STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 1959]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300250001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: STUDY

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CONFIDENTIAL
STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
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VOL. 3 NO. 3 SUMMER 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
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EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
The Life and Work of Stephan Haller
Patrick R. Beller 1
Biography of an intelligence officer extraordinary.
SECRET
Intelligence Gathering in an Unlettered Land
Francis Hollyman 15
Strictures and strange ways CON-
Handwriting Analysis as an Assessment Aid
Keith Laycock 23
Asks a fair hearing for a malpracticed art. SECRET
The Assessment of Graphology . . E. A. Rundquist 45
Not necessarily guilty on all counts. SECRET
Developments in Air Targeting: Progress and Future
Prospects . . . . . . Kenneth T. Johnson 53
Air intelligence girds for the space age. SECRET
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence . . . 63
CONFIDENTIAL
My Ten Years as a Counter-Spy, by Boris Morros
Samuel R. Burvick
The House of Secrets, by Gordon Young
W. P. Zimmock
Count Five and Die, by Barry Wynne
James G. Wanninger
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
William J. Donovan and the National Security
Allen W. Dulles 71
Tribute to the father of central intelligence.
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence . . . 85
A Study of Military Intelligence, by General Cheng
Chieh-min . . . . . . . .
Why Men Confess, by 0. John Rogge
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The Silent Language, by Edward T. Hall
Rommel Ruft Kairo, by J. W. Eppler
Propaganda Analysis, by Alexander L. George
Communication to the Editors . . . . . . . . . 97
Suggests a serious assault on illiteracy in intelli-
gence.
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THE LIFE AND WORK OF STEPHAN HALLER
Patrick R. Beller
This true biography of an intelligence officer is doubly
a study in intelligence: it shows how a goodly endowment
of intellectual equipment, the honing of scholasticism,
and a catholic diversity of interests and experience pro-
vide none too elaborate a base for intelligence work, but
indeed create the potential for extraordinary success.
Haller's contributions to U.S. intelligence began in war,
with the OSS. Often unorthodox in his methods but al-
ways effective in his stubborn onslaught on the work as-
signed him, he lived a career that is now part of the tradi-
tion of the U.S. intelligence service, a tradition that he
and many of his colleagues have been building since the
days of World War II.
Stephan Haller-scholar, mathematician, and political
activist-was not the model intelligence officer, because
there is no such thing. The job is so vast that in addition
to that first requisite-brains-all kinds of persons and
talents are needed. But Haller combined more talents
than most men-combined them and controlled them, so
that even seemingly disparate traits were fitted together.
He was a thoughtful and sensual, purposeful and humane
man.
But trying to measure him is like trying to measure
other natural forces, like explaining a storm as so many
foot-pounds of wind-thrust. He was more than a sum of
attributes.
Stephan Haller was not his real name.' He did not
want publicity or acclaim; he wanted to do his job. Those
of us who knew him know that he would not only have
chosen anonymity; he would have insisted on it for opera-
tional reasons. His identity and character merged with
the work to which he was devoted, shaping it and shaped
by it. The work is his memorial. And because we share
in the work, we also share in his story.
A pseudonym is used here because his contacts are still active and
several of his operations continue to be of a sensitive nature.
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. Stephan Haller
Stephan Haller was the second of two sons born to a middle-
class family of German Jews. Manfred and Margarete Haller
were living in Frankfurt am Main with their three-year-old
Emil in 1906, the year of Stephan's birth. Later a daughter,
Sara, was born. Manfred Haller was a Rabbi. In 1916, after
Stephan had finished grammar school, the family moved to
Kassel. Graduation from Mittelschule at the age of ten is
unusual in Germany; young Stephan was a good student.
From 1916 to 1924 he continued his studies in Braunschweig,
and two years later he took his first degree, a BS, at Marburg/
Lahn. The next five years were spent at a number of uni-
versities inside and outside Germany. The young man's stud-
ies showed the breadth of his interests. He became skilled
in mathematics and statistics, physics, psychology, sociology,
and political science; and he read widely in other subjects.
His father was lean, bearded, and strictly orthodox, whereas
Stephan's broad interests and his studies in the sciences had
increased his natural curiosity and his scepticism. The result
was frequent clashes between father and son. But although
Stephan argued from materialistic concepts, one of his closest
friends has said that later in his life he was deeply religious,
a fact he tried to conceal. In any event, the Rabbi and his
younger son were never intimate in their association.
Margarete Haller died in 1923, when Stephan was seventeen.
Ten years more, and the Nazis were to put his father in a con-
centration camp. Later the Rabbi, his daughter, and his older
son all managed somehow to reach South America. Stephan
found a different course.
Politician and Propagandist
European students have always been more precocious in
political life than their American counterparts. Young Haller
associated himself with the Social Democratic Party when he
was nineteen, and soon became very active in its student
groups. From 1925 until 1933, when he was forced to flee
Germany, he was much occupied with politics and the educa-
tional programs of the German labor movement. For several
of those years he was chairman of the Social Democratic Stu-
dents' Movement at the University of Frankfurt and a member
of the movement's national board of chairmen. He was also
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district leader of this movement for southwest Germany,
which included the Universities of Marburg, Frankfurt, Gies-
sen, Heidelberg, and Munich, as well as the Polytechnic Insti-
tute at Darmstadt. At the same time he took part in the
educational program of the German labor unions, serving
both as educational director and as teacher at various large
plants, including I. G. Farben, throughout Hesse.
Haller also became intensely and practically interested in
the theory and uses of political propaganda. It was this inter-
est that brought him into intimate contact with Kurt Schu-
macher, Ollenhauer, and other leading Socialists. He became
a member of the SPD Propaganda Committee for Hesse, which
worked under the direction of Reichstag Deputy Dr. Carlo Mier-
endorff. For three years, from 1930 to 1933, this committee
maintained a continuous survey and analysis of the effect
upon the German people of the propaganda of all the political
parties. The purpose of the survey was to improve SPD propa-
ganda and reduce the effectiveness of that of all opponents.
Stephan Haller's education thus drew a little closer to his
future work.
During the same period he put his analyses to use, appear-
ing as the SPD speaker at nearly a thousand political rallies
held all over Germany. About half of these were meetings of
nationalistic groups: the Stahlhelm, the German National
Party, and of course the NSDAP, the Nazis. He sharpened his
wits and skills in debate against men whose names were later
heard in intercession and anathema-Goebbels, Hitler's propa-
ganda chief; Baldur von Schirach, Nazi youth leader; Dr.
Franz Seldte, founder of the Stahlhelm. Selected as a dele-
gate to the SPD's national convention, he twice ran unsuc-
cessfully for office, once for the Hessian Landtag and once
for the Reichstag. Politics is not an easy life anywhere; it
was a hard and rewarding school for a young Jew in the tur-
bulent pre-Hitler Germany.
A statement written by Haller for the OSS in early 1944
includes this comment:
I shall not dwell upon the fact that in the course of the
above mentioned activities, I could not fail to acquire a rather
thorough knowledge of the German party system as a whole,
of the structure, history, methods of propaganda and action
of the German national parties, particularly the Nazi Party,
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the German National Party, and of the leagues and associa-
tions either connected to or collaborating with them; as well
as, to a certain extent, a personal knowledge of many known
leaders of these organizations.
He also learned how to assess people and how to deal with
them, when to be friendly and kind and when to be hard or
austere, whom to praise or reassure and whom to treat with
just the right degree of that superciliousness so effective with
certain Germanic types. His convictions gave him reason to
act; his studies and political research had taught him how;
and now experience was teaching him the hardest lesson,
when to act.
Adolf Hitler became Reichschancellor on 30 January 1933.
The night before the Reichstag fire, on 27 February, Haller
made a pungently anti-Nazi speech at Darmstadt. Two days
later the SS storm-troopers came to the Haller home. They
did not find Stephan. A young student of his, a girl, had
somehow learned what was coming and had warned him. The
troopers smashed up the household, arrested the Rabbi, and
hauled him off to the Sammellager.
The Wandering Jew
For six months Haller lived and worked underground with
anti-Nazis in southwest Germany, the Ruhr, and Berlin. In
September he escaped into Luxembourg. Here he continued
his anti-Nazi work until the German government pressured
the small duchy to arrest him and return him. A warrant
for his arrest was issued, but he escaped again, to the Saar,
which was then administered by the League of Nations.
(Much later, at the war's end, Haller went back to Luxem-
bourg with the American forces. He looked up the chief of
police and identified himself: he understood, he said, that a
warrant for his arrest and extradition was outstanding.)
He stayed in the Saarland until 1935, when it was returned
to Germany. When the Nazis marched in he walked out, to
Paris. There he resumed, at the Sorbonne, his studies in
statistical mathematics, sociology, and political science. He
became a volunteer statistician for the Pasteur Institute and
a member of the National Center of Scientific Research, a
branch of the French Ministry of Education. He was offered
an assistant's post at the Institute of Atomic Physics of the
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Stephan Haller
University of Lyon, despite the fact that in 1934 and 1935
France was suffering from unemployment, employed aliens
were required to have work permits, and there were many
times more refugees than permits.
When World War II started, all German aliens in France
were arrested and confined in a detention camp. Soon there-
after Haller and some fifty other German and Austrian sci-
entists were released and formed into a curious organization
known as the Prestation Savante (Service of Scientists), or-
ganized by the French Ministry of War and attached to the
University of Montpellier, where they worked under the orders
of the Ministers of War and Education. The organization was
semi-military, and the scientists were dressed in a compromise
between soldiers' uniforms and the garb of monks. During
this period Haller made friends with a number of fellow-sci-
entists whom he later recruited and used as agents. Precisely
what work was done by the Prestation until the fall of France
is not clear now.
When France went under, Haller fled again. Both the Ge-
stapo and the Vichy militia were looking for him. There was
a price on his head. He went south, to the unoccupied zone.
During his long sojourn there he became fluent in French
and improved his accent sufficiently to pass as a Belgian.
After the Franco-German armistice, the French set up nu-
merous depots at which French military personnel could be
demobilized upon request. Their proof of bona fides was the
uniform; upon discharge they were given a few thousand
francs and a civilian suit. Haller managed to go through
the process three times in three different towns, living in
each on his severance pay.
Finally picked up and placed in a camp for demobilized
French soldiers, he escaped and made his way to the Ameri-
can Consulate in Marseilles, where he obtained an Emergency
Intellectual Visa to the United States. After a brief delay in
Spain in the summer of 1941, he reached New York via Cuba
on a refugee ship. He arrived in wretched physical condition.
Rebel in Uniform
Ten months later, at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he was inducted
into the United States Army. The Haller legend has it that
some difficulty with the military psychologists ensued: asked
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SECRET Stephan Hailer
by one of them if he could sing, he replied with a fortissimo
rendering of Die Wacht am Rhein. This opening scene fore-
shadowed some later events. Assigned as a student to an
army engineering school in Kentucky, he was placed in an
elementary class. The instructor made frequent errors, and
Haller's helpful corrections were appreciated neither by the
teacher nor by the commanding officer. The latter had Haller
on the carpet and informed him incisively that he was not
the assistant instructor. Haller explained that he did not
know anything about the army but did know mathematics,
whereas the instructor's specialties were obviously the reverse.
A compromise was effected: he was to remain silent in class
in exchange for a nightly pass.
From September 1942 until April 1944 he was assigned to
five different Army posts, usually instructing in the opera-
tion of a computer, while the OSS was frantically looking for
men who knew Germany well. At last an IBM run turned
up Stephan Haller; he knew the language, had detailed area
knowledge, was a well-known SPD member, knew important
personages. Almost all the holes in the card were in the
right places.
The OSS brought him to Washington and gave him intel-
ligence training. In June 1944 he was shipped to London and
assigned to the labor division of the BACH section, an organi-
zation which supplied cover stories and documents for agents
working behind enemy lines. In August he was transferred
to a forward combat area in France. He served with one of
the first OSS field detachments that accompanied the armies
from the Normandy landings to the war's end. These detach-
ments provided liaison from G-2 to OSS headquarters, ran
border crossers, recruited spies from POW cages, briefed and
debriefed agents, and performed many other intelligence
tasks. Haller's exceptional capabilities led to his being recom-
mended for a commission. The recommendation included the
following job description:
Haller is in charge of all BACH research work at Field Base C
and acts as immediate assistant to the CO in all intelligence
operations.... He (a) questions officials . . . interrogates
prisoners of war, deserters, and escaped foreign workers .. .
(b) collects and analyzes documents ... (c) prepares written
reports . . . covering such topics as: The German Rationing
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System, Travelling in Germany, . . . Priorities in German War
Production ... (d) supervises the work of six other members
of the detachment.. . .
When Haller's commanding officer was told to have him
ready to appear before an ETOUSA commissioning board, he
was advised to ensure that "Haller's actions in front of the
board be strictly military," and to be sure that the candidate
could salute and about-face correctly, that his uniform was
neat, clean, and pressed, and that his buttons shone. Perhaps
the candidate was aided less by the coaching than by his rec-
ord. At any rate, on 20 April 1945, Stephan Haller was com-
missioned a second lieutenant in the Army of the United
States.
For the next few months his principal task was to interview
prospective agents and work out their cover stories. Supple-
menting his intimate knowledge of German, Germans, and
Germany was his painstaking care in details, an incisively
logical mind, and a quiet devotion to duty. He went from
Verdun to Luxembourg to Belgium. In May his unit moved
to Wiesbaden, where his pay and allowances were further in-
creased by two free bottles of champagne each month.
In Wiesbaden, where the unit was known as "Field Base C"
or "Triangle," Haller located old SPD friends and began to pick
up the broken threads of German politics, while at the same
time busy with counterintelligence work. During this period
he established the unorthodox operational pattern which he
usually followed afterwards. He installed himself in a house
well away from the base, living alone and working with his
agents there. This pattern of activity was threatened with
abrupt termination by an order from Security that he be
separated, but his commanding officer and others who knew
him well obtained a reversal. During the argument over this
order the acting chief of the area wrote, "We have no one in
Europe today who has his scientific background," and fore-
cast for him a brilliant career.
The prediction proved right. In the years after the war
Haller obtained extremely valuable political and scientific
technical intelligence. Although promoted to first lieutenant
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in 1946, he asked to be given civilian status, and in July 1947
became an employee of CIG. He was graded at CAF-11 and
paid $4,902 annually-a bargain if there ever was one. By
this time he was established at Hochheim am Main, an im-
posing mansion-almost a castle-with marble halls and
statuary, walls covered with damask and leather, and a cellar
full of champagne. Thus ensconced in "Schloss Haller,"
which was listed in official records as a political research cen-
ter, he began to exploit the intelligence potential of the SPD
against East Germany and the USSR and to follow French
activity in the French Zone of Germany and even in France
itself. This second task, apparently carried out through
friends made during the days of his exile, produced almost the
only information available about Socialist activity in France
and won him an official commendation.
The three years that Haller spent in Hochheim were prob-
ably the happiest of his life. The talents with which he was
born, the scope and depth of his formal education, and the
diversity of his international experience, both civil and mili-
tary, now came into focus. He was working hard. At times
he did not leave his apartment on the second floor of the
"Schloss" for two or three weeks in a row. He held intense
political discussions with visitors, many of whom were not
agents but unwitting sources, friends and acquaintances who
had known him as an SPD leader and who were more than
willing to help him in the "political research" which he was
now doing for the Americans. Among his visitors were Schu-
macher, Ollenhauer, Heine, and other German Socialist lead-
ers. In fact, Haller even arranged formal meetings of the
SPD Party Directorate in his quarters. The result of these
meetings and discussions was unexcelled political reporting.
Hard as he worked, Haller also found time for fun and
games. He was popular with both his colleagues and the
townspeople, from the Mayor down. He always sat at the
Mayor's table at civic festivities and was in demand as a dance
partner among the wives of the local dignitaries. He drank
and smoked with zeal, but few people claim to have seen him
the worse for alcohol. His cellar was kept well stocked with
champagne and the still wines of the Rhine and Moselle. He
even had a false bottom installed in his car, so that whenever
his driver was sent to the French Zone he could smuggle back
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a few dozen bottles of Hoch. And his major domo, Kurt, was
sometimes detailed to escort one or another fair young lady
to the Schloss of an evening and drive her home again the
next morning.
His pleasure in the present did not keep him from planning
for the future. He suggested to his superiors that for opera-
tional purposes he renounce the U.S. citizenship acquired
through military service and become a German again. He
would then re-enter the SPD and thus give the newly estab-
lished Central Intelligence Agency a high-level penetration
of one of the two most important political parties in Germany.
This position would make him an ideal agent, he felt, for both
intelligence collection and political action. It would not be
suspected that his renunciation of American citizenship and
renewal of old ties were not genuine; the same thing had been
done by others, including a former mayor of Hamburg. But
Haller also made conditions. He wanted to keep his U.S. pass-
port-he was quite proud of being an American-and he
wanted assurances that when the time came he could return
to the United States, his citizenship reactivated. This pro-
posal was not accepted. He frequently referred to it in later
days as a missed opportunity.
Haller was intuitive as well as logical. He had a remarkable
ability to smell out Communist penetrations of the various
civil governments set up in the German states. He felt sure,
for example, that the Minister of the Interior for Land Hesse,
Hans Venedey, was a Communist; and with his customary
pertinacity he set out to prove it. His efforts led the Military
Governor to complain to Hailer's superior: he "had a good
little government going there and Haller was upsetting it."
It seems apparent that Haller then had a talk with the SPD
leadership, for Venedey was expelled from the SPD for acts
injurious to the party. He re-emerged as a functionary of
the German Communist Party.
From Politics to Science
In March 1949 CIA headquarters for Haller's area moved
from Heidelburg to Karlsruhe, and Haller set up shop in an-
other castle, at Pforzheim. In part his work here was a con-
tinuation of the three years at Hochheim. His old SPD friends
continued to visit him and furnish valuable political informa-
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tion. These visits also gave him a chance to explain his own
views, which were of course those of the U.S. Government,
and thus to combine intelligence collection with political ac-
tion. But some of his duties were new. Because of his scien-
tific background, he was placed in charge of a U.S. program
for paying subsidies to German scientists, part of a much
larger operation designed to deny German scientific talent to
the Soviets. This assignment required him to establish and
maintain a new cover, one suited to its purpose.
In 1951, his cover well established, he was shifted to Berlin,
there to direct operations against scientific targets in the
East Zone of Germany. As usual, he took a house which
served as both living quarters and base of operations. He
responded to the tighter operational environment by intensi-
fying personal control. He rarely went to parties now. He
refused to let anyone else handle his agents, even when he
was ill. He did not like to put on paper the mass of informa-
tion accumulated in his head.
He began work, with others, on an operation designed to
hinder the Soviet atomic energy program by inducing large-
scale defection among German specialist craftsmen in the
East Zone. These workers made the fine nickel wire mesh
used for the essential separation of uranium isotopes. The
scheme worked; technicians and their families defected in
droves and were flown to West Germany. But Haller was dis-
appointed to learn later that the Soviets were only inconven-
ienced, not thwarted. The vanished craftsmen were replaced.
His own part in the operation, however, was well done, and
in April 1951 headquarters sent him a congratulatory wire.
One of his chiefs at about this time took written note of his
lone-wolf tendencies, but all were unanimous that his work,
and particularly his reporting of scientific intelligence, was
excellent.
The German and Austrian scientists who had served with
Haller in the Prestation Savante in France soon after the be-
ginning of World War II now constituted a pool of assets.
For two more years he worked with some of them in acquiring
scientific and technical intelligence. A love affair with a young
German actress ended when she married his rival, but his
disappointment did not impair his work. The quality and
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quantity of his output is evidenced in the repeated efforts of
his superiors to get him paid more nearly what it was worth:
His production is phenomenally high, and the many cases
he runs are distinguished for the professionalism evident in
their conduct. Although outstandingly qualified in back-
ground for conduct of positive intelligence operations covering
technical and scientific subjects, he has demonstrated marked
ability in conducting other kinds of positive intelligence and
CE cases.... I should like to underline the fact that in the
handling of agents and the production of intelligence, particu-
larly in the scientific and technical field, in this area, Haller
is, in my opinion, without a peer.
His scope expanded as scientific conferences in Switzerland
and elsewhere enabled him to discuss the meetings with old
friends who had attended, professors and other intellectuals.
Both the briefings and the debriefings of this period are
classics. In late 1955 he debriefed Leo Bauer, former leading
functionary of the East German Communist Party, who be-
cause of his personal acquaintance with Haller had refused to
talk to any other American official. He also debriefed Erica
Glaser Wallach, who had gone to East Germany to locate her
foster-father, Noel Field.
His friends remember only one interview that left him
shaken. Dr. Gustave Hertz, one of the leading German sci-
entists who worked on the Soviet atomic energy program, had
returned to Germany with his secretary, Ellen Mueller, her
husband, and their four children. The family was rushed to
a safehouse, and Haller was called. As he began his careful
questioning, little hands started tugging at his trouser-legs
and clutching at his coat. Soon one and then another child,
chomping hard candies, had struggled into his lap. While
their mother beamed with a pride that was obviously a factor
in her cooperativeness, the two continued the ascent, reaching
Haller's sagging shoulders and making room for the other
two members of the expedition. Haller has been called both a
man's man and a lady's man, but no one ever called him a
children's man. Somehow he struggled through the ques-
tioning. He emerged perspiring and a little stunned, as though
he had been kicked in the stomach. Perhaps he had. All
future dealings with Frau Mueller were handled by his as-
sistant.
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SECRET Stephan Haller
The Sheer Pinnacle
By now he was near the peak of his career. He was using
fully his keen intellect, depth of recall, sensitivity, practical
astuteness and imagination, his background in languages,
science, and politics, and his feel for operations. His ability
to deal with people amounted to genius. He was good at it
because he was patient and, above all, because he was inter-
ested in people. Unlike most refugees, he had no political
or personal axe to grind. He was an accurate observer and
reporter. He could talk to all classes of Germans, from artists
and professors to farmers and laborers, each in their own
language-an indispensable skill in a country in which speech
differences mirror both social levels and geography. His rela-
tions with his contacts were on two levels-of friendly per-
sonal participation and of impassive objectivity-without the
latter being evident to them. Perhaps his membership in a
race recently and bitterly persecuted by the Germans
strengthened this faculty and sharpened his ability to use
German agents for the purposes of his new homeland.
He did not grow careless or conceited with success. He re-
mained a meticulous craftsman. Before he debriefed a source,
he mastered the subject to be discussed. His agents were made
comfortable not only by his cigars and beer but also by the
easy flow of communication. And he did not end until he
had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed,
moreover, to remain alert for operational leads-potential
agents, counterintelligence indicators, propaganda possibili-
ties. When Haller was finished, there were no more questions
to be asked. And though he groaned over the chore of putting
it on paper, his reporting became thorough-and more than
thorough, illuminating-for he rarely failed to make interpre-
tive comments. Despite the bulk of his reporting he wrote
everything in longhand.
His work remained consistently solid, even brilliant. Some
of it was considered sufficiently important to be brought to
the personal attention of the Director of Central Intelligence.
The Director, impressed, thought that the promotions which
his superiors had got for him were not enough. Stephan
Haller thus became a rarity, a man promoted to the top of
Civil Service ranks not because he was an exceptional execu-
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tive-he had never occupied an executive position-but solely
because he was an exceptional case officer. The Director sent
him a personal letter of congratulation, and shortly there-
after, when he was called to headquarters, gave a luncheon in
his honor. Haller was deeply moved. He often spoke later of
the great honor conferred on him in Washington. His life and
work reached on that day the top of a rocket-like trajectory.
It was for him a moment of true glory.
After his return to Germany and a period of hard work in
Berlin, he went in mid-1956 to Darmstadt to visit friends.
Awakening in a strange room, in the middle of the night, he
reached out for the light, but on the wrong side, and fell out
of bed. The fall broke his hip. A German doctor placed a pin
in the fracture, but the leg kept on giving him trouble. He
went to a hospital in Munich, where leeches were used in an
effort to reduce his blood pressure. The results were not good.
He developed phlebitis.
These physical misfortunes would not have been the begin-
ning of the end for most of us, who can learn to be satisfied
with past achievements and past honors, financial comfort,
and a familiar circle of family and friends. Stephan Haller was
a man of different breed. With all the intensity of his charac-
ter he had wound his life around one thing, his work. Work
and the feeling that what he did was recognized were his en-
tire psychological sustenance. Now that appeared to be gone.
Lying month upon month in bed in the Army Hospital in
Frankfurt, he grew ever more depressed, thinking of how he
could do nothing now to justify those honors heaped on him,
and how little he would ever be likely to do again. Remember-
ing that it had once been only his performance which had saved
him from the Security axe, he even developed a growing fear
that he would be released from the service, after thirteen years,
because he had stopped producing. No amount of reassurance
by friends and fellow-workers could dispel this irrational fig-
ment of his frustrated energy. His collapse was so alarming
that he was returned to Washington in February 1957 and
treated at the George Washington University Hospital. About
a month later he was discharged.
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SECRET Stephan Haller
He took an apartment on Sixteenth Street. Far from fa-
miliar Europe, out of touch with his world of operational ac-
tivity, Haller fell victim of that sense of uselessness with which
the jealous gods, perhaps, had visited him at the summit of his
life. On 26 April 1957 he was stricken by a heart attack and
died.
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CONFOORRIA1
Apologia and challenge for the
covert reporter in a land where
learning is an elite privilege,
time is cheap, and the dignity
of friendship dear.
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN AN
UNLETTERED LAND
Francis Hollyman
If analysts and estimators find their political information
on the illiterate countries lacking in depth, confined to the os-
tensible policies and evident intrigues of a few dominant fam-
ilies and providing little insight into future moves, sub-surface
trends, or popular attitudes, the reasons are not far to seek.
Our reporters in these countries, both the Foreign Service offi-
cers who maintain correct official contacts and especially the
covert reporter whose business it is to probe outside this official
sphere, must pit their efforts against formidable obstacles de-
riving from the peculiarities of an anachronistic society.
Take An American trying to use 0 citi-
zens as clandestine sources of political information, however
well versed in Arabic and well acquainted with the country
he may be, has to get through three concentric barriers before
he can begin to look for the information inside. The first is
the fact that there are very few native residents in a position
to have political information. Second, the odds are all against
getting satisfactory covert access to any of those who do. And
third, if you do gain access to a potential source, his patterns
of motivation and behavior are such that it requires consum-
mate skill in an American to get him to produce.
Unschooled Public and Rarefied Politics
The first difficulty, the scarcity of I in a position
to have useful information, arises in part from meager oppor-
tunity for education and in part from traditional restrictions
on participation in political and public life. I who
are well educated by the standards of their country, including
some businessmen and many government functionaries but
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CONFIDENTIAL An Unlettered Land
few others, have generally had no more than eight or nine
years of school, with a large part of that devoted to the Koran.
Well over ninety-nine percent of the populace has been given
much less schooling or none at all. A slight expansion of sec-
ondary education in recent years has not yet had any appreci-
able effect on the general level of elite learning. Plans for
higher education, aside from the training of religious figures
and a few teachers, are still in the dream stage. Only a very
small fraction of one percent of the population can go abroad
and get a better education than is offered by the elemen-
tary schools.
Even at the elementary level, I schools tend to
leave large blind spots with regard to political matters. Sub-
jects such as geography and world affairs are scarcely touched.
It is not uncommon to find that a relatively well-educated
who occupies an important place in commerce or
government cannot read a map, and he may not even be aware
that the world is not flat! With this shocking elementary ig-
norance he cannot begin to comprehend or care about more
complex or subtle things like the meaning of the Iron Curtain
or problems springing from Communist imperialism. The ex-
tremely few who have overcome these educational deficiencies
by going abroad are still far from politically sophisticated;
they are likely to be swallowed in the sea of ignorance around
them, and they have nowhere to turn to get accurate current
information.
The public media of information are weak, and do little to
remedy the collossal deficiency in education. Basic informa-
tion in the form of published surveys, handbooks, lists, direc-
tories, statistics, charts, maps, etc., is virtually nonexistent.
The official radio and press service, organized efficiently in re-
cent years, has become more effective in preventive control of
thought rather than in informational content. It gives little
place for commentary except that promoting government pol-
icy and those slogans of Arab nationalism considered best
suited to Dinterests. newspapers similarly give
only a small fraction of the news available, and the paucity of
published information is often more striking in domestic mat-
ters than on important international questions.
The newspapers are in any case little read; scarcely one
in a thousand is a subscriber. But there is a con-
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siderable amount of radio listening, and the people have gener-
ally come to rely on the powerful Egyptian radio as a source
for news. At the height of the Suez crisis nearly all those who
had access to radios listened also to at least one Moscow broad-
cast in Arabic daily; and they may now be turning to some ex-
tent to the Bagdad radio.
The restrictive character of the I overnment abets the
low educational level in severely circumscribing the number of
citizens in a position to be well informed about political ques-
tions of interest to us. A great deal of the most important
information on political questions is restricted\
L__f Avery
few outsiders, no more than a handful at present, have suc-
ceeded in entering this charmed circle through personal ability
based on a good foreign education; this phenomenon is the ex-
ception rather than the rule. Other officials of the govern-
ment are generally mere functionaries, lacking access to much
information on activities outside their own offices.
There is a tendency to keep the most important matters
strictly
keep personnel of the ministries from
being well informed. And in matters which do go to a ministry,
an unusual degree of reliance is placed on the spoken word, the
personal mission, and the personal memory of the minister
himself. Furthermore, even when there are documents cover-
ing a transaction, they are not likely to be filed in such a way
as to be easily accessible when they are more than a few days
old. It is not unusual for an employee of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, for example, to spend hours in an unsuccessful
search for some item, paging through irrelevant jumbled ma-
terial or unindexed chronological entries.
Outside the ranks of the government, only a few
through powerful business or family interests, have even in-
direct access to authentic information on political questions.
The general public completely lacks such access, and under
present conditions does not concern itself very seriously about
the lack.
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CONFIDENTIAL An Unlettered Land
Reaching the Rare Politico
The second major difficulty for the political reporter is the
relative inaccessibility of those few ho are well
informed about political matters. The hindrances to satisfac-
tory access, being in part characteristic of the restrictive po-
litical and social system of the country, affect all kinds of re-
porting, but there are certain complications which make the
effects of the system broader and more serious in the field of
clandestine information-collecting activities than in the overt
field.
Ways of life in a country like _]make it hard to
reach any good potential source some of the time, and hard to
reach some of them at any time. The virtual absence of easy
social contacts, the lack of suitable public meeting places, the
staggering inadequacy of public communications, and the sus-
picions commonly aroused among native residents by outsiders
attempting to move freely among them-all make the task un-
believably time-consuming. Hardest to see are the persons who
are in the highest positions, or whose work does not call for
contact with foreigners, or who speak only Arabic; and the ma-
jority of good potential sources are probably in these cate-
gories.
The travel habits of practically all important native figures
make them an elusive quarry for the foreigner, who has little
mobility in Persons of interest to us often stay
for long periods of time i
Government personages also a sen themselves re-
quently for trips abroad. The religious requirements of Ram-
adan, the month of fasting, and of the annual hajj or pilgrimage
to Mecca tend to damp down any information-collecting ac-
tivities for considerable periods of time. In sum, almost any
native source is likely to be out of reach for at least a few
months of the year, in some instances for more than half of
each year.
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These difficulties are particularly trying when we are seek-
ing initial contact with new potential sources. We sometimes
have to wait for months because they are not in a place where
we can see them and there is no other means of initial com-
munication that carries any hope of secrecy. The choice of
possible native sources is so narrow and the ways of access to
them are so extremely few that almost any effort to find and
develop new clandestine sources is vulnerable to detection by
friend and foe alike. There is almost invariably a prolonged pe-
riod of intense awkardness and insecurity in the preliminaries
to initial clandestine contact.
Psycho-Cultural Characteristics
Characteristic peculiarities of attitude, motivation, and be-
havior constitute a third major difficulty in the use of native
sources for political information. They are a considerable ob-
stacle even to the overt reporter, but in clandestine informa-
tion-collecting activities they also make it much harder to as-
sess the personal reliability of a potential source. I do not re-
fer here primarily to the obvious peculiarities of outlook caused
by limited education, religious beliefs, social customs, restric-
tions in political and public life, and the thought patterns of a
language so unlike our own. Peculiarities of this kind, readily
identifiable, can be anticipated and partly compensated for in
our training and preparation for the work.
More difficult to handle are other, subtler peculiarities, ones
which would probably not be very apparent if we ourselves
did not have definite expectations of a behavior which fits our
re uirements in those whom we want to use as sources. To a
he peculiarities lie in our expectations, not in the
attitudes and motivations fundamental to his way of life.
One of these is his sense of time, a practical one from his
standpoint, if impractical from ours. For him, infinity
stretches out ahead, contiguous and real. He seldom, perhaps
never, feels the pressure of time. The concept of a fiscal year is
wholly foreign to him, either as a measure of time or as a means
of controlling expenditures. The notion of "production" of po-
litical information in certain quantities within a certain period
would puzzle him. He does not have our sense of a schedule, of
a deadline, of a program. Nothing can be done to make him
work at a set rate of speed, let alone hurry.
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CONFIDENTIAL An Unlettered Land
Another of these subtler peculiarities is his sense of purpose,
which bears little obvious resemblance to ours. Aside from
wanting to be a proper Arab and a good Muslim, he has no
strong aims or convictions. His experience is too little, his
ignorance too great, to provide a foundation for opposition to
Communist imperialism as his motive force. He has no strong
sense of socio-political responsibility, no felt need for thinking,
for making a political choice. The idea of subscribing to a posi-
tive ideological program or doctrine, except as it incorporates
his immediate Arab interests, is beyond him. He does not like
to generalize about the world, because all he knows is his home,
the marketplace, the desert, and the edge of the sea. Very
often his attitude is that of the merchant, even if he is not en-
gaged in commerce. His aims and desires are very simple ones,
and he does not want to change them.
Thel ften reacts in ways that surprise those who
do not know him, or fails to react in the ways they expect.
He is essentially gentle, not belligerent. At the height of the
1956 Suez crisis he hoped for nothing more than an immediate
end to the fighting; he could not comprehend the international
forces at work, and he was afraid. He respects force partly
because it is simple and within his comprehension. Although
he is often distrustful of British diplomacy, he understands and
makes allowance for a frank statement that such-and-such is
in the British interest and British policy is planned accord-
ingly. He rather distrusts the profession of lofty moral prin-
ciple as a basis for policy on the part of any government, partly
because the principle may be too complicated or too different
from his own way of thinking, partly because he does his polit-
ical thinking-such as it is-in terms of interest, not princi-
ples. He likes the material things which the western world may
have made available to him to make life more pleasant, but if
he has been abroad he generally returns happily home, not
very much impressed by other aspects of western civilization.
Relying largely on oral communication, he tends to simplify
and omit when he has to deal with complicated matters. He
cannot easily distinguish fact from rumor. He is not good at
making an estimate of a situation, or even at judging the state
of public opinion, because he is not used to thinking along
these lines. When a new situation develops, he does not fail
to react, but his reactions are simple and direct, based on his
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immediate interest. An observer or overt collector needs a
long period of living among these people and learning to think
in their way to acquire the instinctive appreciation that will
make him a sensitive reporter.
The covert reporter has the further problem of assessing
the individual as a potential agent, and then of
maintaining his motivation and his production. As a clandes-
tine collector of information, it is hard al I to
work in a methodical way, because method is not part of his
make-up. He rarely if ever 1ias the spirit of fighting for a
cause; but on the other hand, even if he is venal, he will do
very little to accomplish things he does not believe in. He can-
not be ordered bluntly, because he cherishes the little niceties
in personal dealings which are his way. He needs a great deal of
orientation and encouragement. What he usually prizes most
in this activity is an abiding personal relationship that gives
him understanding, dignity, and friendship.
These, then, are the awesome obstacles to political reporting
from a country where illiteracy eave
only a handful of worthwhile sources of information, where cus-
toms make this handful difficult to reach and confidential deal-
ings almost impossible, and where the cultural differences that
wall off westerners go down to the very roots of motivation
and thinking. These obstacles have been described with par-
ticular reference to I but the situation there is
not unlike that in a score of equally important other countries
where the people are unfamiliar with the written word, re-
served and imprecise with the spoken, and profoundly different
in their way of life.
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SECRET
An amateur graphologist
pleads for at least a dry run on
an assessment technique of po-
tential value in intelligence.
HANDWRITING. ANALYSIS AS AN
ASSESSMENT AID
Keith Laycock
The assertion that reliable clues to a person's character 1
and some of his capabilities may be derived from analysis of
his handwriting usually evokes a vigorous pro or con reaction
which seems to originate somewhere in the subconscious mind
and not to reflect a reasoned consideration of the proposition.
The reaction is at times so strong as to give a psychologist the
impression that those who shrink from the idea do so because
they fear exposure and those who eagerly embrace it are the
kind who like to snoop and pry. Whatever the psychological
reasons, one thing is certain: the proposition is a good one for
starting a controversy.
The art of handwriting analysis-graphology, as it is more
commonly called, especially in Europe-has two branches: an
established and "respectable" one devoted to the identification
of individuals by their handwriting, and a black-sheep branch
dealing with the assessment of personality. The latter is the
subject of this paper. I am not a professional graphologist,
but I have explored the subject enough to be convinced that
this black art has a practical application in the assessment
of persons to whom access for other character tests is limited.
Since character assessment (as distinct from capabilities-
testing) is as complex as human nature itself, and the art
of handwriting analysis is exceedingly difficult in its detail,
the most that can be achieved in any short paper is to give
an outline of the theory involved, in the hope that those read-
ers who have serious limited-access assessment problems will
be encouraged to explore the matter further, independently,
By character I mean the individual constellation and balance of
drives, inhibitions, and habits which determines how (rather than
how effectively) a man will behave in a given situation.
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SECRET Handwriting Analysis
either through study or by enlisting the services of a pro-
fessional graphologist.
Plotting the Terms of Reference
Anyone undertaking serious study or investigation of graph-
ology-or of any assessment system, for that matter-must
settle three formidable related questions before he can safely
submerge himself in the "how" of the technique at all, to wit:
1) How far do we propose to go in plumbing the ramified depths
of a subject's character? 2) How do we handle the semantic
problems which plague character descriptions? 3) What do we
do about standards for judging the ethical aspects of character?
It seems to me, on the first question, that we have to specify
in some detail precisely what we want to know about a sub-
ject's character before we can proceed in any assessment opera-
tion, and then keep within these sharply delineated limits to
avoid an extensive mire. Most executives appear willing to
settle for any assessment system which will consistently and re-
liably tip them off to those peculiarities of a given individual
which will be helpful and those which will be harmful in the
job they are trying to fill. They seldom appear to be interested
in ultimates about anyone's character, in complete "character-
pictures" pages long, or in abstract conceptions that have to
be interpreted. From the purely practical point of view, then,
assessment starts with the job description, and that job de-
scription should be supplemented by a list of desirable, unde-
sirable, and fatal traits. In the absence of such a guide, assess-
ment becomes perforce an undertaking to describe all the
traits of a given subject, an exceedingly unrealistic exercise
in the present state of psychological knowledge and one which,
if conscientiously carried out, results in massive and compli-
cated reports, long delayed.
I should accordingly, without prejudice to the usability of
graphology in the field of deeper research, answer the first
question as follows: We should consider a reasonably accept-
able result from this technique to be a report containing a re-
liable guide to those character-traits of the subject which make
him fit or unfit for the job we have in mind, as specified by
us, plus a warning on any character-traits that deviate strongly
from the average. For example: We specify that we want to
fill a bank-teller's job. For this (with apologies to bank tellers)
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Han writing Analysis . E RET
we want a stable and mediocre person who is conscientious,
able to stand dull routine, accurate, and honest, one who is
not quarrelsome, thieving, aggressive, or imaginative. We as-
sume that in other respects he will be run-of-the-mill. The
assessment turns up one candidate who meets the specifica-
tions of general mediocrity and willingness to handle other
people's money without appropriating it but who is also exceed-
ingly vain, in fact a peacock. Such a potentially dangerous fac-
tor ought to be reported to us, even if we have not required it.
Our second problem, semantics, can cause a great deal of
difficulty either in the exercise of the graphological art or in
the study of it; it is a pitfall into which many have tumbled.
What is an "honest" man? What is a "brave" man? Defini-
tion of such words is a practical impossibility, since the third
unknown, an ethical standard, is involved. If we could estab-
lish agreed ethical standards, we could, no doubt, compose def-
initions which would be adequate, but there does not now ap-
pear to be such a set of standards. In fact, at this point in hu-
man history there seems to be more confusion than ever over
whether the end justifies the means or is inseparable from them.
We are accordingly, as far as I can see, limited in using charac-
terological terms to those denoting specific acts such as talk-
ing, stealing, lying, etc., and must eschew words with ethical
overtones. Many writers and students on the subject have
fallen into the ethics trap, so let both student and practitioner
beware.
It is necessary to add yet another caution: The analysis of
handwriting is an art, not a science, and the quality of the re-
sult is dependent upon the caliber and capacity of the artist.
Consequently, the statistical evaluation of graphology accord-
ing to the accuracy of the results obtained by a cross-section
of its practitioners is meaningless. The question whether
graphology can be used reliably in assessment work seems to
me to depend on whether even one person can do it consistently,
not whether a majority of those who claim to be competent
can get results. The evaluator should be aware that a great
many so-called graphologists are either dilettantes or charla-
tans, using an art of which they have a smattering to swindle
or astound the gullible. It is, in fact, this swarm of fortune-
tellers and mystics, with a small but noisy retinue of support-
ers making extravagant claims, who have done that recurring
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SECRET Handwriting Analysis
damage to the reputation of graphology which has served to de-
prive many a harassed executive of its assistance.
Basis for the Art
As the reader will see from the bibliography attached at the
end of this article, much has been written on the "how" of
graphology. The bibliography could be much longer without
exhausting the list of serious works. The student who reads
these books will find that, while there is considerable diver-
gence among them in the area of fundamental theory, there
is striking unanimity on the more concrete technical level.
This situation no doubt reflects the general dilemma of assess-
ment: it is a lot easier to devise tests that reveal a hidden
habit, such as "taking ways," than to uncover the underlying
psychological reasons for the habit. We shall therefore try as
far as possible to avoid the more abstruse aspects of the sub-
ject in discussing next the general validity of the thesis that
reliable clues to the character and to some of the capabilities of
a person may be derived from competent analysis of his hand-
writing.
Essentially, two points have to be established, first that the
individuality of every person's handwriting is caused primarily
by psychological, as distinct from mechanical, characteristics
peculiar to the writer, and second, that there is reflected in a
given handwriting, in symbol form, a hidden "story" about
these psychological factors which a graphologist can "read."
The individuality and peculiarity of every person's handwriting
is accepted by the courts, and it follows that a person's hand-
writing must change very slowly and slightly or not at all dur-
ing his adult life, since otherwise the courts would not accept
holographic evidence.
If this individuality in writing were the result of mechanical
influences only, then the enormous deviations from letter
forms taught in school which some calligraphies exhibit would
be due to extreme mechanical idiosyncrasies, not to say difficul-
ties, peculiar to the writer. The fact is, however, that writers
with exceedingly peculiar handwritings perform all other tasks
with about the same mechanical competence as the next man,
and conversely, persons who are markedly unadroit often have
more regular handwritings than those of considerable mechan-
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Handwriting Analysis
ical skill. Mechanical skill, in fact, is one of the abilities which
can not be deduced from handwriting.
Handwriting is in reality brain-writing, as the following ex-
periment will prove to any reader who cares to try it: Sign your
name on a piece of paper. Now take the writing instrument
between your molars and sign; then put the instrument be-
tween your big and second toes and write your name that way.
With some practice legible signatures can be produced in this
fashion, which on comparison will be found to resemble closely
(with due allowance for mechanical factors!) the work pro-
duced by the hand. Even if you cannot control your neck or
leg muscles sufficiently to produce legible scrawls, you will be
able to see that you are trying to direct the instrument held
in teeth or toes to produce the image you have in mind. (I
would warn the reader who attempts this experiment either
to make sure of privacy or to let any possible intruder know be-
forehand what he is trying to do. It can be very embarrassing
to be caught barefoot in simian concentration on managing a
pencil with your toes.)
There are a number of cogent reasons why psychological
rather than mechanical factors dictate the main calligraphic
peculiarities of a person who does not have a neurological
condition of some sort. Let's look briefly at the influence of
a dozen common psychological motivations.
Pride in Appearances. A writer usually feels that his hand-
writing's appearance represents him to the reader and to
the community at large. He accordingly makes a certain
amount of effort, depending on the degree to which he feels
appearances are important, to make his calligraphy look
"good." Therefore his writing will in some degree reflect his
personal taste in what looks good, and how much importance
he places on looking good.
Social Attitude. Except in the case of memoranda written
for notekeeping, the act of writing has strong social implica-
tions. It is an act of communication, seeking to reach and
influence one or more readers, whether with generous or
sinister motives. How the writer moves across the paper
toward the reader must, as a matter of common sense, reflect
somewhat his attitude. A self-confident, outgoing, cheerful,
trusting writer who loves people is bound to cross the page in
a very different way than the writer who hates, fears, and dis-
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trusts others, and perhaps himself as well. As a matter of
common observation such opposite types act differently, use
different gestures, have different smiles, etc.; it is hardly sur-
prising that their gestures on paper would differ.
Docility and Truculence. The act of writing is an act of
conformity: if certain standards are not met, the communi-
cation can be read only with difficulty or not at all. Here
the people who like to make things difficult for others can
have a field day by distorting their handwriting, leaving it
just readable enough to make the reading a torture. Those
who rebel in principle against conformity will also maim their
writing, and so will some gentlemen who fear they may be
called to account for what they have written. Others there
are who conform rigidly to the set standards, some willingly,
some desperately, some furtively, and some because they have
no particular personal preferences to express.
The Shock of Early Battles. Writing may bear scars.
Learning to write is one of the first great struggles with
society which many of us undergo, faced suddenly with a
frightfully difficult task which we must perform or remain
illiterate. The job can be torture, or a game; that depends
on many things. But the attitudes toward writing then es-
tablished (cramped, worried, overanxious; or relaxed, confi-
dent, free-flowing?) are often reflected throughout life.
Emotional Disturbance. Writing is an act of self-expres-
sion, sometimes of feelings hidden from the conscious mind.
A pen driven by boiling emotions will move very differently
than one in the hand of a calculating or apathetic "cold fish."
The writer who is tormented by ungratified (perhaps ungrati-
flable!) sex wishes will unwittingly interject some sex-wish
symbols into his calligraphy. Where these wishes include a
desire to commit rape-murders, the symbolism can be very
sinister indeed.
Energy and Fatigue. Writing is a piece of work, to some a
highly disagreeable chore and to all an effort requiring con-
centration and output of energy. Is the writer ebullient with
energy? Or does he wearily drag one foot after the other?
Is he tireless or easily fatigued? Is he liberal with his ener-
gies, or does he try to economize on every movement? The
impact of his pen on the paper will certainly vary with these
traits.
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Agility and Impatience. As a means of communication,
writing is a slow technique. It is adequate only for the slow
thinker; to the man whose mind is leaping ahead of his hand
it becomes an irritating impediment. But agile minds may
react variously to this drag: some devise ingenious shortcuts,
others butcher the script beyond recognition. The ruthless
ones wade over the paper; the considerate ones torment them-
selves with conscientious printing.
The Devious Intent. The writer knows that what he has
written can be used for purposes he never intended or even
foresaw. Therefore the prudent man with ulterior motives
writes cautiously, and the self-conscious criminal may choose
ornate, imposing script. Men who prowl craftily through
life seldom caper across paper.
One's Path to Glory. We all desire to attain status among
our fellows. Do we try to gain it by hard work? By sudden,
spectacular achievement? By illegitimate methods? By vio-
lence? By bragging? Would it not be strange, after receiv-
ing a letter full of exaggerated capitals and ornate flourishes,
with various senseless embellishments for general effect, to
find that the writer was a conscientious, self-effacing, hard-
working drudge?
The Root of Evil. We all have some emotional relationship
or attitude toward money. Do we spend nights dreaming of
it? Squander it? Hoard it? Steal it? Despise it? Feel guilty
about having it? Most accountants and bookkeepers can tell
you, without even thinking, how a man feels about money by
the way he writes a check. Some of them can make quite
a good guess also about how far he trusts people.
Practice of the Art
At this point the reader will probably be satisfied that about
as many factors in a man's habits, attitudes, and traits influ-
ence the formation of his handwriting as he has habits, atti-
tudes and traits, and may agree that peculiarities in hand-
writing are mainly generated by the psychological peculiarities
of the writer. We still, however, have not established the
validity of point two, that a graphologist can consistently
interpret peculiarities in writing to reveal the peculiarities
behind them. If systematic interpretation of handwriting is
to be possible, peculiarities or their combinations that indi-
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cate a certain trait of character in one writer must indicate
that trait in others, and be subject to interpretation accord-
ing to some set of rules.
In an article of this length I cannot present the voluminous
tabulations which have been compiled by graphological ana-
lysts relating specific peculiarities to specific traits. Moreover,
simply presenting such tabulations would hardly convince the
reader that the tabulated relationships are in fact correct;
paper will, after all, put up with anything that is written
on it. In my experience, the only way you can convince a
real skeptic that this kind of interpretation is consistently
possible is to perform it consistently, or else cite performance
data from a source he respects. From my own files I can pre-
sent quite a few cases where graphologists have made astonish-
ingly accurate delineations of the character of persons in
whom we had abiding interest of great importance, and I
would like to cite two of the most striking ones very briefly.
On these I am prepared to produce (for those with proper
clearances only) precise documentary proof.
The first concerns a person who carried out a monumental
performance in duplicity for several years at considerable
risk. A grapholigist who knew nothing about him but his pen-
manship described him in such accurate terms that when a
sterilized version of the graphological report was circulated
without any other indication of identity to five persons who
had known him well, all five recognized him from the descrip-
tion and four concurred in it entirely. The fifth acquaintance
agreed on all points except one: he did not think the subject
as intelligent as the graphologist assessed him to be. Mean-
while a standard assessment was made by psychologists, who
were in agreement that the man had a very high order of
intelligence indeed.
The other case, a man who had carried out an even more
extraordinary deception, was processed by both a European
and an American graphologist. The two descriptions not only
concurred in all major points, but were ultimately proved to
be far more accurate than we believed at the time they were
produced.
This, of course, is not evidence, in the scientific sense, on
the critical question of consistent performance. In both cases
the handwriting specimens were of the striking kind which
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Handwriting Analysis
even a layman would recognize as having elements of great-
ness from the espionage point of view. To the best of my
knowledge, and strangely enough when one thinks of the
controversy that has raged around this subject, a proper test
run has never been devised and carried out, at least not in
the United States, to determine whether any graphologist
can consistently deliver accurate results in the area of char-
acter delineation. Consistent results in the psychiatric area
concerned with the detection of mental illness appear to be
pretty well established,2 and these are certainly impressive.
That is a different matter, however, from providing data on
the character peculiarities of people who are "sane." It is
high time that such a determination were undertaken, and
at the end of this article I shall take the liberty of making
specific recommendations on such a test.
In the absence of a present fund of test data to throw `at
the skeptic, I resort to offering him a brief description of one
or two graphological techniques and the thinking behind
them. I hope thereby to bring him to the point of joining
the man who needs means for limited-access assessment and
helping him generate pressure for carrying out a proper prov-
ing problem on the pivotal question-can anybody at all do
this work with reasonable accuracy and consistency?
Sorting Out the Symbols
The techniques employed by the graphologist to bring out
the hidden character-story in a given handwriting rest upon
the interpretation of symbolism in the specimen. There are
two kinds of symbol-groups-those common to a society or
culture, and those which the writer may have devised on his
own, usually unconsciously, to express subconscious wishes,
fears, hatreds, and the like. We are all so surrounded and
submersed in symbols and symbolism that we are often oblivi-
ous to the tremendous expressive and controlling force of this
cultural factor. In some way not understood, symbols are
linked with the deepest impulses of the mind. They are not
merely a matter of simple association, as performed by Pav-
lov's dog. Some symbols are coarse-the Swastika, the Ham-
mer and Sickle, the Rising Sun, the Dollar Sign, the Cross.
2 See Lewinson & Zubin, Handwriting Analysis, King's Crown Press,
N.Y., 1942.
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Others are less so-the jagged, angular writing that suggest
combat, cutting, tearing; the hidden rope and dagger; the
blots and drips of ink, like poison and bloodstains, in some
writing; the hidden treble clef of the music-lover. Some sym-
bolism is subtle-the receding left margin, making inner reser-
vations; the flung-lance t-cross harpooning its victim; the
whole writing back-slanting, as though resisting or reneging.
The interpretation of these symbols requires a process of
analysis more or less as follows: First, all deviations from the
model calligraphy the writer was originally taught in school,
insofar as this can be determined, are noted. That requires
a very substantial knowledge on the part of the analyst as to
scripts and formats taught in different parts of the world at
different times. Second, these and other symbolic deviations
are evaluated in terms of the extensive lists of character indi-
cators compiled in tabular form by generations of grapholo-
gists. Then the individual indicators are compared and sorted
to form groups comprising for example those indicating per-
sistence or lack thereof, aggressiveness or lack of it; and the
picture that emerges is then checked for consistency.
A complete re-evaluation has to be made when major in-
consistencies are detected or where confusion results. This
inconsistency or confusion is generally due to the fact that
a given set of peculiarities in handwriting will reflect the cor-
responding set of positive peculiarities in the writer only about
two-thirds of the time, and in the other third the symbolism
may be inverted, reflecting not the positive trait but a sub-
conscious wish for the missing quality. A bold and massive
general's handwriting sometimes comes from a Mickey Mouse
of a man who would like to be a general but doesn't dare and
hasn't the capacity. At times a complex mixture of direct,
inverted, and wish symbols is present, and the graphologist
is stuck with a tiresome cut-and-try process until he comes
up with a consistent picture. It is no wonder that the charla-
tan and the dilettante, who don't do the required cross-check-
ing and therefore should stick to simple handwritings, from
time to time fall on these inconsistencies and are exposed.
Unfortunately, people then blame the art, not the practi-
tioners.
These are the mechanics of the interpretive process, but
there also is an "intuitive" factor involved. There are so
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many aspects of symbolism to consider more or less simul-
taneously that something like a computer is really needed
to perform the drudgery of comparison; and I believe that
the art, if it is ever to become a science, will have to have
electronic support for the human brain. But frequently some
analysts seem readily to understand specimens of writing
that baffle others, and vice versa. Still others seem to in-
terpret handwriting by way of some subconscious response of
their own to the latticework of symbols they see, without
knowing how they do it.
A notorious case in point is that of Roda Wieser, who once
undertook to analyze the handwriting of hundreds of jailed
criminals and then compared it with that of "honest" men
(i.e., men not in jail!). To cap the comedy, she picked police-
men as the "honest" men, apparently not realizing that she
was actually only comparing the handwriting of unsuccessful
criminals with that of a group no better or worse than other
men involved in crime, but hardly ipso facto honest. En-
tangled in the semantic problem and her ignorance of crimi-
nology, Roda labored long and hard and produced the strange
book listed in the bibliography. Yet she was an almost phe-
nomenal interpretive handwriting analyst; she appears simply
not to have known how she did it.
A Kindergarten Case
Let us look, by way of elementary illustration, at one seg-
ment of the symbol structure and something of its interpre-
tation. We shall stick to "direct" interpretation only, since
the "inversion" and "wish" aspects would confuse matters
and are not essential to getting a grasp on principles. In
fact, if the reader sticks to the direct approach and does a
little study on the side, he can soon qualify for dilettantism
and might even become a quack.
When we write a letter by hand on a blank sheet of paper,
we enter as it were an open area; and as we write across this
field, we move upward, downward, and incessantly forward
and backward as well. These four directions and the zones
they point to immediately involve a common or "cultural"
symbolism. In our society the four have relatively uniform
implications; take at random phrases like high ideals, low
life, a backward child, a progressive firm. In writing, the way
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we behave with respect to these directions and how we dis-
tort our movements in these zones has a strong significance
in individual symbolism. In interpreting the significance of
these symbols the graphologist (as distinct from the charla-
tan, however well-read) spends hours and sometimes days
matching up the various indicators to see how they jibe. He
will study slant, pressure, the way of joining the letters, size
of print, flow of the lines, speed of writing, extraneous sym-
bols, etc., etc., etc., in each case building up a pyramid of data,
which, if he is sufficiently competent, ultimately makes consist-
ent sense. For the purpose of our illustration, we can only
show a few fragments of the process.
In the specimen of Figure 1, the right margin goes further
and further right and the left margin also slopes to the right.
As the writer proceeds he strives to get closer and closer to the
reader, ending up practically in his lap. The capitals and
upper loops in this specimen show distinctly the writer's free-
dom of movement in the upper zones, above the line of writ-
ing,but note how repressed and hesitant he is in venturing
below the line. We conclude that he is far more at home in
the world of ideas and ideals than in material and animal ac-
tivities. The letter-formations are extended toward the right,
curtailed toward the left: the writer is in a hurry to get to his
goal (or away from his origins, himself, his past, etc.). The
whole slants upward and onward.
We thus have a small fragment of the giant composite pic-
ture we have to construct before we know what the fragments
mean. The writer seems at this point to be an idea-man,
idealist, or dreamer who is intent upon reaching the reader
and careful to keep out of the mire, or else he is pretending
to be that kind of person, or wishing he was, and moving
full tilt.
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Ian Handwriting na ysrs
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Figure 2 reproduces a charlatan's analysis (in this instance
correct) of two specimens for one pair of traits-talkative-
ness-secretiveness. I choose this example not only because
it deals with one of the easiest human traits to detect in
handwriting and by personal contact, but also because appli-
cation of these indicators is within the capabilities of the lay
reader, who may wish to experiment a little on his own, by
scanning the writing of persons he knows and whose coeffi-
cient of garrulity he knows. I feel reasonably safe in saying
that if the reader rules out those specimens which show
contradictory indications (such as large scrawly writing with
closed and knotted o's and a's) he will soon discover that there
is a high degree of correlation between a given writer's talk-
ativeness and the indicators cited in Figure 2, and that the
more indicators of either group there are present in a given
specimen, the more marked the trait will be.
If the reader wishes rather to test out the effectiveness of
some graphologist, what material should he be prepared to
submit? At least several pages of work, if possible from dif-
ferent sittings, one at least bearing a signature. The writing
should be on unruled paper in ink or good pencil, produced
with an instrument that suits the writer and under writing
conditions to which he is accustomed. Ball-point writing is
anathema because the effort to control the flow from this
atrocious instrument makes the pressure-friction pattern
meaningless. The graphologist is entitled to know the writer's
age, sex, national origin, and profession, since he cannot tell
these facts from the specimens, and they are invaluable in-
terpretive aids. An "effeminate" handwriting produced by
a male, for example, or the "masculine" writing done by some
women must be examined with care to determine how much
of the masculinity or femininity is real and how much is
affectation, secret-wish expression, etc.
At this point I rest my Introduction to Graphology, hoping
at least to have disabused the eager convert of the notion
that he can soon and easily train himself to detect other peo-
ple's secrets, and to have quieted the fear of exposure that
may be haunting others. My object was to persuade the sin-
cere skeptic that he cannot simply say "It can't be done," and
to induce the man who has limited-access assessment prob-
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Han writing Analysis
Avt"
Exhibit B
A. An extreme case of talkativeness: The writing is large and
sprawly, the a's and o's are open. The words tend to "grow"
as they flood the page, ignoring the right margin and crashing
into the reader. The writing is slanted heavily forward; letters
run into each other; the writing slants upward; the capital let-
ters are large but not meticulously formed; t-crosses are well to
the right of the t-stem, indicating haste; the writing is broad,
heavy and brutal.
B. A case of acute close-mouth: The writing is small and refined;
o's and a's are closed and knotted; is are hooked to the left.
The left and right margins retreat. The slant is vertical and,
in some instances, backwards. Lower loops are close-set and
one is sealed shut.
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lems (and some of our people really have them!) to explore
further.
Scope of Intelligence Application
We have a limited-access problem when we have to uncover
the character and capabilities of a person who 1) is dead, and
so no longer available for questioning, 2) is unwilling to talk
and be tested, 3) is out of reach of personal interview, maybe
behind the "curtain," 4) is untruthful in his answers to tests
and questionnaires, 5) cannot be formally tested and assessed
because of expense, time factors, or security considerations,
6) is not supposed to know we are assessing him. Where full
access is possible, a battery of tests, particularly of the real-
situation type used in OSS, and a careful study of the sub-
ject's past performance and reputation will give as reliable
a result as we can expect at this stage of our knowledge of
man and yield something like a scientific picture of his inner
workings. But where access is limited, graphology offers a
not unsatisfactory substitute.
In most cases, competent graphologists can supply reliable
estimates on the following important character-traits:
Disposition to talk too much. There are, to be sure, some
people who can talk much and betray little, but by and
large the man who talks a lot lets many a thing slip out
of his mouth.
Emotional stability under stress. People who crack easily
show cracks in their calligraphy.
Agressiveness, resistance, and tenacity.
Attitude toward money; ability to control the handling of
it. (Not ability to invest it.)
Disposition to deceive, prevaricate, evade, double-talk (as
distinct from capacity to succeed in it).
Ambivalence, i.e., disposition to take both sides of an issue;
to have divided loyalties.
Inclination toward opportunism, i.e., to approach moral
questions and matters of principle on the what's-in-it-f or-
me-I-have-to-make-a-living basis.
Desire for power, predominance, prominence.
Willingness to follow the lead of others.
Rebelliousness, crankiness, indisposition to conform, insub-
ordination.
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Recklessness and rashness.
Important changes in character (by comparison of present
with past calligraphies).
The graphologist can also provide reasonably good estimates
on certain capabilities:
Capacity for abstract thinking and logic.
"Diplomacy," ability to deal with people.
Powers of observation.
Imagination.
Then there are a few characteristics on which a grapholo-
gist can make a good educated guess:
Sex difficulties. Their existence is often detectable, but
their nature may not be.
Disposition to engage in criminal activities, i.e., violation
of laws the validity of which the subject acknowledges.
Disposition to engage in violence against persons. (It is im-
portant to note that these dispositions may never be
overtly expressed either because of fear or other restrain-
ing factors or for mere lack of opportunity, provocation,
or need.)
Graphological techniques also have medical applications.
Some calligraphies bear the warning signs of cancer and cir-
culatory ailments; others the signs of incipient mental illness
and nervous breakdown.
There are certain things a graphologist can not tell:
Sex of writer.
Age of writer (in chronological terms, as distinct from level
of emotional maturity).
Mechanical ability or other special skills.
General level of ability to perform acts to which the sub-
ject may be disposed. (For example, subject may be
strongly disposed to lie and evade, but inept at putting
lies across.)
"Fortune" or future in store for the writer.
Past history of work, crime, etc. (although very cogent esti-
mates can be made as to cultural background from the
type and level of calligraphy).
I have the impression that most people with serious limited-
access assessment problems would be very glad to get some of
the information outlined above about the people they handle
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at a distance. It is an odd coincidence that the graphologist
can shed most light on precisely those character traits which
are of significance in clandestine operations. The art has
thus a peculiar potential in the half-world of espionage and
counterespionage, where paranoid and split personalities
abound and frustrated executives are the order of the day.
The Dry Run
I hope that there will soon be pressure to resolve the key
question-can any person claiming to be a graphologist come
up consistently with reasonably good character descriptions?
If any one at all can do it, then it can be done. If after all
these years no one can be found who can do it then it cannot
(for our purposes) be done. It would be all too easy to devise
a proving problem to show it can not be done, just as it is pos-
sible to prove mathematically that a bumble-bee cannot fly.
The best way to get a meaningless result would be to tie it
into the strange pattern of abstruse psychological jargon
which has of late come to infest some quarters of the psycho-
logical world and which reflects what I believe to be the sheer
delusion that any group of men is able to formulate scientific
conceptions of the qualities of human character. Man is, after
all, just emerging from the Sea of Ignorance and cannot at
this point comprehend so simple a force as gravity. He is
hardly in a position to claim to understand the most complex
of natural phenomena, man himself. Practical executives
want simple, practical descriptions of character-traits without
implied moral judgments or technical jargon, and those with
limited-access assessment problems are willing to settle for
a good deal less.
I would like to recommend the following specific procedure for
the proving problem that will eventually have to be run
somewhere:
It should be controlled, and the final judgment made, by
practical executives, not psychologists, psychiatrists, as-
sessment men, or graphologists. They should be men
who need help in assessment problems, and one or two
should be executives handling espionage agents. In this
matter, neither the graphologists nor the psychological-
psychiatric fraternity are disinterested parties. The lat-
ter, rightly or wrongly, see in the graphologist what the
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doctor sees in the chiropractor-a quack. To what extent
this is due to vested interest I cannot presume to judge;
but I rather feel it touches upon the Achilles' heel of the
entire psyche-testing fraternity, the fact that man is not
now competent to assess man scientifically.
A minimum of fifty sets of handwriting specimens should
be secured, at least meeting the specifications and includ-
ing the auxiliary data prescribed on page 37. They should
bear false signatures and be written in ignorance of the
fact that they are to be used for any purpose other than
communication. The writers must be men whose charac-
ter is a matter of record, not established by some other
series of tests. (Famous men cannot be used; grapholo-
gists know their handwritings.) The greatest precau-
tions should be taken both to prevent the writers from
knowing what is afoot and to prevent the analysts from
learning the identity of the writers.
It should be required that the analyses be couched in com-
mon everyday descriptive language, with jargon and tech-
nical terminology ruled out. They should be short and
to the point, and exclude such ambiguities as "This man
is basically honest and sincere, but is capable of theft and
deception under pressure." A proper statement on these
points would run something like one of the following:
"The writer will say what he thinks as long as this is
safe." "The writer will say what he thinks and take
chances to do so, but does not speak recklessly." "The
writer will say what he thinks, no matter what the risk."
"The writer will steal anything not nailed down." "The
writer will not steal under ordinary conditions." "The
writer has strong moral scruples against stealing and
would rather starve." These are definitive statements
with which the layman can come to grips.
Each graphologist tested should be required to state what
specific character-traits and capabilities (cf. pages 38-39)
he can identify and describe, thus avoiding the danger of
pushing him into having to deliver something he cannot.
None should be required or permitted to go off the deep
end and try to describe a character at large; they should
stick to the specific character-traits each claims he can de-
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lineate and let us assume that the rest of the picture will
either be deducible from these main traits or "average."
Each graphologist should have the right to reject 20 per-
cent of the specimens if he wishes. We do not want to
force him into the educated-guess area, and it will also
be most interesting to see whether they all reject the
same 20 percent.
Some graphologists may wish to operate as a team, and
that would seem as allowable as any other team exercise.
But the tests must not be aimed at groups of grapholo-
gists; the purpose is to test the performance of individual
graphologists without regard to affiliation.
Some European graphologists of stature should be included,
as the art is far more advanced in Europe.
A few amateurs should be permitted to participate. Of
these I should like to be one.
The content, procedure, and results of these tests should
be circulated in the intelligence community.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Analysis of Handwriting H. J. Jacoby
Deine Handschrift-Dein Cha- Hugo Ries
rakter
Der Verbrecher and Seine Roda Wieser
Handschrift (The Criminal
and His Handwriting)
Handschrift and Charakter
Handwriting, A Key to Per-
sonality
Handwriting & Character
Intelligenz im Schriftausdruck
(Intelligence Expressed in
Handwriting)
Symbolik der Handschrift
(Symbolism of Handwriting)
Klara Goldviher
Roman
Dewitt Lucas
Geo. Allen Unwin,
London, 1939, 1948
Siemens Verlag, Bad
Homburg, Ger-
many, 1950
Altdorfer Verlag,
Stuttgart, Ger-
many, 1952
H. Bouvier & Co.,
Bonn, Germany,
1949
Pantheon Books,
N.Y., 1952
Bell Publishing Co.,
Drexel Hill, Pa.,
1950
Orell Fuessli Verlag,
Zurich, Switzer-
land
Orell Fuessli Verlag,
Zurich, Switzer-
land
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Trieb and Verbrechen in der Max Pulver
Handschrift (Drives & Crim-
inality Reflected in Hand-
writing)
Vernehmungstechnik, Ch. 7 F. Meinert
(Interrogation Techniques)
Orell Fuessli Verlag,
Zurich, Switzer-
land
Verlag fuer Poli-
zeiliches Fach-
Schrifttum, Lue-
beck, Germany
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A professional assessor sup-
ports the amateur grapholo-
gist's appeal for validity tests,
although not sharing his en-
chantment with the art.
THE ASSESSMENT OF GRAPHOLOGY
E. A. Rundquist
Two threads of argument run through the foregoing article
on handwriting analysis. The first asserts the great need
for research studies because "a proper test run has never.
been devised and carried out, at least not in the United States,
to determine whether any graphologist can consistently de-
liver accurate results in the area of character delineation."
The second asserts the value of graphology here and now as
an assessment technique, making sweeping claims of what it
can do. The arguments are essentially incompatible. If the
claims are correct, the research is unnecessary; if there is
no research evidence, the claims are unsupported. With the
need for research to establish the value of graphology as an
assessment technique I am in full agreement. I disagree with
the claims for its current effectiveness.
The article makes a number of cogent points. It distin-
guishes between the well-established branch of graphology de-
voted to problems of personal identification and the branch
devoted to character analysis; it stresses the need for re=
search studies; it recognizes many of the pitfalls that need
be avoided in carrying out such studies; it acknowledges that
traditional psychological assessment is preferable to hand-
writing analysis when direct access to the individual is pos-
sible. With these points I am in general agreement. A little
elaboration of all but the first, which is too well established to
require comment, may be helpful.
Scope of Research
In evaluating graphology-or any other assessment tech-
nique-not just one, but many studies are required. Studies
of agreement among graphologists, the development of objec-
tive techniques for measuring characteristics of handwriting,
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SECRET Assessment Graphology
refinements in the methods used, hypotheses such as "small
handwriting with closed and knotted o's and a's indicates
secretiveness"-all these are useful and interesting, but they
do not answer the main question: How well does it in fact
predict behavior? Or in the terms psychologists like to use:
What is its validity? Studies should therefore be concen-
trated in . this area, a point I stress not in disagreement with
Mr. Laycock, but because of its importance.
Validation studies in the area of personality assessment
are not easy to do. There are many complicating factors-
getting a representative sample of persons to participate,
getting the same kind of information about each, getting in-
formation in sufficiently specific terms on the behavior one is
trying to predict. This last problem is recognized by Mr. Lay
cock as a semantic one. "What is a brave man?" he asks.
If there is no agreement on what a brave man is, there is
obviously no means of checking on anyone's assertion that a
person is brave.
More Pitfalls
This semantic problem has another aspect which is often
overlooked. It is not hard to write a personality description
that applies to the vast majority of people. This "Barnum
effect," as it has been called, is one of the charlatan's best
friends. Psychologists prepare such descriptions to show their
students that a person's agreement with the correctness of
a personality description is not proper evidence of the value
of any assessment technique. I once capitalized on the Bar-
num effect when instructing a group of twelve European in-
telligence officers, most of whom were favorably inclined
toward graphology. I asked them for handwriting specimens,
and, after a suitable interval produced personality descriptions
for each of them, which ten of the twelve agreed fit very well.
Then they were allowed to discover that I had given them all
the same identical description, one I found in a German peri-
odical before I left the States.
To demonstrate further the dangers of accepting agree-
ment with a personality description as evidence in favor of any
assessment technique, I asked the twelve to describe them-
selves by answering true or false to a number of personality
statements. All answered true to two of the statements-
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Assessment of Graphology
"You have a tendency to be critical of yourself" and "You
prefer a certain amount of change and variety and become
dissatisfied when hemmed in by restrictions and limitations."
And ten answered true to a third statement-"While you have
some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to com-
pensate for them." Experimenting thus with a few more ques-
tions, one would soon have enough "true" statements to write
a full description which every member of a group would agree
applied to himself. This kind of demonstration underscores
the passages in Mr. Laycock's article which call for specific,
objective, and understandable items of behavior as the cri-
terion or yardstick by which the validity of any assessment
technique must be judged.
Capabilities of Psychological Assessment
"Where full access is possible, a battery of tests, particu-
larly of the real-situation type used in OSS, and a careful
study of the subject's past performance and reputation will
give as reliable a result as we can expect at this stage of our
knowledge of man and yield something like a scientific pic-
ture of his inner workings." I take this to mean that direct
assessment of the kind done by my staff in the CIA Office of
Training is to be preferred over the graphological technique
when access to the individual is possible. With this view, of
course, I should like to agree wholeheartedly. But this brings
me back to the article's claim that "In most cases, competent
graphologists can supply reliable estimates on ... disposition
to talk too much . . . emotional stability under stress . . .
aggressiveness, resistance, and tenacity . . . attitude toward
money ... disposition to deceive . . . inclination toward op-
portunism . . . desire for power . . . willingness to follow the
lead of others . . . rebelliousness . . . rashness" and "rea-
sonably good estimates on ... capacity for abstract thinking
and logic ... ability to deal with people, powers of observation,
imagination" as well as "a good educated guess" about "sex
difficulties . . . disposition to engage in criminal activities .:
disposition to engage in violence against persons."
Even for the extremely thorough assessment. process con-
ducted by my staff I would not claim so much. Either our
own methods have greater capabilities than we credit them
with, or the article errs in conceding the superiority of "direct-
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SECRET Assessment of Graphology
access" assessment over handwriting analysis. If evidence
can be produced to establish that graphology can do all this,
I shall hasten to incorporate it into our assessment process
and eliminate much of the interviewing and testing we do.
"There are certain things a graphologist can not tell," writes
Mr. Laycock. Certainly my list here would be much longer
than his. But I am genuinely puzzled by some of the things
included in this list, and by the statement that "the graph-
ologist is entitled to know the writer's age, sex, national origin,
and profession, since he cannot tell these facts from the speci-
mens, and they are invaluable interpretive aids." I am con-
fused by the inclusion of sex, because there are studies indi-
cating quite clearly that differences in handwriting do exist'
which permit determination of sex at a better than chance
level. I haven't seen any studies on the other characteris-
tics, but except for exact profession they are the kind of
thing I would think might be inferred from handwriting at a
little better than chance level.
Psychologists are impressed by the difficulty of making pre-
dictions about a changing individual in a changing environ-
ment. They are very much aware that such predictions can
refer only to probabilities. Psychologists desire, therefore, as
the core of their assessment process, means and techniques
which have been validated by methodical research. Tests of
general intellectual ability, of some aptitudes, and of inter-
ests, along with information about past behavior, are among
these means. New means can be developed only by testing
claims for special techniques in the same methodical way.
Prospects for Graphology
Up until recently the evidence concerning graphology as an
assessment technique has been so negative that psychologists
generally have preferred to concentrate on techniques that
showed more promise. The negative evidence came from stud-
ies of graphological tenets equating specific handwriting char-
acteristics, such as upward sloping lines, with specific traits,
such as ambition. On the basis of such studies, graphology as
a means of assessment has been lumped with astrology, phre-
1 A. Anastasi & J. P. Foley, Jr., Differential Psychology (Revised edi-
tion; New York: Macmillan, 1949) p. 663; C. L. Hull, Aptitude Test-
ing (Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1928) p. 147.
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Assessment of Graphology SECRET
nology, and other systems for reading character from physical
characteristics such as length of fingers or color of hair.
Handwriting is, however, the product of a person. There
is therefore some reason to expect it might tell something
about him. This reasoning, fostered by graphology itself as
it became concerned with the movements underlying hand-
writing rather than the handwriting itself, has led to the
? devising of different kinds of studies. These studies, while
not yet convincing, do make it clear that the value of graph-
ology is not yet a closed question. One of the better ones, for
example, found that a graphologist trying to infer from hand-
writing how 50 neurotics would answer 27 questions (1,350
items in all) achieved an accuracy of 62 percent as against
the 50 percent to be expected by chance.2 The graphologist
may have been helped by knowing that all were neurotics, and
so the 62 percent may be a bit high. Even taking the data
at face value, these predictions turned out not much better
than chance results; but the study suggests that research
in this area might be more worthwhile than many had
thought. It also points to the need for more research to pin
down just what kinds of things can be predicted and what
kinds of things cannot.
In Mr. Laycock's list of things a graphologist can determine
is included "important changes in character (by comparison
of present with past calligraphies)." Research on change in
handwriting over time and under various conditions appears
to offer some promise. At least common observation suggests
that changes are caused by illness, either physical or mental.
At the present time I do not consider the evidence for
graphology as an assessment technique sufficiently impres-
sive to include it in assessments for which we have direct
access to the individual. I don't sponsor research on it for
this purpose as a matter of economics. I have only so many
dollars, and I think I will get a better return from other
assessment techniques. And even if we did not have access
to the individual, I'd still place my bets on investigation of
his past behavior, his education, his jobs, social status, income,
and so on.
H. J. Eysenck, "Graphological Analysis and Psychiatry: An Experi-
mental Study," British Journal of Psychology, 1945, 35, 70-81.
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It is interesting that graphologists, according to the article,
require some of this investigative information (sex, age, na-
tional origin, and profession) as a prerequisite for their anal-
ysis. They also get the informational content of the hand-
writing specimens themselves. From these data a number
of inferences are already possible. Consider, for example, the
differences in characteristics one might assume with confi-
dence between an age 50 female English secretary and a
21-year-old male German lawyer. I'd be inclined to rely on
the implications of this information, and would be extremely
cautious in accepting inferences, whatever their source, that
were inconsistent with it. The article claims, for example,
that "most accountants and bookkeepers can tell you, with-
out even thinking, how a man feels about money by the way
he writes a check." I'd rather have the evidence on how he
uses his money that can be obtained by looking at his can-
celled checks. So, I guess, would the banker, who lends money
on investigation of background and permanence of job, not
on handwriting analysis. It is dangerous to allow inferences
from less well validated information to influence those ob-
tained from valid sources.
For the clandestine services, however, graphology as a vali-
dated assessment technique might have application in a suffi-
cient number of instances, those where background investiga-
tion is impossible, to warrant considerable research to deter-
mine its effectiveness. I would like to see these studies start
on whatever simple verifiable characteristics graphologists
are willing to try. Should these prove successful, studies
of more complex traits can be undertaken.
I can agree with Mr. Laycock that the study should cover
the abilities of a number of particular graphologists-that
graphology may be an art, but certainly is not a science. In
my mind there is even the nagging question whether it is a
practical art. A problem with an art is that a particular per-
son's skill in applying it may change over time. There is no
way of knowing whether a practitioner's predictions a year
later will have the same value as those he made when he was
tested. It is for this reason that psychologists, as scientists,
keep trying to find ways to convert the art of judging people
to a science. They try to tease out, objectify, and measure the
basis for their predictions, so that the assessment skill can be
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Assessment of Graphology
communicated to others and used reliably with a variety of
persons in a variety of situations.
Mr. Laycock is greatly concerned with getting some re-
search started. So am I; for until we get more information
on the validity of graphology for specific purposes, the dif-
ferences between his views and mine on graphology as an as-
sessment technique, and my concern over the danger of un-
warranted credence in graphological findings, will persist.
Psychologists charged with personnel assessment are ready
to cooperate in such studies. Their only requirement is that
the research be so conducted that a group of scientists will
agree on the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from it.
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SECRET
Sketches a prospective space-
age system for handling air
intelligence data, centered on
a massive electronic brain.
DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING:
PROGRESS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Kenneth T. Johnson
Four preceding articles in this series described how the USAF
Directorate of Targets has been seeking to increase its capa-
bilities by developing mathematical models and other tech-
niques for the mass handling of data. This final article will
look briefly at the progress of these techniques since the arti-
cles describing them were published and then examine some
other analytical tools in process of development for the target
intelligence specialist.
The three mathematical models previously described were
the Military Resources Model, the Air Battle Model and the
Damage Assessment Model. The Military Resources Model
estimates the capability of the Soviet Bloc military establish-
ment, with its supporting economy, to carry out military ac-
tion and analyzes the effects of planned attacks. The Air
Battle Modell war-games the interaction of battle forces on
the basis of a most exacting layout of both sides. It answers
the question, "After x time of the game, to what extent have
offensive and defensive plans been carried through or dis-
rupted?" But it must first be supplied data describing what
resources are available to each side, what courses of action
each will attempt, and all other conditions affecting the out-
come; and the preparation of these data is a demanding task
and a stimulant for intelligence. The Damage Assessment
Models predicts the probable physical, functional, or opera-
tional effects of atomic weapons on targets or target systems.
It answers questions of the type, "Did the building collapse?"
"How many casualties were caused?" The most recent article
See Studies, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 51 if.
See Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 13 if.
See Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 23 if.
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SECRET Air Targeting
of this series 4 treated these models as illustrating one aspect
of the manifold problem of data handling, described the Con-
solidated Target Intelligence File, and highlighted the neces-
sity for better and faster ways of storing and retrieving in-
formation.
The Analytical Models in Operation
Many months have been spent in developing these models
to bring the fantastic capacity and speeds of electronic com-
puters to bear on the increasingly complex data which must
be considered in making operational decisions. How are the
computer techniques working out in practice? The Air Battle
Model has been in constant use, making test runs to evaluate
different target systems, battle plans, and strategies. Lists
of ground zeros-points of burst-from the Air Battle Model
have been fed into the Damage Assessment Model for the
calculation of damage and radiation effects. These results
have then been used by target analysts to determine the
residual capabilities of affected installations.
The Damage and Assessment Model has kept pace with the
Air Battle Model's output of ground zeros, and other data re-
quiring effects analysis. Improvements in the form in which
the results of the damage and contamination runs are pre-
sented have evolved from consultation between analysts and
machine programmers. The latest of these improvements has
been effected by feeding into the Model criteria for determin-
ing automatically from damage and contamination values
whether an installation is still operational after attack.
Since publication of the article on the Military Resources
Model in the beginning of 1958, a series of operational runs
has been made on its economic grid to show the multiple direct
and indirect economic effects of Soviet civilian and military
programs. Completely effective use of the economic grid is
still hampered, however, by data gaps in such important areas
as guided missiles and atomic energy; and aggregations in
the Model which exclude consideration of certain specialized
items of equipment limit the results to statements of general
economic capability.
4 "Data Handling Techniques," Studies, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 95 if.
5-4
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Air Targeting
Developmental work on the military logistics and trans-
portation grids of the Military Resources Model, in progress
in the spring of 1958, has provided the basis for the develop-
ment of a new model covering USSR regional air defense ca-
pabilities. This model assesses the capability of a specific
region-either an air defense district or a penetration cor-
ridor-to mount defensive sorties and missile firings after its
logistic and transportation facilities have been damaged by an
air attack of any given scope and magnitude. The initial
model has just been constructed and an initial run made;
further development is in process. The construction of this
new model shows how the mathematical modeling technique
can be adapted to serve new purposes.
Models have thus already assumed some of the targeting
load, but much remains to be done in determining whether
and how models can be used in other analytical areas. What
is intriguing for intelligence analysts, however, is that in some
areas models have brought them to the threshold of a precise
means for determining what items of information are of criti-
cal importance, a determination which will provide new, sure
guidance to collection and analysis activities. This "sensi-
tivity analysis," as it is called, is done by rerunning the same
problem several times with varying parameters to determine
which variations have a critical effect on the results. It pro-
vides also a good antidote to the tendency of analysts, having
available the models' huge capacity for data, to become in-
volved in the pursuit of minutiae which have no substantial
importance for their problem.
Although the article on Data Handling Techniques ap-
peared in the most recent issue of the Studies, some new
gains can be counted here, too. Of the more than 200 re-
quests for machine processing of the CTIF already levied by
analysts, about 65 can be handled by existing programs and
another seven are now being programmed, leaving a substan-
tial 128 yet to be translated into machine language. The
bridging of the gap between an analyst's statement of his
needs and the marching orders for the machine requires a
high degree of rapport between analyst and programmer, and
this rapport is being developed. The programmer must dis-
cuss the requirement step by step, and patiently record each
step in an ungarbled instruction to the machine. Laborious
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as this process is, it pays off in a better product, and the
analyst man-hours that are made available for more difficult
jobs grow and grow.
The acquisition of an electronic data plotter has very prac-
tically enhanced the utility of the CTIF system. The plotter
accepts coordinates from a machine tape or from cards and
records the locations directly on a linear projection map. Pro-
grams are now nearing completion which by converting lati-
tude and longitude to linear coordinates will enable the ma-
chine to plot locations on a map of any projection and any
scale that will fit on the 48" by 60" plotting board. Single
symbols can be plotted at the rate of 65 to 70 points per min-
ute. The usefulness of the machine is attested by the long
queues of waiting analysts eager to short-cut the tedious task
of massive. data plotting.
In an earlier paper in this series I General Samford was
quoted as saying that the extent to which intelligence should
contribute to the process of war gaming might be disputable
but that if an advanced war gaming process were kept closely
in mind during all processes of intelligence preparation, the
intelligence necessary to a strategy would be better. The valid-
ity of this statement is already being demonstrated as the need
for detailed layouts of enemy capabilities reveals inadequacies
in our estimates. The operation of the Air Battle Model has
properly been moved out of Intelligence to the Directorate of
Plans, but because Intelligence personnel did the pioneering
work on the Model, the Air Battle Analysis Division in Plans is
largely staffed with former intelligence analysts. This ar-
rangement facilitates not only the feedback of requirements on
intelligence but also the interpretation of the intelligence data
to be fed into the Model and the understanding of intelligence
requirements for data from its output.
At the Model Application Branch in the Directorate of Tar-
gets, a cadre of target intelligence analysts has been assembled
and is being oriented to improve the input data for the Air
Battle Model and the utilization of its output. The Branch
must also keep under review the operations of the Damage As-
sessment and Military Resources Models, which are wholly and
? "Developments in Air Targeting: The Air Battle Model," Studies,
Vol. II, No. 2, p. 13.
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r.. grge ing
appropriately placed in the Directorate of Targets; new ques-
tions arise every day about how best to use the existing models
in solving targeting problems. At the same time it is working
on the development of new models to handle current problems
and anticipating other problems which targeting is going to
face tomorrow.
The Data Problem
The inescapable task of assembling intelligence data assumes
an aggravated form when the data is to be used as input for a
mathematical model. It is not that the use of models creates
a data demand; the data problem is there anyway, models or
no models. But what the models often do is make the analyst
face up to kinds of data the likes of which he had never con-
sidered, for example the number of metric tons of pumps and
compressors required for each major military component in
a prewar build-up of forces. A prolonged bout with the stern
requirement of a model for enemy data coefficients, enemy
strike plans, or the capacities of enemy installations can bring
an analyst to the point of despair. Yet he can take comfort
from the ease with which problems can be rerun. The data do
not have to be perfect the first time, and a rerun with a new
figure may show that the variation is not of critical impor-
tance. A capable officer of ours is wont to interrupt a hot de-
bate over input data with "You don't like our figure? Give me
one of yours; I'll use it."
The Consolidated Target Intelligence File described in the
last article is proving a valuable device in this battle with the
data and constitutes a giant step in facilitating mechanized
support of target analysis. Another giant step is anticipated
in the near future with the application of the new Air Force
Intelligence Data Handling System, designated 438-L. The
system is scheduled to be operational early in 1962 for the
Washington area.
The development of System 438-L was initiated in response
to a Headquarters USAF requirement, formalized in March
1956, for an integrated system to accept information from any
and all sources and to organize, store, manipulate, and dissem-
inate it without the limitations of capacity and speed inherent
in present practices. The aim is the best possible system to
meet present and anticipated requirements, whether a fully
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automatic system of machines and computers, a combination
of manual and machine methods, or just human beings. The
contractor is putting a broad selection of talent to work on
the system, including library scientists, experimental psychol-
ogists, computer programmers, and computer engineers.
Although the best approach to a design for this system is
still being worked out, it is already apparent that it will be
based on a large-scale, high-speed, general-purpose computer
to accomplish many tasks. Such a computer will make feas-
ible the development of a rich indexing system, not only by
document but by key words on individual pages. This index-
ing system will enhance the ability of analysts to make subtle
correlations of data and develop significant interrelationships
which may exist in available information. Data storage and
retrieval can be accomplished primarily through microfilm li-
braries.
The computer in the system will make possible the fast and
accurate communication and dissemination of newly collected
data, notably that necessary for evaluating enemy intentions
and giving warning of attack. Many types of information
must be examined rapidly, for example that obtained by mis-
sions flown specifically to develop certain intelligence data. It
will also analyze reports and documents to produce Order of
Battle, Current Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, etc., ac-
cumulating bits and pieces of raw information and associating
them for development into meaningful products. In target
analysis it will be invaluable, for example in the evaluation of
foreign target systems, the charting of foreign air facilities, and
the development of strategic and tactical targets.
The retrieval facet of the system may function in any of
several ways. A question may be given by an analyst to the
operator of a Flexowriter or similar device in his working area.
It would be put into proper form and automatically transmitted
to a Flexowriter in the computer area, which would print it
out. Here it would be checked for format and validity and
then fed to the computer system. The computer would dif-
ferentiate among types of questions. The answer to one con-
cerning evaluated intelligence holdings would be obtained from
a file of evaluated intelligence directly connected to the com-
puter system. As the result of automatic search procedures
the answer would be printed out or displayed, as appropriate.
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A demand for raw information, on the other hand, might be
answered in any of three forms or some combination of them-
a listing of documents or pages pertinent to a study, the docu-
ments or pages themselves, or statistical information derived
from the documents. If the document itself were desired, the
computer system would identify the specific document number.
This identification would be hand-delivered to a separate raw
information storage device, which would produce either aper-
ture cards or a full-size reproduction of the document.
Information might also be added to the system in several
ways. The evaluated intelligence provided by analysts of all
agencies would be entered through the same Flexowriter-type
device used for querying the system. Raw information selected
and extracted from documents by a screening panel would be
entered as part of an index storage file. The documents them-
selves would be microphotographed and placed in the raw in-
formation storage section of the system.
The analytic application of the system will cover war gam-
ing, damage assessment, and determining the economic effects
of military action, as foreshadowed in the mathematical models
we have described. It will also cover target materials and pro-
duction control, an almost independent area, under a fairly
routine application of processing principles. It will provide
document security control for all the highly classified informa-
tion disseminated through the computer. It will make possible
a more accurate formulation of collection requirements and
furnish a means of evaluating both the requirements process
and the collection process. Even our comparatively limited ex-
perience with the models we have been using gives us. ground to
anticipate that actual application of the proposed system will
stimulate continuing development of new analytic techniques
to enhance the capabilities of Air Force intelligence.
For target intelligence the 438-L system is indeed going to
be a quantum jump ahead, and none too soon, The most in-
tensive target analysis effort is now directed against Soviet
guided missiles (especially operational launch sites), air de-
fense (particularly the SAGE system), and command control
systems, objectives around which the most stringent security
barriers are arrayed. The most direct and forthright advances
against these objectives could come from a successful collection
effort-a drawing, a paper, a plan, a photograph, a defector.
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But the more important the target to us, the more important
it is to the Soviet that he deny us information on it, and the
tougher the collection task. Some people seem even to believe
that he can continue to be totally successful in this denial in
the areas where it really counts. This brings us back to mass
data handling and the possibilities it offers. The realistic
solution in these high priority areas may be to break into
the complex of activities associated with the target and let
them lead us to it.
What is suggested is that we collect and process the less
sensitive information, of which there may be an abundance,
along with the sensitive. This approach is not new; intelligence
analysts have always recognized that bits and fragments of
information about persons, places, things, and movements can
when assembled, analyzed, and synthesized enable us to make
a sweeping end run around a formidable security barrier.
What is new is that science has come up with the technology
that will permit us to use this practice on a scale and with
a speed never before possible. The exploitation now made
possible of the vast amount of data already on hand in different
forms in many agencies offers immediate promise. It gives
impetus to the Air Force's effort to develop yet better tech-
niques for the mass handling of data; for the consequences of
failure to provide target information in these critical fields are
grave indeed.
Lest the impression be left that target analysis begins and
ends with data on individual installations, it is important to
round out the picture somewhat. As the Soviet nuclear de-
livery capability and military might in general have assumed
greater and greater proportions the targeting emphasis has
shifted from economic and industrial targets to military forces
and their immediate supporting resources. Furthermore, it
has become more important than ever to draw the full implica-
tions of the effects of attacks-to translate the physical de-
struction calculated to result from planned attacks and the
residual military inventories of men and materiel into terms
of post-attack operational capability. The criteria for the se-
lection of targets and target systems lie in the implications
of these effects; and in this sense effects analysis is the main-
spring and director of target selection.
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It is clear that the models and data handling developments
described in this and preceding papers all contribute in great,
measure to the central work of target selection and effects
analysis. But this is only a part of the picture: the keystone
of the effort is the human being, the target analyst, who
emerges as the manager, collator, and interpreter of data, in-
structing the machines, guiding the collectors, using finished:
intelligence produced by other analysts in their specialized
fields, and finally producing integrated intelligence on live
enemy forces on a command basis. In these force studies the
interrelationships of the forces, their bases, support facilities,
and restraints of time, space, command, communications, and
competition for common support items such as transportation
and fuel are analyzed in detail.
The force study is prepared on a command-wide basis. The
producer in effect puts on the enemy hat and examines the
interrelationships of the forces in his command, say the First.
Long Range Air Army,, the installations they occupy, the sup-,
port facilities and activities necessary for their continued oper-.
ation, their training and maneuvers. This presentation of real
life force intelligence gives new meaning to the importance of.
targets and target systems. It provides an integrated rational
basis for the prediction of wartime deployment and missions
and the prediction of qualitative and quantitative peacetime
growth. Finally it provides the framework within which
targets and target systems may be nominated for attack, a
clear understanding of the reasons they are nominated, and,
through analysis of the output from machine runs on the
damage and contamination model, a realistic interpretation
of the operational effects of given attacks.
The preparation of force studies is under way. One has
been completed on the Soviet Northern Naval Fleet, another
on the Ground Forces in the Caucasus area. Studies will
eventually blueprint the opportunities for air action against
all forces which threaten the United States and its allies and
will be maintained current for immediate application in war
planning and war gaming.
Future Data Problems
As the target intelligence analyst strains to see what lies
ahead he is awed. As he thinks toward the 1970's he realizes
that he must deal with enemy weapon systems not yet in
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being, ones which Soviet strategists are currently engaged in
planning to bring into the Soviet arsenal at that time. Quali-
tatively, they will attempt to outdo US and Allied weapon tech-
nology. Quantitatively, they will try to provide so many and
varied means for fast delivery of nuclear weapons that US de-
fenses will be insufficient to fend off the attacks and US offenses
not quick or massive enough to neutralize the Soviet capability.
It is the target analyst who must wrestle with the realities of
this problem and figure out how to cope with the threat.
In this future period the collection and evaluation of target
data will be performed with improved technology, and conclu-
sions will be reached and decisions made with greater speed.
Some of the technology for collection devices can be predicted
now. For example, aerospace vehicles with a variety of sensing
devices-electronic, radar, infrared-promise data in volumes
never before dreamed of. The prospect that unfriendly neigh-
bors can look into each others' back yards day in and day out
is going to have a profound effect upon what they decide to try
to hide, how they decide to hide it, and what they decide is
just not worth hiding. Some of the new data, for example
infrared detector readings which give warning of missiles being
prepared for launching or being launched, will go directly to
warning centers for immediate decision on US and Allied ac-
tion. All of it will be grist for the analyst, to be evaluated
against the background of the data stored in the 438-L or
some improved system, and all will automatically be added to
this massive store. From it the analyst, using advanced tech-
niques, must draw conclusions on which to base action in an
era when minutes can decide eternity.
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CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON
INTELLIGENCE
MY TEN YEARS AS A COUNTERSPY. By Boris Morros. (New
York: The Viking Press. 1959. Pp. 248. $3.95.)
The story told in this book is that of a Russian immigrant
to the United States-the author-a person of sound educa-
tional background and musical competence, who after reaching
professional heights in the entertainment and movie worlds got
himself involved in espionage. According to his account, his
desire to assist his aging parents in Russia led to a recruitment
proposal by the Soviets for clandestine work against the United
States, which he accepted under the threat of reprisals to his
family. Subsequently, and quite belatedly, he came into con-
tact with the FBI and under its guidance continued his associa-
tion with the Soviet intelligence service for ten more years as a
double agent or counterspy. The fruit of this effort was the
dissolution of an important Soviet spy ring.
The value of the book is not the story told. Tales of the
same ilk in numbers line the operational coffers of intelligence
organizations throughout the world. Its true merit from a
professional point of view is embodied, rather, in the opera-
tional data-those intimate, indispensable, but hard-to-come-
by details-that it reveals concerning the formidable yet vul-
nerable chief target of U.S. counterintelligence, the Russian
intelligence service. The validity of this assessment becomes
immediately clear when one considers the cost in time, money,
and personnel of procuring such details through other clan-
destine operations. Yet here are intimate and damaging data
on RIS objectives, personnel, modus operandi, and vulnerabili-
ties overtly available for the modest price of a book. The
obvious conclusion is that the coordination of overt and covert
information remains an important and obligatory aspect of the
intelligence process.
The Communist cause is more than a political creed; it is a
religion to an otherwise atheistic group. Its devotees are or
are supposed to be dedicated men who preach and live by the
credo that selflessness is the cornerstone of their religion. The
concept of the Cause as overriding all considerations of per-
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sonal loyalty and ordinary ethics is illustrated in passages like
the following:
"How in hell did Myra-who, like you, pretends to be my
friend-write that terrible report about Katerina?" "What
else could she do? She only did it for your own good."
Myra looked like a full-blooded passionate woman. I am
sure that if it had been necessary for the sake of the Cause
to be unfaithful to her husband, she would not hesitate to
give herself.
I never got a chance to use that Sunday punch because of what
he said next: "No matter what the Communists do, I'll always
be true to them, ideologically."
Korotkov's affection for his old friend was truly sincere.
I am convinced of that.... But then he asked, "What in the
world can I do if he continues to cause me so much trouble?"
"Oh, he will come out of it in time," I said. "And if he does
not? I suppose then there will be nothing for me to do but
order him liquidated."
[Comment on Beria's arrest:] "After all, to preserve the
system requires continuous examination and re-examination
of each of us."
It is important for the intelligence professional to understand
this religion and the Marxist code of ethics, for they permeate
the relations among Communists, the attitude of the intelli-
gence center toward its agents, their operations, and even the
conduct of the lowliest sub-source on the intelligence totem
pole. In them lies the secret to their thinking and behavior.
They are a source both of great strength andof critical vulner-
ability. For the utter self-abnegation required by the Cause is
something more-or less-than human. This human vulner-
ability is illustrated in Morros' words:
If a man like Soble is useful to his masters in Moscow, he
is also an ever present danger to them. They have no choice;
they must use men like him, and the Jack Sobles, no matter
how often they are put through the psychological meat-
grinders, remain men. Like everyone else, like all people
everywhere, they have their vanity and pride, their weak-
nesses and strengths.
"Idealists, you see," said General Korotkov, "have something
soft in them always ... and that soft side exposed to suffi-
cient temptation will corrupt them."
If it were up to [Korotkov], he would not let one of his
men stay in America for more than a year. He said the
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capitalist regime, with its easy living and emphasis on false
values, was too corrupting.
[Soble] was pulled both ways. He believed with all his heart
in the "Communist ideal." At the same time he wished to take
his wife and son out of the ever-present danger that was an
integral part of his role as a secret agent operating in a
foreign country. The two dreams he nourished for the future
were dragging him in opposite directions.
The clue to the strange fate that caught up with Jack Soble
may lie in his passionate love for his son and his wife. In the
non-Communist world this sort of devotion is accepted as the
norm. In the Soviet world it is regarded with deep distrust.
If a man lets family love interfere with his duties to the state,
the Kremlin considers his usefulness ended.
Moscow recognizes well this vulnerability in the persistent
humanness of human nature, but its corrective efforts serve
only to create other vulnerabilities, the rigidity of strong cen-
tralization and the resentment created by its mistrust of its
people:
"People back Home sat there with their maps, deciding what
should be done in a certain city and how it should be done,
even though they had never been in the United States them-
selves.... No detail of the plans they make at Home can
be changed without permission.... They should know by
this time that emergencies arise even in a checker game that
one cannot foresee."
They are always testing you, trying to find out if your sym-
pathies have shifted, listening for the chance remark that
will betray a weakness or character flaw.... Even when
their conversation appears casual, there is some purpose
behind it.
These contacts, I was soon to find out, were continually
being changed. The NKVD never trusted even its own people
very far, did not believe it wise or safe to leave any secret
agent in the same city for any great length of time.
Reviewing the Soviet intelligence effort as portrayed in this
book, we observe specific differences between it and the parallel
operations conducted by Western powers-the Soviet stress on
sex both as a tool for the control of women agents and in the
procurement of information from men; the regular use of
threats for recruitment and control of agents; the extensive
countersurveillance mounted over rendezvous and tetes-A-tete;
murder as a means of agent disposal. But in broader view we
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find that the principal difference lies in the insecurity of Soviet
operatives stemming from their continual struggle to remain
human beings under the demands of an autocratic, inflexible,
and unrealistic credo that seeks to convert them into unques-
tioning instruments of the Cause.
THE HOUSE OF SECRETS. By Gordon Young. (New York:
Duell, Sloan & Pierce. 1959. Pp. 179. $3.75.)
Gordon Young, a veteran foreign correspondent whose name
frequently appears on these pages, gives in this book an ac-
count of the Narodno Trudovoi Soyuz (People's Alliance of
Russian Solidarists), or NTS, as the group is more commonly
known. The NTS is an organization of Russian emigres who
believe that Communism in the Soviet Union can eventually be
overthrown through popular revolution. To hasten this day,
it has been active since 1930 in trying to introduce propaganda
into the USSR.
During World War II members of the group reached the
German-occupied areas of Russia and attempted to organize
NTS cells. By infiltrating various German institutions and
agencies, they had a direct influence on the initiation and fur-
therance of the Vlasov movement. This period of "collabora-
tion" with the Germans was ended by the Gestapo's arresting
the Solidarist leaders. After the war the NTS was reorganized
in West Germany, began a boisterous search for Western sup-
port in all quarters, and in recent years has carried on a
sizable propaganda program through leaflets, pamphlets,
books, radio, and personal contacts with Soviets travelling
abroad.
Mr. Young's description of the NTS organization, of the
ideology of Solidarism which it proposes as an alternative to
Communism, and of the group's propaganda operations is
highly readable if somewhat superficial. The author has ob-
tained most of his information from interviews with NTS
leaders and members, rather than from the fairly large mass
of available documentary material. Necessarily, the picture
of the NTS that emerges is an extremely favorable one.
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Available information does corroborate the bulk of the fac-
tual material in Mr. Young's book. There are exceptions, such
as the grossly exaggerated claim that within the past five
years more than 100 million copies of NTS newspapers and
leaflets have been dispatched into the Soviet Union. (The
100 million figure is more probably the amount of literature
printed by the NTS Posev publishing house for the five-year
period.) By and large, however, the story of the group's un-
equal, often tragic, sometimes heroic struggle against the
Soviet Goliath is told without the wishful thinking that has
characterized pro-NTS publicity in the past.
For the professional intelligence man, The House of Secrets
will be useful as an easy-to-read, rapid review of this militant
emigre group.
W. P. ZIMMOCK
COUNT FIVE AND DIE. By Barry Wynne, as told by Colonel
William Eliscu, O.B.E. (New York: Ballantine Books. 1959.
Pp. 152. $0.35.)
This purports to be an OSS story, a recent addition to the
literature of the over-stuffed American pocket. It was origi-
nally published in England early in 1958 1; it subsequently
appeared in a Dutch edition 2 and in a movie version. Mr.
Eliscu (who allegedly took part in the operation) is one of the
sponsors of the OSS television feature which has appeared in
the United States since the fall of 1957.
Both the English and American editions claim to be true
accounts except for changes in "certain minor incidents and
the names of leading participants." The American version
reinforces this claim with a purported introduction by Gen-
eral Donovan. General Donovan's alleged accreditation of
the story makes the book of interest to the intelligence spe-
cialist and injects an element of mystery into what appears
to be a hastily scaled-up version of a movie script. The mys-
tery: How was General Donovan led to underwrite as factual
and truthful, if he did, an account of OSS activity so patently
a figment of the imagination?
`London: Souvenir Press.
Tel tot Viii en Sterf! (Amsterdam: Scheltens and Giltay, 1958.)
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The book's story line is as diaphanous as the habit of its
principal character, one Hannie Herodsen, a toothsome
Abwehr agent. At the story's start in the spring of 1943, she
is plying her blond lissomeness on a "nameless Lt. Colonel"
of OSS Algiers. Having learned from the hapless officer the
place and time of the Allied attack on Sicily and perhaps the
details of some OSS missions, she repatriates to Germany by
submarine at the end of 1943. She receives the personal at-
tention of Canaris' successor, Kaltenbrunner, who sends her
early in 1944 to England.
Infiltrated by submarine in March, Hannie is the same
Dutch refugee she was in Algiers: cover in her case is as
light as her baggage. She sets herself up in a London apart-
ment and proceeds to take over direction of a resident German
IS net consisting of four individuals, including two radio opera-
tors, which had presumably been successful in defying Brit-
ish security forces from the beginning of the war. Her prin-
cipal target is the Americans; her mission is to ascertain the
time and place of the upcoming Allied attack on the continent.
With a lucky-though, one feels, predestined-assist she locks
with an OSS officer in London, this time a Captain. Traces of
her Algiers activity carried in the heads of officers in OSS
London are her downfall.
A joint British-OSS operation ("Stampede") is laid on un-
der OSS supervision to permit the Captain to develop the re-
lationship unwittingly with Hannie and guide her into a spe-
cially tailored Dutch resistance organization in London.
Thereafter Hannie, a singular example of an unwitting dou-
ble agent, is built up and fed deception material on the cross-
channel attack. OSS London sacrifices the lives of two Dutch
resistance operatives in order to make this a better fly-trap.
In a cops-and-robbers ending the GIS net in England is rolled
up by OSS (and the British), but Hannie is permitted to de-
liver the tainted information to Berlin. The outcome, accord-
ing to the author, was a diversion of Nazi military forces to
Holland, a significant contribution to unbalancing the
strength available to oppose the Allied landing in Normandy.
Hannie forfeits her life to Kaltenbrunner when it is realized
that her information was false.
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All of this is fiction purporting to be fact. An examination
of OSS and other official materials has produced no evidence
to authenticate the account, even if one allows the maximum
for changes "in certain minor incidents and the names of
leading participants." Beginning with Mr. Eliscu's colonelcy,
his O.B.E., and his claim of participation in the "Stampede"
operation, the story comes apart at the seams when subjected
to critical review. The record of German intelligence activity
in World War II knows no character or composite identifiable
with Hannie Herodsen. It is now known that the British
security services controlled or neutralized all GIS operations
in the UK during that period. There is no trace in OSS docu-
mentation of an operation entitled "Stampede" or otherwise
identifiable with what is described in the book. The extensive
interrogations and testimony of Kaltenbrunner in 1945-46
contain nothing to support the story. Finally, the official
Dutch resistance has been unable to identify the two indi-
viduals purportedly sacrificed.
The mystery of the Donovan imprimatur is, therefore, of
more than casual interest: the endorsement was decisive in
quieting the skepticism of a reviewer in one of the national
news magazines.3 The issues raised by Mr. Eliscu's TV por-
trayal of OSS were put sharply in the press in 1957.4 Because
the OSS is the foundation of U.S. national intelligence and
counterintelligence abroad, the questions raised by Count Five
Newsweek, January 26, 1959, page 106: "If Count Five and Die were
not introduced and vouched for by Gen. William J. Donovan . . . it
could easily be mistaken for a highly implausible piece of spy fic-
tion. However, British author Barry Wynne's story is true, and
it's a corker."
' The New York Times, September 1957, observed: "There could be
an engrossing TV series in some of the courageous and imaginative
achievements of the men who served in O.S.S. But these are stories
that should be presented with careful fidelity to detail and without
the shabby, melodramatic flourishes that marked this telecast."
In November 1957 the Washington Daily News, in a similar review,
questioned whether "it's a good idea for the OSS to be memo-
rialized on TV by the series under that name," which it found to
be "nothing more than the same old foreign intrigue stuff that
has cluttered the little screen since 10-inch days."
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and Die are basic. Who are the residuary legatees of the OSS
tradition? Is the tradition served by publicity which is as
speculative in substance as it is in purpose?
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Adaptation from an address de-
livered in tribute to the father
of central intelligence.
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY
Allen W. Dulles
It was my privilege to be associated with William J. Donovan
both as a lawyer between the wars and then during World
War II, when I served under his command in the Office of
Strategic Services. His courage and leadership made a pro-
found impression on me. I should like to convey to you some-
thing of that impression, and some idea of what his pioneer-
ing has meant to all of us.
His interest in our national defense and security started
early. In 1912, as the war clouds gathered in the Balkans,
he helped organize Troop I of the New York National Guard.
In 1915 he went to Poland as a member of a Rockefeller com-
mission charged with relieving the great shortage of food
there, and particularly of milk for the children. When the
National Guard was mobilized in 1916, he came home to join
his Troop I on the Mexican border.
Then came his fabulous career in World War I with the
165th Infantry of the 42nd Division-the renowned "Fight-
ing 69th" of the Rainbow Division. Here he got his nickname
Wild Bill. The legend goes that after the regiment landed in
France he ran them five miles with full packs to limber them
up. As the men were grumbling with exhaustion, Donovan
pointed out that he was ten years older and carrying the
same 50-pound pack. One of the men replied, "But we ain't
as wild as you, Bill!" Another story has it that the honorary
title was transferred to him from a professional baseball
pitcher of the same name whose control left something: to
be desired. Whatever its origin, the title stuck.
The citations Colonel Donovan received in France tell the
military story: On July 28, 1918, a Distinguished Service Cross:
"He was in advance of the division for four days, all the while
under shell and machine gun fire from the enemy, who were
on three sides of him, and he was repeatedly and persistently
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William J. Donovan
counterattacked, being wounded twice." Three days later the
Distinguished Service Medal: "He displayed conspicuous
energy and most efficient leadership in the advance of his
battalion across the Ourcq River and the capture of strong
enemy positions.... His devotion to duty, heroism, and pro-
nounced qualities of a Commander enabled him to success-
fully accomplish all missions assigned to him in this impor-
tant operation."
And then, for action in combat in the Meuse-Argonne on
October 14, the highest of all awards, the Congressional Medal
of Honor: ". . . Colonel Donovan personally led the assaulting
wave in an attack upon a very strongly organized position,
and when our troops were suffering heavy casualties he en-
couraged all near him by his example, moving among his
men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons
and accompanying them forward in attacks. When he was
wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet, he refused to be
evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a
less exposed position." "No man ever deserved it more," said
General Douglas MacArthur, who had seen this action.
Three aids were killed at Donovan's side in the course of
these actions. Reverend Francis P. Duffy, the chaplain of
the 69th, said, "His men would have cheerfully gone to hell
with him, and as a priest, I mean what I say." Several years
ago General Frank McCoy, describing his close association
with Bill Donovan during World War I, said he was one of the
finest soldiers he ever saw in his life-long service in the Army,
that he had the qualities of the ideal soldier, judgment and
courage and the respect and affection of his men.
. In 1922 Donovan was appointed U.S. Attorney in Buffalo,
N.Y., and shortly thereafter he entered a new phase of his
career. In 1924 President Coolidge reorganized the Depart..
ment of Justice and called Bill to Washington to be assistant
to the Attorney General, heading the Antitrust Division. Here
he showed both his fearlessness in law enforcement and his
intense interest in making law a practical vehicle to promote
the economic welfare.
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He was firmly convinced that individual freedom is vitally
linked to our system of free enterprise. He attacked re-
straints and monopoly with effective enthusiasm. In the
Trenton Potteries case he won Supreme Court agreement that
price fixing among dominant competitors is of itself illegal.
He brought under legal attack such diverse industries as oil,
sugar, harvesting machinery, motion pictures, water trans-
portation, and labor unions. Yet he recognized that the un-
certainties of our antitrust laws pose serious business prob-
lems, and accordingly instituted the practice of giving ad-
vance opinion on the legality of proposed mergers and other
business activities that might be questioned under the law.
Offered the Governor Generalship of the Philippines when
President Hoover entered the White House in 1929, Bill turned
it down and went into law practice in New York City. He was
soon appointed counsel to several of the New York bar asso-
ciations in connection with a general overhauling of the bank-
ruptcy laws. During this period he also served as counsel to
a committee for review of the laws governing the State's Pub-
lic Service Commission. In 1932 he unsuccessfully ran for
Governor of the State.
As a corporation attorney he won in 1935 the important
Humphrey case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the President could not arbitrarily remove a chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission. He also won an important
decision in the Appalachian coal case, upholding the right
of coal producers to organize a joint selling agency in eco-
nomic self-defense. This agency is still in existence.
During this period of corporate law practice, Bill never lost
his interest in world affairs. He took time off to visit Ethiopia
during the 1935 Italian invasion. He was in Spain during its
Civil War, carefully observing the Axis efforts to test their
new equipment in these foreign adventures.
Presidential Emissary
In the early days of World War II Donovan was called into
action by President Roosevelt. In 1940 he was sent on a fact-
finding mission to England and in 1941 to the Balkans and the
Middle East. Anthony Eden told Washington that the Balkan
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mission had been most helpful to the British assessment of
the situation there.
From the first trip, the one to Britain not long after Dun-
kirk, Bill had brought back to Washington a very important
report. You will recall there was skepticism at that time in
some quarters as to whether the British could effectively
carry out Churchill's thrilling promise, "We shall defend our
island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the
beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight
in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we
shall never surrender." Donovan reported to Roosevelt that
the British could and would do just that. This had a direct
effect on American policy. He also warned Harry Hopkins
that the Germans might strike toward Suez through French
North Africa-a prophecy that soon became a reality.
Donovan also recommended to the President that the
United States start preparing immediately for a global war.
He particularly stressed the need of a service to wage un-
orthodox warfare and to gather information through every
means available. He discussed this idea at length with his
close friends in the Cabinet, Secretaries Knox and Stimson,
and with Attorney General Jackson.
The seeds which Bill planted bore fruit. In July 1941 the
President established the Office of the Coordinator of Infor-
mation and called Donovan to Washington to head it. In
original concept this Office was to combine the information
and intelligence programs with psychological and guerrilla
warfare. This proved to be too big a package for one basket
and in 1942 the organization was split. That portion of it
coordinating wartime information services became the Office
of War Information, and the intelligence and unorthodox war-
fare work, where Bill's greatest interest lay, was put under
an Office of Strategic Services.
Truly one of the remarkable accomplishments in World
War II was the organization and activity of the O.S.S.-feats
which would never have been achieved without Bill Donovan's
leadership and his vast interest in the unorthodox, the novel
and. the dangerous. Starting from scratch in 1941, he built
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William J. Donovan
an organization of about 25,000 people that made a real con-
tribution to the victory. Many of the deeds of O.S.S. will
have to remain secret, but with the passage of time many
have been disclosed.
Bill conceived the O.S.S. as a world-wide intelligence organi-
zation that could collect the facts necessary to develop our
policy and war strategy. He was convinced that Axis secrets
were to be found not only in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, but in
other capitals and outposts around the world. So he imme-
diately set about dispatching officers to key spots in Europe,
Asia, and later Africa. The pay-off justified the, effort. He
was able to obtain information of great value from carefully
established agents with contacts in Berlin, in the German
High Command, and in the Abwehr, the German military in-
telligence service. The work of these agents gave us advance
information about the development of German jet aircraft,
about German work with heavy water in the effort to develop
a nuclear weapon, about the V-1's and V-2's, and about the
plot against Hitler.
In addition to his organization for the collection of strategic
intelligence, Donovan provided means to help gather tactical
information in the combat areas, forming teams of parachut-
ists-Americans as well as indigenous-to drop behind enemy
lines. But not content with passive intelligence, he also
wanted action. He knew that well-organized guerrillas operat-
ing behind enemy lines in areas where the local population
was friendly could wreak havoc on enemy lines of communi-
cation and tie down troops that could otherwise be used in
combat. Working with our allies, he built up teams of lead-
ers and communicators to organize resistance in the coun-
tries occupied by the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese. There
were also air drops of supplies and equipment deep behind the
Axis lines in France and Italy, in Burma and elsewhere.
These action teams were well supported by a headquarters
technical group, which under Donovan's guiding hand was
imaginatively developing new ways to sabotage the enemy
war effort and new gadgets either to harass the enemy or
help our own cause-equipment ranging from the most so-
phisticated communications systems to a repellent used by
personnel forced to bail out in shark-infested waters. Not all
of the products were so practical as these. Ambassador David
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William J. Donovan
Bruce, one of Bill Donovan's closest associates, in a recent
tribute to the General's qualities of leadership, vividly de-
scribed his excitement over ideas. Ambassador Bruce wrote,
and I subscribe to every word of it:
His imagination was unlimited. Ideas were his plaything.
Excitement made him snort like a race horse. Woe to the
officer who turned down a project, because, on its face, it
seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual. For painful weeks under
his command I tested the possibility of using bats taken from
concentrations in Western caves to destroy Tokyo [with de-
layed action incendiary bombs]. The General, backed by the
intrigued President Roosevelt, was only dissuaded from further
experiments in this field. when it appeared probable that the
cave bats would not survive a trans-Pacific flight at high
altitudes.
Many ingenious ideas to work on the nerves of the enemy
were born in another part of the O.S.S.-the Morale Opera-
tions Branch. This was the undercover psychological war-
fare branch of the war effort. While the Office of War Infor-
mation was telling the enemy about the magnitude of the U.S.
war effort and getting the facts and figures well circulated,
this Branch was dedicated to confusing the enemy and break-
ing their will to resist.
General Donovan was convinced that there were great un-
tapped reservoirs of information in this country about for-
eign areas which had become of vital interest in the war
effort-data in the archives of business organizations, infor-
mation acquired abroad by American scientists, academicians,
and tourists, and also that held by foreign experts residing
here. He set about to collect this information and data and
a mass of photographs of foreign areas. As the war reached
more and more areas of the globe, this information came to
have great importance.
He also realized the importance of analyzing and present-
ing information to the policy makers in readily usable form-
one of the most difficult tasks of intelligence. He established
in the O.S.S. a major branch for research and analysis, as-
sembling in Washington the best academic and analytic
brains he could beg, borrow, or steal from the universities,
laboratories, libraries, museums, the business world, and other
agencies of government. Theirs was the task of probing the
political and economic aspects of the war, assessing both our
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William J. pDonovan
allies and our enemies, both neutrals and the occupied lands.
Theirs also was the task of estimating Axis vulnerability and
war potential and the staying power of the Russians, who even
then told us almost nothing about themselves.
Bill Donovan had the qualities a great intelligence officer
must have. He took nothing for granted and at the same
time was insatiably curious. He had a good nose for the
news: a faint whiff of something unusual would speed his
mind into a dozen possible explanations, generally as ingeni-
ous as the wiles of the enemy. He wanted to see things on
the spot and judge for himself. He was constantly on the
move and drove his staff wild trying to keep him from places
they thought too exposed. He also put them into a state of
near exhaustion trying to keep up with the pace he set him-
self. One of his great qualities was his dedication to the
men who served under him, and his ever-readiness to give
them his full support. He, in turn, had their complete loyalty,
respect and affection. I vividly recall a personal instance.
For about two years, from November 1942 to September 1944,
I was working for Donovan in Switzerland, then entirely en-
circled by the Nazi-Fascist forces. In September 1944 the
American Seventh Army, coming up from Southern France,
broke through to the Swiss border near Geneva. Under orders
to return to Washington to report, I had joined a group of the
French underground in a secret hideout in the Rhone Valley
between Geneva and Lyon to await a clandestine flight to take
me to London. As far as I knew, General Donovan was in
Washington and had not the slightest idea where I was hidden.
After weather had held up my plane for several days, there
was a knock on the door of my hideout in the middle of the
night. It was one of General Donovan's aides, telling me that
the General was waiting for me at the nearest available airstrip
south of Lyon, which had just been evacuated by the Nazis. He
had been searching the area for some twenty-four hours be-
fore he discovered where I was.
Together we flew back to London, arriving, I well remem-
ber, on that day in September 1944 when the Germans launched
the first of their ballistic missiles on the British capital. It de-
scended near the center of London after a flight of nearly two
hundred miles. Both the American and the British intelligence
services had been closely following the development of this
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missile. I have often wondered why, in this country, our tech-
nicians and strategists failed to see earlier the full implica-
tions of the success of the V-2, as I believe the Soviet did, and
to realize much earlier in the game that the combination of
the ballistic missile with the atomic bomb, which was then
about to be unveiled, could change the nature of war and the
security position of this country.
Few men of his time were more alert than Donovan to the
new threats that might develop. In late 1944, sending a man
to Cairo to take over the direction of activities at that post, he
gave oral instructions to the effect that the main target for
intelligence operations should now be what the Soviets were
doing in the Balkans rather than German activities in the
Middle East. The German threat was receding. The Soviet
danger was already looming. Operations were to be adjusted
accordingly, although such instructions could not be put into
official writing.
Also, while the war was still in progress, General Donovan
was looking forward to the peace. He foresaw the need for a
permanent organization not only to collect intelligence but, per-
haps even more important, to coordinate the whole govern-
ment intelligence effort and see that the President and policy
makers get comprehensive and consolidated analyses to guide
their decisions as to our course of action.
The Father of Central Intelligence
In the fall of 1944 Donovan presented to the President a
paper proposing an intelligence organization operating on a
world-wide scale and having direct responsibility to the Presi-
dent. While it was not to take upon itself the responsibilities
of the departmental intelligence services, it would act as a co-
ordinating mechanism for all intelligence. The paper stressed
that the proposed organization would have no police or sub-
poena powers and would not operate in the United States. Pres-
ident Roosevelt expressed considerable interest in this propo-
sal, and a week before his death in April 1945 asked Donovan
to poll the Cabinet and the heads of agencies concerned for
comment on it. These comments, ranging from the opinion
that there was no need for such a peacetime organization to
the belief that it was vital to national security, make interest-
ing reading today.
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William J. Donovan
NFI ORA17DUi! FOR TRF PRESIDENT
Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944 1 have given con-
sideration to the organization of an intelligence service for the
post-war period.
In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelli-
gence services were mainly in and for military operations, the
OS" was placed under the direction of the J03.
Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally
pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems
of peace.
This will require two things:
1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision
of the President.
2. The establishment of a central authority reporting
directly to you, with resg,onsibility to frame intelligence objec-
tives and to collect end coordinate the intelligence material re-
quired by the Tzecutivo Branch in planning and carrying out
national policy and strategy.
I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the means
by which I think this could be realised without difficulty or
lose of time. You will note that coordination and centralization
are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that
pertaining primarily to Department action) remeina within the
existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority
than would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence func-
t.ions within the Army, Navy, Department of State and other agencies.
In accordance with your wish, this is net up an a permanent
long-range plan. But you may want to consider Whether this (or
part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative action.
There are common-sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of
the chip at once.
The immediate revision and coordination of our prevent intelli-
gence system would effect substantial economies and aid in the
more efficient and speedy termination of the war.
Information important to the national defense, being gathered
now by certain Departments and agencies, is not beint,. used to full
advantage in the war. Coordination at the strategy lov~',l would
prevent waste, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste
and unnecessary duplication.
Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transi-
tion which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of
rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will
contribute to informed decisions.
We have now in the Government the trained and ,peciallzed
personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.
William J. Donovan
Director
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William J. Donovan
April 5, 1945
MEMORANDUM
Apropos of your memorandum of November
g, 1944, relative to the establishment of a
central intelligence service, 1 should appreciate
your calling together the chiefs of the foreign
intelligence and internal security units in the
various executive agencies, so that a consensus of
opinion can be secured.
It appears to me that all of the ten execu-
tive departments, as well as the Foreign Economic
Administration, and the Federal Communications Com-
mission have a direct interest in the proposed
venture. They should all be asked to contribute
their suggestions to the proposed centralized
intelligence service.
F.D.R.
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William J. Donovan
Donovan received an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished
Service Medal for his wartime work, but his plan to develop the
O.S.S. into a peacetime intelligence organization was beset with
conflicting views. Some would have the new organization, like
the O.S.S., report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while others pre-
ferred that it be put under the Department of State. And
there was controversy as to whether one individual could or
should be responsible for presenting a consolidated view of the
intelligence picture to the policy makers, rather than leave this
the collective responsibility of the chiefs of all the intelligence
services. No agreement had been reached by the time the war
ended in August 1945, and the O.S.S. was soon ordered 'dis-
banded.
A proposal for a central intelligence organization such as
Donovan had conceived was contained in the first draft of the
so-called unification act submitted by Ferdinand Eberstadt to
Secretary Forrestal in October 1945. And in January 1946, to
preserve assets while the issue was being settled, President
Truman issued the order creating the Central Intelligence
Group, which later picked up some of the functions and per-
sonnel still remaining from the O.S.S. and other scattered in-
dependent intelligence activities.
Bill Donovan's dream was not yet completely realized. Con-
gress still had to act.. After extensive hearings to which Gen-
eral Donovan contributed important testimony, the provisions
for a Central Intelligence Agency were incorporated into the
National Security Act of 1947, which created a Department
of Defense and set up the National Security Council to advise
the President and oversee the new intelligence agency. In July
1947 final executive and legislative endorsement was thus given
to the views which Donovan had been striving to have accepted.
I have always felt that the decision to place the C.I.A. under
the President, as Donovan recommended, was wise and neces-
sary.
Bill Donovan's restless energy had turned elsewhere with
the disbanding of O.S.S., although he never gave up his in-
terest in the organization or stopped hammering home to the
public the necessity for providing adequate and accurate in-
formation to the policy makers of the government in order to
protect the national security. His varied talents were being
called on for other important services. His legal ability 'nd
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William J. Donovan
vast knowledge of German wartime activities were used to help
prepare the Nuremburg trials for the Nazi war criminals. He
went to Greece to investigate the murder of newsman George
Polk, a clear effort of the Communists to prevent the truth
about the extent of their activities in the Greek civil war from
seeping out.
The more General Donovan saw of the Soviets in action the
more concerned he was with alerting the American people to
the dangers. He co-authored an article in the Yale Law Journal
for July 1949 presenting a "Program for a Democratic Counter
Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service."
The article said:
The Communist Fifth Column . . . seeks to identify itself
with every social grievance. Russian espionage and subver-
sive operations are made up of trained and skilled spy tech-
nicians and intelligence officers, propaganda specialists, ex-
perts in spreading rumors. Instruction is planned so that
the agent will find it as easy for a minority to operate a labor
union, or a pacifist league, or any other such movement, as
itis for a minority group to control a large corporation when
most of the stockholders take no active interest in the man-
agement.
In 1950 President Eisenhower, then President of Columbia
University, presided on the occasion of the award to Bill Dono-
van of the Alexander Hamilton Medal, given by the Columbia
Alumni Association for distinguished service and accomplish-
ment in any of the great fields of human endeavor. In 1953
the President named him Ambassador to Thailand. At this
time the ancient kingdom of Siam was a main target for Com-
munist subversion. With a vigor that belied his years, this
remarkable man of 70 threw himself into the job of helping
the Thais bolster their defenses against the Communists so
that this keystone of anti-Communism in Southeast Asia could
continue free.
Upon his return to the United States one might have ex-
pected him to seek retirement, but nothing was further from
his mind. He became National Chairman of the International
Refugee Committee and the director of that group's fight
against the Soviet program to induce Russians who escaped
from Communism to return home. At the time of the Hun-
garian Revolution he turned his energies to aiding the refugees
of this unsuccessful effort to win freedom from Soviet tyranny.
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He was Chairman of the American Committee on United Eu-
rope from its inception in 1949, and through this organization
he continued to further the efforts of our major allies in West-
ern Europe to achieve a greater unity in the face of Communist
danger.
Even after ill health forced his retirement to Walter Reed
Hospital, General Donovan continued his interest in the fight
against Communism and the development of our intelligence
work. In recognition of his role in the intelligence field, Presi-
dent Eisenhower in 1957 awarded him the National Security
Medal. The citation reads:
Through his foresight, wisdom, and experience, he foresaw,
during the course of World War II, the problems which would
face the postwar world and the urgent need for a permanent,
centralized intelligence function. Thus his wartime work con-
tributed to the establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency and a coordinated national intelligence structure.
In February 1959 he passed away at Walter Reed among the
men he had led. As soldier, public prosecutor, leader of the bar,
director of the Strategic Services in wartime, public servant
in time of peace, he had left his record with the nation he served
so well. He was a rare combination of physical courage, in-
tellectual ability, and political acumen. He was a mild-man-
nered man, with an insatiable curiosity, an unflagging imag-
ination, and the energy to turn his ideas into action.
The heritage of Bill Donovan is written in the national se-
curity. He woke the American people to the need of a per-
manent peacetime intelligence service. He bestirred Washing-
ton into creating a mechanism whereby all the government
components which receive information on what is going on any-
where in the world pool their knowledge, share their interpre-
tations, and work together to make one unified estimate of
what it means. He helped place intelligence in its proper per-
spective and stimulated the policy makers to recognize its role
in determining American policy abroad. He was one of the
architects of an organization that should keep our government
the best informed of any in the world.
History's epitaph for William J. Donovan will be:
He made his nation more secure.
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CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON
INTELLIGENCE
A STUDY OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By General Cheng
Chieh-min. (Taipei: Kuo-chia An-ch'uan-ch'u. 1958. Pp.
706.)
This work, whether or not it was so intended, is a summation
of the experience and studies which have made General Cheng
an authority in his field. While in substance it contains little
that has not been presented elsewhere, its Chinese point of
view gives a fresh perspective to familiar subjects. The au-
thor's background includes extensive research into Western
thought, philosophic and military, from the writings of the
ancient Greeks to training publications of the United States
Army; but it also includes a solid grounding in Chinese thought
and strategy from Lao-tse and Confucius to Mao Tse-tung and
Chiang Kai-shek. Clausewitz and Jomini, Lenin and Liddell
Hart, Toynbee and Sherman Kent are seen in a new light when
interpreted through the thinking of Hsii.n-tzu and Mencius,
Sun-tzu and Szu-ma Kuang, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang.
The author, at the age of 60, in poor health and in semi-
retirement, is still Director of the National Security Bureau,
the highest intelligence agency in the Nationalist Government.
A graduate of the second class of the Whampoa Military Acad-
emy in 1925, he studied in Moscow and Western Europe, served
as combat commander and general staff officer in China, and
had liaison duties with various Allied commands during World
War II. He has been consistently close to the Generalissimo,
a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomin-
tang, Vice and Deputy Minister of National Defense, Director
of Military Intelligence, Director of the Office of Mainland Oper-
ations, and a member of the President's Advisory Committee
on Strategy. He spent 1957 in "a year of convalescence," re-
vising and expanding his two previous works on intelligence
into the present study.
General Cheng states that the purpose of his book, designed
for the Chinese military community, is to correct long-stand-
ing misapprehensions about the nature of intelligence work,
and to arouse interest or furnish guidance in a sadly neglected
field. He proposes to take up in order "all questions connected
with military intelligence" with a view to establishing a com-
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Recent Books
plete and sound foundation for those who may be called upon
to work as intelligence officers. Considerations of security and
limitations of space, however, force him to gloss over details
of intelligence organization and specific techniques of applica-
tion.
He has nevertheless achieved a comprehensive study of the
huge field marked out for treatment, embracing national pol-
icy, the nature of intelligence, national strategic intelligence,
military strategic intelligence, combat intelligence, counterin-
telligence, and psychological warfare, and including specifics on
strategems, signal intelligence, the intelligence process, and
intelligence training. He draws a thousand examples from as
many sources-Hannibal's campaigns, the Napoleonic era, the
two world wars, and every stage of Chinese history. He some-
times yields to a passion for categorizing and occasionally
belabors seemingly obvious points; but such shortcomings seem
inevitable in the light of his announced purpose to fill a void
in the Chinese literature on intelligence. They are more than
offset by the insights he gives into Nationalist Chinese ideas
of national policy and strategy and the role of intelligence in
their formulation and execution.
The author's discussion of such matters as the function of
intelligence, its several types, the stages of the intelligence
process and their interrelations, or intelligence training and
its supervision follows generally the lines of standard Western
works on the subject. More stimulating, to a Westerner at any
rate, is his development of the concept of intelligence as the
basis for effective strategems and for economical victory, the
foundation of every type of activity in cold or hot war, and so
the tool without which no adequate decision can be made, no
determined policy executed. Here the argument is peculiarly
Chinese.
General Cheng himself feels that he is taking a traditionally
Chinese view, as opposed to Western glorification of power and
naked force, when he says, quoting President Chiang, "War is
based essentially on benevolence, though its methods are sav-
age; war has peace for its end, though its means are terrible-
even barbaric." He thus considers war the last-ditch defense
of the people's welfare, to be waged only when there is no other
means of safeguarding the welfare of the people in a "peace
which is the external manifestation of benevolence." But even
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victory in war, he emphasizes, does not necessarily mean profit
for the nation; a military triumph can leave the people and
the government far worse off than if there had been no war.
Therefore any victory, as Sun-tzu insisted, must be economical.
The sage military leader is the one who "fights without battles,"
who "creates victory out of opportunities offered by the enemy."
It is precisely here that intelligence is given its most impor-
tant role and that the value of "strategems," repeatedly em-
phasized throughout the book, is most clearly illustrated.
Strategems "are the struggle of wits in which intelligence
copes with intelligence; they are unconventional but legiti-
mate expedients, a method of war in which deception of the
enemy is used as the only means to attain a predetermined
objective. Under all conditions, favorable or unfavorable, they
are the most valuable, most economical, and most effective ac-
tivity of warfare." The author's pronouncement that strate-
gems are to be used against enemy, neutral, and ally alike,
together with his statement that there are inevitably differ-
ences of goals and policies between allies and "today's allies are
tomorrow's enemies," shows the vigorous nationalism of his
thinking. He believes that strategems are an aspect of strategy
gravely neglected in Western studies.
It is unfortunate, with respect to these revelations of Chinese
thought, that this authoritative book is not available in Eng-
lish. Since, however, the Chinese concepts of peculiar interest
are scattered widely through the massive work, translation
in toto or in significant part would hardly be worth while. For
the Western student of intelligence it will probably remain
little more than a reference, difficult of access.
WHY MEN CONFESS. By O. John Rogge. (New York: Nelson.
1959. Pp. 298. $3.95.)
The evaluation of the Chinese indoctrination process used
on Americans during and immediately after the Korean War
remains a topic of lively interest, and the search for antidotes
to this kind of indoctrination gives purpose to continued
studies of its nature. The dissemination of the Code of Con-
duct by the Defense Department, with its strong emphasis on
training, has resulted in many attempts to synthesize current
knowledge of the process in manageable and teachable form.
But an oversimplified and distorted popular concept of "brain-
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washing" has become so well established, not only with the
man in the street but with many whose association with in-
telligence work should make them more sophisticated or at
least better informed, that the problem of furnishing a better
foundation for understanding, combatting and resisting Com-
munist indoctrination becomes formidable.
Kinkead's In Every War But One,' written in support of the
Code of Conduct, explicitly discounts any occult art of brain-
washing, but in its straining to dramatize the need for better
morale among enlisted men it bypasses the problem of pre-
paring air force or intelligence officers, for example, for the
kind of interrogation and indoctrination they may face as pris-
oners of the Communists. But if Kinkead's viewpoint is too
narrow, it is almost impossible to round out the picture by
pointing to books with a wider vista or with more specific appli-
cability to the intelligence specialist. The more general books
range from the obviously well-intentioned but scientifically in-
accurate ones of Hunter 2 to those like the quasi-scientific but
highly controversial Rape of the Mind, by Joost A. M. Meerloo.>
The definitive book on the indoctrination process particularly
as it pertains to the intelligence specialist is yet to be written.
Why Men Confess is certainly not the definitive book, but it
does represent an important contribution to a growing liter-
ature. It treats the Communist process as one manifestation
of a standard inquisitional method used by others today and
in the historical past, and it becomes therefore an encyclopedia
of the history of confession and a sort of concordance of literary
allusions to the confession process. It does not have the jour-
nalistic polish of Hunter or Kinkead or the sensationalism of
Meerloo. The skill of a practiced lawyer has been applied to
produce what is in effect a brief on the subject as seen from his
experience and reading. His experience is largely in the "con-
fessions" of the criminal courts, which are so often fallible and
sometimes dictated by pathological motives; his reading has
been historical, literary and scientific. As far as can be deter-
mined, he has been both catholic and thorough in these re-
New York: W. W. Norton. 1959.
'Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956) and Brainwashing in
Red China (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1951).
Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. 1956.
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searches. Consequently, even though fault can be found with
some of its conclusions, his work is very useful as a source book.
It is apparent that Mr. Rogge is more at home with his-
torical and literary research than in evaluating scientific ar-
ticles. Except in citing the Senate testimony of experts and
the descriptive (rather than evaluative) paper of Hinkle and
Wolff,`' he uses scientific authorities inappropriately. His
rather heavy emphasis on psychoanalytically based concepts
that are at worst obscure and at best controversial is unfortu-
nate. The book would be more solid if he had stuck to the
approach he used with his literary and historical materials.
Dostoevski, Gogol, and Beck and Godin represent much more
effective documentation for his position than Reik, Berg, or
Freud. Perhaps this criticism would not be necessary were it
not for the blurb on the dust jacket (for which the author is
presumably not responsible) ". . . Mr. Rogge tells us all that
psychology knows about the compulsion to confess."
Mr. Rogge uses his historical concordance to present a brief
for protecting individuals against the inquisitional methods of
modern states, including our own:
The inquisitional method, which the communists have ex-
ploited for a quarter of a century, is a throwback to the past
and should be abandoned, especially in view of the growth and
power of modern states. (p. 29)
Neither the system of legal proofs nor the use of. physical
force will explain the many confessions to communist, French,
and clerical inquisitors. But there was one thing which the
different regimes. of these inquisitors had in common: the in-
quisitional system. (p. 199)
All roads led to the same conclusion: the primitive and irra-
tional nature of most of the mind together with the power of
modern states, our own included, make it necessary to abandon
not only the inquisitional technique but also any of its
challenged fruits. The world should have done with investi-
gative authorities questioning a suspected individual, like a
powerful parent interrogating a helpless child. The inquisi-
"Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of `Enemies of the
States,' " AMA Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, August 1956,
Vol. 76, pp. 115-174.
The Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession (New York:
Viking, 1951).
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tional system stands in the way of the development of equali-
tarian societies and the growth of human beings into mature
individuals. (p. 246)
Woven into this thesis and making up the climax is his belief
that silence is a right of man that is basic, inviolable, and the
only true defense against authoritarianism. The dust jacket
promises a further application of these ideas in quoting Mr.
Rogge: "Why Men Confess is the first of three books on the sub-
ject of confessions. I am now working on the next, which will
deal with the First and Fifth Amendments."
THE SILENT LANGUAGE. By Edward T. Hall. (New York:
Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 240. $3.95.)
Practically everyone in and out of government is full of
ideas for practical steps to make U.S. representatives abroad
more effective. Dr. Hall's book seeks to lay a theoretical basis
for these practical efforts, to the extent that they are directed
toward minimizing the reaction that takes place when one
moves into the area of a foreign culture. Some people have
chosen to call this reaction a "culture shock." Hall explains
it as the "removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues
one encounters at home and the substitution for them of
other cues which are strange." Proceeding from the proposi-
tion that "most people's difficulties with each other can be
traced to distortions in communication," The Silent Lan-
guage "treats culture in its entirety as a form of communica-
tion" as it seeks to outline "a theory of culture and a theory of
how culture came into being" and to present "the technical
tools for probing the secrets of culture."
The author is in a position to know what he is writing about.
He is an anthropologist who has travelled and worked abroad
to develop principles and concepts for teaching U.S. repre-
sentatives how to be more effective. He has done such teach-
ing in the State Department, the Strategic Intelligence
School, and elsewhere. He now makes this subject his busi-
ness.
The study points out basic differences in languages and ways
of speaking, but emphasizes the actions which speak louder
than words, and particularly the kind of communication that
takes place "out of awareness." "This notion," it says, "that
there are significant portions of the personality that exist
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out of one's own awareness but which are there for everyone
else to see may seem frightening. The point, however, is a
crucial one and will grow in importance as men begin to grasp
its implications." Another subtle complication in the commu-
nications process of particular significance for anyone who
anticipates service abroad is brought out in elaborating the
fact that "people reared in different cultures learn to learn
differently."
Some readers may not be persuaded of the validity of the
author's conceptual construction. His time, space, and order
as communications media seem unnecessarily abstruse. His
"map of culture" may be over-billed as "a mathematics of
cultures." His classification of behavior patterns as formal,
informal, and technical is an effort toward unattainable pre-
cision. He uses a great many words in a specialized sense
when it seems that a garden variety of meaning would serve
the purpose just as well.
But dissatisfactions such as these only serve to point up
Dr. Hall's own contention that there is much work to be
done in this field. The understanding of foreign cultures is
critical to intelligence operations and to intelligence analysis;
and such a considerable contribution of new thinking as The
Silent Language makes can but stimulate more progress
toward this understanding.
ROMMEL RUFT KAIRO (Rommel Calling Cairo). By John W.
Eppler. (Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag. 1959.
Pp. 300. DM 6.85.)
Operation Condor was a bold, even desperate stroke-the
attempt to place a German resident agent in the heart of
the British North African command center, one who could
provide Rommel with vitally needed order-of-battle informa-
tion. It failed, partly because of bad luck, but mainly because
of the agent's cowboy operational methods, brash and almost
incredibly insecure.
Published just on the heels of a British account of the
same events,' Eppler's tale of his espionage activities in Cairo
for Field Marshall Erwin Rommel during the struggle for
1 Leonard Mosley, The Cat and the Mice. (London: Arthur Barker
Limited, 1958. 160 pp.)
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North Africa reveals little new substantive information.
Mosley's report, reviewed in the last number of the Studies;"
will be of more interest to the professional intelligence officer.
Eppler has told an adventure story in a romantic, intensely
personal style characteristic of much of the recent spate of
German war reminiscences. The fact that a motion picture
is being made in Germany based on Operation Condor is per-
haps indicative of the nature of the book.
We learn nothing from Eppler about how he was spotted
and recruited by the Abwehr; the story opens with his post-
ing to Rommel in North Africa, and the first 130 pages deal
with the problems and experiences of his 4,000-kilometer trip
across the Sahara to reach the target area. He gives passing
mention to technical intelligence preparations for the mis-
sion, such as documentation, communications equipment, and
clothing. Inasmuch as he is arrested by British security
forces on page 216 and devotes himself from then on to his
treatment by his interrogators, it will be seen that he gives
relatively little space to his actual work in Cairo. Details on
the recruiting of sub-agents are almost completely lacking,
as well as a useful account of what, if anything, was accom-
plished. One incident is described, the separating of a British
courier from his pouch of battle plans by the belly-dancer
Hekmath Fathmy; a satisfactory account of this is available
from Mosley. Mosley also deals at some length with the
tracking down of Eppler by British security forces, to which
Eppler's own. account adds nothing of significance.
Eppler never again made radio contact with Abwehr base
stations after his initial report upon arrival. The two special
radiomen assigned to service him had been posted too close to
the front by order of Rommel and had been captured with
their codes during a raid by the Long Range Desert Patrol.
Eppler was cut off (eingemauert) after this in order to pre-
vent a play-back. Eppler's radioman tried night after night
without success to make contact with base station, and the
title of his story would therefore more logically read Cairo
Calling Rommel. This book can safely be passed by, especially
by those who have read The Cat and the Mice.
'' Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1959), p. 139.
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ecent oo s
PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. By Alexander L. George. (Evans-
ton, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company. 1959. Pp. 287. $6.)
This scholarly and imaginative book by one of Rand Cor-
poration's social scientists is of special significance because it
evaluates propaganda analysis techniques actually used in
an operational situation and has therefore had to consider
the dynamics of politics, rather than the formal structures
to which the usual scholarly study in political science is de-
voted. Mr. George's validity research is based upon the anal-
ysis of German propaganda done by the FCC's Foreign Broad-
cast Intelligence Service during World War II. He examines
this in the light of information obtained later from German
war documents and German officials, which provides a unique
opportunity to validate the inferences drawn from propaganda
bearing on intelligence problems and questions. critical to
Allied policy. Some 80 percent of the FCC inferences that
could be scored proved to be accurate.
The reader who does not make a specialty of propaganda
analysis will be most interested in Part III, "Methodology
and Applications," in which 20 case studies are presented to
illustrate the broad range of intelligence problems approached
by the FCC. The analysts' reasoning is reconstructed and
their inferences matched against the available historical rec-
ord on such important problems as the question of a German
offensive against Russia in 1943, German expectations in 1942
of an Allied second front in North Africa, the German public's
attitude toward the Nazi information policy, and a predicted
change in the propaganda presentation of military setbacks
on the Russian front.
The first case study, on the German V-weapons propa-
ganda, is cited as one in which the FCC analysts did not do so
well as their British counterparts. The brilliant British anal-
ysis may be known to some readers. Reasoning from the sub-
stantiated hypothesis that German propaganda would not
deliberately mislead the German people about an increase of
German power, it concluded that the Germans actually had
some sort of new weapon and were not merely bluffing. It
accurately described the German leaders' evaluation of the
new weapon and made the tentative estimate, based on subtle
shifts in the propaganda, that in November 1943 the Germans
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expected to have it ready between mid-January and mid-April
1944. This estimate proved amazingly accurate.
As Mr. George writes:
The deduction concerning the German leaders' private esti-
mate of the timing of the V-weapon was based upon ingenious
use of a general observation about Nazi propaganda practice.
The British analyst reasoned that Goebbels would be careful
not to give the German public a promise of retaliation too far
ahead of the date on which the promise could be fulfilled.
... Taking a number of factors into account, the British
analyst reckoned that Goebbels would give himself about three
months as the maximum period ... to propagandize forth-
coming retaliation in advance.
One of the reasons advanced for the lower caliber of FCC
analyses on this problem is that the FCC analysts, unlike the
British, worked on their own and were not asked to coordi-
nate their V-weapon research with that of other intelligence
specialists. They assumed that other intelligence techniques
more appropriate than propaganda analysis were being ap-
plied to the problem. This lack of coordination may also have
damaged the quality of their analysis in another case study
cited: they were not informed of TORCH or briefed to look
for indications of Nazi concern over possible invasion of North
Africa, and so continued to search for signs of the Nazi atti-
tude toward a possible second front across the English Chan-
nel or in northern Europe.
These two cases, in both of which the analysis was directed
toward predicting a major action, are not regarded as covering
the range of situations with which propaganda analysis can
fruitfully deal. The author recognizes and discusses at some
length the possibility that leaders may decide to forego any
propaganda preparation which might reveal a planned action
in advance. In either event, he points out,
The value to the policy maker of inferences assessing the
nature and objectives of the major action once it is taken
should not be underrated; in many cases they overshadow in
importance the usefulness of having predicted the action
before it occurred.
Writing for scholars and experts, Mr. George has set him-
self a much subtler task than presenting these interesting
case studies. He has sought: (1) to identify general types
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of inference made about conditions which helped to determine
the communication content (for example propaganda goals
and techniques, "situational factors," and elite estimates,
expectations, and policies) ; (2) to identify other possible de-
terminants about which the FCC did not attempt to make
inferences, and then to depict the relationship among all the
various factors making up the system of behavior; and (3)
to identify reasoning patterns in individual inferences and
codify the more general methods, direct and indirect, that
were used. Out of this thorough and painstaking study comes
his cautious conclusion:
It seems.that propaganda analysis can become a reasonably
objective diagnostic tool for making certain kinds of in-
ferences and that its techniques are capable of refinement
and improvement.
The book is not easy to read, in part because of both unde-
fined and overrefined terminology. The author never defines
"propaganda," but apparently uses it interchangeably with
other undefined terms, "propaganda communications," "politi-
cal communications," and "public communication." Yet
propaganda is distinguished from "mass communication,"
also undefined. Readers may find quite confusing the rela-
tionships between propaganda analysis, communications anal-
ysis, content analysis, quantitative analysis, and nonfrc-
quency analysis. And many a reader may never get beyond
a choker on page 79, in the introduction to Part II:
4. Dichotomous attributes (that is, meaning or nonmeaning
characteristics which can be predicated only as belonging or
not belonging to a given unit of the communication material) 4
If he persists, however, footnote 4 on page 81 will refer him
to page 96, where he can learn that a dichotomous attribute
is merely "the presence or absence" of a designated symbol
or theme.
Addressing an academic audience which historically has
tended to make content analysis synonymous with count-
ing, the author overstates his criticism of quantitative tech-
niques in propaganda analysis. The casual reader may miss
his references to the fact that quantitative techniques are im-
portant in the first elementary step in analyzing propaganda,
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that is in describing its content, and his judgment that "an-
other deficiency of FCC's procedure was its failure to make
use of systematic quantitative procedures in evaluating cer-
tain aspects of Nazi V-weapon propaganda." Debate over
quantitative vs. qualitative techniques is actually beside the
point. The real question is how best to combine these tech-
niques in attacking each specific intelligence problem.
Despite these minor shortcomings, it is gratifying to find
such an eminently qualified and objective expert as Mr. George
reaching conclusions like the following:
Provision must be made for examining all of the output of
a propaganda system and for evaluating its over-all propa-
ganda strategy. Any division of labor which divorces trend
analysis on individual subjects from cross-sectional analyses
of the entirety of propaganda and propaganda strategy may
result in incorrect or misleading interpretations of specific
trends.
The propaganda analyst makes the basic assumption that
propaganda is coordinated with elite policies, but he needs
more concrete knowledge which he can obtain only from a set
of empirically derived generalizations about an elite's opera-
tional propaganda theory. ... [He also] requires knowledge
about technical expertise and skillfulness of propaganda sys-
tems under scrutiny and that of individual propagandists em-
ployed therein.
The investigator must have rather specific, detailed knowl-
edge of the propaganda organization whose output he is
analyzing in order to appraise the situational context-who says
it, to whom, and under what circumstances. . . . Comparison
of what is said to different audiences is generally of consider-
able value in making inferences.
In propaganda analysis, it is typical for the investigator to
be concerned with establishing slight changes in propaganda
lines or minute or subtle differences in the wording employed
by different speakers or by the same speaker to different
audiences.
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COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS
Dear Sirs:
This letter is prompted by the suspicion that B. B. Ben-
nett's diverting essay, "The Greater Barrier," (Studies, Fall
1958) on the need for good English prose in intelligence was
not calculated only to entertain, which it did, but was also in-
tended to instruct, which, regrettably, it did not. The very
solemnity of your journal compels the assumption that be-
hind the author's frivolous shoals ("Chaucer, Shakespeare,
Conrad, O'Neill, Wolfe, Spillane" [imagine putting Wolfe in
there!]) lies the open water of Serious Purpose. The reader
is admonished at the outset that "the time is upon us when
we should face and begin to penetrate a barrier even greater
than that of foreign languages-the English language bar-
rier." Face it we then do, throughout much of the remainder
of the article. But penetrate it we do not.
The article does seem about to get down to business in the
section called "Spying the Land," devoted to discovering three
constituent parts of the barrier, or perhaps factors which
obscure its existence-"Self-Exculpation" (which is merely
the universal human tendency to avoid recognition of self-
guilt) ; the "Literary Bent" (a common subjective failing [or
triumph, depending on who has it]) ; and the forced "Viability
of the language," with its offspring, "linguistic chameleon-
ism." But having identified these characteristics of bad writ-
ing, the author abandons us, the article ends. It is necessary
to identify symptoms in order to diagnose an illness, but we
do not ordinarily stop there and seek to cure the disease with
a mere analgesic. The proper pathology finds the agent re-
sponsible for the condition and then treats it with antibiotics,
not aspirin. The problem with diseased writing is not the
determination of the all-too-obvious symptoms, but the iden-
tity of the causal virus.
in the estimates, where a "predictive conclusion," your au-
thor says, is "useful only to the extent that it is precisely
qualified." Can this be an accurate axiom? We think not.
As a matter of fact, estimates which are too liberally sprinkled
with precise qualifiers sometimes seem to lose their way.
A word or two must be put in here in defense of the writing
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To the Editors
There is still room, we think, even in an estimate, for sugges-
tions, degrees of emphasis, perhaps innuendo. For many
readers, the neat shadings of probability are either lost or soon
forgotten. What is more often remembered is the general
drift of a paper, the over-all impression shaped by many
things, qualifiers among them. Thus the writer of an esti-
mate, though duty-bound to assign exact degrees of prob-
ability if he can, must also remember that he is usually creat-
ing more a rounded image than a sharp picture. We do not
mean to rise here in defense of slovenly presentation or in-
exact qualification; we merely hope to refute the unkind no-
tion that an estimate must stand or fall solely on the strength
or weakness of its adverbs and adjectives, important as they
are.
Moreover, the precision gained by assigning such words as
"possible" and "probable" a value on a mathematical scale
appears to upset your author most of all: by using mathe-
matics, he says, we have "departed the realm of language."
The fact that a word has a mathematical meaning, however,
does not entitle him to suggest that it is no longer a part of
our language. Words, after all, are used to express feeling or
thought, mathematical or otherwise. Should we follow his
argument to its absurd end and conclude that using the word
"oak" would propel us from the "realm of language" into the
realm of trees?
Beyond distinguishing the estimate from other varieties,
"The Greater Barrier" makes no attempt to subdivide cate-
gories of intelligence writing. That is too bad, for there is no
such thing as intelligence writing in general. Not yet, any-
how. And if that's what Dr. Bennett and the Office of Train-
ing would like to establish, then woe to us all. There is not
now, nor should there be, a common school of prose for, say,
current intelligence, national estimates, and technical memo-
randa. There are certain standards of good practice common
to all intelligence writing, but most such standards can be
applied to all prose; Self-Exculpation, the Literary Bent, and
Viability are certainly not the exclusive properties of the in-
telligence community.
Perhaps, in some instances, we should admit that learning
to write is a hopeless task; some of us just cannot master it.
Why should this be any more disgraceful than the proposi-
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tion that some of us just cannot draw, or paint, or sculpture?
But let us assume that most of us are not completely hopeless,
and need only apply to the Office of Training for instruction
in the art. No special talent is needed to draw a recognizable
chair, nor any great gift to write an understandable sentence.
And presumably, with training and experience, the minimal
chair or sentence can be improved upon.
Now one critical ingredient in such training and experience
is not mentioned by your author and might be overlooked in
the OTR. We should not begin by endlessly drawing chairs
or endlessly writing sentences. First we must look at chairs.
And first we must read before we write. Any normally percep-
tive person, exposed to a quantity of good reading, will soak
some of it up. There is no point at all in instituting a course
in creative writing, intelligence writing, or any other kind
of writing for persons who have not read. This is not to say
that reading will make it so. Not all readers are writers. But
there is no such thing as a writer who has not read. And
while this is-or should be-obvious, it is all too frequently
forgotten.
Exhorting us to write better, to communicate more clearly,
and to surmount the Greater Barrier is a pious exercise but
one with little hope of practical accomplishment. It will re-
mind those who probably cannot that they should. It may
also remind those who can that they can. It may even lead
to some worthwhile self-examination for those who are some-
where in between. But until Dr. Bennett loses his modesty
and tells us how he penetrated the barrier, he must, in all
good grace, rest content, albeit surrounded by all of us self-
exculpitators.
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Ar,icies and book reviews on the following
page are printed" without" classification and with-
out identification of the writers, for the con-
venience of readers who may wish to detach them
from the classified body of the Studies.
William J. Donovan and the National Security
Allen W. Dulles
The Director of Central Intelligence pays tribute to
his former boss.
25
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence . . 85
A Study of Military Intelligence, by General Cheng
Chieh-min . r
Why Men Confess, by O. John Rogge
The Silent Language, by Edward T. Hal
Rommel Rut t Kairo,' by J. W. Ep pier
Propaganda Analysis, by Alexander L. George.
Communication to the Editors
'instructed by a Studies article
entertained b
utun
1"s
the
English language.
on the use
of
25
25
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