REAR PREPARATIONS OF THE RED ARMY IN EASTERN USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 121
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 27, 1947
• Content Type: TRANS

Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A0005000100
D0-U%IEN1 NO. _ ~ .
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L7
DECLAS: IFIED
CHANGED TO: TS S C
-V}EW D t F=:
H i 'O.2
DOCUMENTS BRANCH
TRANSLATION
27 Jun 1947
REAR PREPARATIONS OF THE liED ARMY IN EASTERN USSR
Prepared By
Documents Branch
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS IN FORMAT ION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT. 50
U.S.C.. 31 AND 32. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO ANY
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE IN THIS PUBLICATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT SPECIAL
AUTHORITY FROM THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A0a0500010022-0
Number 81 27 Jun 19+7
RE R_ P1 P I~C,l'i S, Q TI RED ARNY IN EAS TERI:T USSR
Prepared by
Documents Branch
CENTRAL I TTELLI GENCE GROUP
2+30 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Approved for Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 'Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Distribution List
State (I.t D )
JIS
CI1i CFE
,AAF
AGF
ID
MITI
CIG
DB
1
10
21
10
7
30
4
137
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 11999108/25 CIA-RDP78,03109A0000500010022-0
SUM111ARY OF CONTENTS
Rear'Preparations of the Red Arm in Eastern USSR
Doc No 220664
This is a complete translation of a comprehensive study
of the rear preparations of the Red Army in Eastern USSR
made by Japanese General Headquarters in early 1945. "Rear
preparations" as used in this document is extended to in-
o ude ,"every phase of preparations for' military operations."
The scope of this study covers surveys of Eastern USSR's
materiel self-sufficiency, transport capabilities, degree of
dependence upon outside aid (including a discussion of lend-
lease from the US), and wartime requirements. A short con-
eluding section estimates the military strength that Eastern
USSR could employ against Japan, based upon the supply trans-
portation capacity to Eastern USSR.
The appendix to this study, referred to in this trans-
lation is not included in this publication. It was trans-
lated by SCAP in Japan and is, however, available for refer-
ence in Documents Branch.
Pages l through 115
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 :, CIA-RDP78-03109A0005d0010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999108/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECR~m: .
GOMPIE TRANSLATION DOC 2066k
TABLE- OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
Part 1 OUTLINE
. Army Department
General Headquarters
1 April 1945
Current Conditions in Eastern USSR from
Standpoint of Rear Preparations
A, Ability to Replace Men, Horses, and
vehicles
B. Self-Sufficiency in Essential Provi-
sions and Materiel
C. Capacity of Munitions Industry
D. Accumulated and Stored Suppliers of
Munitions
E. Lend-Lease to the USSR via Eastern
USSR, Ports
1. Freight Transportation Capacity
G.. Weakness andStrength of Eastern USSR
II. Study of Supplies Available to Eastern
USSR in the Event of War with Japan
III: Estimate of the Military Strength the
USSR Could Employ Against Japan Based
on the Supply Transportation Capacity
tQ Eastern USSR
Part
REAR PREP RATIONS OF, THE RED:ARMY .IN EASTERN USSR
2.? EXPLANATORY
Section 1. WARTDVIP REQUIIMENTS IN THE EVENT OF WAR
WITH JAPAN
Section 2. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN EASTERN USSR FROM
STANDPOINT OF REAR PREPARATIONS
II. Study of Materiel Self-Sufficiency
A. General
B. Provisions and Forage
C. Fuel
D. Mining Industry
E. Munitions Industry Capacity
F. Status of Reserve Stocks of Munitions
G. Lend-Lease to the USSR via Eastern
USSR Ports
SECRET'
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-031.09A000500010022-0'
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT,
II...Study of'Replacement of Men, Horses,
and 'Vehicles
A. Replacement of Men and Horses
B. Vehicles Replacement Potential
III. Study of Logistics
I. Railroads
B. Maritime Transportation
C. Water Transportation
D. Air Transportation
IV. Strength and Weakness of Eastern USSR
froizi Standpoint of Rear Preparations
A. Weakness
Strength
Section 3. STUDY OF SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO EAaSTIiN USSR
IN THE EVENT OF 1J WITH JAPAN
Section 4. ESTIMI TE OF THE POTENTIAL MILITARY STRENGTH
THE USSR COULD ENI'LOO 1 GAINST JAPAN BASED ON
THE SUPPLY MkNSPORTATIOIT CAPACITY TO EAST-
ERN USSR
EDITORtS NOTE: Proper names appearing in capi-,
tal letters followed by an as-
terisk are transliterations from
the original Japanese.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
=T
PREFACE.
15ef rii tionand' Signif cancd of x'Rear;.Preparations"
.
The term "rear preparations-P -as:usedherein..refers to every
phase of preparations for-military.operations. It-therefore in-
cludes accumulated stores of munitions., munitions,production capa-
city, essential raw materials, and, of course, manpower, pack
"arirnals, and vehi.clo.s, as .well as communication and transportation
facilities, These factgrs,,,together'with?rear. supply ~nd trans-
portation capacity, are what is :meant, in abroad-sense, by "rear
preparations." This study is not concerned with the fact that the
principal decisions'of the Red Army in Eastern USSR-.on rear prep-
arations were"motivated by the Red Army's anti-Japanese operational
B.
Importance of Studying 'the Rear
Preparations
Since, in modern warfare supply is as important as combat it is no
exaggeration to say that?superiority or inferiority in rear military
strength can decide the outcame of the war. Consequently, an accurate
study of the actual state of.rear preparations in Eastern USSR will
,make possible.ah evaluation of the operational plans and capabilities
of the Red Army. therein lies,the importance of this volume.
C, Notable Features'of the Rear preparations of the Red Army in the
Eastern USSR
1',. jypical Red Army Battle Tactics
one a harncteristic'of the .ed Army's battle tactics is its
'employment of'overwhelming forces to overpower-and annihilate-the
enemy. Recent years have seen remarkable increases, all based upon
the vast manupower and materiel resources, .in the' military,prepara-
tionsof the Red Army particularly in their-air, their mechanized,
and,-their artillery forces. 'The amount of materiel required by an
..operational force in'wartime has reached enormous proportions; and the
operational effectiveness 6f a unit is directly. deterrained, by the
standard of its supply`and'.transportation services.
2. Geographic,-Weaknesses in the Defense.of Eastern USSR
Eastern USSR lacks self-sufficiency -of .man' power, and materiel;
its munitions industry is especially weak. Th.e communication.facili-
ties and industrial resources of the'Eastern USSR ate concentrated in
an area close to the border, which-lacks strategic depth.,. Far removed
from Central European Russia, which will serve in wartime as the prin-
cipal source of military supplies, it has. only the Trans-Siberian
Railway as its main supply route.
3. Scale of era .i s alga rest Ja~a1~
The USSR has considered the personnel and materiel resources
of Eastern USSR;'its own inability to supply Eastern USSR, and the
strength of the Japanese 'forces which could be used against'. it.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 :: CIA-RDI? ~0 ,1.09A000 00010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A0005000.10022-0
CPYIGHT
SECRET
Consequently, the USSR has decided that in a war against Japan the
employment of such large forces as those used in the Russo-German
war would be nc;t.oily extremely difficult but also unnecessary.
Moreover, ther"e:are natural' .limjjtations upon the forces which could
be ,,used against Japan, and it is readily under steod.:,t .. any such
operaticnswould be carried on a greatly reduced scale compared
with those: of, the Russo-German conflict.
.D.
,Esunt be Considered-1n Examination of thhe Rear PrePara-
-t ons; of the Red Array in Eati1tern USSR (Cf Diagram No 1, Dian
grammatic survey of `Rear Preparations )
`..!'This; survey 6f 'the rear preparations of the Red Army in Eastern
"USSR will have as its main objectives the calculation of the degree
of self-sufficiency of Eastern USSR in man-power and materiel and
the supply and transportation capacity of the USSR Proper with re-
.gar-.d,to Eastern USSR. We shall thereby obtain an evaluation of the
operatibrial plans and the scalp of operations of which the USSR is
capable in the event of a war against Japan.
Estimate of Wartime Requirements
:A calculation of the wartime requirements is a prere
uisite
q
for surveying .the..'rear-preparations of the Red Army in Eastern USSR,
especially its moan-power and materiel self-sufficiency and the abil-
ity of the USSR to supply Eastern USSR. However, wartime requirements
will, also be. greatly affected by the respective operational strength
of tie USSR and Japan, the nature and time of the operations, their
duration, and conditions in the theater of operations. Consequently,
in the following study, certain basic facts have been assumed and
calculations made from them. Moreover,,it is believed that in the
event-of:war, although civilian needs rtay-differ in some respects
from present ones, the general,situatien will be little changed.
2. Manpower and Materiel Self-sufficiency of Eastern USSR
A consideration of the wartime self-sufficiency'of Eastern
USSR from the standpoint of manpower and materiel is vitally im-
portant in calculating both the wartime requirements of the region
e
and th
ability of the USSR to supply Eastern USSR.
In considering self-sufficiency, we must not only inves-
tigate the question of productive capacity and the amount of supplies
which can be requisitioned locally but also the amount of stores
accumulated. This is'gu'ite,obvious from the special nature of East-
ern USSR. Unfortunately, there is.very little information available
on, the amount of accumulated stores in Eastern USSR, and it is very
difficult to make an estimate. ,Much will depend Loon future inves-
tigations. Production, besides being affected by?'climatic and other
factors, will naturally he subject, in wartime, tc' other influences.
Nevertheless, in this study,, the volume of production is ,based on
the figures for the present year.' (Statistics for agriculture and
fishing are those for an average wartime year). Furthermore, the
supplies acquired in Eastern USSR. will have a considerable effect
upon the vclume'of'gonds available as supplies. However, these
factors will be greatly affected by the nature of the operations.
-4-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 : CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Consequently, in this study, we have ignored those supplies which
are naturally available in Eastern USSR and have, for the most part
assumed that Eastern USSR will be dependent upon supplies from the
USSR Proper
3. Abi l ty of the USSR to Supply Eastern USSR (Transportation
Capacity
If we accept the proposition that, in wartime, Eastern USSR
will be dependent upon Central European USSR for supplies, the next
problem is the ability of the USSR to carry on a war and the amount
of lend-lease available. This problem may be,further subdivided
into the questions of'what constitutes the ability to prosecute a
war and the questions of supply and transportation. The former
bears no important relation to the scale of operations against Japan.
For the latter, the least that can be said is that the Trans-Siberian
Railway, serving as the main wartime supply artery) will greatly hamper
the operational effectiveness cf the USSR against Japan.
NOTES: (i) The value of Outer Mongolia to rear preparations
is worthy of intensive study, but because of the
lack of nformation,'it has been relegated to the
appendix. Consequently, the information given
sho4Jd itself be amplified by further study.
Some essential items have, however, been included
in this study.
(ii) The organization and management of the Red Army's
rear preparations are important aspects of. such
a study, but because of the lack of information,
these points will have to await further research.
(iii
The following may serve as rei;erence material for
detailed. study:
port in Eastern USSR (Prepared by'Imperial Head-
quarters)
.(e) Survey of US - USSR Air Communication Routes
over the Northern Pacific (Prepared by Army General
Staff Headquarters)
(a) Report on Storage Facilities in Eastern USSR
and Outer Mongolia (Prepared by Army General Staff
Headquarters)
(b) Report on Factories and Industries in Eastern
USSR and Outer Mongolia (Prepared by Army General
Staff Headquarters)
(c) -Evaluation of Transportation Capacity of the
Trans~Siberian Railway (Prepared by Army General
Staff Headquarters)
{d) Summary of a Report on River and Sea Trans-
.5 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
3
a
a
~~
c
d
)
+
. --- `\ W
$ml IN
(x1 d ~~~ rilY'~
P4
a)r
to Cd
4
co
a) 4
Cd
s, f.. o r-4 aa))
a~
E-i
r~ P4
4J 2-114
proved For Release 1999/08/25 : CIA-RDP78-03109A0005000
10022-0
 Approved For Release 199,9/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT-
P.4
N
O
?r!
f~
''mod
4-+
0)
?ri
N
fl)
?r)
rd
r
Q
?ri
4a
P+
Pa
?ri
0
P-1
to
Q
cNil
cyaL
?ri
Pi
N
td
N
O
N
-r4 4-4
~
N
h
r
!
CC
N
N
?
N
M
p
La ?c
c3 n
Approvl?d For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RD IP.7.$=12'1Q9A000500010022-0
 Approved for Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A090500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Part 1. OUSE -
7. CURRENT CONDITIOS IN EASTERN USSR FROM
THE. STANDPOINT OF, REAR
(Cf Table .1, "Troop, Horse,.andjehicle Replacement-Capacity
and Materiel ' Supply Capacity of Eastern USSR.,"-.Table 2,' "MAanpower
and'Materiel Self-sufficiency of Eastern_USSR during thb First Year
of War," and Map 2, "Distribution, of Essential Industries and Prin-
cipal IFesourcet of Eastern. USSR.")
A. Ability to Replace Men, Animals and Vehicles_
1, Approximately 140,000 men and.100,0.00 horses are available
in Eastern USSR. "(This includes..5d,O0O men liable to conscription.)
When potential wartime losses are considered, these numbers are quite
insignificant, especially the number of men available.
.2. The-various types of vehicles available include 18,000
tractors,~"i28,000 oxen and horse-drawn vehicles, and about 63,000
sleds. Large'nthmbers of-vehicles , especially trucks, will have to
be brought''in from Central European USSR.
.B, Self-sufficienc in Essential Provisions and Materiel
European USSR or from abroad.
2?. Coal
The average annual crop is. about 930,000 metric tons,' which
is no more than approximately 67% of the amount necessary for self-
sufficiency at present. Theref@re, if we assume that 860.,000. metric
tons are available as a wartime supply and that an additional 2~0,fjO0
metric, tons are available in the storage depots 'of Eastern USSR;: the
supply capacity of the Eastern US.M in the.. first year of 4var would
be 1,110,000 metric tons. ' Thtis,in order to meet- the. demands of war,
an enormous volume of supplies would have to be shipped. from Central
1. BX:ea Grain
be necessary.
The actual amount available in the Eastern USSR is approy_
imately 13,000,000 metric tons., At present, thip'appears'ta? ?cQristitute
a surplus. However, in wartime, with'the demands on transportation in-
creasing, the amount of coal consumed by the railroads Viill.iric`rease.
greatly, and the total demand will climb to 18,000;00() metric tons.
Although an increased wartime production of 14;500,000 metric tons_is.
possible, even when this'has been added to Eastern USSR1s'stored re-
serve of 3,000,000 metric tons, the actual supply. will not.be-sufficient
to meet the demand..-Suppliet,'fromi"Central European.USSR will therefore
The annual petroleum production of Eastern USSR is approximately
650,000 metric tons, which is only 66% of the amount required for self-
sufficiency at present. Even when this has been added to the stored
reserve of 1,300,000 metric tons, Eastern USSR's capacity to produce
and supply petroleum during the first year of. war.? nounts.-to- only 1,950,
000 metric tons. In view of the 'vast wartime demands, this willnUcesssi-'
fate the supplementation of supplies either from Central uropean R
or from abroad.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25.: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
4. Steel
SECRET
The annual steel production of Eastern 'USSR is only about
220,000 metric tons, which is about 38% of the amount necessary
for self-sufficiency at prescrlt.? During wartime, -railroad con-
struction, repair work, and-other factors will create sudden in-
creases in demand. Consequently,, even when the stored reserve
of 200,000 metric tons has been added, it can be assumed that
considerable supplies will be required from Central European USSR.
C. Capacity of hunitions, industry"
Eastern USSR' s. munitions industries 'can prodcico'approximately
400 aircraft, 150 tams, and 550 artillery piec(!s per month. Even
if this-rate of production were maintained and the stored reserves
were made available, considering the losses incurred in'modern war-
fare, the capacity of-the munitions industry is too small for self-
sufficiency, Moreover since the production of. munitions is low,
supplementation of supplies of ordnance equipment and ammunition
from Central European USSR and from abroad will be on a large
scale in wartime. This will be particularly true of those weapons
and equipment whose rate of production is especially low.
D. Accumulated and Stored Su lies of Munitions
Although these did not apnear.to be large from observation of
storage installations, it is estimated that the reserve of pro
visions and fodder amounts to approximately 800,000 metric tons,
the reserve of liquid fuels,to?1.,300,900 metric tons, and the re-
serve of ammunition to 200,000 metric tons.
E. Land-Lease-to the USSR via Eastern USSR Ports
The annual imports of lend-lease supplies from the US via
Eastern USSR ports amount to approximately 1,700,000 metric tons.
This figure could be increased in wartime, thereby greatly increas-
ing the fighting potential of the Red Army in Eastern USSR.
F. Freight Transportation Capaci
Although the transportation capacity of the various: routes,
available in wartime as lines .of supply to Eastern USSR varies
according to cireumstances, the following is an outline of the
annual maximum capacity:
Method
Freight Transportation. Percentage of i
of Transportation
C^pac:i.t, (metric tons Total
Trans-Siberian Railroad
iver (Sea) T
About 13,000,000 About 82%
ranspor-
tation
Aix, Transportation
About '2,500,000 About 16%
About 100,000 to
260,000 About 2%
Total
15,700,000
. a 100
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For-Release 1999/08/26: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
i. _
NOTE: The transportation-capacity of the-Trans-Siberian Railway
for military materiel during. the current year was approxi-
mately 9,300,000 metric tons.
G. Weakness and Strength of Eastern USSR
The weakness and strength of Eastern USSR from the standpoint
of rear preparations can be outlined as follows:
1. Weakness
a. Sparsity_of population and basically unstable economic
structure.
b. Distribution of population and lack of strategic depth,
resulting from the location of the main production belt and-the muni-
tions storage installations.
c. Weakness of the internal communications of Eastern USSR
and the deceptive weakness of the transportation supply routes to
Eastern USSR.
d. Lack of completion of rear preparations along the western
Manchurian front from the standpoint of offensive operations.
e. Weakness of the Red Army in Eastern USSR in regard to
operational strength and ability to replace vehicles.
2. Strength
a. Increase in fighting strength ' as a result of 'US ' lend-
lease.supplies to the USSR.
b. Increase in the rear supply capacity by utilization of
the US-USSR northern air routes. I
c. Establishment of rear installations on a wartime basis.
Approved -or ReIea er1999108/25 : CIA-RDP78-0,3109,AO, ,0500010022-0
 yr vr Ap,j2rnvprl Fnr Rplpacp 1000/nR/7c ? C.IA-RfP7R-n%1ngnn90500010022-0
C
o$
0 a)
0 f
I cC
c; 0 ,
O
0 q
O
m a~
0
W Ce' oo
r-q r-4
10
rW 4Ir
:~ P^
?
4:nd
-I-' 'd
0 +'
p
C 0
ce ca r` 9
-4 ca
CH Qi 3
o r Ce
a( to
P
0
u o
o al w,
-rl ,C0
r-1
0.
W. (D H 0 0
0
0
O
0
O
O
0
U"%
0
,^I N
0
O
0
to
N
r-I
I CD
O
000 0
0 + O DI. 0..
s
N
I
f~-+ N
$1 N
I IT co
cd
I $1 +'
.P
~~$
igln~'W
O 3
: U O
Q
! o -I
H ELI
~r{+~
} saTotuaA
saTaTuaA
sas. OH 'sdooai .zo; Svpudeo
'I-UGrraOVTdaU
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 p,)g# or Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
O O
0 O
0 0
j1
O:
0
ccd
O 0
O
Os
00
1
4)
0 0
O
k.N
U
0 0
O
O
?r41
to H
H
W
a),
H H
H H
h`-
Ni
to
~?1
P.,
0
0
CJ
0
0
0
0
d
0
c
Cd
1a) 0)
'~H Ul 4'
-P H tll .,?1
'i 3 C)
0 Cd
4):0
,
0 1-1 4z. P,
CH V)
O
U -P P
CT.cd H`..,
0
tfl
C-) bo
i-1
N
0
0
0
0
LO
O 0 0
O o 0
C\j
TO D
'1
N H
0
w
O
O
O
0
Cu
0
H
O
O
0
0
PYl
N
0
0
0
O
r4-%
Kl
rn
0
0
4-1
Cd
0
w?
0-
a',
N
m -H CO
.,A 4-1 U
O
0
0
0
0
0I
O
cd
U',%
?r1
0
rc
0 0
O
0
cd
r-E
N
0
;
0
0
0
LCY
O
C
C H
8
N?
~
rill ,.o
4
_
1~11
Id.
4
rcl,
t
r-I
4-i
?r
O
cd r4
O o o
E7 A f
O
A
O
O
q
O H
A
O O
A A
txi
.rq
a
4-5
w
U-\ Lil r`-
LCl
1 -
LCl
t`~
i
o
CH -r-i >
0 t
a))
OO
0 O
O
O
O
c
r
to of
W Ra
H-
o
o of of
o of
o
. o
0
O
ol
o c
0 0
6
W
Cd
,^S Ci W 0
Q' a) ?ri
w' A -P
0 o l O
LC' Nl% to
o N r --
.O
LC \
N
cr
N
N-
Cr)
0
N
0
LC1
I--?
00
O
M N
r 1 Ll'
I
P
C)
r-1 ! r{
!
r1
+>4i
rl O
U)
va
001 0
001 0
of
O'
O
0
0
01
O
01
o0
0 0
0 ~
:Z)
00! 0
of
0
0
?
-
oo
a) 4
o "+
0
~+
O O! O
0 r-1
N
no }
G1
H
1~1{
N
0
to
0 0
1P 0
i r-1 r-4
N
r -I
Imo-
0\ N
i
a(
Md
O O
r.'
CO W
?
W
!
W
:~)
W
...
W
c) c)
-1
-1
~
1
r
0
1
0
q,
a)
h0 0
I
r
?
P Fi
- - - -
- 0 oI
,
}
o
-~
C 0
Fa +P
-$- -P
() a)
v 0
~
0
0
* 0
r-1 o f
A q
Fi ~+
a) 2
W 6 ASS +3 14- -P
Fr a) $-[ a)cd a)
P
W i-'
+D O
P`' $4
C 4'
U N
F-i
4. +~
-I a)
~,' Si 1
-H +-
d W
r-1 *
a) 4
O
a) o H chi wJ a2 A
cd a.
0 A
r
cd F
P fl
'rr
p
~JTTS U pug: SUO
TSTA
O.t
JOT14
00010022-0
 CPYRGHT
Approved limor-I
U
U
>~
U\0
0
4
0
.H
IN
0
i N ?
H
M
?H
U) A
fl
?H
Cd ,-I
a
to
U-- )O 0 0
P 4-4
0
L O N Ulm
?rt
m
r1 r-1 Imo-,"
FY
to
-
l
0
a
Cu
0 0
M ?ri
U)
4-t ?H
O
(1)
Cd H
~Frl H
Fr+
Lf1O0 0
Lh M 0 I`-
t N rl LO
r-I
I
C)
U)
IU)
LO
U
Pi 0 4-1
Q)
P1
0 Lfl O 0
Cu N O N
0 0 O 0
N cal O Kl
- NDOtO
Lrl
Cu
I --I
,-0 0 0000
I1lr4,K,K,
to ,-4
1UINO 0
LrI\
1-U-\
l U) U) U)
4 iR ~Ny Cll Q)
.4-2ri W 4-I 4)
HI -4 -,q
E-IfI4
PL,
O
~I
N
9F
Cd 0
N N
0 ?rI Sy ?H
4 U +~
CJ .H ?H 'd
4-4 CD
4-f Q) s
O
Q) H
O Cd.E ?H
Cad O U) H
to EI P,
Q) U) a) 21
E I-q 0
H
rIN Kl
9A000500010022-0
Ap
roved. For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-031
)A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
Hap' 2. r-ISTRIRUTICUT eF 7, SsEI'TIAL
factories
C DI-*
(7" Tank (AFV) factories
General munitions faet_o:res
Steel works
Oil refineries
LEGEND
CTII
'0
Coalfields
C iJJieids
Repo?its 1 r: naterials J
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved_ For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
1ui8Y5HgvKA,'~.,~_?-- \F/~. t
CIvuarJ:
E NOR:- H KARAFUTO
'KA
VOROS LOV i !r` CS a~JCs .kid ? t;?'`
6 V-1, I
(TN: ;-AK1--1AL.IN)
KVA'31
.JJ J s AND
cman numerals nAar. $umbois Yidicate the number Of factories;
Arabic nur r" indicate their procuctivE capacity-per month.
(Figures in brackets) x 1,000 tons [-M: Deposits c,f coal, iron, etc.
\-
KnM50MOL5K! p 4
Appr9ved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Pi
a)
H
H
o
w
cd
?ri
.r.,
1
0 $1
0 0
4
12
. (1)
00
N
O N
~ ?1-~
s
Cd
f
0
N +
CO
S
-i a)
C)
0
d
'
E4 to
0
P? Ei
0
F+
Cl
A
C)
U ?V
0
0
O
01
rd ?
a) 0
rd 0
0 00
P
c~3
E-I 4-+ UO
c i-4
Pi
P,
0
0
0
0
+D
.~
a>
~
(D
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
r0~1
0
?
+a
0
P
Pa
F1
0 '
0
0
0
?r?1
?r-I
?H
?r??i
Fi ..L1
0
0
0
0
0
0
LCII
?)
O
O
rl
WIN
O
0
O
C)
m
o >
(V
U)
a>
H
a)
Cd
0
1-4
ni
P
f
a)
Pq
0
r~
W
ui
a)
a>
CH
W
0
r-1
Cd
Fa
G0.
a)
0
ja)
H
Ei
W
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET
CPYRGHT
II. StUDY OF SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO EASTERN USSR
IN THE EVENT OF VAR WITH JAPAN
(wartime requirements and.available supplies include the replace-
ments for losses of men, animals, weapons, and vehicles.)
-It goes without saying that in'the event of a war with Japan,
'wartime requirements will take precedence over all other supplies
being sent to Eastern USSR and that the state of operational prep-
arations against Japan, especially the amount of munitions in re-
serve, will have an effect upon the-prosecution of the war. In
view of the present rear strength of manpower and materiel, an
estimate of requirements in the first year of war for Eastern
USSR is given in Table 3. Wartime requirements of the military
forces form the basis of the estimate.
--lg -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 1for Release 1999/08/25: CIA RDP78-03109A0bb500010022-0
4)
0
?ri
CI)
0000000000 0 00 0 00 0 000
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O H O
4-1
rn ~
? n
0 0 0 0 M U-1 LC\ LC\ V\ 0 P r? O O
r-d n tY , 150 ri H N I- W I` M r- t Z'0
0 H 0
?r1 ?ri
U) J
N
4-1 Q
O H 0
u) -H U)
pi
0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 00 0((3 00
0
00000 00 0
0 0 "- 0 r- no no to LO 0 rr1 r-1 0 0
0 LG1 r-r `O r! r-I Cu N-- t N N r-1 -t
l9 r-1 ,zt LO - r-f LC1()-\ N- 0
0 C0~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 00
0.000000000 00 00
0000 r1H Hr-1CP0
LCl r-- V LC, N Cu r+"1 ,50 W 150
U .-~
-I-) ci O
U
rl ;-4 (D 0 -N a4z No 3 0 ~Cd
w i c i (-r Cn In
Ord cn f1
?H P ++ Fi
4 N Qom)
rrl H 0 0
d 0 N Li
rI r1 N
V ti/
0000000000 00 00
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q O O O 0 0
0000000000 cc 00
0 000a?lboboI1.zf O rrlH O0
LC1 M'1 r-- N C\J N r~ tO 031 cY\ r-l r- bd to
0 N LO 01 - - Cu 8() N \ H _J-
ri v ..i r-1 cu n
9~?'ea OZ
Pula Suo-EST,%.014
cn
d
50
0 N
41
o O
r
+- U)
? 51 -r1
(D rA
El Cd
0
+"d a
0
PQ (D
0
F ?r-I .r1 CO
0000 0 0 0 +' U
00 00 ate' N.i
.r.i- rr+rr, r- 0 0
LIl N f+'1 N C\j
00800000
000000 0
:310bO~OOff-OO
42 Cd
0 0
+) 5v
?rl a)
S -r-I
~4) 1
?.1
,Si
000000000
000000080
N'.O O N Lc .0 _~- 0
0ti C t
ri r-I LO tO
0 CC (D
51 a) 5-1
?0000000 000 00 4-, ti 4-,
(:I' r-"0 to t-- ? f 0 0 -r+ 0 0
r-I r 0 1-0 ,Cd- 01 M aa) d a)
13' N 0
0
r
i O
to F
a)
co (D co 0 0
U U U rl +~
?H a) 0
O PA rj 0 N
0
i-Z U _ rd Cd
CC
0 to ci
r--1 E 0
k 4-
U ~' U U 0 H
u)
CCd H01o
U2 P-1 0
U 0 -H
.. + Cd
-N U V) -H
cd -H 41
o P -d 41
UOT4TtlTMMV
pT_L- Suav
r-I N
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
III. ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH THE USSR COULD Eiv LOY
AGAINST JAPAN BASED UPON THE SUPPLY TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY TO
EASTERN USSR
It is estimated that the maximum military strength the USSR could
employ at any one time in a war against Japan, based mainly upon the
F"1pply transportation capacity to Eastern USSR, would be 80 rifle div-
sions.
In other words, the transportation capacity of the Siberian Rail-
road can be depended upon to supply the nucleus of 60. rifle divisions.
If it is possible for the Red Army to use lend-lease goods shipped by
sea from the US-to Eastern USSR, an additional 15 rifle divisions can
be suppliod. Moreover, if other war materials transported via the
Lena. River and lend-lease supplies sent by air from the US are taken
into account, an additional six or seven rifle divisions can be sup-
plied.
The following table gives the maximum military strength which could
be employed by supply transportation routes:
Routes
Military
Strength*
Annual Transportation
Capacity (metric tons)
By Trans-Siberian Railway,
60 Rifle Divs
9,300,000
By sea to Eastern USSR
15 Rifle Divs
2,000,000
By river to Eastern USSR
5 Rifle Divs
500,000
By air from US to USSR
1 or 2 Rifle
100,000 to
Divs
260,000
Total
80 Rifle Divs
12,v0O,000
s; These figures are approximate
With the exception of the Trans-Siberian Railway in wartime, the
possibility and efficiency of utilizing these supply transportation
routes, especially the Lena River and air routes, would vary according
to circumstances. It can therefore be estimated that the maximum
military strength used against Japan at any one time would be the
nucleus of the 60 rifle divisions transported by the Trans-Siberian
Railway.
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET r
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
;Part EXPLANATORY
Section 1. WARTIME UIRE62ENTS IN THE EVENT OF WAR WITH JAPAN
(For fuller, details, of Appendix 2, "Estimate of Wartime Require-'
z7ents+') In a war against Japan the wartime requirements of the Red Army
would be greatly affected by its operational plans and scope as well
as Japan's resistance. An estimate is given, in Tables 4-7, in accord-
ance with this line of reasoning, of the requirements of operational
forces during the first year of war against Japan.
A, Strength of Forces imaged in Operations against Japan
Estimated on the basis of 60 rifle division, 40 rifle divisions,
30 rifle divisions, and 20 rifle divisions.
B; Operational Intentions of Forces En a amd in Operations A ainst
!4,2pan
Although the operational intentions will depend upon the operational
strength of the forces involved, 60 rifle divisions will be taken as the
bas:; figure.
In accordance with the theory of concerted attack along an entire
front, which requires complete superiority in military strength, most
of Manchuria, Mongolia, and the stretegic areas of ltortherri korea and
China would be invrded, 'but' the -pHHifcipal ' area.
rich an offensive
would be launched is the western section of Manchuria.
It is estimated that the approximate duration of operations tno uld
be one year,
1. Phases of Operations
a. Initial Phase (about 3 months)
41) Border engagements (about one month)
(2) From the border to the limit of advance for the initial
(about two months) teal
b. Interval between the initial and secondary phases (about
'three months)
c. Secondary phase (about six months)
2. Zssentials of Tactical Command during the Various Phases of
a. Initial Phase (about three months)
By launching a concerted attack along the entire front, the
Red Army will burst through the Japanese Army positions and advance to
a line along the T'u-men-Chia-mu-ssu Railroad and the Great and Little
Hsing-an Ling Mountains (i.e.) a line from Tsitsihar to Pai-ch'eng-tzu
to Pei-an).
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
On the Inner Mongolia front, they will undertake a deep
penetration at the very outset to the Yin Shan Range (i.e., a line
from Pai-ling-miao to.Hsi-juhs:i.-ni to To-lun)Wand into the Jehol
region.
b. Secondary phase (about six months)
After waiting approximately three months for equibment
to arrive from the rear, the Red. Army will assault the major ,por-,
tion of Manchuria and Mongolia and a section of Korea and North
China.
NOTE: (i) The units of the Japanes?r Army engaged in
these operations against the Red Army will
be reinforced and will plan a delaying
action.
(ii), In general, the phases of the operations
will be based upon the seasons.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
- 22 -
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
C.PYRGHT
C4 th to U)
a) a) a) v a)
800008000
0 000000 00
-P o o ti c. 0 0 C
0 to LC7 r-+ 0 U-% rn
E+ f- N N N I- ---t r-4
Mr--1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
U7 ?rI r+.r.!40 0
E) F?i .rl JL~ r-?I
I-i w .r?1 U
0 0 Cl) ?)
O 0 -41' . ~.
000 9 >,a)00
-P00 f4 tadvaO
0 rr1 c" ? , IO %.D
r-I
a)
H
H
ta" ?r4
rl
Cd +. N N Cd td
(6 -P 40 w)
Fa (L) Cd rco 0 34
a2G,zo3 pur:
SUOTSTAQ?Id JGTUD
0,~ m 0
PC) N b0. 0
N r1 rr1
0
0
0
0
0008000
0 000080000
0 O O N 0.0 0 0
{VboNNlC1m
~t ^
m 0
to A ci
H 0
,O
to
H
r lri rirl
(1)
U
U 0 0 0
1
4 ?
i
..~?1
9
?rl
r
?r4 ?r
?r
O
q O c to)00000
0
R-i0'tD--00000
0
?r1 O
D =to 00
r-I a) 'U
4-1 4-D -P
0
f r 8 ' EI
Pi P+ rr1 r-I
00
0
N
C\j r?i
a)
? o m to
r td Lb a)
r-4
a) tul V
to
4-1 4-+ N N ?d E+ c-i
O V ?r1 Ii 0 0 0 0
to rys
o Ra
.~ -P Ri
-
iA U
C) r?1
a) U a) -H
~' ?r-1 C ~. H U) ci
cci s 4-1 r
0000000.00
u-\0 0000-00
1-- N M 0 b0 r1 00 0 0
LLC\ r4 'D r-I M
0) W
N ci
CJ r-1 0
4-1 V2 4L) rj
rd p d C H 0 U IPIZ .
V) r1
U .0 0 U o r-I Cl)
t3 4) Cd iP 4-1 R
0 c-a O ?rl
OOU'CUPJ
uOTITuttunuy
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022 ;0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
U) V) N, to U)
0 i ti a) N 4)
P p p i-1 9
Q1 N 0 0 U) (1) 0 0 0 0 rl
F) F3 Ed q Q ~1 PI
?` 0000 0 000 0 00
C7, 0 O
CPYRGHT
0
P.,
U1.
?r
O
4Z-
1
U
U)
O
F' .
O 0 Iw
.H -H ca
F+
4:1
to -4
?r i ?r-1 r-1 .
'J? b 0
H
4i
A -
ci
o
0
~+
a)
0
a)
(
r -q
.
4-4 P 4..
P
Cd ri H cd
-- a~ 8
H
H
U)
H
H
R
H
F1
r-1 P4
6'
N
r',
A
O
r!
ca
-4
(f)
H
y
r-i
0
m A
o _ 0
+
co
r-!
N
Gd
+-D
r?
4-+ ,Z--
0
rn
-H '`t'.,-~ 0
E-i
-
x!90 Ei
w 00
rl
U 00
C)
s; N o
N
r
rd ?r4 (1)
9" CD ci
w 4a m ai
cd Cd -4
bLO
U P
P -4
ri ?ri U) ?IJ
4c4----
0 0 U 0 d)
U U U U U
00c000
0 M000
rd H P
a) 0
U) P P +3
0 0 C)
cd + O P
Ei c(,' E
r-i 0000)000 O O
P, 0 HHNN- -0 N-' LC
0 H \.O N , in N Pr) H
H to
0
. q 0
U)
CD +, 0
A O o q
0 47? U
?ri 0 0
4 ~ t~
rt P
U)
ci.ci 00 0000
cd G) 00 0000
?r-i 0 0O 0000
r-I ? (D -R rI r i ICJ N H
C
U 0
P'+
000")0000
F-i (D o 0000000 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r-i
14 O N . r-1 r~I O
IP
N a)
r-1 U)
e , 0; ptr
*juOT3ih.O.I3 . atu3
r5,
UI -P
m U)
N U .r?i P
cad c s . ~ to 14 43 N
0 0 0 00 0)OOO
0 0 0: 1- O .p p
0 0LUlN0;NI.I1OOQ
Lc1 rrl O ,1~ 0
t H M to
W
0
'RI
r-I
co O 0) ~j H
C)
? P U 0 aE
r-i
0 4-i rd E+ F+ ~,, +~
?~ri P I F o$4 4a 0 E 4
0
t
N
-
Cl)
O
U
07
'
4:-
fi
4
0
O
C-a
Fi
4-'
f-+
Cl)
to
N
cd
cd
0
0
0
0
0
r=1 Ti
+?
40
f1O
'd f-t
-F'
CO
? -5
4-+ EI
CG
Q)
S'
0
0 Cd
?ri
Cd Fa 0
C-t
0
rl 0
di :f.
Ei
Dl
t3
tn~~U
N N N N
m u] m ~
$1 $71 0
q E~ C3 I; r A 10 1
000000 000b00
0000Q 0 >O00Oo
O LC1 O rr1 r- CU M CJ
O H -t-I ?.-I H ?rl '~ S"
- U) r-I 'Z'3 . ?rl N V1 U)
fi U) UJ r-f
N ri rl O Yn ?ri 0 >~+ ,4D ~". fi to
?ri C3 U N .
O A A 0 C) A 4-4 4-+ a) N Id N F-4
ti cd Cd H I Cl) O U
P, ~-?J Fi P, G[I 0 u1 F+ F- I, PI
N Cl) > 4 r-I Cl)
,.O ,
r?{ N rl ' q) 0 U U G ?r1 O O U O
4-t Fr +~. la +3 i 41 4-D +-'~ P $-1 ?rl ,; +~ CO 4-.')
. Ld ?ri ?ri '~' ,Cd O .< ?ri _ O ?r4 ?rt U1 +1 O Fa C)
a910aO3 ptU
aouSupap
UOT.TUrLr=7
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A00050001 Q022-0
 Approved for Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYR.GHT SECRET
Section 2.:: CURRENT CONDITIONS IN EASTERN .USSR.I 09 THE
S . POINT. O F
In this chapter, the standard peacetime"po6tAition'"will be
taken as 6,0501000 (700,000 in service). -Moreover, regional di-
'
vis.ions for this chapter are given in Map 3, "Map of Regional
Divisions." (Cf Appendix Map 1, "Map of Industrial Resources
of Eastern USSR and Outer Mongolia from the Standpoint of Rear
Preparations!'
I; STUDY OR MATERIEL SELF-SUFFICIENCY
A. Gen-,, e eral
1. For a long time the USSR has planned to perfect her
preparations for a war against Japan, using Eastern USSR as the
major base from which to control Eastern Asia. At the same time,
g-ercoming_ innumerable difficulties, she has labored to develop
and strengthen the country, with'a view to making Eastern USSR
economically self-sufficient in war and peace. Since the Man-
churian Irroident,, the USSR has paid special attention to strength-
ening her position to counterbalance the increases in Japanese
forces in Manchuria, but the Russo-German War broke out before
she was able to establish economic self-sufficiency.
After the outbreak of the Russo=German War, the USSR
had no alternative but to prosecute-that war and recapture'those
territories she had lost to Germany. As a result,, she was in-
capable of paying any attention to Eastern USSR. Consequently,
not only was the establishment of economic self-sufficiency in
Eastern USSR halted temporarily but also the vast mobilization
program after the'outbreak of the war and the stoppage of the
constant immigration from Central European USSR caused a consider-
able drain on manpower. In addition,,a decline in transportation
capacity became evident as rolling stock, automobiles and trucks
were sent to the western front. As a result of the singular
lack of machines and equipment in Eastern USSR, her productive
capacity decreased generally. Furthermore, certain of her-reserves
of munitions were sent to the western front immeaiately after the
outbreak of hostilities in answer to the pressing demand for them.
In view of,.these circumstances, it is believed that the materiel
self-sufficiency of Eastern USSR decreased after the outbreak of
the Russo-German Var.
Subsequently, Eastern USIZ concentrated mainly upon sat-
isfying the requirements of the German front and upon relieving
the situation in Central European USSR by striving to increase
and expand her munitions industry. However, the production of
arms, iron, steel and certain other non-metallic goods seems
to have decreased, a fact which cannot be ignored.
2. Even in peacetime Eastern USSR lacked many essential
goods and depended upon imports from Central European USSR and
the US for certain necessary commodities. In view of the limita-
tions imposed by present conditions, there are numerous difficul-
-27-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
CPYRGHT
ties impeding ' the .establishment- ,cf self-sufficiency in Eastern
USSR. The situation is .liable.. t{o become prggre.ssively worse in
wartime because of the vast requirements.
Provisions and Forage
1, Bread grain
a. Present Estimates
Since the outbreak of the Russo-German ar, there
has been a marked shortage of :Labor.and machinery and a decline
in production. The'maximum peacetime supply of bread grain was
about 930,000 metric tons while the requirements were mainly as
shown in the tab'.e below. The deficit of about 450,000 metric
tons was made up by imports from the US which arrived at ports
in Eastern USSR, by mixing ' var:i:.ous types of grain and by using
potatoes as a substitute.
Supply (metric tons) Demand (metric tons)*
Production' Seed Actual Supply Military Civilian Total
1,130,000 200,000 9309000 230,.000,1,150,000 1,380,000
Deficit: .450,000 .
3E The military~requirements are 330 kilograms per year (900 grams
per day)"per person, and the civilian, 215 kilograms per year
(590 grams per day) per person.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET,
CPYRGHT
Map 3. REGIONALDIVISIONS
,1 0
,,'Amur `3ew~r
\OhIjst j.A'~,tos,or.,Dus\
o C.I1, i^ _ i v Y1 a ! 1.
~lI n c ~~ u ri a t
~',`rLc~JV 5o6-
oi,i;.r,c to
krrvF~ :~ ~-~tf~ k
N k"roi
29-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-031.09A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
The general outline of regional requirements should
be as given in the following table: (in metric tons)
Region
Supply
Demand
Surplus or
Deficiency
Maritime Krai
73,000
210,000
(-)197,000
Raions directly subordinate
78,000
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish
125,000
Autonomous Oblast
131,000
(-) 53,000
Amur Oblast
121,000
(-) 4,000
Khabarav.sk Krai
31,000
111,0C)0
(-)10$,000
Chita Oblast
205,000
261,000
(-) 56,000
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
155,000
114,000
(-) 41,000
Yakut ASSR
45,000
$$,000
(-) 43,000
Irkutsk Oblast
247,000
214,000
(-) 37,000
Total (Eastern USSR)
931,000
1,380,000
(--)4 9,000
b. Wartime Estimates
Since it is possible in wartime to maintain an actual
maximum supply of 860,000 metric tons (Note i) and an estimated
reserve of 250,000 metric tons (Note ii), Eastern USSR's poten-
tial maximum: supply is`1,110,000 metric tons. The relationship
between demand and supply for the military forces is given in
the tabl below. In addition to the large supplies sent from
Central European USSR, considerable quantities of essential goods
will be received under lend-lease.
NO'S'ES: (i) The figures for 1944 are the total pro-
duction of about 1,060,000 metric tons less
seed (a decrease of 5% from the peacetime
crop).
(ii) The details of reserve supplies are as
given in "F;" Status of Reserve Stocks of
Muni tions: .
A B C D
metric tons
Wartime Mi1itary` 630,000 460,000 370,000 290,000
Demand Civilian 1,115,000
Total 1,780,000 1,610,000 1,520,000 1,440,000
Eastern USSR's Poten-
tial Maximum Supply 1,110,000
Maximum of Essential
Supplies 670,000 500,000 410,000 330,000
Period of Sustenance
from Eastern USSR's Po-
tential Maximum Supply 7 me s 8 mos 8.7 mos 9.3 mos
Legend: A - Basis of 60 rifle divisions
B _ -it It 40 " it
C - it It 30 it It
D - it if 20 it It
_ 30
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
* The military demand includes one month's reserve supply, at
the rate'of 365 kilograms yearly per man (1 kilogram per day).
2.
Present Estimates
(1) 'Animal., Meat
The, decrease in meat production in Eastern USSR
attar the.outbreak of iar with Germany was caused
by added restrictions upon slaughtering and a
shoat:ge.of,feed. Annual production fell below
62,000 metxijc ton's.
The approximate-deficiency of 6,000 metric tons
was almost tirade good by imports from the US,
rriv.ng at ports in'Eastern USSR and by a re-
auction in_ civilian"demands. The situation of
supply and demand is as follows:
Supply
Military
Demand*
Civilian Total
Deficiency
Animal Meet
(metric tons) 62,000 18,000
50,000 68,000
6,000
Animals included in the "supply" above are
as shown below:
Type of Animal
No'of Livestock
% Slaughtered
Production
(metric tons
Cows
1,620,000
30
32,000 .
Sheep
1,550,000
45
11;000
Hogs
1,350x000
40
19,000
Total
4,520,000
62y000
# Military requirements 25 kilograms per person per annum
(70 grams daily)
Civilian requirements 9.2 kilograms per person per annum
(25 grams daily)
-Summary of Regional. Supply and Demand
Region
Supply. Demand.. Surplus or
Deficiency
(in metric tons)
Maritime Krai
Raions directly subordinate to
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish..
8,000.
16,000
- $,000
Autonomous Oblast
2,000
'7,000
- 5,000
Amur Oblast
4,000'
6;000
- 2,;000
Khabarovsk Krai
2,000
5,000..,
- 3,000
Chita Oblast
16,000
13,000
- 4.,000(sic)-
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
10,000
5;000
5,000
Irkutsk Oblast .
14, 000
13,000
1, 000
Yakutsk,ASSR
6Y000
4;000., .
~- 2 00.0
Total (Eastern USSR)
62,000
68,000
6,0001,..-
- 31 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
,(2) Fish
Although the fishing industry has shown the
greatest surplus of any of Eastern USSRts in-
dustries, since the outbreak of the Russo-
German War, a shortage of labor has caused a
tendency towards decreased production. How-
ever, with careful management, the catch was
maintained at 290,000 metric tons.
A surplus of 140 OOO metric tons was canned,
salted or' dr7ed, and shipped principally to
European USSR.- Conditions of supply and de-
mand are in -general as follows:
Supply (metric tons) Demand,H% (metric tons)
Catch Discard* Net Supply Military Civilian Total Surplus
290,000 60,000 230,000 30,000 60,000 90,000 140,000)
3~. Discards are 20% of catch.
3E Military requirements 43.8 kilograms per person per annum
(120 grams daily)
Civilian requirements 11 kilograms per person per annum
(30 grams daily)
Summary of Regional'Supply and Demand
Region Supply Demand Surplus or
(metric tons) Deficiency
Maritime Krai 81,000 25,000 ,- 56,000
Raions directly subordinate to
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish
Autonomous Oblast 10,000 11,000 - 1,000
Amur Oblast --- 9,000 - 9,000
Khabarovsk Krai 130,000 7,000 +123,000
Chita Oblast --- 16,000 - 16,000
Buryat-Mongol ASSR 5,000 6,000 - 1,000
Irkutsk Oblast --- 14,000 - 14,000
Yakut ASSR 4,000 4;000 Total (Eastern USSR) 230,000 92,000 i-138,000
b. Wartime Estimates
During the war, at many points o'ff the coast of
Eastern USSR, it became impossible to carry on the fishing in-
dustry and, as a'result, there was a decrease in the catch. If
the present 70% of tho pre-war catch can"bcr maintained, the not
supply will be approximately 1.60,000 metric tons,'' Including ani-=
anal meat, the total supply will be approximately 222,000 metric
tons, When this is added to the; 60,000 metric tons stored in
Eastern USSR, the potontia1 wartime total of meat available can
be estimated at 282,000 metric tons.
However, it is estimated that the requirements of
the military forces in the first.year of war will be as shown in
the following tablo. Ngtwithstanding the increase in 'wartime
- 32
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET
CPYRGHT
requirements, Eastern USSR can be self-sufficient if her potential
supply is maintained; no supplementation-of supplies will be nec-
essary. Although a decrease may ocbur in the fish catch, com-
pleto regional self-sufficiency can b'e maintained by increasing
the slaughter.of cattle, if'there is no anxiety over a decrease
in livestock, or by utilising.'the abundant 'livestock resources
of Outer Mongolia.
11 . (For Outer Mongolia's supply capacity to Eastern
USSR, see'Appondix l,. "The Value of Outer Mongolia from the
Standpoint of Roar Preparationstt):
A
B
C
.in metric tons
Wartime
Milit aryl
146,000
105,000
84,000
66,000
Demand
Civilian
110)000
Total
2561000,
215,000
194,,000
176, 000
Period of.Sustonan,ce from
Eastern USSR1s Poten-
tial Supply
13 6s
15.7 moos
17.4 mos,
19 mos
Legend: A
B
- basis of 60 rifle divisions
It 40 It It
- It 't 30 It It
,- t1 Ii 20 11 It
(54.8 kilograms of animal meat per person
( per annum
( (150 grams daily)
*Military requirements
( 36.5 kilograms of fish per person;.
per annum
( (100 grams daily)
(250 grams -daily)
approximately 10% of, total
_33-
SECRET
Vegetables
a,. Present Estimates
Conspicuous success has resulted from thorough on-
co.uragement of private and industrial vegetable gardens. The
marked increase in production has made possible self-sufficiency
of,vegetablos in Eastern USSR.
(1) Conditions of supply and demand of potatoes
are generally as follows1'
Supply (metric tons) Demand (metric tons)
Indus- Total
Produce Damagod-M Seed Not Supply Militar 4 Civili tria
1,520,000 "150,000 350,000 1,020,000 110,000 540,000 150,000 800,000
Surplus 220,0Q0
approximately"?10% of total
4 military requirements' 150 kilograms per person per annum
(400 grams daily)
civilian requirements 90 kilograms per person pc,r annum
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010-Q22-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Although tho table shows a surplus of 220,000
'metric tens when this is. utilized. to. supple-
Mont the bread shortage or as hog food, 'supplies
and barely kept within the limits of self-
sufficiepcy.
(2) As can be seen from the table below, there is
a deficipnoy of about 50,000 metric tons in
green veketalbles,.but it is estimated that self-
sufficie,cy can be maintained within the supply
capacity.
Supply (metric tons) Demand**3 (metric tons)
Produce Loss* Net Supply Military5* Civilian Total Deficiency
440,000 110,000 330,000 60,000 320,000 380,000 50,000
approximately 25% of production
military requirements 100 kilograms per person per annum
(300 grams. daily)
civilian requirements 60 kilograms per person per annum
(160 grams daily)
Summary-of Rcgi nal Supply and Demand of Potatoes
and Green Vegetables
Region
Supply
Demand
Surplus or
Deficiency,
in metric tans
Maritime Kral
244,000
224,000
-~ 20,000
Raions directly subordinate t.
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish
Aut-onom-)Us Oblast
152,000
115,000
37,000
Amur Oblast
249,000
118, 000
131,000
Khabarovsk Krai
54,000
89,000
35,000
Chita Oblast
267,000
225,000
t 42,000
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
58,000
92,000
- 34,000
Irkutsk Oblast
285;000
241,000
t 44,000
Yakut ASSR
20,000
69,000
- 49,000
Total (Eastern USSR)
1,349,000
1,173,000
+ 176,000
b. Wartime Estimates ,
,Military requirements are greatly increased in war-
time; statistics for wartime requirements are given in the table
below. By utilizing Eastern USSR's potential vegetable supply
of 1,350,000 metric tons, and by cutting down civilian require-
ments, it will be possible for this regi-n to be self-sufficient
without importing:.
Wartime
Basis of 60 Rifle Divisions
Basis of 4,0 Rifle Divisions
Basis of 30 Rifle Divisions
Basis of 20 Rifle Divisionp
Military Requirements
Vegetable Demands
Military* Civilian
in metric, tens
Total
480,000. 1111230.10Q0 : 1,710,000
340,000 1,570,000
280,000 1,51Q,000
;20,000 ti 1,450,000
299 kil-^grams per person per annum
(820 grams daily)
-34-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT SECRET
Salt and Sugar
a. 'resent 1etimates
1) Sugar-
.The' annual pry ducti^n of . sugar from sugar
beets does ant: exceed 9;000 metric tons.
This leaves a daficiency,of'21,000 metric tons
against the demand of.30.000metric tons. This
ahorte.ge wi],1 be balanced mainly by imports
yfr},the US _via ports in Eastern USSR.
Supply and Demand of Sugar
Supply Demand*
:Military Civilian
in metric tons
8,500 6,400 23,500
Total '.
29,900 11
Deficiency
21,2.oo ,
9.2 kilograms per person per*annum
(25 grams daily)
4.4 kilograms per person per annum
(12 grams daily)
(2) Salt
The main salt-producing centers are located at
Tarimi Lake in the Maritime Krai, at` Us0ole in
Irkutsk Oblast and at KENFEMJAI-~ (TN: proba-
bly Kem endvay5 and NORUDOUIKU*= (TN: 'probably
Nordvik) in Yakut ASSR: The annual produc-
tion does not exceed111,150,00b'metric tons,
The deficiency of 80,000 metric tons is filled
by imports. from Central European USSR. The
following. table shows ' general 'conditions of
supply and demand: .(metric tons)
Military requirements
Civilian requirements
Supply Demand. ,,#-,; Deficiency
Military* Civilianisr Fishing Miae.a1 Total
3 ~ civilian requirements' 8.4 kilograms per person per annum
(23 grams daily)
80% of the catch is preserved, requiring 35% of the salt
supply
includes salt for industrial use; for livestock (cattle
and horses - 5,5 kilograms per animal per annum);
and for losses (approximately 5% of demand)
- 35 -
SECRET
military requirements ll k-ilograms per person per annum
115,000 7,700 ' 44 o0 6k;aoo 8o, OO 196,600 81,600
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
b, Wartime Estimates
(1) Sugar
The potential wartime supply of Eastern USSR
is 39,000 metric tons which includes the 10,000
metric tons in storage. To meet the require-
me4s of military forces, in the first year of
war, supplies will have to be received from
Central European USSR or under lend-lease from
abroad as shown in the following table: (metric
tons)
:UVartime Military*
Basis of
60.Rifle
Divisions
23,000
Basis of
40 Rifle
Divisions
16,000
Basis of
30 Rifle
Divisions
13,000
Basis of
20 Rifle
Divisions
10,000
Demand Civilian
24,000
24,000
24,000
.24,000
Total
47,000
40,000
37,000
34,000
Eastern USSR's Po-
tential Supply
19,000
19,000
19,000
..19,000
Supplies Required
28,000
21,000
1$,000
15,000
Period of Sustenance
from Eastern USSRts
Potential Supply
5 mos
5.7 mos
6.1 mos
6.7 mos
# The military requirements, which include one monthts reserve
supply, are 13 kilograms per person per annum (35 grams daily).
(2) Salt
Notwithstanding the sharp decrease in the fish
catch in pastern USSR and. the corresponding de-
crease in the requirements of the fishing in-
dustry, the demand for salt did not decrease.
Current conditions demanded wartime increase in
the supply of salted fish. and pickled goods.
Civilian requirements must be studied in the
light of present wartime military requirements.
The potential supply of Eastern USSR is 1,230,000
metric tons, which includes 8,000 metric tons in
storage. To meet the needs of the military for-
.
ces in the first year of.warsupplies will have
to be supplemented from Central European USSR.
The relationship of supply and demand is shown
in the following- table: (metric tons),
36. -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08125 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
1. =MT
Basin of
60 Rifle
Divisions
Basi's of
40 Rifle
Divisions
Basis of
30 Rifle
Divisions
Basis of
20 Rifle
Divisions
Wartime Military .
20,000
15,000
12-000
9,000
Demand Civilian
199,000
189,000
189,000
189;000
Total
20,51000
204,
201,000
19g,000
.Eastern,USSR's Poten-
tial Supply
123,000
123,000
123',000
123,000
Supplies Required
86,000
81,000
.78,000
75,000-
Period of Sustenance
from Eastern USSR's
potential Supply
7 mo
7.2 mo
7.3 mo
7.4 mo
# The military requirements, including one month's reserve, are
11 kilograms-per person per annum (80 grams daily), and 5.5
kilograms per horse per annum (15 grams daily).
5. Forage Grain
~a, Present Estimates
In contrast with the situation whereEastern USSR
depends upon lend-lease from abroad for its supplies of bread
grain, very strenuous efforts have been made to increase her pro
dilation of forage grain because it is essential for her to be
completely self-sufficient in this field. In recent years her
annual peacetime production was estimated at 460,000 metric tons,
a surplus of 20,000 metric tons over the demand of-440,000 metric
tons. This surplus, however, was allotted for the development
-of livestock, which had diminished after the outbreak of the Russo-
German Vvar, and the balance between supply and demand was barely
maintained.
The relationship between su ply and demand isshown
in the following table: (in metric tons)
Supply
Demand ...
Pro- Seed
Net
.:Militareh Civilia i'" In- Total
Sur-
duction?
Supply
dustrial
plus
560,000.100,000
.460,000
140,000 270,000 30,000 440,000
20,000
tons) for cattle 1,610,000, for sheep 1,530,000 and for hogs
There. are. about 95,000 military horses each requiring 1,460
kilograms per annum (4,400 grams daily}.
33, The am al civilian requirements for horses are 614,000 metric
387,000.
37
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25- CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
Regional,Suppl,y and Demand of Forage Grain
Region
Supply Demand Surplus or
Deficiency
in metric tons
Maritime Krai
Raions directly subordinate to
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish
3%,000
95,000
59,000
Autonomous Oblast
39,000
32,000
i- 7,000
Amur Oblast
62,000
39,000
+ 23,000
Khabarovsk Krai
2,000
22,000
20,000
Chita Oblast
104,000
109,000
- 5,000
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
77,000
28,000
+ 49,000
Irkutsk Oblast
1.24,000
86,000
+ 38,000
Yakut ASSR
22,000
32,000
- 10,000
Total (Eastern USSR)
4,66,000
443,000-
+ 23,000)
b. Wartime Estimates
The amount of forage grain stored in wartime is estimated
at approximately 320,000 metric tons. If it is possible to maintain
the volume of production previously mentioned., Eastern USSR's poten-
tial supply will be 780,000 metric tons. During the first year of war,
the wartime military requirements were calculated to be as shown in
the following table, vwhidh reveals that no supplementation of supplies
will be necessary from Central European USSR.
A
B
C
D
in metric tons
Wartime
Military
450,000
340,000
280,000
230,000
Demand
Civilian
300,000
300,000
300,000
300,000
Total
750,000
640,000
580,000
530,000
Period of Sustenance from
Eastern USSR's Potential
Supply 12.5 mo 14?5 mo 16 mo 17.7 mo
Legend: A - Basis of rifle divisions
B -
C
n tr
t, tr
40
30
~t The military requirements, including one month's reserve, are
1,825 kilograms per horse per annum (5,000 grams dai~y).
6. Hay
a. Present Estimates,
Because of the recent shortage of Labor, the production
of hay in Eastern USSR has shown a tendency to decrease. Production
is being maintained, with difficulty, at the rate of 2,000,000 metric
tons annually, which is calculated to be approximately 800,000 metric
tons below the desired amount, Nonetheless, Eastern USSR appears to
be completely self-sufficient within the limits of this production.
-38-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25-: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET
CPYRGHT-
Regional Supply and Demand
Raians directly subordinate to
Khabarovsk Krai and Jecish
Autonomous. Oblast
Amur"ObIast
Khabarovsk Kral
Chita Oblast
Buyat-Mongol ASSR
Irkutsk Oblast,
''Yakut ASSR
Total'(East.ern USSR)
NOTE:.
Since it is difficult
is'for reference only.
marked increase in military requirements
a
s a
There w
at the outbreak of war. Estimates of. military requirements for
the first year of war are given in the table below. If this rate
of production were maintained, and civilian requirements curtailed,
it would be, possible for the region to be self-sufficient with-
out supplies from outside.
Basis of 60 Basis of 40 Basis of 30 Basis of 20
'Rifle Divisions Rifle . Divisions Rifle Divisions Rifle Divisions
in metric tondo000 260,000
490,000, 370,000 3
NOTE: 2`,000 kilograms per horse.per- nnum (5,500 grams daily)
.' C. Fuel
1. Coal
a. Present Estimates
Because of the movement of labor and material to
the west, a considerable decrease in the production of coal in
Eastern. USSR has been apparent. The annual output is estimatedld
at approximately 14,600,000 metric tons. The actual supply wou
be approximately 13200,000 metric tons after. deductions had been
made for ternary waste.,
Because the regional requirements have been dimin-
ished, due to the 'decrease in consumption by the railroads and the
curtailment of civilian supplies, the demand seems to be approx-
imately 12,300,000 metric tons. It appears that the deficiency
of approximately 900,000 metric tons.' is being shipped west, main-
ly to the Krasnoyarsk area. Details.of'the recent coal output
follow: (in metric tons)
--39--
.SECRET
Approved. For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Supply Demand Surplus or
Deficiency
metric tons
120,000. 274,000 4 154,000
59400Q, 77,000 15,000
148,000 127.000 + 21,000
23000, 50,000 - 27,000
470,000 740,000 - 270,000
458,000. 455,000 + 3,000
548,000. 568,000 - 20,000
193_, 00 . 497,000 - 304,000
2,019,000 2,788,000 - 769,000
to?determine the demand, this table
.,Wartime Estimates
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Region Coal Mine Amount
Mirwd
Suchan
Artem
Maritime Tavric,hanka
Kr~i Voroshilov
Podgorodnensk
Kraskin
Sub-total
1,000,000
1,700,000
200,000
190-,000
150,000
100,000
3,340,000
Khabar- Kamchatka Korfa 20,000)
ovsk Anadyr, fKrai Sakhalin Sakhalin 721',000
Bureaa 150,000
Amur Kivda
Oblast Raychikha. 2,920,000
S'ub-total 3,890,000
Eastern Coal
Chita Trust 1,c,_10,000
Oblast Bukachacha 275,000
Sub-total 2,0E5,000
Buryat- Ozero Gusinoye 60,000)
Mongol ASSR RtJISOGORUSUKI* 25,000)
Cheremkhovo 5,000,000
Irkutsk Oblast Coal
Oblast Trust 32,0Q0
Sub-total 5%032,000
SANGAARUI*
Yakut Kangalaskiy 50.0001)
ASSR Zyryanka 4,45,00010,000
55,000
Sub-total 202,000 21,000 181,000
Total (Eastern USSR) 14,634,000 1,465,000 13,169,000
NOTE: The ternary waste is calculated. at approximately 10% of.
amount mined,
The following table shows recent consumption, by
consumers: (in metric tons)
Consumers
Railroads
Industry
Generating .Plants
Water
Transportation
Fishing Industry
Red Army.
Heating Red Navy
. Civilian
Total
Consumption % Consumed
3, 61Q, 000 '30
3,510,000 28
1,650,000 13
1,210,000 10
240,000 2
200,000
6%
17
,l, $20,OOO
12,300,000 100
- 40
Ternary Net
Waste Output
100,000. 900,000
.170,000 1,530,000
20,000 180,000
19,000 171,000
15,000 135,000
10,000 90,000
334,000 .3,006,000
10.9000
72;000
15,000
.90,000
648,000
135,000
292,000 2,628,000
389,000 3,501,000
7_$1,000 1,629,000
28,000 , 247,000
209,000 1,876,000
9,000 76,000
500,000 4,500,000
3,000 29,000
503:000 4, 529,000
11,000 96,000
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
RogionaX Supply and Demand of ,Coal _
Region
Supply
Demand
Surplus;"or
Deficiency
in metric tons
Maritime'Krai
3,000,000
2;890,000
+ '110,0(V
Raieras directly subordinate `t,
Ihabar-vsk.Krai and Jewish
Auton^mnus Oblast
1,850,000
+1,850,000
Amur Oblast
2,760,0QO
#380,Q00
-1,880,000
Khabar?vsk Krai
740,000
880,.000
140,000
Cb,ta'Qblast
1,880,000
2,760,0007
-
- 880,000
Duryat-Mongol ASSR
80,000
940,000
- 860,000
Irkutsk Oblast
4,530,000
2,000,000
+2,530,000
Yakut ASSR
1$0,000
100,000
+ 80,000
Total (Eastern USSR)
13170,000
12,300,000
+ 870,000
b. Wartime Estimates
A1th-7,ugh an increase in the coal requirements -)f the
muniti:ns and other essential'industries might.be expected in war-
time, no great increase will occur. This situation is due to the
fact that wartime :inn tions production, in the Eastern USSR, lim-
ited by,the weakness of the steel industry and the lack of other
industries, will nryt be extensive.
The railroads, on the ^ther hand, will'require two or
two and a.half times as much coal as normally, as a result ^f the
obvious. increase in ' transportation.. 'The amount of coal required
by the railroads alone is expected to reach 9,000,000 metric tons.
If the amount required for other industries is included, it is
believed that the total tonnage required in wartime will reach
approximately 16-000,000 'metric tons..of;coal appear to be produced
annually, the.actidl supply will on3y be about 14,400,000 metric
tons, leaving'a deficiency of approximately 3,700,000 metric tons.
(Cf.-;riotes below)
However, preseht'conditions in Eastern USSR lead one
to -believe that unless 'lab-,r and materiel are brought inter the
area, it will be difficult to achieve this volume of production
to meet the rapidly increased wartime requirements. Although
13,100,000 metric tons. (Cf table below)
However, if it is assumed that approximately 3,000,000
metric tons are" store,d in the -region, this deficiency will be re-
duced to 700,000 metric tons,-thereby easing the pressure on war-
.time transportation.
NOTES: (i) Prior ;t;; the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the coal
output of Eastern USSR was estimated at approximately 16,000,-
OOO, metric tons annually. In spite of the shortage of labor
and materiel subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities, this
pre-war'figure is taken as the wartime maximum potential.
(ii) From the standpoint of output potential, loading facil-
and rail transportation capacity, it is presumed that
the following five mines will concentrate on increased pro-
duction, - Artem, Suchan, Kivda, Raychikha and Cheremkhovo.,
41 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release. 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
The wartime consumption of coal by various consumers
is estimated to be as follows: (in metric tons}
Consumers
Annual
Requirements
Remarks
Railroads
9x000,000
21 times peacetime
demand
Industry
4,:000,000
10% increase above
;peacetime
Generating -Plants -
1,600,000
Slight increase
rater transportation
1,00,000
Fishing Industry
X00,000
Keating Military
300,000
Civilian
7,.:800, 000
Total
18,100,000
2. Petroleum
a. Present Estimates
The oilfields of Eastern USSR are concentrated in
Northern Sakhalin at Okha, Ekhatbi and Katangli. Although normally
approximately 700,000 metric tons of crude oil were produced an-
nually, the annual output was increased to about 1,000,000 tons
after the acquisition of Japanese concessions in March, 1944.
(Cf note (i) below) Of the 900,000 metric tons remaining, after
a 10% deduction has been made for local consumption, 500,000
metric tons are refined at the Ordzhonikidze Refinery in Khabar-
ovsk and the remainder at the Amur Refinery in Komosomolsk. (Cf
note' (ii) below) These two refineries together should be capable
of producting approximately 650,000 metric tons of refined oil
annually.* (Cf note (iii) below)
NOTES: (i) According to information from German
sources, Northern Sakhalin produced approx-
im4tely 1,300,000 metric tons of oil in 1942
and about 3,000,000 metric tons it 1945.
(ii) hccording to information from German
sources, the potential output of Eastern.
USSR refineries is roughly as stated below.
It is also'believed that when the pipe line
between Okha ahd Sofiskoye has. been com-
pleted, the output of refined oil from the
Amur Refinery in Khabarovsk will be
increased considerably.
Komsomolsk: approximately 1,000;000
metric tons (3rd 5 Year
Plan Target)
Khabarovsk: Approximately. 400,000
Nikolaevsk: 200,000 metric tons
(iii) The amount of oil 'refined is reckoned
at, approximately 80'X of the 810.,000 metric
"tons after a 10% deduction has been made
for the crude oil consumed at the mine and
in the district.
- 42
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT ' SECRET
AIthougi strenuous efforts are being made to control
consumption, approximately 360,000 metric tons arc required for
military use and 620,000 for civilian use, a total of 980,000
metric tons. (Cf.table below) The deficiency of approximately
330,000 will have to be imported from Central European USSR and
from-the US via various ports in Eastern USSR.
Moreover, the oil refined in Eastern USSR refineries.
is of very low grade and, as aresult, 90,000 metric tons of avi-
ation fuel have to be imported. (Cf note (i) below
Recent oil consumption by various consumers
roughly as follows: (in metric tons)
Consumers
Consumption
% Consumed
Military
280,000
31
Industry
300,000
34
Agriculture
100,000
11
Communications
and Transportation
170,000
19.
Civilian
40,000
5
Total
980,000(sic)
100
NOTE':" (i) The consumption of aviation fuel is approximately
70,000 metric tons,. the greater portion of which is for
Red Army aircraft and for aircraft flying the northern
air routes from US.
b. Wartime Estimates
If the 1,300,000 metric tons in storage were avail-
able for use in wartime, the'potential supply in Eastern?USSR,
including the annual production, would amount to approximately
1,950,0^0 metric tons.
In modern warfare, the amount of oil required by
military forces. is very grep . t+ `.Mor'eover, with the acceleration
of industry and 'communications ar increase in the civilian rate
of consumption is.inevitable.
The following table,gives,an estimate of the require-
ments of various military forces during the first'year of war.
It can be seen from.th.e table that_oonsideieble quantities-of
d
oil will have to be-imported from Central European USSR an
from abroad.
~43-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999108/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
Wartime Milit~ry* 3,440,000
Demand Civilian- 690000
-Total 4,130, 000
Potential Supply from
Eastern USSR 1,950,000)
Supplies Required 2,180,OOC)
Period of Sustenance
from gastern USSR ' s
Potential Supply 4:.7,mo.
Basis of . Basis- of - - Basis-.of
40 Rifle 30 Rifle 20 Rifle
D;.v,isions Divisions Divisions
irl metric;tOris
21-460$006v,2.1000.10001 1,340,000
3,150,000 ?2,690,000 2,030,000
7.3 mo
740,000
8.7 mo
80,000
11.5 mo
Military requirements include one month's reserve.
Details of civilian requirements are as follows: (in
metric tons).
Miscellaneous
40,000
D.
Total
Mining Industry
690,000
'Since: the development of Eastern USSR's iron ore re-
sources'has been.. slovu, her'iron manufacturing industry
has had to' depend on Central' Euro eanUSSR for her supplies of iron
ore and scrap iron. Moreover, very little rnanganese.or,caking
coal is produced in the area. (Cf note (i) following page)
Ire view ;of this extreme, scarcity of essential mater-
ials, there sppear to-be no iron foundries with 'the exception of
those at1='Stacy Amur.-.ax}c} Petrovsc. Approximately-'22O,000 metric
tons of steel and l0 000 metric toga of pig''frdh are produced an-
nually. (Cf note-(ii) on following page) In spite of the restric-
tions on eotsumption and the cessation of constructional work,
approximately 570,000 metric tons of steel and 1.80,000 metric tons
of. pig iron are required to satisfy the demand. As a result, ap-
proximately 350,000 metric tons of steel and 170,000 metric tons
of pig iron will have to be imported from Central European USSR
or via Eastern USSR ports from the US,
Industry 350,000 (10% increase over normal)
Agriculture 100,000
Communications
Bc Transportation 200,000 .(Slight increase over normal)
'1. Iron Manufacturing , Industry.
a. Present Estimates
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SCRET
NOTES'.
(i The only mines producing; are. those. a
Nikolaevsk (producing 10,000. metric tons
-annually) and at Balyaginski in Chita Oblast
(producing 30,000 metric tons annually).
(ii) The annual production of steel is
?.roughly as follows:
Location
Factory Name
Annual Steel
Production
in metric tons
Komsomolsk
Stary- Amur
100,000
rovsk-Zavod
Pet
Petr.ovsk-Zabaikalsky
65,000
.
Irkutsk
Kuibyshev ITeavy Machinery Works
40,000
Bl eschensk
agov
Vladivostok
Metallist Mbtal Works
Primorskey Metallist ti orks
15,000
Ulan Tide
Khabarovsk
Cast Steel Works attached to
Railroad V~orks
iviolotov Machine Works
000
220
Total
,
b.- Wartime Estimates
In wartime, the development of the munitions indus-
try, the construction of railroads, and'the need for replacement
for railroads will increase the demand for steel,, Of note below)
Supplies from Central European USSR are more likely to comprise
manufactured steel products rather than scrap iron or:_iron,ore;
the wartime demands upon the Eastern USSR iron manufacturing in-
dustry, therefore, will certainly . not. be;great,'
Steel reserves stored in Eastern USSR are estimated
at approximately 200,000 metric tons, which should be sufficient
to meet emergency wartime. demands.
NOTE: For further'details,~see Appendix 6, "The
Time, Steel. and Labor Required to Construct
and Rebuild Railroads in the Event of an
Invasion of Manchuria bythe Red Army."
Eastern USSR is' extremely rich in reserves of non-ferrous
Non-ferrous Metals
metals. Although strenuous efforts have been made to increase
production to satisfy :demands since the outbreak of the Russo--
-German War, the metal .industry has remained undeveloped. The
complete processirig of the'metal is not.carried out in the area
where it-is mined and graded. Smelting is carried out at fac-
tories in Central European USSR and certain of, the completed pro-
ducts returned to Eastern USSR.
The production and'distributi,on of the principal metals
are roughly as shown in the table on the following page. Tin,
molybdenum, tungsten and mica-are mainly produced in Eastern USSR
which constitutes the main source of. supply for the Soviet
munitions' industry.
-- 45
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Type of Metal Annual tutput . % of, Total Remarks
in`+metr;. c tons
Lead 9=O00 72 Although deposits are
these, only. silica is. ,mined.
reat Umalta andwest
cif _J?ida.
Principally produced
.at Slyudyanka and Bilyu-
z.unskoe in Irkutsk Oblast..
Other important resources of which there are abundant
reserves in Eastern USSR are s:L1ica, manganese, asbestos, etc; of
E. Munitions Industry Capacity
1. General Estimates
100
to be found around
Olga and Tetyukhe in
Maritime and in Chita
Oblast, the latter mine
is the only one active.
All deposits are in
the Zabaikal area,
Mainly produced at Umal-
ta_, on the upper Bureya
River' and at _Jida ri
Buryat-Mongol. ASSA'.
70 . .. The, productive mines _
a. Special characterLstids, of Eastern USSRrs munitions
industry
decently noted' special .characteristics-of the muni-
tions industry in Eastern USSR are as follows:
(1) Tendency of Komsemolsk Area. to become Center
Not only is' -Komsomolsk favorably located for
;of Munitions Industry
national defense frock a, ,geographical standpoint
but it also possesses such essential industries
as iron manufacture and oil r6finirig and?con-
stitutes a so-called kombinat,,,zone. It there-
fore possess' the carcteitics which will
enable, it to become the' center of'the"munitions
industry.. A:i:rcraft, .ta., acid other factories
have already been estalil'ished.; and further devel-
opment' may 'be e-.xpefted, in the future. Its str'a-
eg c,pcs tiori is such that, when the construe-
Lion-program has' been completed;" it coil serve_
as a munitions supply base for 'the `Red-!Army in
Eastern USSR even if the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way were cut. Komsomolsk' deserves special atten-
tionbecause'of its pdsitioff" n re'latioin to
lend-entering- the USSR'. The problem
of its rapid conversioh' into a base will b-6--Vey
difficult, however, without outside aid."..-
-46 SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
(2) development of Irkutsk and Ulan Ude Areas
These areas are comparatively well located from
the standpoint of industry because there are
convenient communication facilities. The ease
with which supplies of materiel-can be sent from
Central European USSR has given rise to consider-
able transfer 6f aircraft and other munitions
factories from`this area to Eastern USSR since
the outbreak o the Russo-German War..
(3) Relationship between Munitions Industry and
Lend-lease to USSR via Eastern USSR
In wartime, not only'wo uld the unfavorable lo-
cation of the munitions industry in Eastern
U$$R be offset by lend-lease supplies.from the
US arriving via Eastern USSR ports, but it can
also be forecast that this industry would play
an extremely important part in building up the
military potential of the.Red. Army in Eastern
? .USSR. ,
That is to say, the munitions industry, which
in the past has been forced to depend upon sup-
plies of materiel from Central European USSR
and from abroad, has now been.strengthened by
lend-lease supplies. Even if the supply routes,.
for raw materials from Central European USSR
were cut, the military resources of the Red
-Army in Eastern USSR could be maintained with
these lend-lease supplies.
b. Weaknesses of Eastern USSR's Munitions Industry
The weaknesses f?f Eastern USSR's munitions industry
are as follows:
(1) weakness of Iron Manufacturing Industry
The main weakness of-the munitions indusry.,
lies in the extreme backwardness of their9n:
manufacturing industry, which is.the,basiC?mun-
itions industry. The iron manufacturing indus-
try, is extremely weak in Eastern USSR because
of the low production of iron ore and the scar-
city of'calcing coal; it. is dependent upon Cen-
tral European USSR, for most of the raw mater-
ials essential to the manufacture of iron.
These, therefore, are the basic deficiencies
of the iron manufacturing industry in Eastern
USSR and can be taken as the factors restricting
the development of its munitions industry.
(2) Absence of Aluminum Production
No aluminum is produced in Eastern USSR. The
47
SECRET
?
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SCRE.T
:fact,, that ,the area s,-ax,Ltir,ely -dependentupon
Central' European USSR. and upon aid from abroad
Gonstit4te4wa basic weakne.s:s of the munitions
industry and particularlyof the aircraft in-
.(3) .Deficiencies,of.Maehine Industry
In .addition. to the Jack of ?gssential raw mater-
`ials -me }tioi.ed above, there is no machine in-
dustry capable of exploiting them. Since the
outbreak of ?.the 'RussgrGerman War,, the majority
of uachiae. imported, have been sent to Central
European USSR. This will hinder the future
development of the munitions industry in East-
a.. Present.Estimates
2. Aircraft
Strenuous efforts have been made since the outbreak
of the Russo-German'War to bring about a considerable increase
in aircraft production in-Eastern USSR by stepping up the produc-
-tion of those factories already in existence and of those trans-
ferred=from- Central European USSR. Consequently, monthly pro-
duction fig ires, have reached. e, total of 400 aircraft. The ma-
jbrity of the :aircraft produced at present are dispatched to
the west.
Formerly, ,.1t was necessary Ito await supplies of al-
most all aircraft parts.from, Central.Egropean USSR and from the
US, but recently it has been possible to produce engines and in-
struments in Koms.omolsk 'and. Irkutsk,
The production capacity of aircraft
roughly as shown in the following table:
Factory-Designation..
.Factory No 116
Factory No 83
Factory No 126
Factory No 99
Factory No 39
' Factory. No 125
Factory-No- 77
.Location
Monthly
Production
(planes)
SE;myonovka 9QA
Khabarovsk, 3
Komsomolsk 100
Ulan r.Ucie
Irkutsk.
Irkut sk
Irkutsk
Type of a/c
Fighters
Bombers
Bombers and
Assault planes
Fighters
Bombers and
Fighters
_ 48
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1,999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500;010022-0
CPY1RGHT
SECRET
The principal aircraft repair and'aircraft parts
plants are as follows:
Aircraft Repair Plant No 145
Aircraft Repair Plant No 160
Aircraft Repair Plant
Aircraft Repair Plant No 111
Aircraft Repair Plant No 83
Aircraft Repair.Plant No 113
Aircraft Repair Plant No 126
Vladivostock
Novo Nikolskoe
Vozdvizhenka
Voroshilov,
Khabarovsk
Khabarovsk
Komsomolsk
Aircraft Repair Plant No 117 Chita
Electrical Plant No 389 Sv'ilsk
Aircraft Repair Plant Yakutsk
100'engines per
month
150 engines per
month
Repair and manufac-
ture cfparts
Manu acture of air-
cfafI'electrical
equipment
For the . use .of the
US-USSR north-
ern air routes
b. Wartime Estimates
Although strenuous. efforts will be made to increase
aircraft production in wartime, no sharp increase can be expected
because of the dependence of Eastern USSR upon. Central European
USSR for materials. The main emphasis appears to be- laid *upon
the maximum development of the manufacture of parts and of repair
facilities.
Assuming that the present rate of production could
be maintained in time of war,, the. following table is a rough esti-
mate of losses and replacements to meet the requirements of various
military units for a one month period during the, first year of
war,
NOTE: For estimates of the losses and replacements
in wartime, 'see Appendix 2, "Brief Estimate
of Vdartime Requirements" ' fr om which the fo 1-:
lowing is extracted.
Basis of Basis of Basis of Basis of
60 Rifle 40 Rifle 30 Rifle 20 Rifle
Divisions Divisions Divisions Divisions
Planes
Monthly Losses 560 420 355 165
a
E t USS I
R
s ern
s
Potential
Supply 400
Replacements
,Required 160' 20
49
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25': 'CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
3. Tanks
a. Present Estimates
Tank production has increased steadily'and it now,
appears'that approximately 150 tanks and 30 armored cars are pro-
duced per month.
The following table shows the approximate monthly
production by individual factories:
Factory No 119
Voroshilov
20 tanks
15-armored
cars
Factory No 106
Khabarovsk
10
Kaganovich Factory No 105
Khabarovsk
40
Factory No 413
Komsomolsk
30
d
Ulan Ude Ordnance Plant
Ulan Ude
20
15 armore
cars
Factory No 104
Irkutsk
30.
b. Wartime Estimates
In wartime, not only would it be impossible to accele-
rate production for the reasons stated above but it would-be dif-
ficult to maintain even the present production rate. It appears
that the main emphasis is being laid on the maximum development.
of the rear repair facilities of the tank factories of Eastern
USSR. It is believed that production itself will be cut in half.
Estimates of losses and replacements for various
wartime units for a one month. period during the first year of
war are given in the following table:
Basis of.
60 Rifle
Divisions
Basis of
4.0 Rifle
Divisions
Basis of
30 Rifle
Divisions
Basis of
20 Rifle
Divisions
Monthly Losses
350
290
230
120
Eastern USSR? s
Potential Supply
75
l s
Rep acemen
21
155
45
Required
275
5
4. Small Arms and Artillery
a. Present Estimates
Although figures on the production of small arms
and artillery are difficult to obtain, recently there has been a
scarcity of the materials necessary for the manufacture of these
items, and production has fallen off. The following is an esti-
mate of present monthly production:
St4all caliber weapons
100
Mortars
450
Heavy machine, guns
300
Light; machine guns
400
Rifles .
9,000
50 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000509010022-0
 CPYRGHT 1 CR T
Approved for Release -1999%08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-O"
The main ordnance factories known to be nexistence
Factory. Name
Vorsshilov Far Eastern Naval Factory
Ordnance Factory
MiQyan Ordnance Factory
Molotov Machine Manufacturing Plant
Degtyjarev Light Ordnance Factory
Ordnance Factory
Ordnance Repair Plant No 73
Mil.tary. Factory No 41
Ordnance Factory
Buryat-Mongol Ordnance Factory
Ordnance Factory
Kuybyshev Metal Works
4't llery Factory
b. Wartime Estimates
Location
Vladivostok
Voroshilov
Sysoyevka
Khabarovsk
Khabarovsk
Komsomolsk
Petropavlovsk
Chita
Petrovsk-Zabaikals.ki
Ulan Ude
Irkutsk
Irkutsk
Batreynaya
In view of the special character of the Red , Army,
wartime losses of artillery and small arms will probably be very.
heavy, but the possibilities of increased production are?rather
remote, as mentioned above. Replacements from present production
will be insignificant compared with wartime losses. This will
%be,especially true in Eastern USSR where it is necessary to.depend
upon Central European USSR for all ordnance supplies'of'mediuin,"
or larger, caliber.
The following is a rough estimate of monthly losses
in wartime and replacements, required to satisfy the needs of
various military units:,
Monthly
Losses
Basis of
b0 Rifle
Divisions
Rifles Arty
38,300 1,330
Basis of
40 Rifle
Divisions
Rifles Arty
25,800 830?.
Basis of
30 Rifle
Divisions
Rifles Arty
100 670
19
Basis of
20 Rifle
Divisions
Rifles Arty
12;750 440
Eastern USSR's
,
'Potential
Supply
9,700 rifles;. 550 artillery pieces
Re
t
laceme
p
n
s
Required
28,600 780 16;100 280'
9,400 120
3,050 -
Ammunition
a. Present Estimates'
The production figures for ammunition in-Eastern
USSR are not kxlawn,. but.,. considering the deficient iron manufact-
uririg industry and the undeveloped'chemical industry, a great
production capacity cannot beexpected.
Efforts, however, are being made at present to~pro-
duce small caliber ammunition, and the most recent trend appears
W51
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release) 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
Vladiv.,st_k
b~ towards increaser. the producti~,n c:f .,rt:7r shells.
Tho following is a list of p.:r.:unition factories known
VUrvshilov Far ,astorr_ ~,Tavy Yard
rLi I.u=it c F^ctory
Orin^~:.c,~ Fn.ct:.ry
Land Mine Monuf&ctmrirao tm.tory
Mikoyan Ordnance racto
Ordnance Depot
Ussuri War Plant
Stalin Amunition Facto
Molotov Machine Factor
Artisan Factory )
Ordnance Factory
Land Mine Factory
Var Plant No 41
Land Mine Factory
Buryat-Mongolian Ordnance Factory
Kuybyshev Machine Fact ry
Nikolayevsk Ammunition Factory No 137
ER.IBAN41 Ammunition Factory
Semyonovka Ammunition
Factory
For the
production would be d
mows wartime consumpt
imported from Central.
Eastern USSR; appro
Thee f oll
various military unit
of 10,000 metric 'tons
Wartime Demand
Period of Sustenance
from Eastern USSR's
Potential Supply
6. Miscellaneo
Little is k
equipment; military
is a rough list of t
at present.
Approved For Release
Vci oshilo'v
&ysoyevka
.Spassk
Lazo
Khabarovsk
Komsomolsk.
Svobodny
Chita
Petrovsk-
Zavod
Ulan Ude
Irkutsk
Nizbneudinsk
In area with-
in the ' juris-
dittion, of
X.habaroy.sk
Se0.$0novka .
area
easons stated above, a rapid increase in
fficult` in wartime. In view of the enor-
considerable supplies would have to be
on
,
European USSR despite the reserve stock of
tely 200,000. metric tons.
wing is an'estimate of the requirements of
nits
(i
n u
(ju'ring the first year. ~,:).f war:
153
SECRET
Basis of Basis of
40 Rifle 30 Rifle
Divisions Divisions
86 70
Basis of
20 Rifle
Divisions.
1.6 mo 2.8 mo 3.4 mo 5,7 mo
owh'about the production of chemical warfare
ehicles''and ships. The following, however,
e principal factories known to be in existence
..52_
SECRET
1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-0310PA000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25:;:. CIA-RDP78-03109''A000500010022-0'
CPYRGHT
it would be practically impossible to undertake any new construc-
tion of'large vessels in view of the condition of.steel.produc-
tion in Eastern USSR,,-It,,has been observed that with the recent
increaae in the volume of lend-lease supplies to the USSR efforts
have been concentrated.upon the repair of freighters. In view
of the d ,ficiencies of. the steeli:adustry, it appears that no im-
proVement in shipbuilding can be expected even in wartime.
SECRET
Nothing is known of the ship-building situation 'tut
a. Shipyards
The principal shipyards are as
follows:
Name of Yard
Location
Remarks
Voroshlov Far Eastern
Vladivostok
Capable of building sub-
Navy Yard
marines, destroyers, etc.
Oshpovski-Kilov
Khabarovsk
Latest shipbuilding
Shipyard
equipment"
Amur Shipyard
Komso.molsk
Capable, of repairing sub-
marines And vessels of
4,000 ton ' class
Shipyard
Nikplaevsk
Shipyard
Pe tropavlov sx
Chemical Warfare Equipment Factories:
Name of Factory
Location
Equipment Manufactured
Poison Gas Factory
Vladivostok
Poison gas
.Iodine Factory
Olga
Chemical warfare supplies
Axsenic Factory
Barabash
Poison gas
Lazmov Arsenic Factory
Irkutsk
Poison gas and'other
chemical weapons
Lazmov Chemical Factory
Poison gas and smoke-
No 97
screen compounds
Chemical Factory
Tulun
Poison gas, smoke candles
and flares
M,S~_
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Cart Factory Birobidzhan
'Name of Factory Location
Voroshiov Light Krasnaya-
and Heavy Vehi- rechka
cle Factory
Military Vehicle Tulun
Products Manufactured Remark
s
Field cogking .uten- Annual pro-
sils; Light & heavy duction
vehicles ..approx 5,500
Light and heavy Annual pro-
vehicles, duction ap-
prox 11,000
Field vehicles
Light and heavy
vehicles
NOTE: Although nothing is known about the production of these
factories,"they are probably incapable of doing more
than renovating those vehicles at' present,"iri existence.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
b. Special Topographical Features Affecting National
Defense
The Trans-Siberian Railway, which is the supply
artery for Eastern USSR, can be cut with comparative ease in time
of war,by Japanese troops, especially in the area to the east of
Amur Bay.
St tus of Reserve.Sto'ks:o Munitions
(Cf Appendix Map 2, "Installations for the Storage of Reserve
Stock's in Eastern USSR and Mongolia")
It is not necessary to stress the importance of the role which
the reserve stocks of munitions will play in the prosecution of
a war against Japan by the Red Army, but it, is extremely difficult
to obtain an estimate of the quantities of weapons; ammunition
and materiel comprising these reserve stocks.
For the following reasons ",however, it can be assumed that
considerable. reserves are in existence at present.
1. General Observations on the Storage of Munitions
a. Eastern USSR's Lack of Material Self-sufficiency
As previously stated, the discrepancy between wartime
demand and supply will reach alarming proportions as a natural
result of the special characteristics of Eastern USSR. It has
been observed that, in order to counteract this deficiency, she
has been laying in stocks of those essential materials, in peace-
time, particularly munitions whose production rate is low.
co Tendency to Increase Military Preparations against
Japan Prior to Outbreak of Russo-German War
From the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident till
the Russo-German War, a tendency to increase the military forces.
maintained in Eastern USSR, stimulated by the stepping up of Jap-
anese preparations in Manchuria, was evident. It is therefore
only natural that the USSR should lay in reserves of munitions,
which would be of particular importance in carrying out agressive
operations against Japan.
d. Red Army's Theory of Materiel Superiority
of
plan
The annihilation of the mater-
iel resources is one of the characteristics bof the RedArmy's plan
of operations. In order to be able to meet the tremendous wartime
demands, especially in the event the Russians took the offensive,
it wa's"necessary to lay in large stores of reserve supplies in
peacetime.
The fact that the Soviet was capable of making good
her tremendous materiel losses, exemplified by operations in the
Russo-German V~ar, was mainly due.to the reserve supplies stored
in peacetime, a fact worthy of deep thought and reflection.
54
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release' 999/,j
It ,can be understood; that ,troops and munitions would
be sent west from Eastern USSR after the outbreak of the Russo-
German liar to make good the tremendous losses of material incurred
and it has been confirmed
uat
do
b
,
e no
~
in gp.er:ations. There can
by intelligence reports, `that certain of the lend-lease supplies
arrive rig via Far Eastern 'ports were.'stored for wa"mime `'use, but
noiures can be established as to ' the. quantity.
2, Quantity of Vital Munitions Held in Reserve
little information on the quantity of Muni
er
T
y
heres v
tern in storage in Eastern USSR but the following is a rough
estinite based upon conditions in Eastern USSR prior'to the out-
break of the Russo-German Vrar and upon her storage facirities.
Eastern USSR is not self-sufficient in,food-
stdffs and is ' compelled to import supplies of
od from Central uropean USSR every, year.
f
o
After the outbreaks _p f .th.g Russo German War,
this deficiency was counteracted by supplies
If one year's supply (Cf table on follow-
ing page)for the prewar Red. Army in East-
6,n t SSR (about 30 rifle divisions) is
sti:l 'maintained, then :the reserves can
be 'estimated 'at 'approximately 800,000
metric tons.,, .
rllowing table gives a rough estimate
#
Th
~
e.
'of the provisions, including durable pro-
visions, for one year required by a forge
of 30 rifle divisions?(700,000 men, 180,000
horses).
- 55 -
'SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
from tke US and iwaa just possible to balance
supply and demand?by curtailing civilian re-'
quirements.' It'is',believed that in view of
these condition strenuous efforts were made
over .a prolonged perio'd`to.lay in stores of
food as a precaution against wartime shortages.
(a) Judging from those storage installations
whose existence has already been confirmed
by intelligence reports, about 600,000
metric tons should be' in storage. If this
were added to the reserves in.the area
west of the Bur.yat-Mongol, ASSR, about
which it is difficult'to:obtain any infor
mation, and in the remainder of the inter-
ior, it is estimated that the total would
amount to approximately`800`,000 metric tons.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
Items Annual Re-
Actual Suppl
s
quirements
(metric ton
(metric tons)
YUheat Flour
244,80..
204,400 (1,000 grams daily)
Dry Black Bread
35,G 0
:33,215 (650 grams daily)
Canned Meats
102,070
63,875 (~50 grams daily)
Person- Salt
8,000
7,665 (30 grams daily)
nel Sugar
10,000
8,945 (355 grams daily)
Miscellaneous
40,000
Total Provisions for
Per sonnel .
440;600
)
Barley
358,000
328,500. (5..000 grams daily
l
)
Fodder Salt
1,000
y
675 (10 grams dai
Total Fodder
359,000
Total
799,600
NOTES: (i) The ratio of wheat flbur to black bread is five to
(ii) As in Japan? the weight of wrapping, etc. is counted
into the required amount.
(2) The following, based upon intelligence reports,
is a rough estimate by area of the amount of
reserves in storage assuming that all available
storage facilities are utilized.
'Area
Reserves
(metric tons)
Maritime Krai
168,000
.Ihabarovsk Area
90,000
Blagoveschensk Area
182,000
Okhotsk Area
21,000
Chita Area
89,000
Ulan Ode Area
41,000
Outer Mongolian Area
6,000
Total
597,000
Liquid Fuel
It is estimated that the amount of liquid fuel stored
in installations whose exis 'ence is knovan. plus that stored in in-
stallations whose existence 7s not yet known would total approxi-
mately 1,300,000 metric tons?. -This is the equivalent of slightly
more than'15 months' peacetime'supply.
The following table gives an. estimate by area of
supplies in reserve on the basis of the storage facilities, assum-
ing that all available storage facilities are utilized.
-56-
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-0310!A000500010022-0
 Area
Reserves
(metric tons)
Maritime Krai
380,oa0
Khabarovsk Area
300,000
Blagoveschensk Area
40:000
Okhotsk Area
x.70, 000
Chita Area
70,000
Ulaa Ude Area
40,000
Total
1000,000
c. Ammunition and Miscellaneous
Although there, is particularly little information
available on the amount of ammunition in reserve, t hat.amount is
believed to be sufficient to supply the pre-war force for two
engagements.
A serious muni.tlons shortage was caused by the sharp
drop in the production of ammunition following the temporary loss
of territory after the outbreak of the Russo-German War. Although
some of the ammunition, especially of medium and large caliber,
stored in Eastern USSR.was 'sent to the west during the-initial
stages of the war, it is estimated that the reserves still amount
to 200,000 metric tons--provided that a sufficient amount was,
retained to supply the pre-war force of 30 rifle divisions for
one engagement (sufficient small caliber ammunition for two en-
gagements).
NOTE: The amount of ammunition required by one rifle
division for one engagement is estimated at
4,500"metric tons, with medium and large
caliber ammunition ,comprising half that
total.
ti
A discussion of the.ordnance"and munition re-
oerves will lie omitt99d here because.of the
lack of reliable data.
3. Military Supply Bases from the standpoint of Storage
Facilities
The f9llowing'table shows roughly the military supply
bases of the Red Army in Eastern USSR as related to the distri-
bution of storage installations.
Military Supply Bases
Area
Eastern Area Vladivostok area; Shmakovka area; Anuchirio and
Aaubikhe area; Voroshilov area
Northeastern Area Khabarovsk and"Komsomolsk area; Birobidzhan area
Northern Area Kuybyshev and Svobodny.area
Western Area Chita area; Borzya area; Ulan Ude area; Irkutsk
area
4. The following table shows the materiel self-sufficiency
of Eastern USSR in wartime from t.he,standpoint of reserves.
NOTE: Only those items of munitions whose storage in ast-
ern USSR has been comparatively easy to ascertain
have been entered on this table.
- 57 -
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A0005000100'22-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
4-1
4-4 M'
V) N o
. W U
.r~
4-4 4i
r?I r-i M N V` M
rl r r?4 rl rl r-1
O O O.0 0 0-0
0C)OO(D 0 00
0C)0000 N0
I-4) TO000.- 0
to
1)
N
N P-%
N-N
O
H
N
U
N
F3
= =
_ ?'
rn
O a
is
0
0
0 0
0 0
0
U
d
.rl
0
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0 0
Q
0
O-t NOOO 0
M tS0 r-4 rl (J OI LC\
rn
v
0 _ c x = =
N N to I`-- r-F r---
r?-1
O
Id
O O 0 CC,~ O O 0 54
O i1 11\ rY\ O O 0 >~
C\j O r? ri rr'1 N \.O )
-t r-4
0 =
?rr
m s, aoN ~, ~D
Guo!STAO.la ? '
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
6
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
"SECRET
G. Lend-Lease to the USSR via Eastern USSR Ports
~. Present Estimates
It is estimated that lend-lease supplies from the US
arriving via Eastern USSR ports recently averaged an annual total
of approximately 1,700,000 metric tons (about 24% of all supplies
entering the USSR). (Cr note below) Goods imported vary with
change in the needs of the USSR-and recent figures show that
food comprised 32%, fuel 26%, and machinery, including transporta-
tion equipment, 35%; miscellaneous goods accounted for 7%. The
effect which these imports have had uRon the economy of Eastern
USSR is'not clear, but it is known that the foodstuff arid miscel-
laneous goods aremainly consumed there while the machinery,
metal products and vehicles are mostly shipped to the west.
NOTE: The fol~'owing is a ro4gh estimate of the imports
upder lend-.lease singe the Lend-Lease Act went
into effect,, This volume is increasing year by
year.
1942 approx 370,000 metric tons
1943 approx 1,220;000 metric tons
1944 approx 1,700,000 metric tons
It appears that 90% of the lend-lease supplies imported
via Eastern USSR still come by the North Pacific route and are
unloaded at Vladivostok.
Since the beginning of 1943, aircraft have been ferried
from the US by the Northern Air Route. Recently,approximately
250 to 300 aircraft have been ferried to the west-via Velkal,
Ya
t
K
k a
ku
s
nd
rasnoyarsk.
2. Wartime Estimates
As long as friendly relations are maintained between
the USSR and the US, the trategic.value of lend-lease. supplies
arriving via Eastern USSR ports will probably be great,
The volume of supplies which get through will be entire-
ly dependent,upon the mastery of the sea and the. air. The volume
of munitions imported by sea continues?to increase. Its value
as a rear supply route for the Red Army in Eastern USSR is as
great as that of the main supply route from Central European USSR,
the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The volume of munitions imported by air over the North-
ernAir Rote is not expected to be-great; however, it is antici-
pated that aircraft and lightweight materiel will ultimately be
tiarispdrted'over_the air route in considerable volume (Cf note)
NOTE: Cf Chapter I11,..)'Study of Logistics' for details
of supply and transportation to Eastern USSR.
- 59 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
anent of Men and t1urge
Distribution and Types sf Men and Horses
Under the Second Five Year` Plan, it was planned
to makeaEastern USSR self sufficient. Techni-
cians and v~orkmen were sent to develop her in-
dustr3,a, resources (these did not include the
large numb .ers of people who migrate there every
' year) with the result that her population be-
fore the outbreak of the Russo-German was grad-
u.lly increasing. Despite this, the population
in general remained` exceedingly low and sparse-
ly di5tribu'ted. The only densely populated
area wars Along the Trans-Siberian Railway.
ulatio3^i
Because Ei9 stern USSR constitutes 'the Far East
ern base .',r' the defense of the USSR, the mili-
tarYpopulation 1'8: Considerably out of ..propor-
..,
tion t , o the nirmal civilian population, which
consists mainly of immigrants.' It. appears
that,, in.spite of the extensive mobilization
the male, population exceeds the fe-
German Vva~;
,
ma1e in a proportion of 110 to 100. It also
that
s
rou
e
of
,
p
g
ag
,appears from observation
il 11
falls
lati
o
on
pu
the largest segment of the p
SECRET
II. STUDY OF REPLACE N1' OF
Marjtime Krai
Khabarovsk Krai
Chita Oblast
~upyat-Mongol ASSR
I'rkut sk Oblast
Yaku4 ASSR?
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
MEN, HORSES AND VEHICLES
Total 'Eastern USSR.}
(1) Total. Population'
The total population of Eastern USSR as of .
March 1145 was estimated at 6;0,50,000, includ-
ing job 00.0 military personriP1 and 360,000 con-
vict laborers.
(2) Density and Distribution
Area
Population
Density
(sq km)
(persons
per. sg km
206
000
1,031,000
5.0
,
2,572,000
1,567,000
0.6
720,000
1,11,x$, 000
1.6
331,000
531,000
1.6
923,000
1,313,000
1.4
3,030,000
} 412,000
0.1
7,781,000
6,047,000
.0.8
(3) Status (Civilian or' Military), Sex and Age of
density of population by area is as follows:
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRT
into the 16 to 30 age group. Of those eligible
for ,labor conscription, (16-59 years of age),
the'e are 1,650,000 males and 1,480,000 females,
a"total of'3,130,000,.comprising 59% of the
population.
The ratio of-military personnel to civilains,
by area, is,roughly as f ollovrs :
Region
Military
Civilian
Convict
Laborers
Total
Maritime Krai
345,000
646,000
80,000
1,031,?000
Raions directly sub
ordinate to Khabarovsk
Krai and the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast
55,000
478 000
405,00
000
57$,
Amur Oblast
91,000
323,000
100,000
514,000
Khabarovsk Krai
81,000
282,000
112.,000-.
475,000,
Chita Oblast
110,000
1,036,000
7,009
1,148,000
Buryat-Mongo1 ASSR
2,000
526,000
1,000
531,000
Irkutsk Oblast
16,000
1,293,000
5,000
113131000
Yakut`ASSR
0
402,000
10,000
412,000
Total (Eastern USSR)
700,000
4,987,000
360,000 `
6,047,000
The sex and age groups of civilians is roughly
as follows':
Below 15
16 - 59
Above 60
Total
% of population
(by sex)
Group
Male..
Female
Total
% of
849,000_
,808,000
1,657,000
population
(by age)
33%
1,653;000
1,483,000
3,136,000
63%
108,000
86,000
194,000
4%
2,610,000
2,377,000
4,987,000
100%
52,4% 47.6% 1:00%
(4) . Labor ;Potential
96t gnly'rias the mobilization of.some 870,000
persons after the outbreak of thc,Russo-German
War and the restrictions, upon the annual'influx
of about 200,000 immigrant laborers caused'a
steady drain up1n the labor potential of the
USSR, but'it ap cars that the labor deported
toassist'in the reconstruction of recaptured
territories is further taxing that labor poten-
tial. 1
As previously mentioned,. approximately 3,130,000
(about 1,650,000 male and 1,450;000 female) of
the total population of Eastern USSR arc eli-
gible for labor conscription. 'Of theso, approx-
imately 2,700,000 are at present employed, the
balance'of approximately 430,000 consisting of
housewives, people incapable of work, and stu-
dents.. There is 'very little possibility of
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 i'6$ u d?R+LE^"=d'a?t a 164
Horses
Persons
Percentage by Industry
6615,000
24.7%
66,900
2. `5
;n;212 00
.7':99
1;,237,400
45:9%
171-, 400
6.4%
79,800
2.9%
196,900
703%,
6!5,200
'
2.4%
14.,800
2:.9.69
100.0%
(1) Total dumber of Horses
The total number of horses in Eastern USSR in
March 1945 was estimated at 709,000, of which
95,000'were military and 614,000 privately
owned.
(2) Distribution and Types of Horses
The. following table shows'the distribution nad
.types of military and privately-owned horses,
'Replacement' Potential for Men and Horses
',Manpower. Replacement Potential
As previously stated in the section on labor poten-
tial, since the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the only people
62 -
Approved For Release 199`9108/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Industry,
Agriculture
Forestry
Fishery
Mining.
SECRET
:thgse'people, being pqt to work because Eastern
USSR' is deficient` in soc~f. institutions or
factories. ei?loying` women., It can therefore
be assi=ed'that thb 1"abor no-tential of Eastern
I
ts nmaxi,nuun.
USSR nas, now reached
The, fo] pwirig table shows rolughly'the distri-
41
ti
ot
l
b
u
i
r
l l
'
en
a
:
or p
ma
a
b
t
on o
.the no
Transportation and
Communications
Administration
Education and Culture
anc .. 'and Commerce
'~ntal
by area:
Region Military Privately-owned Horses
Total
-,;Horses ; ' ,,.Active Inactive Total
Maritime Krai 3$,OD0 39,.400 9,900 x+.93
8.73
-Raa ons directly sub-
ordinate to Khabarovsk
the J
h
i
a
ew
s
nd
Krai,
Autonomous Oblast
13,500 11,300 2P_800 1.4+1
2.76
Amur; Oblast
12, `,ib1 . 16,700 4,200 2.09
3.314
Khabarovsk 'Kai
9,20+. $,400 2,100 1.05
1.97
Chita Oblast
19,000 108,900 , 46, ,100 15.56
17.45
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
l,obo 61,700 26,400 8.61
8.91
Irkutsk Oblast
1., 800 91, 000 22,800 11.39
11,56
Yakut,'. ASSR
97,400 64,900 16.23
16.20
USSR)
st
'
'"'t
F80o 61.46
000-43 4 800 179
95
70.92
ern
(Ea
otal
,
,
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved. For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-031.09A000500010022-0
eligible for conscription are laborers. For this r'eason's'--either
the labor potential will have.to.be bled or production,cut down
if these men. are mobilized.,Because 'the labor potential 'of East-
ern USSR has already been bled to'the.limit, it,_mu'st be assumed
that present production will be partially cut d6wn'to permit the
further mobilization of residents of the area. However, even
if further mobilization were enforced, the maximum replacement
potential of Eastern USSR would not exceed '90,000 men,?necessi-
tatng,a 3% reduction in production potential.
The following is a ealbulation of the replacement
potential..
Total population as of March 1945, in' uding- those',....
mobilized
(excluding the military units stationed in?the area)
.6,? 19,000
Number of males in above total
Residents (52% of total) 3,046,000
Convict Labor (males 80% of total no
of convicts) 288,000
.Number eligible for military service (16-50
years of age) 1,533,000
(55 of male population)
Number physically fit 1,374,000
(75% of those eligible)
Number of'physically `fit' 412,000
in essential work
,(30%?, of ~ physically fit')
i,. Number' mobilized from out= 872,000
break of war to 1944
(ci, table below)
Nuber of `physically fit 90,000
remaining
The following table shows numbers of reservists call-
ed. and,mep .conscripted after thy: outbreak of war:
Year
Reservists
Conscripts
Total
1941
160,300
160,300
1942
363,900
49,900
413,800
1943
78;500
123;200
201,700
1944
47,600
48,800
96,400
Total.
650,300
221,900
572,200
If approximately 80% of the 60,000 men eligible for
conscription, i.e., approximately 50,000, could be drafted, the
total replacement potential: of Eastern USSR would amount to
140,000 men..
Approved 'For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
b. Remounting Potential
As previously stated, the present number of active
horses, in Eastern USSR is estimated at approximately 435,000.
If it is assumed that,330,000'of these are required in industry
(mainly in agriculture), 100,000 will be available for commandeer-
ing. as reraounte.
Total horsepower required in industry approx 600,000.HP
Mechanical horsepower available for use approx 130,000 HP
at time of mobilization
Horsepower derived from livestock approx 120,600 HP
substitutes (cattle)
Deficiency in horsepower replace- approx 250,000 HP
ment potential
Horsepower of 330,000 horses approx 250,000 HP
(assuming 1 horse = 0.75 HP)
B. Vehicle Replacement Potential
1. Present Vehicle. Situation
a. Automobiles and Tractors
In Eastern USSR, vliere the railroads are not fully
developed, transportation by automobile plays an extremely im-
portant role in communications. It should be noted that there
has recently been a marked tendency to develop the road networks
to satisfy military, economic and, above all, operational require-
ments.
A summary of the present situation in trucks and
tractors follows:
(1) Military Vehicles and Tractors of the Red
Army in Eastern-USSR.
The number of military vehicles and tractors
maintained 'key the Red Army in Eastern USSR is
unknown bec. .use of the lack of information, but
,it can. be assumed that many of_those maintained
prior to the war have been transferred to the
west sixce the outbreak of the Russo-Gorman War.
Excluding those transferred, the present reserves
can be estimated at approximately 22,600 trucks
and 3,300 tractors.
NOTES: (i.) Although the number of trucks sent
to the west would vary according to the
are ,.the average is believed to be 27%
of the, total.
(ii) The following table gives an esti-
mate of the distribution of trucks and
,tractors by area:
64 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Area
Trucks
Tractors
Maritime Krai
7,500
2,000
Raions directly subordinate to
Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish
Autonomous Oblast
1,700.
100
Amur Oblast
2,400
300
Khabarovsk Krai
2,000
200
Chita Oblast
2,$00
300
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
300
100
Irkutsk Oblast
500
100
Yakut ASSR
--
-
Outer Mongolia
5,100
-.200
Total (Eastern USSR)
22,600
3,300
(2) Civilian Trucks and Tractors
If the number of vehicles sent to the west since
the outbreak of war is taken as. a. basis for
the number hold in Eastern. USSR prior to the
Russo-German War, it can be estimated that
there are approximately 26,000 trucks (Cf
note i) and 11,200 tractors including 1500
tracked and 9,700 wheeled vehicles (Cf note ii).
NOTES: (i) Estimated distribution of civilian
trucks by area is roughly as follows:
Area
No prior
to Russo-
German War
No sent to
the west
Present no
of vehicles
Martimo Kral
Raions directly subordinate
to Khabarovsk Krai and
11,400
7,41Q
3,990
Jewish Autonomous Oblast
7,800
5,460
2,340
Amur Oblast
7,700
5,390
2,310
Khabarovsk Krai
4,200
540
3,360
Chita Oblast
15,300
11,475
3,$25
Buryat-Mongol ASSR
14,000
10,500
3,500
Irkutsk Oblast
17,500
13,125
4,375
Yakut ASSR
3,300
$25
2,475
Total (Eastern USSR)
51,200
55,025
26,175
REMARK:
1. Approximately 25,000 vehicles had~been.sent from the US
to the USSR via Eastern USSR under lend-lease by October 1944, and
it is presumed that the-majority of these were sent to the west.
2. The number'of vehicles sent west does not take account
of those sent east.
- 65 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
(ii) Estimated distribution of civilian
tractors by area is roughly as follows:
c19s sent
west
Present no, 2200
of vehicles
2600 Loo 9, 400
Local Carts and Sleds
Although there is a complete lack of information on
local transportation resources in Eastern USSR, an estimate of
NOTES: (i) Estimated number of carts by area:
Total
AmUtr Trans- Total
Baikal
2000 3000 7,000
1500 2400 5,200
50'0 600 1,800
2600 5400 10,800
1400 1,400
Present ,Number of Sleds
3$,000
12,900 .
19,700
57,500
12$,100
66
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
Martime
Khabarovsk
Kraap
'No' of vehi- 1500
500
'o3 os prior
Tracked to war
Vehicles No of ve-hi- 1000
300
clue sent
west
Present no 500
200
of vehicles
No of vehi- 2200
600
Wheeled cles prior
Vehicles to 'war
'No of vehi-
(Cf note (i) below) and 120,000 sleds (Cf note (11) below).
c'u ' erit figures may be derived by subtracting the number of carts
and sleds commandeered for service on the Russo-German front from
the 19~S fi ures. On that basis, there are approximately 250,000
and tho Trans-Baikal.
m
came from the Maritime Krai and Khabarovsk and 20zo from ur as
R~+IARKS It is estimated that 10% of the carts sent to the west
Obl t
A
Area Present Number, of, Carts
MaritimeKrai 75,900
Khabarovsk 25,900
Amur', Oblast 39,300
Trans-Baikal 115,000
Total 256,100
(ii} Estimated number of 'sleds by area,
Area
Daritirtb Krai
Khabarovsk
Amur Oblast
Trans-B ikal
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RD78-03109A000500010022'-0x
CPYRGHT
2. Vehicle Replacement Potential
a. Trucks
As already stated, since approximately two-thirds
of the (i rained.. prior, to. the war we're. commandeered and
sent; to Lhf. T es;., a pare minimum of truok=s remains at. present
for ind'art. i;1. aed tray::.sportation use, Any further commandeering
of trucks i. 1, ham. or bho industrial economy of Eastern USSR..
Although it must be. remembered' that some _of the
remaini.rg trucks wore repaired, the majority can be mainta,inbd'
only if they ^re sdbj cted;.to constant and large scale repairs.
(Cf note' (ii) below)
In view of the above, it can bc.said that the com-
mandeering of trucks in Eastern U3SR has alr.eaci reached its
limit.
plants which
?
Eastc rrl .,y
are alrn.ct l_nLi.tivo, ^.ss~ naiu ; that every
effort wore exerted after the outbreak of
the Russo-German War to exploit her repair
capacity to the utmost, her repair capacity
wo.a l.d still be extrom.ely low,
(-ii) The vast majority.af the vehicles in
Eastern USSR were manufactured 'in the USSR
and are of Via, or quality, The life of ' those
veh9.cles is short, averaging approximately
.tvm ;tears., and is dependent upon th4. type
of vehicle and the. usoage'it receives."
Excluding the wheeled, vehicles us.ed,ih industry, it
is estimated that there. are approximately 1800'tracked vehicles
which could be commandeered..
Area
Maritime Krai
Khabarovsk
and sleds, in cxist nce, (28,000 carts and 63,000 sleds) could be
commandeered in wartime;..
'The foJ_lis an estimate by area ..of the numbers
which could be, comm"In' .oored?
-?-Amar,Oblast-,,
-`Trans-Baikal
NOTES: (i) The,.?e" are r< a ~.cr..~t~i.le factories in
It is eti.!?i~ted that 'approximately 50% of the carts
Total,..
SECRET
Carts
Sleds'
:7,950
19,0010
12,950
6,000'
19,650 .
9,800
57,500
28,700
128,050
63,500.
- 67
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 'CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
MON"
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
III. STUDY OF LOGISTICS
(Cf Appendix Map 3, "Comm.unication Networks of Eastern USSR
and OuterMongolia
A. Rai roads
.1.. Overall Condition of Railroads in Eastern USSR.
as The railroads of Eastern USSR have gradually been
developed as a result of her economic expansion and her anti-
Japanese attitude. The trans-Siberian Railway is a-double-track
line; a branch line has been constructed to connect it with.the
Baikal-Amur Line and an operational line leading toward the Man-
churian border.
So critical was the scarcity of labor and materiel after
the outbreak of the Russo-Germ .n War that the USSR was compelled
not only to discontinue all railroad construction with the excep-
tion of one section but also to take up some of the tracks already
laid.
Construction work on the Baikal-Amur Railroad, which runs
from Komsomolsk to Sovetskaya Gavan, was continued after the out-
break of the Russo-German?Var, and the line was open to traffic
as of Juno 1945,
b.' About 35% to 50% of the rolling stock maintained in
Eastern USSR was transferred to, Central European Russia to extend
the rear supply lines on the Russo--Gorman front and to meet pres-
sing requirements in the reconstruction of recaptured territory.
.This resulted in a,marked decrease in the transportation capacity'
of Eastern USSR. At present, there are only about 15 or 20 loco-
motives, and the problem of normal goods transportation is further
aggravated by the increased demands for. freightage caused by the
large quantities of lend-lease goods landed at Vladivostok.
The following table shows the comparative pre-war and
present transportation capacity of railroads in Eastern USSR.
Pre-war Capacity
Present
Capacity
% of Pro-war
Capacity
Goods transported
43,000,000 metric 21,OQOp.OOC) metric
49%.
tons
tons
Locomotives,
2,350
1,180
50%
Freight Cars
66,000
42;800
65%
Employees
120,700
90,500
75%
c. Since large quantities of railroad materials are re-
quired in the Ural district-for the emergency construction of
railroads and the reconstruction of railroads in recaptured ter-
ritory, rails and other materials have been sent from Eastern
USSR. It will be very difficult in the future to satisfy the
demands for repair and construction material as long as the insuf-
ficiency of the iron manufacturing industry and the deficiency in
supplies of steel and other materials continue?
68
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999108/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
ci. New Locomotives, freight cars, etc.,are manufactured
mainly in the factories of Central European USSR; while Eastern
USSR.is mainly responsible for. maintenance. and repair, The
following table shows the annual potential and the actual
figures:
-Principal Factories
(ii) The average annual rate of repair is 420; minor
repairs, 3,600; and 120 cars for annual repair.
Condition of Branch Lines in Eastern. USSR
The br, neh lines in Eastern USSR have bce?ikept'in eon-
Location
Locomotives
Freight Cars'
Volume Volume
Planned Produced
Volume
Planned
Volume
Produced
Voroshil.ov
132
121
1,356
--
Mihailochyesnkovsk
Acces-
spries
Mfr &
Repair.
1,620
1,205
Chita
25$
212
69'
--
Ulan Ude
562
488
12,000
8,592
NOTE; This table is based on 1938 figures.
Frincipal epair' Shags
Railway Bureau
Number of
,Installations
Accommodation Repair
Capacity Capacity
Maritime Krai.
6
60
16,500
Far Eastern
7
70
25,000
Amur
10
100
41,500
'c`ans-.Baikal
$.
$0
29,000
Eastern Siberia
$0
25,00'0
REMARKS: (i) Normally,
each shop is capable of accommodating
or. six 4-axle cars,
ten 2-axle cars
has been broken down into the 'fallowing text)
dition for both economic and military purposes, There are more
than twenty such lines linking up with 'the main Trans-Siberian
Railway. Those lines loading towards the Soviet-Manchurian
border woro constructed mainly for military purposes, and the
romainder, for their economic value. Table' $'which follows
gives an outline of these branch lines (EdN: This table
DETAILS OF SI$ERIAN RAILWAY BRANCH ~WS
Maritime Krai Railways
This-line-runs from Ugolnaya to Nakhodka, a distance
Approved :.For. Release i 99/08/25 : GIA-RDP78-03109AOpQ50OO10022-0
`of appr+~ 1tely 171 kilometers. It is abroad-gug'e, single
have improved its faeilities.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Its speed is, approximately 35.kilometers per hour, About 16. trains
are used in summer, and about 15 in winter. Completed in 1907,
it is of military and economic importance in the defense of the
Bay of Amerika and in the development of Suchan coal mines. The
Dunai and Sergeyevka lines, also of military value, branch off
from this line, the latter to be extended'to the Daubikhe River
valley.
2. Posyet Line
This line runs from Baranovskiy to Posyet, a-distance
of approximately 194 kilometers. It is a broad-gaugo, single-
track railway, and, although in poor condition at the time of,
construction, continuous improvements are being made. Its speed
is approximately 35 kilometers per hour. About 19 trains are
used in summer, and about 18 in winter. Completed in the spring
of 1940, it,is of great military importance to the Posyet area.
-Branch lines extend to Slavya.nka and Kraskino.
3. Grodekovo Line
This line runs from Voroshilov to Grodekovo, a distance
of approximately 97 kilometers. It is a broad--gauge, single-
track railway, and, generally speaking, is in good condition.
About 19 trains are used in summer, and about 18 in winter.
Completed in,1900 it connects with the HIN?SUI%,- (TN: probably
.Pinkiang-Suifenhoj line in Manchuria and is of strategic military
importance. A narrow-gauge, military, light railway line extends
from GATIYONKI, (TN: probably Golenki) to tho'border area.
4. Turiy-Rog Line
This line runs from Mansovka Station to Turiy-Rog, a
distance of approximately 153 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge,
single-track railway, generally in good condition. About 19
trains are used in summer, and about 18 in winter, Completed in
1936, it is a military railway connecting with the Tung-an area
in Manchuria.
5, Sysoyevka Line
This line runs from Ma:.nsovka Station to Varfolomeyevka,
a distance of approx rnately 110-kilometers, It is a broad-
gauge, single-track railway it good condition. About 13 trains
are used in summer, Completed in the spring of 1939, it con-
nects with the Daubikhe River valley.
B. Far Eastern Railways
This line runs from Krulikovo to East Obor, a distance
of approximately 70 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-
track railway completed in 1933; the line east of Obor was com-
pleted in 194.1. It is a 'forestry railway; unreliable informa--
tion tells of a line extension to Sovetskaya Gavan.
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved for Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0'
CPYRGHT
SECRET
2, $omsomolsk Line (Railway No 1).
This ;ine runs from Volochayevka to Komsomolsk,`a dis-
tance of approximately 355 kilometers. It is.a brow.-gauge, single-
track railway, and, with recent repairs, its condition appears-
generally good. About 19'trains are used in summer and about lg
are'used in winter. Incomplete in 1936 although of economic and
military value, it runs along the,.Amur River and connects the
Njkolaevsk area.
3, Leninskoye Line (Railway No 2)
This line runs from Birobidzhan to station number 130,
a distance of approximately 130 kilometers. 'It is a broad-gauge,
.single-track railway, using approximately 19 trains in summer
and 1S in winter. Incomplete in 1937, it is a military railway
reaching the border area along the Amur River.
4. Izvestkovy Line
This line runs from Izvestkovy to URUGARU* (beyond Ust
Niman), a distance of approximately 350 kilometers. A broad-
gauge, single-track railway, it was completed in 1941; however;
although built for the development of coal mines near. URUGARUN-,
it seems that the rails were removed, in the. spring of. 1943..
C. . Amur Railways
1. Poyarkovo Line
This line runs from Zantaya to Poyarkovo,.a distance of
approximately 80 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-track.
railway in good condition which uses about 10 trains in the summer.
Completed 1n the'spring of 1942, it is a.military railway conne,c-
ting the border along the.Anur River.
Blagoveshchensk Line
This line runs from,Kuybyshevka to Blagoveshchensk,a
distance of about 116 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single
track railway in good condition, using about 20 trains in sumnIcr
and 18 in winter. Completed in 1914, it is a strategic military
railway connecting points along the Amur River.
3, Tambovka Line
This line runs from Berozovka to Konstantinovka, a dis-
tance of about 110 kilometers. Itlis a narrow-gauge (1 meter),
single-track railway which uses about 4 trains in summer. Com-
pleted in 1939, it is a military railway which branches off the
Blagoveshchensk line and connects with the Amur River,.,
4. Dzhalinda Line
This I line 'runs from Skovorodino.to Dzhalinda, a distance
of approximately 68 kilometers. It is a broad gauge, single-track
'railway in poor condition, using about 16 trains in summer. It
71
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0.
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SECRET
CPYRGHT
is an important railway for military and water-transportation
purposes.
D. Zabaikal Railways (formerly known as Molotov Railways)
1. Tonda Line
This line runs from 5h2e Baikal-Amur ZRailwaf to Tonda,
a distance of approximately 150 kilometers. It isa broad'-gauge,
single-track railway which was completed in 193g. It is a branch
built from the Siberian Railway for the construction of the Baikal-
Amur Railway. According to reports, transportation was recently
stopped on this line.
2. Srotonsk Line
This line runs from Kuenga to Sretensk, a distance of ap-
proximately 53 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-track
railway in generally good condition, using about 13 trains in sum-
mer. It is important to water transportation on the Amur River.
3. Manchouli Line
This line runs from TARUSUKI%c to Manchouli, a distance
of approximately 377 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-
track railway in good condition, using about 19 trains in summer
and.iS in winter. Completed in 1901, it is of military importance;
alterations are being made continually to make it a double-track
railway.
4. TAMUSUKU Line
This line runs from Borzya to -TAMUSUKU*, a distance of
approximately 570 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge railway be
tween Borzya and CHIYOBARUZAN%? but narrow-gauge the rest of the
way. The trains used between Borzya and CHIYOBARUZAN%- are esti-
mated to number 19 in summer and 18 in winter. Completed-in 1941,
it is of military value. Branching off the Manchouli Line and
connecting with Outer Mongolia, it has a branch line, the ZUMBU-
ROKKU*,
5.
Urulyunguy Line
This line runs from Kharanor to the Ur-ulyunguy district,
a distance of approximately 1&) kilometers. It is a narrow-gauge
(0.7 meter) railway, using about 4 trains in summer. Completed
in 1941, it, is of military importance; branching off the Manchouli
line it faces three border rivers.-
E.' Eastern Siberian Railway
This line runs from ZAUSHINSUKU* to Naushinski, a distance
of approximately 250 kilometers, It is a broad-gauge, single-
track railway, using about 12 trains both summer and winter.
Completed in 1939,' it is important for-military and economic
72
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release .1999/08/15 CIA-RDP78-031004A?005g0010b22-0
CPYRGHTf
SECRET
purposes. It may'have been constructed to reach Ulan Bator,
capital of Outer Mongolia.
F. Bakal-
. One line runs from Tayshet to Bratsk, a distance of
approximately 200 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-
track railway completed in 1938. Part of the proposed Baikal-
Amur line,. it is reported to extend to Nizhne-Angarosk.
2,. Another,line-runs?from Komsomolsk to Sovetskaya Cavan,
a distance of approximately 475 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge,
single-track railway permitting a speed of about 13 kilometers
per hour; it is expected to use 12 trains during the summer.
Its,.gompletion is anticipated Aug 1945, and, when Vladivostok
and the bay area become.unysable in wartime, it will be import-
ant as..,-xear supply line to. Khabarovsk via the Pacific,
F. Others
1,F There is a. light railway in the Maritime Krai running
from Tetyukhe to the BURENNER.U* mines, a distance of approxi-
mately 32 kilometers. It is a narrow-gauge,, single-track line
used for, ore transportation,
2. Another line runs from Okha to Moskalvo, a distance of
approximately 38 kilometers. It is a broad-gauge, single-track
railway which, incomplete in 1931, is used for the transporta-
tion of.oil near Okha.
,3. There is also a line which runs from Magadan to Palatka,
a distance of approximately 70 kilometers. It is a narrow-
g uge, single-track railway which, although incomplete in 1941,
is, important for the transportation, of goods.
(Ed.; The material of insert table number.8 ends here)
Wartime Transport Capacity of railroads in Eastern USSR
The Trans-Siberian Railway
.(For further detail on this subject see Appendix
5 "Future Increase in the. Transportation Capacity
of the Siberian Railway)
The transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian
Railway from the point of view. -of' track load is decided by condi-
tions to the west of Karymskaya, i.e. the section between Ulan
Ude and Tayshet, and in; wartime by conditions between Karymskaya
and Ulan Ude.
(1)
Present Maximum Transport Capacity
(See Table 9)
It is estimated that in peacetime the maximum
number of available trains is 40 (38 in winter),
- 73
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
of which about 17 (15 in winter) are available
for military use.
(2) Wartime Maxgl_mum Transport Capacity
(See -Table -LO)
It is estimated that the maximum number of
trains in wartime is 54 (51 in winter), of
which about.39 (36-in winter) are available
for military use.
(a) To convert to wartime operations, addi-
tional auxiliary equipment and locomo-
tives will have to be supplied in' greater
quantities, an operation taking approx-
i.rnately 3 weeks. Some of this equipment
has already been distributed.
(b) In view of the above figures, the 'annual
transport capacity is estimated as shown
below. Note that the loading capacity of
a locomotive. is assumed to be 680 metric
tons. (A locomotive travelling from Cen-
tral European USSR to eastern USSR is
taken as the.standard.) Note also that
the year is divided into two 6-month
seasons, summer and winter.
1. With 54 (51 in winter) as the maximum
number, of locomotives available in
wartime, the annual transportation
capacity will amount to approximately
13,030,000 metric tons. The daily
capacity will be:
Summer: approximately 36,700 metric
tons
Winter: Approximately 34,700 metric
tons-
Daly,Average: approximately 35,700
metric tons
2.
With 39 (36 in winter) as the maximum
number of locomotives available for
military use, the annual transportation
capacity will amount to approximately
9,300,000 metric tons. The daily
,capacity will be:
Summer: approximately 26,500 metric
tons
Winter': approximately 24,500 metric
tons
Daily Average: approximately 25,500
metric tons.
T 74
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25 CIA-RDP78-03.109A000500010022-0
SECRET".
CPYRGHT
J. When there is a demand or increase
transportation capacity, half the
nutber of` locomotives being used for
normal communication purposes may be
allotted for military use; approx.i-
nitely 46 locomotives will then be
available for military use. (See
Table 11) Under these conditions,,,
the daily capacity will be:
Summer: approximately 31,280
metric tons
Winter: approximately 29,240
metric tons
NOTE: For mass troop movements, etc.,
it will be possible for the Red
Army to avail itself of addition-
al transport within a maximum
period of 3 months when necessary.
It is estimated that the wartime capacity of the
Trans-Baikal Branch Line (formerly known as the Molotov "ranch
Line) is about 19 trains (l8 in winter). This estimate is based
upon the track load capacity.
/ The following table gives the amount of rolling
stock required for the amount of transportation given above.
Rolling Stock Required by'the Army
Locomotives
Excluding Reserve Including Reserve Freight Cars
Locomotives Locomotives
At present, 2,780 (11%) 3,;920 (16%) 102,9D0.(16%)
In Avg 4,80 (17%) . 6,040-.(24%) 153,600 (25%)
War- Max 4,930.,(20%) . 6,940 (28%) 175,100 (28%)...
time
REMARKS: The percentage of rolling stock represents the percen-
tage of the total in the entire USSR.
b. Branch Lines
(For further details on this subject, see Appendix
6, 'Time, Steel and Labor Required for the Con-
struction and Reconstruction of Railroads in the
Event of an Invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet
Army.[?)
75
SEC SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25 :.CIA-RDP78-03109A00050001.0022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Maximum Wartime Capacity of Trans-Siberian Railway Branch Lines
. Name of
Maximum No of Avail-
able Trains
Annual Trans-
portation
Branch Line
Effective
Potentially
Capacity
at' Present
Effective
(metric tons)
Sichan
16
18
2;600,000
Nan-tao
19
21
3,000,000
Grodekovo
19
21
3;000,000
Turiy Rog
19
21
3,000,000
Sysoyevka
13
15
2,200,000
Komsomolsk.
19
22
4;600,000
Leninskiy
19
21
3,000,000
Poyarkovo
10
12
1,700,000
Blagoveschensk
,20
23
3,300,000
Benzovka
4
-
200,000
Dzhalinda
16
18
2,600,000
Sretensk
13
14
2,000,000
Manchouli
19
21
4,200,000
Tamsog Bulag
4
200,000
Urlyunguy
4
200,000
Naushki
12
14
2,000,000
Sovet r skaya Gavan
12
2,000,000
REMARKS: The lading capacity of each train travelling on the
, branch lines is as follows:
Komsomolsk
Manchouli
680 metric tons
Benzovka
Tamsog Bulag 150 metric tons
Urlyunguy
Others 500 metric tons
The annual transportation capacity is reduced by 10-15 pbr-
oent in winter and since this and other factors have been taken
into consideration, the figures given represent an overall 20
percent deduction.
76
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 CPYRC4F
4a e)
0 ) Ei
FI
H
c
n-4
E C)
4'
4i a) 0
0,0
0 0 C)
H +' A
0
CH 4 H
?ri
0 c3 0
CD ri
fr
0
m -H
C)
E4 t)
ON H N N U'Ii N
N O '4 r`. r- LSl
CQ N N N H N
l0 l0 DO M ' 01 LI\
H H H H N N M
LC1 D LSD Ln rr1 CO M
0 rr1 rr1 N 0 LI\
H H H H N N
r-i O rr1 M 0 r-1 N
H 0 0 O 0 r-I N
0 0 KN rrl 0 0 0
M r4r1 N-11 L~C'\ to
M ~ 0 L LC C) MO)
LC\ '0 0
ri
Aoo i cd c+ C3
4-' r'n rCC 5 c:
cul )A
O L SO4
ti r O N
.H 0
Id M .L .Q .0 f. 'via a m d cA to
tM cd r--1 cd cd O O O
r4 ".r7 ~~` 4 r4' E W I tJ H E ~44 7 L
0500010022-0'
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
O cd
-ri -P
0
PA
0
P1 * 40
v) cc 'H
O C)
cl3 w
$- 0 Gl
C)
H P-1 M
4-1 0
0 -rl m
M
ro
-ri
0 GO
 Approved For Release 1999 08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0.
CPYRGHT
b N
(1) ?r4
rn
'Ch
O ~-i r-i
Appro\ d F& Re-lease 199`9/8/2 : CIA-I DP78-0310.9k0005000100.22-0,,
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
N
Cd ti
.p Cll
C)
H C) Pal ~N"\ NN \ M
0(3) 0 m H H M
0 0 O
I~
0
w
0
d .H +i ti LO t. cm \.O LO to
O 4- O N
cs p--t
F-+ r~
c3
0 ?-+
rd
O
0 -OP
4-{
rd C)
CJ H
F+ rl C3
?ri 43 M N to t L.O- .z1 K1
0 o~ cad l
E
p1 F1 Ci
H W r''
M 4-1
9 0 c t~ CV O O O O
E1 0,
41 ra 0
0 d 0 0 t:O O
O Ca 0
0
v) C)
H H W'\ H H H 0
?~ LC\ lf\ LCl CO
0
C)
O H i
:4 C)
U)
LLc Ln Ln to
. t Lc\ LO X00 n O
H
r ~/ Cd. ~~ I r1 F~-I
0 0 ci O o 1 C) -H
?
Cd ~'a V) V)
10 to 0
~2 CSC ~i CJ Cd '
2 w
t" CLS H ~-{ CI Cd O 0
'7 E+ EI !2)1 ti O
proved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO 0500010022-0
 Approved'For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
? 'H 0
ri 'k'd O rll
) a
ra -4 += p
Ul 'H
?d
:H
4p1
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP7'8.03109A000500010022-0
 AB IFLor Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
clu
?r1
Q)
W r-i
+'
LC1
l,0
LC\
M
,~1
c
t'r\
h~l
Pr?1
cd
Ei O
4+
Q)
0
(:)
F
t o
CSI,
N-
LO
t--
r-i a)
M
t
IYl
0
C)
w
k
-d
E-+
N
4i
0
U
l10
In
to
w
r-
0
10
0
0
ci)
0
4-t f..i
0
R3 ?H
a)P
k co
?H +`1
0
0 04
to M
.~ ti)
l0 N-
r-i
.d LCl zt- .. - LCl
Ei ~, C)
F-i 0 1"I
0 Y
Cl-4
?H 4- CV H ,zt' M N1 CV CV
0
a E-t
0 O
Cn .rt +~
1 c3 i CV H 0 0 O (D CU
?H
Pe,
O?1-, ~~ ?d
f-, G) c,; O 0 .t CYl M CV O
0 cd
r2i C>
-d- . LC\ in LC \
Fi
C
U F LC\ -} 0
F A' --t LC) Lll l \ to
c P
-F'
U
c3 o,
L-+
rll LCr-I \ k0 0 0 V. 0
r-4
Al r l ~ i U)
o r`- 1 cd c3 0 ccaa'
0 C. 0 rd -N +~ r rc cn
I Fi F-+ to La T/) CI) ,D C) 0 ?H ?ri
.,j CA
rQ r rQ r. to Cn 0 0 .".4
H cad d o 0 0 W
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release, 1999/08/25, :CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0` ,
'COYRGHT _w.
1. Present Condition of Eastern TYSSR Maritime Transportation
. Ship ,ning in East Asiatic Waters
Recently, the number of Soviet vessels in East,
Asiatic waters annually has been about 296 with an estimated
total tonnage of approximately one million tons.,. Of these, about
126 are engaged in overseas trade, shipping lend-Tease supplies
from the US to the USSR. Their. total tonnage is ap??roximately 590,
000 tonstnd the annual total' of goods. transported amounts to 1,
700,000 metric tons.
There are 214 Soviet vessels of 2~,OOO tons or over in
East Asiatic waters, "with'a total tonnage of about 91+0;000 tons,
and of these about 201 (99.0,000 tons) can be used s freighters.
The following table shows the vessels of 2,000 to:is,or over in East
Asiatic waters:
Type of Vessels
Number
Total Tonnage
Cargo and Passenger
'142
510,975
Tankers
16
117,035
Crab Fishing
9
36,797
Ice Breakers
3
13,921
Whalers.
1
5,055~ ~. O
F?~ .~ a,' E) U E ! P . +7 CD Cd o iti E U Ci f+ O U
O o
O O
O O
to tic
cu N
40
4 H
?ri r-I 0 0 O O
U O O O C>
cd do o O O cu 'C'
cd rr, O O 0 O
O CO 0
'? .1 Ca
r~ iU)
to Cd 11 P"
00 l
'aa.IV
ZI4S O3 u.zaq4nog
O 0 0
O O O
o o 0
S N LC`
00 N--
a.IY e G.1
?zntrty Jo tj;.no: unt
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
'0 Fi 4. cn 4 a3 7j ~7..j . ?r-i Cd ?D ~' +'
 Approved For Release, 1999108/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0 .
CPYRGHT
f2
o M o Cu C\j r-I N- LCN H - u 4i
C cd O
?d V)
4-1
o 3 o
0 LO ?1
4 4 C)
.rj *H 4-3
-+ E '0 w
w afl
rJ O d-D ? t~
Q Q) m
4-D
4-1
id 0
41
u ? rd CO
m
Yls ?r I F1 'CH
?H
4?I C) rt CH
O
r 4
Pi
P
m
- .r-1 *G
sti
pp Ul 1
O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 ~tO ~?
4A
?ri r-j (1)
P1 L`l 1 1 c 1. 1' 1 1
0
40
r.i N r, g 0 O O O O O O O
G O O
bt? 0 ?
r b o o 0 bo
?H (i3
F~ O
.O
i3
cd-
'eaz~
xs 4 MINO
4.1 i?1
Tn
0 ,0
c
Id cd ~e ?ri f-1 Vi
0 rfl ?r?1 +~ . H
Cu ~
1e a.1v -ex e a.z-
-~uaw ~reaap
'ed For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A0005000
C(S C)
U u
0
PLI
N
10022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
2. Maritime Transportation in: Eastern USSR during Wartime
Conditions of maritime: transportation-1n wartime will vary
with.the strategic situation and 'rill be especially dependent upon
whoever possesses mastery of the sea and air in the northwestern
region. It will be impossible to use the ports in the southern
section of the Maritime Krai. (Vladivostok, Tetyukhe, etc) for
traffic between the US and the USSR, and it is believed that the
USSR intends to use inster".d the ports of the lower Amur Oblast
(IN?ikolaevsk, Dekastri, Sovetskaya Gavan, etc). In this case, the
maximum annual supply potential of tastern USSR by sea will be
mainly dependent upon the cargo dandling capacity of these ports
and is estimated at approximately two million metric tons.
NOTE: After the cargo has boon unloaded at ports mentioned
above, it can be shiwn-Ded to the Komsomolsk-
Khabarovsk area. by water up the Amur River; by high-
way along the Sovetskaya Gavan-Komsornolsk Railway;
and then by the Komsomolsk Branch Line. Alternative-
ly, it may be shiDapod from Petropavlovsk and Nagaovo
to the Komsomolsk ihabarovsk area by small ocean-
going vessels.
The basis for the foregoing ostimate of the maximum annual
sup-nly potential is as follows:
Annual Transportation Capacity of Ocean-Going Soviet
Shipping in Service in Eastern USSR i"Taters
(1) There are about 200 vessels of 2,000 tons and above
(about 990,006 metric tons) which are capable of
ocean voyages. They are of the following types:
Cargo Vessels 510,795 tons (142 ships)
Tankers 117,035 tons ( 16 ships)
Unknown types .259, 294 tons ( 4+3 ships)
(2) If 20 percent of the above is deducted for vessels
30 years old or over, there remains approximately
710,000 tons of shipping (gross tonnage). As dead-
weight tonnage is approximately 1.4 times gross ton_
nsge, the deadweight tonnage amounts to approximately
1,000,000 tons.
(3)
With vessels mri,ing three crossings per year, approxi-
mately 3,000,000 tons can be shipped.
(u-) However, if it is assumed that the freight dead--
weight tonnage is the c"quivalent of 90 percent of the
deadweight tom-iago, the annual transportation capaoity
will be ap?;roxi_lately 2,400,000 tons.
Cargo Handling Capacity of Ports
The factor liable to havo the greatest effect upon trans-
portation capacity in this area is the ability of ports to handle
cargo . ''hc maximum cargo handling capacity is estimated at
g5
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
approximately 1,700,000 metric tons.
Port Maximum Annual Capacity
(10,000 metric tons)
I`Tikolaevsk
Z20,000
Dekastri
90,000
Sovetskaya Gavan
7#50,000
TOTAL
1, 90 000
Cargo unloaded at the three ports above is shippod to the
Komsomolsk-Khabarovsk area by the routes illustrated below. No
bottlenecks occur in transporting goods via the Amur River, the
Lomsomolsk Branch Line, and the Sovetskaya Gavan-Komsomolsk Rail-
way.
Goods unloaded at Dekastri (approximately 90,000 tons
annually) can be shipkpod to Sovetskaya Gavan by truck; the number of
vehicles required is very small.
[)eka5tri ;~ Ci 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 I ~,.r1 00 000 00 0
N ? F r 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
-P U - 0 G b~O 0 M ~ rH-i 0 LrI\
ri. Cv
P
,
_
rQ
?ri
0 0 0 0 0 0
o 000000
PA ri 0 0 (D 0 0 0
r _ :
N Cf") r--I r4 ,N'l 0
LC\ r-I LC \ N
O 0 0 0 0
?0 000
0 0 0-t o,
LC\ r-4 Nl N t.;
r-I r-i N r-i
(D ?r1 r-'I H
a
Vt
c
Vl
.
C-2
r;
?-t
G ,
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT
SECRET
Section 4+. ESTIMATE OF R POT ~I\TTIAL MILITARY S'T'RENGTH TIC USSR
COULD =LOY .AOA N '1, J ATT B$ N TITER SUPPLY TRAMS=
P RTATI011 . Q AC TY TO EASTER7IT USSR
The question of how strong a military force the-USSR will'
employ against Japan will depend upon the aggregate national
strength and upon the general situation, particularly upon Japan's
ability to repel USSR attacks. Although no general statement can
be made on this problem, in this estimate the maximum potential
military strength which the USSR could employ from the standpoint
only of supply (transportation capacity) is examined.
Because of Eastern USSR,'s lack of self-sufficiency in manpower
and materiel, she is compelled to depend largely upon Central and
European USSR or the US for supplies. The transportation capacity
from these areas will therefore be a .very important limiting factor
in determining the military potential which the USSR can employ
against Japan.
A. Dependence u on the Syl.)-ply Capacity of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
'Way (See Appendix "ihamber of Trains Required to Transport
Supplies. ifi Vartimo
(Replacements) to Eastern USSR by the Trans-Siberian Railway")
1. The annual transportation capacity, exploiting all the
lines of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the utmost in wartime, will
be approximately 13 million metric tons. The annual (normal)
transportation capacity for military goods will. be approximately
9,300,000 metric tons (approximately 13,690 trains) after deductions
have beoon,made for civilian requirements and for coal.
2. In the event third-.class military strength (approximately
60 rifle divisions, 3,000 tanks and 4,000 aircraft) were employed,
the number of trains required to transport this annual total of
supplies (replacements) at the outbreak of a war with Japan would
be approximately 15,567.
NOTE: In unofficial estimate of the number of trains required
follows.: ,
Provisions and Forage approximately 2,2+3 trains
Fuel approximately 5,709 trains
Ammunition approximately 1,551 trains
Other items approximately 2,905 trains
Personnel, Horses and Arms approximately 3,459 trains
The number of trains required to deal with the stores of
accumulated munitions is approximately 3,6)42, leaving approxi-
mately'2,225. The amount of supplies stored is estimated at
approximately 600,000 metric tons of provisions and forage (supplies
not required have been deducted from the total stored in Eastern
USSR), 1, 300, 000 'metric tons of liquid fuel and 200,000 metric tons
of ammunition.
113 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
 ; ~ o~r~d FOr P ease 1~ 9i CIA= ~~ ?_9Pi f} ;0010 2 =b
CPYRGHT'?
Siberian Railway.
In light of the above statement, ifwe ignore tie
. 1?
tZ~O (i) Ignoring the accumulated stores:
15,867 trains minus 13,690 trains equals 2,177_trains
. -T ,+177 trains divided by 37.3 'trams equals about `5U
8.ay s
Taking the accumulated stores into consideration:
6 90 trains minus 12,225 trains equals 1,465 trains
]?65 trains divided by 37.5 trains equals about 39
days
T ercfore, even in the former case, if the transportation
equivalent of 1+0 days'.transportttion capacity,on the Trans-
accu mu ated mu i t.i ens stored za East r~ .;US ?, , approximately 2, l 0
traip.s .will xnQt be .available for transportation, which is the
e,z'ivalent of 2 months' transportation capacity of the Trans-
On the other hand, if sae do take the above into
eo ex,;ont an 1,x+65 trains will become surplus, the
In the, latter case, it will be possible to increase the
military strength by 9 percent of third-class military strength, the
equiva1ent of five rifle divisions.
Theoretically, therefore, the maximum potential military
tleducted,,the equivalent of eight rifle divisions.
brcal- of war, (possible, if the mobilization period is extended by
ai o2 months,), It will be possible to utilize third-class
y strength. If this is not carried out, approximately 13
o r ' , of tho' third-class military strength will have to be
of which'2,177 trains are capable is carried out prior to the out-
strength.
`divisions. In,fact,'thoro will be little error, if the estimate is
set t 6o rifle divisions, the equivalent of third-class military
strength which the USSR can employ, depending upon the Trans-
Sibcriaaawrtay for transportation, is from 52 to 65 rifle
Dendence on the Su.
rn USSR
qr thedai.lysupply rate for one rifle division, see
~pondix 3, "Daily Supply Rate for Red Army in Eastern
.aR by the Trans-Siberian Railway.'
sOVOid f, (.IR 1999/0815::v CIA-RaP7& O31 O9AOO0a000'10 22-O
divisa,ons by sea and by by inland waterways).
waterways transportation facilities of Eastern 'USSR is approxi-
matey ~i0,000 metric tons (ap roximately 2 pillion metric tons
'by sea and 500,000 metric tons by inland waterways), and if the
daily supply rate for one rifle division is taken as 350 metric tons,
which is xoughl 1~ 0,000 metric tons annually the figure of 2, 500,000
_y'.
..metric toils _issufficioit for,20 rifle divisions (approximately 15
''Skke annua maximum supply capacity of the sea and inland-
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
CPYRGHT SECRET
C. o,nendence Upon ,fir Transportation Capacity
The aerial transortation capacity using the US - USSR Northern
Air Route and other al , r routes i,s zpproximate-ly 100,000-260,000 metric
tons aniius,11r. This~is sufficie;:.t for one to two rifle divisions
according to the' fig.xes given .above for the annual military require-
ments of one, rifle dvision (approximately 130,000 metric tons).
(End of Document No '2206'64,
[End of DOCUII NTS BRANCH TRANSLATION No 817
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109AO00500010022-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0
SE CRT
Approved For Release 1999/08/25: CIA-RDP78-03109A000500010022-0