PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMIGRES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A002200040002-9
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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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PAOBLLI? AID ?PROGRAMS OF THE RUSSIAN E *
Post-revolutionary Russian emigres at present total a little
over three million persons, exclusive of children born in exile,
although no estimate of their exact numbers can be made. A large
Proportion were displaced persons who for political reasons did
not return to their homeland after World War II. Only about three
percent of them take an active part in ennigr6 political groups, the
rank and file being reluctant to join political organizations, pro-
:erring instead to participate In local church, educational, and
similar groups. However, as a whole they are exceptionally alert
to political developments and follow with keen interest the con-
tinuous debates and controversies carried on in the large number
of Russian-language periodicals and newspapers published outside
the Soviet Orbit.
It is not possible to judge the importance of an ?migre' pclitica:'_
group by its size. Some of them that are numerically insignificant
exercise an important influenos on 'emigre political thinking through
the personal qualities and stending of their leaders. However, the
popularity of each group and even of individual leaders fluctuates
nridely, depending not only on the ideology of the group but also on
international developments and the attitude of local authorities
toward the Russian problem.
The groups discussed here are organized on a world-wide basis
end have branches in most countries where there are centers of Russiax-
emigration. The headquarters of most groups are located either In
estern Europe or the U.S. While the groups have aroused outside
nterest in the countries where they are active, none of them has
sfficial governmental backing.
This report surveys their attitudes on the following topics of
rincipal interest in relation to a non-Communist Russia. form of
Go '? 'overnment, role of political parties,, civil and religious rights,
oblems of national minorities, territorial problems, federal versus
ntralized state,, types of economy. Some of the groups have issued
rmal programs or statements of aims. Others either have no formal
blished program or state their aims in vague and general terms.
nsequently there is some unevenness in the information available
44.
Based on IR. 593, May 14, 1954, DRS, OIRR, Department of State. The
iginal report; contal.xs much detail on the programs and aims of the
dividual groups that has been omitted in the present summa---v veraio
.
veral important studies on the Russian diaspora are listed in the
"3biiography, page X; the list represents a sampling and is not
'xomprehensive
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in attitudes on specific issue. On foreign policy, armed forces,
police power, and other equally important and controversial subjects,
the 6igr6 groups and leaders have avoided taking a public stand.
In describing the political attitudes of the groups no evaluation
is attempted, nor is any evaluation made of the influence of dmigr6s
in national or international affairs.
I. ~ 0?r~arxi?~aationa ~
Except for a common opposition to Communism and the Soviet govern-
ment and hope for an eventual return to a non-Communist Russia, the
emigres have few common aims. They are actually categorized in a
broad sense less on their political attitudes than on their length
of exile-the "old", the "new", and the newest".
The "old" dmigrO, estimated between one and two million per-
sons, left the USSR between the revolution of 1917 and the outbreak
of World War II. Once abroad, the majority of the "old" emigres
revived their former political parties, some of which advocate the
restoration of the social and economic order that had existed before
the revolution, modified by a land reform and by the principle of
"no predetermination," which leaves the question of the future
political structure of a non-Communist Russia to a constituent
assembly to be elected after liberation.
The "new" emigres are refugees displaced by the upheaval of
World War II, Even after the forcible return of some of these dis-
placed persons, the number still remaining abroad is probably not
less than one million. The group is composed of members of all
strata of Soviet society. It is poorly unified and has no leader.
ship of importance. The low educational level of most of the people
who have gravitated toward this group (not more than 10 percent of
them have professional training) and their lack of experience in
political affairs have retarded their participation in &Igr political
activities.
The "newest" emigres are persons who have escaped from the USSR
or Soviet-occupied areas since the and of the war, Although the size
of this group is not definitely known, it is estimated that it can.
sists of about 30,000 persons. These emigres generally remain aloof
from the other groups.
..mow
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Major Political Organizations
The amigri political groups are so diversified, numerous, and
subject to change that it is difficult to penetrate the maze they
form. However, there are five major political organizations toward
which all groups have a tendency to gravitate. and the discussion
here is confined to them: Solidarists (NTS), Socialists, Union of
Struggle for Freedom of the Peoples of Russia (SBONR), Liberal
Democrats, and Monarchists.
1, National labor Union or Soli istsp The largest and most
active Russian 6migrrr organization is the National Labor union (IT'S),
whose members call themselves "Solidarists." Its headquarters are in
Frankfurt, Vent Germany, and it has branches and representatives in
other countries where there are Russian imigr6 centers. The present
NTS program combines anti Bolshevism with nationalism, and advocates
a centralized state with some features of a corporate and planned
eoonoo. The size of the NTS membership is estimated to range between
500 and 3,000 active members.
2. Russian Socialists The Russian Socialists in exile have
few followers among the mass of 6migrds though they have had con-
siderable influence on emigre political thought. Their longfeatablished
connection with the leaders of Socialist parties in the Nest and their
important role in postwar efforts to uaii"y Russian democratic groups
have helped them to influence Emigre political affairs beyond their
numbers. They are divided into two major partiess Social-Democrats
and Socialist Revolutionaries.
a. _ O 1 DoRa" . The Social Democrats (the Menshevik
segment of-the Russian Marxist movement) interpret Marxism in much
the same way that West European Social Democratic Parties do. They
rejected Lenin's "April Theses" (1917), in which he substituted the
soviets for the parliamentary republia.traditionally postulated by
Marxists as the political form of the proletarian dictatorship. The
Mensheviks propose to achieve Merxian socialism gradually by parlia..
mentery methods.
b. Social tat Revolutio ai{ s. The Socialist Revolutionaries
are a loose union of several groups of non-M eian Socialists, the
most prominent of which is the Populist ) Party of #Lexander
Kerensly. Their ultimate objective is the eats lishment of a
politically democratic republic with a limited socialist economic
lase. However, they have never had a consistent program for political
action, and the organization has continuously been torn by internal
strife and dissension.
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3. Union of Z'"mmI2 f Freed= of the Paonlas of RuaU
(SBONR). Composed largely of "new" dmigrd elements, this movement
had its roots in q youth organization set up during the war under
German auspices and led by the Soviet General Viasov, who was
captured by the Germans in 1941 and in the autumn of 1942 began to
collaborate with them. After the war and the temporary disbanding
of the group, it was revived under the leadership of the Monarchists
(see below), who interpreted the Vlasov movement as a continuation
of the "White" movement of 1917-21. In 1948 the movement was re-
organised again under its present name and asserted its complete
independence from the Monarchists and all "old" Russian fimigr6s.
The present aims of the organization follow the basic principles
stated in General Vlasov-s "Prague Manifesto" of 1944, and may be
summarized as social 3ustioe, limitation on the right to possess
private property, opposition to restoration of the monarchy, and
recognition of the multi-national character of the Russian state.
SBONR'a headquarters and the center of its activities are in Munich;
it also has a considerable following in the U.S.
SBONR has worked out a method of cooperation with the Union of
Warriors (War Veterans) of. the Liberation Movement (SVOD). At pre-
sent both organizations are under the same leadership,'and the
decisions made by SBONR automatically apply to SVOD. SVOD represents
the military complement of SBONR, which confines itself to the
political area. The two organizations work independently, however,
4. Liberal Democrats. This group consists of the remnants of
the Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets") of pre-revolution times,
sprinkled with ex-Socialists and Russian intellectuals. It is
officially named the Union of Struggle for Freedom of Russia, but
its members are usually referred to as Liberals or Liberal Democrats.
It is under the leadership of Professor Serge, Melgunov, with head.
quarters in Paris# Although numerically insignificant, the group's
members are well educated and exercise some influence on emigre
political affairs. Its immediate aims are to create a, strong national
democratic, anti-Soviet organization, to establish contact with
anti-Soviet elements in the USSR, to abolish Communism there, and to
establish a democratic form of government through a constitubnt'
assembly,
5. Monhists, Although rapidly dying out, Russian Monarchists
still play a considerable role in the political life of the Emigre
movement, chiefly among the older elements and the military. In the
early postwar years (1945-48), they dominated the political activities
of the Vlasovites and displaced persons in Germany. The Monarchists
have not succeeded in winning over any considerable number of the now
imigr?s, however, and their influence has steadily declined.
SR a .. p
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The Monarchists do not consider themselves a political party
but a movement supporting monarchy as a form of government, and
they recognize Grand Duke Vladimir Kirilovich as the rightful Taar
of Russia. As a supra-party movement, they-have no definite program
for organisation of a non-Communist Russias a fact which they con-
sider to be a major advantage over other. political groups.
Despite their common agreement on the form of government, the
Monarchists are split into three major groupst the Absolute
Monarchists, the Constitutional Monarchists with a conservative
Vlasovite faction, and the People's Monarchists.
II. The ini r &Ogg A
The emigre organizations have one aim in commons the
formation of a non-Commmist Russia, but their programs reflect
BMW divergent views as to what form of state organization should
replace the present one. While most organizations have expressed
some views on certain major features which should characterize the
new state, such as the form of government, the national minorities,
civil and religious rights, etc., they have avoided a public stand
on 6,number of such important subjects as foreign poli
policy,, police
powers, to.
It is also difficult to determine what, if any, features of the
present Soviet state would be retained; that is, what rrconstantsn
would be carried over into a non.Cometunist Russia. A recent example
of the disunity of amigrfi thinking in this regard was a suggestion
made by several well-known dmigrd`economists that in the period of
transition the collective farms be retained in order to prevent a
major economic dislocation that could cause serious food shortages.
This evolved violent objections from other emigre elements, not only
against the proposal itself, but against the people who had presented
it.
Despite such-conflicts, the majority of emigres seem to agree on
the retention of some social and economic features of the Soviet state,
probably altered to fit new circumstances. Among these, for example,
are some type of cooperative organization of farming, along with pri-
vate ownership, to which the state would render assistance; central
governmental control over foreign trade, exploitation of natural
resources, and armed forces. They also seem to hold a common view
that many prominent features of the present state would be eliminated
by various measures; private ownership of important parts of the
national economy would be restored; controls over internal trade
liberalized; and in general the econonRr organized to give greater
attention to consumers, needs.
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S 9 f: A, -t
The emigre' programs as a whole give only a sketchy notion of
the form of organization of a new state. The best that can be done
from the information available is to examine the individual programs
of the emigre groups on specific subjects without attempting to
reach final conclusions. Seven major subjects are examined below,
Form of Government in a Non-Communist Russia
Ekcept for political groups of the extreme right (Absolute
Monarchists) and the extreme left (Mensheviks), the Russian political
6migra`a accept the principle of "no predetermination." In practice
this has meant that each group has advocated its own form of govern-
ment but has-'agreed to its being approved by a constituent assembly.
All groups repudiate the Soviet form of government.
The Solari1ests advocate a centralized government. YAW
students of Russian political movements have interpreted this to
mean that the N1S leaders ultintely might attempt to replace the
dictatorship of the Soviet Politburo by their own dictatorship in
a milder form, with the emphasis on Russian nationalism instead of
international Communism. The Russian Socialists unqualifiedly support
a parliamentary republic as the desired form. The SBONR aims to
unite features of both the Solidarists program and socialism. Comm.
posed largely of persons born and; raised in the Soviet-Union, the
group wishes to retain the advantages of a strong centralized govern-
ment while preventing abuses by limitations over its authority.
The Slidari is hold that supreme power in a "national.-labor"
state would be exercised by a chief of state, whose authority would
be defined by a constitution adopted by a constituent assembly.
The chief of state would appoint the head of government, who in turn
would appoint his own cabinet, of which he would be chairman. Depend-
ing on the final provisions of the constitution, he would be'responsible
either to the chief of state or to the national legislature. For the
legality of its acts, the cabinet would be responsible to a supreme
court.
The Socialists advocate a republic based on proportional repre-
sentation in parliament, government responsible to the elected
representatives of political parties, and reintroduction of. the
"genuine". achievements of the February Revolution (e.g., freedom of
speech., press,assembly, and religion, and universal suffrage).
The Menehevikst ultimate goal is establishment of a socialist
republic based on the teachings of YA= and Engels. They advocate
the union of all workers under the leadership of the industrial
proletariat, accepting a parliamentary republic as the political
form of the proletarian dictatorship. Although still maintaining
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that the capitalist system is breaking down and that the logical
next step in social evolution must be the collective ownership of
the means of production, the Social Democrats now favor putting the
doctrine of the class struggle and complete collectivization in the
background, and emphasizing social reform instead.
The Other Socialist group, the Socialist Revolutionaries, sub-
scribes to a democratic republic with a limited socialist economic.
base. Rejecting Marxism, this group advocates equal representation
in the government of all working people, including the intelligentsia
and the peasants. It not only rejects the Soviet form of
government
but opposes proletarian dictatorship or leadership In f
P any form,
The SBONRR attempts to unite features of both the Solidarists
and the Socialists' political programs. SBONR accepts the principle
of "no predetermination," Provided-that the rights and freedoms
pledged in the February Revolution are guaranteed. It advocates
a republic headed by a president and two deputies elected for a
four-year term by direct, secret, and universal vote. A candidate
would have to receive at least 60 percent of the total votes cast
to be elected. The president would form his own cabinet, which would
be independent of the legislative body. However, a minister could be,
dismissed by a three-fifths vote of the parliament.
The 12=1mocr s state their program in genera]. terms. it
advocates establishment by a constituent assembly and formation of a
government on democratic principles.
Monarchists, The Absolute Monarchists aim at the reetoration of
a monarchy in Russia as it existed before the revolttton of 1905. The
conservative Vlasovites (KOV), who reject the SBONR program, advocate
a monarchy limited by a constitution, which would be adopted by a
constituent assembly. They subscribe to the principle of "no pre.
determination" and support the general views of the Constitutional
Monarchists.
Role of Po7{tiW p111120Information on the attitudes of the
emigre groups on the role of political parties in a liberated Russia
is limited. The Solidaristss program limits partisan political
activity to the "right to influence public opinion and government";
in other words, to propaganda activities. Nothing is said specifically
about party participation in any branch of the Gover ent. SBONR
would outlaw parties of the extreme left (Communists and Anarchists)
and the extreme right (fascists and Absolute Monarchists). The
Constitutional Monarchists, while not advocating prohibition of
proclaim that no class ar party parties,
Monarchists consider privileges should exist. The absolute
Program even if political parties unnecessary, and under their
parties were not prohibited their activities would
be made minimal.
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C= Rights and Freedom of Rel g on. Recognising the profound
changes that have occurred in Russian national life as a result of the
revolution and the Conmunist dictatorship, all major Russian political
parties except the Absolute Monarchists have proclaimed their support
of civil rights and freedom of religion, within the framework of their
respective programs.
The H&UMI i o . The leading Russian emigre' organizations
in 1951-53 modified to a considerable extent their stead on the
national minorities question to eliminate some of the glaring features
which they 1aaew to be in disfavor with unofficial groups in Western
countries interested in supporting gmigre activities. Their revised
views now provide that national minorities should have religious and
cultural freedom and some degree of local autonon5r. Controversy
continues,, however, regarding the right of national minorities to
assert their independence,
Territorial Frob1e . All Russian emigre leaders have been carer.
ful not to make any definite statements on the future boundaries of
a liberated Russia. The s'migrd's show an increasing apprehension that
any future anti-.Communist struggle might be transformed into a fight
against "Russia" aimed at dismemberment of the USSR. The "Balkaui.
nation" of Russia in opposed by the responsible leaders of all the
emigre political groups. Even the Socialists, who in principle
support the right of national minorities to independence, reject
dismemberment of Russia, All groups believe that one of the main
problems of the future state would be to preserve and strengthen its
independence and territorial integrity.
~, . Judging by their programs, the
groups generally favor a strong centralized state. The rights
and duties of the national government are always clearly stated; those
of local administrations, inoluding "autonomous" territories, are
usually described in general and vague terms. The only notable em-
caption is the Liberal Democrats, who advocate a federated state.
Type of Econow
Private. Versus Public Ownership. All emigrC groups support acs
government controls over the econome6v and at least partial public owner-.
ship of some industries. With the exception of the sell group of
Monarchists and Liberal Democrats, the majority believe that a con-
siderable part of the Soviet economic structure would, out of
necessity, be retained. Political expediency precludes incorporation
of such a blunt statement in any of the political programs of the
Smigref groups. But evidence of such intentions, chile disguised.,
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is found in the economic programs of NTS and SBONR. The Socialist
program naturally has nanny economic objectives Comm with
counmism; it advocates gradual socialisation of industry, arable
lend, and natural resources.
AgrigUJIM, The abolition of the compulsory kokihos system
and transfer of the land to the people are accepted by all leading
Russian emigri groups as the cornerstone of agrarian reform in a
liberated Russia. All major groups have expressly announced that
the restoration of the land to prerevolutionary landlords would be
prohibited.
JVdVg=. To achieve the maximin development of the country's
industry but to prevent the development of large-scale capitalism,
the Solidarist and SBONR programs provide that the state retain in
its own hands the principal branches of industry. Other siimller
industrial enterprises would be transferred gradually to commnity
and private sectors of the national economy.
The Russian Socialists expect that eventually all means of pro-
duction would be socialised. They oppose the taking over of big
industries in a liberated Russia-by private capitalists, domestic
or foreign, even during a transition period following liberation.
However, enterprises of light industry would be privately owned dur-
ing the period of transition from controlled capitalism-to socialism.
The Monarchists, conservative Vlasovites,_and the Liberal Democrats
advocate traditional capitalism in this sector of the econo r, with a
minimnt of governmental supervision and interference.
Ia Problems. All main groups hold that wage earners should
be protected from exploitation by private factory owners and from
monopolistic controls over employment by, the state. All lead ng
groups accept trade unions. However, some of them would limit labor's
right to strike. SBONR, for example, would, permit ordinary strikes,
but would prohibit general strikes as being political. in nature* The
Solidarist program says nothing about the right of workers to strike.
In., NW. &Z W kwiLle
Blanket condemnation of all Russian.&igre's residing in the
West has now been replaced by the Kremlin with a differentiated
attack upon the leaders of anti-Connist igmigre Organisations
*. Based on a report prepared June 25, 1954 by FBIS
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(partioularltiy those of Civil War vintage) who are said to be intimi-
dating and exploiting the unfortunate rank-and-file displaced persons.
This tactic of isolating the DP leadership in propaganda complements
the recently Intensified Soviet efforts to weaken the Emigre' organi-.
zations by kidnapping and assassinating their leaders.
The Soviet announcements on June 12 and 15 of unusually lenient
sentences mated out to five "candid" American spies apprehended in
the USSR and the accompanying propaganda on American oppression and.
exploitation of the DP community in ;7stern Germany, together with
promises not to punish returnees indicate a serious propaganda effort
to encourage Soviet defectors and DP's to abandon the West and return
to the homeland. The special effort to promote the defection of DP'a
working with the West may be grasping for chips to play against the
recent defections of MTD agents.
Moscow's propaganda attention to Soviet a has al
ways been
extremely low. In recent years, when dmigr6 leaders have been mentioned
at all, they have been denounced as "American agents." In 1950 a
low-level attack was launched against the forcible detention and "sale"
of Soviet DP children by Western and particularly British "child traderal
but this was not associated with an appeal to adult DP's nor was it
concerned with their plight.
A widely reported sympathetic allusion to Soviet DP'a in West
Germany within recent times occurred in a Pravda editorial broadcast
on June. X21,. 1953, following the anti-Soviet riots of June 17 in
Last Germany. In an item ostensibly devoted to a demand for greater
vigilance by the Soviet people, Pala discussed the recruiting of
agents by American intelligence from among DP camps "where a con.
siderable.number of former. POW's and civilians driven away from the
USSR by German fascist occupiers during the war are detained by
farce." American intelligence officers have taken advantage of the
plight of these people, the editorial charged...and exert upon them
"every means of pressure, deceit, bribery, and blackman in ordet to
force then to carry out espionage and subversive activities against
their country." The editorial distinguished between "direct fascist
accomplices" among the fimigr4s and persons "driven away from the USSR".
by the Americana. Though primarily concerned with internal vigilance,
the editorial. was broadcast 14 time in Western. languages (once each
to Germany and Austria).
There was, however, no explicit bid to DPts to return and no
guarantee, of I aanity against punishment in the Pravda editorial. A
more obvious attempt to isolate hmigr+di leaders from rank-and-file
DP's and to encourage the latter to return was contained in the
propaganda dealing with the "voluntary" return to the USSR of the
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Ukrainian political emigx Josef Brutij_ in Mey, 1954 immsdiate]y
after the announcement of the execution of the spy Okhrymovich. An
article published both in the Ukrainian press and in XOMM
described his career as a Ukrainian nationalist, his fight against
the Soviet regime during the Civil War, his emigration, and his
separatist activities abroad. Adcording to the article, the
brutality of the German occupation of the Ukraine and the ex
perience of his nine-year stay abroad after the war convinced him
that the Ukrainian leaders "desired per over the Ukrainian peoples,
not their freedom."
Brutij.makes a distinction between the leaders'-Bandera, Melnik,
Bogovets, Bolenko--and the ranked-file Ukraiasn iamigre s "whom the
nationalists try to drag into adventure.* In a strong appeal to
Ukrainian DP'a and emigres to.return, the article concludes that
"for every honest Ukrainian who wishes real happiness for his nation
and development of its spiritual and material forces there is no
colmnon road with those so-called. 'leaders and Atamaus'j the place
for the honest Ukrainian is in the Soviet Ukraine among his own
people." Brutij asserts that the return to the 'USSR of the Russian
NTS leader Trushnovrich several days earlier had finally convinced
him to make the mane.
Russian $migre circles of various political trends '(including
monarchists) have recently been swept by rumors that the Soviet
regime plans a general amnesty which will enable a. great majority
of Russian iimigrs to return to their homeland. The amnesty will
be realised in such a way as to persuade the doubtful that this time
the Communists are going to keep their word,
Authorities suspect that some of the more recent refugees have
fled to the West with the assigned purpose of:creating a proper
atmosphere among the Russians for the reception of such rumors. In
this connection it is interesting to note that some Ukrainians from
Galicia who have not heard from their nearest relatives for more
than a decade are now beginning to receive communications telling
about family affairs and even openly asking for packages, chiefly
with clothing.
* Based on material in the files of DRS, OIR, Department of State,
(Sources State/OIR Psychological ntelliaenae DimIts
Vol. 2, No. 22 dtd 15 Nov 54)
?'11e
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