THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THE WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A002500070002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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TID GM.:AN I JIGiICESEITVICE ;CAD THE WAR
Extent 2.LEarl_a_.ed eftn,ose
-
Knowledge of the German Intelligence Servioes its organisetion., its personne7.t
acid its -activities against tae Western Powers and in the Balkans* ic imperfect from
1039 to 1940, adequately rerresentative from. 1940 to 1943, end from 1943 to 1945
probably complete. In spite of lack of current intelligenoe about the earliest
period, the fullness of our linossledge during the last two years enables us to infer
eaellee conditional and mute evidence referring to that period has come in, mad iv
atilliearning in, in the fore of interrogations and oaptured documerite. The interresee
tion of SCIIELLETTDZP.Gs the head of the IS in its final f ?reit has provided a greet
mass of inside information; but the value of this information lies less in the new
evidence which it has sage:tied than in the coni'irmation which it hao given to the
cenclucions already reachet from more impersonal, and therefore mere objective pouroetu
In thir: paper, the statemeets of SCHEI,L717TBERG will sometimes be cited as evidenee for
a oceeclusion; they are cite not because they are the sole evidence:, but because
they aeo the most convenient evidence; and they will never be c.S..ted to support a
one which is not already deducible fro:e independent matters The conclueione
sureser:.sed in this paper aro based on farailiaeity with a wide range of evideecO, sed
are esoLieved to be valids
?eters; saticn of the GIS.
From 1955 till 1044, the principal Gerutn intelligence service was the OKU
At eberehr,a. deparbsse:t of the 0i0 under the control of Ackairel Canards, who also
oorsteolled a parallel department, the Platsgruppe Nusland. The AG Ausland received
repoete from non-secret sources, mainly service attaches, and was the department of
the ()K7 in liaison with the Auswaertiges Amt, The Abwehr was a secret departeonts
It had in in Berlin., and eve-stations in Germars and abroad. In Geirasny and in
occuel..ld coun ries, its organization followed ths pattern of the Ge Oil military
organization and Was static or mobile according is the Germen armies wore oecupational
or 0:g3 rational In neutral countries the Alseehr was dependent on tlea Gomm diplomates,
reprosentation and the principal officers had diplomatic status and toyer,. Functionally
the ebefehr vat divided into three departments, concerned reepectiveles with (I) Op
tional nspionage, (II) Sabotage and political and military subversien, (111') Counter-
eionee,e.
s'
Dotal c of the structure of the Abwehr can be found in the publications "The German
Intell. gene? Services" iseurei in October 1044 bu Sapreme HQ GesE. CI Subdivislon
(reference E.OS/G/9) and will not be repeated here.
at,-venlr.
4, It will be n.otioes that this subdivie .on of the Aberehr excludes all mention
of oenttosre.pbses and in. fact the GIS :aever controlled the processes, though it
seesnueetly had access to the results, of cryptograrilly. Cryntosraphy was in fact
never eentralised in Germany, and this lack of centralisation is of card.inal import..
for the understanding of the history of the GIS, and is indeed one aspect of a
Lipleonaaellan which was of meact wider relevance in Nazi Germeny. For al.1.thoush in theory,
the structure of the adainietration was 'perm:tidal' end conerelized, in fact the
apex
el the pyramid, or the centre of the circle, was not a unitary structure at Ea.
but a vortex of corepeting personal ambitioue? Thus all German politicians of con-
sequenoe sousht to sot up their an information bureaus (just as they also Bought
to esteblisla private e.rraioi; as additional aupports for their political authorityi.
was ?-eSseatiel to the purpose of those bureaus .thet their results should be
the peivate property of then:- chiefs, and net pooled it an administrative levels
Thus :7.I9BELTTROP had his bureau or personal informers as a means to securing the
Force iiinistry for himself, GO-M.1M had the Forschteigsaet which successfully
preeterved for himself the results of teleshone-interception, IIII.17.L11R had the SD
(Int III) msrl Ant VI or the 2.811A to mainly hita vdth intellieenoe from. within
Gees-any and abroad respectively. The Atriehr was almeSt universally regarded? not
as an rAntinistrative departeen.t of the CV1? but as the personal bureau: of Admiral
CerA.P.Ire. Cryptography was dissipated an mg those and other various offices?
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It ntz lone (reputedly nith great succesa) by COL'ar"Gls Forechengs It wee aone
'? ey the .,h)reie. ninistry; it ,ms done by the OM (Abt Chi), nd separeesly by the
ehrec eorvice ministries (shtl, OKt, and TM). And although the oryptogrephie secteen
of the oTalwas ultimately (14.11.) merged in that of the 9EU. this was done not in
the :natarests of olainistretive efficienoy, 'eat because the OKU, after the Teitsoh. of
20 Jr:1.y 1E144, was politicalne suspect. DID; system led, not aaly to tbe staenation
of intelligence in private pools, but also (ea leas inemitable In a as:eject so
pendoe. on contra" research es dryptoersehy), to technical inofficiany.
Achievements of the GI3
hool?????1?1??????????4*.
The reputation of the Abvrohr in erramety stood, at the beeinning of the ware
very 4.; and this reputation was not soriously questioned until after 19el. Altheteh,
our keonledee of its aettvit-;.es is lose complete during that time thin later, it ie
olear that such a reputation ems not really due to its achievementa. In fact, if the
eohieeenents of the GIS are analysed funetionally, it is clear thatJbt I (resit:ere
ueeiesenge) ries consistently nnaucceseful, at least as a cource of secret operational
Itat(3 el; that &1st II (sellotege arid subvorsifmt) had some successor ir. areas where the
eorefs...e heel a deeree of e...,feetive control ehtch the Allies had not (0.g*ere.-00ially
in the 7talkors in 1941), or eiplomatio superiority (e.e. in Spain 19-43), but woe.
reeelerly unsucoossful in areas ?die re these advantages were with the Al/;es (e.g. In
the itIdele East and in linereted arees); c:nd that Abt III was generally quocessfu4
Detween the work of Abw. ebt III and RSILet .krat IV (ie, the Gestape)? theAllied
tollieence services in the Low Countries leer? deeply penetrated at the beei.enine of
the veze end ,throughout the history of reeistance movements in occupied territory
there were, many instances of effective Gennei penetration, sono of them on. e. large
scale (e.g. in 11011and It meat be reaoraborod, however, that this success
'ens achieved mainly on the avant level, aid that the GIS learnt e or at least pieced
together e very little about the hi.eher "creel erganization of the Allied41ortee
nereheee (see para 3/ (4) ?
Inside Germany, hawever, the recori of ths .A.bwehr e as not subeected to such a
negational analysis, Ishich Would anyway have been difficult owing to the secrecy with
which any secret service must enshroud its aotiniCes. In the early years of the;
the klelehr lived on the succees of tee Ceram armies (which was naturollytififeen
to 17.1p y ood intelligence), and on the saccess of its CCM 7i'o unto r-o? pi on ad6wh
stied above, eras considerable. With he turn of the title of war in 1942., the
enhienreents of the GIS e.ssered emoter livertence to the Germans, end its talures
wore eamitted to .ereater or:ticistr. These failures were regular end. conspicuous,
and, .)..tded by certain secondery causes, led. .to the camplete collapse of the Abwehre
erie!eh was absorbed by Let VI of the Reichssichesheitshauptecie; (R3111) or centre,"
off of um:Laos Sip? end SD (see below).
I:art-lee:Lox orr.tions of the Abeehr
A Seer selected instances of Abrrehr activikt in the yeers 1939-41 will illustrate.
both the extent and the efficiency of its operatf'.aus.
Abt I (positive inteIl:ieenoe) was througheut the war the most unsucoeesful
libeener departments* and this was in a very laree measure del to the chareeter of
..itItar.ah himself, altho eueh there are also indepfeatient reasons fres its failure, inherent
in the eeric itself. It Was in positive espioncee that p,t,7ARIS took most personal
interee7t (he Showed littlo interest in the other departments of. the Abwehr), mad it
-.nrs ti e branch of activity that was least credit.dahe to the Abeehr. The explanation
is, to. a large extent, that CATIK.ZIS was, firstly, a bad judge or nen, and secondly,
pea40c0,i0nal intrieent rether than en erg',-,niser. In eonsequenee ef the
tirst teult, :go chose worthless officers; end in consequence of the eecond, he gave
thkee erection' independence. In effect, t.he 'opera Aortal! offloors of the Abfwar
cot LI Paris mad Athena, in :Ue-rrite and Estoril* eajoyine the opportunities for
splf,!..14Nicenoe provided by these resorts, undistuebed (thanks to a complete lack
oftatteztrnlisation at 110, so long as a. quota of reeorts was sent in. Whether these
rene'rts wore true or false ens .traireportant, eines there was no centralised eveluatior,;.
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and inee truth or falsehood did not matter (at least while the German armies were
vecterious), it was equally unimportant whether the agents were controlled by the
allios or not. 'It was bettor to have a controlled agent them none at
obseneed one cynical officer when items suggested to him n (correctly) that his prin-
cipal source of infor.lation was under Allied management; and, another efficer, mhen
a similar suggestion vr...s made about mother agent (again correctly), raised his hands.,
in horror at such an indecent reference to these undisputed but irrelevant facts of
life. If he were to orient that to his chief, he said, he would be shot for defeatism..
There wore to other agents producing information of similar veluo, ead the LITS could
not afford to admit that it had no genuine agents in the U.K. The eeductio ad
absueaem of this system cane when it was realised that if truth aalfalsehood-wore
17:7177771t, it was a waste of money to pecy real aeents. By the end of the war there
were ecveeal officers or bead agents who wore, regularly ha-mating (end being paid
for) their ageeto and their agents reports; and it is an. ironical comnentary an the
whole sastam that in fact the best reports did come from two sources, viz; con-
trolicef, agents, whose false reports were necessarily interlarded with a proportion
of te.lah; and notional agents whooe inventors were attentive readers of the news-
papene The most successful of 'he latter class was Paul mom, oOSTRO, who
opereted in Lisbon, and whose reports were considered 'correct without qualification'
to the end. Both those typos of agents had no difficulty in maintaining themselves;
beece their euocess. They were veluod because they survived; and the real oemse of
tbeir survival ems never examined. Genuine agents sent into Allied territory dried
411017p aleeat immediately*
9* In these circumstance these is very little to say about particular os rations
bf Ant I. The agents who wore sent to the UK in the summer or 1940 wore, for instance,
quite useless. They wore captured almost immediately, since the systenwas already
penetrated; but even if they had survived, they were neither trained nor equipped
nor inthllectually or morally qualified to perform the service. The seme is true of
the agents in the USA and the Middle 'lest who were also controlled. But the same lack
of centralisation which made most of the operations of Abt I discreditable, did also
enable a few Abwehr officers e initiative to perform work which (if it had been
appreciated or correctly uscd)" might have been valuable* Thus a Ihmgerian desert.'
explorer of distinction, LILTASX, made an expedition across the Libyan Desert from
Ronnel's Army to the Middle Nile which would in my oircumstenoos have been creditable
and the feet that the agents 'whom ho loft there wore worthless was a reflection an
the Anvehr, not on himself* But the most conspicuous, perhaps the only, success of
Abj :, was achieved in, thespecial conditions which favoured all Abeehr activities
in Spain andr&ich once ocean, were a consequence of the personality of CaNARIS.
10. From the time of the last war, when he h.d been interned in Spain, CAITARIS
had many influential frienis in the Spanish political world. These contacts wore
confirmed or extended during the Spanish C'vil nese end the German intervention, in
which CAUARIS played a personal part (be is credited with having been the architect
of the EitlereFronao agreement); and by the beginning of this war, CANARIS was a.
fmnilior figure in Gon. France's entourage, and officers of the Kondor Legionwhich
had, fought in Spats., Isere feailiar figures in he higher posts of the Abwehr. Prominent
among these Spanish friends of CANARIS wore Gen. Franoo himself, whose signed portrait
dominated C !TARN" office ir the Tirpitzufer, Count JORDANA (his foreign minister),
Goneeal VI= (his air minister), Gen. STI7C10 (his war minister), and Gen. nRTIN;'2,
bA:IPOS (his chief of General Staff Intelligence). LIARTINEZ CAL:POS, in some ways the
most useful, received a Christmas box fmen Abwehr funds. Thus GAUEN enjoyed a
1Iiehi4 privileged position in Spain and Spanish Morocco, and this privilege embraced
the Xswehr also, not as the Abwehr, but as Admiral CANARIS' personal. bureau*
-On at leegt three occasices, documents which came to the hands of the Spanish
I.S. were hAfstded over to the Abachr; Spanish police, coastguards, custems-officials,
and ermy officers acted for the Abweer with the approval or connivance of their
superiors; special radie-bo_con end eeteorelogical stations weresot up by the Abwebr
with Spanish support, labour and personnel, at Seville esti near Vigo; attacks an
British and Allied shipping were regulerly attemptee from Spanish harbours with
Spanish divers; md an el-borate _rid successful system of reporting the passages
of Beltishwarships through the Straits of Gibraltar was perfected with Spanish
assistance. This last undertaking, the so-called Unternehmen BODDEN, and Its by-
products, was the most successful undertaking carried out by Nbt I, although energetic
British protests prevented lb from echioving its full aims and eventually reduced
its efficiency very considerably. It was absolutely dependent on the far-reaching
cooperation which was given by the Spanish government; Prui insofar as this cooperebion
was eseilable to CITARIS pa:smelly rather than to the German government, it was a
personal success for CANARIS0 The Germ= naval mad air authorities are unanimous
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in reseeding it as the most important contribution made by the Abwehr to the conduct
of the emze and the fact that neither the Gernan navy nor the Luftwaffe were oble
fully to exploit it is irrelevant. It did not indeed materially influence the course
of the war; but (as long as it lasted) it materially strengthened the personal position
of eln. CANARIS0
U. After the Spanish ship-reporting service, the service which brought the
greateat oredit'to Alm Abt I.was the so-called Dienststelle Klatt in Sofia. The
exact eneition of Klatt, in spite of all efforts to olarify it, remains something
of a mystery. Briefly, the feets are as follows. Richard KLATT is a Hungarian Jew,
tnese:selue to the Abwehr coneisted in his connection with an extensive circle of
White loesian emigres conteriee upon a notorious professional spy, General (alias
Prince) Turkul, normally resident in Rome. Through Turkults organisation, mad partiou-
ler theeugh one member of it named Ira LO1;GIS LAW* Klatt claimed to dispose of a
large netvork of agents in Soviet Russia who since 1941, supplied him with operational
intellteence about the movemeats and disposition of Russian troops. This intelligence
Ins in env =ye oFceptional. It Was delivered eith quite extraordinary punctuality,
in cite extraordinary quantity, and was regarded by the evaluation section of OKH
Fremdo IiLE which received it as of quite extraordinary reliability. KLATT (whose
personal position was further complicated by his Jewish origin) kept his organisation
personal to himself, and tho Germans themselves knew, or wore allowed to know very
little about it. But from the start certain suspicions mere entertained; and after
local investigations, one of the few able officers in the Abwehr (Dr, 'lamer a Delius,
41110ead of K.O. Bulgaria) satisfied himself that ICL !TT (who worked for A,D.0 I Luft) was
doceeviug the G mans. :;.',GIIER's suspicions led at first to an enquiry; but this
enquiry had scalloely begun before it was suppressed an the demand of oxa Preside
vhich declared that the Nox reports (as these Russian reports were called) were Indiopenseblo and must on no account be jeopardised. KL'TT thus survived, but suspicions
of his loyalty, continued to arise, and although none of the investigations produced
proof of reATT's duplicity, he was ultimatelyeropped as a character too suspicious
to be trusted.
:20 Several suspicious features are noticeable in KLATT's reports, It is almost
certain ahat the original matter was in 'Russian and this applies not may to the
intelligence from Russia but also to the so-called Moritz reports which were alleged
to be derived from the British 'Addle East. KLATT ii known to have had contact with
the Soviet Legation, which continued to operate in Sofia throughout this period.
En also maintained and concealed mysterious relations .with the Bulgarian police.
fli exteesive and infallible systol Which delivered intelligence with equal speed
from Leningrad, Kuibischev, Nororossisk and the "eastern Desert, was suspiciously free
from the aaministrative hitohee to which most spy systens are liable* All these
facts taken in conjunction strongly suggest that KLATT at 10 act in respect of the
Max repoets wes a Russ:an controlled deception agent, although it is possi le that
he himeelf was unconscious of the facto The matter however has not yet been con-
elusivele settled .nd the Uoriez reports are difficult to explain even an this
hypotheees.,
3. If KLATT was really working for the Ger-ans, it must be admitted that he was
ry high!y valued by them; and since we are uaable to establish the degree of truth
his reports on purely Russian operations, we must credit the elswehr with having
scored at least one success in the use of operational agents. On the other hand no
certainty is possible; and if ( as seems more likely) KLATT was in reality a Russian
double-wont then no exception need Ise eade to the generalisation that the only cone
stant ead 'reliable' agents used by the Abwehr wore either controlled or notional,
40 0r.0 other breech of Abu PIA / activity deserves mention. This is the work
of Abt I. ii (Wirtschaft), which obtained economic intelligence (Allied production
figures, etc), by simply buyine in Portugal and South America, British and American
industrial and statistical publications, from which intelligent deductions could be
made. This eater Was not secret, and therefore in sone ways falls outside the
ordinary definition of secret service work; but the results obtained from it were
probably of more value than other intelligence obtained from more secret sources.
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Tee principa/ successes of Abw. tht. II (sabotage and stayers ica) ite the earl ice
psrt of iie ear were obtain d In. Yugosl avia in the Spring of 19410 Yu eosl svi a, thank,
tee its etelitical divisions, the weakness of its administretion, and the degree of
G rues oecnomic penetration which had already been achlevJd, was ideally waited to
tai s hi ed of work; and by pencerasl on and controlling various dissident or us-leering
groups, the Abwehr enoceeded in sabotaging the mobilisation of the Yugeelav ferces0
cud in.eeoventing the denolition of bridges, etc., t an extent which eateri aily
aseeetee the advance of the German armies, and which affords a strong contrast to
tee taofThetiveness of its operations in the se area when the German armies 7J13re
in retreat, The contribution :f the Abuehr to the dissipation of French res'etence
Le 1940 is less easy to detereLne; but it is believed that some success was obtained
there by the Dresedceabure Ilegisent z.b.v. 800 (afterwards Brandenburg Division) or
privete my of Ales. Abt. II. The Brendenburg Regiment also operated in Russia,
bet the setent of our knaaledee does not entitle us to make general deductions con-
cornine ueccess or failure,
Abets Abt. III was the most consistently successful of Abwehr departments,
although it is not almmys easy to distinguish between its operations aed those
of the Gestapo (RSTIA- Amt IV), Thus the capture of Stevens Lard Best in Deo. 1939,
the moot spectacular coup of the German counter-espionage service, vas the work of
the Gootapos Similar activities in B lgium wore also successful; lad with the con-
,
euest of Frence ead the Lou Countries, Abr. Abt. III met.'s able to penetrate the local
slat eoe movements and, through them, the Allied agencies which relied an them.
The ponetr tion of the Dutch resistance eevement in 1941, after the Allies had olroale
-leaded euoceasfully in France, shows that Abu Abt. II.t continued to act with vigour
ond suc ?peso later than any other Abwehr department. It is interesting to note the'
in the /rtlfi '31.1.8 purges to which the Abwehr was subjected in 1942-44, Abu. Abt.IEI
clove hopt is personnel and censtitutions almost intact - a strong argument that
its ef-ficiency was admitted,
I 7 , In the years before the weir, Aba. Abt. III, thanks to its control of Allied
a ents. aiso acted as a medium for strategic deception, passing out to the Allied
Intell!sence Services material supplied to it by (particularly) the Gernan Admiralty?
Ttis siraogic deception WES aot, however, ferny exploited after the bagie rang of the
war; when it seems that the German Service dopartnente were no longer willine to re-
lee (.031)ion-matcridl in the sere) measure as in peace-time.
The Ceicie of the Abuchr0
The period of crisis which,. led to the fall of 5he Abwehr lasted from Nov. 1042,
ehee the Allies lended in Norte Africa (Torch), till no 10440 when they and d in
France (i)serlord), and was directly oonnocted elth it failure in respect of Allied
streteeie intentions over thi3 period. Since this tae. the c melte'. period of the wsr,
and since success or failure in eivins notice of Torch, Husky aid Overlord nicht have
materi let altered the course of the seer, the answer t ) the question 'whether the GIS
had ame aeereciable influence on the course of the wee lios in the events of this
_period 4 'Ssfore 1942 and after the summer of 1944, the relative strategic and materiel
hSeraMal of the belligerents as such that good or b ad intelligence coeld only have
tacteesl significance.
It is therefore sienifi east that neither Torch, n er Husky, nor Overlord, was
cerreotly forecast by the Abvid:2r, which, on the contrary, drowned the OM with inis-
informatioe, sometimes inventee, and often deliberately oupplied by the Allies. This
141.:Lferr record of failure was ehe prime cause of the collapse of the Abviehre Secondary
cr' c jrovFa and.i2iccoepable evidenee of financial corruption and political
s affe,::-.1 on among it membere, and the competition of arr.-7 fiS intelligence se rvic
whioh eitimetely replaced it. The fell of the A?evrehr was rendered slow and gradual by
other esc...;endary causes; ,zicl in particular, the personal suscess of VITA IS in. Spain
Those atier:100.See enabled CAITAR1 to survive the preliminary purges of tie Abwehr, End
whole he fell (Feb. 1944) a Change of policy in Spain was ono of the immediate causes
of hie fall. To signalise the change from nonebelligerer,ce to neutrality, the Spanish
peliticiens suddenly refused to receive CAeARIS on one of his regular visits, and thus
171 de it olesious to the German Goverment that his special j? ist ificali on no lorner
trees-toe., (sec belays - parte
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_6.
The Abwehr's record of sabotage in the sarae period Tras no higher. fth
elaborate plan to leave saboteurs in all eweuatod aroa in thetodfterraxienn, whieh
was proj)eted at this ti-e, was afterwards rdnitted to have been a total faUureo
This ii:.dont contrasts instructively with the successful sabotage carried out in
the s:Tic area in 1041, when the Germans had effectively penetrated the area (.see
W.,01"0 rat-a 15), and again suests that agents are only effective in Ireas freely
!loco C -)11,0 to their employers, (see below para )
The Pole,e of the P.SHA.
I:,)anwhile a choice in lie political bias of Geraany was effect:Lig all adminis-
trativ,L, ,Lnd serrice dopartmen-;,s, uncltuling the OM nzd Abwehro This vas the docline