AREA SURVEY OF AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A000800050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Area Survey of Africa
This is much too bright an afternoon to deal in great detail with all
the problems of the dark continent. I think I shall content myself with
an overall survey which will attempt to point out some of the main terrain
features of the continent in an economic, political, and social light, and
which I hope may provide you with some guideposts, sow points by which you
may orient yourselves.if you ga into further study of this particular area.
The first thing I would like to do is to define the area a little bit.
Now this lecture is generally labeled "Africa." as a whole. Actually our
office in OCI only deals with the part of Africa that~s outside of this
line; in other words, I~bia, Egypt, the Anglo Egyptian Sudan, belong in
the Arab states world, so that those. would be wholly excluded from my talk
this afternoon. Now there are three other areas which I will not have
very much to say about. Those are North Africa, Ethiopic and the contracts
of the Somal.ilands, and Eritrea, and 2~,dagascar. Actually from the stand-
point of continental Africa, those represent, in the case of Madagascar an
actual sea island, and in the other two cases, land islands. They have
relatively little connection, physically or politically, with the rest of
the continent. Ethiopia has peculiar problems to itself; itts isolated in
the highlands of the so-called loin of Africa. North Africa again, is
separated from the rest of Africa by the Sahara, which acts as an effective
barrier, and also as, in some ways, as a means of communication for
caravans and that sort of thing. But there's not much interaction between
them. Madagascar has a very different culture from any of those in the
west of Africa, and again presents very peculiar problems.
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Now I should like to say a few words, first, as to why we might be
interested in this particular area. American direct interest in the area
is concerned primarily with the resources that the area can produce,. or has
that we can develop. Some of those resources you'll be very familiar with.
Uranium in the Belgian Conga, and the Union of South Africa; chrome,
manganese, asbestos, mica, various other types of minerals which. are of
considerable strategic importance, and some of which are on the critical
list. That's one problem. The second type of interest which-we have in
Africa is an indirect interest -- the way in which events in Africa affect
the fortunes of the colonial powers, Britain, France, Portugal and Spaim,
which control the area to a greater ar lesser extent. Africa is both s
source of strength and weakness to those power. Tt's s source of strength
insofar as the sheer physical area which they control gives them a certain
amount of prestige. It's a source of strength insofar as they can control
the direction in which the resources coming from Africa flow into the rest
of the world; but it may be a source of weakness if, in the necessity of
maintaining control over this part of the world., they are compelled to
expend batallions of troops, equipment, money, and so on, which they might
prefer to expend in more critics]. or more immediately critical areas. I
can illustrate that with a recent exampl?: we are afraid at the moment that
there is going to be trouble in Northern Rhodesia, one of the British -
colonies. Last February, the governor of N. Rhodesia asked the British
War Office that a battalion be returned from Malaya to N. Rhodesia to fore-
stall possible disorders there. This last week, troops, an extra battalion
of British troops had to be flown out to Fenys colony in East Africa to
combat the well-known Mau-Mau situation. -All of .this unrest in Africa
which draws forces away from other and perhaps more eritica.l areas is a source
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Now I should like to outline the main geographical and political,
divisions of the continent. There are a lot of ways of dividing the
continent, but generally speaking, when talking about Africa, you divide it
into Africa north of the Sahara and north of the south of the Sahara.
You divide it-into Moslem Africa mad Black Africa. Now, the shadings
that may come, particularly in this middle belt of the lower Sahara, there
are a good many shadings where you have both black and Moslem Africa in
together. That is, th? Moslem peoples in. the area are also black, and so
on. Hut generally speaking, that's one of the fundamental divisions of
Africa--on a line running roughly across the continent this way, swinging
down below the Sudan, and then running out on the east coast, And the
main emphasis in what I have to say this afternoon will be placed on the.
area south of that line rather than north of it,
Turning now to the political characteristics of Africa, the first
political characteristic that strikes us at once -- it would strike you
in the colors of this map, if you could ses it -- is the fact that Africa
is a colonial. territory. There are only two independent states on the
entire continent. This has important consequences. It means, first of
all, that the. basic decisions as to the political nature of the continent
are not s~.de in the continent but in the E4ncopean capitals in Paris,
Landon, or Lisbon, or what have you.. Now, that of course, is not true
of the Union of South Africa, which occupies that peculiar position, a
dominion within the British commonwealth, a self-governing dominion and
one that is becoming increasingly restive iat that position. Not only are
they all colonial, but within the colonial complex, th? policies that have
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been put into effect in Africa b~ different European powers are not
2a by any matter of means,
eommonwealth. The French policy on the other hand has a different aim and
view. The basic ob~set of French ~d.icy is to ur~i.te its overseas territories
as closely as possible with Frans?. Frenchmen disagree rather violently
on the proper means by which this may be accomplished and in consequence,
French colonial thought has always been divided between what they call a
policy of assimilation, which means a policy of making the overseas
territories more French than the French, .f possible; and a pa.icy of
association, which means bringing the territories into some kind of
relationship with France on a moxe or less equal basis, probably less
equal. In the French Union it is quite clear that everybody is going to
be equal, but some are going to be more equal than others,
Portuguese policy, the policy that affects the two colonise of Angola
and Mozambique as well as a small territory in Portuguese Guinea, has not
been worked out quite so clearly or on such rigid ideological lines as
French policy haa. The Portuguese, however, subscribe generally to the
idea of assimilation. Their eolonies are politically integral parts of the
Portuguese realm, they simp~.y happen to be separatat~ from Portugal by e
few thousand miles of ocean. Other than that they should be treated no
differently than provinces of Portugal itself'.
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Belgian policy 3s concerned with Belgiumts only colony. That has
bean fortunate for Belgium, and in a sense for the colony. Belgium has
been able to concentrate its interests in that particular place. This
policy has been .one of what ws can call. I think, "Materialistic Paternalism."
Its not interested in assimilating th? native. Its interested in seeiag
to it that hefs very well fed, very well cared for,-that he is happy as
possibl?, and that hs worl~s dust as hard as hs can. 5a far, that policy
has been pretty much successful. observors who go to Africa are struck
very favorably by the material accomplishments of the Belgians. They
strike them much more favorably than the material accomplishments of the
territories in British West Africa, where the liberation policy of Britain
has been pursued, It remains to be seen which policy, whiahc# these
several policies in the long run, will turn out to bs the more realistic
in terms of providing a reasonably happy relationship between the overseas
territories and the metropolitan country.
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Now that, of all, I think should illustrate some of the difficulties
in making braced generalizations in Africa. All of these generalizations
that 2 am making before you today should be taken with a very large measure
of salt indeed. They will be affected in a very large measure by the conditions
.that pertain there. In concluding this very brief political survey, I
should indicate that the current trend in Africa is that the initiative:.
the political initiative, is being taken over mare and ire by Africans
themselves. Now it is still true as I said before, that the basic
decisions as :far as the political future of Africa are concerned, .are being
made in grope. But those decisions are being amide not as positive d?ciaions,
but rather as decisions made in response to things that the Africans do in
the territories to political activity that the Africans carry on, rather
than as decisions that are made according to a long range policy. That
trend of course, varies from territory to territory. Its most obvious
in the British territories. Itts least obvious, perhaps, in the Portuguese
and Belgian territories,
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Now the economic situation in Africa is one that is changing very
rapidly. Basically the African economy is a subsistence agricultural setup.
There's relatively little specialization of labor under such conditions.
Everybody has his chore to da but he has to keep doing it steadily, he
can't switch fobs. H? can't be taken off the fob of hunting, fishing, or
sewing, and put on .another Sob of working in the mines without having
serious effect on the ability of the economy to grow its own food. If he
were taken off the Sob, if you were to recruit mine laborers, on a large
scale, then you raise the problem of how the hams folks and the mine labor
is going to eat because there isn't anybody around who's going to be able
to grow the stuff far them to eat._ The eom~mon trend, however, is away from
this subsistence agricultural economy, The introduction of western
techniques, the demands of western technology for raw materials, have
overritien the old agriculture economy, and more and more Africans are now
being placed in the position whereby, for one reason or another, they are
practically or. legally compelled to go to work in the more or less special-
ized economy. They may be compelled or forced by the circumstance of having
to pay a head tax or some other tax, to ga to work an a European plani~.tion ,
or in a European mine. They may willingly, in view of the high wages that
are offered in the rapidly growing cities in Africa, go to the town to work
as a houseboy in some domestic service; to work as a parts-assembly man in
a GM plant in Natal, for e~rample~-.something of that kind. So there is this
shift going on.
And this shift from one type of economy to another, this introduction
of western techniques and western ways of operation and western ways of
thinking about how to make a living has produced a great variety of strains
on the African's mind. He doesn't retend at the resent time to understand
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how this thing came about. All he knows is that the situation that his
fathers knew, the traditional situation in his village is not what it was,
he's perked out of that, put into a wholly alien environment, where the
traditional sanctions of authority, the sanctions of his chief and his
family no longer exist; he's looking around for other sanctions, and the
question which continually bothers us is in what direction he is going to
loo}, for an explanation of what has happened to him, and in what direction
he is going to look for the new authority that he seems to need. The danger,
of course, is that the Marxist, the Communists, in presenting a very simple,
a very striking and dramatic explanation of haw the African came to be
where he is, and also presenting an apocalyptic vision of where he could
be--if he follows their tenets. They'll successfully outbid us, outbid the
local Europeans and the local governments in their competition for his
long-term loyalty.
Now turning briefly to the social. problems. I've already indicated
what some of those are likely to be. I suggest first that the African
society, as it has traditionally etaisted, is a communal. one. The notion
of individualism in the Western sense ie alien to it; individual rights
and property are alien to its. the land and a basic agricultural economy.
The land was a property of the community and the community was conceived
of not nearly as-those people who happen to exist--to happen to be living
on this land at this particular time but the community included those who
have a bed and those who have not yet been barn. The land was held in
trust by the tribe as a unit for the future and. was also held as a trust
that had been handed down to them from the past. This society is not then
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an intensely individualistic one in our sense. Brat, the .new society that
is growing--a society that is growing in the towns in Johannesburg and
Leopoldville and the Bidonvilles in North Africa--is a very individualistic
society where every person has to scramble alone to get what he needs. And
needless to say, this in turn produces again the psychological attains,
the dissatisfactions which are (I stated earlier) in terms of an economic
tran~rmation. The agglomerations and the results therefrom are particularly
CPUCial. The growth of population ix>, native towns particularly towns of
Leopoldville and Johannesburg - those towns and areas where intensive
economic development has bean going on - the growth of population threatens
to and, as in many cases, has outstripped the capability of the European
authorities to take care of sanitary arrangements, to take care of the
various social arrangements, that are necessary to have a satisfied
ation. In consequence, we find Africa at loess ends; we find the
rising crime wave, crime rate; we find the various types of political
religious fanaticism that developed in a situation of this kind in a
dissolving social situation.
I should like to , by way of illustrating some of the things that I
have said, to move over four or five of the current hot spots in Africa;
to illustrate some of these current problems for you..
Current intelligence, this month in Africa, is a pretty good business.
Today, the verdict an the trial of Jomo Kenyatta on a charge of instigating
Mau-Mau terrdriam in Senya.ie expected. The British authorities there era
afraid that all hell is literally going to break loose, if he is acquitted
and some kind of minor hell is likely to break loose if he ian~t acquitted.
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It's twiddle dum and twiddle dee - if the verdict doesn't come today, it's
going to come some time this week. There is such a situation in Kenya as
this. The Kikuyu tribe is the tribe from which the Mau-Mau terrorists have
been recruited. The emergency has now lasted officially some five months,
actually some six or seven.months, and shows no signs at the present moment
of abating.
The Kikuyu tribe was paradoxically, and in some persons' view not so
paradoxically conaidering the strains of this transformation that I have
been talking about, the tribe which was the most Europeanized of all the
tribes in Kenya. The Kikuyu is the tribe from which the good boys came,
from which the bright boys came. They knew how to fix a truck, how to
drive one, and how to do the work on a European farm, Its been a
tremendous shock to local Eur?peans to discover the Africans with whom,
by and large, they were in the closest association, are the Africans who
have turned most violently against them. The loyal Africans, on the other
hand, are what the British refer to as the loyal Africans who have come
from what we would think of as rather more primitive tribes. They have
not become so much socially disorganized, and some of them would like
nothing-better than a chance to take a whack at the Kikuya. They are
traditional enemies in one way or another. Essentially then, this struggle
that is bearing out of East Africa is a product of the strains that T have
been talking about between advancing European society and a disintegrated
African society. Locally, of course, a great many more things are. involved.
There~s the long-term problem that when the Europeans came to Kenya
they pre-empted the White Highlands which are the most temperate parts of
the area. They are the areas that .both Europeans and Africans would like
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best to live in. They are unfortunately the only areas where the white
man in Kenya can. live and prosper successfully. The Kikuyu, justly or not,
2~~~~ented the fact that the E~ropsans have taken these lands over. The
Next week, the Union of South Africa will have general parliamentary
elections. These elections fundamentally, are going to decide two iasuess
one of them is the attitude that the European population is going to take
toward the aspirations of the African and Indian ma3ority in the country,
The second issue is going to be the future rel.a,tionships between the Union
of South Africa and the British Commonwealth. We expect the Nationalist
Party to win, The Nationalist Party's long range goal is a republic within
the Commonwealth with a status comparable to India's. Sts long range goal
in terms of racial policy is the word you may or may not be more or less
familiar with from the newspapers - "~?Aparthei~," - a policy of total
segregation of totally segregated developments. The only thing that we can
say is that we think the Nationalists are going to win, and if they do win,
then the situation in South Africa is likely to deteriorate fairly rapidly.
There's. every indication that the Africans are growing in their sense for
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political organization, that they are likely to get together with the
Indians, perhaps not this year but perhaps nextyear. We've been through
it before as to the time it would take them to organize and the whole thing
is summarized as simply a mess to which no one ssea~any real out, The
danger in this, as far as the U,S. is concerned, is that South Africa is
the one pole on the eontiaent which has showed some capability of defending
itself and which would not have to be defended so much from outside. The
South Africans went so far as to agree to contribute a fight of honor wing,
an honor division, to the Middle East defense setup; at least to the old
Middle East defense setup, At the present time, the internal situation, $~e
strife between the whites in the country as well as to the security problems
as far as blocs are concerned, there's absolutely no possibility that they
can fulfill that commitment.
Between Kenya and the Union is an area which is shortly to be federated
we believe - called the Central Africa Federation. This is another British
scheme, The referendum on Central African Federation is to take place in
one of the areas to be federated in Southern Rhodesia tomorrow. The
Africans - such African opinion as wrists - indicates that they're fully
opposed to this federation,scheme, The African leadership in these
territories appears to regard it as a method for, if not perpetuating this
type of racial discrimination that is now practic?d in Southern Rhodesia
then perhaps even introducing a more stringent type from the Union of South
Africa
Bow the contravala.tion of the coincidence - this arks the troubles
in Kenya, troubles in Central Africa, and the possible troubles in the Union
of South AfricaRis, T think, a very ominous one. We don't know how this
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trouble 3.n the near future and the chances are that there is going to be
trouble for a long time ahead. Ori the other end of the continent, next
week, there will be Kaidal elections in Tunisia. 'The first elections in
this French-North African protectorate that have ever-been held ender the
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French administration. This points up to another crisis.
The French have been attempting to introduce what they ce~7.l political
reforms into their North African protectorates, The local people believe
that these political reforms are simply a cover for perpetuating and, in
fact, strengthening the control of those French settlers who are in the
area, The Seidel elections tomorrow, or the next week rather, are parts
of that reform program. The native Nationalist parties are boycotting the
whole thing insofar as they can or at least boycotting those election
districts where they're sure they'll lose; and generally speaking, they
appear to have what looks like an impasse in that situation., The only
hopeful, possibly hopeful part of the Continent is British Meat Africa
from a political standpoint.
And in the Gold Coast they have afire-brand for a premier,
fir. Kwamin Kama, an American-educated Goldcoaster. He has so far performed
pretty well. He's actually taken on certain conservative shadings since
hers started running the country and became aware of the complex problems
that were involved, We can qualify the Gold Coast situation as something
of a success.
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Nigeria looked as though they're going pretty good. Nigeria
incidentally is the largest colony and the most populous one yet remaining
in the Britiah Empire. There are 3 ?,000,000 people in it. Unhappily, the
perimeter lines that were drawn on this map were drawn in Europe. There
are a lat of fissial lines and Nigeria in consequence is divided between
the Moslem north and an animistic or westernized south, The Moslem north
has no use for the southern politicians and lastly the s?uthern politicians
walked out of the Central Legislaturd in a huff. because their program for
self-government and the first self-government in 1956 had been turned down.
by the representatives of the North This is the conservative Moslem
population which is deathly afraid that if the South gets control of the
whole works, they'll predominate the thing and turn the resources of Nigeria
toward the South rather than allowing the North ita proportionate share.
A similar situation has prevailed in Sierre Leone; faa?tunately at
the moment, things seem to be working out rather better than was expected.
Now those in brief are some of the problems which Africa is currently facing.
They illuatrate, I think and hope, the sort of thing that we are up against
intelligence-wise, iri analyzing an African situation.
Now, as a final point, I should like to talk a little bit about the
intelligence problems that we face 3n Africa. Most of our information from
Africa comes from the Dept. of Statetis sources. That means the Consulate
General in one or two cases, the conssulate Counsellor General in one or
two oases, a legation or embassy in some cases. Now those sources are
sometimes limited at best, even in the European situation where the personnel
of a consulate can circulate fairly freely, where there are no physical
difficulties involved in getting around the country, like France or a
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The basic factor there would depend upon the relations, essentially the
personal relations, which the counsellor or legation personnel has with the
government officials.. Now in Africa the situation is a little bit
different. Ori the whole in British colonies, American State Department
officials have a good deal of freedom to range about, to talk to Africans
as well as the European government. In French, Belgium, and Portuguese
colonies an the other hand, that situation does not generally prevail. ~'
unofficial Europeans, any unofficial European who is not known to be an
actual representative of the government there, who goes out and talks to
Africans on his own hook, is likely to be viewed with a good deal of
suspicion by the local security people; and he is likely to be given the
snow treatment. He .will be invited to a great many parties during his
stay there and he will never see a blessed thing of the country. Everyon?
will be very friendly, very hospitable; and he won't find out a darn thing.
That is one of the dif`ficu7.ties of operating under that type of situation -
a situation where the people of the country and the government are two
different entities; where the rapport between them and the type of thinking
that they do is by no means necessarily the same.
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