BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 15, 1967
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Signiicant Dates 1
[ASTERISK denotes ANN:IVERSARf:ES . All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
21-28 World Youth Week celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY:
Communist front).
?5* Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community of
Atomic Energy (Euratom) signed in Rome by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957. TENTH ANNIVERSARY.
27* Khrushchev succeeds Bulganin as Premier of USSR. 1957.
27-5 International Union of Students Congress at Ulan Bator, Mongolia. (IUS:
Soviet-line Communist front)
29 Martyrs' Day and Youth Day. (Communist China)
I* Berlin Blockade begins. In 15 months, US and Britain airlift 2.34 million tons
of vital supplies to city. (Blockade lifted by Soviets, 12 May 1949) 1948.
4* North Atlantic Treaty signed, including US, Canada and 10 West European coun
tries. 1949.
II International Day of Liberation from Fascism. Celebrated by International Fed-
eration of Resistance Movements (Communist front).
14 Day of Aid to Spanish Youth. Celebrated by World Federation of Democratic
Youth and International Union of Students. (WFDY and IUS: Communist fronts).
16* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Germany
to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building weapons
in USSR. 1922. FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
17* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to Russia.
1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
18-27* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrated
by WFDY and IUS. (Communist fronts)
26* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina;. 21 July, agree on armistice
effective II August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recognized as
neutral. 1954.
28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation.
MAY
I May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second International
(Socialist Congress) in 1889.
7* V-E Day, end of World War 11. 1945.
15* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on
22 May 1943 declares other Communits Parties to be autonomous.
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Media Lines
13 February 1967
EAST GERMAN NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION FIGURES. According to East German
published figures, there are 38 daily newspapers in East Germany, and
their combined circulation exceeds 6,000,000 copies per day. NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND, East Berlin, official organ of ruling SED (Communist)
Party, leads the dailies with a circulation of 800,000. Other impor-
tant dailies and their circulations are: FREIE PRESSE (Karl-Marx-
Stadt), 490,000; FREIHEIT (Halle), 400,000; LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG
(Leipzig), 360,000; and VOLKSSTIMME (Magdeburg) with about 300,000.
There are also eight large illustrated weekly newspapers in East Ger-
many which have a combined circulation of nearly 4,000,000. Comparable
figures on other Eastern European countries are not readily available.
The significance of the above figures is that in this Communist country
there is one Party daily for every third citizen or about 75% percent
of alI households in East Germany receive SED papers. The circulation
figures of the "non-Party" press is relatively low. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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(MEDIA LINES)
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13 February 1967
History The Glorious Soviet
Made to Thirties
Order
Briefly Noted 0000"
The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution is
an occasion for Communists to recall,
not only the Revolution itself, (See
BPG 199, Item #1055, 12 Sept. 66) but
also the 50 years of Soviet rule
which followed it. On the whole,
they would probably rather not recall
those 50 years in too much detail,
since there is much in the Soviet
history of that period which is hard
to reconcile with the current Soviet
line, or indeed with any normal per-
son's beliefs about how people ought
to behave. This is particularly true
for the period of the 1930's.
A Soviet historian, Vladimir
Yakovlevich Klimushev, gave on 16
January a broadcast talk for Soviet
domestic audiences on "The Party in
the Struggle to Build and Consolidate
Socialism in 1933-1941." Not surpri-
singly, Klimushev emphasized the first,
second, and third constitution; the
"unification" of "the western Ukraine
and western Belorussia" (i.e., Eas-
tern Poland) with the USSR; the
"restoration of the Soviet system"
in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
His talk was more interesting for its
omissions:
1) Stalin's name was mentioned
only once, in its alphabetical
position in a list of 15 party
leaders.
2) No mention was made of mass
deaths connected with collecti-
vization.
3) No mention was made of
the blood purges of party
members, Red Army leaders,
and "nationalists" follow-
ing the murder of Kirov
(December 1934) and lasting
until 1939, taking a toll
of over a million lives.
4) No mention was made of
Stalin's use of slave
labor camps.
5) No mention was made of
the Nazi-Soviet pact, which
made possible the Soviet
annexation of Eastern Poland
and the Blatic States:-- as
well as encouraging Hitler
to start World War II.
All these events are apparently
"unhistory," even more than in
Khrushchev's day.
Since Klimushev's talk was
a live domestic broadcast, only
those assets can refer to it
which would plausibly have know-
ledge of such broadcasts. We
have presented it here, however,
as we suspect that it may typify
other yet-to-be published Soviet
treatment of the last 50 years
during the anniversary year; we
expect that articles and books
will also appear which will be
more notable, like Klimushev's
broadcast, for what they do not
say than for their actual con-
tents. (This seems especially
likely regarding Soviet leader-
ship; thirty of the fifty years
were under Stalin, and ten were
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under Khrushchev, both now being played
down or overlooked in Soviet output.)
Some of our assets should be equipped
and prepared to supply the missing
information.
place -- although in mid-December
they claimed that their meeting
would boycott and "smash" the Bei-
rut conference. (END UNCLASSIFIED) 25X1 C10b
Who Smashes Sino-Soviet Struggle for
Whom? Writers' Allegiance
(UNCLASSIFIED) Nowhere
is the struggle for leadership of the
Afro-Asian movement more pronounced
than in the writers' movement. The
Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau. (AAWB)
split.last summer and set up two sepa-
rate secretariats, one in Peking and
one (Soviet-controlled) in Cairo, each
claiming to carry on the functions of
the former Ceylon secretariat (See BPG
196, item #1048, dated 1 August 1966
and item #1096 in this BPG). In re-
cent weeks representatives of the
Peking-based Bureau have toured Asian
and African countries trying to enlist
support for a Peking-oriented writers
conference which is to rival a Soviet-
sponsored writers meeting to be held
in Beirut from either 11-18 or 18-
25 March. A preparatory meeting for
the Beirut conference was held in
Cairo last November. The Chinese have
bitterly and repeatedly denounced the
Soviet "splittist" activities. On
15 January NCNA reported that revolu-
tionary writers, journalists, and other
freedom fighters from 20 Afro-Asian
"countries and regions" at a meeting
in Peking on the 14th strongly con-
demned the Soviet revisionist clique
for having engineered the Cairo pre-
paratory meeting for the "bogus" Third
Conference of Afro-Asian Writers. But
it would seem that the Chinese have
failed so far to muster the necessary
support for their meeting -- for they
have not as yet announced a date or
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23. In addition to the Boffa article described (J 10), the Italian
Communist press has recently carried a number of perceptive comments
on China. It also reveals (J 18) that the Chinese have barred a PCI
journalist, accrediting an unknown representative of the obscure pro-
Chinese NUOVA UNITA as Italy's Communist journalist: moreover, it
claims, the Chinese have recently approved accreditation for other
Italian papers controlled by wealthy industrialists.
24. Castro announces plans for a Cuban "new societ if which sounds
suspiciously like Mao's all-embracing communes. 'J 29) He also appears
to be having difficulty winning Soviet approval of a new 1-year trade
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The February Revolution Approaches
Its 50th Anniversary
The liberal Russian revolution, called the "February Revolution"
because it began on February 23rd on the Old Style (Julian) Calendar,
broke out 50 years ago. (On our modern calendar, on 8 March 19171i')
This popular uprising, in which workers and soldiers really fought for
freedom, made hopes rise throughout the world. It seemed that demo-
cracy had triumphed in the citadel of absolutism.
Unfortunately, hopes for Russian liberty where shattered in the
so-called October Revolution eight months later -- actually a Bolshe-
vik "putsch," without mass participation. The Communists are already
celebrating the October Revolution; we should see to it that the.real
revolution is not forgotten.
For details, see strategic guidance item #1055: "February 1917:
The Real Russian Revolution," issued last September 12th in BPG No.
199.
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(WCA.)
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#10 3-30 January 1967
WOPLD 001NA1UI IST AFFAIRS
CHRONOLOGY
The Chinese "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (CPCR)
Reporting on the tumultuous events in China has further increased and
is more confused than ever. Posters appear in the name of various Red Guard
units from institutions in Peking and in other cities, and posters attack-
ing a certain leader have sometme6 disappeared a few hours later, replaced
by others defending the sam individual. Newspapers and radio stations
announce that they have been taken over by Maoist "revolutionary rebels"
who have seized power from "the handful of persons in authority who are fol-
lowing a reactionary, revisionist line": however, the Maoists claim that
some of these "take-overs" are phoney, staged by oppositionist elements
sailing under false colors ("waving the Red Flag to oppose the Red Flag")
to "hoodwink" the people. As of the end of the period, it appears that the
press organs in 11 of the 27 provincial capitals have been taken over by
Maoist rebels, and the radio stations in 11 (not entirely identical) -- but
this is far from "hard" information, and new developments are reported
daily: two of the radio take-overs -- Kunming (Yunnan Province) and Harbin
(Heilungkiang) -- are reported on the last day of our period, the 30th.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly practicable to follow our
usual chronological pattern. Instead, we will attempt to provide an out-
line summary of what seem to be the principal developments, with specific
reference to, or quotes from, only the "hardest" items: i.e., articles
from main Chinese press organs or radios or eyewitness accounts by compe-
tent observers.
A. The story behind the GPCR: materials appearing in Peking during the
first week of January posters and wall newspapers describing speeches by
Mao and Lin Piao to the October "Work Conference" of the CCP/CC, confirmed
in part by the January 1 RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY joint editorial) provide
the following information on the genesis of the CR, from the Maoist point
of view:
-- Mao reportedly says that he erred in 1958 when he relinquished all posi-
tions other than Party Chairman, leaving Teng Hsiao-ping GenSecy and Liu
Shao-chi Chief of State. They gradually consolidated their grip on the
party and state, which steadily drifted away from a true Maoist course.
"Mao tried to rectify the situation by taking up the problem at the ...
(CC meeting) in September and October 1965. However, Mao could not ...
because the capital had already been firmly fortified by a group of anti-
Party revisionists led by Peng Chen, former Peking mayor and the first to
suffer in the current purge. Therefore, Mao had no choice but to leave
Peking and go to Shanghai in order to launch his attack against the revi-
sionist group in the capital." (Tokyo YOMIURI's Peking correspondent on
Jan. 6.) (Note: it was a Shanghai paper, LIBERATION DAILY, which in Nov.
1965 published the first Yao Wen-yuan article seen as launching the CR.)
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-- For 8 months, the CR was apparently limited largely to inside maneuvering
at the tcp of the Party, during which Lin Piao's stature visibly increased:
we still have little more than published editorials and articles as evidence
of what xeally happened during this period.
-- By late May, Mao was ready to move against Peng and carry his CR to the
"people" -- with first priority to the universities. As the Jan. 1 joint
RF/PD editorial puts it:
"On 1 June 1966, Chairman Mao decided that the country's first
M-L big-character poster, posted first at Peking University, should
be publicized. This kindled the raging flames of the GPCR and set in
motion the mass movement which has as its, main target for attack the
handful of persons within the Party who are in authority who took the
capitalist road...."
Simultaneously, the Maoist press carried a series of purple editorials on
the urgent need to head off a full-scale revisionist counter-revolution
(a parallel to Hungary was mentioned). During the months of June and July
(with Mao out of Peking again), the CC sent out a number of "work teams" to
prosecute the CR: however, it is now revealed by posters that the teams
often tended to counter extreme demands and violence by local groups, then
already bearing the "Red Guards" name.
Returning to Peking late in July, Mao was dissatisfied with the perfor-
mance of the Party's work teams: either before or during the August 1-12
plenum (where, although strongly supported by Lin Piao, Mao and his sup-
porters reportedly were a minority), he decided to take the conduct of the
CR away from the Party apparatus and give it to the "masses," represented
by the Red Guards. Unleashed at the huge Aug. 18 rally, the Red Guards
rampaged wildly throughout the country: their actions seemed to be increas-
ingly directed against the established Party bureaucracy.
-- Obviously demoted in standing and of uncertain status, President Liu and
GenSecy Teng apparently felt impelled at the October "Work Conference" to
offer "self-criticism" of certain errors, principally in misguiding the work
teams sent out during Mao's absence, thereby opposing the CR: the Maoists
denounce this self-criticism as superficial.
B. December highlights: Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, appears in a leading
role in the CR, becoming cultural advisor to the Army, dominating a mass
meeting, publicly revealing opposition to the CR in top Party circles and
implicitly acknowledging that the Maoists are a "temporary minority." Liu
and Teng are repeatedly denounced as leaders of the "bourgeois, reactionary
opposition" to Mao, Peng Chen and others are arrested and publicly humiliated,
2 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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-- and Tao Chu, CCP Propaganda Chief and leader of the CR (who had made
the ar,,reef leap" from w rankiri? so~,_,ewhere around 90th in the hierarchy to a
com.s-,o:;.cuoizs l-th in 1966, and who personally made the first p .r 11c ch=arges
against Liu and Teng), falls victim of concerted attacks by the end of the
month. As the month ends, the Maoists make the (possibly fateful) decision
to carry their GPCR into the factories and fields, insisting defensively
that it would help, not hinder, production: the charter and marching order
for this new sit'.Aation" are c,et forth in the i -:Iortant Jan. 1 joint RED
FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.
C. "Civil war" in Januai : The decision to carry the CR into industry
brings strong opposition from the entrenched bureaucracy in provinces and
cities throughout the land, from the local Party organizations and adminis-
trative organs, Party-controlled labor and other mass organizations, and
from masses of workers. Numerous reports tell of bloody battling against
Red Guard intrusions, strikes and widespread disruption of production and
transport, etc. The Maoists launch a drive to "seize power" from the
existing organs - still referred to as "a handful of persons in authority in
(the local) Party Committee who have taken the capitalist road.". Follow-
ing traditional Communist tactics, they aim their top-priority "take-over"
efforts at the communications media. Reporting of developments in the pro-
vinces thus tends to convey only a Maoist picture: a series of victorious
take-overs, with negative developments acknowledged only after it can be
reported that they have been overcome. By the 23rd, Mao orders the Army,
heretofore held to a "non-interference" policy, to intervene on behalf of
the Maoist "revolutionary rebels" when necessary, though a subsequent CC
Military Affairs Committee directive prescribes moderation and "persuasion"
rather than force. By the end of the month, Maoist media are triumphantly
reporting examples of take-overs in which Army units have played a decisive
role, --- even against large military formations such as the reported
20,000-man "August First Field Army" in Sinkiang, said to contain a quasi-
military division of demobilized soldiers.
Note the increasing stature of Chou En-lai as a moderator, nominally
loyal to Mao but publicly condemning extremes and urging moderation, even
though he is occasionally attacked (and quickly defended) by posters. Four
persons seem to be at the top of the Maoist team, the Mao pair, CR chief
Chen Po-ta, and Army chief Lin Piao. (The latter has not been seen publicly
since November and there was some speculation as to his status when a major
purge of the Army's CR group was announced on the 11th, but his role would
seem to be enhanced since the Army has openly entered the struggle.) On the
other side, Liu and Teng still seem to enjoy the support of a large majority
of the Party CC and apparat, to the degree that the Maoists feel unable to
go beyond verbal attacks on them.
The following seem to be the most significant specific developments
of the period:
(1) The "Shanghai example": Within the first week of January bloody bat-
tling, strikes, etc, are reported in various places. The first and bitterest
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fighting apparently begins on Jan. 3 in the major industrial city of Nanking,
where, after almost a thousand casualties, Red Guard attacks are repelled
by public security forces supported by the Army, with the arrest of 6,000
of the `rebels." (Nanking seems to be still controlled by the old Liu-
loyal bureaucracy.)
On Jan. 5th, however, the local radio in Shanghai, largest of all Chi-
nese cities, announces that one of the two principal S. dailies, WEN HUI
PAO, on the 4th ''determined to lean on ... the side of the proletarian
revolutionary line represented bychairman Mao ... (and) turned itself into
a paper of the rebel revolutionaries." A "message to the people in S. from
11 revolutionary rebel organizations in S., including the S. workers' rebel
HQ'' follows. It tells how the "handful of persons..." tried to suppress the
revolution by various devious meart8, including inciting the masses ("with
the appearance of extreme 'leftists' and the sweetness of 'revolutionary'
words") to sabotage production by leaving their jobs and going "north" to
"deliver an indictment." Next day, S. radio announces that the other prin-
cipal paper, LIBERATION DAILY (which in Nov. 1965 first published the first
CR article), "has also been placed under the new management of the rev.
rebels." Various materials from these papers describing "the present excel-
lent situation of the GCR in S." are broadcast over the next few days,
including a commentary on the 8th which concludes that "the bourgeois
reactionary line is now approaching total collapse." On the 9th, however,
all carry an "urgent notice issued today by the rev. rebellion HQ of S.
workers and 31 other rev. mass organizations" which names the Shanghai
Municipal Party Committee (SMPC) as leading the opposition:
"... We hereby solemnly warn the SMPC that no schemes aimed at shift-
ing the line of struggle through disrupting production, interrupting
communications, and increasing wages and material benefits will ever
succeed...."
Because (as noted below) Maoist media publicize this notice throughout
the land as a model for all rebels, we briefly outline its 10 points:
1. "Grasp the revolution and stimulate production."
2. Take prompt action to persuade and mobilize workers and functionaries
who are exchanging rev. experience elsewhere to return to S. immediately.
3. Authorizations for travel for exchanging rev, experience are cancelled,
and money advanced must be repaid.
4. The "circulating funds" of all offices, organizations, and enterprises
are frozen.
5. "Matters related to the readjustment of wages, and back payment of wages
and material benefits," shall be dealt with later.
6. Paying students higher wages for labor when they are integrated with
workers and peasants "is a revisionist practice pure and simple" and must
be stopped.
4 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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7. Seizing or inciting to seize public buildings, including houses confis-
cated from capitalists, shall be dealt with by law, and "those who moved
into houses seized by force must.move back to their original lodgings
within one week."
8. Those opposed to Mao, Lin Piao and the CR shall be immediately arrested.
9. All rebels must immediately carry through the above points `'and turn
on all organs of propaganda to popularize them and educate the masses."
10. Anyone violating these points shall, after investigation, be immediately
punished.
The extent of the disruption which had actually prevailed in Shanghai
is revealed during the following weeks as the media report a continuing
series of "victories" against sabotage: the end of strikes in electricity
and water services, rail transport, shipping and shipbuilding, etc.
On the 15th, S. radio declares that the grouping of 32 organizations
which had signed the "urgent notice" was "completely under the control of
the SMPC," used as "a tool by the SPCC," and "has already been smashed to
pieces," -- as it announces the formation of a new"Workers Rev. Rebel
Liaison Dept." to replace the old.
An unconfirmed report in the Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST on the
25th from its S. correspondent tells how the S. mayor and a large group of
former SMPC officials have been paraded through the city for several days
in open trucks wearing dunce caps and bearing placards. But, on the 28th
S. radio broadcasts a new "urgent notice" to workers in the suburbs and
rural areas, its tone betraying concern about the situation outside the city.
(2) The battle against "economism": Two top-level documents are published
on Jan. ll* --
(a) agreetinas message signed by the CCP/CC, the State Council, the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee of the CCP/CC, and the Cultural Revolution Group
under the CCP/CC, to the signatories of the Shanghai "u_rgent notice": it
calls their "rev. actions... a brilliant example" and calls on "the workers,
peasants, rev. students, rev. intellectuals, and. rev. cadres throughout
the country to take concerted action and to beat back the new counterattack..."
(b) aJoint RED/FLAG PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial." "Oppose econoraism and smash
the latest counterattack by the bourgeois reactionary line." It says that
the Shanghai "urgent notice" has "vividly and penetratingly revealed the big
conspiracy of the reactionary elements ... using the 'sugar-coated bullets'
of economic benefits to seduce a part of the masses." This is `economism,"
"garbage picked up from the rubbish dump of old style and modern revisionism,"
which "uses bourgeois ultrademocracy to replace proletarian democratic
centralism," etc.
5 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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"It is a form of bribery that caters to the psychology of a few
backward people among the masses, corrupts the masses' revolutionary;
will, and leads the ... masses onto the wrong road ... to disregard
the interests of the state and the collective ... and to pursue only
personal and short-term interests...."
*Wall posters on the .10th stated that Mao had returned to
Peking to take personal pharge of the CR.
(3) A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 22nd frankly admits:
"... Right from the beginning., the GPCR has been a stride for the
seizure of Dower.... He who has power has eve int: he who is
without tower has nothing. Of all the important things, the posses-
sion of power is most important!
Such being the case, the revolutionary masses, with a deep
hatred for the class enemy, grind their teeth and, with steel-like
determination, make up their minds to unite, form a great alliance,
and seize power.' power::: and more power:::"
(4) Therm enters the fra : On the same day, Mao is reported (by a
poster appearing on the 23rd) as ordering Lin Piao to rescind the old
directive on "the so-called non-interference" (which is now "false non-
interference") and issue a new order that the Army should send help to
"the leftwing and revolutionary masses" when they ask for it. On the
23rd, NCNA declares that "the commanders and fighters of the three services
of the Chinese PLA have pledged their most resolute support to the rev.
rebels seizing Party, state, financial, and other power...," -- carried
as top news by all media on the 24th. LIBERATION ARMY DAILY makes it
official policy in a short editorial on the 25th.:and a follow-up on the
27th. The former sets the rationale:
"The struggle to seize power constitutes a general counter-
offensive against the attacks launched on the proletariat in the
last 17 years by the bourgeois agents who wormed their way into the
Party.... It is a conscious mass movement drawing in hundreds of
millions of rev. people under the command of Mao Tse-tung's thought....
The PLA must firmly support end assist them (the proletarian revolu-
tionaries), for this is a vital call from our great leader Chairman
Mao.... Even though they may be just a minority temporarily, we
must support them without the slightest hesitation.
Some people use 'non-intervention' as a pretext to suppress
the masses in reality. This is absolutely impermissible....
'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' The
political power of the proletariat seized by the people's army
with the gun, too.... We must follow Comrade Lin Piao's instruc-
tion...."
6 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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Some indication that this mandate was given ex post facto is seen
in a wall newspaper reported in Pelting on the 23rd describing the dispatch
of PLA troops on the 22nd to Fangshan, only 2 miles southwest of Pekin
to defend rev. rebels who had beenlbeaten and imprisoned by security
forces when they launched an unsucgessful attack against anti-revolu-
tionary elements on the 20th. "The dispatch of Army troops to Fangshan
served greatly to raise the morale of the rev. rebels and to dishearten
the reactionaries," the paper said; -- and this phrase is repeated through-
out the remainder of the period, as Maoist media report the successful
intervention of the Army in Harbin, Changchun (Kirin Province),
Huhehot (Inner Mongolia), Hofei (Anhwei), and other places.
(5) Dissension and purges in the Army: Liu Chih-chien, Deputy Director
of the Army's Gen. Political Dept. and official responsible for purging
the Army of anti-Maoist elements, is denounced by a Jan. 9 poster for
blocking the purge: he is among the missing from the'4iamelist of members"
of the newly reorganized "cultural revolution group" of the Army publicized
on the 11th. At the head is Hsu Hsiang-chien, with Chiang Ching (Mrs.
Mao) as his Advisor. However, five of the 18 members named are strongly
attacked by posters within the following days, including Hsu himself and
his First Deputy, Hsiao Hua (the latter two subsequestly defended by
Chou). Other prominent military coming under heavy attack include the
80-year-old hero Chu Teh, the politically powerful Ho Lung, and Tang
Ping-thou, editor of the LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL. Lin Piao is reported
as having denounced Ho Lung, -- but the denunciation of Hsiao Hua, an old
associate of Lin's, is attributed to Chiang Ching, -- and so it goes!
It is worthy of note that Ho Lung's nephew, Yang Shang-kun, purged
last summer from his job as CC Secretary, is accused by Red Guard wall
newspaper COMBAT on the 19th of being "an important spy" who has "often
conferred secretly with the Soviet Ambassador and conveyed important
secret documents to the USSR," "installed microphones in the residence
of Mao Tse-tung to spy on him.," etc. Yang is accused of plotting a coup
d'etat with three other purged leaders: Peng Chen, former Army Chief of
Staff Lo Jui-thing, and Culture Minister Lu Ting-i.
(6) Denunciations and purges of other figures: Few of the top figures
in the Party, state and society have escaped denunciation during this
period, but it is difficult to determine who has been purged and who is
still on his job. Public humiliation seems to be a good criterion, and
the three named at the end. of the above paragraph were exiong 20 shown
bearing placards in photos displayed in Peking early in the month.
(7) Seizure of power at the top: According to a wall newspaper posted
at the Peking Municipal Party Committee HQ on Jan 29, a "Peking Revolu-
tionary Rebel Communeestablished at a "congress of representatives
of the worker, peasant, soldier and student rev. rebel factions" of 30
""revolutionary organizations" meeting on the 28th in response to Chen
Po-ta's call, "will assume ant' execute the overall power of Peking
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Municipality." The 30 orgEuIzations are identified as: "the Institute
of Politics and Law, which seized the Public Security Bureau; the Mao
Tse-tung Thought Combat Corps of the Broadcasting Administration Bureau,
which seized the central Radio Station; and the Chingkang Shan Corps
of the Teachers' College, which supported the Maoist faction in repub-
lishing PEOPLE'S DPILY; as well as organizations embracing wide circles,
such as the Academy of Sciences, the No. 1 Machine Tool Factory, etc."
The take-over of 11 or 12 central ministries had been reported
during the period Jan. 14-19, as well as the Peking Public Security
Bureau on the 9th and Peking Radiolon the 15th. What the rule of the
new "Commune" in Peking will mean i`or the nation as a whole remains to
be seen.
Meanwhile Maoist media have reported a continuing series of take--
overs of provincial and municipal media, institutions, local administra-
tions and Party Committees throughout the land, often with considerable
confusion and leaving much room for doubt as to the validity of the claims.
(8) Noteworthy Miscellany: (a) Beginning with Copenhagen on the 8th,
news media in various capitals around the world report the departure of
Chinese personnel for Peking, presumably to face the CR: it is indicated
that a large part of the diplomatic staffs and most students and other
personnel are involved.
(b) Radio Peking on the 29th announces: "the State Council has decided
that there will be no holidays during the spring festival of 1967. The
spring festival home leaves of workers will be postponed." ("Spring
festival" is the Communist label applied to the traditional lunar new
year celebration.)
(c) Various posters and wall papers have used the terms "Crimson Guards"
and "Red Flag units," presumably to apply to groupings of adult Maoist
shock troops, complementing the youthful Red Guards.
(d) Posters reported on Jan. 27 say that the 77-year-old former Acting
President of the Nationalist Chinese Government, General Li Tsung-jen,
who defected to Peking from his exile in the U.S. in 1965, was arrested
as an "American agent," -- on testimony of his young Wife of less than
a year!
(e) Liu Shao-chi's son, Liu Yun-jo, identified as leader of the "916
Revolutionary Rebellion Regiment" of the 7th Machinebuilding Ministry
(aircraft), is reported as criticizing his father at a mass rally on the
6th: on the 20th he is reported arrested on charges of spying for a
foreign country!
8 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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Chronology Continued
Throughout the period: Soviet and other Communist media continue their
recent pattern of coverage of events in China.
January 3: Czech agency CTK publicizes a statement by SecyGen Saillant of
the Prague-based WFTU on "the illegal and drastic measures ... taken by
special groups in the CPR ... against the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions" (reportedly closed late December).
NCNA Cairo describes an AAPSO press conference at which the Soviets
tried unsuccessfully to stop the Chinese Liang Keng from finishing a state-
ment, aroused the indignation of the participants, and finally, with "their
handful of followers," "fled amidst cries of 'renegades!' and 'shame!""
The Chinese finished and was applauded.
January k: Radio Moscow gives its version of the above press conference:
the Chinese tried to "spread coarse slander against the peace-loving policy
of the Soviet Union," but met with a worthy rebuff and "shouts of 'shame!""
from those present. AAPSO SecyGen as-Sibai declared the conference closed
after the Soviet walk-out and himself left the hall, while the Chinese
"continued to talk alone!"
NCNA Budapest reports that Li Shou-pao, Chinese Secy to the World
Peace Council, denounces the WPC Secretariat for "scheming and playing
tricks on the extension of his Austrian visa," so as to oust him from the
Vienna WPC HQ, -- blaming it all on manipulation of the WPC by the Soviet
revisionists.
In a Moscow press conference, the three Soviet correspondents ousted
from China in December (#9) condemn Chinese anti-Soviet actions and the CR
in general. They particularly object to Chinese statements attributed to
anonymous Soviet citizens supporting Mao's line. "Chinese newspapers are
not beyond even using fake documents. Thus they published ... an anonymous
letter from 'one Soviet Komsomol member.' Krushinskiy, who earlier worked
in Chinas as a translator, remarked that the specific expressions and
vocabulary used in this 'letter' showed clearly that it was originally
written in Chinese...."
January I--8: The French CP holds its 18th Congress, with observers from
"more than 0" foreign CPs, including two ministers from Hanoi and a Viet-
cong delegation, -- but none from China or Albania. Denunciations of
Chinese policies come throughout, from SecyGen Rochet's opening report,
through Soviet chief delegate Pelshe's speech on the 6th to the closing
resolution, -- which calls for the convocation of a world CP conference
"as promptly as possible." Pelshe on the conference says the CPSU agrees
with other FPs that favorable conditions are being created and declares
that "more than 60 parties have come out in favor" of it.
9 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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January 4 and contiruin : L'eginning with Moscow and Leningrad on the 4th,
CPSU officials are reported fanning out over the entire country to address
meetings of local party units on the results of the Dec 12-13 CC -plenum,
which was devoted almost entirely to"the new, dangerous stage"of Mao's
"anti-Soviet policy."
January 5: PRAVDA promotes a world CP conference in its editorial -- "Clear
Aims, Bold Plans" -- and in an article by Polish Politburo member Loga-
Sowinski, who adds that the convocation of the conference should not be
dependent on whether or not the CCP or any other part attends it.
French pro-Chinese Communist dissident L'HUM?ANITE NOUVELLE publishes
first installment in French of the purported `programmatic pamphlet" of an
underground "Bolshevik CPSU" published by the Albanians December 20.
(Belgian pro-Chinese dissident organ LA VOIX DU PEUPLE began serialization
Dec. 30.)
The 37-year-old program director of the Moscow State Circus, Eduard
Ruschat, defects from the touring circus in Nuremberg, West Germany, and
requests political asylum: it is granted Jan. 19.
January 5 and following: Chinese media continue to charge Soviet collusion
with U.S. imperialism.
January 5, 13, 17, 20: Tirana Radio continues to broadcast to Poland
excerpts from the purported "'document of the Provisional CC of the Polish
CP" which it began on Dec. 30. (See also Jan 24)
January 6 & 8: Vladimirov article in TRUD paints grim picture of living
conditions in Mao's China. He also notes "the fallacy of Chinese propa-
ganda allegations that the CR is spearheaded against the bourgeoisie. China
still has some 1.2 million capitalists who still receive large sums from
the state as compensation for their seized capital...." PRAVDA on the 8th
goes farther to say that "thus far, only the bourgeoisie ... has not been
affected... F'
January 8: Reuters article in London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH from a special
correspondent in Vienna cites East European sources for a report that the
Chinese seized two Soviet SA-2 guided missile units in transit to Hanoi
last spring and used or copied some of their sophisticated electronic
equipment for their own program. (See Chinese reaction Jan 21-22.)
The CPSU/CC releases the text of an 8500-word "decision" on prepara-
tions for the 50th anniversary of the "Great October Socialist Revolution."
Boasting of great successes, it concedes no difficulties within the USSR
or in the ICM. It asserts that "the 50-year history has proved the correct-
ness and vitality of M-L," -- and makes no explicit reference to the bitter
polemical warfare with the Chinese over the true meaning of M-L, though it
does say "any attempts to replace M-L with pseudorevolutionary phraseology
and dogmas are inevitably a failure." Claiming "the widest,, most represen-
tative and just democracy of all," it assigns anniversary tasks to the USSR
10 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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Academy of Sciences, the Boards of the USSR writers, artists, composers,
film workers, journalists," and even the Union of Sport Societies and
Organizations!"
January 9, 11, 23, 25: The Chinese and Indonesians continue their diplo-
matic warfare, including:
On the 9th, a Chinese Foreign Ministry note "'hereby lodges the strongest
protest" against the "atrocities of intensifying persecution and eviction
of Chinese nationals."' (It adds that "the I. Govt is just actively playing
the role of an anti-Chinese flunkey in order to get rewards from the U.S.
and the Soviet Union."
-? On the 23rd, the I. Govt expels aChinese Assistant Naval Attache
apparently for conduct at a festival "endangering the relations between
the two countries."
-- On the 25th, the Chinese expel an I. Asst Military Attache.
January 10: A Yugoslav CC plenum reaffirms its position that conditions
are not ripe for an international CP conference.
Italian CP daily L'U1iITA feature by the Party's Sinologist Giuseppe
Boffa says that although dissent over such questions as the Great Leap,
communes, and military organization had long been simmering in CCP, the
current crisis was precipitated at a CC meeting late in the spring of 1966
when Peng Chen criticized Mao and Lin Piao's foreign policy and about half
the CC members sided with him. Boffa claims major issues were: (a) Peng
advocated joint action with USSR for united front in Vietnam; (b) Peng,
Liu, and Teng called for Party control of the Cultural Revolution; and (c)
the latter opposed Lin Piao's urge to promote the international scope of
Maoism. Boffa says that Liu, Teng and Pend; are by no means pro-Soviet but
must have come to realization that China can not fight simultaneously
against American imperialism and her o-vm "natural allies," the USSR and
other socialist countries.
Japanese CP daily AKAHATA announces the expulsion of 3 more senior ~"
members on charges such as "acting as an agent for a certain foreign party.
January 10, 13, 16, 18, 27: The multi-faceted problems of the Soviets in
their relations with the Indonesian regime is evident in a series of docu-
ments:
--- On the 10th, the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT denounces "the obvious inten-
sification of political and economic relations between the Soviet revi-
sionist leaders and the I. fascist regime, which "'proves" that they are
"the friends of the assassins of the I. Communists and patriots".
-- On the 13th in PRAVDA and on the 16th over Radio Peace and Progress,
the Soviets decry the "anti-Communist hysteria" in I. and recent moves to
the right, including agreements opening the door to U.S. private investments.
11 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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-- On the 18th a N5FM TIMES article by two Soviet journalists who recently
visited I. cites opinions expressed there by some people that the coup
attempt "was the outcome of provogstions by Western counterespionage and
Peking," while others, "without tduChing on the question of possible pro-
vocation, linked the cause of the;tragic events in I. with the direct inter-
ference of the Chinese leaders in-the internal affairs of that country."
-- PRAVDA on the 27th denounces Arlw,r Dharma, the former Moscow corres-
pondent of the PKI daily HARIAN RAKJAT who was expelled last September
(and who found asylum in Peking) of "slandering the Soviet people and dis-
torting the policies of the SovGovt in an attempt to turn the readers of
HR against everything Soviet." (NC 1A publicized a long Dharma statement
denouncing the Soviets on Oct. 5, #`''.)
January 11: TASS Algiers reports the signing of a contract under which
"a large group of Soviet oil and gas specialists will come to Algeria to
work for the National Society of Oil and Gas Transportation."
January 11 and continuing: NCNA reports the arrival in Peking of an Albanian
military delegation headed by Minister of Defense and Politburo member
Balluku, at the invitation of Comrade Lin Piao, -- but Lin is not reported
in any contact with them, while Chou En-lai heads the Chinese delegation at
the reception. An Albanian political delegation headed by Politburo member
Kapo arrives on the 13th. Chou hosts at a banquet for both delegations on
the 14th, -- but still no report of Lin. (The Albanians are reported meet-
ing with Mao after the end of the period.)
January 12: Djakarta Radio announces the capture of two more former PKI
leaders.
January 13 & 26: Soviet media imply Chinese interest in collusion with the
U.S., e.g.:
-- On the 26th, TASS New York comment on the ''secret meetings" between the
U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Warsaw, concluding: "A guarded exchange
is said to have been made last year to avoid a direct encounter over Vietnam.
January 15: NCNA Peking publicizes a new statement of "revolutionary Afro-
Asian writers, journalists, and freedom fighters from 20 A--A countries and
regions" which "strongly condemned" Soviet-engineered preparations in Cairo
for a "bogus 'Third A-A Writers Conference!"' (See #9, Dec. 17 for the
first statement.)
NCNA Peking: "The Political Science and Law Association of China
sends a protest cable to the International Assn of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
12 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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stating the refusal of the Chinese Lawyers to attend its 20th anniversary
commemorative meeting and international inquiry meeting on 20 and 22 Janu-
ary 1967 in Paris, and lodged a strong protest" against conspiracy and
Soviet manipulation. The last straw apparently came with the decision to
T"openly invite a UNESCO representative to attend: "This has crudely exposed
the ugly features of the IADL and the UN working hand in glove."
January 16-17: Chinese Foreign Ministry sends a note to the Indian
Embassy protesting a large number of Indian troop and air intrusions into
Chinese territory in 1966. Next day NCNA accuses the "Indian reactionaries"
of "scheming to rig up an anti-Chinese alliance in southeast Asia,"
--
"at the bidding of their backstage masters, U.S. imperialism and the Soviet
revisionist leading group."
January 17-18: Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny make an "unofficial friendly
visit" to Warsaw, where they re-state "full identity of views" with Polish
leaders on the world situation and the WCM.
January 18: Italian CP daily L'UNITA explains (regarding a reader's ques-
tion) that the Chinese do not permit it to have a correspondent in China,
while they accredit as "Italy's Communist correspondent" an unknown and
poorly informed reporter of the pro-Chinese NUOVA UNITA and have even
approved recent applications for accreditation of some other Italian papers,
such as CORRIERE DELLA SERA, "organ of Milan industrialists."
NCNA Damascus: "The Chinese trade union delegation to the third meet-
ing of the International Trade Union Committee in Solidarity with the
Workers and People of Aden withdrew from the conference this morning,
because the USSR and the WFTU, which controlled the conference, illegally
deprived the Chinese delegation of the right to speak."
January 21: AKAHATA reveals the Japanese CP's sensitivity to guilt by
association with the CR: "Liberal-Democratic candidates now campaigning
for the coming general elections are saying: 'Think of the Red Guards in
China. If the JCP should be in power, Japan would be like China today."'
It concludes: "We can say that we will not adopt the method which China
is following today."
A communique on 2-day talks between Italian CP SecyGen Longo and Yugo-
slav boss Tito at the latter's residence in Brioni acknowledges that they
"paid particular attention to an exchange of views on current problems of
the contemporary ICM" and the talks "showed the existence of full mutual
understanding."
PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on "the 18th anniversary of the founding of
the Laotian People's Liberation Army" says: "They have grasped the most
effective weapon to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. This weapon is
Chairman Mao's thought on people's war."
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January 21-22: With an NCNA commentary on the 21st and a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article next day, the-Chinese blast the story on Chinese hi-
jacking of Soviet missiles carried by the London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH on Jan. 8
see above "The Soviet revisionist leading group is spreading shameless
lies through the Western press about China's 'pirating' of Soviet missiles
sent to aid Vietnam.... The pun ose of this is to belittle our great
achievement in guided missile--nuear weapon test and to besmirch the good
international reputation now enjoyed by the CPR." (NCNA)
East German ADN and NEUES DEU'SCHLAND publicize a long "Appeal by the
Committee for Preparation of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October
Socialist Revolution." The adulatory document in one passage contrasts the
SED to "the attitude of that group of leaders of the CCP," saying: "Suc-
cesses in the building of socialism are only possible in fraternal coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union and the rest of socialist countries."
January 22: Western correspondents describe a Moscow police action to
break up a demonstration by 50 young Russians protesting the arrest last
week of four other young persons, "understood to be facing investigation
on possible charges of spreading anti-Soviet material." The demonstrators
had gathered at the statue of Pushkin and unfurled banners calling for
the repeal of "the unconstitutional Article 70" (of the Criminal Code,
providing for a prison sentence of up to 10 years for "anti-Soviet agita-
tion and propaganda").
January 23: TANYUG Peking reports the appearance of posters announcing
the formation of "a revolutionary CP of Bolsheviks" in the USSR, a similar
party in Poland, and an "M-L group" in Yugoslavia.
A Soviet-U.S. agreement on reciprocal air service is signed.
January 2l: Japanese CP daily AKAHATA, seizing as a pretext a passage from
a Peking wall newspaper that "the revisionist JCP refused to accept"
amendments proposed by Mao to a draft communique on the visit of a Miya-
moto-led JCP delegation in March 1966, tells a revealing "inside story'
of Mao's crude last--minute effort to browbeat them into accepting the
inclusion in the communique of a denunciation of the CPSU leadership, "and,
furthermore, a stand of a united front against the U.S. and the USSR,"
-- after a satisfactory draft had been carefully worked out to accommodate
the differing views of the two parties and accepted by the CCP delegation
of Chou En-lai, Peng Chen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i, and Liao Cheng-chih.
"The center of the disagreement ... was not simply whether strug-
gles should be organized against 'Soviet revisionism' but whether a
revolutionary double-faced policy should be pursued toward the CPSU
leadership --- which is now being forced to take a double-faced atti-
tude in the face of the ferocious escalation of U.S. imperialism's
aggression in Vietnam and under pressure from the international anti-
imperialist forces -- so that their activities for an anti-imperialist
united front can be encouraged and, at the same time, their misbehavior
14 (WCA Chronq Cont.)
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can be criticized, or whether a stand should be taken to regard the
CPSU leadership as an enemy as ferocious as U.S. imperialism, thereby
forming a united front against both the U.S. and the Soviet Union."
'y... At the eleventh hour Mao in his 'bitter criticism' tried to
force the Chinese views on our Party.... The only and they main reason
why they have insultingly called our Party 'revisionist' is that our
Party delegation did not give unconditional approval to Comrade Mao
Tse-tung's arguments...."
The Japanese press gives heavy play to the article.
While PRAVDA again rejoices in "world Communist support" of the CPSU,
LITERATLWTAYA GAZETA carries stories of Chinese oppression of the Moslem
peoples of Sinkiang told by four Kazakhs who recently escaped across the
border to the USSR. One tells how, in the Chinese drive for forced assimi-
lation, "young Kazakh, Uighur, and Kirgiz girls are taken away from their
parents and forced under penalty of death to marry Chinese."
NCNA Peking: "PEOPLE'S DAILY today carries an article entitled 'Let
Johnson Weep' written by a group of Red Guards commenting on 'the recent
stinking State of the Union message by U.S. robber chieftain Johnson.''"
After shrilly denouncing those passages aimed toward conciliation with
China, it says:
7`'3ut the Soviet revisionist leading group valued it so highly
that they published it in their press, accompanied by pictures of
J. smiling, to boost him. There is nothing strange in this, for U.S.
imperialism and Soviet revisionism are birds of a feather....
We shall not only undertake the Chinese revolution, but also under-
take the world revolution.... Be it U.S. imperialism or Soviet
revisionism...."'
Tirana Radio reports that "Enver Hoxha ... has received a greetings
message from Kazimierz Szyman (phonetic), SecyGen of the provisional CC of
the Polish CP."
January 21+-31: Soviet President Podgorny's visity to Italy, including a
talk with the Pope on the 30th, does not reveal any unexpected results,
but causes minor demonstrations for and against (including bomb explosions).
L'UNITA article initialed by PCI foreign specialist Pajetta on the 28th
takes strong exception to IZVESTIYA articles on visit, especially one
lauding the Fiat firm. "It can happen aywhere that a superficial, hasty
journalist knocks out an unfortunate article and writes, let us call it
by its name, a piece of stupidity.... But (we) ... say to IZVESTIYA with
brotherly frankness: 'Dear comrades, this time you are quite mistaken.'"
January 25: A Moscow article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES summarizes evidence
that a high-level Cuban trade delegation which has been in Moscow since Oct.
30 is having difficulty reaching agreement with the Soviets on a new 1-year
trade pact.
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January 21 and continuing: Cino--Soviet relations plunge to a ner low as a
result of the Chinese blow-.up of a new incident of ':cloo~'y Soviet repres
lion of Chinese students.'' (See March?4, 1965, and continuing:for:earlier
case.) It begins at noon on the 25th as a group of 69 Chinese students
returning from Europe to face the Cat mount a demonstration at the Lenin
I?ausoleum in Red Square. According to Soviet accounts,, they ''took out
booklets with quotations from Mao Tse-tung and, on command, raised them
over their heads and began shouting anti-Soviet slogans.` ?-?hen the militia
(police) tried to get them to move on and stop blocking entrance to the
mausoleum, "they began insulting Soviet citizens standing nearby and caus-
ing unrest,`' going 'so far as to strike a woman in the face'.` and "stomping
on'' another. According to the Chinese Embassy protest, as the peaceful
Chinese "began to read aloud quotations from Chairman P.ao Tse--tung after
standing in silence, Soviet troops and police pushed and beat up the women
students among them. Then, as the Chinese students turned to sing. the
Internationale, a large number of Soviet troops,, .!policerien, and plainclothes-
ment attacked them. from all sides and beat them up, thus committing a s
serious, shocking, and bloody incident." The note declares that Soviet
Vice Foreign Minister Firyubin, who finalll,r received the Chinese Embassy
charge d'affaires at 1920 in the evening after stalling; hire off all after--
noon,, keeping him standing outside on the lawn more than an hour, "made a
verbal statement which reversed right and wrong," and "even had the cheek
to lodge a protest with the Chinese :anbassy."
A Chinese Foreign ,'inistry statement next day expands the incident in
the most "undiplomatic" language :
"... Listen, you chieftains of Soviet revisionism, Brezhnev, Iosygin,
and the like: all those who suppress student movements, all those who
enforce fascist rule over the people, and all those who betray the
revolution will core to no good end! The German, Italian, and Japanese
fascists ... Chiang Kai-shek ... t ,aeT.gaar.... Kautsky ... Khrushchev
came to no good end.-, and. you will definitely come to no good end
either! This is not the first time that Chinese students have shed
their blood in the streets of Moscow.... All these debts must be
repaid in full!"
,P..ZOPLE' S DAILY editorial, ":zit Back Hard'" on the 27th uses the most
inflammatory language yet:
"... Listen, you handful of filthy Soviet revisionist swine. The
Chinese people ... are not to be bullied!"
Blatantly appealing again for "the Soviet people to rise in rebellion,",
it concludes:
"We believe that the brilliant red banner of M-L, the thought of
Mao Tse-tung, will one day be fluttering high over lied Square and in
the Homeland of the October Revolution! ... Long live the all-conquering
thought of Mao Tse-tung!"4
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Simultaneously, massive round the"?cloc'.L demonstrations around the Sov
iet l'mbassy in Peking are continuing on into February. As Prague's CTK
correspondent reports from Peking on the 27th:
"Tine general wave of anti `.soviet hatred is being stirred up b-r
leaflets spread all over the city asserting that 'scores of Chinese
students were killed and wounded' in Moscow. The fanatical crowds
are chanting: Tooth for tooth, blood for blood."
A Soviet Foreign Ministry press conference on the 28th emphasizes the
planned, provocative nature of the incident, denies the Chinese version of
events, and adds that before their train was very far out of Moscow, all
but five of the 20 bandaged students had "apparently gotten tired of the
bandages and plaster" and removed them.
The Chinese hold an unuurecedented Dress conference in i..oscowr also on
the 28th, excluding the Soviet press? to display "one of the wounded Chi-
nese students" and tell his lurid story. they also present the "chief
surgeon of the neurosurgery section of the 'anti--imperialist' hospital'' in
Peking who flew to Moscow especially to treat the wounded students and who
gives grim reports on the extent of injuries.
On the 28th,, :`."C'_ A Ea hdad reports a new fascist atrocity when "more
than 30 Soviet thugs streamed out of the -embassy and ... furiously beat
up" a group of 10 Chinese students and an `C:'A correspondent ,who had gone
there to read a letter of protest. A Chinese Foreign Ministry protest on
the 30th emphasizes that this 'blatant atrocity" eras committed "outside
Soviet territory and in the capital of an Asian country": thus it is "also
a serious provocation ain:_t th eoLle of Asia."
And ',CINTA Paris on the 30th describes a brutal and bloody assault by
French police on a group of 4. Chinese in Paris who were going in an
orderly fashion'' to lodge a protest note at the Soviet ?:,Tbassyr on the 27th.
1S girls, -sere beaten up ... some grounded in the
"All 19 of them, including
head and bled and others suffered internal injuries.... The French E')-bassy
in Peking joins the Soviet and Yugoslav as a target for hostile demonstra
Lions, with all Chinese employees out on strike., -. though the crowds are
smaller and the slogans less insulting!
(Chinese anti-Soviet demonstrations and attacks in Peking grows so
insulting and threatening that the SovGovt decides after end of the period
to evacuate by air about three fourths of their personnel.)
January 26: N. Korean agency KCLTA issues an ''authorized' statement in
English:
"Red Guard papers, wall papers, and handbills in Peking and other
parts of China have recently been 2i,.aking the false propaganda that
something like a 'coup' brokeao-dt-.,uid political unrest has been created
in our country....
17 (?.!CA Chrono Cont.)
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In this connection, h~C''A declares that the propaganda spread
the Red Guard papers, wall papers, and. handbills of China is totally
groundless fabrication... an intolerable slander against the Party,
government, people, and people's army of our country...."
TASS publicizes this in embroidered form on the 27th.
TT. Vietnam party daily NIAIT DAN condemns and denies the "odious slander
by the imperialists" with their "false report that China had hi~a~ eked
missiles sent by the Soviet Union to help the Vietnamese," who "have always
enjoyed the unreserved support and the great and heartfelt assistance of
the Soviet Union., China, and the other brotherly socialist countries."
A Soviet LIFE ABROAD article taunts the CPR again for its toleration
and use of the colonies of Pacao and. Bonn, Yong on its territory.
January 27: AAiA.TA denounces a radio Peking broadcast to Japan on the
25th, `'with the general elections near at hand," by a Peking -residing rene-
ade Japanese Communist who "slandered the autonomous and independent stand
of the JCP."
January 8: A Soviet Govt statement bears down heavily in w,Tarning, of the
growth of '`neo -Nazi and militarist forces" in Germany and demanding
steps by the Bonn Govt to cut them back. The Bonn Govt denies the charges
in a mildly worded reply.
January 28-31: Yugoslav President Tito meets with top Soviet leaders in a
visit to i-Soscow: the communique says only that they "exchanged opinions
... in a frank and friendly atmosphere.''
January 29. Cuban Prime hinister Castro announces plans for a Cuban new
society" based on collective farming units and state care of children from
the age of one month: children will spend only week-ends with their parents,
thus freeing women for productive ?Bore.
Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress cites the Sudanese press as condemn-?
ing the Chinese for economic cooperation with the racist regime in South
Africa. `The magazine quotes the following figures: the Chinese trade
balance with SA from 1961 to 1963 was 3 million pounds, in 1964, 7 million,
and in 1965, 10 million. Last year the figure increased 1.5 times.''
Belgrade BORBA says on the Chinese CR that it has "now probably entered
one of its final phases -- with prospects that political power will remain
at the mouth of the gun barrel. Same issue carries an article reviewing
'indications that the Sino Soviet dispute about their long border is
reviving.`
January 30; The Czech Govt begins the trial of Czech born American travel
agent Kazan-.Komarek who was taken fromaa Soviet airline diverted from a
EM:ioscow- Copenhagen flight to an unscheduled Prague landing W, P? 15) on
charges of anti-Government activities in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
(After the end of the period, he is convicted, sentenced to 8 years in pri-
son, and then expelled with suspended sentence.)
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1096. AAPSO's Problems:
Council Meeting in Nicosia
25X1C10b
SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) The 8th Council session of the Cairo-
based, non-governmental Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO) in Nicosia, Cyprus (13-17 February 1967) may well lead to a
split in the AAPSO movement -- similar to the one that has already
occurred in the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau (see BPG 196, Item #1048,
dated 1 August 1966) -- a split which would turn AAPSO, Sino-Soviet
tension-ridden for several years, into a sham organization. Since the
organization's inception, the Soviets, the Chinese and the Egyptians
have exerted decisive influence in its policy-making Council but, in
recent years, bitter Sino-Soviet feuding has seriously impeded AAPSO's
organizational and other activities, and has disappointed and angered
those Afro-Asians who support it for the attainment of constructive
goals. It is important to recall that Egyptian alignment with the Sov-
iets in the AAWB was a determining factor last year in the splitting
of that organization which had come under Chinese control in 1962: in
a Soviet-engineered, Egyptian-backed AAWB "extraordinary" meeting in
Cairo last June, the AAWB secretariat was transferred from Colombo to
Cairo and the Chinese subsequently announced the transfer of the AAWB
secretariat to Peking.
Chinese Have Lost Ground. Until about a year ago, Soviet and Chi-
nese influences in AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat in Cairo had been
roughly balanced. The Chinese then lost ground after the departure from
the Secretariat to Peking of the Indonesian delegate, following the
coup in Indonesia, and after a more recent split in AAPSO's Japanese
affiliate which formerly was a supporter of the Chinese line in AAPSO.
As a result, the Soviets have gained an upper hand in the Secretariat
(run by an Egyptian secretary-general, Yusuf el Sibai) but they by no
means control it outright. After protracted search for a Council meet-
ing site, Nicosia was chosen where, significantly, the host AAPSO affi-
liate and the general atmosphere favor the Soviets. The Chinese have
opposed the Nicosia site to no avail. Originally, the Council meeting
was to be held in Tanzania, but the Tanzanians postponed the September
1966 date and later signified that they would prefer not to host the
meeting, apparently being concerned about the prospects of a Sino-Soviet
feud in their country.
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* (1096 Cont.)
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Major Areas of Conflict. Sino-Soviet views can be expected to clash
on matters of (1) representation, (2) agenda, and (3) the site of the
Fifth AAPSO Conference.
(1) Representation. Delegates from AAPSO's affiliates will be eli-
gible, representing as the case may be ruling and opposition parties,
exile groups and a few militants representing nobody but themselves. In
some instances (such as Ceylon, Kenya, Japan, South Africa, possibly Ghana
and others) the Council may have to decide which faction, the pro-Soviet
or the pro-Chinese, to admit. (The Tri-Continent Conference (AALAPSO) in
Havana in January 1966 had to decide which of two Indonesian delegations
to seat.) As at all front meetings, an array of observers will attend --
from other pro-Soviet and/or pro-Chinese front organizations, the European
Communist countries, and, given the Tri-Continent Solidarity concept, from
Latin America.
(2) Agenda. The agenda will deal foremost with the struggle against
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism (headed by U.S. imperialism)
and for national liberation, etc. -- the standard militant bill of fare
of Communist fronts, and particularly of AAPSO, which has no functional
charter whatever. It will address itself to the problems of the imperial-
ist policy of war and aggression (particularly in Vietnam), foreign mili-
tary bases, aggressive military pacts, etc. and also to AAPSO's organiza-
tion and prospective Fifth Conference
(3) Fifth AAPSO Conference. In the unlikely event that the recogni-
tion of delegations or delegates or agenda matters ("substance") should
be dealt with relatively smoothly, the question of the next Conference
site can hardly be resolved without an unprecedented clash in AAPSO. The
4th AAPSO Conference held in Winneba, Ghana in 1965 decided that the Fifth
Conference should be held in Peking in 1967 -- a decision which the Chinese
naturally defend to the best of their ability and with all the means avail-
able to them. The Soviets and Indians have announced that they will not
attend a Conference in Peking, and the Nicosia Council meeting will deal
with a request for change of venue from several AAPSO affiliates*. The
Soviet supporters argue in favor or a neutral site where conditions would
be more conducive to holding a Conference without a bitter Sino-Soviet
struggle -- a partially valid argument but not a realistic proposal, con-
sidering the difficulty in finding any other meeting place acceptable to
all concerned. Even if a site is found, it may be difficult to induce the
host government to offer it. (END UNCLASSIFIED)
*Among others: India, UAR, Cameroun, Nigeria, Madagascar, Angola, South
Africa, Senegal, Gambia.
2
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(1096 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
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 Approved For Release 1999~A-RDP78-03061 A000400070008-4
25X1C10b
(USIA) Lavalle Report, summarized in Circular Airgram 4254,
December 5, 1966
CA 7468, January 23, 1966 on the Tri-Continental Conference.
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+~ (1096. )
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 CIA-F P78-03061 A00046d0l6bWr8v 41967
1097. MARSHALL PLAN: 20TH ANNIVERSARY
25X1C10b
"The emerging spirit of confidence is precisely what
we hoped to achieve when we went to work a generation
ago to help rebuild Europe. We face new challenges
and opportunities there -- and some dangers. But I
believe it is the underlying will of the peoples on
both sides of the Atlantic that we continue to face
them together." -- President Lyndon B. Johnson,State
of the Union Message, 10 January 1.967
SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED): In a speech delivered 5 June 1947, Secre-
tary of State George C. Marshall proposed a European-sponsored program of
foreign aid, self-help, and mutual assistance, aimed at restoring a war-
ravaged Europe to its feet economically. As the U.S. Department of Commerce*
noted five years after the Marshall Plan had begun:
"Postwar recuperation of the European economic structure was hindered
by the continued political and economic encroachment of the USSR into
Central and Eastern Europe, at the expense of an integrated, balanced
European economy. Russia prevented the economic unification of Germany
and precluded the return of Germany as a full working-partner in the
European economy. Two years after the surrender of Germany, such re-
covery as had been accomplished was facilitated by assistance from the
United States Government....
"The proposal put forth by Secretary Marshall underlined the position
of the United States in support of the drafting of a joint agreement
as to goals and methods for a period of from 3 to 4 years. The USSR
declined to.associate with the United Kingdom and France in framing a
reply to the Marshall proposal. The latter two countries issued invi-
tations to all other European countries (except Spain) to attend a
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(1097 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/MMiIA-RDP78-03061 A000400070008-4
conference in Paris. Because the Eastern European countries under
Russian influence decided not to take part, the conference was un-
able to deal with the problem of Europe as a whole, as envisaged
in the original proposal. Nonetheless, the 16 countries* partici-
pating organized the Committee of European Economic Cooperation and
submitted a report to the United States in September 1947 setting
forth their needs and their willingness to cooperate in a joint re-
covery program. It
In late June 1947 the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France,
and the USSR (Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov) had met in Paris to discuss
the Marshall proposal. The Soviet delegation first charged that the
"steering committee" suggested by Britain and France would "meddle in
the internal affairs of sovereign nations," and even before the Big
Three meeting broke up on 3 July PRAVDA alleged that the Marshall Plan
was a, scheme to prolong the postwar boom in the United States and on 29'
June TASS described the aid proposal as another instance of "American
imperialism."
Czechoslovakia, which had at first agreed to attend the Europe-wide
conference in Paris to consider the recovery plan, withdrew after its
Premier and Foreign Minister had been summoned to Moscow. Poland, which
had also signified its intention of participating in the Plan, later re-
canted. Then on 6 July PRAVDA announced the establishment of the Cominform
in Belgrade representing Communists of nine countries** and six days later
the Soviet Government negotiated trade, aid, and barter agreements with its
satellite states in Eastern Europe, later to become known as the "Molotov
Plan." The dichotomy of European recovery efforts was completed on 22 Oc-
tober when Andrei Zhdanov, speaking for the Cominform, called on Communists
everywhere to defeat the Marshall Plan, which he denounced as an "instru-
ment for world domination by American imperialism."
The 16 nations of free Europe were not daunted by the Communist propa-
ganda barrage, however, and on 16 April 1948 they formally established the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); the zones of Germany
occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France, along with the
Free Territory of Trieste, were included in the OEEC. The same month the
U.S. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA) to furnish means
for covering such essential import needs of the participating countries for
commodities and equipment as could not be financed by their own efforts, and
*The countries comprised Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
**The USSR, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania.
2
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(1097 Cont.)
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to support those measures of self and mutual help on the part of the par-
ticipating countries which were necessary to achieve true economic recovery.
Actually the $12.5 billion dollar total expenditure on the Marshall
Plan for Europe is only a portion of a much bigger and continuing effort
on the part of the United States to contribute to the economic viability
of Europe since World War II. During the period from July 1945 to March
1961 non-military U.S. Government aid in grants and credits for European
recovery totaled twice that sum; of this,$6.7 billion went to the United
Kingdom,$5.3 billion to France, $3.7 billion to West Germany, $3 billion
to Italy, $966 million to the Netherlands, and $703 million to Belgium.
Perceptive Europeans recognize this aid, not as a gift for which they
must forever carry a burden of gratitude, but as vivid proof of America's
own interest in a free and prosperous Europe.
In retrospect, France provides some excellent illustrations of what
too many other people may have forgotten about the Marshall Plan -- and
U.S. aid in general -- over the years. Sisley Huddleston, the English-
born correspondent of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, THE LONDON TIMES, and
other British papers in Paris before and after World War II, recalls in his
book (see attached excerpt) that the turning point in French recovery after
the War was the application of this Plan, for "had America deserted Europe,
had she not behaved with enlightened generosity, Europe would long ago gone
Bolshevik."
Today, President de Gaulle implies that the aid program of two decades
ago was merely a passing phase of U.S. manipulation of Europe for its own
selfish purposes. According to the semi-official French news agency AFP,
de Gaulle told a meeting of the Institute of Higher Studies of National De-
fense in Paris on 20 January 1967:
"The policy of the United States with regard to Europe has passed
through three phases. First there was the Yalta phase: the United
States, stiZZ at war with Japan, wanted to keep its hand free in the
Pacific and it gave the USSR a free hand in Europe. Then there was
the second phase: Japan was beaten and the United States perceived
its mistake and realized that Europe could become a threat to the
United States. So the United States reversed its policy; this was
the time of the Marshall Plan, NATO, and so forth.
"Finally, there is the third phase, the one which is taking place
under our eyes. The United States again wants to have a free hand
in the Pacific to settle the Vietnam problem, to continue its policy
in the Philippines, to support Japan against Communist China, and so
forth. It would Zike to conclude a gentleman's agreement with the
Soviets. But there is a new fact: West Europe exists, and a stable
Europe must be centered around this Europe* in order to arrive at a
*The AFP dispatch noted at this point that another version of de Gaulle's
statement at the Paris meeting was "a united Europe must be made up of all
the countries of Europe..."
3
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$EW6041 (1097 Cont.)
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tripoZar world of Europe, the United States, and Asia. As for
West Europe's economic policy with regard to the satellite fringe,
business is business. We can imagine that the Americans, once
free of the Vietnamese problem, will also act so that business
will be business in their relations with these countries."
President de Gaulle might well have remembered, in this connection,
another statement* made as recently as 29 July 1963 when he told a press
conference:
"As for the Franco-American alliance which has existed since the
time of Washington, Franklin, LaFayette, DeGrasse, and Rochambeau,
and which was brought to full fruition during the First World War
in 1917-1918 and during the Second one beginning in December 1941,
it is a fact that it still exists today and that everything requires
the two countries to maintain it. As long as, in effect, the Soviet
bloc arrays itself before the free world, capable of suddenly sub-
merging this or that territory and animated by a dominating and de-
testable ideology, it will be necessary for people on both sides of
the Ocean who wish to defend themselves to be linked together in
order to accomplish this." (End UNCLASSIFIED)
For the full text of de Gaulle's statement see Andre Passeron, "De Gaulle
Parle," Fayard, Paris, 1966.
4
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(1097 Cont.)
25X1C10b
 25X1C10b
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REFERENCES
Books:
U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Aid by the United States Government
1940-1951," GPO, 1952 (pp. 56-62 on European Recovery Program)
Warren C. Baum, "The Marshall Plan and French Foreign Trade," pp. 382-402
iri articles edited by Edward M. Earle, "Modern France," Princeton
University Press, 1951.
Sisley Huddleston, "France -- The Tragic Years," Kevin-Adair, New York,
1956 (see attached excerpt from pp. 339-341).
Legislative Reference Service of Library of Congress, "Some Important
Issues in Foreign Aid," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1966
(history of the U.S. program with charts and tables).
David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy," Praeger,
New York, 1966 (contains a collection of annotated documents and
speeches).
David Ormsby-Gore, "Must the West Decline?" Columbia University Press,
1966 (former British Ambassador discusses economic, political, and
military unification to meet Communist challenge).
Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, "The Truman Administration: A
Documentary History," Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
25X1C10b
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(1097.)
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1098 WH..
GUATEMALA: Free Government
Vs. Guerrillas
25X1C10b
SITUATION: An unclassified attachment to this paper provides a
background report on the political situation in Guatemala since the
inauguration of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro on 1 July 1966.
In brief, the main points are: The Mendez government came to power by
free, democratic elections, despite widespread opposition from conser-
vative military leaders. Shortly after his inauguration, Mendez made
a determined effort to effect internal peace by offering amnesty to
the Communist guerrilla forces which have plagued the country for years.
However, the Communists refused the amnesty offer and launched a new
campaign of terrorism. At the same time right-wing extremists, charg-
ing that Mendez was favoring the far left, unleashed their own campaign
against the Communists and the government.
The government struck back hard at both extremes, despite predic-
tions from all sides of its imminent overthrow. A state of siege was
declared on 2 November, most of the leaders of the extreme right were
arrested, and the army sent troops into the mountain hideouts of the
Communist guerrilla forces. The campaign against the Communists has
been the most determined and the most effective of any undertaken in
recent years and it has produced encouraging results: a number of
guerrilla leaders have been killed or captured, heretofore undisturbed
rebel bases have been overrun, and dissension among the various Commu-
nist groups has grown.
To counteract the government campaign, Cuba has increased its
efforts to support the guerrillas. Speeches from Havana, encouraging
the rebels, have accompanied increased efforts to smuggle arms into
Guatemala, and the training of Guatemalans in Cuban guerrilla schools
continues apace. To obtain funds for the rebellion, the Communists
have resorted to robbery and kidnaping, thus reinforcing their charac-
terization as bandits, not liberators.
The turmoil caused by the extremists of both right and left has not
significantly reduced Guatemala's capacity to expand its economy and
ameliorate the privations of most of its citizens. One of the most
harmful results has been the flight of capital abroad, but this is
decreasing. Nevertheless Mendez Montenegro has vigorously pushed the
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(1098 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999MIA-RDP78-03061 A000400070008-4
preparation of an economic development plan and has actively searched
for support of this plan within the framework of the Alliance for Pro-
gress. It is noteworthy that Mendez has received strong support from
neighboring nations, particularly Mexico.
25X1C10b
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mw (1098.)
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1099. THE DRAFT IN THc USSR
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The basis for the Soviet draft is the Universal Compulsory
Military Service Law of 1 September 1939, as amended in June 1962. This law
sets forth: a) the procedures for conscription; b) the duration of the
military obligation (3 years in the Army; 4 or 5 years in the Air Force and
Navy); c) the reserve obligation; and d) mobilization regulations. Cur-
rently, youths register when they reach the age of 17 and they are normally
called up when they are 19. Exemptions and deferments are to be granted to
youths for medical and educational reasons, to youths whose induction would
work a hardship on their parents, and to married men with two or more chil-
dren. In 1966, as has been observed during the past several years, 800,000
were inducted into the Soviet Army during, September to December. This fig-
ure amounts to a bit less than half of the youth reaching the age of mili-
tary service in 1966. The balance were either deferred for the above-noted
reasons, or were placed in a reserve category.
Although the Soviets' draft law a ears to be egalitarian, it is carried
out in such a way that certain groups or classes are favored. For example,
sons of CP and Government officials tend to be granted a disproportionately
large share of the places in higher educational institutions, and thus they
benefit from educational deferments. They are placed in reserve during their
university years, and upon graduation serve in the ranks for a year or less,
after which they can qualify for reserve commissions.(Similar treatment was
given to educated youths in pre-1914 Germany, and this discrimination was
an object of Socialist criticism.) Another boon to the already-privileged
"New Class" youths results from the Soviets' practice of thoroughly examin-
ing a youth's papers during the pre-induction period. Only the most trust-
worthy (in effect, those whose parents are known and approved of by Party
officials) are given assignments to such desirable duty as the rocket forces.
On the other hand, it is reported that inductees whose parents are unknown
or are not members of the CP are almost all assigned to hard-sweating combat
arms such as the infantry and the engineers. In addition, there is a provis-
ion in the law for early induction of some draftees who then have a better
chance to select a preferred branch of service; this provision is reportedly
used for the benefit of the sons of the politically favored.
These inequities undoubtedly contribute to the negative attitudes which
sizable numbers of Soviet youth display towards military service. Some other
factors influencing this attitude are: the Khrushchev era's generally heavy
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IllI L! (1099 Cont.)
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emphasis on peace; the rigors of the 3- to 5-year tour of military
service*; and the admittedly sagging morale** of the troops now on
active duty.
A campaign to correct these negative attitudes has been intensi-
fied since its launching in March 1965 when N. G. Yegorychev, Moscow's
CP boss, expressed his deep concern for the "military-patriotic educa-
tion" of Soviet youth. The Komsomol (Communist Youth League) led the
campaign in 1965, and in April 1966 "military-patriotic education"
gained the strong endorsement of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The
aim of the campaign was restated in May 1966 by the chief of the Main
Political Administration of the Army and Navy, General A. A. Yepishev,
who said:
"....Serious changes in the nature of warfare ... call for
new criteria in the assessment of our entire work in preparing
youth for military service.... Personal technological preparation
has increased in importance ...; therefore the right image of mili-
tary service has to be created among the young."
The major Soviet organizations involved in this "educational" pro-
gram are the Komsomol and DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with
the Army, Air Force, and Navy). The latter organization, though "volun-
tary," has been called upon to mobilize its members for the fulfillment
of tasks which include patriotic military propaganda work. DOSAAF was
also charged, by a decree of August 1966, with a broad array of tasks for
the military indoctrination of Soviet youth. (See attachment).
Some of the devices used in this campaign are trips to battlegrounds,
mock battles between selected teams of youngsters, an expanded sports pro-
gram aimed in part to train young people "in the defense of the Homeland,"
and a marked increase in the supplies of military toys as evidenced by
their abundance on store shelves in December 1966.***
*Soviet inductees receive no leave during their three years of duty, ex-
cept for emergencies; little compassion is shown by the aloof and tough
officers and NCO's who are exceptionally rank - and class-conscious. ro
**In January 1966 Soviet marshals registered deep concern over the low
level of morale, discipline, and political indoctrination in the armed
forces. Criticism for failure in these areas was leveled primarily at
officers and professional Party and Komsomol officials in the military
establishment.
***In contrast, US toy manufacturers noted that the market for military
toys during Christmas 1966 was very disappointing.
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9A?G~ (1099 Cont.)
 dM"Or"
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Close observers of Soviet military affairs conclude that the intensity
of the Soviets' campaign is a rough measure of the severity of the problems
being encountered in conducting a draft and military training program. They
note that the Soviets' draft system functions (albeit with glaring deficien-
cies) and that the pre-induction attitude of Soviet youth is clearly nega-
tive though not so strongly so that there is a manifest resistance to draft
calls. If the Soviet press were free to shine enough light on this situa-
tion, then it is believed that informed persons the world over would be 25Xl ClO b
aware that the USSR, too, has serious problems with the military draft.
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4^i?Y?A" (1099.)
 1967
1 13 Februa'
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RECENT FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS
IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The most striking illustrations of Soviet frauds in the
foreign sphere are the forgeries which appear to have increased sharply
during late 1966. In the handling of domestic news the Soviets have con-
tinued to withhold and distort information on important developments.
Although the foreign target audiences of'Soviet forgeries differ sub-
stantially from the domestic target of Soviet propaganda, as do the
techniques employed, the objectives are the same: to gain or expand
the influence of the Soviet state by any means.
In support of their foreign propaganda program the Soviets and
their cohorts have created or inspired ad unknown number of forgeries
(probably amounting to several hundred) during the past decade. A lull
in the use of forgeries by Moscow & Co. during 1961-62 was followed by
a sharp and steady increase in their counterfeits, reaching a high point
in intensity in late 1966. Examples of recent forgeries* are:
a. Mogadiscio: A forgery making a thinly-veiled link between the
Peace Corps and US intelligence agencies and published in AL HAKIKA was
reportedly supplied by the local Novosti-staff;
b. Lusaka: Forgeries alleged that the US was planning a coup in
Zambia;
c. Beirut: A countefeit US Army document suggesting covert US
involvement in Moroccan affairs was surfaced in Lebanon;
d. Caracas: A forged letter allegedly from the US Ambassador to
a high-ranking Department of State official implied that the Ambassador
was involved in the planning of a coup in Uruguay.
*Although these recent forgeries cannot at this time and may, in fact,
never be definitively attributed to the Soviets or other Communist sources,
they nevertheless conform to the pattern of past Soviet forgeries.
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l? fl[ T (1100 Cont.)
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These examples, like other forgeries which have been observed over
the years, show that the primary Soviet aim is anti-US propaganda. Fur-
ther similarities will undoubtedly show up when current forgeries are
compared with past forgeries. For this purpose, the unclassified attach-
ment provides descriptions of Soviet forgeries which have been studied
in detail.
Assessment of 4+6 Soviet forgeries perpetrated during 1957-65 (see
references) reveals that most of them are readily detectable from abun-
dant technical errors and also from their implausibility. In spite of
these flaws, the forgeries have served some of the Soviets' interests of
the moment. With the lapse of enough time for the forgeries to be
analyzed and publicized, however, the Soviets' reputation has sometimes
been adversely affected. Soviet officials obviously believe, however,
that the gains from these forgeries more than offset the occasional
damage of their reputation.
Although it is impossible to measure the Soviets' gains and losses
from their forgeries, it is possible to shed light on the attitude which
underlies the Soviets' extensive use of forgeries. The Soviets have
shown a general contempt for objectivity and for real public opinion.
As they see it, the public's views are to be molded, not listened to;
and besides, by the Soviets' reckoning, the public's memory is short.
This manipulative outlook is clearly illustrated by Soviet internal
propaganda. A major objective of Soviet domestic propaganda is to con-
vince Soviet citizens that the Party infallibly represents the will of
the; masses who, thus, have no need for elections through which to express
their preferences. In the complementary sphere of "agitation" the Sov-
iets' objective is to mold mass opinion and to inspire the masses to
carry out their assigned tasks. With information policy guided by
these objectives, it follows that all events and statements are screened
and almost all are reported in distorted form.
The Soviet people are the most competent judges of the degree of
news distortion by USSR media. Free World visitors to the USSR have
almost invariably reported that many Soviet citizens are contemptuous of
the Soviet press. Soviet citizens have over the years told Westerners
their own joke which has it that there is no news in PRAVDA (TRUTH: the
CPSU newspaper) and no truth in IZVESTIYA (NEWS: the Government news-
paper). Rephrased, the joke confirms that Soviet propaganda and "agi-
tation" objectives are systematically pursued by withholding and modifying
news.
Some illustrations of Soviet withholding of news are:
a. the severe 1963 crop failure in the USSR, which was not reported
meaningfully in the Soviet press until well after the reading public in
the West was aware of it.
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---- - (1100 Cont.)
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b. the April 1966 earthquake in Tashkent was scantily reported at
first as having caused minimal damage, whereas subsequent reports grad-
ually expanded on the seriousness of thetdisaster and 2 months after the
event the republic CP boss Rashidov stated that 1+5,000 families had been
left homeless;
c. a majority of the numerous Soviet failures to make a soft land-
ing on the moon were unreported;
d. the influenza epidemic of 1965, which affected several million
Soviets and which accounted for a substantial part of the increase of
109,000 in Soviet mortality in that year, was barely mentioned in the
press and the severity of the epidemic was not revealed until almost 2
years had elapsed.
The usual Soviet practice of distorting the news is dramatically
illustrated by two incidents concerning the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair. A
month before the trial, IZVESTIYA broke Soviet journalistic silence on
the arrest (which had taken place 1+ months earlier) and detention of the
2 writers in an article which not only violently and abusively attacked
them but which also took quotes so far out of context that the writers'
expressions were completely distorted. This article was followed up by
published "letters to the editor 'which applauded the article's point of
view; the fabrication of such letters endorsing official policy is a
familiar tactic, more than once exposed. The second incident was the
reporting of the speech by Soviet author Mikhail Sholokhov at the 23rd
Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1966. In that speech Sholokhov, who
to all appearances was representing Soviets writers, blasted Sinyavsky
and Daniel and implied that nothing short of execution would have been
a just punishment. While Sholokhov's speech was published, subsequent
events have shown that large numbers of prominent writers had an exactly
opposite but unreported view of the justice meted out to Sinyavsky and
Daniel.
With such lack of restraint in the ianagement of domestic news, the
Soviets controlling the press can hardly be expected to restrain them-
selves in the presentation of material concerning the free world. The
Soviets' virulent press and radio treatment of President Kennedy's assas-
sination, especially during the latter part of 1966 and early 1967, is
a recent case in point. Another case is`the reduction of Truman Capote's
343-page "In Cold Blood" to a 58-page translation retitled "An Ordinary
Murder"; the shortened Russian version gives the strong impression that
premeditated murder is a commonplace in America. 25X1 C10b
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S{^e^ * (1100 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
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25X1C10b
"Communist Forgeries"; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Internal Security (by Richard Helms, then Assistant Director, CIA) on
June 2, 1961
"Communist Forgeries 1961-1964"; published 12 August 1965 (Official
Use Only)
R.N. Carew Hunt, "A Guide to Communist Jargon", The MacMillan Com-
pany, New York, 1957
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Ai?i?1?1~F (1100.)
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0 009J
ruary
mccerpt from "France -- The.Tragic Years" by' Sisley Huddleston
The turning point in French recovery was the applica-
tion of the Marshall Plan of financial and economic aid. Had
America deserted Europe, had she not behaved with enlight-
ened generosity, Europe would long ago have "gone Bol-
shevik." The Marshall Plan was the turning point for two
reasons: first, because it furnished a material basis for re-
construction; second, because it forced France to make a
choice. On the first point, it is unnecessary for me to ex-
patiate. But on the second, I will add a few reflections.
France, in my view, had, after the disillusionment of the
Liberation, lost hope. The tribulations of the war and the oc-
cupation, the violence and the injustice which accompanied.
the victory and left few families untouched, the mismanage-
ment which followed the establishment of a constitution
which was infinitely worse than the constitution of 1875, and
might easily have resulted in one-chamber government, that
is to say, in a dictatorship of the political parties which of-
fered themselves at the elections and practically forbade any
opposition, the malpractices, the scandals, the exactions, the
requisitions, the spoliations of all sorts, the division of France
into two groups of citizens, the ultrapatriots and the near
traitors, the restrictions, the controls, the excessive function-
arism, the toleration, if not the encouragement, of a black
market worse than any that flourished during the war, the
suppression of independent opinion, the refusal to pass a
generous amnesty bill, the shameful exploitation by the false
Resistants of their privileged position, the lawlessness that
declared itself in every domain of daily life, the continual
rise of the cost of living, the steady depreciation of the cur-
rency, the inadequate wages, the gross immorality reflected
in the press, the pusillanimity of the politicians, the partiality
of the radio for the Communists, the constant strikes of a
frankly revolutionary character, all these things and more
that" I might enumerate discouraged the better citizens of
France, who could be heard to say (how many times have
I heard them say it!) that France was better off under the oc-
cupation than under the succeeding governments!
France felt that she was alone, helpless, having lost her
rank among the nations, fallen into decadence, no longer a
nation, and with nothing to indicate that she could ever be
a nation again. Communism actually offered to many an es-
cape from the feeling of frustration. In these conditions, the
.CPYRGHT
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MARSHALL PLAN 20TH ANNNERSARY
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Marshall Plan was received with joy. It had a salutary e ect.
It stimulated the French. It was fought ruthlessly by the
Communists, who rightly saw that it would prevent France.
from turning completely to Bolshevism. They described the
Plan as an attempt to make France a satellite of America,
when they far preferred her becoming a satellite of Russia.
The choice had to be made, however reluctantly, by the gov-
ernments. Materially, they were compelled to choose the
American Plan, whatever its consequences, and soon they
had, by the sheer force of Communist opposition, to choose
it morally as well. The breach between Communism and
(may I call it?) Americanism grew wider every month. The
good effects of the Plan were soon felt, and any immediate
return to Communism was at last improbable.
The pact with England concluded at Dunkirk, the port by
which the English left France, paradoxically regarded as a
symbol of mutual help and of union, though it passed with-
out much notice, operated in the same sense. The Atlantic
Pact, which definitely linked up France with America, carried
the process a step farther. But I am bound for state that these
measures seemed to come too late and were always insuffi-
cient to create the full sentiment of the unity of the Western
world. The menace of Bolshevism was hardly appreciated
.for years, though it was obvious from the commencement.
The Socialists, in particular, without whom no govern-
ment could live, were slow to understand that an absolute
severing of all relations with Communism was essential: they
looked on the Communists merely as rivals for political
power. No drastic laws against a mortal enemy have yet
been taken, though it is apparent that there is a Fifth Col-
umn in France bent on sabotage, declaring openly that, in
the event of war, the Communists will refuse to fight, or
rather will fight against their own country. If it were not
tragic, it would be comic to watch the attempts to fashion Eu-
ropean unity. Three or four competing bodies have been
formed which seem chiefly designed to serve the political
ends of European "leaders," and some of these European
"leaders" do not in the least see that the first step to European
unity is the unity of their own countries. France is not yet
united; there is no full appeasement of old quarrels, no firm-
ness in dealing with dissidents. Nevertheless, there is at last
hope, and it is a hope which has its roots in the Atlantic
Pact.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
U. S. Congress
The opean Recovery Program. Basic Documents and Baekcround
Information
Senate Document III9 80 Congress, lot Session
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: C IA-RD.P7.8-03061 A0- 0040-007.0008-4
Economic I d to Europe: The Marshall Plan
New York: II. W. Wile.-on Co., 1948
htman, David
Economic Co-operation in Europe,-_ a Study of the United Nations
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States
Economic Progress and Problems of Western E oe: Third
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Benham, Frederic
'[dent Years of United States Foreign Aid 1940-1960
Economic Aid to Underdevelo_ped.Countries
Ficker, Hermann
Relations, 1964
Ward, Barbara
Now York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign
Mason, Edward S..
Price, Harry Bayard
. r21jn Aid and Foreign Policy
London: Oxford University Press, 1961
Herbert
Forai, Aid and Foreign Policy
Now York: St. Martina Press, 1964
Frank M.
Witnosn for Aid
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964
Washington: The Library of Congress, Legislative Reference
Service, March 21, 1961
The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations
Now York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962
The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press
Summers,- Robert Edward
New York: Praeger, 1956
Brown, William Adams and Opie, Redvers
American FForeitm Assistance
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1953
Brookings Institution
Senate, on Administration of U. S. Aid for a European Recovery
ProLram
Committee Print, 80 Congress, 2nd Session
Gordon, and others
Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies
Washington: Governmont Printing Office, 1950
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
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February 1967
Guatemala: Free Government versus Guerrillas
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro;` was inaugurated as President of
Guatemala on 1 July 1966. In the presidential election held in March
1966 Mendez had received a plurality of the votes cast for the three
candidates. At the same time his party, the PR (Partido Revolucionario),
won a majority in Congress. According to Guatemalan law, the Congress
picks the president if no candidate receives a clear majority in the
nationwide vote. Thus the newly elected Congress chose Mendez for the
office on 25 May and he was inaugurated at the beginning of July.
Mendez' victory was a major surprise for Guatemala since the out-
going regime of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia had strongly backed a mili-
tary candidate: Col. Juan de Dios Aguilar de Leon. In past Guatemalan
elections the "'official" candidate has always been victorious. Further-
more, military influence on Guatemalan politics is normally enough to
guarantee the success of a military candidate against a civilian. Since
1839, when the country became independent, only eight civilian presidents
could be numbered among the 26 leaders of the republic. In 145 years of
independence, Guatemala had been governed by military men for 80 years.
As might have been expected, a flurry of rumors arose after the March
elections to the effect that the military and the outgoing government
would stage a coup d'etat rather than permit Mendez to take office. It
is to the credit of Col.Peralta, however, that his government insisted on
the legality of the elections and on the right of Mendez to become president.
Communist guerrillas in Guatemala did their part in attempting to
provoke a preventive military coup by mounting a campaign of violence and
terror during the spring of 1966. Although guerrilla activities have been
going on for many years, the pace picked up during the spring and at the
same time moved onto the streets of the capital, where kidnapings, terrorist
bombings, and gunfights became almost commonplace. To counter the terrorist
campaign the Peralta government proclaimed a state of siege.
The first official act of the Mendez government after the inauguration
was to lift the state of siege, restoring all constitutional guarantees.
Shortly thereafter Mendez made an open request to the guerrillas to abandon
their opposition and reintegrate themselves into the national life. This
offer included a general amnesty for those persons who had committed po-
litical crimes since 1960 provided they turned in their arms and released
kidnapped officials.
Although the Communists had backed the Mendez candidacy in March 1966,
against the regime's candidate Aguilar, it now called the election a
"diversionist maneuver" and refused the amnesty offer.
The Communists' stepped-up campaign during the first months of the
new government aroused serious concern among the rightist extremists who
had been opposed to Mendez' inauguration. Some of them commenced a counter-
terror campaign, organizing a group calling itself the White Hand. This
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organization was suspected of having planted bombs in Guatemala City, and
three of its leaders were arrested in August for possession of arms and
subversive propaganda.
The situation appeared to be headed toward further deterioration when
President Mendez began a strenuous crackdown on both rightist and leftist
extremists. In a radio broadcast on 7 September he said that "groups of
unpatriotic persons ... are engaged actively and criminally in undermining
this nation's foundations to subvert its legality, obstruct the govern-
ment's first steps, and overthrow this government of law and moral re-
construction." He declared that the armed forces had been put on the
alert and were prepared to do what was necessary to "obtain the country's
general pacification." The crackdown was speeded up when a state of siege
was declared on 2 November 1966 (it has since been extended at least until
2 March 1967).
The government's campaign against the Communist guerrillas has been
marked by military probes inuo the mountainous areas in Northeastern
Guatemala which had previously been the home grounds of the guerrilla bands.
The campaign has been the most determined and most effective of any under-
taken by the Guatemalan army in recent years, and it has produced encourag-
ing results: several bands have been encircled in the mountains, hereto-
fore undisturbed rebel bases have been overrun, and in the cities and towns
the army and police forces have captured several bands of terrorists. The
young leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), Luis Augusto Turcios
Lima, was killed in an automobile accident early in October; there was im-
mediate speculation that he had been assassinated by a rival Communist
group, but this could not be proved. Turcios Lima's sister, Melida Turcios
Lima, was captured on 25 October 1966, his successor, Cesar Montes ap-
parently narrowly escaped capture in November, and Cesar Montes' second
in command, "Chino" Arnoldo,was killed in a clash on 24+ November 1966 in
Las Delicias.
An encouraging factor in the government's campaign has been the sup-
port accorded by the nation's peasants. On 26 November 1966 the London
Times reported that more than a thousand peasants had staged a march
through Zacapa department,scene of a major part of the guerrilla fighting,
protesting against the constant terrorism and calling for arms to fight
the guerrillas. On 2 December 1966 the Yugoslav news agency Tan jug also
reported that demonstrations in support of the government led by students
and peasants had taken place on that date.
At the same time, dissensions and divisions among the various Coirmu-
nist groups have festered. The chief guerrilla group, the FAR, had pre-
viously been led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa who heads the 13th of November
(MR-13) Movement and who had been a favorite of Fidel Castro and had re-
ceived enthusiastic support from Cuba until his guerrilla movement splintered
in 1963 with the departure of Turcios Lima. Then it became apparent that it
would be more profitable for Castro to support Turcios Lima, who was willing
to subordinate his group to the direction of the Communist Party. In his
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.peec:h at the closing sess.'.orf of the Tricontinental Conference, Castro
denounced Yon Sosa for his ties with the Trotskyites. Yon Sosa has since
then allegedly divorced himself from the Trotskyites: in a statement
published in the 15 June 1966 issue. of the Salvadorean Communist publica-
tion Verdad, Yon Sosa said that he hs,d broken with the Fourth International
because some of its members in his organization had misappropriated party
funds for their own sectarian interests!
To counteract the Guatemalan government's campaign, Cuba has increased
its efforts to support the guerrillas, both materially and polemically.
Late in September 1966 the Mexican press revealed that an organized band
of arms smugglers, composed of Mexicans and Guatemalans in exile, had been
caught red-handed attempting to smuggle arms purchased in Mexico to the
rebels in Guatemala. Subsequent press articles added the significant in-
formation that the Eminence rgise of the operation was Julian Lopez Diaz,
Third Secretary for Press and Cultural Relations in the Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City. The Guatemalan leader of the smugglers was Victor Hugo
Martinez Pantaleon, militant member of the Guatemalan Communist Party. This
band was arrested only five weeks after the committal for trial of a group
of Mexicans charged with subversion -- including the running of a guerrilla
training school -- led by the exiled Spanish Communist Victor Rico Galan,
known previously to have been a backer of Yon Sosa's guerrillas.
In Havana, the Castro regime ceaselessly exhorts the Guatemalan Com-
munists to continue and strengthen their campaign of violence and terror.
On 26 July Castro singled out the FAR as a guerrilla movement which has
had "considerable success." On 13 June the Cubans issued a joint communique
with the FAR and the Guatemalan Communist Party; this quoted Castro's remark
that all Latin American peoples should fight simultaneously against "im-
perialism" and applauded the Guatemalan Communists' decision to take up
arms. On i1 July Flavio Bravo, Central Committee member of the Cuban Com-
munist Party, gave a speech endorsing the guerrillas' rejection of Mendez
and praised their violence. He reaffirmed the Cuban line that armed struggle
was the only choice in "all or almost all" of Latin America. The Afro-Asian-
Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) declared 6 February
1967 as a day of solidarity with the people of Guatemala. In its document
proclaiming this event the organization stated:
"The struggle of the Guatemalan people to rid themselves of
domestic and foreign exploiters ... has been successful during the
past few years.... After a brief period of demagogic promises that
lasted no more than three months, the government of Mendez Montenegro
... unleased a ferocious repressive campaign against revolutionary,
democratic, and popular forces, especially the peasant masses that
constitute 73 percent of the population ... it has tried to halt the
patriotic, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist movement of the
Guatemalan people who are directed and led by the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) commanded by maximum leader Cesar Montes....
3 (Cont.)
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"On the occasioi of the celebration of the worldwide day of
sc.-idarity with the people of Guatemala on 6 February, the AALAPSO
Secretariat calls on all member organizations and national committees
to wage an intensive campaign ... to support firmly the unyielding
posture of the revolutionary fighters and of FAR and its leaders."
On 7 February, speaking on behalf of the FAR as its representative
in Cuba, Francisco Marroquin stated: "Our revolution does not involve
the polls. Our decision is to fight with our weapons in our hands, with
the firm intention of winning or dying for Guatemala."
To help implement this "solidarity" the AALAPSO has formally announced
the establishment of schools for training guerrilla cadres from other coun-
tries. One of the training schools is already in operation in Havana,
training Guatemalans, among other nationalities.
To finance their own efforts, the Guatemalan terrorists have increas-
ingly resorted to kidnaping and robbery, thus reinforcing the conviction
of most Guatemalans that the rebels are actually more common bandits than
"liberators."
The turmoil caused by the extremists of both right and left has not
seriously reduced Guatemala's capacity to expand its economy and thus
ameliorate the privations of most of its citizens. Mendez Montenegro has
vigorously pushed the preparation of an economic development plan and has
actively searched for support for this plan within the framework of the
Alliance for Progress. At the same time, Guatemala has received strong
encouragement and support from its neighboring countries, particularly
Mexico, and there is every reason to believe that its economy will con-
tinue to expand at an encouraging rate, despite the Communists' efforts
to disrupt it.
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February 1967
MILITARY YOUTH INDOCTRINATION STRESSED
[Following is the translation of an un-
signed item in the Russian-language news-
paper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 26 Au-
gust 1966, page 1.1
A few days ago the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VLKSM
(Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi -- All Union
Lenin's Young Communist League) approved the exemplary statute pertaining
to patriotic military schools for youth in military schools, military units,
DOSAAF* educational organizations, schools and elements of the civil avia-
tion, river, maritime and air force detachments.
The statute indicates that patriotic military schools are organized
for the following purpose:
To educate students who are boundlessly dedicated to communism, to
their Soviet Homeland, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to
the Soviet Government in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and
friendship among all the peoples of the USSR;
To carry out occupational orientation of the adolescents;
To inculcate the students with high consciousness of their social and
military duty. To instill them with discipline, love for military service
and for the occupation of a Soviet officer, to give them a sense of Soviet
kilitary pride, an aspiration for heroic deeds for the glory of the Soviet
Homeland, and also to train the young people for entrance into military
schools;
To inculcate the students with the necessary moral will power charac-
teristics to make them physically fit. To give them some concrete military
experience, and to prepare them for the fulfillment of the sports norms
qualifying them for the rating of "Ready for the Defense of the Homeland."
The schools consist of members of the senior classes of general educa-
tional shcools, trade schools, or from schools of the working and rural youth
who enroll in the schools voluntarily. There is no tuition for attending the
schools. The instructors at the schools are reserve and retired officers,
military personnel from army units and ships, as well as cadets from military
schools, instructors and teachers of DOSAAF educational organizations. The
*VVsesoyuznoye Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo Sodeystviya Armii Aviatsii i Flotu -
All-Union Voluntary Society for the Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and
Navy.
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(Cont.)
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personnel from schools and elements of civil aviation, personnel of naval
stations, airports and air force detachments also serve as instructors.
Each patriotic military school has its own banner, oath (a solemn
pledge), and a uniform.
A council consisting of the school director, a representative of the
komsomol rayon committee, city committee (oblast committee), group leaders
(instructors), secretary of the school komsomol organization, platoon com-
manders and representative of the parent committee is organized for the
purpose of managing the school.
The school term begins in September and ends in April-May. The whole
course covers one to three years. Training is conducted no more than twice
a week for two academic hours per session, after school hours. The educa-
tional work must ensure the all around mental and physical development of
the students, their inculcation with practical experience in accordance
with the specialty of the school.
In the summer time military-sports camps are organized for the stu-
dents with funds contributed by trade union organizations, by public educa-
tion and health agencies, and by enterprises with the aid of military
schools and civil aviation elements, personnel of naval stations,
airports and air force detachments, as well as with the assistance of the
local VLKSM committees.
A challenge Red Banner of the VLKSM Central Committee was created as
an award for the best patriotic military establishments. It is awarded
annually on the eve of the Victory Holiday.
2
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Facts Analysis Service
Chicago, Illinois
Morale in the Red Army
Soviet marshals in'late 1965 registered deep concern over the low
level of morale, discipline, and political indoctrination in the armed
forces of the USSR. Criticisms for failures in these areas were leveled
primarily at officers and at professional Party and Komsomol officials
in the military establishment. Serious shortcomings of military personnel
stationed in the Belorussian Republic, such as drunkenness and amoral be-
havior, appear to have precipitated the campaign. Defense Minister Malinovsky
and the armed forces' political spokesman, Gen.Yepishev, placed the blame
squarely on the shoulders of the officer corps. The head of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, Marshal Krylov, concentrated his concern on the broader prob-
lem of the poor motivation of youth, a problem which also concerned conserva-
tive Party spokesmen.*
These statements by Soviet marshals drew expressions of surprise by
Western observers. Some commented that the Soviets were merely treating a
normal disciplinary problem in an open manner rather than, as usual, suppress-
ing such unfavorable information. Other Western observers point out, however,
that the marshals may well have been mustering support for a policy of in-
creasing the patriotic-military education of youth prior to induction. Bear-
ing out the latter conclusion is the strong emphasis placed on the military
indoctrination of youth. According to Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Army news-
paper) of January 19, 1967, more than 8,000 war games were held for youth in
1966. These games included storming of defenses and river-crossing exercises.
Visits to military establishments were also emphasized. Evidently viewing
results in 1966 with satisfaction, Krasnaya Zverda recommended that Pioneers
and schoolboys be included in future programs.
*See the following articles:
Marshal Malinovsky in Krasnaya Zvezda, Dec. 29, 1965;
General Yepishev in Komsomolskaya Pravda (the Communist Youth League News-
paper) of Dec. 28, 1965;
Marshal Krylov in Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia) of Oct. 7, 1965.
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February 1967
ABRAHAM BRUMBERG LETTER TO DAVID M. BURNS,
U.S. CULTURAL ATTACHE, BAMAKO
Forged Document Identification Data
Abraham Brumberg, Executive Director,
Problems of Communism, Press and
Publications Service, USIA
TO: David M. Burns, U.S. Cultural Attache,
Bamako, Mali
Ostensible date: 27 October 1961
Synopsis
The writer of the letter is shown to refer to the closing of the USIS
Cultural Center in Bamako, Mali; to note that USIA intends to publish a
special article on this "outrageous act"; and to solicit the addressee's
help in preparing material for the article and in interpreting the closing
of the Cultural Center as part of the Cold War. The forgery implies that
persons connected with the USIS Cultural Center had been engaged in illegal
activities, but states that the article about the closing of the Center
should aim to show that the "events in Bamako" had been instigated by "out-
side and anti-Nationalist forces." The letter is designed to cause distrust
among African peoples toward U.S. nationals and also to intensify racial op-
position to the United States by its inclusion of such statements as "in my
opinion the African Negroes are not more capable than our own."
The forgers mailed photostat copies of the letter to several African
embassies in Cairo and to the Sunday Express of Lagos, Nigeria, in February
1962. The letter was not published, but at least one African diplomat in
Carlo was informed by a Malian official that the document was believed to
be authentic. Attached to a copy of the forgery sent to one embassy was a
forged handwritten note which read: "Dear Sir, You will find here something
very interesting. Use it as you wish. NA." The forged initials were those
of an officer of the U.S. Embassy, Cairo, who was in the habit of initialing
outgoing U.S. Embassy transmittals. The official investigation of this inci-
dent revealed that no correspondence had ever been exchanged between Mr.
Brumberg and Mr. Burns. The letter did not follow standard U.S. government
format for informal letters exchanged between U.S. officials.
Because the purpose of this forgery is identical with several others--
to cause ill-will toward the United States among African peoples by "prov-
ing" U.S. intervention in local affairs--it would seem to be the work of the
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{Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070008-4,
same fabricators. Derogatory references to non-white peoples, the mail-
ing pattern, and other similarities (such as the comparison of Africans
to wild animals) can be noted both in this forgery case and in an earlier
anti-United States propaganda exercise--a false document which ostensibly
originated with the Ku Klux Klan in late 1960 which was discussed in the
U.S. Senate document of June 1961. The Ku Klux Klan letter was mailed to
several African and Asian diplomats in the United States; it warned African
and Asian delegates to the United Nations to stay away from hotels and res-
taurants of New York City and closed with the statement: "There is no wel-
come in America for a Black and Yellow United Nations."
Forged Document Identification Data
From: Edward R. Murrow
Director, USIA
To: All Principal USIS Posts
Ostensible date: 25 April 1963
Synopsis
Apparently designed to strengthen the position of anti-U.S. parti-
cipants in the Congress of the International Union of Socialist Youth
(IUSY) at Oslo, Norway, in August 1963, this forged USIA circular re-
quested USIS representatives abroad to make sure that "our sympathizers"
among the youth leaders influence the Congress proceedings "in our favor"
and give "financial aid to those friendly to us." U.S. delegates to the
Congress described some of the circular terminology as "utterly un-
American." Available evidence strongly suggests Soviet involvement in
this propaganda attempt.
BRADY LETTERS (LATIN AMERICA)
Forged. Document Identification Data
From: J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ostensible dates: 2 January 1961 (first letter) and 15 April 1964
(second letter)
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Synopsis
Groundwork for the launching in July 1964 of the forged Brady
letters was laid with the circulation of an earlier forgery, the
"'suppressed" USIA press release into which had been threaded false
claims of a "Mann Plan" for the overthrow of the Brazilian and Chilean
governments, among others, during 1964. As a prelude to the surfacing
of the Brady letters, U.S. and other diplomatic installations in Rio
de Janeiro, Santiago, and Montevideo received circulars from a "Com-
mittee for Struggle Against Yankee Imperialism" which warned of "hundreds
of American ,CIA, Pentagon, and FBI agents" masquerading in Latin America
as diplomats. The first sheet named "some of the American agents who
took a direct part in the recent coup d'etat in Brazil" and the second
sheet gave "the names of some of the American agents among those who are
involved in the preparation of a coup d'etat in Chile." The name of
Thomas Brady was listed as one of the "American agents" who had allegedly
been involved in the Brazilian coup in April 1964.
Investigation has failed to produce the slightest evidence that a
committee with this name exists anywhere in Latin America, and it must
be assumed to be a phantom organization created for the express purpose
of the mailing to support the forgery.. The letterhead showed not only
the name-of the committee.but also the slogan "Latin America for the Latin
Americans" in.large print, in both Spanish and Portuguese. Both languages
were used in the text of the circular, one above the other and side by
side. On one of the two sheets of letterhead the Spanish for "imperialism"
was incorrectly spelled with the initial letter "e", which might suggest
that the letterhead was done by someone usually careless, unfamiliar with
the language, or both. At the same time, examination showed the printing
method to be letterpress for the letterhead and offset printing for the
text, processes hardly in keeping with the capabilities of a "committee"
that defied identification. The envelopes carried Uruguayan postage stamps
and postmarks, the latter generally illegible, but sample envelopes were
found to be of probably Brazilian and Argentine manufacture.
Another mailing from the same committee, addressed to Uruguayans and
Latin Americans, came to attention at the end of December 1964. It de-
nounced alleged U.S. pressure on the military of Uruguay to take over the
government and, following the pattern set by the first circular, went on
to list five U.S. officials involved in the planned coup, four of whom the
"committee" claimed were CIA agents.
The two Brady letters, surfaced in Argentina on 23 July 1964. and re-
played elsewhere in Latin America in fairly rapid succession, were designed
to lend credence to overt propaganda charges of U.S. involvement in the
overthrow of the Brazilian government of Joao Goulart. At the same time
they were intended, with the help of the phantom committee mailing, to sup-
port overt propaganda charges that the U.S. was then meddling in pre-election
activities in Chile.. The first letter, an innocuous one ostensibly dated
2 January 1961, was published to give authenticity to the second one, dated
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15 April 1961+. In the second letter the forgers had the Director of
the FBI writing to Brady to convey "personal appreciation to each agent
stationed in Brazil for the services rendered in the accomplishment of
'Overhaul'" and referring also to the part played by "the CIA people"
in "this large scale operation." Not content with providing "proof" of
U.S. coup involvement, the forgers added a slighting reference to living
conditions in Brazil. Technical scrutiny revealed that the completely
fabricated second letter was prepared on a typewriter of European manu-
facture and the signature showed signs of forgery. There is also proof
that the first letter was spurious. In a television speech on 5 August
1960 Raul CASTRO indicated that the Cubans held a letter identical with
the first Brady letter, but it was one which had been sent to another
man to congratulate him on his years of service. The forgers simply re-
typed the letter, changing the name of the individual and date of the
letter.
PEACE CORPS CIRCULAR MAILED IN IRAN
Forged Document Identification Data
From: Mr. Cleo Shook
Director of U.S. Peace Corps Workers in Iran
To: The Peace Corps
Ostensible date: No date shown on document.
Synopsis
The forgery is an ostensible background briefing memorandum addressed
by Mr. Shook to Peace Corps members assigned to Iran in which Mr. Shook is
shown to describe the Iranian people, their customs, and their religion in
highly derogatory terms. In some respects, this forgery resembles a USIA
brief forged and circulated earlier in Brazil. It shows Mr. Shook as re-
ferring consistently to Iranians as "the natives" and as portraying them
generally as backward, indolent, ignorant people who are religious fanatics
but morally degenerate. It is especially designed to antagonize the Moslem
clergy against Americans by the inclusion of phrases describing Islam as
"reactionary" and Moslem religious customs as "savage" and "wildly fanatic"
and by advice to the Peace Corps volunteers to prevent the young Iranians
"from going to the Mullahs to learn Islam, which bars the country from
modern life." Several hundred reduced-size photographed copies of the
forged memorandum were mailed in Tehran, Iran, to addressees in Iran, some
of whom were newspaper editors. The Iranian stamps and postmarks appear
to be genuine.
The following factors give indication of probable Communist Bloc manu-
facture:
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1. Since early 1964, the Communist movement has sought to con-
vince the Moslem world that its "scientific socialism" is con-
sistent with the ethics and social doctrines of certain Moslem
teachers. The Soviets, for their part, engaged in a strenuous
campaign to win the good will of Moslem religious leaders in the
Near East and to seek to influence them to become anti-American.
The forgery fits into this Soviet propaganda campaign.
2. Other themes implicit in the forgery are similar to those of
other forgeries known, or strongly suspected, to have been pro-
duced by a Communist Bloc intelligence service. It is designed to
spread ill will toward Americans by showing that Americans in Iran
have little genuine respect for the people of Iran and that Americans
consider Iranians as backward and degenerate. Moreover, the letter
is designed to show that the very opinions of Americans about the
qualities of the people criticized in the letter are in fact descrip-
tive of Americans themselves. Also, the forgery was clearly planned
to indicate that Americans have a ridiculous sense of superiority
which causes them to intervene in foreign countries in order to re-
fashion them after a corrupt American model.
3. Immorality of Peace Corps members and of local citizens was a
subject discussed in another forged Peace Corps letter. That letter
appeared in Somalia and was ostensibly written by Peace Corps Director
Sargent Shriver to Harris L. Wofford, Peace Corps representative in
Addis Ababa. Identical words and similar emphasis were used in dis-
cussing the subject in both forgeries -- a fact which suggests a com-
mon inspiration if not a central point of origin. The subject of
U.S. immorality -- especially of Americans serving overseas -- is
frequently treated in similar terminology in Communist Bloc press and
radio propaganda stories.
4. Other forged U.S. documents known to be, or strongly suspected
of being, of Communist Bloc intelligence service manufacture, have
also appeared in the form of reduced-size photographed copies, rather
than original documents -- a condition which renders technical analysis
of the forgeries more difficult, as Communist Bloc intelligence services
are well aware. Also, other Communist Bloc-produced forgeries of U.S.
documents most frequently have been mailed in locally-procured envelopes
with genuine postage.
5. Some expressions used'in the forgery are cliches commonly found in
Communist Bloc English language publications. Examples of these are
"historic winds" and "torch bearers of progressive ideas."
6. The forgery contains certain typographical errors which consistently
appear in Soviet-produced documents written in the English language.
5
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