that the student body at Columbia University's
Russian Institute is made up primarily of Foreign Service of-
ficers, cadets from West Point, and students from the Naval
Academy, and that the Universities of Indiana and Pennsyl-
vania, Yale, and the Air Force School at Syracuse University
have similar spy-training programs.
The State Department is also considered the focal point for
espionage against the USSR done by official and unofficial
groupings as diverse as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations,
MSA, ICA, IBRD, the Jehovah Witnesses, the Rand Corpora-
tion, the Vatican, the IRO, journalists, correspondents, and
Republished in the Soviet Union by Literary Gazette in 1950.
? Moscow, 1954.
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many others. Moscow University students have been cau-
tioned particularly against tourists, "50 percent of which are
spies connected in one way or another with American intelli-
gence." A 4 February 1960 Red Star article on the "U.S. es-
pionage octopus" pointed out to Army personnel that "Ameri-
can intelligence employs military attaches, diplomats, and
other official and unofficial observers as spies." Such warn-
ings were given with increasing frequency as East-West ex-
changes and tourism were expanded.
In general, the Soviet military press carries more material
on U.S. intelligence activities than say Pravda or Izvestia, with
the obvious purpose of maintaining a high state of counter-
espionage alert within the Soviet military. Although U.S.
military attaches are described as the main link to the intel-
ligence organs of the armed forces, the distinction between
military and other intelligence is generally presented, as by a
13 March 1959 Red Star article, as a purely functional break-
down: the military attaches are primarily concerned with
military dispositions and technology, whereas others spy out
political and economic matters.
During the past year the Soviets have taken increasing
notice of U.S. intelligence collection by scientific and techno-
logical means. References to electronic devices for monitoring
Soviet rocket tests and the launching of earth satellites, to
the pilotless SD-3, and to project "Sentry" for using earth
satellites to photograph Russian territory have been pub-
lished. Discussions of scientific espionage are sometimes in-
troduced by quoting Mr. Dulles' 15 October 1959 statement in
New York, "We feel that the scientific side of intelligence col-
lection should be emphasized to the point where radar and
electronics tend to take the place of the wiles of the Mata
Hari of several decades ago."
These warnings and other propaganda alerting the people
to U.S. espionage activity are addressed chiefly to those who
might disclose classified information unwittingly, rather than
to the few "bourgeois degenerates" who would deliberately be-
tray state secrets. A typical story is that of a young Soviet
flyer on a train who got involved in a discussion of the rela-
tive merits of Soviet and foreign aircraft. Out of patriotic
pride and in order to show off his knowledge, he cited Soviet
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advances that were classified information and even described
aircraft in the testing stage. One of the passengers on the
train took little part in the conversation, but occasionally ex-
pressed doubts about the young flyer's knowledge in a way
that incited him to even more revelations. This quiet man, of
course, was a U.S. agent.
Cutthroats of CIA
Several Soviet publicists have recently commented at length
on CIA activities, particularly in connection with H. H. Ran-
som's Central Intelligence and National Security,4 which has
obviously been carefully studied by responsible officials in the
Soviet Union. An April 1959 New Times article by J. Yudin
quotes data from the book on the new CIA building, the num-
ber of buildings currently occupied, the number of employees,
an estimate of the total budget ($2 billion), and some of the
functions of CIA.
Although these commentators take note of its role as co-
ordinator of intelligence, CIA is normally presented primarily
as the agency responsible for planning and carrying out sub-
versive activities in the USSR and other Bloc countries, for
the direction of psychological warfare campaigns, and for
paramilitary operations related to the East-West struggle in
the non-Communist world. The Soviet citizen is given. the
picture of a dangerous and wily adversary willing to stop at
nothing to recruit agents, train them, and give them weapons,
explosives, poison, money, false papers, and other equipment
for organizing subversion in the Soviet camp. These op-
erations have a dual purpose-an economic one, to disrupt the
work of industrial and agricultural components, and a political
one, to prepare revolts, rebellions, street riots, and general dis-
order. It is said that CIA subversion was a major contrib-
uting factor in the Berlin riots and in the Hungarian revolt,
and that such operations are not carried out without the
knowledge of the high diplomats in U.S. embassies.
CIA's clandestine activities are ascribed variously to its
"Secret Operations Branch," its "Department of Dirty
Tricks," or its "Department of Covert Activities." The over-
throw of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala is cited as the prime
'Cambridge, 1958. Reviewed in Intelligence Articles 11 4, p. 79.
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n e igence
example of such activities outside the Bloc, with the coup
against Mossadegh in Iran a regular second. The Moscow
broadcast of a recent Neues Deutschland article on CIA adds
"two new examples which are fresh in our mind: Jordan,
where the coup succeeded, and Syria, where it failed." The
attempted assassinations of Togliatti, Duclos, and Tokuda and
the murder of Julien Lahaut, however, were attributed gen-
erally to imperialist intelligence services, not to CIA.
Soviet sources refer frequently to the recruitment and use
of defectors as agents against the Bloc. Since the enactment
of the Mutual Security Act in October 1951, CIA is presented
as having inexhaustible funds for this purpose. Propagan-
dists constantly refer to the $100,000,000 granted by the Ker-
sten Amendment and imply that the figure has increased
since that time. It has also been alleged that large U.S.
monopolies such as DuPont and General Motors spend
$350,000,000 annually for subversion and that the AFL pro-
vides $100,000 every month for U.S. intelligence. Occasion-
ally an essayist seeks to sort out the roles of U.S. private
and governmental agencies in subversive work: in the Febru-
ary 1957 International Affairs K. Ivanov distinguishes among
the CIA, CIC, ICA, Office of Special Warfare, and USIA, and
among the several foundations, the Crusade for Freedom, the
Committee for Liberation, etc., noting that they are all coordi-
nated by the OCB.
A book by P. Yakhlakov, Vigilance is the Tested Weapon of
the Soviet People, describes U.S. subversive activities as the
work of unscrupulous people who recruit "gangsters, pimps,
criminals, and bandits from the dregs of society for whom
espionage and subversion are a means of livelihood and profit."
Several books and newspaper articles have referred to an
alleged statement in late 1951 by C. D. Jackson, then described
as the leader of the fascist organization Committee for a Free
Europe: "We need the support of cutthroats and hoodlums,
as many as we can recruit." The procedure is typically de-
scribed as follows: U.S. intelligence agents screen displaced
persons who are detained by force under miserable conditions
in refugee camps in West Germany. All kinds of pressure, in-
cluding deceit, bribery, and blackmail, are applied against
these people to compel them to carry out subversive activity
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against their homeland. Selected persons are then sent to
the village of Bad Wiesee near Munich where they are taught
the arts of sabotage, terror, espionage and murder. When
their training is completed they are given the necessary equip-
ment and dropped by parachute from unmarked American
aircraft over the Ukraine. They are instructed to get into
Kiev and use whatever means are necessary, including mur-
der, to obtain genuine Soviet documentation. Then they are
to get into touch by radio with the American espionage cen-
ter in West Germany for further instructions regarding
espionage, sabotage, and subversion.
Soviet publicists also charge CIA with psychological war-
fare operations, of which the Free Europe Committee is seen
as the archtype, and apparently quite dangerous. The Yudin
article of April 1959 says that CIA provides about three-quar-
ters of the funds for the Committee. Another CIA function
in Soviet eyes is to oversee and subsidize the intelligence serv-
ices of other Western governments, but published statements
on this subject are vague and propagandistic. The West Ger-
man intelligence service is most frequently cited as closely
tied to CIA. The recent Neues Deutschland commentary on
CIA had the establishment of a West German center for psy-
chological warfare originating "in the CIA manure pile."
"The espionage-sabotage service of the Hitlerite intelligence
officer, Reinhard Gehlen, lives on American dollars under the
guardianship of Dulles' CIA," says an article by V. Makhov in
a 1957 collection, About Those Who Are Against Peace.
The ten-page Makhov article is probably the most detailed
and comprehensive description of CIA and its works in the
open Soviet literature. It expounds all the themes enumer-
ated above, illustrating them-with characteristic organiza-
tional imprecision-from press reports of General Donovan's
activities in Thailand and during the Hungarian revolution,
from published U.S. allusions to Ambassador Peurifoy's and
Allen Dulles' part in the Guatemalan coup, and from confes-
sions of former members of "Dulles' full division of agents"
who have been apprehended behind the iron curtain. It in-
cludes a biography of the evil genius Dulles himself, stress-
ing his Wall Street background and his status as an agent
for the monopolists in all foreign and military affairs from
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insuring the domination of U.S. capital abroad to establish-
ing naval strength ratios. It affirms, on the basis of captured
Nazi Foreign Ministry documents and other evidence, that
his chief wartime mission in Switzerland was to see to the
preservation of German economic and military might as a
bulwark against the USSR.
Analysis, Estimates, and the Shaping of Policy
The very little that is published in the USSR on the U.S.
intelligence community's estimative function is cast in tones
of satire and belittlement. In a recent example, an article
by Leontyev in the 31 January 1960 issue of Red Star, en-
titled "The Spies Count Rockets," noted Defense Secretary
Gates' statement on Soviet ICBM capabilities and said that
his information was derived through the following calcula-
tions: "There are five crows sitting on one fence and three
crows sitting on another fence. Now, how many rockets does
the Soviet Union have?" More generally the Soviets take
the line that our ability to estimate their capabilities accu-
rately is impeded by our preconceptions and by our inability
to see the world situation in realistic terms.
The Nikitinsky book cited above mentions that "sociologists,
historians, economists, geographers, transportation and com-
munication engineers, and other `scholars' are ... a part of
the western intelligence service." These so-called scholars
are said to have sold themselves to U.S. intelligence and bound
themselves to carry out. assignments on the demand of their
masters. This and other such statements imply that aca-
demic or intellectual elements in the community merely prove
what they are told to prove without any attempt to arrive
at logically reasoned conclusions. The Soviets do not present
the U.S. intelligence community or any part of it as an in-
tellectual organization.
But they leave no doubt that the intelligence community,
and CIA in particular, wields a critical influence in the for-
mation of U.S. policy, for "every step a government takes is
determined by the nature and the slant of the intelligence
information it receives," and U.S. intelligence is an integral
part of the Wall Street machinery that determines foreign
policy. The Yudin article cited above says that Allen Dulles,
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"though normally only an advisor to the National Security
Council, has become the chief figure in all its deliberations."
Several Soviet publicists have quoted a Washington Post arti-
cle to the effect that "CIA serves as a refuge for dare-devil
cutthroats. . . . Through their activities they can start the
ball rolling in the field of foreign policy." The 1955 summit
conference had hardly ended, Makhov says, when Allen Dulles
demanded that there be no yielding to the spirit of Geneva.
This Soviet view of the effect of intelligence on policy is
consonant with that of the relationship between their own
policy-making and intelligence organs. There was more than
just scapegoating in Soviet statements that Beria, operating
in his capacity as an intelligence chief, was primarily respon-
sible for the rupture in relations between the USSR and Yugo-
slavia. And Soviet spokesmen's treatment of the exposure of
U.S. overflights in its effect on the summit conference epito-
mizes their distrust of the force that intelligence activities
exert on the framing and carrying out of national policy.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
INTELLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY
THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A Non-Communist
Manifesto. By W. W. Rostow. (New York: Cambridge
University Press. 1960. Pp. 179. Cloth $3.75, paper $1.45.
Also London: Cambridge University Press. 1960.)
This is an important book. Professor Rostow's thoughtful
and imaginative study takes the masses of discrete facts that
have marked the development of the many modern national
economies and puts them into a single common framework.
In the course of identifying and defining five progressive
stages of development applicable to all the individual cases,
the author presents not only a general theory of the economic
growth of nations but also a synthesis of modern history.
His work is more than provocative analysis of the past, how-
ever, for its concepts have also the predictive value of sound
scientific theory.
The analysis is built around the proposition that the eco-
nomic activity of any nation at a given time can be identi-
fied as falling within one of these stages-the inertia of the
traditional society, fulfillment of the preconditions for take-
off, the takeoff, the drive to maturity, and the age of high
mass consumption. The traditional society is described as
one in which per capita production is limited by inability or
failure to use modern technology in any systematic fashion.
Traditional societies in general concentrate most of their
human and capital resources on agriculture; the resultant
social structure is quite rigid, and people are resigned and
fatalistic about long-run prospects for improving the levels
of living.
The transition to sustained economic growth is preceded by
a period in which the preconditions for takeoff are met. In
this second stage the ideas and institutions making for mod-
ernization gain, not necessarily the upper hand, but first tol-
eration and then enough freedom of action to initiate and
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sustain a process of economic transformation. Some of the
more important of the complex variety of preconditions are
a change in value judgments involving the acceptance of eco-
nomic progress as a desirable goal, the emergence of a class
of entrepreneurs, and the creation of institutions for the mo-
bilization of savings. Probably most important is the estab-
lishment of an effective centralized national state.'
The third stage, the takeoff, is "the great watershed in the
life of modern societies." At this point the forces making for
economic progress achieve critical mass. Rapid growth oc-
curs in a few key sectors of the economy. Investment in-
creases from 5 to 10 percent or more of national income. New
techniques power the rapidly growing manufacturing sector
and penetrate the agricultural sector as well. In short,
growth becomes the normal condition and is sustained by dy-
namic forces, irreversible as the loss of innocence.
Some 60 years after takeoff, with surprising uniformity, the
modern economies have reached maturity, a stage defined as
one in which they demonstrate the ability to apply advanced
technology over the total range of their activities. Then fol-
lows finally the stage of high mass consumption, where the
leading sectors shift toward the production of durable con-
sumers' goods and services. The decisive element in this
stage, the author notes, has historically been the quantity
production of inexpensive automobiles, with its concomitant
revolutionary social and economic effects.
Professor Rostow emphasizes that there is nothing preor-
dained about a society's passage through these conceptual
stages of growth: at every stage it is confronted with funda-
mental policy choices, and making these choices is an exer-
'Professor Rostow and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology have expanded their analysis of the preconditions
period-perhaps the most crucial one in economic growth, requiring
a vast array of economic and non-economic changes in the tradi-
tional society-in a study prepared for the U. S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, "Economic, Social and Political Change in
the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for U. S. Policy"
(86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D. C., 1960).
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ecen oo s.?
conomic
cise in value judgments far outside the province of economic
analysis. In the author's words:
The stages of growth are not a set of rigid, inevitable, prede-
termined phases of history. The process of growth imposes for
men and societies certain problems and possibilities from which
they must choose, and modern history can be viewed as the con-
sequences of choices made by various societies at various stages
of growth.
The erection of an alternative rational framework into
which the history since 1700 of all nations may be fitted in-
evitably clashes with the dogma of Communism, and the final
chapter of this book is therefore devoted to a comparison be-
tween Karl Marx's construction of history and the stages-of-
growth concept. Writing 120 years after Marx, Professor
Rostow has an enormous advantage in the experience of the
many nations which during that interval have developed their
economies to the point of high mass consumption. Marx's
predictions about the future evolution of industrial capitalist
societies, based on the single experience of the United King-
dom's drive to maturity, have not been borne out, and the
Marxist-Leninist alternative to capitalism is appraised here as
follows:
Communism is by no means the only form of effective state or-
ganization that can consolidate the preconditions in the transi-
tion of a traditional society, launch a takeoff, and drive a society
to technological maturity ... Communism takes its place . . . as
one peculiarly inhumane form of political organization capable
of launching and sustaining the growth process in societies where
the preconditions period did not yield a substantial and enter-
prising commercial middle class and an adequate political con-
sensus among the leaders of the society. It is a kind of disease
which can befall a traditional society if it fails to organize effec-
tively those elements within it which are prepared to get on with
the lob of modernization.
Such a disenchanted appraisal could not be expected to
bring approving shouts of agreement from the Kremlin. The
Rostow thesis was formally denounced in a Pravda article
("Snipe in the Bog," October 19, 1959), for its failure to take
account of the class struggle and of social formations. This
criticism of the stages-of-growth theory is simply untrue, as
its author, Mr. Yuri Zhukov, head of the State Committee
for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, undoubtedly
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knows. His party-line invective may, however, reflect a gen-
uine concern at the appearance of this new, persuasive theory
of economic development. The men in the Kremlin know
that many decisions fateful for the future of the world are
not being made in Moscow or Washington, but in capitals like
Karachi, Conakry, Djakarta, and Cairo. They are also aware,
from their experience in the spread of the Communist ideol-
ogy, of the truth of the late Lord Keynes' observation:
Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back 2
The Rostow thesis has also been attacked from the oppo-
site end of the ideological spectrum for its emphasis on the
important role the state must play in economic development.
See, for example, Professor David McCord Wright's criticisms
in the December 1959 Fortune. To those who believe strongly
that free enterprise provides the only true path to growth,
Professor Rostow's proposition that the vital entrepreneurial
spark can come from either the public or private sectors is
pure heresy. Thus we find the crux of denunciation from
the strange bedfellows of extreme right and left to fall on
the author's conclusion that there are many institutional
roads to sustained economic growth.
This bare outline of the stages-of-growth argument and the
kinds of criticism levied at it gives some indication of the sig-
nificance of the Rostow thesis for intelligence. First, as a
scholarly challenge to the Marxist economic interpretation
of history and a solid refutation of many of the key myths in
Communist lore, this could be one of the most influential
books of our time. For those who are actively working to see
that the newly emerging, fragile nations of Asia and Africa
follow a non-Communist course of development, the Rostow
thesis, with its impressive historical documentation, offers a
powerful weapon to combat the central challenge of our time.
The book should receive the widest dissemination among the
intellectual elite, in and out of government, of those coun-
tries setting out on the path of modernization.
2 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, In-
terest and Money (New York, 1936) p. 383.
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Secondly, for those engaged in the reporting and prepara-
tion of current intelligence and the making of estimates on
nations in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
Professor Rostow has forged a theoretical framework for
thinking logically about national economic growth. Some of
his descriptive characterizations of the individual stages of
growth-the preconditions stage and the takeoff, for ex-
ample-are already a part of the language of economists
grappling with problems of economic development.
The first publication of Professor Rostow's views came after
his relevant lecture series at Cambridge in the autumn of
1958. The fact that they have stirred up a furious interna-
tional debate in this short period of time is eloquent testimony
not only to their stimulating content but also to their effec-
tiveness in challenging certain aspects of conventional eco-
nomic wisdom on both sides of the iron curtain.
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INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY STRATEGY
THE TURN OF THE TIDE-1939-1943. By Arthur Bryant.
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co. 1957. Pp. 624.
$6.95.)
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST-1943-1946. By Arthur Bryant.
(Garden City: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 438. $6.95.)
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Im-
perial General Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee during the critical war years, made a careful and de-
tailed entry in his diary every day. This diary forms the
basis for these two volumes aggregating more than a thou-
sand pages. British historian Arthur Bryant has indexed it,
edited out superfluous material, and provided continuity as
necessary.
To say that this work will be a treasure house for the his-
torians of World War II is putting it mildly. Here are chron-
icled among other things the conflicts between the British
and the American strategy, with the British viewpoint, of
course, dominant and convincingly laid out. From the be-
ginning there was a constant struggle over the date when the
invasion of Europe should be mounted, the Americans pressing
for an earlier assault. Then followed disagreement on how
the German armies should be destroyed, the British urging
an offensive across the north German plains. And through-
out all, until the collapse of Germany, there was the issue of
getting what the British considered sufficient strength in Eu-
rope in the face of U.S. pressures for devoting more resources
to the Pacific.
If Montgomery's autobiography was blunt in expressing
his thoughts about American inadequacies, the Alanbrooke
diary is even blunter, particularly in its comments about
General Eisenhower and other revered American leaders.
Anti Alanbrooke will be taken more seriously than the flam-
boyant Montgomery. He was an extraordinarily able Chief
of Staff for the British, one of few who could have done so well.
For the student of intelligence, there is considerable mate-
rial to be found in these volumes for the searching. Alan-
brooke is no great admirer of intelligence; he grumbles sev-
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eral times about having to labor through JIC "appreciations"
and about the inadequacies of information on enemy activities
and intentions. Intelligence being not an end in itself, how-
ever, the rich insights conveyed here into its end products
and end uses will be important to any more detailed analyses
that may be made of intelligence successes and failures in
World War II, and of how intelligence was utilized by the
commanders.
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A33-A33
THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. By Oskar Mor-
genstern. (New York: Random House. 1959. Pp. 306.
$3.95.)
As its title implies, this book examines national defense
policy in the missile age, in particular the relative vulnerabili-
ties of fixed and mobile defenses. The author, described as a
consultant to various defense groups, must be presumed to
speak with more than academic authority, and his analysis
is clear and well written. He makes a very strong case for
mobile defenses-or perhaps one should say retaliatory
forces-specifically, pending the advent of a mobile ICBM
with solid fuel, for the Polaris submarine and an air-
borne SAC.
Professor Morgenstern devotes one chapter of about forty
pages exclusively to intelligence, making a practical compari-
son between the problems facing U.S. intelligence in Soviet
security barriers and other circumstances and the relative
ease with which the Communists get information on the
United States. Here his analysis lacks sophistication: Dr.
Morgenstern has given too much credence to what he reads
in the press or hears on the cocktail circuit without check-
ing it against the facts. The chapter is nevertheless correct
in its main thesis and should despite its inaccuracies be of
help to the lay reader.
FREELY I SERVED. By Stanislaw Sosabowski. (London:
William Kimber. 1960. Pp. 203. 25/-.)
There are two matters of intelligence interest in these con-
tentious memoirs of the man who conceived and built up in
the UK the Polish Parachute Brigade and commanded it in the
lost battle of Arnhem. The first is the boldness of his suc-
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cessful devices for avoiding arrest in his underground work
and escape from Poland in the confusion after Warsaw's fall
in 1939. The other is his opinion that the major cause of the
Arnhem fiasco, more decisive even than Eisenhower's "dilatori-
ness" and the blunders of all the British commanders involved,
was the failure of intelligence on the German strength in. the
area and its probable reaction to the assault on the Rhine
bridges.
General Sosabowski presents a viewpoint which of course
is lost in the Eisenhower, Montgomery, and other British-
American accounts; but he would have done well to employ
a ruthless editor to weed out personal trivia and damp the
I-knew-better-but-they-wouldn't-listen and I-didn't-want-to-
be-a-personnel-problem-but-I-had-to-stand-up-for-Polish-rights
tone of many passages.
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THE NILI SPIES. By Anita Engle. (London: Hogarth Press.
1959. Pp. 245. 25/-.)
From the remote past to modern times, from Rahab at the
fall of Jericho to Ethel Rosenberg in World War II, women
have engaged in some of history's most spectacular espionage.
An analytical study might reveal that women, directly or in-
directly, had more radically changed the course of history
through their clandestine efforts than men. Certainly Sarah
Aaronsohn, the field leader of the Nili spies, belongs to the
category of strong-willed history makers from the weaker
sex. She has not yet become a legendary figure only for lack
of public knowledge of her deeds.
The Nili spies, who took their code name from the initial
letters of the biblical phrase Netzach Israel lo Ishikare-"The
eternity of Israel will not fail"-were a dedicated group of
early Zionists engaged in haphazardly courageous endeavor to
save the Yishuv, the Jewish colony in the Turkish province
of Palestine, from oppression and destruction during World
War I. They hoped by collecting detailed and timely intelli-
gence on the situation in the province to catalyze the inertia
of British Headquarters at Cairo into an early military action
which would liberate it. Sarah and her brother Aaron be-
lieved, long before the Balfour Declaration and the concept
of a Mandate Authority, that once Palestine was under Brit-
ish control British law, order, and humanity would eventually
permit the establishment of a homeland for the Jews.
Upon the outbreak of war in 1914, Aaron Aaronsohn, a bot-
anist who had achieved considerable fame, especially in Ger-
man and American academic circles, for his rediscovery of
wild wheat, founded the Nili underground espionage organiza-
tion with the object of sending intelligence to General Allenby
in Egypt. His sister Sarah helped him in this dangerous work;
and after Aaron left Palestine to join Allenby in Cairo and
Absalom Feinberg, her sister's fiance whom she loved, had
been killed trying to slip through the Turkish southern front,
she bore the main burden of organizing the spy network
throughout Palestine, collecting the material and sending it
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to Egypt until she was captured. She escaped her torturers
by a hideously executed suicide and without the consolation
of knowing that her efforts, perhaps more than any other
person's, had been instrumental in the successful launching
of Allenby's Palestine campaign.
To the professional, Nili operations, precisely because they
were amateurish, make interesting reading; they offer many
examples of tactical errors whose inevitable result was the
death of members of the ring. Although the network had a
safe foundation in the loving and trusting devotion of one
family, the Aaronsohns, and their relatives or close friends,
their operational cover was inadequate protection, not,
strangely enough, from the Turks, but from the Jewish com-
munity. Ideological and Zionist rivalries for control of the
early colonizers, along with genuine fear of the Ottoman prac-
tice of holding an entire community responsible for the trea-
son or even misdemeanors of individuals, made the Aaron-
sohns and their friends suspect and disliked. The fact that
Nili became the channel through which Diaspora gold was
brought to the starving Jewish community did not mollify
the local leaders' attitude towards them. They issued what
Sarah considered a cowardly ultimatum to cease operations,
on threat of exposure, shortly before the net was rolled up
by other means.
The local Turkish administration and military forces, cor-
rupt and venal, were bought off almost weekly with Nili gold;
perhaps they would never have been fully conscious of the
espionage in their midst if they had not finally been alerted
and goaded by German intelligence. Meanwhile Nili agents
speaking fluent Turkish, Arabic, Hebrew, and several other
languages managed to carry on unmolested until 1917. Their
ultimate exposure, if one can rely on the accuracy of the au-
thor's details, can be attributed to three important factors-
the lack of proper security precautions and compartmenta-
tion, the unstable personality of one conspirator, and very
poor communications.
All of the Nili leaders and some of their agents knew one
another by their true names and personal recognition, a not
unnatural result of their recruitment from among friends,
from whom they could not hide their identity. Many of these
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agents and some couriers knew the location of Nili headquar-
ters in Aaron's experimental station at Athlit. Too many,
including Sarah's old Arab carriage driver, were aware of the
clandestine beach contacts with a British naval ship from
Egypt.
The British courier ship, for various reasons that are not
always explained, maintained an irregular and undependable
schedule which necessitated hurried and haphazard exchanges
of intelligence, gold, and supplies. The failure of the ship to
keep a scheduled rendezvous and the urgency of what Sarah
considered vital information influenced her to send a message
to Egypt by courier pigeon, a method which had already been
proved unreliable. The pigeon, apparently bereft of homing
instincts, flew north instead of south and was intercepted by
the Turks, who, with the assistance of the Germans, began
a methodical counterespionage investigation.
Even this exposure might have been unproductive for the
Turks until too late if the unstable braggadocio Yosef Le-
shansky, who had unnecessarily antagonized the elders of the
community and the Hashomair Hatzair Marxists, had not
boasted of his exploits, his contacts, and his influence to un-
trustworthy individuals, foolishly relying on the loyalty of
some of his Bedouin and Turkish friends. After his arrest
he talked freely, thereby implicating almost everybody.
Reflecting the intricate patterns of human affairs in the
Middle East, the book includes many interesting asides to the
main story. The author almost, but not quite, succeeds in
destroying the myth that Lawrence of Arabia dedicated his
famous Seven Pillars of Wisdom to Sarah Aaronsohn.
Written more as a eulogy than a treatise on espionage, The
Nili Spies is based primarily on the voluminous reports and
diaries of Sarah and Aaron, which in turn are supported by
official British documents and memorabilia of World War I.
The author, who inclines towards the lyrical to the detriment
of her text, adulates Aaron as the unsung hero of the Balfour
Declaration and the man whose imagination and determina-
tion established the foundations upon which Chaim Weizman,
Ben-Gurion, and others built the State of Israel. She nour-
ishes a gentle animosity towards the present Israeli regime
for failure to grant Sarah and Aaron the recognition they
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justly deserve. It does seem strange that Israeli and Zionist
circles, known for their celebration of outstanding contribu-
tions to the cause, should have remained almost silent about
the accomplishments of a valorous woman whose exploits
would have made her a Joan of Are in other countries.
ORDE WINGATE. By Christopher Sykes. (London: Collins.
1959. Pp. 575. 35/-.)
This is a long, well-written, painstakingly researched biog-
raphy of one of the most interesting leaders of World War II.
Orde Wingate was a regular British Army officer, a mystic,
a Zionist, an intelligence officer, and a guerrilla leader. Be-
ginning his career in North Africa, he soon was moved to
Palestine, the land that became his major interest and love.
As British Army intelligence officer turned rabid Zionist, he
apparently perfected a counter-guerrilla system to enable the
Jewish communities to protect themselves from Arab raiders.
Later in Burma he likewise made considerable effort to know
the area, peoples, and languages, and as guerrilla leader there
his peculiar talents were again particularly effective.
'Wingate could almost be described as instinctively an in-
telligence officer but, because of his eccentricities and oddities,
never as a great one. It is a credit to the British that they
recognized his considerable virtues in spite of his aberrations.
Mr. Syke's biography weaves in a wealth of material on in-
telligence techniques, countersubverson, and guerrilla war-
fare that is worth the digging out for today's intelligence
operator.
ONE MAN IN HIS TIME. By Serge Obolensky. (London:
Hutchinson & Co. 1960. Pp. 324. 25/-.)
This autobiography, perhaps an important one for socialites,
qualifies as an intelligence reference because in World War II
its princely author commanded two OSS paratroop operations,
one in 1943 that secured the loyalty of Italian troops on the
Sardinian flank of the Salerno action, and one in France in
1944, undertaken to prevent the withdrawing Germans from
sabotaging a transformer station important for the Paris elec-
tric power supply.
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As with other potentially interesting aspects of the book,
however-his childhood and adolescent impressions of the life
of the imperial Russian nobility, his description of cavalry ac-
tions in World War I, and his participation in White Russian
and Tartar resistance to the Bolsheviks in the Crimea-the
light he might throw on these events is buried under a bushel
of trivia. Prince Obolensky has written not for history nor
even for a popular audience, but for himself and his exclusive
circle of celebrities, tracing their intricate family relation-
ships to one another and to royalty and recounting in detail
the things they said and did in the endless round of games
and parties that was their life.
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DOCTOR GOEBBELS. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraen-
kel. (New York: Simon & Schuster.
1960. Pp. 306.
$4.50.
Also London: William Heinemann.
1960. Pp. 329.
30/-.
Published in France as Goebbels: Sa Vie, Sa Mort.
Robert Laffont. 1960.)
Paris:
This biography of Hitler's indefatigable propaganda chief
and most staunchly loyal comrade traces a thread of conti-
nuity in the history of the Nazi movement and the Third
Reich which no single other life story but Hitler's own could
match, a thread unbroken from the early struggles of the
mid-twenties to those charred bodies in the garden outside
the Fuehrerbunker on May Day 1945. Nor is it a slender
thread: Joseph Goebbels fancied himself the future historian
of the great era and alone among the Nazi leaders kept a
diary for posterity. Only fragments of its some thirty vol-
umes have been found; but these, the diaries of his aides, his
correspondence, and the testimony of surviving acquaintances
have enabled the authors to clothe the man in flesh and blood
and follow him through his career.
The story is of particular interest to propaganda analysts
and propaganda strategists. Goebbels' definition of propa-
ganda was of the broadest, and he regarded command over
propaganda as virtually equivalent to command over the lives
and actions of the audience. Hitler's Minister of Propaganda
was thus in Goebbels' eyes his deputy in charge of the home
front, the captive audience, and after July 1944 he could al-
most be said in fact to have run Germany while Hitler ran
the war. The conquest of Europe, too, if he had been doing
it, would have been undertaken not by force of arms but by
the power of the spoken word over men's minds.
Goebbels' direction of the powerful Third Reich propaganda
organs was meticulous and comprehensive; in spite of Ribben-
trop's efforts to take over foreign propaganda and the fact
that Hitler or one of the other leaders occasionally stepped MORI/HRP from
out of line, essentially everything that was said in the Ger- pg. A40-A41
man press and broadcasts or shown in the German films and
public spectacles flowed from this one man. Thus today's
propaganda strategist, on the one hand, studying the model
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of thee extraordinarily effective Nazi system, will find its most
significant feature to be, not what Goebbels characterized as
massive reiteration of simple truths and the Nazi's enemies
dubbed "the big lie technique," but the integrity of unitary
control and consistent one-man direction. The propaganda
analyst, on the other hand, will in this same feature see ful-
filled> his necessary assumption that the propaganda he stud-
ies has a logical, self-consistent content aligned with the pur-
poses of the regime. The Nazi propaganda was in fact so
distressingly self-consistent that it, left the Anglo-American
analyst little foothold for that digging into factional differ-
ences and divergencies among the leaders' policies that has
been the aim of much analysis of Communist propaganda since
the war.
THE REVOLT OF THE MIND. By Tamas Aczel and Tibor
Meray. (New York: Praeger. 1959. Also London: Thames
and Hudson. 1960. Pp. 449. 35/-.)
The subject of this revealing book is not intelligence, but a
conflict of profound interest to the many intelligence officers
who wondered, all through the three middle years of the
fifties, at the strange things being said by the Hungarian
press and radio and tried to divine their portent. Although
it became clear in November 1956 to everyone that this sur-
facing of ideological unrest had reflected no mere adminis-
trative difficulties "of little consequence and likely to dimin-
ish," as some had theretofore concluded, the intellectual crisis
of the time has nowhere been so perceptively and thoroughly
delineated as here by Aczel and Meray.
The authors were prominent young Party writers of sin-
cere Stalinist persuasion, well representative of the Hun-
garian Communist intelligentsia. They were able by and large
to contain their normal artistic passion for individual, non-
conforming creativity and to maintain unwavering loyalty to
the Party through the early phases of the Nagy-Rakosi strug-
gles over the best road to socialism, although the corps of
Communist writers was indeed deeply divided between the two
leaders. It was the revelation late in 1954 of the contrived
and groundless arrests, tortures, imprisonment, and execu-
tions in the wake of the Rajk trial-a revelation made through
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the release of Janos Kadar and a score of other surviving vic-
tims-that reunited the writers and many other intellectuals
in open revolt against the Rakosi leadership, almost against
the very Party. Then a year of ever severer defeats for the
rebels, until the twentieth Soviet Party congress and Khru-
shchev's "secret" speech turned the tide.
At this stage the authors' Hungarian emotions betray them
into oversimplification, and they make Nagy too much the
martyred hero, Rakosi too much the despicable villian, and
Kadar too easily the Judas of their idol Nagy. Earlier char-
acter portraits, like that of the Hungarian Zhdanov, Jozsef
Revai, had been unbiased, sympathetic, and enlightening. Yet
for all this fault the book is a unique documentary on the be-
liefs and motivations of Communist intellectuals, on an im-
portant aspect of what makes Communism work and wherein
it fails to work, and-more profoundly-on the contradictions
between the individual and the social ideals of man at large.
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THE DOUBLE DEALERS. Edited by Alexander Klein. (Lon-
don: Faber & Faber. 1958. Pp. 381. 21/-.)
This anthology of grand hoaxes includes short accounts of
half a dozen intelligence deceptions, one from the Civil War
and the rest from World War II and after. They are the story
of Emma Edmonds, whose first mission as a Union spy was
executed in the guise of a negro lad; Donald Q. Coster's ac-
count of how he persuaded the Germans in North Africa to
expect an American landing at Dakar; Clifton James' recollec-
tions of his appearances as General Montgomery at Gibraltar
and in North Africa in order to divert German expectations
of the Normandy landings; Al Newman's story of a Spanish
MORI/HRP spy for the Nazis whom the British impressed by showing the
from pg. same air squadrons, fleets, and troops repeatedly moved up
A43-A43 along his travel route; the exposure as a fake of Quentin Rey-
nold's book on George DuPre's purported four years as a Brit-
ish agent with the French resistance; and the escape of five
political prisoners from East German prisons engineered in
1953 by Hasso Lindemann with forged release orders and false
telephone calls.
The collection also includes, curiously, one intelligence
story that is not a hoax, Richard Sharpe's reconstruction from
open sources of Allied foreknowledge of the V-2 weapon.
Sharpe credits the discovery of the Peenemuende test area
as early as 1938 to a traveling British writer-agent, the map-
ping of the experimental station to Polish forced laborers, and
the first air photo identification of the weapon to Constance
Babington-Smith. He attributes the catastrophic timing of
the 17 August 1943 obliteration raid to Allen Dulles' source
Gisevius and details about material and construction, capped
finally by shipment of one of the missles intact, to Polish
underground intelligence from the new test range at Blizna
and Sarnaki.
THE MAN THEY COULDN'T KILL. By Dennis Holman.
(London: Heinemann. 1960. Pp. 232. 16/-.)
This is the story of a thread of exceptional luck woven
through the life of one man, Robert Oldfield. Behind it lies
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the provocative possibility, of no small interest to intelligence,
that intensive study of many Oldfields might yield a better
understanding of luck's chemistry, and perhaps even a means
of predicting accurately whose ventures will be blessed.
A Royal Navy stoker active in submarines during World
War II, Oldfield's path took him through innumerable close
brushes with death. Characteristic of his experiences was
an incident in prewar Haifa in which he stepped from a truck
seconds before a terrorist-planted bomb demolished the vehi-
cle. In subsequent years deliverance by a matter of seconds
or inches became almost commonplace with him. Among the
perils from which he emerged relatively unscathed were an
earthquake, bombings, a major naval battle, torpedo attacks,
a ship-submarine collision, the sinking of the submarine Sara-
cen by depth charges, a break from a POW camp, an action
with Italian guerrillas, two sentences to death before firing
squads, a stay in a German concentration camp, and a near
electrocution. Between these more dramatic incidents. there
were many minor ones that did not want for lethal quality:
on several occasions, for example, last-minute developments
removed him from the crews of submarines destined not to
return.
Although the account of Oldfield's adventures touches on
POW interrogation, escape and evasion, guerrilla activity,
sabotage, and other matters of intelligence interest, its brief
treatment of these subjects offers nothing particularly new
or significant. The keynote of the book is luck.
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Articles and book reviews on the following pages are un-
classified and may for convenience be detached from the classi-
fied body of the Studies if their origin therein is protected.
The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents
preceding page 1.
The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelli-
gence Collection, in scanning current public literature for in-
telligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who
prepared book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most
noteworthy in this respect are the following:
Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth .. EDWARD L. ALLEN
Engle's The Nili Spies ...................
Books on Propaganda ...................
Holman's The Man They Couldn't Kill ... .
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