GENERAL CABELL SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03527A000400170044-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: SPEECH

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qupw, ;UR'S CAB=
responsibilities for ;the National
Security, and our understanding of the teamwork which is so vital in
carrying out our task. Tirst, the CIA is part of the governmental
Intelligence Community. It gets its job done by means of corrobora-
tion, work, and assistance from and to other Government agencies.
The associations which our people make among their classmates are not
only lasting and personal, but help us substantially in this respect.
And, finally, I think that the students gain, too, by their association
with the CIA representatives.
Now, we have arranged a presentation for you today which will de-
scribe how and why CIA came into being, and what it does, how it is
organized in work, arid where it is placed in the National Security
structure of the Government. You will also hear something about our
intenZcprtrtmental relationships and overseas activities. But since a
large number of you are military officers, before turning the program
over to other speakers, I should like to spend a few minutes in dis-
cussing some of this Agency's activities.
I believe that this subject will also interest those of you who
were with other agencies.1-One of the principal tasks assigned to the
DireCtor of Central Intelligence that of co-ordination. This task
is accomplished/through a variety of methods, from the. formal Intelli-
ganneAdvisars_Cemmittee machinery to the informal day-to-day working
level opposite-number contact and communication of ideas. This com-
munication and exchange of ideas between ourselves and the #ilitary
services is enhanced by the assignment to CIA of a good number of
military officers and enlisted men. In fact between five and fifteen
percent of our personnel are active-duty military people. (Now I am
giving a bracket here that is five to fifteen percent rather than the
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actual percentage because we think it important that the total Agency
strength remain secret.)
Now this admixture of civilian and military talent, points of view,
traditions, and concepts is healthy. It provides an essential balance to
our business. The mixture assists in maintaining mutual understanding and
confidence between this Agency and Defense. It alto provides many opera-
Ii itberwiae would be awkward, if not impossible, to
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In our leadership role it has taken time to develop understood
policies and procedures and get them in working order. There undoubt-
edly have been, in this period, some people on both sides who have been.
made unhappy or frustrated and who, without much soliciting, bevie'a
story to tell. I would like to think that the good points of our eels
tionship overcome those more isolated instances, and I hope that when
you return to your own service you carry with you an improved under-
standing of this Aeeney's role in the overall National Security struc-
ture and of its relationship with your own departments.
Miany of you on graduation will return to your parent services and
assignments Which will prevent you with a need.-to-know about some of
our specific operations. I hope you will feel free to call upon us at
that time for information. Others of you at some point in your career
may have an opportunity to serve with CIA, and I. trust that the brief-
ing you get today will give you further insight into the advantages and
disadvantages of such an assignment. I will now turn the rostrum beak
over to Mr. Baird., our Director of Training, who has organized the pre-.
sentation and who will introduce speakers and monitor the question
period. Thank you very miah?
Next speaker will be the Inspector General, Hr. Lyman B. Kirkpat
who will speak to you cn the origin* the mission, and tha structure of
CIA.
Mk 'MOLD- XXMATPICi
Admiral Wooldridge, Gentlemens
September 18th, this year, will mark the tenth anniversary of the
Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the United States Air Force,
:oint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, and the Nations l Security
Council.
Here is a brief history, a eummary history, of the modern origin of
the Central Intelligence concept of the U.S. Government.
In 1940, when the Western allies were at their lowest ebb, President
Roosevelt asked Col. William J. Donovan, of New York, to take two trips
abroad to find out what the true situation was. Col. nonovan, as you
may remember, was the Medal-of-Honor winner with the Fighting 69th in
World War I and, as a prominent New York attorney, had been very active
and interested in international affairs. His first trip went to south-
ern Europe, into the Balkins? and he came back and reported on that at a
time when many senior Ls. representatives abroad were counselling that
the British could not possibly hold out against the Germans. Consequently,
later in the year Donovan went back and talked to many of the leaders of
the French and British. Be reported to the President that he thought
the British would hold out, but that the United States should gird itself
for global warfare. And here Donovan's prime interest and information
and intelligence of oubversive activities came to the fere and he urged
the creation of an intelligence structure of this nature.
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He went around and talked to Seoretary of Navy Knox, Secretary of
War Stimpson, and Attorney General Jackson, and urged the creation of
an organization in the United States Government that would merge intell-
igence with the forces of propaganda and subversion.
On June 10th, 1941, Donovan proposed a Service of Str4egic Infor-
mation be oreated. This organization, he suggested, would have an
advisory body composed of the heads of Intelligence of the Army and Navy,
and the bead of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a representa-
tive from the White House. It would have the right to collect and
analyze intelligence of the strategic nature independently and it
would not interfere' in any way, with the responsibilities of the mutual
departments for the collection and analysis of departmental intelligent*.
This was the origin of the Office of the Co-ordinator of Information,
which combined overt propaganda with researchoanalysis and intelligence
with clandestine activities. In June 1942, this office was splits, and
there was created from the information portions the Office of War
Information, whioh is a predecessor to our current U.S. Information
Agency. From the balance of the organization there was created the
Office of Strategic Services.
From the Office of Strategic Services the modern Intelligence
Community inherited certain as3ets. These included some techniques
and collection of overt clandestine intelligence. It included certain
counterespionage files which had been developed primarily with the
assistance of the British: it included some very sound new techniques
in research and analysis in basics intelligences there were some
skilled personnels and, last but not least, there was a reservoir of
relationships with certain key Foreign Intelligence aervices.
As a result of this early start, bevertaL-of tha senor officials
in the U.S. Intelligence Community during the war started to think
*boa a peace-time intelligence service. On August 25th, 1942, Brig.
Gen. John MoGruder, later to be Deputy Director of OSS, proposed a
Joint Intelligence Bureau under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This started
a period of about two years of intensive thinking, proposals and counter-
proposals for a combined Central Intelligence Agency organization.
There was considerable discussion as to where this organization
should report, Whether it should report directly to the President,
whether it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or whether it
should report to the Department of State; and, needless to say, there
were very strong views held on the behalf of each of these points.
On October 5th, 1944, General Donovan produced a paper entitled
0.4 Proposal for a Permanent World-wide Intelligence Service." Now there
were certain basic principles in this paper which it is interesting to
note. It proposed that this world-wide intelligence service should have
independent oommunications, and Should have an independent intelligence
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collection organisation. On the other hand, it stressed the feet
that the new organization was in no way to out into the rights of the
established departments for the collection, anelysis and dlessmination
of their own intelligence, and it proposed that the head of the new
organization should report directly to the President.
This paper became the basis for further intensive discussion on
the subject of an intelligence organisatien. Seoretary of War Stimpson,
in his postwar biography written with McGeorgeBundy bad a rather inter-
esting comment in this context. read it to yott Stimpson was
insistent that no impatience eith its occasional eccentricities should
deprive the Army of the profits and oo-operation with Gen. Donovan's
Office of Strategic Services. Throughout the war the intelligence
activieies of the United States Government remained incompletely co-
ordiezted, but, here again, it was necessary to measure the profits of
reorganization against its dislocations and on the whole Stimpson thought
that the American achievement in this field measured against the condi
tions of 1940 was more than satisfactory. A full reorganization belonged
to the postwar period.
As a result of thielonovan paper of October 1944 the Joint Strategic
8urvey Committee came up with a proposal of its own. This is on emery
18th, 1945.. Maw of its proposals were identical with the Donovan paper.
However, in this particular paper, it created a National Intelligence
Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and Cheers
of Staff to the President. It proposed an Advisory Board to the new
central organization consisting of the heads of all the intelligence
services. It also proposed that the new oreanisatien should have a
collective rather than an individual responsibility because one of the
important parte of the Donovan paper was that the head of the organiza-
tion should have the individual responsibility for the presentation of
National intelligence to the President.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee paper was in January 1945,
and on rebruary 9th, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald
came out with almost an exact report on the context of the paper. The
result of this was that there was a considerable furore in Washingtcn
and in Congress there were several Congressional statements to the
effect that what had been proposed by General Donovan and by others in
the Government was the creation of a peace-time "Gestapo".
At any rate the creating plus the war at this point was rapidly
coming to a conclusion that was such that no further activity was taken
in this regard until after the end of the war. I'm sure we all remember
the haste with whioh the United States commenced demobilization and the
elimination of its wartime agencies.
On September 20th, 1945, the Office of Strategic Services was of-
ficially disbaneed. Its Espionage and Gounterespionage or SI Branch
together with its Covert Operations Branch or SO ware transferred into a
unit called the Strategic Services Unit whioh is placed under the
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Assistant !ecrotary of War. The Secretary of War made a poll of the
various military commands as to whether this unit should be preserved
or not. The Navy reported from the Pacific that they had had very little
experience with OSS and couldn't comment. Cep. MacArthur commented that
the OSS had never appeared in his theater, and therefore his viewe were
to the contrary in maintaining it. The CBT theater reported that they
bad recieved very many majcr assets from OES as did the European theater
and both of those recommended its needednees.
At any rate, the decision was made that the SSU, the Strategic Ser-
ice unit would be maintained on a stand-by basis pending further devel-
opments. A second major portion of the OSS, the Research and Analysis
Branch, together with the Presentation Unit were transferred intact to
the Department of State and ':,ere they were maintained. The old R Be A
today is the basis of what is the Office of Intel) igence Research in
State
At this point the Secretaries of State, Ar and Navy got together
on November 14th, 1945, and established an Intereeeartmental Subcommittee
to determine what should be done in regard to a permanent Central Intelli-
gence Organization. This subcommittee had, as well ae the Denman, paper
of 1944, a paper produced by Ferdinand Eberstadt dated October 22nd, 1945
which proposed among other things the unification of the Army and the
Navy, a National Security Council, a National Intelligence Authority, and
a Central intelligence Organization.
It was just about at this juncture that President Menem started to
get impatient and in January of 1946 he called in Admiral Souers, Admiral
Lahey and urged on them to come up immediately with an "agreed paper" for
the creation of a Central Intelligence Organization. The result of this
was the Executive Order of January 22nd, 1946, which created the Central
Intelligence Group and President Truman named, at the head of this,
Admiral Souers as a temporary head until the Army an Navy and State'
Department could agree on a permanent head.
The Central intelligence Group was to consist of representatives of
the Army and the Navy as well as civilians: it had the power to propose
plans for co-ordinations it had the authority to ana3yze and process
intelligences and, it was established under a Nation:a:1 intelligence Auth-
ority similar to the ones proposed before, coeposed of State, Navy and
War, and Chiefs of Staff to the President.
Shortly after this proposal the President sent this executive order
to Congress and urged that together with the Eberstadt report on unifica-
tion they use this as a basis for legislaticn, permanently establishing
a Central intelligence Organization. This Organization finally was
created exactly a year and a half after the creation of the Central intell-
igence Group when on July 25th, 1947, a National Security Act of 1947 was
passed setting up the Central intelligence Agency.
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Now, In the mean time, in this year and a hslf, there had been
an accretion of functions to the Central Intelligence Group--some of
these taken from War agencies which were being disbanded, and some
functions passed from line agencies who were, at the time, faced with so
some major budget cuts. These eccretions ate interesting because they
OOMDOSO a certain basis fer the present Organization of CIA.
For example, the Strategic Services Unit which had been maintained
under the Army was passed over to CIG, and was the brisic nucleus of
the present organization which conducts espionage and counterespionage.
The Washington Document Center which had been maintained by the Navy
throughout the war, was passed over and, together with the German
Military Txcument Center from Fort Holibird or the Army, became the
for the Forel 7 Documents(f the present organization.
So the missions of the Central Intelligence Agency when it was
created were fairly well generally delineated by certain National /ntell
igence Authority Directives and by the National Security Act of 1947.
There re two important aspects of this Act which are worthy of
note. First, thc, Act stresses co-ordination responsibility, and in so
doing it names the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. (You'll note that the word 'Agency'
is left off t'ese titles so both Mr. Dulles and Gen. Cabell have a dual
responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence and 'Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, at the eame time as the administrative beads
of the Agency' The Act also specified that the departmental reeponsi
bilities for intelligence would net be affeoteds it was very specific
that the new Agency should have no police or eubeeona powers, and then
it put In the usual blanket clause that it should perform certain ser-
vices of common concern.
New this Act together with the National 5ecurity Council Directly
and the National Security Council Iletpl;tgeepe Directives, delineates
the responsibilities and the missions of the CIA. The distinction be
tween NSC Directives and NSCIDis is thins National Security Council
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You will note that today basically, the organization is grouped
under three principal deputies with the Fourth Deputy,
responsible for co-ordination activities. Starting at the top on the
right of the Director is the 3peoial Assistant for Planning, this
mdi-
vidua]. is responsible for long-range planning, that is co-ordinating
the lou!,-range planning of the various parts of the Agency, and for
handlint; such special cross-Agency projects as might be assigned him by
the Director.
On the left is myself, the Inspector General, whose functions are
very much like those of the IG's and the Military periodic
inspections of all components* trouble shooting, and acting as an appeal
board for individual complaints --he Eaocutive Officer is the usual role.
Now, the three deputies organization strting at the right,the Deptvt
Director of Plans
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And then, of course, there is a small Inspection and Review Staff,
and a Plans and Co-ordination Staff out of the immediate Office of the
Deputy Director, now the Deputy Director for Intelligence.
# Central
organization is grouped all over the intelligence* analysis and production
of the Agency. Under this, reading from your left to right is the Office
of Basic Intelligence which puts out the encyclopedias of the Intelligence
Community.
If you recall, at the start of World War II when we wanted to know
military operations there was tremendous scrambling to find the basic bog-
formation we needed about countries, beach data* industrial production,
railroad systems, and so on. This office, working largely with other
agencies ankacting primarily as a co-ordinating mechanism is now pro-
ducing the National Intelligence Surveys, a program which will ultimately
have basic encyclopedias on every area of the world.
The second office listed, the Office of Current Intelligence is the
current intelligence office of the Organization charged with produoing the
National Current Intelligence, daily and weekly, and charged with back-
stopping the Director in his capacity as Intelligence Advisor to the
National Security Council.
The third office, the Office of Central Reference, is our files and
library system, and as such servicee the entire Intelligence Community.
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The Central Office, the Office of National Estimates, could probably
be appropriately called the pinnacle of the Intelligence Organizatian
structurally "la as much as this small office consists cf the Board of
National Estimates and their staff, and t'-ic is the office where the fin-
al National estimates are written in close collaboration with all of the
other intelligence agencies and submitted in draft form to the Director
and the IAC who sit down and agree on the final National estimate to be
submitted to the policy maker of the Government.
The Office of Operations I've already described and its
and Organisations have not changed in the last ten years.
The Office of Research and Reports is the basic research
the Seviet and Sntellite Economy and on certain major industr
as well as carrying a very large burden of the responsibility
graphic intelligence.
And the Office of Scientific Intelligence once again is self
descriptive with the responsibility here for research In the basic
seiences which is then picked up with each .of the military services,
picking It up, at the technological stade where it moves into production.
On the left, is the Deputy Director for Support effice. Now,
this is the organisati,n which supports the entire Agency from an
admin-
istrative and logistical point of view. 1115 you'll note, the ADS has the
General Council's Office reporting directly to him as well as the Special
Su,:vorts Assistant. Now the Special Supports Assistant deserves a
sPsolsl mention in as much as that is the individual who ties in and makes
sure that our whole clandestine structure is being properly supported by
the DDC organization. Mere are four staffs under the Deputy Director
for Support* an Audit Staff charged withtthe audit of all our accounts and
I'll mention it a little more ful when T mention the Ccm troller* a
ucts
1 s ca c rge e respon-
a y sep ug t e genoy ealthy; and 4 Mhnagemen to. t erned
with seeing that we have an efficient organization, proper management pro-
cedures and are operating economically esti efficiently.
The DDO has six line offices under him. The Office of Communications
is fain l self-descri tive but I should mention here that our Off c- of
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Now our Comptrollers Office, as well as having he responsibility
of prepari-y the Agency budget each year and defending it or at least
serving as the backstop for the Director in defending it before the
Congressional hearings, also is responsible for accounting for every
dollar that the Agency spends. There has been a fallaoions serth which
has travelled *round that the CIA can spend money without accounting for
it! That is incorrect,' We try to keep as large a prol.:rtion of our
fUnde es we possibly can without jeopardising security on * vouehered
basis in which instance the General Accounting Office will audit the ao-
counts. On the balance of these accounts our own Auditor inspects the
receipts whioh the Comptroller passes over.
The Logistics Office is self-descriptive. It should be mentioned
that hers, as well as in all of our transportation facilities, we *leo
have a large accumulation of equipment and arms which must be maintained
for emergency use.
Pereonnel Office, which is also charged with the adanis
our Career Service System.-
* Security Office?now there is an assumption that this is strictly
a physical security officet that is not correct. When we were originally
organised the Federal Bureau of Investigation commeneed the investiga-
tory clearance of our employees, then they dn.-Opp:0d it because they
over-worked and needed to get rid of it. They took it up again briefly
and then they asked us if we would establish our own organisation perman-
ently for investigating and clearing our own employees. This is a re-
current and constant procedure, incidentally. We tem the system so
that automatically when a person is transferred or promoted his security
file Is reviewed; and we have, working together with our counter/ate=
gence system, a counterintelligence system iraide tie organisation to
maintain as secure as is humanly possible.
And, finally the Office of Training charged with the training
across the board not only on the research side but on the clandestine
side* because we are of the firm conviction that trained personnel are
the key to good intelligence operations. That is a very brief descrip-
tion of the structure of the Agency. Thank you very
(Applause) (Iknow you carildn't see the ohart and during this fifteen
minutes (Captain Shaded coffee break, you are welcome to come up and
look at the chart. Captain, will you get them back reasonably close to
fifteen minutes, please.)--.-----------Coffee Breaks
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Adndral Lo ey Gentlemen:
rt'* a pleasure to participate in this program and withoutmore
ado l',11 take on where Mr. Kirkpatrick left off. He was talking to
you about the structure of CIA: from here on out I'm going to talk about
C/A only in so far as it lean articulate part of what we call an intell-
igence community. Frankly, that's the only way you can understand CIA
because, by itself, it really doesn't make much of any sense.
In dollars and in head count it equals only about one eighth of the
total investment of the United States in the Intelligence business. An
organizational chart of CIA by itself is not very well balanced; that is
beceuse it engages In services of common concern, acme of which it does
all by itself and other things where it may have only one liaison man
assuring himself that the community effort done by somebody else is ade-
quate. In other words CIA's work either contributes to the work of the
other departments in producing finished intelligence or that part of CIA
in which I work, pulls together the work of each of the other departments
in order to present the work of all to the MSC and the President. The
organisation (if we could have the first slide,) of this community is
illustrated on this chart shortly to come before us. A little less light,
if we could have it in the room is not a:scrt ef egocentric idea of
putting intelligence to the center of the whole washington machinery, so
much as to illustrate the subordination cf intelligence to the planning
structure.
Mow I assume you have had plenty oi' instruetional Literature about the
MSC. The president of MSC, shown es a unit on that chart, is at the topt
the Intelligence component or feed Into that being the himself,
who site not be statute but by directive as an advisor as apposed to a
member of the qouncil. That is r lipry luportant proviso because it
protects him from having to participate in decisions of policy in what we
do about a certain situation and, therefore, his views as to what the
situation is or what the eituatioe portends, will never be suspect because
somebody thinks he is an advocate for a particular course of action or
line of conduct to deal with it. It is also very interesting and unique,
as far as r can make out, in governments anywhere in the history of the
world to find the head of the intelligence service actually sitting at
the final center coert round of governmental decisions. Everywhere else
you will find intelligence represented through a departmental cabinet
head or chief of staff committee or something else like that.
oopied or are about to be copied
some other places in this, but th cp e w o wro
ity Act wrought very well in seeing intelligence un-
d by policy advocacy hes crack at the very top.
the rirector, as he speaks there, speaks from not only his
authority but from the authority of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
that being composed of the heads of the intelligence services Were the
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kssistant Chief of Staff for the Ar for Intelligence; the same name
understand now applied in the Air rorce but was shortly to become obsolete;
Director of lag Intelligence; Deputy Director of Joint Staff for Intell-
igence; Mr. Hugh Cummings, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Intelligence; and the Director. That Is friar military and two civilian as
full time members. Actually regularly participating in full is a represent-
ative of the AEC and a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investii!ation. But they talk or participate only on those matters that
fall within the cfnfidence of this agency. Under this IC membership there
are found committees representing the same groups in each of the functions
that Mr. Kirkpatrick ticked off of our intelligence production*
In current intenigewe the spot work there is the Watoh Committee; in
scientific intelligence there ie_the Scientific Committee, a special one
on Guided Missiles, a special one on Atomic Energy; ORR, the Soviet research
on economics is baokstopped or supported (/111 talk about it in little more
detail) by an Economic Committee; and the HIS Committee for basic intent.
genes. That is, each of the medium command responsible offices of CIA, in a
sense wear the same kind of double hat tRat the Director does--one, a line
lob to run their part of the show, two, a co-ordincating job to see that
that sphere or function of intelligence falls within their juri&flction is
efficiently and effectively conducted on a community.wide basis as well as
within their awn shops. This community is designed to function its struc-
tural setup to perform two malor missions.-one is to manage itself and the
other is to produce substantive National intelligence.
Mr. Kirkpatrick talked about the National Security Council Into i.
gence Directives and they are the forms that this management takes. The
DCI has no command responsibility obviously over a major general of the
Army or the Air Force, or assistant secretary or level person in the State
Department. That would gum everything upl The President is the only one
who can command. The NM is nothing but a group of the President's prine
cipal advisors surrounding him when he slun act, but the Ike and the Dir-
ector can recommend.
Now in fact, with the exception of one case so far, all NSCID's have
gone lip with the unanimous approval of the IAC and have, to all intents
and purposes, been rubber-stamped by the NSC thus the IkC might be said
to be a self-governing body, which is very nice. The two ones where there
was a little difficulty were negotiated with some ease, whether / can make
the same kind of statement a year from now after the current attempt to
revise all NSCID's has run its course, I don't know. But the fact remains
that the Intelligence Cifimunity has taken its own responsibility and done
itsmewn work that way, rather than going crying to the *umpire in the
White House at an MSC meeting. However, any gain like that has been com-
pensated for by a certain rather heavy course.
re is a feeling, partioultjly after reorganisation Plana 6 and 7
in the Department of Def se that this is a rather uncontrolled
dy, particularly as the senior people on it from Defense are mere
star generals and admirals certain people that we call the "palace
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guara" of the Office of Secretary of Defense have taken a dim view of the
IAC as managing itself and think that there cut to be a different scheme
wi01 the Departmental Chiefp rather than the Service Intelligence Chiefs
Playing a greater role. And secondly, in an effort to produce this unani-
mous front before our elders and betteSs at the NSC level we have taken an
unconscionable period of time to resolve certain principles. It tea ever
twelve months to sort out the assignment of Economic intelligence between
State, Military, and C/A, and some fifteen months of haggling to get a
Guided MissileIntelligence Sub-committee. I sometimes wonder if we can
justify that degree of lethargy in order to get this, but anyway we are
aware of it and are working on it on a community basis.
Now, turning to substance, theNSC's basic policy paper charges the
Intelligence Community, through the Director, with producing an intelli-
gence organization capable of gathering the necessary data and analysing
it so as to deal with three primary problems. One with indications of
hostile intentions giving maximum prior warning against aggressional sub-
version, against ourselves, our &lies, or anywhere in the world--the
Watch function (which talk about specifically in a, second). The
second is the capabilities- of foreign countries to effect our interests,
neutral as well as enemy, an., political and economic as well as military.
And, finally, a nice neat catch-all just se they won't have any leisure
time forcasting potential foreign developments any of them having a bear-
ing on U.S. national security.
Now, first with respect to the advanced warning function that was
cenducted by the Watch Committee of the TAO, backstopped as far as we're
concerned by our Office- of Current Intelligence and by similar subdivisions
of the Intelligence Agency, the progress In that in the last three or
four Tars has been very notable.
We have now in constant operation one hundred sixty-eight hours a
week a National Indication Center, jointly manned with full access, as
far as we can bring it about to all the relevant data on the most expedi-
tious means. We have to be careftl in running a Watch Committee- like
thie (General Cabell who chairs it pays rticular heed to th
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Liez?a Watch one.
The second problem is to be sure that we tie in as well as
nossible with our overseas Watch Committees and our friendly allied cnes.
A great deal of effort has gone into mal,ing sure that our communications
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Finally, in order to make sure that a scheme like this works you
have to harp back to the essential failure of Pearl Harbor, and there, I
think, the best unclassified piece I know on it and really the mcst read-
able Once is Admiral Theopole's otherwise rather unimpressive book, but
his narrative of the sequence of events of intelligence reporting and
how each piece was handled is startlingly horrible from this point of
view only, as far as from many otherss Had any reasonable captain of
infantry, flp.boy, or deck duty officer on a PC had all those pieces of
paper on a bridge table in front of him on November 30, he not only
could not have failed to predict an attack by the Japanese, but could not
have failed to predict that it would come at the Hawaiian Islands and not
in Singapore otherwise as its main thrust:
Sc we have tried to be conscious of the fact that you're no good
unless you've got all the pieces on the table in front of you. And
back in 1954 we got through an NSC Directive 543a, which charges, by
Presidential Order, all departments and agencies of the Government, not
just Intelligence agencies to make fully available to the IAC Watch
Committee, gll information and intelligence of reasonable creditability
pertinent to its mission and functions, without ITst11,9tA,pri because of
source, policy, or operational sensitivity. No one has a right any longer
to say, This is classified too high for the Watch Committegan And sec-
ondly, on the other side of the fence, to be sure that we will be prepared
for what would be a reaction to some U.S. action they are all charged to
keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning significant diplomatic,
political, military, or other courses of action by the U.S. approved for
immediate implementation which might bring about military reaction, or
hostile actien by the USSR or its allies.
Thus we believe we have now a machine.'rating round the clock,
manned by competent specialists with access to all the relevant dope,
There can be more Pearl Harbors and there cell he &wful ones, but it won't
be because somebody hasn't done the advanced work of setting up a system
and keeping it constantly in operation. There will be human failures only,
but anybody who has better ideas ti as that we can prove this, we are
certainly desirous of hearing from V-7.em because we realise that this is a
responsibility that transcends all others In It life-or-death significance.
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Now, the next kind of intelligence, (I'll stop just a minute or two
to talk about by illustrating an intermediate group) economic intelligence
on the Soviet Union. How are we organised in the 8oviet Bloc to do that
and, if r could have a quick look at slide two which will horr44y you,
slide two (this business which T know nobody can read) is a blow-up of
that little EIC business. Here's the EIC with the Secretariat represent.
ing not only the IAC agencies, but here we draw in everybody else in the
Goverement-eAgriculture, Communication Commiseion, Federal Reserve Bank,
and etc. that may have, and under it ? series of functional sub-committees
on the Chemical Industry, the Armaments Industry, the Electrical Power
Industry, Ship betiding industry, etc. Now take that off, because I don't
want anybody pouring around in this kle! of wiring diagram for its own
purpose, but what / want to Illustrate is that machinery called for the
addition to the Federal payroll of a total of exactly four peoples Two
professional and two secretaries who are the Secretariat. Everybody en-
gaged in this machine was already on somebody's payroll. The object of
the exercise was only to bring them together to see that all the expertees
in a given field were focused on a specific problem, whether it be the
y of the
somewhere
? ng e pot s o settle these V:ings in a forum that
is made up of the experts, rather than get a lot of departmental positions
sell it on a basis of phony or conflicting intelligence and then have a
lot of people who are so senior that they can't possible know any of the
details of the problem bagele it out in a "mishmash" of policy and intell-
!nonce.
Now, finally, to get to the heart of the matter which is the pro-
duction of National Intelligence. Now National Intelligence has been
defined many times and it's really quite simple because it's defined by
its need; we call it that correlated and evaluated information which the
highest policy makers of a nation require for their deliberations and
decisions. Obviously it overlaps and comprehends a lot of what is also
required by the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Secretary of this or
that department to run his own department, so they are not exclusive.
The statute makes the Director personally responsible for producine Nation-
al Intelligence and he could, in fact Mr. Kirkpatrick said, for a while
his predecessor; came perilously close te producing it himself or with his
own CIA organization. The only trouble with that was, that naturally every-
body else sitting around the NSC said, "Well, t at may be what you boys
think. It isn't what my boys think." And you hadn't done very much about
making an omelet out of the eggs.
On the other hand you could require that everything be settled by a
pure committee approach, that would he the opposite pull of solution, but
the trouble with that is that if you take people who have many motivarious
administrative duties and other items and force them to word-chop from
scratch, you would get either an inferior product or at minimum you fail
to get an integrated product. It would be the military section would be
left to the military, end political to the state Department people, and
the economic to the arpropriate, and the appropriate to CIA, but there
would be no internal cohesion.
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So hat we have devised is a system under our Board of National
Estimates, which we think partakes cf the best or both, in that we have a
group impanelled called the Board of National Es.telmates, get the highest
salaries that the Civil Service Commission allows, ane have no administra-
tive responsibility, no legislative ax to grind; they!te not for or against
a balanced budget, for or against any given organisation of the Services,
or any particular political policy in the Middle East. They are a jury of
elder statesmen, not elder necessarilY in years, but have been selected
primarily because cf their dispaesionate judgment, proved and demonstrated
in previous walks of life not necessarily intelligence.
For example, the head of it, a famous historian, Sherman Mint who
did known work in OSS, Research and Analysis during the war and wrote the
book--one cf the eost read books on intelligence generally. His vice-
chairman, one of Admiral rcolridge's predecessors(le your Commandant;
General Bowls; the other naval admiral, Admiral Sherman who Is Director
of Naval Intelligence; and we are about to gat an Air Force general,
meanwhile General Cabell having taken care of the interests of the Air Force
when the other two Services tended to gang up on them in the intelligence
business; and a couple of historians; a businessman, an ex-general counsel
of the Mutual Security Aolminintratien which is eow ICA; and one appointed
Assistant of Secretary of State Linden. The beauty of this board, as I
say.,4s its freedom to concentrate on thinking out specific intelligence
issue without fear of any pressure being put on it to find one way or an-
other, or selling a departmental position down the eiver. At the same
time with no problem of administering vast numbers of personnel, attaehb
assistants, and ether things that a G-2 or Director er Intelligence has to
do,
Very briefly, to tick off the sequence of events, how this machine
operates, the demand for an estimate normally comes out of either the
situation itself such as, the trouble in Syria is plain to everyone who
reads the newspaper; or out of the machinery of planning at the NSC
offices, where the Planning Board and the NSC staff says "It's abeut time
isn't it that we had a look at cur ve would like to bring
a revision of it before the NSC in Sovemter. wju. you have a National
estimate for the Planning Board of the NSC three weeks before that?"
About half of them are thus deliberately scheduled; the ether half are de-
veloped to meet situations on the spur of the moment. More nnd more they
specifically are requested to deal with options open to America, 'What
will be the result if we join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee but don't
formally adhere? If we join the Baghdad Pact? If we don't join it at all?"
Instead of writing an essay about the Middle Fast it is thus a very pro-
poeive document and is of a maximum utility, we hope, to the policy makers
either in the departments most closely concerned or in the NSC grouping as
a whole.
Once you've decided to do an estimate the next thing to get very
straight is what we call the terms of reference or the outline. Be sure
that we have put down all the questions which, if they could be answered,
the policy maker would like ti have answered. Maybe you're not going to
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be able to answer them; they're very unknown or unknowables, but at least
let's be sure we've had a crack at them and toss them around. That is,
checked cut with the consumer, the policy user as oell as with the intelli-
gence spe6lalist.
Then you whack that up according to best Communist tradition from
?soh according to his abilities and you assign the job of producing a
contribution to each ef the appropriate agencies and departmental groups,
net of writing a draft of that section but of writing a study which norm-
ally will be in the order cf five to fifteen times as long as that portion
of the ultimate national estimate wi:1 be. Those then come in on a sched-
uled deadlinedf the time is awfully short they may actually come in in
one day in a form of an oral presentation or some rough notes. And at that
point the Board and its staff set things down together and,after reviewing
these contributions, produce the first draft.
It is normally within the four corners of the.eentributions, but w
do not regard ourselves as bound. If t e Air Faroe and Navy, for example,
agree that the Soviet Union bomber force in 1960 will be such and such
probably they will prevail, but we feel free to argue with them on the
basis of the evidence which we've seen and so is the State Department re-
presentative or others as the case may be. In other wcrds, there are no
preserves in which anyone's particular word is law.
Once that draft is whipped into shape it is then eat on by the Board
stimatea as a whole by itself. This is where you get this isolation
reality, some people might say, at least from what we think mislead-
ng pressures tat would exist under other circumstances, and they "murder
board" it, as many of you would my, improve it as best as they can, and
then kick it back out to all of the DX member agencies who have as much
time as one can give them to review it, and then send their chief estim-
ator for that topic, normally of a colonel/captain level or one under, to
meet with a panel of the Peard and rehash it again from a community ver-
sion. At the end of that it goes to the IAC and, let me assure you there,
that the members of !AC do not by any means (I have never seen them) rubber.-
stamp a document. Sometimes a document will go through with very few
changes, but they regard themselves not just as head of their agencies in
sitting there, but as a eersonally impanelled group by the President of
the NBC of six or eight people, as the ease may be, whose personal judg-
ment militantly backed by their departmental expertees is being collectively
sought and they wrestle with them and frequently will run meetings very
long and very arduously until they get the best possible view.
Now, the problem in any such collective effort iehow much do you
strive for unanimity?" And we've worked carefully and wrestled with our
souls on this for a long time, being very careful to err, if anything, on
the side of being sure we set forth clearly and don't vary actual differ-
ences of opinion. The worst thing in the world would be to get agreed on
what we call "tent language" sufficiently big so everybody would come in
under it, but still so placid and meaningless that it doesn't convey any-
thing to the reader cr user. At the same time the other extreme would be
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uruiezirable whereby you descended on every captious little matter or
phraseology because then you wouldn't telegraph to your ultimate readers,
maybe the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, those in-
portant issues on which the community in in fact split; because it's
impertant not only that they realise there's a split but they realise that
there is something important that they should take into account in making
their policy decision. And normally, if the community is reasonably split
it leaves to the oolicy maker freedom either to cop for the majority's
views or the minority's, or preferably, if he's a good polio-, maker to
say, *Well if a reasonable element of the Intelligence Community, for ex
ample, thinks that if we go int the Tongking Delta the Chineee Commune
lets will move militarily as they did in Koreas therefor whatever we do
about the fall of Dien bien Phu had better bo done consistent with an
enemy capability to mix it with us in actual hostilities.*
When these papers are done they normally constitute and put out for
he 10 either the intelligence annex to an NSC paper or stand on their
own bottom as useful background for some policy committee. Ny function
in sitting on the Planning Board as the little side-kick, so to speak,
of the Director sitting on the NSC itself is to be sure that any state-
ments of fact, recitals, or others in an MSC paper are not inconsistent
with the National Intelligence view of it.
Five, four, three years aro had an awful lot of trouble particularly
with the top elements cf the Office of Secretary of Defense who had no
intelligence offices of its own but had anoawfel lot of views on things.
That has now gradually circulated right on up to the top and any agency
on the Planning Board that participates directly or through a subordinate
department In theointelligence planning Is normally a faithful backer of
the intelligence line.
But there are the Bureau of the Budget,OK, this, that and the other
bogs, maw of which are representated here not in majority, r trust, who
occasionally say, "Well, that may be what you think about Soviets having
an ineflight rationing capability, but, by God, i don't believe itI
And I just reties to see it in a policy planning paper." So the job is
not complete sinecure in fighting with them.
As far as work on these papers is co corned we're not through when
they're done, we constantly do two things with theme one is we conduct
a post-mortem of the last paper in process of doing any succeeding paper
on aoy country, area, or problem. What did we predict about Algeria
eleven monthe ago? How has the situation drifted? Has it drifted faster
than ye said, better than we said, or worse than we said? Seccndly, we
have a group that meets up at Princeton of guys of calibre of George
Cannon and Ate Lincoln and Max Milicon, and Others w o will not work fell
time for the Government now, at least like in Abe Lincoln's case stays
at the faculty not because of hioself but because of another Arkansas
character. But we use them generally as a body of elder statesmen to re-
view our work from their wisdom with full access, they're cleared for
everything so they can read any background material they want on it and
we use them to go over cur problems with us and give us the frankest pos-
sible critique which we then pass out to the community.
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I would like to say a word before close cc some prcblems about the
Director's actual function at the NSC itself, in addition to speaking
for, or promoting and defending the National Intelligence Estimative
point of view on a given policy debate* He has a much more far reaching
and difficult mission and that is to speak virtually from the hip on
Intelligence matters from an intelligence point of view on any matter
that is coming before the 0ouncil andoeven more than that, on anything
that has happened anywhere in the world during the preceeding week or in
two weeks, if the Council hasn't met a week before, as in the form of an
intelligence briefing.
Now that briefing is prepared in our shcp, but with the closest and
most intense effort to make it represent the best expert feeling around
the community without tying people down to an actual co-ordinating piece
of paper. But, if we're talking about the Soviet 10 announcement, you
can be perfectly sure that we don't just it CIA's words into the Direc-
tor's mouth, or he himeelf wants to know the best thinking of the Army,
and the Navy, and the Air Force, and AEC on such a matter. That is, to
my mind, one of the things I like best about President Eisenhower that
when he first took over and was revising the NSC machinery and method of
operation, he told Bobby Cutler that he wanted every meeting to start
with a fifteen munute intelligence briefing. Sometimes they don't start
with them but it has been a rare, rare exception when the Director hasn't
gotten a chance to have a captive audience, you might say, of the Secre-
taries of Treasury, Defense and ro on, knowing how busy particularly are
those people who are not concerned directly with the day-.to-day manage-
ment of the National Security affair such as the State and Defense,
thinking more of the ODM, Bureau of the Budget, Vice-President, and eta.,
etc. have very little chance to read and absorb themselves from intelli-
gence publications, even though obviously availabl: to them. This chance
to be held to line and forced to think about the externals of the world
situation for fifteen munutes is very constructive and the Intelligence
Community can, I think, be rightly proud of him.terrific burden as it is
on the Director.
Now, I know somebody would like to ask, "Now good have these esti..
mates been?" There's no statistical wow, / think, of giving an honest
answer, of course. Since we've had this system there been no major
outbreak of hostilities. The Israeli attack on Egypt not being major in
my mind in that sense and therefor the great question of "Are the Rus-
sians up to trouble now or in the future?" we haven't really been tested
on.
I think we have been pretty good on most capability pictures despite
Allsop 's and other characters's we certainly have not compromieed down
our estimates on their projected abilities. We have been up to a year or
two behine on particular showi s of a particular weapons, but, as far as
their over-all capab:lity is cccerned, I think it's fair to state that
our scatter-gram is all around tie line of truth asi hindsight shows it
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out. I think where we have been Inadequate is in rorseeing really
great soft flexible changes of peee. Nobody, I think, really saw in ad-
vance (and certainly no estimate I have seen) how completely Chou-en Lai
adopted the soft love-and-kisses line at Undone and went out to woo
rather than terrify the people of Asia. No one saw early enough that
the Soviet would use its vast stockpile of obsolescent arms ane its ex
gess capacity in certain types of production, machine tools, and earth
moving equipment to make as big a splash on the underdeveloped areas'
economic front as they did. It has been in those things we have been
weak rather than on others.
Now, rd like to tick off for you, finally in closing, the problems
that I think in this area are only parti lrdd. and-remairvwith us,
and I hope that MO 41:jr0 us in thinking about the papers you will
write this year and the general thinking you were acing at the War Col
lege, will bear these i mind, and thst out of your work may come 80'0
hel to us on the line.
The first is this question of full disolonure within the U.S.
Government; I read you the C Directive about the Watch Committee:, but
let me tell you that still it isn't anywhere near as good as it should be.
There still is too much of a tendency to chest the cards and say, 'Oh,
this is so sensitive, thia is 'Ayes Only', the Secretary of Chief of
Staff? and what you're doing then le depriving the desk an the key
area expert, who really knows the politics in a given country or some-
thing like that of the most valuable intelligence cr information that
he oould have to keep abreast of the situation, which is improving but
it isn't good enough yet.
Secondly, is genuine co..ordination and articulation. We still do
too much of what each other does also--there Is pervasive feeling that
each chief is entitled to a full rounded intelligence organization and
that his intelligence chief doesn't rely on the product of a rival in-
telli ence or anization to service his chief, and therefore, we in C/A
we re wor ng on ecause sooner or er ngress
and its econecy-mindedness is going to straighten it out with a neat
ex, and then the United States could get badly hurt!
are worried about a problem of interchange with our all
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