ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON AT THE NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE 10 FEBRUARY 1953

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A001100060049-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: February 10, 1953
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON
AT THE
NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
10 February 1953
When Mr. Dulles invited me to talk before this group, I had very
grave doubts as to what I might be able to contribute to this program.
That you are all experts or potential experts in a very specialized
field was clear to me when I read the contents of the printed program
showing both the coverage of subject matter and the biographic sketches
of the participants. I, therefore, know that I would, be out of my
depth were I to attempt to compete with intelligence experts in talking
to you. Thus, it appeared that my most appropriate contribution to
this training course should come from a recognition of your interest
in gathering and analyzing facts which are then used as the basis for
forming National Intelligence Estimates for the National Security
Council of which I am a statutory member. Further, realizing that
whatever is done in the formulation of foreign policy must in the final
analysis receive the support and approval of the Congress, I felt I
would attempt something which is rather unusual--namely, analyze the
current situation with which we are confronted in the world as seen
through the eyes of an average U.S. Congressman or Senator. This I
can do because I have been an average Congressman and Senator. This
I would like to do because much misunderstanding exists in the Executive
Departments and Agencies regarding the Congress, both House and Senate,
much of which is attributable to a tendency to be overly fearful of
what the Congressman or Senator is going to think or do and, hence,
what must be done to make him act in "proper fashion."
I came to the House in 1947 just at the beginning of the period
when we were developing the programs which you are working with and
under today. That was the year of CIA's creation in the National
Security Act of 1947. Naturally, what I say will be colored to a
great extent by my own background and experiences. However, in working
up my thoughts today I have attempted to make them representative of
the thoughts of most of the Senators and Congressmen, both Republican
and Democrats--probably more Republicans--who believe that some changes
in the direction and attitudes of our foreign, military and security
policies need to be made.
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First, I believe it is appropriate to start with an analysis of
our foreign policy as inherited from the past administration. The
first question we have to ask ourselves is whether this policy ought
to be continued as is--intact--or modified to some degree. Fairness
demands that we pose the query as to whether or not that.policy has
been successful. To answer this question we must go back at least to
the end of World War II--the most costly war in the history of the
world. That was the time when the people of the United States had
great hopes for the future, with our complete military superiority,
based justifiably on the possession of the best Army, Navy and Air
Force plus the monopoly of the atomic bomb. In scanning the peoples
of the world we felt that all were on our side with the exception of
possibly 180 million to 200 million in the USSR and the satellites.
Such was the situation at the end of World War II.
Since that time the Congress has appropriated approximately 100
billion dollars for military purposes and about 33 to 35 billion for
foreign aid, most of which has gone to Europe.
We also developed certain plans and programs--the Greek-Turkish
Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and others which were designed to stop
the march of aggressive Communism throughout the world and to roll
back that tide. But as we analyze the results of that policy today
and after all, people in political life think usually in terms of
results and not in terms of causes and excuses, no matter how good
those excuses may be, I believe that most of us get somewhat of a shock
in finding that we have lost our military supremacy--though not com-
pletely, certainly to a great degree. For example, we are stronger in
strategic air power but we are definitely weaker in tactical air. Even
though we are more powerful on the sea, I think even good Navy men, and
I happen to be one, will admit that we are probably weaker under the
sea. We no longer have a monopoly on the atomic bomb although, of
course, we derive consolation from our conviction that we have many more
and better ones than our enemy.
As far as peoples in the world are concerned, and that, of course,
is the most dramatic part of this analysis, we find that we have lost
600 million people to Communist control, for various reasons, some of
them probably pretty good.
Now those are the facts--the facts which concern the average U.S.
Congressman, the average U.S. Senator, and accordingly the average
American. Since this policy seems to have failed. in some instances, the
question arises as to how this did happen.
At this point I reject two extremes that probably you will find
today in the Congress of the United States and through our country.
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One extreme contends that the only reason this happened is because the
people that made the policy intended it that way. This morning I do
not intend to go into any detail on the question of disloyalty in the
Government. But without minimizing the importance of this problem, I
think any reasonable person rejects the idea that the failures we have
had in foreign policy since World War II have to any considerable extent
been caused because those who made the policies deliberately intended
that they fail.
At the other extreme is the fatalistic view of those who say that
the results were inevitable because of the cleverness and aggressiveness
of imperialistic Russian Communism. Proponents of this view conclude
that the chicanery and subversive methods of the Soviets in their use of
means that we would never adopt brought results which gave them their
great successes and gains and that nothing we could or would have done
would have changed the results.
I repeat that both of these extreme viewpoints must be rejected
because I think that there is another ground which represents better the
thinking of the great majority of the members of the House and the
Senate and which I believe is representative of the American viewpoint.
Frankly, it doesn't make a great deal of difference why it happened,
except, perhaps, from the academic standpoint we may avoid the errors
of tomorrow by examining the mistakes of yesterday. Today it doesn't
make a great deal of difference to stable, current, national security
whether those who made the policies intended them to fail or whether
the failures were due to bad judgment. The important fact of the
moment is that we are confronted with current errors in policy and
recognizing the mistakes we must develop new policies that will not
contain in them the seeds of error which caused the failures of our
present policies.
At this point I believe some general conclusions can be drawn.
In ..hs first place I think the great basic error which has caused our
present difficulties is that we misjudged the character of the world
Communist conspiracy. It was, perhaps, quite easy to do that. All of
us who served in World War II welcomed the participation of the Russians
in that war. We recognized the great contribution that they made and
we were happy in the realization that the assistance of Russia cut down
the contributions and sacrifices that would have to be made by American
men and American women. But as a result of this and because of very
clever propaganda in the United States by persons whom we have since
learned to recognize as actually serving the conspiracy of international
Communism, an idea grew up even in high places in the United States
that the Communist movement, the Communists, themselves, the power
center of the Soviet Union, were all segments of a great peace-loving
democracy and that you could therefore, trust the men in the Kremlin
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and believe what they said at the conference table. Yalta and Potsdam
were primarily the results of that mistaken concept. Though some of
those who attended the conferences had serious doubts about the sin-
cerity of Soviet expressions, we know that these doubts were not
ventilated in the open and removed. If they were made known at all, it
was not until after the conferences took place. Thus, we must reach the
conclusion that one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that exist
today goes back to the concessions that were made at these conferences
and that such concessions were granted because of a fundamental error
in judging the character of the men in the Kremlin who run the Communist
conspiracy.
Even after we began to recognize the fact that the men in the
Kremlin could not be trusted at the conference table, we note a second
fundamental error which, of course, is related to the first, viz., that
we failed to realize that the Soviets were engaged in a conspiracy--a
revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the free nations. Even when we
did realize this fact, we failed to appreciate fully the global
character of that conspiracy. There was a theory, which, incidentally,
is still prevalent in some places and can be sustained by fairly
effective argument, holding that what we are confronted with in the
world today is not World Communism but simply Russian imperialism which
has taken the form of Communism. Hence, as we look over the past seven
years, we find that in too many places there were people who said
Communism was a danger within Russia. Some people of this kind would
go even further and say that Communism was dangerous in Germany and
possibly in Greece, in Turkey, in France, in Italy, but that Communism
in Asia, and specifically Communism in China and in the United States
was a different kind altogether. Such oversimplification, I remind
you, is an effort to give you the average thinking of those in the
national legislature which is representative of the country at large.
The result of that line of thinking is quite obvious because it was
the basis for what happened in China and, of course, what happened in
China caused what happened in Korea. From my own experience I give
you an example which I think points up the falsity of that approach
and which, at the same time, proves the point that Communism is a global
conspiracy, as President Eisenhower said in his State-of-the-Union
message.
I was in Europe in 19.7 with the Herter Committee. Allen Dulles
was one of our advisers, without pay as I recall, and he did an excellent
job. I am sure he will agree with me when I make the observation that
if more members of the House and Senate could go on such trip, we--. --
would experience less difficulty in getting programs through the House
and the Senate which are needed for the security of the country. The
Herter Committee, as you recall, was making studies as to the needs of
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the various countries of Europe for Marshall Plan funds. Our recommenda-
tions to the House were in large part accepted and resulted in the
adoption of the ECA program in the House and, of course, its counter-
part, in the Senate. On that European trip some of us made it a point
not only to talk to the heads of the governments which were anti-
Communist in the countries which we visited, but whenever and wherever
we could we got an audience or an interview with the Communist leaders.
This was of particular interest to me because I wanted to see what made
them tick.
I remember on one occasion a very interesting conversation I had
with Togliatti, the leader of the Communist party in Italy. One segment
I remember quite vividly. I informed him that I was a member of the
Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives and that,
consequently, I was interested in his thinking on labor problems. I
said, "Mr. Togliatti: In the event that the Communists take over in
Italy (the Italian elections were coming up within a few months) what
kind of a program would you favor as far as labor is concerned? Do
you believe, for example, that labor unions should be free of govern-
ment control, and that the right to strike should be protected and
guaranteed?"
A translation was made-he thought a moment, and his answer to
these questions was "Yes." Obviously, he had to answer in this fashion
because he was not in power at that time. After the answer was given I
told him I was very glad to hear his reply because that was the kind of
policy we had in the United States,
Then I added, "Labor unions are free in the United States and, of
course, strikes are going on right now. Of course, you realize, Mr.
Togliatti, that in the Soviet Union such is not the case because the
labor unions there are completely dominated and controlled by the
government and the right to strike is denied."
The translation was made and he looked at me in a not-too-friendly
manner and said: "Well, I don't think that the Congressman and I under-
stand each other. The reason why the right to strike has to be
guaranteed in the United States or in any capitalist country is that
there the labor policy is dominated by employers, reactionaries and
capitalists. Therefore, the workers must have score protection against
such exploiters. But in the Soviet Union we have no employers,
reactionaries or capitalists and, hence, the right to strike need not
be guaranteed in the USSR."
I said: "That is very interesting. Now let me ask you another
question. In our conversation up to this point you have been ex-
tremely critical of the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly,
you cannot contend that all. of what you call 'aggressive intent,
aggressive actions and imperialism' is on the side of the United States.
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Do you have any criticism whatever of the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union on the ground that it is imperialistic? After all, you are an
Italian, and sitting here in the middle you certainly cannot put all
of the blame on our side when there are two great powers apparently
involved in this conflict. In other words, is the policy of the Soviet
Union imperialistic in any respect?"
Again the translation was made. I received the same rather un-
friendly glance and then a very interesting answer. Said Mr. Togliatti,
"Again the Congressman and I are not speaking or understanding quite
the same language. The reason why the foreign policy of the United
States is imperialistic is that it is dominated by employers, re-
actionaries and capitalists. In the Soviet Union we have no employers,
reactionaries or capitalists. Therefore, it is impossible for the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be imperialistic. It is a
people's policy, it is always right and is never subject to any
criticism whatever."
I asked the same series of questions of Arthur Horner, the head of
the miners' union in Britain and received the same answers cloaked in
a British accent. I have asked the same series of questions of William Z.
Foster, in a little different way, of course, because he happens to be
an American citizen. Very pertinent for our purposes is the testimony
of Foster before the Judiciary Committee in 1918 which was considering
legislation to control the Communist Party in the United States.
Senator Ferguson of Michigan questioned him at length as to whether
members of the Communist Party of the United States would fight on the
side of the United States in the event of an aggressive war begun by
the Soviet Union. For approximately thirty minutes, Foster, in a very
able display of mental footwork and gymnastics, side stepping, twisting,
and turning, contended over and over again that the question was
hypothetical because he said it was impossible for him to conceive of an
aggressive war by a people's government, to wit, the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in his estimation it was not necessary for him to determine
whether or not he, or other members of the Communist Party would fight
in such a war because it was impossible that such a war could occur.
These examples are sufficient to show the global character of the
Communist threat.
Accordingly, it seems to me that we made a basic mistake in failing
to realize this fact. The Communist, wherever he exists, whether in
Moscow, China, Korea or in the United States is essentially the same--
owing his loyalty not to his own country, in the event that he is not
a citizen of the Soviet Union or a satellite country, but to the power
center, the Soviet Union, and to others who control the world Communist
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conspiracy. Yugoslavia, of course, is the present exception which
proves the rule. Thus, I conclude that our mistaken evaluation of the
global nature of the Communist strategy had much to do with the failure
of our policy in China.
Compare, for example, the policy that we adopted in Greece with
what we adopted in China. Though the' terrain was much smaller and the
complexity of the Grecian problem not at all as great, we could have
applied to China some of the recognition of the Communist threat which
motivated our actions in Greece in 1917. Over and over again we re-
peated the theme that the Chinese Nationalist Government was corrupt, that
it was unstable and for those reasons that the support we had given was
no good and no further help was justified. I was in Greece in 19117 and
if there was any more corrupt or unstable government in the world than
what Greece had in 19117, I would like to have seen it. It changed twice
in two weeks while I was there and, yet, what did we do? We went in
there and General Van Fleet did a magnificent job of training the Greeks
so that they could defend themselves. As a result of our positive
action, the Greeks met the Communist threat and met it effectively and
at the present time, with our continued support, Greece is still on
our side. Thus, as we look at the situation in Asia, it would seem
that some of the same medicine possibly might have made the difference.
All of these, of course, are problems and mistakes which have been
made in the past and the question is: Where do we go from here? As
we analyze the problem of the immediate and distant future, may I say
again that the only reason we discussed the past today is to make sure
that we do not make those same mistakes tomorrow. As we determine
where we go from here, I consider it proper that we look at some basic
factors. The first basic one is: What do we want? Well, we want
peace, not peace at any price, of course, but certainly peace at as
high a price as we can pay without losing the honor of our nation.
Secondly, the United States will never use war as an instrument of
policy. Our Secretary of State underscored in a very effective manner
this point before he went to Europe. However, the Kremlin, when con-
fronted by a potential enemy, will use war as an instrument of policy,
and so the key to peace is to see what actions or failures to act on
our part will cause the Kremlin to act or fail to act at a critical
time. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we analyze from all view-
points the enemy with whom we are dealing--the man in the Kremlin, the
man who is trained and brought up on the bibles which the Communists
read and follow, viz., Marx, Lenin, Stalin. Without prying too deeply
we are confronted with certain conclusions which are inescapable.
First, the men in the Kremlin are realists. Hence, though they are
bent on world revolution, though they will use war as an instrument of
policy, they will not begin a world war until they are convinced they
can win it. Second, they have a sense of history in that they are
willing to wait not only through their own lifetimes but even longer
than that, if it takes such time to reach the point where they can
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win the world conflict. Therefore, if we want peace, we must do
several things. First, we must exert every effort to make sure that
in the world the balance of power, from a military standpoint, is
actually in our favor so that the Kremlin could not win a war if it
began one. By the words, "in our favor," I do not mean quantity as
much as I stress quality of arms and adequate training. Secondly,
we must make the men in the Kremlin believe that the military balance,
to which we have just referred, is in our favor because if they
actually miscalculate by arriving at erroneous conclusions by reason
of something we have done or failed to do, then, regardless of the
power balance, war will come. Thus, I cannot overstress the importance
of making sure that the military balance of power is actually on our
side and to underscore our responsibility to make sure that we do
nothing which will cause the men in the Kremlin to miscalculate our
strength and begin a major world war, which, in a sense, no one will
win. Thirdly, we must acknowledge that besides our military strength
at home, we need allies abroad, because 150 million people obviously
cannot stand up against 800 million people. Not only do we need
allies but we need as many as we can get.
And so, the policies of the next few years, in large measure,
will have to continue the policies which have developed during the
past seven years, particularly with regard to Europe. If we keep the
United States militarily strong at home, we must strive to get as many
militarily strong allies as we can abroad.
But military strength alone is not enough. In this struggle for
the world we are confronted with men who are very pragmatic about what
they need to achieve their goals of conquest. Thus, they have developed
new tactics of aggression with which you are familiar and which have
proved themselves successful. Let's face the stark fact that by such
tactics 600 million people have been won by the Soviets in seven years
without the loss of a single Russian soldier in combat--at least none
admittedly lost in combat. These new tactics of aggression developed
by the Soviets do not contemplate the use of armed force involving
the armies of the power center, itself--the Soviet Union. What are
such techniques? Some of them, of course, are quite obvious.
a. The use of internal subversion, employing not only the
traditional foreign agents but also agents who are nationals of
the countries involved. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the most
striking example of how a nation can be taken over through a
coup d'etat in which the principals were Czechs and, yet, they
owed their allegiance to a foreign power.
b. Next is the fomenting of revolution. This tactic used
in various parts of the world, in Asia particularly, has been
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quite obviously employed in China. And again we note the in-
stances in which the involuntary forces are made up of nationals
of the countries involved and in which the forces of the USSR -
power center are not committed.
c. Extremely important is the great new weapon of economic,
political, and psychological warfare.
Our answer, to some extent, is quite obvious. First, on the
economic side, we must be as sound at home as we can possibly be--
that means balance. There are times, undoubtedly, when you may
wonder why the Congress hesitates to approve appropriation requests
for funds which you feel are needed for adequate military purposes
or for foreign aid programs. I can assure you that this is not
negativism on the part of the Congress but rather a sober attitude
to be convinced of the necessity for the expenditures, because the
greatest asset the free world has in the present struggle, and the
importance of this point was emphasized in President Eisenhower's
State-of-the-Union message, is a sound, free, productive, American
economy. Thus the total program of the nation must be in balance,
and I am sure that the policies recommended to the President by the
National Security Council will always aim at achieving this result,
namely, that we give as much support as we can to the development
and maintenance of needed military strength for ourselves and the
free world without destroying the basic economy which is our greatest
asset and advantage in the battle for civilization in which we are
engaged. This will demand of us that, while we maintain a sound
economy at home in realistic fashion, we must shore up the economy of
nations abroad so that they, themselves, may be militarily strong and, also,
that they may develop a strong economy, because in such a climate, there
is less likelihood that the Communist conspirator will be able to appeal
to the masses of the people and sell his doctrines.
This last point compels me to inject a word of warning. I do not
subscribe to the views of those who say that the answer to Communism,
whether in the United States or abroad, is solely economic well being.
Any of you who analyze this point will reach the same conclusion which
is already expressed in the Bible that man does not live by bread
alone. Economic strength is, of course, a definite factor entering
into the present struggle. Certainly, where economic unrest prevails
and hunger exists, you have a fertile field in which the Communist
ideas can grow and prosper. But economic strength alone is not the
complete answer, and I use again the classic example of Czechoslovakia.
There was probably a no more advanced country in Europe at the time
of the coup d'etat than that nation, and, yet, the Communist movement
flourished and in a most effective manner.
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In addition to economic soundness, we must have internal security
at home. I won't belabor that point because I believe it is in good
hands at the present time. This is a most difficult problem, and I
can imagine that some of you who have followed the work of some of us,
as we have investigated subversive activities in the United States,
are concerned about these investigations and the trend that they take
in this country. I think, perhaps, that some concern is justified,
because a very delicate balance must be maintained in this field be-
tween security on the one side and freedom on the other. This is not
always easy to maintain.
I am sure that if you took a vote of the Congress of the United
States--a secret vote, or perhaps, a public one--they would support
a movement to put all the Communists in this country in one boat and
ship them to the USSR, even though, of course, that might be technically
impossible. That, however, gives you an idea of the temper of the
Congress on this problem. This is somewhat symbolic of other easy
solutions which are offered: for example, the outlawing of the
Communist Party in the United States. This sounds laudable and easy
but; unfortunately, as indicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
this is an unworkable solution. Therefore, we must be constantly on our
guard that we do not resort to totalitarian police methods in dealing
with the conspiracy in this country and, thus, adopt within our own
borders the methods which we have criticized in our enemies abroad for
dealing with dissidents in their countries. I leave with you the con-
viction that those of us who have been in the Congressional investigative
field and others who are presently engaged in this activity have a
realization of how constant care must be exerted not to kill the patient
we are attempting to cure.
Finally, I believe we will all agree that the bolstering of our
national defense in the development of political and psychological
counterattack is essential. For example, I think that President
Eisenhower's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be
used to blockade the Chinese Communist coast from raids from Formosa,
and his statement that a request would be made on the Congress for a
resolution to repudiate secret agreements are worthwhile examples of
taking the offensive in psychological warfare, besides the fact that,
from other standpoints, these steps should have a great effect. Such
steps as these mean only two things when they are interpreted to the
world. One is that we back our friends and the other that we will not
write off the captive peoples. So much for analyzing the Congressional
mind--assuming that any Congressman or Senator has a mind. That, I
admit, is a debatable point!
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Now, what is our new policy to be? First of all, I believe that
the general outlines of that policy have been set forth in President
Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message and in the recent speech by
Secretary of State, Dulles. I do think that a summary of that policy,
as I see it, might be appropriate and of interest at this time.
Basically, the new policy represents a. change in attitude--a change in
emphasis. I am sure that we are not going to see too many evidences
of drastic moves which would indicate to the people of this country,
or to the peoples of the world, that the policy is of a radically
new type. The action regarding the Seventh Fleet, the pronouncement
regarding secret agreements are good examples of this appreciation.
In this analysis we inevitably grapple with the word "containment".
Even though the policy concepts underlying "containment" may have
served some useful purpose up to the present time, which I rather
doubt, still, I believe that we have arrived at the point where the
word "containment" means a static policy--a draw in the conflict in
which we are engaged. In fact, it means victory for neither side.
What we have failed to realize is that the alternative to "containment"
is not all-out, total war but rather the winning of the cold war. As
President Eisenhower indicated, only by winning the cold war can we
avoid the hot war. To achieve this goal of tangible victory, some
immediate objectives come to mind:
First. The most difficult goal of all is the winning of
the war in Korea. Victory in Korea is of prime concern to our
nation. I know that some peculiar arguments can be made, but
always in quiet fashion -- never in the open, because you could
never convince the American people of this -- contending that
the continuance of the war in Korea is a good thing for the
United States. Supporting this spurious position are statements
to the effect that we should look at the casualty ratio in
Korea--five to one in our favor. Now, this position is untenable
because it is political dynamite which the people of the United
States would never buy, and, furthermore, approaching it from
just the standpoint of a layman, it would seem to me that all we
have to do is realize that in the past two years or so of the
Korean war, we have suffered 130 thousand casualties and'the
Soviet Union hasn't had any. Again, it is the old problem of
keeping our eye on the main target, and winning the current
war in Korea must be the first objective of such a policy.
Second. Our second objective, which is, of course, re-
lated to our past policy, is to allow no further solidification
of Soviet holdings in satellite countries and no extension of
their boundaries, because it is obvious that if they forge
strength within their dynasty and bring further terrain under
their command, they may calculate that they can begin a war--
a World War--and win it.
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Third. we must avoid trouble at home and keep under
control the inevitable problems which we will have with the
nations which we consider to be on our side. without this
approach, the strength which we develop will be sapped of its
potency.
Finally, and this is the most important ingredient in what
we mean by "dynamic" policy, is to roll back the enemy strength
if we possibly can. Even though some consideration of this
factor existed in past policy, I am convinced that we are going
to see a stepping up of attitude and emphasis to reduce Soviet
gains, to puncture the Communist conspiracy and to stir up just
as much trouble as we possibly can in the satellite countries
and in the Soviet Union proper.
This is a big order--a very big order. The objectives we have
outlined certainly have been in the minds of our policy makers during
the past two or three years. They are in our minds today, and we
are hopeful that we will be able to translate these concepts into
appropriate actions. Regardless of our thinking in wishful manner
for easy answers, we must constantly admonish ourselves that in this
field of foreign policy there are none.
The objectives for an affirmative foreign policy can be attained
only by the support which policy makers must receive from you. I speak
now as a member of the Administration and as a member of the National
Security Council, which is the greatest consumer of your product, to
emphasize that knowledge of the facts is essential if we are to make
the right decisions. Essentially, that is why we have to have in-
telligence. Perhaps the best proof of this point is the rather obvious
truth that with better intelligence support our nation might have
avoided most of our present difficulties. Better intelligence might
have put our leaders on notice as to the true character of the Communists,
the men in the Kremlin, the men we were dealing with across the table at
Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. Better intelligence might have given-us a
greater appreciation of the overall global character of the Communist
movement. For example, if we had better intelligence, we might not
have made, what I think was, a fatal error in judgment as to the character
of the Chinese Communist movement in the early days of its development.
We would have known that the Chinese Communist was no different,
essentially, than his counterpart in the satellite countries in eastern
Europe and that, therefore, the choice in China was not between a
Nationalist Government and something better but between the Nationalist
Government and something far, far worse. This, therefore, is your job,
to gather and analyze in impartial manner all the facts and to make the
findings available to those who have to make the policy.
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I recognize that this is a tough job. I know that some of your
assignments will be dangerous and, simultaneously, interesting. I
realize, also, that many of you have already served well in difficult
undertakings. In an organization of this type, which must be a kind of
silent shock absorber, I can Imagine that there are times when your
tasks seem boring and maybe completely meaningless, because you may
not be in a position to see the entire picture. Hence, when you are
tempted to ask yourselves such questions as: "Why do we get this?"
"Why do we have to spend precious time in such tasks as these?" I
admonish you to have confidence in those who direct your activities,
and without allowing your efforts to be neutralized, that you do
the job which has been assigned to you, because, I say this advisedly,
there is no job in our present government which, I think, is more
important than the task which you ladies and gentlemen will be doing
in the years ahead.
In my experiences as a Congressional investigator of Communist
activities in the United States, I have been impressed by a number of
things, but particularly, by the kind of people who have become
Communists in our country. Though most of you are knowledgeable in
this field, my own conclusions may interest you. What kind of men
were Alger Hiss, John Apt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Victor Perlo
and, I will add, incidentally, the atomic scientists and others who
came before our committee and refused to answer questions on the
grounds of incrimination? What kind of people were they? First of
all, they were all born in the United States and, secondly, they were
sensitive, intelligent, able people. Almost without exception, they
were the graduates of the best colleges and universities of this
country. Not one of them acted just for monetary gain but was motivated
by fanatical belief and devotion in the cause in which he was working.
Each believed so deeply that he was willing to do anything for the
cause--a boring job, if need be. He was also willing to do a very
dangerous job--one that would run the danger of a jail sentence and of
holding himself and his family up to disgrace in his community and
among his friends. Often have I thought, during the past three to four
years, as I have seen these people parade before us--these young, in-
telligent, able people--of the need for people on our side as devoted 25X1A
to our cause as Communists are devoted to theirs.
evotea ana aearcatea man or
woman to do the job that you are doing. This may sound like flag waving
to you, but most sincerely do I conclude on this note: The conflict in
which we are. engaged in the world is great and complex. It is military
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in character, economic in character, political in character. But,
over all, it is a conflict for the minds and the hearts and the souls
of men. Our enemies are dedicated to their cause. '/e need dedicated
people-on our side. General Smith, to you and to Mr. Dulles do I say,
as a member of this Administration, and I know that I represent the views
of the Commander-in-Chief, the President, we are very proud to have
serving the United States a group of dedicated men and women--the people
who are members of this Agency. Good luck and Godspeed;
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