SPECIAL TEXT NO. 8 STRATEGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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• Original Classification: R
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.
No person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge
or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those
individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession.
(Par 12, AR 380-5, 15 Aug 1946. See also Par 24b.)
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REST, `ICTED
SPECIAL TEXT NO. 8
STRATEGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE
15 February 1949
PUBLISHED AT
THE GROUND GENERAL SCHOOL
REST ICTED
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Paragraohe
Page
CHAPTER 1 Introduction ----------------------------------
1- 3
I
CHAPTER 2 History and Principles ------------------------
4-28
3
CHAPTER 3 Operations -----------------------------------
29-34
13
CHAPTER 4 Leaflets and Newspapers ----------------------
37-57
22
CHAPTER 5 Dissemination --------------------------------
18-70
44
CHAPTER 6 Radio Propaganda ----------------------------
71-91
73
RESTRICTED
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RESTRICTED
Chapter 1
1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE. a. The purpose of this special text is to pro-
vide those students taking army extension courses in psychological war-
fare specialization or in the psychological warfare aspects of military in-
telligence with the materials necessary to understand the history of, rea-
sons for and functioning of modern strategic psychological warfare (or
long-range propaganda).
b. It includes a brief survey of the background of psychological
warfare and the principles on which it is operated; it distinguishes be-
tween strategic and the other fields of psychological warfare activity; it
considers the organizational possibilities for psychological warfare work
,especially in the-overseas theaters; it explains the role played by printed
matter in the form of leaflets and newspapers; it emphasizes the im-
portance of the dissemination of this printed matter and examines how
this- dissemination, can best be obtained; finally, it analyzes the vital place
of the radio in psychological warfare and states the basic principles and
techniques to be followed in operating this radio activity.
2. THE THREE FIELDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. It is con-
ventional to divide psychological warfare into three categories:
a. Strategic-which consists of "timeless" general themes which can
be used for long periods of time against a given enemy anywhere, either
against troops or against the enemy home front.
b. Tactical-where the effort is directed primarily against enemy
troops in the battle zones and where the arguments and messages are based
on momentary local situations.
c. Consolidation--which aims at the education and organization of the
populace of an occupied area.
3. THE DISTINCTION NOT ALWAYS EASY TO MAKE. It is empha-
sized that the distinction made in paragraph 2 is completely valid only in-
sofar as it affects the organization of operational units and teams. In
many cases it would be highly artificial and inaccurate to make the same
distinction with regard to the ideas and propaganda themes utilized. Fre-
quently, a theme classified as "strategic" can be used with profit in a
"tactical" situation. In like manner, "strategic" arguments enter into the
program of "consolidation operations".
-1-
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a. To illustrate the above, you have in Figures 1 and 2 reproductions
of the obverse and reverse of a leaflet which the Germans used against a
British. unit on the Anzio beachhead. It was "tactical" in the sense that it
was intended to depress the morale of hard-pressed troops under heavy
enemy fire. But it was only one angle of a long-range German propaganda
campaign designed to exploit real or imagined prejudices and jealousies
which divided British and Americans;.in that sense, it was "strategic".
b.'During World War II our strategic psychological warfare service
used radio and leaflets to give wide dissemination in Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan and elsewhere to the texts of the Atlantic Charter and the various
proclamations of Roosevelt and Churchill. The principles contained in those
texts are the.same ones used by our psychological warfare service in the
re-education of the populations of occupied territory.
c. Thus, no hard-and-fast distinction can be made between "strategic"
psychological warfare as far as themes are concerned. There are innumer-
able cases- where "tactical" themes could not be used by the "strategic"
units and many elements of a local nature enter into the "consolidation"
aspect- which are not "strategic"-but modifications of many "strategic"
themes can be employed with profit by one or both of the other
two services.
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6a are A -Alike aMd
dyiv far away from
your country while
e 1,anks arepufting
their teHfs in
Merry old Endlaod
They've got tots of
woney and loads of
time to chase after
your women.
FIGURE 1
2-
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'Yew v~/,ca#s
FIGURE 2
Chapter 2
HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES
4. DEFINITION. Strategic psychological warfare means the wartime
use of long-range propaganda to enemies and neutrals in support of mili-
tary and political operations. Some of its themes and arguments are based
on permanent political principles which remain the same through the cen-
turies; others are less permanent and may have to be changed when a ma-
jorpolitical or military development modifies the situation in the world or
in any large area thereof. But, the ,very term strategic indicates that the
basic themes and arguments are generally applicable against enemies and
neutrals everywhere and there is little likelihood of their having to be
changed within a short period of time.
5. ROLE IN, TOTAL WAR. Military and political strategists have come
to think of the "shooting war" as being only the final phase of "total war".
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It is preceded by a period of "cold war" in which every effort is made to
attain the desired objectives by diplomatic negotiation and economic pres-
sure. In connection with these, an elaborate psychological campaign is
carried on by press and radio to convince the world of the right and jus-
tice of one's own position. Just as actual war is only the last step in a
larger, overall political operation, so strategic psychological warfare is the
continuation and prolongation in time of war of a propaganda campaign
which was started long before during the years of peace.
6. AN ANCIENT ACTIVITY. Any discussion of psychological warfare
must begin with the statement that there is nothing new about it. Since
the dawn of history men have resorted to the same familiar techniques in
order to induce in the mind of a rival or opponent an attitude or frame of
mind favorable to their own purposes. If a potential customer can be per-
suaded that he wants the article you have for sale, your worries are over
as far as he is concerned. By the same token, if an active enemy can be led
to believe that his cause is unjust (and/or that his leaders are evil or in-
competent and/or that you have an insuperable advantage' in equipment
and weapons) and that therefore he hasn't a chance against you, your
struggle is already more than half won. History abounds in instances of
successful psychological warfare: there is the story of Gideon vs Midian-
ites in the Old Testament, the ruse of Ghengis Khan as his hordes swept
over the vast area from the Danube to the Pacific Ocean.
7. MODERN APPLICATION. There is, then, nothing fundamentally
new about the principles of psychological warfare. What is new is the im-
proved techniques of the science of psychology, the systematic study by
the experimental method of how men's minds work, the vastly expanded
media for disseminating the spoken and written word to larger and larger
audiences-and the forging of all these elements into a streamlined pre-
cision tool for influencing the thought of large masses of people.
8. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF CONCLUSIONS. In the years follow-
ing 1918 the German General Staff set its best brains to work to discover
why defeat had come to Germany despite the fact that ample and well-
trained forces remained intact, and the internal economic condition of the
country at that time was far from desperate. They came to the conclusion
very quickly that defeat had been caused by a disintegration of national
morale rather than by military disaster or economic collapse. According to
their analysis, there are three stages in preparing a nation for modern
war : psychological (to strengthen and toughen the morale of one's own
people and undermine and weaken that of probable enemies and neutrals),
economic, military, in that sequence and in that order of importance. They
were c9nvinced that the defeat of Germany in 1918 was to be explained by
the failure to make adequate provision for the first stage.
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9. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF PREPARATORY MEASURES. Ac-
cepting the accuracy of the above conclusions, the German General Staff
approached the study of the problem with characteristic teutonic thor-
ogghness. A vast network of schools and laboratories, staffed with their
ablest psychologists and technicians, set about the task of determining how
the psychological weapon could best be used to :
a. Induce the desired frame of mind in the population of the home
country and
b. Frighten, convert, or confuse potential enemies or neutrals.
10. RESULTS OF GERMAN MILITARY RESEARCH. A study of the
results and decisions of these German researchers affords us an excellent
insight into the evolution of modern scientific propaganda as a part of po-
litical warfare, in time of peace as well as in time of war. It was they who
handed to Josef Goebbels, when the Nazis came to power in 1933, this f ear-
some weapon of which he was to make such effective use in the following
decade. It was by the study of their methods and techniques that Allied
psychological warfare experts laid the foundation which enabled our peo-
ple to overtake and surpass enemy propagandists in the course of World
War II.
11. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL "WEAPON". Applied psychology, co-
ordinated with economic and diplomatic operations before the war and
with military and political operations during the war, is one of the great
new inventions of "total" war, it is an offensive weapon designed to de-
stroy the morale of the enemy's civilian population and armed forces, and
to lower enemy prestige in the eyes of neutrals. It knows no limitations in
time or space; it is conducted before, during, and after the war against
both the home and military fronts of the actual belligerents as well as in
the territories of neutral nations.
12. SUCCESS WITHOUT SHOOTING. a. Recurring constantly in the
writings of all German. commentators on psychological warfare is the
statement that the propaganda campaign must be started in peacetime,
long before the outbreak of actual hostilities. If the campaign has been
carried out effectively, many decisive successes will be scored without
firing a shot. We all recall how Hitler occupied the Ruhr with no more
than a show of teeth by playing on world sympathy for a "poor, divided
Germany" and by arousing in British minds the old spector of French
domination of the continent. We also remember how logical the Nazis made
the "union" with Austria sound with the argument that a tiny, weak inde-
pendent Austria-incapable of sustaining herself economically-was a
senseless anachronism and that all Europe would be better off if she was
a part of a German federation. And by 1938 the might of a rearmed Ger-
many was such a nightmare to all the nations of Europe that Czechoslo-
vakia was overrun simply by rattling the saber.
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b. A more recent (and from our point of view, a happier) illustration
of the part that strategic psychological warfare played in political warfare
is the outcome of the Italian elections in mid-April,' 1948. In the early
winter of 1948 all signs pointed to the weakness of the DeGasperi gov-
ernment and the strong possibility of a sweeping victory by the Com-
munists in the forthcoming elections. There followed swiftly a series of
moves by the western powers designated to strengthen the hand of the
DeGasperi government and encourage Italians to stand firm against the
encroachments of communism. U. S. naval units moved into the Mediter-
ranean. In the United Nations, Britain and the United States advocated
the return of Trieste to Italy and supported Italy's candidacy as a member
nation. Hints were dropped that the western powers would favor the even-
tual return to Italy of the Italian colonies. Radio and press stressed the
fact that communism is a foreign-dominated international movement and
reminded Italians of Italy's glorious role in the history of western civili-
zation. The Italo-American "Friendship Train" brought to the doorstep
of individual Italian families proof that their friends in America were
thinking about them. Personal letters and radio messages assured numer-
ous Italians that they were not forgotten by their former compatriots on
this side of the Atlantic. The passage of the European recovery plan
(ECA) made it certain that Italy would soon begin to receive the ~jconom-
ic assistance necessary to regaining her prosperity. The Vatican spear-
headed the propaganda campaign to remind Italians that Italy was the
cradle of Christianity and laid stress on the anti-Christian nature of com-
munist philosophy. The sum total of these moves offers a splendid exam-
ple of skillfully executed political warfare and the result was a smashing
victory for the anti-communist parties in the April elections. The strategic
psychological warfare moves that may be discerned throughout the elec-
tion and pre-election periods is the use of press and radio campaigns by
the western powers both in Italy and throughout the world against the
communist international movement (ably spearheaded and abetted by the
Vatican), the extensive advertising of the movement of U. S. naval units
in that area, the return of Trieste to Italy, the Italo-American Freedom
Train, the intensive use of personal letters, radio messages, etc., by Ameri-
cans of Italian descent and the advertising of the use of ECA which prom-
ised economic assistance. All this propaganda from a strategic psycho-
logical warfare viewpoint may be recognized for its true worth in assist-
ing and abetting political warfare effort of the western powers.
13. BENEFITS AFTER WAR IS DECLARED. Beyond the successes
scored by political warfare without any fighting, clever strategic psycho-
logical warfare should achieve additional and spectacular results soon af-
ter the start of actual hostilities. This can be done by continuing intensive-
ly with a wartime slant propaganda themes which have been persistently
and continuously pounded home to the enemy in time of peace. We have a
striking example of this in the unexpectedly rapid collapse of France in
the summer of,1940. The morale of the French army and civilian popula-
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tion hal been so thoroughly eaten away by sustained waves of subtle propa-
ganda that there remained no will to resist. The Nazi planners had carried
out ably the instruction given by Hermann Foertsch of the German Gen-
eral Staff in 1935:
"To render an opponent defenseless means to rob him of his will to
fight ..... Everything that affects his will and his means to fight must
be attacked, not only his military-but his moral, spiritual and economic
forces-in short, his entire political power."
The French nation had been convinced that it had been deserted by
the British, forgotten by the Americans, and betrayed by its own govern-
I ment.. France was a beaten nation before the first German tank crossed
the frontiers of the Lowlands. No one believes today that the France of
1940 could have held out indefinitely against the military power of Nazi
Germany, but the most competent observers feel that a grim and de-
termined France 'could have made the occupation of the country a much
more prolonged and costly operation than what actually took place.
14. THE ARMY'S ROLE. Strategic psychological warfare is, then, the
wartime continuation and application of propaganda which has been. start-
ed in time of peace. But, our peacetime policy is controlled and directed
by the Department of State and the propaganda employed to support it
must necessarily be directed by the same agency. In time of war, a large
part of the burden of strategic psychological warfare devolves naturally
on the Army and Navy. For this reason, it is vital that in time of peace
experienced key personnel of the Army and Navy be kept in close and con-
stant contact with the policy-making and operations of our propaganda
campaign. Conversely, in time of war it is necessary to have experienced
reN.-esentatives of the Department of State included in the formation of
strategic psychological warfare policies. This cooperation with the De-
partment of State in the formation of policies will be given more detailed
consideration in Chapter 3, under OPERATIONS.
15. KNOWLEDGE OF AREA ATTACKED. An essential requirement of
successful psychological warfare is that it be based on an accurate knowl-
edge and full understanding of the intellectual, emotional and economic
trends of the country against which it is directed. Religious prejudices,
sociological problems and other factors differ widely from one area of the
world to another. An argument or theme which might be highly effective
with the population of one country could be completely ineffective (if not
actually harmful with another people in another part of the world.
16. MISTAKES IN THE PAST. In the early days of modern psycho-
logical warfare frequent mistakes were made which stemmed from a ten-
dency to believe that the emotional and intellectual reactions of all peo-
ples to a given issue were the same : that issues which were very "live" in
one country were equally important in another. With experience there
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came the realization that a question which might be of vital interest in one
area could be completely unimportant elsewhere. For example, the border
dispute between Ecuador and Peru is a "hot" issue in those countries, but
it is of no concern at all to the Chinese. To be effective, propaganda to any
given nation must be in terms of things which affect its people deeply and
not in terms of what is important to people in another part of the world.
17. NEED FOR AREA SPECIALISTS. Thus, successful psychological
warfare requires not only specialists in the general science of human be-
havior, but also area specialists who can give to the generalities a form and
expression which will make them appealing to (and not offensive to) the
particular social or racial group for which they are intended. Each na-
tional, racial and religious group has its particular prejudices and taboos
in the light of which a propaganda message must be carefully weighed.
Even within a single country there are regional differences and sensibili-
ties which have to be considered. For example, in our own country we
might find that an argument on the civil rights question which might be
received with approval in Wisconsin would arouse anger and protest in
Alabama. The function of an enemy psychological warfare operator would
be to exploit and intensify such latent dislikes and hatreds.
18. FLEXIBLE POLICY. Psychological warfare must not have a fixed,,
stationary policy, but must be highly fluid and flexible, adapted to chang-
ing developments and sensitive to national, racial, religious prejudices and
differences. It must be prepared to change its "line" in accordance with
shifting events in various parts of the world, and at the same time adhere
to national policy statements and not be caught in transparent contradic-
tions. This can be done by making statements as, general as possible, but
not rashly predicting the uncertain future, and by not making specific
promises which we may not be able to keep.
19. DON'T COMMIT YOURSELF. One of the cardinal principles of psy-
chological warfare is: "Always commit the enemy as widely and as fully
as you can. Never commit yourself except for a specific purpose and then
only when you are absolutely sure you can make good on your commit-
ment." Unfulfilled promises and rash boasts from the enemy camp are
bread and meat to the worker in psychological warfare. He pounces eager-
ly on any such lapse by a political or military leader on the other side and
hurls it back by leaflet and radio with intent to convince the rank and file
of the enemy that-their leaders are not dependable and don't quite know
what they are about. It is spectacular psychological warfare to forecast a
brilliant achievement and then make it come to pass ; it raises the morale
of your own forces and depresses that of the enemy. But, if the forecast
proves to be only m idle boast and the enemy tosses it back at you with
a resounding "Oh, yeah?", the opposite effect is disastrous. Hence, the ex-
pert psychological warfare operator tries to commit the enemy as widely
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and as deeply as possible, but he is extremely wary about committing his
own side.
20. DON'T CREATE NEW ISSUES. ,Another basic rule of psychological
warfare directed at the people of another country is that it should never
create new issues and then try to convert the foreign nation to them. It
should detect existing issues and concentrate on twisting and exploiting
them. A weakness of German propaganda directed to Americans during
the last war was its insistence on the anti-Semitic theme. It failed to rea-
lize that among Americans anti-Jewish feeling is neither very widespread
nor very deep, and thus most of the effort along this "line" was wasted.
But the German propaganda machine was on safer ground when it ap-
pealed to an actual anti-European prejudice among the Arabs of North
Africa. And many an American did some serious thinking about the state-
ment that the Russian ally on whose side he was fighting was actually a
greater menace than the German enemy with whom he was exchanging
bullets.
21. IMPORTANCE OF PERSONALITIES. More often than not it is
preferable to direct psychological warfare at personalities rather than at
issues. Emotional enthusiasm for (or hatred of) an individual is much
easier to arouse than for an abstraction. His (or her) features can be en-
nobled or caricatured, the shape of the head distorted, some physical defect
exaggerated in order to produce the kind of effect desired. We are familiar
with the use made by political opponents of Chamberlain's umbrella, Hit-
ler's mustache, Stalin's head. We saw how both Communists and anti-Com-
munists in Italy adopted the likeness of Garibaldi's magnificent face to
win votes for their respective causes. People come to love or detest a per-
son much more readily than they do an idea.
22. OBVIOUS SOURCE. At the strategic level, it is usually desirable for
the source of the propaganda to be evident. Experience has shown that a
consistent, straightforward presentation of one's own viewpoints ("white
propaganda") is more effective than the use of ruses, tricks and rumors
whose origin appears to be different from what it really is ("black propa-
ganda"). "Black propaganda" is highly delicate and risky. It should be
practiced only by skilled experts and then only when the objective is of
the most vital importance and it seems impossible to attain it by the
"white" approach.. In rare cases, it is better to have rumors spread by
agents and "fifth columnists" in such fashion that they seem to have gen-
erated spontaneously within the country under propaganda attack. Your
own radio can then pick them up and disseminate them as "news" from
the enemy country. (This technique will be elaborated in Chapter 6, under
RADIO PROPAGANDA.) This technique is extremely dangerous; ex-
posure of your deceit means the loss of the confidence of your audience-
and this confidence will be hard to recapture once it is lost. It is always
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safer (and in the vast majority of cases just as effective) to stick to the
truth, labelled for what it is and indicating clearly the sources from which
it emanates.
r
23. DISSEMINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. a. Psycho-
logical warfare is conveyed to the enemy by the use of printed matter,
films, and by radio. Each of these methods are discussed below:
(1) Printed Matter. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the enor-
mous role which the-written word has had in influencing the history of
human thought. Newspapers, leaflets, handbills, booklets and books have
proven in the past to be the backbone of psychological warfare and they
will continue to be a primary media despite the increasing and expanding
importance of the radio.
(2) Films. This medium, with its graphic appeal to the eye, is more
and more widely used as one of the most persuasive means of swaying
human thinking. In the movie-conscious United States, we have daily evi-
dence of the influence which this medium can exert. And it takes a wide-
awake, discriminating and thoughtful mind to distinguish between truth
and "hokum" in a motion picture. Following the invasion of Poland, the
diabolically clever Nazi Propaganda Ministry arranged for films of those
scenes of horror to be distributed as widely as possible in all countries
which were to be eventual victims of German aggression. Foreign visitors
of all categories were given special showings. We can readily believe that
no small amount of the panic and paralysis caused in France by the Ger-
man invasion in 1940 sprang from a visual memory of what had happened
to Poland. For obvious reasons, this medium is of little use against the
enemy in time of actual fighting. However, it can be of deadly effective-
ness during the years of "cold war" which precede the period of military
operations.
(3) Radio a. Students of mass psychology have reached the con-
clusion that the human mind is more affected by what it-hears than by
what it sees, that the appeal of a reasonable voice is greater than that of
the most brilliant artistry or the most eloquent printed mater. German
military psychologists made this observation early in the 1920's and subse-
quent laboratory research has confirmed their deductions. Thus, the radio
has become the No. 1 medium for influencing public opinion and its influ-
ence will increase as technical improvements better its performance and
expand the potential listening audiences. This primary medium is of such
importance that the last chapter of this text will be devoted to the subject.
b. Psychological warfare themes may be conveyed forcibly by the
three devices discussed below. These devices may be used in any or all of
the mediums discussed in the preceding paragraph.
(1) Slogans. Single words or brief phrases which have an emotion-
al content and convey to the hearer the suggestion of a whole idea. "Leben-
"sraum" ("Living space") conveyed in a word Germany's expansionist
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FIGURE 3
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d. "Black" propaganda (see paragraph 22) is a highly delicate op-
eration and must be carefully coordinated with secret intelligence. If it
is not closely controlled, it may produce adverse or even dangerous results.
Accordingly, such operations are best conducted from theater headquar-
ters.
e. The intelligence requirements for psychological warfare go beyond
the scope of ordinary military intelligence. Matters like the food situation
on the enemy home front, rumors about scandals in the private lives of
enemy political leaders, any sort of social unrest-all of these are part of
the fabric of psychological warfare. When the usual intelligence agencies
are asked to provide the ramified information needed for this work, the
burden placed on these agencies is unduly heavy and distracts, them from
their specific duties. Insofar as the intelligence needs of psychological
warfare can be met through normal army channels 'without placing on
them an additional- heavy burden, this method should be used. Usually,
however, Psychological Warfare Division will have to provide its own
channels for supplementary information.
36. ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION. Condition in a particular the-
ater of operations will determine the organization of a psychological war-
fare division for that theater; it is impossible to define it in detail. In gen-
eral, it can be said that the organization should be based on the duties of
the said Division in that theater and should be functional im nature, i. e.,
groups and sub-divisions thereof should be established to perform duti:a
incident to each of the operations indicated in paragraph 33. Figure 3
diagrams an organization which can easily be modifed to adapt it to the
special circumstances in any theater. When the headquarters is joint or
combined (and it is probable that this will be true in many cases in future
war), the Division willcontain personnel from each of the services or al-
lies represented in accordance with the type of staff which is established.
The assignment of functions to the various sub-divisions of the Division
are discussed in the following paragraphs :
a. Plans and Policy Group. As the same implies, this group is charged
with the staff work to cover sections a, b, and c (5) of the responsibilities
of the Psychological Warfare Division discussed in paragraph 34. It fur-
nishes the necessary guidance for the Intelligence and Operations Groups,
keeps their work in line with present and future operations in the theater,
and sees to it that the work of the Division is coordinated within its own
elements, with other kindred agencies operating in the theater, with po-
litical advisers and news agencies, and with the work being done in other
theaters and in the ZI.
b. Liaison Group. The normal coordination between the Psychological
Warfare Division and other divisions of the theater headquarters staff
is conducted in routine manner, i. e., members of the Plans and Policy
Group coordinate with G-3, members of the Intelligence Group with G-2,
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(2) Programming and .operation of fixed radio stations 'which are
. 11 beamed at enemy or' enemy-occupied territory.
(3) Preparation and mass-production of newspapers, periodicals,
and "long-range" leaflets and arrangements with the Air. Force for desired
dissemination on carefully chosen targets.
(4) Establishment of a monitoring service to listen in on our own,
allied and enemy broadcasts.
(5) Evaluation of the effectiveness of our own, allied and enemy
psychological warfare and the development of new methods, techniques
and devices to make our own work more effective.
(6) Preparation of requirements in personnel, supplies and equip-
ment and the allocation of same to proper units and teams.
35. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. The principal fields in which the psy-
chological Warfare Division will operate are as follows :
a. Operation in the radio field will always be necessary when cover-
age of distant areas 'can be provided from fixed stations which are taken
over or set up in the theater. Policy coordination and assignment of mis-
sions for such operations must be under direct theater control. Extensive
monitoring can also be provided better at the base of operations where
technical equipment is available in larger quantities than elsewhere. All
these factors make it advisable to have activity in the field of radio cen-
tered at theater headquarters.
b. In addition to the "long-range" strategic leaflets which are its spe-
cial province, the Division will be called on to perform certain services
for lower commands. To insure high quality of manufacture acid uniformi-
ty of size (this last factor is vital when the material is being prepared for
packing into leaflet shells or leaflet bombs), the quantity production of
standard leaflets needed by tactical units can be effected better on the
large static presses available at theater headquarters than on the small
mobile presses with which the lower echelons are normally equipped. Ac-
cordingly, such leaflets as "fair treatment of prisoners", "safe-conduct
passes", etc. which are used by all psychological warfare elements should
be manufactured at theater headquarters.
c. Leaflet newspapers intended for enemy, troops or civilians require
a large editorial and publication staff, particularly when these pa-
pers are double-sheet, illustrated, and are to be produced in volume. Their
dissemination is generally effected by strategic air units whose bases of
operations are within delivery range of theater headquarters. All these xe-
quirements are met better as a theater project than when the activity is
decentralized to lower units. This does not preclude the publication in spe-
cial cases of small single or double-page leaflets by teams at army group,
army or similar headquarters.
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the Zone of the Interior (ZI) through the medium of short-wave radio.
Some "timeless" printed matter can be produced in the ZI and shipped
overseas, but the experience of World War II was that such material was
usually too stale to be of much value. The great bulk of the printed
matter must be prepared and produced in the theaters where there is the
closest contact with latest developments. The greatest part of the most ef-
fective. standard-wave radio programs must also be prepared overseas.
In general, the ZI is too remote from the areas of operations to contribute
more than high-level directives on political psychological warfare and the
broader aspects of military psyochological warfare; these general princi-
ples can best be translated into radio scripts and leaflet texts in areas more
closely in contact with the changing situations, I. e., in the theaters of
operations.
33. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE A FUNCTION OF COMMAND. Re-
sponsibility for psychological warfare within a theater, rests with the the-
ater commander who must take into consideration the directives under
which he operates, the special conditions in his theater and the nature of
the military operations he is to conduct. To implement the psychological
warfare activity, the theater commander will normally' establish a special,
staff division and will assign to it the functions and duties pertaining to
his responsibilities in this field. Since general conditions and the nature of
the military operations to be conducted will vary from theater to theater,
it is impossible to define precisely the functions and organization of the
psychological warfare staff division for any particular theater headquar-
ters. However, the fundamental functions and responsibilities of this staff
division will be the same in all theaters and constitute a skeleton which
can be modified to establish an organization suitable for any particular
situation.
34. FUNCTIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION.
The basic functions and responsibilities of the Psychological Warfare Di-
vision are to :
a. Integrate psychological warfare with proposed theater operations
and to execute such operations as may be directed by higher headquarters
or requested by lower commands.
b. Coordinate all psychological warfare activities within the- theater,
relate them to similar activities in other theaters, establish close coopera-
tion with the political advisers to the theater commander and with repre-
sentatives of any national (or allied) information services which may be
operating or planning to operate within the theasew.
c. Plan and put into operation the different attivities of psychological
warfare, I. e.:
(1) Acquisition of necessary intelligence and the interchange of
pertinent items with other interested agencies.
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cy decisions about psychological warfare, but the role of the representa-
tives of the armed services will become much larger and more active than
in time of peace. They must guard against any political moves which
might hamper or embarrass theater or field commanders. For example, it
might be brilliant political propaganda to promise the civilian population
of a certain area supplies and transport in return for cooperation with
our advancing forces; however, if the field commanders are not in a po-
sition to furnish these services, the later widespread disillusionment and
discontent over failure to keep the promises may outweigh the advantages
gained by making them. The representatives of the armed services must
keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly informed of the latest trends in
political propaganda in order that these may be fused with military psy-
chological warfare directives sent out to theater commanders. The em
phases at this level are necessarily quite different from those at theater
level.
31. THE ARMY'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACETIME. The Army's
participation in the national propaganda campaign in time of peace is
largely consultative and advisory. It must, however, make plans and prep-
arations for assuming a more active role with the outbreak of hostilities.
Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff, De-
partment of the Army has the following broad responsibilities for psy-
chological warfare operations :
a. Providing planning and operational guidance for psychological
warfare activities.
b. Providing Department of the Army liaison with joint agencies and
with non-military agencies of the government.
c. Collecting, evaluating and interpreting sociological and psychologic-
al information, including an anlysis of foreign propaganda affecting the
military interests of the United States.
d. Providing psychological warfare units and bulk authorization in
the organization of appropriate echelons of the Army and inclusion of
suitable materials and supplies in logistical planning.
e. Providing for army training in psychological warfare and the de-
velopment of new or improved weapons, instruments and techniques.
The allocation of functions affecting the above among the various di-
visions of the General Staff, United States Army, is found in appropriate
Department of the Army memoranda. The Director of Plans and Opera-
tions, United States Army, has the responsibility for general supervision '
of army psychological warfare activities.
32. THE THEATERS OF OPERATIONS ARE THE CENTERS OF AC-
TIVITY. In time of war, the theaters of operations become the centers of
strategic psychological warfare activity. Some part of it can originate in
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The answers to the above questions vary widely. Some German experts
have gone so far as to state that this weapon is to be considered as sup-
planting rather than implementing the military machine. This is an ob-
vious exaggeration and is not to be taken seriously. Those enthusiasts who.
believe that propaganda alone can work miracles are hypnotized by their
own words and dazzled by scattered initial successes. Dictators do not un-
derestimate the importance of military, naval and air power, but they
count on using psychological warfare to win many political battles before
any "shooting war" starts. They know you can't win a war by psychology
alone, but they also know that its use before and during wars will make
them easier to win. Most American psychological warfare experts (and in
this they concur with the British), content themselves with the statement
that theirs is a valuable auxiliary weapon and does contribute to victory
when coordinated with other arms,-when integrated with economic, dip-
lomatic, and military warfare. As to its value in connection with military
warfare, they point with pride to the statement of General of the Army
Eisenhower
"In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have
seen a great many changes in military science. It seems to me that not the
least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific
and effective weapon. Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved
its right to a place of honor in our military arsenal."
Chap&r 3
OPERATIONS
29. PEACETIME POLICY CONTROL. In time of peace propaganda is
employed in support of U. S. foreign policy and that policy is the responsi-
bility of the Department of State. Thus, in the board or agency which di-
rects.pre-war propaganda, the influence of the Department of State must
be predominant. In the said board or agency representatives of the various
branches of national defense (Army, Navy, Air Force) are included. These
representatives keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed up to date on the
changing pattern of our peacetime propaganda and present to the cooper-
ative board or agency appropriate views on items which affect the func-
tions or responsibilities of the armed services. In this way, trained and ex-
perienced representatives of the armed services are fully cognizant of the
background of our propaganda campaign and are able to advise the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in making plans for the day' when the armed services will
become the operational agencies for psychological warfare, i. e., with the
outbreak of hostilities.
30. CHANGES NECESSARY IN TIME OF WAR. With the advent of
war, the cooperative board will continue to be the source of high-level poli-
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thought on a higher level. If one tries to reason with a person who has
been thus impregnated, he will sooner or later withdraw into his fortress
of collective thinking and will hide behind some emotional slogan. The
mass delusion which gives him the feeling of greatnE s and superiority is
dearer to him than all personal consciousness. The technique of such ideo-
logical regimentation is based on that of hypnosis. There are a few simple
slogans. These are repeated, day-in and day-out, in every conceivable form.
The radio, the press, posters in the streets, public advertising-all say the
same thing. In times of mass emotion, people are especially defenseless
against mass suggestion. Such a people is no longer composed of reason-
ing individuals; it follows the thought pattern in which it has been traingd
since childhood.
26. NEED FOR SKILLED AND CAREFUL PLANNING. Psychological
warfare one of the most delicate and explosive of weapons and can prove
a dangerous boomerang if placed in the hands of inexperienced operators.
In normal military operations we are accustomed to thinking in terms of
evaluation of the objective, screening of the intelligence, detailed prepara-
tion of the operation and the assignment of specialists to each phase of
the, mission-but there is often found the deluded impression that anyone
can execute psychological warfare. On th,, contrary, a psychological war-
fare "mission" is just as complicated and requires (if it is to succeed) the
same amount of calculated preparati gin, detailed integration and skilled
execution. To assign any phase of the task to an unqualified or inexperi-
enced operator is to invite failure of the entire mission. In psychological
warfare, the effect of such a failure is even worse than in other operations
because a long series of successful missions is necessary to "live down" in
the mind of the enemy the amusement or ridicule occasioned by one single
mistake.
27. PRESTIGE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The achievements of
psychological warfare during the past war were. such that its usefullness
and value are much more generally appreciated in this country than they
were a decade ago. We observed how close Josef Goebbels came to per-
suading the, world of the myth of Nazi invincibility and the hopelessness
of our trying to overtake the Germans in the race for supremacy in the air.
Our own successful efforts in this field awakened our people to the im-
mense possibilities of clever and skillfully executed propaganda.
28. ACTUAL EXTENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE'S CONTRI,
BUTION. We can admit that propoganda, efficiently applied long in ad-
vance of an actual state of war and continued through the period of active
fighting, is a deadly weapon of total war. But just how much can really be
claimed for it? To what extent can psychological warfare (joined with
economic and diplomatic activities to form the combination we call "po-
litical warfare"). be expected to supplant or replace armies and navies?
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dreams. "The Mediterranean, an Italian lake," expressed Italian ambition
to recreate the Roman Empire. "Asia for the Asiatics" won for the Jap-
anese many friends in other parts of the Orient.
(2) Symbols. Signs or figures which carry to the eye the same
effect that slogans do to the ear. These are one of the oldest and most
powerful ways of influencing public opinion. We are all familiar with the
use made of the swastika by the Germans, of the hammer-and-sickle by the
Russians, and the "V" made famous by Winston Churchill. We also recall
how reverse use was made by our enemies of caricatures of Uncle Sam
("Uncle Shylock") and grotesque distortions of the face of President
Roosevelt.
(3) Music. "Music hath charms to soothe the savage breast" and
the hypnotic power of a haunting rhythm accompanied by simple, easily-
memorized words is enormous. We are all conscious of the emotional ap-
peal of "AMERICA," "THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER" and the
"BATTLE HYMN OF THE REPUBLIC." For Nazi Germans
"DEUTSCH UBER ALLES" and the "HORST WESSEL SONG" had
the same appeal and "GIOVI.NEZZA" (Youth) helped "sell" fascism to
the Italians. Students of United States history recall how JOHN
BROWN'S BODY LIES A-MOULDIN' IN THE GRAVE" helped inflame
emotions during our own Civil War.
24. PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION. A guiding principle of which the
psychological warfare operator must never lose sight is repetition, repe-
tition, repetition. A small number of carefully selected simple themes is
preferable to a large number of over-subtle or complicated messages. Some
appeal to the emotions and others to the reason; of the two classes, the
former is more effective with a large number of people. On these themes
the propagandist hammers, pounds and insists with every medium at his
command. The form is changed frequently, the idea is dressed up in new
clothing, but the basic theme remains the same and the intended victim
should see it and hear it again, again, and again until he finally comes to
accept its truth.
25. MASS HYPNOSIS. In conducting psychological warfare against a na-
tion which has been subjected to totalitarian regimentation, it is important
to remember always that such a nation does not think along the same lines
as does the population of a democratic country. Every inclination toward
independent thought has been crushed through systematic training; in its
stead there has been substituted automatic response to fixed stimili. Mass
delusions can be induced; if one isolates a people, allows no outside cor-
rective, and pounds away daily with press, radio and films, with fear and
pseudo-enthusiasm, any delusion can be instilled into that people and it
comes to accept as natural the most primitive acts. Such delusions, so
carefully implanted, are difficult to correct. Reasoning no longer has any
value, for a mind mesmerized by the lower type of thinking is deaf to
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etc. However, the very nature of psychological warfare makes the work
so complex and the necessary relations with other agencies, service, etc.,
so ramified, that liaison is of the utmost importance. Furthermore, it is
normally desirable to have division representatives make regular visits to
subordinate commands to effect the necessary coordination and exercise
such supervision as may be authorized. The Liaison Group may be a spe-
cial section of the Division or. it may be a part of the Plans and Policy
Group. Either system is satisfactory and the choice will be determined by
the composition of the theater headquarters and the nature and extent of
the liaison tasks to be performed. It is always preferable that the officer
(or officers) doing liaison work with a particular service have a reason-
able competence in that service as well as in psychological warfare. For
example, the officers doing liaison work with the Air Force should know
enough about capabilities of the different type of aircraft, about the lo-
cation and operations of the different air units in the theater to forestall
any requests for air distribution which might be unreasonable or impos-
sible of accomplishment. In like manner, the officers doing liaison work
with the artillery should understand the problems and difficulties of those
units to be able to advise the Plans and Operations Group accordingly; in
short, they should be able to "talk the language" of the artillery service.
Only the most general statements can be made about the organization of
the Liaison Group. The particular conditions within the theater, the kinds
of forces involved and the nature of the operations will govern the kinds
of liaison to be performed, and these requirements will in turn govern the
size and composition of the Liaison Group in the Psychological Warfare
Division.
c. Intelligence Group. This group is responsible for gathering the in-
telligence necessary for psychological warfare purposes and for the pro-
cessing and dissemination of such intelligence. Its work separates natural-
ly into three stages:.
(1) Collection of materials.
(2) Interpretation and evaluation of those materials.
(3) Reports and records.
Appropriate sub-groups should be created to cover those functions.
Their respective duties are as follows:
(1) Collection Unit. Acting on advice from the.Plans and Policy
Group on the basis of directives and requests from other headquarters,
this unit will formulate the intelligence needs for psychological warfare
needs in the theater. The required information will be obtained insofar as
possible through normal military intelligence sources. To the extent that
the required intelligence cannot be obtained through the usual sources, this
unit will conduct interrogations of Prisoners of War (POW's) interviews,
document research, etc. To this end, the personnel of this section must be
in closest contact with the various G-2 divisions so as to know of the
whereabouts of the enemy or other persons or materials which might re-
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veal information useful in psychological warfare operations. The collec-
tion unit will also conduct surveys, polls, etc., to determine the effective-
ness of our own, allied and enemy psychological warfare.
(2) Analysis Unit. This unit will take the information gathered by
the collection unit, correlate same with information forthcoming from
other sources and prepare the net result in a form suitable for use in psy-
chological warfare. Its analysis should point toward two main objectives:
(a) An indication of the strong and weak points of the ene-
my's current morale, an evaluation of the effectiveness of our propaganda
against him in the past and a prediction of how we can best attack him
psychologically in the future.
(b) A study of the effect on our own forces of enemy psycho-
logical warfare with recommendations for advisable counter-propaganda
measures.
(3) Report Unit. This unit puts into proper form and gives ap-
propriate distribution to the reports compiled by the collection and analysis
units. It also maintains up-to-date the files and records of the Intelligence
Group so that the information contained therein can be made readily
available to properly authorized agencies.
d. Operations Group. This group is the pulsating heart of the entire
Division and it is on the efficiency and ability of the members of this
group that the success of the Division's work hinges. It is subdivided into
units of which each is charged with one or more of the media of psycho-
logical warfare employed in the theater. When there is need in the theater
for any sort of specialized or technical training, the training unit or-
ganized to take care of this work will fall in the Operations Group. Co-
ordinations of activities within the group is effected by the group chief
and the heads of the various units. Specific duties of various units are as
follows:
(1) Radio Unit. Under guidance of the Plans and Policy Group and
on the basis of information furnished by the Intelligence Group, this unit
prepares the scripts of programs and supervises broadcasting from all
the fixed radio stations in the theater. Its technicians arrange for the in-
stallation of new stations and for the repair, activities and maintenance
of captured stations. It coordinates the radio work being done by the mo-
bile radio units attached to lower commands and transmits over the fixed
stations such tactical scripts as may be requested by lower commands and
approved by the Plans and Policy Group. It formulates the requirements
in radio personnel and equipment for all radio activities in the theater and
allocates frequencies, personnel and equipment to the various stations and
mobile units. It establishes and maintains a general monitoring service of
the activities of all enemy, neutral, and friendly radio stations within the
range of reception.
(2) Leaflet Unit. With the possible exception of the radio and its
powerful appeal to the ear, printed matter and its appeal to the eye consti-
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tutes the most widespread (and consequently the most effective) medium
of psychological warfare. Under the guidance of the Plans and Policy
Group and on the basis of information furnished by the Intelligence
Group, the Leaflet Unit prepares the strategic (or "long-range") leaflets
designed to attack the enemy's morale in support of theater operations or
national propaganda policy. This unit also produces the regular newspa-
pers which are distributed on fixed schedules to enemy battle-front and
home-front and which bring to the enemy's attention news that his,own
leaders would be likely to conceal from him or misinterpret to him. The
unit receives from the ZI booklets, pamphlets, illustrated folders, etc., and
in consultation with the Plans and Policy and Intelligence Groups decides
on the proper distribution of this material. In some cases, this unit uses
its technicians and facilities to execute for lower echelons tactical leaflets
for the production of which the subordinate units do not have adequate
facilities. Through the air liaison officer (s) and in consultation with the
Plans and Policy and Intelligence Groups, the-unit arranges for aircraft
dissemination of the printed material over selected targets and in desired
quantities. Needless to say, the unit keeps under constant scrutiny the re-
ports of the analysis unit on enemy leaflet activity and its effect on our
troops.
(3) Training Unit. Such a unit will be established if needed. It
will supervise special training of psychological warfare personnel and will
prepare and supervise orientation in psychological warfare to be given to
military units coming into the theater. It will also arrange for suitable
military orientation of civilian specialists who may be brought into the
operation. It will also make recommendations concerning the basic train-
ing in psychological warfare which should be provided in training pro-
grams in the ZI.
e. Administrative Group. This group performs the normal admin-
istrative functions of the executive element in any staff division. It may
have many other tasks, depending on the nature of the situation, e. g.,
whether the headquarters is combined or purely American; whether ci-
vilian personnel and supplies are employed by the Psychological Warfare
Division; whether the theater is located in enemy, liberated-friendly, or
allied territory; whether the various elements of the headquarters are
close together or are widely scattered, etc. Under the most complicated
circumstances, the division may be called on to perform clerical, communi-
cations, supply, personnel and transportation functions. Under the most
favorable circumstances, the duties will be limited to office administration,
with the remainder of the tasks being performed by other agencies of the
headquarters. The sub-divisions listed below are those which may be needed
under more unfavorable circumstances:
(1) Executive Unit. This unit plans the physical arrangement of
the Division, establishes routines and procedures, maintains the Division's
records and reproduces reports, communications and staff studies. It pro-
vides for the security of the Division, supervises the message center, re-
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ceives and routes visitors and supervises the movement of the Division
when the headquarters is moved.
(2) Communications Unit. This unit operates the Division message
center. It also procures and allocates communications -facilities for psy-
chological warfare purposes, i. e., the transmission of directives, informa-
tion and intelligence between the Division and neighboring higher and
lower commands.
(3) Personnel Unit. This unit prepares the personnel requirements,
arranges for the acquisition, transfer, promotion, reclassification and sep-
aration of personnel; to this end it maintains records on personnel not
maintained by other agencies of the headquarters, especially those con-
cerning civilian-and allied personnel.
Chapter 4
37. PROVISION OF PRINTING FACILITIES. Since printed and pic-
torial matter constitute one of the two mose effective media of psycho-
logical warfare, a large proportion of the Division's energy goes into its
production. When the Division is activated, one of the first steps to be
taken, by the Operations Group is to insure the availability of mass-pro-
duction printing facilities. As headquarters will normally be in a large
city where full-size newspapers were printed in time of peace, it can be
presumed that suitable presses are already in existence. If the headquar-
ters is located in Allied territory, proper contracts will be made with news-
paper or publishing firms to place the needed facilities at the disposition
of the Leaflet Unit. If the headquarters is located in captured enemy terri-
tory, these facilities will be requisitioned. The printing technicians of the
Leaflet Unit will survey the local situation and make recommendations as
to which of the existing printing installations are best suited to the needs
of the Leaflet Unit. The question of inks, paper stocks and other materials
which go into the printing operation is one for technical experts and need
not be considered here.
38. IMPORTANCE OF THE APPEARANCE OF PRINTED MATTER.
Only those experienced in the publishing business are fully aware of the
stress which must be laid on the form, make-up and general appearance of
printed matter. In the early days of our psychological warfare activity in
North Africa, the available printing facilities were poor, the paper stocks
limited and of low quality, and the inks and other supplies insufficient.
The consequence of these conditions was leaflets whose appearance was
not very attractive. Intelligence revealed that the Germans received these
leaflets with a mixture of pity and contempt. Germany, the birthplace of
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the printing press, had a tradition for good typography and fine crafts-
manship which had become almost instinctive with all Germans and had
penetrated down to the lowest levels of the population. When they received
one of our poorly-executed efforts, their automatic reaction was that such
an inferior piece of composition could not contain ideas of any great value.
Although this feeling is especially strong with Germans, the same rule
holds true to an extent with all recipients of leaflets. An excellent and
telling script, conforming to policy and based on a shrewd evaluation of
what will strike the mind of the enemy most forcibly, is only the first step
in the process. If the leaflet is to have the desired effect, it must be ap-
propriately illustrated by competent artists, set up in attractive form by
skilled lay-out technicians, and prepared for the press by experienced
typographers. Failure to meet the mechanical requirements can nullify a
great part of the effort expended in arriving at the idea and the text.
39. PERSISTENT REITERATION OF THE SAME THEMES. For the
writer of leaflets at the strategic level, the essential principle is repetition.
(See paragraph 24). With tactical leaflets, there is constantly a new situa-
tion to be exploited-either as it happens or as quickly as possible there-
after-for the tactical situation may change suddenly and a message which
would have been potent on Wednesday becomes useless (or even damag-
ing) on Thursday. But in the strategic field only a major realignment of
forces or a large-scale military or political upheaval causes a change in the
propaganda "line". By way of illustration let us examine our strategic
psychological warfare in Italy during World War II. This can be broken
down into three stages :
a. From the start of the war up to the invasion of the Italian main-
land in September, 1943, our messages to the Italians were variations of
the theme that we had no quarrel with the Italian people, that there was
every reason why they should be our friends, that it was only the mis-
guided ambition of Mussolini and his foolish alliance with Nazi Germany
which made them the object of our attack.
b. With the fall of the Mussolini regime and the formation of the Ba-
doglio government, our psychological warfare urged Italians to bring
pressure on this government to sign a truce with the Allies and take Italy
out of the war.
c. After the truce had been signed, our messages began to urge the
Italians of northern Italy to support their government, to sabotage the
barbaric German who continued to hold a part of Italy at the cannon's
mouth, and asked why more Italian blood should be spilled to salvage what
was left of Hitler's fading hope of world domination. Thus, there were
only three basic stages in our strategic psychological warfare campaign
against Italy during the entire war.
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40. SAME BASIC THEMES IN CONSTANTLY CHANGING FORM.
The basic themes must appear again and again in changed forms of pres-
entation, must be frequently arrayed in new clothing. Each day's news,
speeches by political leaders, parallels drawn from history,-in short, ev-
erything in the range of imagination of the script-writer will be a new trel-
lis on which to drape the unchanging vine of the basic theme. When the
same thought is suggested over and over again in a variety of new modes of
expression it eventually comes to be accepted as fact. Figures 4 to 19 repro-
duces a. few of the innumerable leaflets which carried to the Italians the un-
derlying ideas of the three phases of our psychological warfare campaign
against them. By pictures and printed words these themes were hammered
into Italian minds-week after week and month after month-by millions
of bits of paper which fluttered from the skies in every part of Italy. It was
only after the Allies had occupied a good part of Italy that we were able
to measure the extent to which this incessant drumfire of psychological
warfare had crystallized in the minds of Italians these ideas toward which
they were already vaguely predisposed.
41. EXPLOIT EXISTING ISSUES. It cannot be repeated too often that
is is usually a mistake to try to create new issues, (see paragrpah 20). The
skilled operator very rarely attempts to make a. new fissure in the armor
of the enemy's. morale; he selects with care weaknesses which already ex-
ist and insists upon them with artful suggestion and reminder. There are
always some ideas which certain individuals or certain nations fear, de-
test, and avoid; the psychological warfare expert plays upon these like a
skilled pianist, covering the basic theme with varied overtones but never
leaving the basic theme altogether.
42. "TIMED" MISSIONS. There are occasions when the strategic psy-
chological warfare service is assigned a "timed" mission to cover a mo-
mentary situation, but it is a situation which affects an entire theater or
even more than one theater. By a very precise interpretation, one could
insist that such a situation is "tactical" because it is momentary. This
quibbling over terms is pedantic; the situation is also "strategic" in extent
because it affects the operations of an entire theater or is of inter-theater
concern. There follows an illustration of such a situation:
a. In January, 1944, it was discovered that the Germans were oper-
ating in Florence and Rome two elaborate training schools for Italian
spies. These spies then infiltrated Allied lines.and caused an immense
amount of damage both in actual sabotage and in information carried back
to the enemy. Names and details were secured from captured spies; Psy-
chological warfare was instructed to "plaster" the areas in which these
schools were located .with leaflets showing our full information about the
operations of these schools, and threatening with future retribution those
"blacklisted" Italians who continued to do this work for the Germans. In-
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"Our friends have arrived."
FIGURE 4
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L Italia si ricostruira.
Sara tr popolo italiano a far
questo, scegliendo it proprio
governo secondo i principii
fondamentali della democra-
zia : libert-a ed uguaglianza. "
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
A iergc . I& riproduzione di un eartellone the viene afiaao nella Sicilia libsnu
"Italy will rebuild itself. The Italian people themselves will do this
by choosing their own government according to the fundamental principles
of democracy: Freedom and Equality."
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
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"Italy will act. on her own."
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ANNUNCIO
.Questo a un me aggio rivo:io al popolo italiano dal Presi-
dente degli Stati }iti d'America e dal Primo Ministro della
Gran Bretagna:
In questo momento le Forze Armate associate degli Stati
Uniti, delta Gran Bretagna e del Canada, sotto it comando
de: Generale Eisenhower e del suo vice -coma adante, Ge-
nerale Alexander, lstanno portando la guerra net cuore del
vostro paese. Questo a it risultato diretto dells politica ver-
gog.nosa the Mussolini e it regime fascista vi hanno imposto.
Mussolini vi ha trascinato in questa guerra come nazione
satellite di =n distruttore brutale di popoli e di liberty.
Mussolini vi ha trascinato in una guerra the credeva fosse
stata giy vinta da Hitler. Nonostante la grande ,vulnerability
dell'Italia agli attacchi dall'aria e dal mare, i vostri capi fas-
cisti hanno inviato i vostri figli, le vostre navi e la vostra avia-
zione, su campi di Battaglia molto -lontani dally vostra patria,
solo per aiutare la Germania nel suo tentativo di conquistare
l'Inghilterra, la Russia ed it mondd.
L'adesione dell'Italia ai piani della Germania nazista era
indegna Belle antiche tradizioni di liberty e di cultura del
popolo italiano - tradizioni alte quali tanto devono i popoli
dell'America e della Gran Bretagna.
.I vostri soldati non hanno combattuto affatto per gli in-
teressi d'Itali ma solo per quell dells Germania nazista.
Essi hanno combattuto con coraggio, ma song stati traditi, e
abbandonati dal Tedeschi. sul fronte russo e su ogni campo
di battaglia in Africa, da El Alamein a Capo Bon.
Oggi le speranze the nutriva la Germania di dominare it
mondo sono state frantumate,su tutti i fronti. I cieli d'Italia
sono dominati dalle vaste flotte aeree degli Stati Uniti e delta
Gran Bretagna. Le coste d'Italia vengono minacciate dal pia
FIGURE 7
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ANNOUNCEMENT
This it a message directed to- the Italian people by this. Prerident
ofthe United:State's and the Prime Minister of Greats grits1n.
At this moment, the joint Armed Forces of the United-Statet-,- Great
Britain and Canada, under the command of General Eisenhower and his
second- In-commend,- General Alexander, area carryi-nir the-war into. the
heart of your country. This Ise a direct result of'the - shameful. policy
which Mussolini and- his fascist regime have imposed upon you. Musso-
lini.has. draggedyou into this war as_ the satellite ally of a, brutal
ravisher of peoples , and` liberties.
Mussolini has dragged you into a. war which lie believed-li.d sl--
ready been won by Hitler. Notwithstanding.th'eexteesie vulnerability
of Italy t--attack-s. from the air and from the seas, your fascist lead-
ere havesent your sons, your ships, and yoursir force away from
your father-lend, solely to help, Germany in her attempt to- conquer- Ent-
land!,Russia end- the world.. .
Italy's adhesion to the plant of'nariGermany -was unworthy. off the
anc;ent traditions of liberty ^nd culture of the Itad lan^peopfe-tredl tions
to which -the Peoplesof America and Great Britain. ewer so much.
Your soldiers have note fought for. the interests ofIt:aly at 4.14,
but only for those, of nisi Germany. They. have- fought.'courageouairy,
but'. have been betrayed and deserted. on the Russian front and on- every
bstt.efr.ont in Africa,. from El Alamein to Cape Son.
Today., Germany's hopes of domi'nating; the world have been d-isappoint
ed on aIl'. fronts. The skies of Italy are controlled, by the' vast air
fleets of the. United" States- and Great Britain. The coasts of Italy-are
being-assaulted by the greatest mass, of. naval forces that the- AI-lies- have
ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.
*(The rest of the message warns that Italy's oal} have of. ralvation
Lies, in.getting- out of the *at at once'. ft- hol ly out the hope of
r news, free. Ttsly: which wi1'l-- take her place i-n lb.- respectabl'e
family, of nations. Ft warns that the alternative is cos Vet-e ands
utter destruction.):
FIUURE' Za
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1. (on leaflet) "A Message from the Allies to the Italian People."
2. (on skirt which symbolizes Italy) "The Italy We Have Known and Loved."
FIGURE $
-30-
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Translation of Italian Leaflet I. J.
(Front)
WHEN THE GERMAN AND FASCIST DOMINATION
OF ITALY SHALL HAVE COME TO AN END
The President of the United States, when he received repre-
sentatives of the Free American Press at the White House in Was-
hington on the 11th June, 1943, announced the surrender of the
garrison at Pantellaria after aerial bombardment carried out by
Anglo-American aircraft. He added that this seemed to be an oppor-
tune occasion to address the Italian people through the caress and
the radio.
The President of the United States said that the Italians should
remember that the present effects of the Anglo-American emsapaign
against their country, were a perfectly logical and inevitable result
of the policy pursued by Mussolini di ns,` recent years. Mussolini
betrayed his own country by a military alliance with the Germans,
dragging her into war in order to increase his personal power.
According to the President, such actions are not the actions
of the Italian people. Thia -e.'es of iriespons'ble acts was carried
out by the personal re irae of Mussolini, the Fascist Rcg me, in the
name of Italy, bu. without really representing the Italian people,
which is in its majority a peace loving peep"c. This contrast was
clear in the Italian declaration of war which was made without pro-
vocat[ci, an act which President Rooseve't had previously defined
as a a crab in the back ?.
Na-ueally, the President continued, the United Nations now
have nc other choice, except to Pursue the war against Mussolini's
Government and against Mussolini's armed forces, until final vic-
tory. It ;,ppeared, however, to Roosevelt to be honest, to declare,
in the name of the United Nations, that they are in agreement upon
one poirs : when' the German domination of Italy has come to an
end, and when the Fascist Regime has been swept away, the Italian
people can be sure that it will enjoy the liberty to choose any form
of non-Fascist, or non-Nazi Government, which she may prefer.
Naturally the United Nations cannot do anything about this until
Fascism has been destroyed and the Germans have abandoned Ita-
lian territory.
The United Nations, in Roosevelt's words, certainly intend -
and hope - that Italy shall be re-made as a Nation, taking back
once more, her place as a member of the European family of Na-
tions. He concluded by saying that when the Germans have been
driven out of Italy and Fascism has been abolished, then and only
then, the good judgement, the supreme good judgement of the Ita-
lian people itself, will be clearly revealed.
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(FRONT)
WARNING !
After the fall of Tunis the Germans will make Italy a
battle-field,. Germany's Southern Front..
The conquest of Tunisia leaves the Allied Air. Forces free
to attack military objectives in Italy.
This means that all the plants, arsenals, ports, railways,
bridges and roads of Italy must expect attack from the
air by day and night.
Those who continue to live near military objectives run.
the risk of losing their lives or of being injured.
For this you must thank Mussolini and his master Hitler.
Remind yourselves of Mussolini's speech of the 18th.
November 1940: t( I have asked and obtained from the
Fuehrer a direct participation in the' air war against
Great Britain... ))
NOW, IT. IS ITALY'S TURN I.
WHY DIE FOR HITLER?
(Back)
WHY DIE FOR HITLER?
Italian soldier, you have no interest in fighting this war.
Like you, millions of Italian men, women and children,
that is the whole of Italy, stand to lose everything. if this
war continues.
This is Hitler's war.
No one provoked Italy; no one assaulted Italy; no one
declared war on Italy.
Hitler is making Italy his shield against the overwhel
ming. superiority of the. United Nations, a superiority
which is admitted by even the Axis Communiques.
For the Italians this means death, ruin and desolation.
Yesterday? Hitler.: sacrificed the Italians of Africa. To-
day he. sacrifices the Italians of Italy..
GERMANY WILL FIGHT TO THE LAST... ITALIAN i
Italian soldier, no one asked. you if you wanted to fight.
But they have sent you. to die. They have told you
is BELIEVE, FIGHT, OBEY' m
WHY ? FOR WHOM ? FOR HOW LONG ?
FicuRE 10
32--
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WE HAVE LANDED TO LIBERATE
YOU FROM THE GERMANS
The Allied armies have crossed the Messina Straits to the
Italian mainland. They come as liberators not as conquerors.
We were able to liberate Sicily so quickly _because Italians
cn the island not only welcomed us but helped us as allies
t,7, drive out the common enemy, the Germans. They sabo-
taged German Pines of communication, they gave us valuable
information about military movements and helped us in a
thousand other ways. All of these things you can do now
that out troops have landed .on the mainland.
The Germans want to transform Italy into a battlefield by
fighting a rearguard action through your country, leaving
only scorched earth behind them as they retreat. towards the
Brenner Pass. They are indifferent to what happens to Italy,
so long as they can postpone a little longer the day when
Germany will be occupied by our troops.
We know that you want the war to end quickly for Italy
se that your country will be spared further destruction. We
know, too, that so is it has. been impossible for you to end
the war because of the German troops in your country. But,
now that we have already landed in the South, and, owing
to cur command of the sea, are also strong enough to ?land~
large forces at any other point in Italy, you need not fnara
the German forces.
You can her save Italy from further destruction I You
can hasten the end of the war for Italy I Follow the directions
liv,n on the other side of this page, and the Germans will
be dri,len quickly _rcm Italy, and you wi,l L-e fr.,e..
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Winston Churchill. Franklin D. Roosevelt.
TIE MOMENT TO FIGHT
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt have ad-
dressed the following appeal to Marshal Badoglio and the
Italian people
a In this hour of agony for your country, fate has called
upon you to take the first steps towards winning -peace and
liberty, and to art so that Italy shall `take the honourable
place which awaits her in the concert of the nations. Fars,
cism has collapsed, and the important task is now to free
Italian soil from the oppressor.
a Hitler, making use of his accomplice Mussolini, has
brought Italy to the verge of ruin, in disastrous' campaigns
in Egypt and in Russia. On the field of battle the Germans
have always deserted their Italian allies, making use of them
to cover, tthe rear in their precipitous retreats.
a Hitlter is now threa.teriug to subjugate the Italian people
to the infamous Nazi regime. The moment has now come for
every Italian to fight at the side of the liberating nations. That'
have powerful forces and the arms of liberation are comirci
to your aid.
The Nazi terror will not last long, and by helping ;us you
will place yourselves once agaic at the side of those is?gds
from whom you were deceitfal.ly separated.
a Do not miss any cpl:ortunity to strike hard and sure'.;,
at the Cox-mans. Have faith in your future, march t~gn'hc
with your Amcrl.can andEritivh friends to win again peace,
FIGURE 1.3
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Translation of Italian Leaflet I. E. E.
POST CARD
To A. E.
......:............................ ................ .......---- ..................................
Marshal Pietro BADCGLIO
. _ ................. _............................................................... _............
Head of the ?Government
_... _ ....................._..............................................................................
ROME
.....................
Your Excellency,
Today Italy's :destiny is in your 'hands.
in a moment of such gravity, it is more than ever your duty to
respect the will of you! i eople.
After four years of Nazi-Fascist war, the Italian people address
themselves to you, who freed Italy from Fascism, asking that you put
an end to our sorrow and our suffering.
THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WANT PEACE
Several million of these postcards were airdropped to the Italians.
They were accompanied by messages urging that the Italian people dem_and_
that Italy make pepce and suggesting that the postcards be mailed in mass
luantities to. Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
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Translation of Italian Leaflet I. SS
YOUR KING SPEAKS
ITALIANS,
For the supremje,welfare of the country, which has always
been my first thought and, the aim of my life, and in, order to
avoid greater suffering and greater sacrifices, I authorised
the request for an armistice.
For the safety of the capital and in order fully to fulfil
my duties as a king, I, together with the government and
the high military authorities, moved to another part of the
free and sacred national soil.
Italians,
I have absolute faith in you whatever may happen, as yor
may count even to the supreme sacrifice ,on your king.
May God help Italy in this grave hour of'her history.
VICTOR EMMANUAL.
YOUR GOVERNMENT ORDERS
IT IS THEREFORE OUR DJTY TO FIGHT BY THE SIDE
OF THE ANGLO-AMERICANS ACA.CNST THE Guy ~IANS, and
a few crazy Italians, no longer worthy of the name, who have
placed themselves under their orders. We must fight them
by every means, everywhere and at all times.
RFME11BER that in every German yore must see an enemy,
and that at all times and everywhere you must treat him as
such.
REMEMVMBER that to allow oneself to be disarmed is a crime
and a crime which you and your families will pay for with
long'years of slavery.
REMEMBER that resolute men, under good leadership and
full of determination, can resist force much superior to
themselves.
REMEMBER that when people and troops form a single
block of hearts and weapons, a single front and a single
force, they are invincible.
REMEMBER that, against stronger forces, our troops and
population have the terrible weapon of guerrilla warfare;
take to the woods, cut communications, blow up bridges and
stores, destroy, isolated men and material. And above all do
not give up, do not lose heart, stand firm. Today, keep this
well in mind, f(ESISTANCE MEANS SURLIVAL.
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SABOTAGE
THE GERMAN
When the Germans retreat before, our forces, they
will try to loot, burn, steal and destroy, as they have
done everywhere in southern Italy, Prevent them by
every means in your power.
See to it that the Germans obtain no supplies of
food or any other kind from this region. Preserve your
water supply.
Impede German communications in the vital
areas. See that the electrical lines, .the tunnels, the
railroads, the bridge:, that are useful to the Germans
are put out of commission.
Watch the Germans. Stop their mad list for
destruction.
Protect your lives.
Aid Italy In the fight for liberation.
Keep the Germans from destroying.
Remember Naples.
FIGURE -17
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COUP-. H L
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44. VALUE OF ILLUSTRATED LEAFLETS. The experience of World
War II was that the illustrated leaflet usually "carried more punch" than
one consisting of text alone. Sometimes a striking picture with a very sim-
ple caption was more effective than any quantity of words. The famous
drawing of the "boot" of Italy kicking out a Mussolini garbed in Nazi uni-
form (Figue 6) was one of the most spectacular single items in the psy-
chological warfare campaign against the Italians. When Allied troops ar-
rived in the peninsula, they found copies of this leaflet pasted or tacked on
houses, barns-everywhere. The picture told a simple story in a direct
fashion which appealed to a peculiarly Italian sense of humor. It is certain
that a similar effort directed against a Japanese leader would, under
parallel circumstances, have provoked more anger than laughter and would
have failed completely to get the desired effect. Figure 23 shows the ob-
verse of a picture leaflet used in connection with stage 3 (see paragraph
39c) of the psychological warfare campaign in Italy. The use of the same
picture against the Germans would have been .inadvisable at that time,
since most of them would not have accepted then the idea of a grotesque
"red-handed" Hitler.
45. LEAFLETS FOR ILLITERATE POPULATIONS. When dealing
with a primitive or illiterate populations, it is necessary to depend almost
entirely on the pictorial device to convey the messages. During the Assam
(Burma) campaign, energetic efforts were made to enlist the cooperation
of the native hill people in the struggle against the Japanese. So few of
these people could read that printed messages were valueless; in this op-
ration the artists rather than the writers were the purveyors of pscho-
logical warfare. It was also found that these people were highly suscep-
tible to presents, even of the simplest kind. So, small packages containing
needles-and-thread, salt, vegetable seed, etc., were scattered by plane over
the villages in the path of the projected Allid advance. These packages
were marked so as to indicate the source of origin: red-white-and-blue,
American flags, markings of the Air Force, etc. The seed packages turned
out to have additional significance at a later date. Combat officers re-
ported that when these areas were occupied by American troops they
found the natives tending plots of vegetables which had grown from seeds
dropped by American planes. In order to insure the necessary native labor
and keep the population contented, the Allied forces had to do something
about the famine conditions in the region; these almost mature vegetables
reduced the size of the burden on Allied Military Government.
46. "WAR AIMS" LEAFLETS. Another use of leaflets made in the last
war was to disseminate widely among the populations of enemy and ene-
my-occupied teritories the significant pronouncements of Allied political
or military leaders which stated the objectives of the Allies and their
plans for the post-war world, decisions of Big Three conferences, etc.
These were usually reproductions in print of the scripts which were broad-
cast over the radio; on one side of the leaflet appeared the actual text of
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"OUT WITH THE GERMANS!"
FIGURE 23
-49-
The reverse bears the words: "We drove them from Sicily; now, let's
drive them from Italy."
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the declaration (or excerpts of the most significant passages if the entire
text was too long) and on the other side commentary on the salient items
in the declaration. For example, the text of the Atlantic Charter was dis-
seminated in millions of leaflets in all languages in all parts of the world
which could not be reached by normal news services. Figures 24 and 25
give the obverse and reverse of one of the many leaflets which made the
provision of the Atlantic Charter known to the people of German-occupied
Italy. Figures 24a and 25a give the translations of the leaflet.
47. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Until
evidence to the contrary was produced, sceptics argued that a message
like the one described in the foregoing paragraph would be dismissed with
a shrug by the enemy and would have no effect on his thinking. "More
propaganda!". This contention would probably have been true of any one
isolated message, if it had not been a part of a long-term, overall psycho-
logical warfare campaign. But the effect of psychological warfare is cu-
mulative. As the enemy's situation became more difficult and as he had oc-
casion to see that our plodges and promises in other respects had been ful-
filled, repeated statements of our intentions gradually came to have the
desired progressive effect on his, mind. Our psychological warfare effort
had two objectives :
a. To establish the reliability of promises made by our leaders.
b. To show the unreliability of promises made to the enemy by his
own leaders,
Figures 26 and 27 give the obverse and reverse of a leaflet intended
for German troops everywhere and designed to show them that Hitler and
his intimates sought safety from bombing in the remote Berchtesgaden
retreat, but denied this shelter to refugees from bombed-out metropolitan
areas back home. Similar leaflets pointed out to the Germans each instance
of broken promises or bad faith of which any Nazi leader was guilty.
When this is done over a long period of time, the enemy leaders finally l}e-
come discredited in the minds of their own people. It should not be forgot-
ten that a clever enemy will make effective use of any careless statements
made by our own leaders. The Nazis made excellent capital of a pre-war
speech of President Roosevelt in which~he made the careless statement that
not one American boy would be called upon to shed his blood or lay down
his life on foreign soil. They deluged our troops with leaflets showing cari-
catures of President Roosevelt, the caption "I PROMISE YOU!", and fig-
ures (their own, of course) on our recent casualties. The American soldier,
who was dodging bullets and wallowing in mud at the time, could not fail
to be affected by a series of such reminders.
48. THE BEST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS ALWAYS TRITE. A
cardinal principle of psychological warfare is that falsehood does not pay.
When one is dealing with the same audience over a long period of time, it
is vital to establish the reputation for telling the truth always. This is
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CARTA DELL' ATLANTICO
II Presidente degli Stati Urriti d'America ed it Primo
Ministro Winston Churchill, rappresentante it governo di
Sua Maestb del Regno Unito, dopo essersi riuniti, consi-
derano che a opportuno rendere noti alcuni principii co-
muni ally politico nazionale dei loro rispettivi poesi,
principii sui quali essi bosono la Toro speranza di un avve-
nire migliore per it mondo.
1. 1 lord rispettivi paesi non mirano ad ingrandirsi, sia in eio che
riguarda i loro territori sia in qualsiasi oltro modo.
2. Essi non desiderano vedere nessuna modifica territariale che non
sia conforme ai desideri, liberamente espressi, dei popoli interes-
soti. '
3. Essi rispettano it diritto di tutti i popoli a scegliersi to forma di
governo sotto la quale vogliono vivere ; essi desiderano vedere
restituire i diritti sovrani e l'autonomia a quei popoli che no
sono stati privati cotta violenza.
4. Essi si sforzeranno, pur rispettando i trattati preesistenti, di
facilitare su un piede di eguaglianza I'accesso di tutti gli Stati,
grandi e piccoli, vincitori o vinti, of commercio ed alle materie
prime del mondo, necessari ally Toro prosperity economica.
5. Essi desiderano raggiungere be piu so',ida collaberazione fro tutte
to nazioni nel campo economico, alto scopo di assicurare per tutti
un miglioramento delle condizioni di lavoro a di sicurezza so-
ciale, ed alto scopo di facilitare I'adattan+ento di tutti i poesi
all' evoluzione economica.
6. Dopo la distruzione definitive dells tirannide nazisto, essi ape-
rono vedere to stabilirsi di una pace che offriry a tutte be na-
zioni i mezzi per vivere in sicurezza nell' interno delle proprie
frontiere, una pace che darn a tutti gli uomini di tutti i paesi
to garanzia di vivere una vita normale, liberate dalla paura e
dalla miseria.
7. Una tale pace deve permettere a tutti gli uomini di attraversore
senzo ostacoli i mari e gli oceoni.
8. Essi ritengono che tutte le nazioni del mondo, tanto per ra-
gioni morali quanta per ragioni protiche, debbono pervenire
ally rinuncia dell' impiego delta forza.
In considerazione quindi che nessuna pace future potry essere
mantenuta se gli armamenti terrestri, novali ad aerei conti-
nuassero ad essere utilizzati dalle nazioni che minaccieno o
potrebbero minacciare di fare oggressioni e1rre le proprie
frontiere, essi credono che, in atteso dello ,tabilirsi di un
sistema permanente di sicurezza generals, it disarmo di
queste nazioni a essenziale. Essi aiuteranno ad iscoraggeranno
egualmente tutte le altre misure protiche suscettibili di ri-
durre it peso schiacciante degti srmamenti per i popoli che
amano to pace.
FIGURE 24
-51-
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The President of the United States of America and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, representing the Government of His Ma'e, sty of the
United Kingdom, having gathered together inconference believe that
it is opportune to mike : up blic certain principles common to the national
policy of their respective countries, principles upon which they base
their hope of a better future for the world.
1. Their respective countries aimat no self-aggrandizement,
either with respect to territory or in any other way.
2. They want to see no territorial change which does not conform
to the freely expressed desires of the peoples concerned.
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they wish to live; they desire to see restored
the sovereign rights and self-determination to those peoples who have
been deprived of them by violence.
4. They will strive, while respecting pre-existing treaties, to
make accessible on a footing.yof equality to all nations of the world,
large and small, conquerors and conquered, commerce and raw materials
of the world necessary to their. economic. prosperity.
5. They desire to arrive at the closest collaboration among all
nations in the economic field, with the intent to assure to all an im-
provement in working conditions and social security and with the intent
to make easier the adaptation of all nations to economic evolution.
6. After the complete destruction of the nazi tyrrany, they hope
to see the establishment of a peace that will give all nations the means
of living insecurity within the confines of their own frontiers, a
peace which will give all men of all countries the guarantee of living
a normal life, -freefrom fear and- misery. -
7. Such a peace must allow all men to cross the sees and oceans
without hindrance.
8. They contend that all nations of the world, for moral as well
as for practical reasons, must come to renouncing the use of force.
Considering then, that no future peace can be maintained if land,
naval and air. armaments were to becontinued to be used by the nations
which threaten or. might threaten.to make encroachments beyond their own
borders, they believe that in the attempt to stabilize a permanent system
of general, security, the disarmament of those nat-ions is essential.
They will assist and encourage all practical measures likely to reduce
the crushing burden of armaments for the peoples who love peace.
FIGURE 24a
-52-
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ITALIANI !
Voi porcte leggere e riflettere sulfa CARTA ATLANTICA the
not abbiamo riprodotto sul retro di questo manifesting. I vostri
eapi vi hanno sempre noscosto questo documento. Essi hannu
avuto paura di pubblicarlo.
PERCHE ??.
Le ragioni di questo silenzio fascista sono chiare.
La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :
I) Che le Nazioni Unite non desiderano ingrandirsi a ipese
dell'Italia e delle altre Nazioni. Mussolini dichiaro la guerra of
I'Inghilterro e all'Americo. Ma not non nutriamo nessun odio con-
tra if popolo italiano e not non vogliamo wendicarei sul suo dorso.
La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :
11) Che quondo le Nazioni Unite avronno liberato I'Italia e
gli altri paesi oppressi, esse daranno sic a voi the alle altre nazioni
to possibilitii di accesso, sulle stesse basi di paritc, of commercio
ed alle materie prime delta terra, the Sono necessori ella prospe-
rita economica. Voi otterrete queste MATERIE PRIME come gll
altri popoli.
La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra
111) Che le Nazioni Unite vogliono restourare i dirittl so-
vroni e un libero governo del popolo italiano, egualmente agli
altri popoli. Noi provvedereno affinche it popolo italiano, come gli
altri popoli oppressi dell'Europa, posse scegliere it proprio governo
the rappresentera realmente gl'interessi del popolo italiano.
La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :
IV) Che le Nazioni Unite sono decise a restaurare it commer-
cio internozionale, in modo the voi, come gli altri popoli oppressi
dell'Europa possiate beneficiare di migliorate condizioni di lavoro
a di una progressive sicurezza ECONOMICA E SOCIALE.
Vol non voleste questo guerra. VOl NON FOSTE INTERPELLATI
QUANDO MUSSOLINI DICHIARO LA GUERRA. Voi non ovete
potuto impedirla. MA OGGI AVETE LA POSSIBILITA DI PORTARE
LA PACE ALL'ITALIA.
Volete continuare a soffrire per la Germanic di HITLER the
vi ha condotti al disastro ?
Se tale a la vostra volontc voi sarete le vittime delta guerra
totale the not siamo decisi a portare contra tutti I regimi fascisti
e nazisti.
0 VOLETE LA PACE ?
Voi potete ottenere la pace.
Ne HITLER roe Mussolini possono mantenere I'ITALIA IN
GUERRA se IL POPOLO ETALIANO ESIGE LA PACE.
Vol DOVETE SCEGLIERE
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You can read and reflect on the ATLANTIC CHARTER which we have
reproduced on the reverse of this leaflet. Your leaders have
always concealed this document from you. They are afraid to
make it public.
WHY?
The reasons for this fascist eilence are clear.
Tile ATLANTIC CHARTER reveals,
1) That the United Nations have no desire to expand their
territory at the expense of Italy or of other nations. Musso-
lini declared war on England and America, but we hold no grudge
against the Italian people nor do we want to take any revenge on
them.
2j That when the United Nations have liberated Italy and the
other oppressed countries they will give you, as well as other
countries, the possibility of access. on a basis of equality to
the commerce and raw materials of the earth which are necessary for
economic prosperity. You will have access to these RAW MATERIALS on
the same bases asother nations. -
31 That the United Nationswent to restore sovereign rights
and a free government to the Italian people. as well as to other
peoples. We will make provision for the Italian people, like
nther oppressed peoples of Europe. to be able to choose its own
government which will res.l rerreeent the interests of the Itel?
ian people.
4, That, the United Ne*ions have decided to revive inter-
national commerce, so that you, like the other oppressed peoples
of Europe can benefit by improved working conditions and by a
progressive ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL .security.
You did not want this war. YOU WERE NOT CONSULTED * N MUSSOLINI
DECLARED WAR. You could not prevent it. BUTTODAY WHO HAS IT IN
YOUR POWER TO BRING PEACE TO ITALY.
Do you want to continue to suffer for Hitler's Germany which has
brought you to the brink of ruin?
If such is your wish, you will be the victims of the total war
which we are resolved to wage against all fascist and nazi regimes.
Neither HITLER nor MUSSOLINI can keep Italy in the war if THE
ITALIAN PEOPLE DEMANDS PEACE.
FIGURE 25a
54 Y
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"All regions in the environs of Berchtesgaden are closed to re.fngees from the
districts damaged by bombs."
The Rr.ichemmiser for Special Housing
1 August 1943
FIGURE 26
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(Back) FROM THE HOMELAND
A Swiss paper, the ST. GALLER TAGBLATT, writes :
u London has become a soft prelude - to Hamburg, Colo-
gne and Wuppertal. If the front would run diagonally through
Western Germany, the destruction could not be more dread-
ful. Descriptions of Swiss citizens returning from the erased
cities show that the remarks of a survivor of Stalingrad that
Hamburg.looks worse than Stalingrad is hardly exaggerated.
New and positively unthinkable is one aspect which is being
mentioned in all these reports : Not only gas, electricity and
nutrition services cease to function but the Government ma-
chine and the police - the German government machine and
the German police. There were no longer any harbor autho-
rities to control the ships which still could leave Hamburg
harbor; thousands of foreign workers, according to the Da-
nish radio, started to leave for home without even consulting
the officials in charge and lynchings were committed not
only against looters : there many accounts to be settled when
the police cannot maintain public order. Perhaps Hamburg
is but a prelude n.
A German paper, the KtELNISCHE ZEITUNG, writes :
Homelessness of hundreds of thousands, is it not a very
fertile source for all symptoms of general decay ? The anni-
hilation of property creates that great equality which drives
whale rzgons towa;ds bolshevism without any effort. Mass
feeding, housing in barracks and mass transports are signs
of the hour... A great migration is under way in Germany
And how do the migrants feel ?
A Swede who has taken refuge in Sweden after a long stay
in Germany reports in a Swedish newspaper, the ? GC?TE-
BORGS POSTEN ? :
(( I travelled in a car with many homeless refugees from
bombed districts. Among them was a boy, ten years of age,
pale and lean who was looking out of the window. Talking to
him I learned that in three weeks he hadn't slept more than
three nights. His mother had been evacuated to Eastern
Prussia, his brother and sister somewhere else, perhaps to
Bavaria.
The face of the boy was expressionless, and with the same
quiet stubbornness with which he told his story he said :
I o isli. 1 could shoot hiller to death. This is the atmosphere
in the bombed regions and not only there )).
Mass migration, misery, destruction, homelessness -
that's how it looks today in Germany. And one city after the
other is in for it. That is the homeland which you desire to
defend ?
Are you really defending it? Does it do any good to your
homeland that you are fighting here in foreign lands where
you are uninvited guests, where they wish you to the devil.
Don't you just contribute to the progressing .destruction at
home?
While you are fighting here far away from the homeland,
the homeland behind you goes to pieces. Don't wait too long,
or you won't find anything left at home.
YOU FIGHT TO WIN TIME
TIME FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF GERMANY
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known as "building up credibility". It is especially essential when one is
dealing with an audience predisposed to want to disbelieve every state-
ment you make. The individual member of .your audience cannot check on
all your statements; in fact, he personally can check on very few of them.
It is highly important that he discover over a period of time that all things
you told him on which he could check turned out to be absolutely accurate.
After a while he comes to believe you in spite of himself, to read with in-
terest everything you have to say, and to accept -as equally true those
things on which :he cannot check. One untruth,, misstatement, or foolish
assertion can destroy the patient work of weeks or months; it can also
furnish the enemy counterpropagandist with valuable ammunition with
which to wreck your "reputation for credibility" with his own people.
49. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
TRUTH. The good psychological warfare operator tells the truth con
sistently. But there is a tremendous field for his work within the frame-
work of the truth. The skill lies in three things:
a. What truths are told.
b. How much of the truth is told.
c. What coloring is given to the truth presented.
People often ask: "Is it true or is it just propaganda?" This question
is not pertinent. The question to ask is: "Why did the source elect to print
(or put on the air) that particular piece of news and give it that particu-
lar emphasis?" Those who collect the facts also select the items which they
pass on to their audience: what is the motive or bias behind this selection?
Unless some other motive is obvious, it can be presumed that the selection
was designed to affect the minds or emotions of a given group of people
for a given purpose. Naturally, the selection of facts to be presented-and
the manner in which they will be presented-must be carried out by spe-
cialists who are thoroughly familiar with the emotional reactions and
thinking processes of the audience for which the messages are intended -
a specialist who might be very effective for the Chinese might be of no
value at all in psychological warfare directed to the Arabs of the Middle
East.
50.. IMPORTANCE OF NEWSPAPERS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR-
FARE. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 48 and 49, newspapers ad-
dressed to the populations of enemy and enemy-occupied territory are one
of the most important vehicles of printed propaganda. A dispassionate
and apparently impartial presentation of the facts is in most instances
more convincing (for week-in, week-out consumption) than emotional
tirades or denunciations of the evil intentions of the enemy's leaders. These
"vest-pocket" airborne newspapers are of immense value in any area.
They are of special value in areas which are without other news sources,
or in those where the population has ceased to believe the statements of
the official sources of news.
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51. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE NEWSPAPERS IN CHINA. The
%ast hinterland of China was "sealed off" by the Japanese from contact
with the outside world for a period of eight years; most of the Chinese
looked with suspicion on the news given them by the Japs. At war's end
we found that the people of these areas had devoured hungrily the con-
tents of nev ssheets dropped to them by American planes, scanty as these
drops were. Because of the immense areas to be covered and the limited
resources available, it was impossible to achieve the volume and regularity
of coverage so important in newspaper operations. Despite these handi-
caps, our psychological warfare service kept a trickle of news flowing to
a news-starved population. Figures 28 and 29 give the obverse of two
copies of the weekly news-leaflet air-dropped to Japanese-occupied areas
c;f China during, the summer of 1945. Figures 28a and 29a give the trans-
lation'.
"."zYCIIOLOGICAL WARFARE NEWSPAPERS IN EUROPE. In
France, Jugoslavia.. and other German-occupied areas of Europe, airborne
newspapers could be and were delivered on regular schedules and in suffi-
cient volume to reach a large percentage of the public. The news contained
in these pages was a powerful factor in giving encouragement to and keep-
ing alive hope in underground allies. Without it, they might have been re-
duced to inactivity by the conditions of suppression and discouragement
under which they lived and worked. Nor was the territory of Germany
itself neglected. Vast masses of newspapers were air-dropped on 'regular
schedules over all the chief German cities. While it cannot he claimed that
they were believed with the same readiness that they were in other Euro-
pean countries, post-war information proved that they were widely read
and their contents compared with that of German newspapers. Their very
presence probably forced the German News Agency to print news items
which it would otherwise have doubtless withheld from the German public.
53. NEWSPAPERS FOR TROOPS IN BATTLE AREAS. Enemy troops
in the battle zones, cut off from most sources of news, are vulnerable
targets for the "newspaper weapon". Because of the more elaborate fa-
cilities for production and distribution, it is usually better to have these
produced by the "strategic" team at theater headquarters. But this ac-
tivity should be carried out in closest cooperation with the tactical teams.
The editors who prepare these newspapers should spend frequent periods
of time with the tactical units. They should engage in frequent interroga-
tions of freshly-captured prisoners. In short, they should take every step
to keep abreast of the current thinking of the enemy troops 'on the front
for which this particular newspaper is intended. The selection and em-
phasis on news items for battle-front troops is a problem quite different
from that of editing for home-front civilian population or for dissident
elements in territory overrun by the enemy. Figures 30 and 30a show the
obverse and translation of the weekly newssheet dropped on German
troops in the closing weeks of 1943.
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11,
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The Truman-Churchill-Stalin meeting officially began on July
17th, in the former palace of the kaisers ^t Potsdam, 17 miles
southwest of Berlin. Their retinues consisted of foreign ministers,
military chiefs and advisers. The meeting place itself is symbolic
of the common victory the Big Three have won ^nd the common task
they are to shoulder.
The conference is believed to be ^ long one and in likely to be
even more important than any in the pest. It is for the purpose of
settling pressing problems not only in Europe but in Asia. The major
problems to be discussed will include (1) the Pacific War, (2) the
future of Germany, (3) new borders of Postwar Europe, and (4) re-
habilitation of the wartorn areas. In a word, the meeting of the Big
Three will be a preliminary peace conference which will set-the pat-
tern for a full-dress peace. The solidarity among the three great
powers guarantees the success of this historic meeting and the suc-
cessful conclusion of the San Francisco Conference and the recent,
agreement regarding the formation of a new and united Polish govern-
ment have already augured well for it.
In Berlin President Truman was welcomed very heartily by both
the Russian and British authorities. Surveying the ruin of once
powerful Berlin, he remarked: "This in terrible, but they brought
it upon themselves."
Before Generalissimo Stalin left for Berlin, the Chinese
Premier T. V. Soong, who arrived at Moscow on June30 foran
important mission, conferred with him for the sixth and last time
on July 13, at midnight. This meeting lasted more than one hour.
After the meeting, Soong went to see the U. S. Ambassador Harriman.
It was reported that all the Soong-Stalin talks were carried on in
^n atmosphere of war cordiality.
FIGURE 28a
60
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A communique issued at General MacArthur's headquarters On July 5
said: "THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ARE NOW LIBERATED AND TOE PHILIPPINE
CAMPAIGN CAN BE REGARDED AS VIRTUALLY CLOSED."
This campaign started last October 20th when General MacArthur landed
his amphibious forces on Leyte Island. After 250 days of fierce fighting,
all the organized resistance of the Japanese troops, totalling 450,000 has
been smashed and the entire archipelago, comprising of Luzon, Mindanao and
7,000 other large and small islands, liberated.
The Japanese lost about 420,000 troops in the battle of the Philippine.
while the U. S. Army suffered only 54,000 in killed, wounded and missing.
The remaining 30,000 Japa are widely scattered and from now on can offer only
sporadic resistance (Illustrated with a photo of General MacArthur).
ASSIES CAPTURE BALIKPAPAN ON BORNEO
On July 1, the Australians, supported by U. S. naval and'air force.,
landed on Balikpapan, an oil-producing center and seaport on the east
coast of Borneo. This is the third of major Allied landings on Borneo.
The first was made on Tarakan May 1, and the second on Brunei Bay forty
days later.
Prior to the landing, Balikpapan was subjected to fierce American
naval and aerial bombardment continued for 15 days. Despite that the
Japa were well prepared for this invasion, the Aussies made rapid ad-
vances. They have captured two airfields and the central area of Bal-
ikpapan. Balikpapan is one of the most important production centers
for refined oil in the For East. Its annual output reached 15,000,000
barrels before the Pacific War. Like the oil of Tarakan, Seria and
Miri fields, the petroleum- refined at Balikpapan will help Allies in
the drive against the common enemy.
(Illustration with a map of Borneo)
T. V. SOONG CONFERING WITH STALIN IN MOSCOW
The Chinese Premier, T. V. Soohg arrived in Moscow June 30, accomp-
anied by a 15 men delegation. This marked the first of a Moscow visit
by a Chinese leader since 1940, when Sun Fo, President of Legislative
Yuan, was there. Soong's party was accorded highest honors by the Soviet
leaders. He conferred with Generalissimo Stalin twice and had an inter-
view with President Kalinin. On his arrival in Soviet capital, Soong
stated: "I express my unswerving confidence that friendly collaboration
between China and Russia will be an immense contribution to the task of
establishing unshakable and general peace."
A couple of days after Soong's arrival, Prime Minister of Outer
Mongolia, Cheibalsan, came to Moscow, too. His presence may have connection
with Soong-Stalin ia:,lka which are believed to cover virtually every issue
of the Chinese-Russian Policy.
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FRONTPOST
Roosevelt, Churchill and
Stalin treffen sich in Persien
tiudeu erfolgen w rnlrn ,,.
:Noeb Jam tillage " enleu w tr
mit all.-n LSndern, web ? gros,,
rider klnin, tatkeditig zusammen-
arheiten. cleren Volk rr ill, 11 lie
mere Volker ntit 1.ei11 and Seale
der Antgahe geweiht hahen. 'ty-
ranuei zu ntiirzen arid tiklavcrei,
t nterdruckung mud IJnduldsan-
keit an, der Welt zn schaffeu ,,
o Keine. ilaclit der Lrde Mann
Der tUrkischs AussenmInIstsr war snpigsm
Die Arai fiihrenden Staalsindnner der Vereinten Nationen
trafen sich in Teheran, der IlatlpLstadt Persians. Nach iheer
Zusammenkunft, die vier Tage dauerte, verOfientlichten sie
am i, Dezember eine genleinsame Erklarung, in der tinter
anderem folgendes gesagt wild:
(Vie It? voile. Cehreriantinunuitg Tien "bur .(unmans and
reitli