BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 27, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : C A- P78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Ruse 2000/08/27 : 011 51114iR A000400060007-6
Significant Dates
[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
MAY
16* Treaty of Aigan, ftirst of "Unequal Treaties," cedes Chinese Territory east
of Amur River to Russia. Treaty never ratified, but confirmed by Treaty of
Peking, 14 November 1860. 1858.
22 Soviet All-Union Writers' Congress scheduled to convene, Moscow.
25* Josip Broz Tito born. 1892. SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY
28-31 Pacem in Terris, Second Convocation, Geneva. (Officially sponsored by Center
for Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara. Financial support from
Investors Overseas Services.) -
JUN
I International Ch11drens' Day, celebrated by Women's International Democratic
Federation (WIDF; Communist front).
5* Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposes European Recovery Plan ("Marshall
Plan") in speech at Harvard. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
1I-12* Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals arrested; later
tried secretly and executed. 1937. THIRTHIETH ANNIVERSARY.
'16* First Congress of Soviets (Councils of Workers; and Soldiers' Deputies) meets;
only 137 out of 1090 members are Bolsheviks. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
16-17* East German workers and youths demonstrate and riot, quelled by Soviet troops.
(Commemorated annually in West Germany as German Day of Unity.) 1953.
17* Hungarian government announces trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Premier during
Hungarian revolt who had been seized in violation of promise of safe-conduct.
1958.
22* Germany invades the Soviet Union. 1941.
25* North Korean army crosses 38th parallel, invading South Korea, 1950.
28-29* Demonstration by Poznan workers against wage abuses turns into riot; Polish
government crushes riot, killing 44, wounding hundreds, though later moves to
correct abuses. 1956.
28 Opening of International Union of Architects (UTA)(Congress, Prague, followed
by International Meeting of Women Architects, Bratislava. (UIA is basically
professional, not a front, but meeting inHavana in 1963 exploited by Communists.
I* Dominion of Canada established, uniting provinces under federal government.
11867. CENTENARY.
6-9 World Conference on Vietnam, Stockholm. (Communist fronts involved include
W(jrld Peace Council and International Organization of Journalists; non-Communist
World Conference of World Peace Through Law also participating.)
9-14 World Conference of World Peace Through Law. Conference in Geneva.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(SIGNIFICANT DATES.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-R MA000400060007-6
MedIa Lines
27 March 1967
African Nations Resent NCNA Distortions. Several independent
African governments have been seriously disturbed during the past
year by the distortion of statements of leading African statesmen in
news releases of the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY (NCNA). Last summer NCNA
twisted a statement of President Nyerere of Tanzania in which he stress-
ed that "imperialism" should not be exclusively equated with the Western
Powers: in NCNA's version, Nyerere said exactly the opposite -- that
"the reality of imperialism is Western imperialism." President Kaunda
of Zambia, who had warned in an important October 1965 speech of the
imperialist aspirations of Red China and other Communist countries, was
reported instead by NCNA to have attacked the West. Such false report-
ing has recently led to the banning of the dissemination of NCNA dis-
patches by the Government of Tunisia. A week before the ban was put
into effect in February, NCM reported that "Tunisians from all walks
of life have praised Chairman Mao as the greatest revolutionary genuis
and a standard bearer of the liberation and progress of mankind".
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(MEDIA LINES.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 1 - P78-03061A000400dgO 1967
t
27 March 1967
Briefly Noted
Does It fear East German Regime
Aging "Over- Chagrined By U.S.
come" Itself? Folk Music Popularity
American folk singers,
for example Joan Baez and Pete Seeger,
frequently function as social critics of
the American scene. This circumstance
sometimes encourages the Communists to
feature such singers at meetings under
their sponsorship in the United States
and abroad. But social criticism knows
no national borders. When the songs of
American folk singers are introduced to
the Communist World, it is natural that
they should be "adapted" to local con-
ditions by the disillusioned people of
these countries.
The attached clipping from the 5
March NEW YORK TIMES reports on the
reaction of the East German Satellite
regime to "We Shall Overcome," intro-
duced to East Berlin by Pete Seeger.
This illustrates a fundamental point:
that while the Communists encourage pro-
test in free countries, they cannot
tolerate any limit of protest in their
own bailiwicks. This incident (and
any similar ones) might be used to con-
trast toleration outside the Bloc with
the still-existing totalitarianism
within it. This case is also one more
indicator of the growing isolation of
East Germany from progressive develop-
ments in music, drama, literature, and
all other phases of life in the Free --
or even the East European -- World.
But No Castro Gives 'Em Cir-
MiZk cuses and Ice Cream
Fidel Castro apparently
doesn't read GRANMA, the Cuban
Communist Party's newspaper. In
a speech to Havana steelworkers
on 21 February he bragged that 26
flavors of ice cream are being pro-
duced and that soon the number
will be increased to 40 or 42. He
also said: "in the dairy industry
we will produce dozens of varieties
of cheeses; at this moment we have
almost 30 comrades in various
European nations studying the
techniques of cheese production...
And we are going to produce all
the most famous varieties of
cheeses."
But only slightly less than
three weeks before his speech,
more precisely on 4 February, GRANMA
carried an article noting that
in Camaguey Province there had been
a serious milk shortage since at
least last November. According
to the article, the province was
short 80,000 kilos in December
and in order to reduce this deficit
all cheese and yogurt production
had been stopped. Nevertheless,
by mid-January the shortage had
risen to 110,000 kilos, which
required the adoption of emer-
gency measures to ensure that
children from one to six received
milk; presumably there was not
enough for anyone else. While no
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(Briefly Noted Con't)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 _ CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
production figures were given for
the first of February, one can
assume that the situation had
further deteriorated since the
4 February article announced the
dismissal of the provincial milk
enterprise director, his deputy,
and the official in charge of
distribution.
(The pertinent excerpt from
Castro's speech and the GRANMA
article are attached.)
Appointment Cuban 'IntelIigence
Appropriate Official Named
to Respon- Deputy Foreign
sibiZities Minister
The appointment of
Captain Carlos Chain Soler as Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs was
announced in GRANMA on 17 February
1967 (copy of article attached).
That sa.rhe day he was presented to
the diplomatic corps in Havana.
GRANMA summarized Chain Scler's
background: arrested by Batista
in 1956; provincial coordinator of
the 26th of July Movement in Camaguey
and later Oriente Provinces during
the resistance against Batista; after
the revolution held various posts in
Oriente Province; and was alternate:
delegate to the OAS. The final
sentence in the GRANMA article notes
that his latest employment was a high
position in the Ministry of Interior.
Cuban exile publications have clearly
stated that Chain Soler was in fact
for several years deputy chief of the
Cuban foreign intelligence service,
the General Directorate of InteL_i-
geilce (DGI) under Manuel Pineiro; in
1965 he became a senior aide to
Ramiro Valdes, the Minister of
Interior, who is in charge of all
Cuban intelligence activities.
This appointment should not be
surprising to observers of Cuban
foreign affairs; of ter all, Cuba
has very few diplomatic relations
of the ordinary sort. The over-
whelming part of its foreign
activities involves clandestine
action, whether it be smuggling
arms into Latin America or running
extensive guerrilla training schools
for "national liberation movement:,"
in Africa.
Appropriately enough, the
first foreign diplomat to congrat.u-
late Chain Soler was the doyen of
the diplomatic corps in Havana,
Soviet Ambassador A..Lexei Ivanovich
Alekseyev, well known as a high
KGB official.
Pre- Novy M r Re: Ip aces
Writers' Two Editors
Conference
Maneuver? NOVY M1,R (New World),
liberal. Soviet intel-
lectual monthly, wa.s in the news
again on 3 March, this time over the
dismissal of two editors, A. G.
Dementiev and B.G. 2:aks. Dementiev,
who was one of two deputy chief
editors, is said -:o have been dis-
missed because he ignored recent
official policy prescribing a truce
on the sub=ject of Stalin's role in
Soviet history, and instead decided
to go ahead and publish the memoirs
of Konstantin Simonov. Simonov, an
outstanding Soviet writer and him-
self a former editor, of NOVY MIR,
severely criticized the late dictator
in his memoirs. (The memoirs were
later deleted from the journal.)
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : Z1f Txmo" 9^96061A000400060007-6
NOVY MIR has also recently pub-
lished an autobiography covering
the earlier years of Boris Paster-
nak, which it had rejected in 1956
(when Simonov was editor). Zaks was
a key production man, and the reasons
for his dismissal are not clear.
Alexander Tvardovsky, the controver-
sial editor of NOVY MIR and a well-
known poet, retains his position--
at least for the present--and
declared on 8 March that his journal
would continue to publish critical
material. (For other news of NOVY 25X1
According to Moscow rumor, the
dismissals are an indirect attempt
to force Tvardovsky's resignation;
a heavy drinker, Tvardovsky has
been quite dependent on the aid of
Dementiev and Zaks, and may be un-
able to carry on without them. The
open dismissal of Tvardovsky would
have aroused protests on the eve of
the 4th Writers' Congress, now
scheduled after many postponements
to start on 22 May. In this connection,
one of the black marks against
Dementiev was that, in NOVY MIR's
November 1966 issue, he had suggested
that the Congress (at the time
scheduled for mid-December) should
pay more attention to literary than
to socio-political U e., propagan-
dist) themes.
Appropriate assets should speculate
as to whether or not the Writers'
Congress will finally convene, noting
that by the removal of such men as
Dementiev, Zaks and (if he resigns)
Tvardovsky, Soviet cultural authorities
are taking measures to warn liberals
not to "cause trouble" at the Congress.
Comment might note that such incidents
as the Dementiev-Zaks dismissals are
only symptoms of the continuing
struggle between liberals and
conservatives in the Soviet
cultural world; most of this
struggle cannot be seen by the
outside world.
(See also article in
Literary Supplement of LONDON
TIMES, 2 March 1967, reprinted
in PRESS COMMENT of 9 March 1967,
P. 9).
10b
CP Popular French CP
Front Strategy Election Suc-
Given New ceses Attributed
Encouragement By World Press
To Gaullist Govern-
ment Policies
The French CP,
in the view of many foreign cor-
respondents in Paris, owes much
of its election success to the
fact that the DeGaul.le Government
had made it respectable in the
eyes of the electorate. Out of
486 seats in the new Assembly
the French CP now has 72 (com-
pared with 41 in the last Assembly),
while the Gaullists and their
allies retain only the barest
margin of a majority (losing some
40 seats). Government policy has
also squeezed out the democratic
parties of the center and eradi-
cated the republican traditions
represented by the Radicals, at
the same time setting the stage
for the new Federation of the
Left to gain some 30 seats.
The attached collection of
quotations from the world press
can be cited by selected assets
to make the point that the chances
of the French CP forming a popu-
lar front of the left have been
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : Cl.3-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(Briefly Noted Conte)
 Approved For Release 200 RDP78-03061 A000400060007-6
enhanced, thus promoting the chances Advertisement
for similar developments in other
countries. Arguments against this
have been outlined in extenso in a
number of guidances, most recently in After the F;evolutio-i, What Happened?
25X1C10b
When the revolutionary vanguard
had seized power in Rjssia, and had
inaugurated the dictatorship of the
proletariat, ... who Derlef i ted?
When the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union inaugurated the Five
Year Plan, ... who got the good jobs?
When reconstruction began after
the Great Soviet Patriotic War, ...
who got the new apartments first?
While the workers' government
sends Soviet butter to Cuba, who gets
the
_.,La?
The 50th Anniversary of the October
Revolution is not a celebration of
fifty years of rn~le by the Soviet people.
Since January 1918, when. Lenin dis-
banded the Constituent; Assembly, the
Soviet people have had no freely
elected representatives, no voice in
their own government. The professional
revolutionaries who took over the
Russian Revolution made themselves
the new ruling class, carrying out
long since their own ThErmidorian
Reaction -- ending revolution and
replacing it with a self-perpetuating
dictatorship representirg their own
interests.
For Q. handy. gu i de tc this deveil op-
ment, order our unclassified booklet,
THERMIDOR.
(f=or those who can obtain their
own copies, we still recommend Milovan
Djilas' THE NEW CLASS fcr a full treat-
ment of the new ruling class from
inside.)
Approved For Release 2000/08/?7 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
fmk~
(CADI CCI V AI(1TC 1
 Approved For Release 2000/08 0040060OO'--61967
TROUBLES BESETTING DICTATORIAL RULE:
What Happens When the Old Man Goes?
25X1C10b
SITUATION: One of the good fortunes of the United States is that
it has a well-established plan for succession if the President dies.
Even in the turmoil surrounding President Kennedy's death, there could
be no doubt who the new leader was, or of his right to assume his powers.
Other democratic and constitutional governments also have written and
unwritten rules to follow when government leaders die. Hereditary mon-
archy has been a time-honored way of establishing a definite succession.
The long prevalence of monarchies in history suggests that people found
it vital to have succession clearly established, almost regardless of
the merits or demerits of the successor.
There were other reasons for hereditary monarchy, however, and they
are not irrelevant to modern dictatorships. One was the desire of
rulers to have their rule live after them -- to gain a sort of earthly
immortality through the succession of 'their own flesh and blood."
Another reason was that the monarchy came to represent and Justify the
existence of major political and social hierarchies, such as the court,
the nobility, the army and the magistrates. Appointed by the king, the
officials served him and his heirs; in return, the monarchy provided them
with prestige, a continuing focus of loyalty, and a raison d'etre. When
monarchies fell on evil days, however, officials discovered that other
reasons for their status had developed and that the old loyalties could
be dropped. The oath on the flag to the monarch was always a most solemn
occasion in the German army, but when the monarchy became an embarrass-
ment in 1918, a general told the Kaiser: "The oath on the flag is now
merely an idea" -- it no longer meant anything.
Today there are few monarchies and even fewer where the monarch
holds real power. But dictatorial leaders still hanker for some kind of
immortality or survival beyond the tomb: they may like Stalin have
cities renamed and monuments built, or they may like Mao try to brainwash
a nation (and especially its youth) into parroting their "thoughts."
In any case, they are unwilling to surrender power while they still
breathe. And officials pay honor to the dictators -- at least as long
as the dictators serve their interests. Of course, dictators can use
terror to enforce obedience and outward loyalty, as Stalin and Hitler
did, but this may fail or rebound, as the July 191+1+ plot suggests.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1108 Cont )
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
r T
People are apt, to suppose that in all dictatorial states, or indeed
in all states dominated by one man, the passing of the "Chief" must mean
a prolonged period of drift or even anarchy. Perhaps this is sometimes
the case. Where a government is custom-tailored to fit one :personality
and there is little to tie its elements together aside from that personality
-- as with Alexander the Great or Napoleon I -- then the removE.l or demise
of the leader is likely to shake the empire to its foundations. More
often, however, and especially with Communist regimes and other modern
dictatorships, the :Leader is a:u'rounded by a party apparatus., an officer
caste, or other organization, which has from the start had other loyalties
besides that to him and which is inclined to look out for its own inter-
ests. There may be no effective constitution in our sense, but the organi-
zation has rules of a sort. The dictator may have founded the organization
and may have appointed its secondary leaders, but his death is unlikely
to endanger the system itself - - even when (as after the death of Stalin)
there is a period of disorientation and instability. The organization will
master its grief without much difficulty and carry or... In fa2t,,, if he
seems to be acting against their interests, they may speed his c.eparture.
The relation between a dictator and his following is bound to involve
tensions. The iron will and seLf-confidence which got him where he is
are usually accompanied by intolerance of dissent and inflexibility in the
face of changed conditions. As his followers see it, he becomes more and
more divorced from reality; some of them become convinced. that t:iey could
do the job better. i[e on his side may fear that he is losing control,
that his aides are grooming themselves for his place, and that h:;:s otim name
will someday be vilified or (worse) erased from history. Some of his
lieutenants may foster his suspicions in order to eliminate their own.
rivals; the members of the entourage eye each other with suspicion.
Leader and followers, all trainel in political maneuver and conspiracy,
put their skills to use against each other. A crisis arises "within the
family."
The facts on the succession of Communist leaders are not fully known
(compared with their deaths, the Kennedy assassination is no mystery at
all), but available information shows how the leadership of the apparatus
has maintained continuity:
1. Lenin died in January 1924 after a series of incapacitating strokes
over a period of almost two years. He was mentally incompetent during
parts of this period, but in his lucid intervals he showed concern over
Stalin's growing power. Some accounts, never confirmed, suggest that
Stalin hastened Lenin's death by poison. Already '3,eneral Secretary of
the Party, Stalin increased his influence through his control of
appointments. He pledged fidelity to Lenin's principles at Lenin's
funeral, and then proceeded to defeat first Trotsky and then his erst-
while allies against Trotsky, Kaanenev and Zinoviev,, following first a
moderate and then a hard policy. By the end of the 1930's he had elimi-
nated (in most cases, by execution) all the other one-time Bo:L.shevik
notables, and had as aides men who had risen only through his favor.
Approved For Release 2000/08 : IA-RDP78-03,6aAU00.40~0060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
Q A A r
2. Stalin died in March 1953; officially his death was ascribed to a
cerebral hemorrhage, but the fact that he had been preparing a purge
of his associates has led to suspicions that some of them assassinated
him (or perhaps refused him medical aid) to save their own lives.
Stalin's lieutenants seem to have feared that public disturbances or
even a revolt would follow his death. Malenkov, Stalin's appointed
successor, briefly headed both party and state organizations, but
had to yield his party position within nine days. Beriya regained
control of the secret police, but was executed by the rest of the leader-
ship; according to some reports, he was shot after a struggle at a
Kremlin meeting. Khrushchev became First Secretary in five months,
forced Malenkov to resign as Premier within two years, and obtained
the expulsion from the Presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich
in 1957. Reversing Stalin's procedure, Khrushchev had followed first
a hard and then a moderate policy. Zhukov, who helped Khrushchev
against Malenkov et al., was denounced within four months. Bulganin
was obliged to retire in 1958. Except for Mikoyan, the older genera-
tion of Soviet leaders had been shorn of power.
3. Khrushchev, on 15 October 1964, "resigned" from office; denunciation
of his policies and methods in the official press made it clear that
his resignation was involuntary. His son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, was
also expelled from his position as editor of IZVESTIYA. Khrushchev's
party functions were assumed by Brezhnev and his state functions by
Kosygin. Evidently Khrushchev was forced out by a well-organized
plot; since A. N. Shelepin and his successor as KGB chief, V. Y.
Semichastny, soon obtained promotions, they are believed to have pro-
vided secret police support for the action. At this writing, neither
Brezhnev, Kosygin nor Shelepin are known to have tried to force out
each other.
4. Mao's power position today is still unresolved. It would seem that
Mao, the successful revolutionary, could not cope with building and ad-
ministering a national economy using rational means -- over the question
of rational means he lost touch with the officials responsible for
carrying out such things. His irrational approach failed in the case of
the Great Leap Forward, and left the party cadre to pick up the pieces
and work largely for practical, goals, including the strengthening their
own position. In the fall of 1965, however, spurred apparently by
thinly-veiled criticism, by premonitions of death, by some of his en-
tourage, and possibly by natural. desires to reuse the tactics learned
during the Long March, Mao bestirred himself to "solve" China's problems
and launched a series of moves to replace bureaucratic routine with
revolutionary enthusiasm, as well as to strengthen his own place in
history. The "Cultural. Revolution" is in part an effort to assure that
Mao will be honored by posterity; it also expresses his commitment to
permanent revolution as the way to lift China to modern nationhood.
There are already signs that the "Cultural Revolution," like the Great
Leap before it, is being quietly curtailed. Mao appears unlikely to
Approved For Release 2000/08/27_:_51, -P4DP78-03061A0004000~ 7 nt.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
live much longer, and his efforts to fix the fature seem doomed to
failure. The day may cone soon when an official will tell him: "The
thought of Mao is now merely an idea.."
The following lessens may be drawn:
1. The succession of Communist dictators tend. to brin, about a power
struggle : 50 years after the Russian revolution, Communist regimes
are still without functioning constitutions and stable :internal condi-
tions. This struggle may give rise to dubious policy moves, undertaken
for the sake of enhancing someone's power or prestige, rather than in
the interests of the nation. The struggle begins before the old ruler
is gone, as he tries to shore up his position and reputation and to
designate an heir, while others try to maneuver to assume the succession.
With the old men gone, there has tended to be a weeding ou?c of rivals,
with one individual emerging on top.
2. There appears, however, to be an over-all trend toward oligarchy, as
opposed to one-man rule... The "collective leadership of the party appar-
atus has for the time being proven stronger than any ind_vidual in the
USSR. Mao seems to have recognized this same trend in China and to have
opposed it; however, it seems that he will probably fail if he has not
failed already. The trend results from many factors, such as the imprac-
ticality of running a country in the twentieth century using permanent
revolution or terror tactics, the replacement of bandit-trained personali-
ties by educated. administrators of social/industrial/econom'c programs,
the pressure of scientific-advanced weapons competition with the US (and
the Soviet Union), and the universal tendency of power groups to become
entrenched vested interests.
3. Although certain Communist parties have become secure in their
positions, no signs have a oeeared as yet to indicate that the Soviet
(let alone the Chicom) leadership is ready to submit :itself to any sort
of genuine-elect" on or vote of confidence by the :!?arty, much less by
the public. Khrushchev once, when faced with the opposition of Molotov,
Malenkov, and Kaganovich, took his case to the Central Comml?,tee, but
the latter was packed with his supporters, and in any case he had the
support of Marshal Zhukov; the :incident was without a sequel,. Many
observers have thought that there might be in Russia an evolution like
that in England, in which the rights and powers wrested from King John
by the medieval barons eventually became the rights of the pt_bl:ic. One
may hope that this happens. But an evolution of the Soviet system in
this direction would seem to require certain conditions difficult to
realize under tha', system: e.g., public discussion and debate, indepen-
dence of electors and notables from regime control, and a respect on
all sides for the law. Communist leaders do not think in suca terms,
but in terms of manipulation., maneuver, and conspiracy. Unde.- all con-
ditions, they keep control of the military and pol ce in the hands of
their own circle. At present at any rate, a change in leadership involves
no chance for the public to express itself, either by voting or revolting.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
~rnerr `11.08 Conti
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
w r e e r v
I25X1 C10b
b
Approved For Release 2QIA-RDP78-03061.~4g0060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
27 March 1967
1109 EUR, COMMUNIST PARTIES TO DISCUSS
"EUROPEAN SECURITY" IN APRIL
25X1C10b
SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) On 26 February the Soviet news agency
TASS announced that a meeting of the Editing Commission which had "pre-
pared material for the conference of European Communist and Workers
parties on European security" had ended in Warsaw. The Commission (TASS
reported without further details) had "worked in a fraternal atmosphere,"
had drawn up documents for the consideration of these parties, and had
discussed "organizational matters" connected with a conference to be held
in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, 24-27 April 1967,
TASS had previously reported the opening on 22 February of the Warsaw
Editing Commission meeting and had noted it was attended by representa-
tives of the CP"s of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Britain, East
Germany, West Germany, West Berlin, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Poland,
Portugal, the Soviet Union, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Switzer-
land'. Nothing was said about the absence of the CP's of Sweden, Norway,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, or
-- of course -- Albania.
On the third day of the deliberations in Warsaw TASS transmitted the
highlights of a PRAVDA article (see attachment) which hailed the meeting
for its "great importance for the further practical implementation of the
Bucharest declaration" -- despite the absence of Rumania at the Warsaw
meeting -- which, the CPSU organ claimed, "has already played a positive
role in strengthening peace and security in Europe." PRAVDA charged that
the efforts of the "fraternal socialist countries" to ease tension in
Europe had been hampered by the policy of the United States, in collusion
with West German revanchists allegedly seeking "to undermine the united
front of the socialist countries in their struggle for security in Europe
and to isolate the GDR, to make it more difficult to follow the line
adopted by the Warsaw Pact members in the Bucharest declaration."
Evidently the Rumanian recognition of West Germany has caused serious
problems for the would-be organizers of "European security". (For more
details on the relations between the GDR and the other Pact members see
BPG Item #1101 of 27 February 196'7, "East Germany Maintains 'Die-hard'
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1109 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
Opposition to European Mainstream," which focused on their meeting in
Warsaw in early February. Although at the time that item was written it
appeared that several other Fast European. countries would ignore East
Germany's complaints against West Germany, it now seems that Moscow's
renewed anti-Bonn campaign is making any understanding with Bonn in Sofia,
Budapest, and Prague far less likely -- at least for the time being.)
The 22-26 February Warsaw meeting was held at a time of high-level
discussions with East European leaders in Moscow, following a spate of
numerous personal contacts by Brezhnev and Kosygin with East European
leaders. Hungarian Party Secretary Kadar, Polish Defense Minister Spy-
chalski, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister David, and Bulgarian Party Secre-
tary Zhivkov all visited the Soviet capital, and there were many other
visits by high-level CP officials to the East and West European capitals.
The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister appeared on Moscow TV on 23 February and
included the following stateme rr in his remarks, which are presumably typ-
ical of the line to be followed in a "united front" of East and. West
European CP propaganda:
"The interests of peace and, security in. Europe demand teat the German
Federal Republic Governni.ent should recognize the real situation in
Burope; and inviolability of the postwar borders;, that West Germany
should give up its claims to nuclear weapons and -the right of so-
called exclusive representation of the entire German people, that it
should withdraw the unlawful thesis of West Berlin being a part of
the German Federal repub Lic, and that it should reconize the exis-
tence of the German Democratic Republic as an independent and
sovereign state,"
Despite the consistent use of the time--worn pharases "fraternal atmos-
phere" and "united front" of the CP's in all the reports of East and West
European CP discussions and visits early this year, there isconsiderable
evidence that much has still to be agreed on. Rumania and Yugos_._avia,
which have been very busy in sending delegates to other European countries,
were not represented at the 22-26 February meeting in Warsaw aid neither
is expected at the April meeting in Karlovy Vary; both believe that pro-
gress toward European security can only be achieved in concert with all
West European governments, .ncauding the West German. In this regard,
Rumania on 31 January recognized the West German Gover:i.merlt, and on 25
February the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG announced that the West German
Government was working to improve relations with,Yugosavia.
East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union have been claiming that
the CPA's stand united in blaming West Germany as the major cause for ten-
sion in Europe, (Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's recent visits to Paris
and London have largely failed to gain support for Warsaw's views on the
German question.)
On 1 March Poland signed a renewal of the treaty of friendship and
mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, stressing the thereat of West German
militarism. Two weeks later Poland and East Germany signed a new 20-year
Approved For Release 2QQAIQ8127 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 78-03061A000400060007-6
treaty promising mutual military assistance against any attempt by West
Germany to change their borders by force. "Poland will never agree to have
a militarist Germany as its western neighbor," CP boss Gomulka stated at
the 15 March signing ceremony in Warsaw. East German CP chief Ulbricht
accused Bonn of trying to infiltrate the East European Communist bloc and
isolate East Germany, and then took off with his delegation to Prague to
sign a similar treaty. Poland is reported to be working meanwhile on a new
European security proposal (perhaps a spruced-up version of the old Rapacki
Plan designed to prevent West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons) which
may be announced before the Karlovy Vary conference. And another platform
for a major propaganda move against West Germany before Karlovy Vary opens
may be provided by the East German Party congress in mid-April,.
All in all, however, it seems highly unlikely that Karlovy Vary will
turn out to be the ideal conclave which French CP Politburo Member Raymond
Guyot predicted in an article in L'HUMANITE quoted by TASS on 1 March.
Guyot said that the April meeting, news of which he claimed had been met
with "disappointment amid the Bonn revenge seekers," would advance "construc-
tive ideas on the necessity for replacing the existing military blocs with
a system of collective security embracing all states, both capitalist and
socialist." In view of the present situation, however, Guyot -- who had
traveled to Bucharest and Belgrade on apparently unsuccessful missions
before the Warsaw Editing Commission meeting -- was not necessarily on firm
ground when he concluded: "The (Karlovy Vary) conference, which will be a
reaffirmation of the unity of the European Communist and Workers parties,
will be able to urge all peace forces on the continent to act together and
to follow the road of security and disarmament." (For a listing of material
Orly r~nh
25X1C10b
According to the 4 March issue of the LONDON ECONOMIST (see attached),
the Soviets are not so much interested in the Karlovy Vary conference for
what they might be able to accomplish in the way of more unified propaganda
on European security but as a "way -f reforming the ragged ranks of the
Communist movement and getting their friends to accept the policy Russia
wants to follow in Asia." The Italians, as the ECONOMIST points out,
"seem to have decided to play along with the Russians but without abandon-
ing any of their prejudices against a world meeting," The head of the
Italian delegation at the 22-26 February meeting in Warsaw, Hugo Pecchioli,
in a statement published in his party's organ L'UNITA on 28 February, ad-
mitted that "the Vietnam question was very much present in our discussions."
Pecchioli also noted, according to a summary of his statement quoted by
the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG, that "not all the parties whose represen-
tatives took part in the Warsaw meeting have declared themselves in favor
Karlovy
of the Eruopean conferences; some of them announced they will go to (END
Vary, others reserved the right to announce their decision later."
UNCLASSIFIED) 25X1 C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1109 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
'25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/ P78-03061 A000400060007-6
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 i~ D78-03061A0004000600071-657
1110. YOUTH IN MOSCOW'S POWER STRUCTURE
The KGB-Komsomol Relationship and Soviet
25X1 C10b International Youth Activities
SITUATION: Available evidence indicates that the Soviet intelli-
gence service plays a leading role in the international youth activi-
ties of the USSR. For the past 82 years the KGB (Committee for State
Security) has been headed by men whose known previous experience had
been almost entirely in youth work and who had risen to the number one
job in the Soviet mass youth organization, the Komsomol (Communist Youth
League); these men, the KGB heads Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin (1958-
61) and Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny (1961-present), probably still
influence some youth activities. Through its affiliation with foreign
and international youth groups, the Komsomol plays a leading role in
international youth activities, for which it receives strong financial
support from the Soviet Government. In those activities Komsomol guide-
lines and programs conform to Soviet foreign policy and propaganda ob-
jectives and also provide opportunities.for carrying out intelligence
missions.
Background: Basic information on the Komsomol, which prepares and
provides the Soviet officials in international youth organizations and
congresses, may be summarized as follows. The Komsomol is one of several
major instruments used by the state to orient, control, and organize
Soviets from early childhood to young adulthood.* The manipulation,
ideological indoctrination and organizational training of children and
youth is of decisive importance for all Communist Parties -- not only
because they need replacements for their depleting, over-aged member-
ship, but (and this is even more important) because only malleable youth
can be effectively re-shaped to become "professional revolutionaries,"
as demanded by Lenin. The Komsomol in .1966 had 23 million members rang-
ing from 16 to 25 years in age. In recent years Soviet youths have been
progressively more indifferent to the Komsomol, as revealed by speeches
by Soviet leaders. However, now (since the 23rd Party Congress in
March-April 1966) that Komsomol membership is required for all young
people joining the CPSU, Soviet youth cannot afford to indulge their
*Other instruments are the Octobrist group (15 million children between
8 and 10) and the Pioneers (23 million children between 10 and 15).
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1110 Cont.)
 Approved For Release DP78-03061 A000400060007-6
feelings of indifference towards the Komsomol if they want to advance in
politics, government, management or the professions. The Komsomol has
less and less the appearance of being a voluntary organization, and
resembles more and more Hitler's and Mussolini's mass youth organizations.
Links between intelligence service and-youth organizations One
link between intelligence and youth activities emerges when we trace the
careers of top leaders. It frequently happens in Soviet politics that
when an official is :promoted and is assigned more responsible and broader
functions, these include supervision over the field he had previously
been in charge of. In any case, when Shelepin rose from the position of
First Secretary (chief) of the Komsomol to the chairmanship of the KGB in
1958, he seems to have retained some responsibilities for youth work.*
Similarly, when Semichastny, Shelepin's successor as chief of the Komsomol,
in turn succeeded Shelepin as chief of the KGB, he is believed also to
have continued to oversee youth activities. (It will be interesting to
see whether the present First Secretary of the Komsomol, Sergey P.
Pavlov, who is regarded as the protege of Semichastny, also becomes
chairman of the KGB),** See the attached chart showing the order of suc-
cession of Shelepin, Semichastny, and Pavlov.
Another link between the KGB and the Komsomol arises from the KGB's
overseas security- (and other covert) responsibilities. The KGB is
responsible for overseeing all Soviet activities abroad; it has been
delegated the specific jobs of clearing all Soviet personnel for trips
outside of the USSR and providing all returnees with a standard form on
which to report in detail to the KGB on their contacts with foreigners.
Thus, the KGB is involved both before and after any trip abroad by a
Komsomol official or delegate. Because of its virtual veto powers over
foreign travel, the KGB has the opportunity to assess and give as assign-
ment to any Kcmsomol traveller.
*This is evident from the consequences of Shelepin's visit to the
Moldavian Republic for "a few days" in mid-February 1967 to, i.a,,
hold discussions, with the leaders oP Party and econom-c organs.
-
(PRAVDA 19 Feb 67). On 21 Feb 67 SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIA (SOVIET MO=,DAVIA)
announced that the First Secretary, G. I. Lavranchak, and two other
members of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Komsomol had been
replaced. SOVETSKAYA. MOLDAVIA of 3 March 67 announced the appointment
of P. V. Chvertko as Chairman of the Moldavian KGB.
**In this connection, close observe:s of Soviet politics use the Russian
word "shefstvo" (derived from the French "chef") which is sometimes ren-
4ered as "patronage". What is meant is a leader's practice of training
proteges and seeing to their advancement each time the leader himself
is elevated.
Approved For Release 2000/08)27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1110 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 _10- WE 78-03061 A000400060007-6
Further, because top Komsomol officials must necessarily
work together with the KGB in working out the lists of selected and
approved' Komsomol and other travellers, and in other connections. In
this, the Komsomol has the function of proposing the make-up of Soviet
delegations and teams to countries outside of the USSR; subsequently
the KGB goes over these proposals, accepts or rejects the Komsomol's
nominees, and sometimes suggests others. Komsomol officials, therefore,
are routinely contacted by the KGB in the above-noted connections, and
cooperate with the KGB. Although the top age limit (40 years) for
Komsomol officials is not rigidly enforced, they must all eventually
find a career elsewhere; the KGB thus has excellent opportunities to
recruit the most suitable of them for its own purposes.
The frequent travels abroad of Shelepin and Semichastny under
Komsomol sponsorship, as well as the work done by these men in the
selection and approval of Komsomol travellers* evidently brought them
into frequent, close contact with the KGB. Presumably Shelepin and
Semichastny, while heading the Komsomol, showed an ability to work
effectively with the KGB; otherwise they would hardly have been promoted
to the leadership of the KGB.
The Komsomol's role in international youth work: The Komsomol has
been the basic Soviet organization concerned with the Communist-front
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)** and International Union of
Students (IUS) *, and prior to World War Two, with the Communist Youth
International, a section of the Comintern. The First Secretary of the
Komsomol is traditionally the vice-president of WFDY or of the IUS.
Shelepin, while head of the Komsomol, also was vice-president, in turn,
of both the IUS and WFDY. There is, interestingly, no indication that
Shelepin resigned or was replaced as vice-president of WFDY before the
expiration of his second term in 1959; thus, as far as the record goes
he was the leading Soviet official. in WFDY while also directing intelli-
gence work at the highest level.
The original Komsomol charter was expanded to deal with youth
abroad soon after the Bolsheviks seized power. Its first' instrument,
*See attached list of trips abroad and special duties of Shelepin,
Semichastny, and Pavlov.
**WFDY boasts that it consists of 202 organizations from 99 countries;
however, there is no published list of such organizations, and many
cannot be accounted for.
***IUS claims 76 students organizations as members.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : C14-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1110 Cont.)
 Approved For Release -RDP78-03061 A000400060007-6
11 L V- -
the Communist Youth International (CYI), was formed in 1919. Three
lines of control over the various national youth leagues were established;
one of these was from the Russian Communist Party through the Central
Committee of the Komsomol and the CYI. The CYI passed out of existence
in 1943 and the Anti-:ascist Committee of Soviet Youth (founded in 1941)
and WFDY (founded in 1945) came into being. While the names of some of
these organizations have changed or disappeared, Komsomol supervision
over Soviet international youth activities has continued. (See
attachment for additional details).
Guidelines for Soviet international youth work. Complete subordi-
nation to Soviet foreign policy and propaganda objectives has consistently
characterized the efforts of WFDY and the IUS.. In addition, the goals
of these organizations include t;ae winning over to Communism of the
masses of world youth as well as the future leaders of other countries.
(See references), The following excerpts from Soviet cress coverage of
the February 1967 meeting of the Central Committee of the Komsomcl indi-
cate the direction and the authority of the Komsomol's guidance in youth
work.
Party Chief L. I. Brezhnev, in his address to the Komsomol leaders,
spoke on the tasks of the Komsomol, stressing, i.a.:
-the bonds of the Komsomol and its various contacts with youth and
class brother abroad, "a very important sector of (the USSR's] foreign
policy work";
-the large number in "fraternal Young Communist Leagues"
(70,000,000 in 80 countries) whose international strength is a growing
factor (particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) in the struggle
between the forces of national 1_beration and imperialism;
-the dual goals of undermining capitalism from wi-:hin and fi,;htirig
against "oppression arid. exploitation, against; imperialist aggression."'
The published resolution of the meeting highlighted Brezhnev's
heavy emphasis on the international aspects of the Komsomol's word? It
said:
"The Leninist Komsomol is consistently and unswervingly strength-
ening its friendship and collaboration with the youth of the socialist
countries, and with the young fighters in the national--liberation
movement developing in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America."
Further details cf recent and earlier guidance for the Komsomol in
international youth wcrk are included in the attachments.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
P r n n r
(1110 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/ 78-03061 A000400060007-6
Scope of Soviet international youth activities: According to the
NEW YORK TIMES, (6 March 1967) Soviet Government financing for Communist-
front youth organizations has averaged about $10 million a year since
the late 19)40's. The range of Soviet international youth activities is
demonstrated by statistical reporting: in 1966 alone, according to
Brezhnev, Soviet young people played host to more than 200 youth delega-
tions and some 50,000 tourists from 90 countries. Other activities
include committee work and correspondence between officials of interna-
tional youth groups (see above-cited figures), the organization of youth
festivals (8 between 19+7 and 1962), sporting and cultural events, and
propaganda. A Komsomol has abundant domestic propaganda resources,
some of.which are also used abroad. According to Pavlov as quoted in
the Komsomol newspaper of 29 Dec. 1965, the Komsomol "has at its dispo-
sal 17 magazines, with a circulation of 5,000,000 copies per issue; 108
central and local newspapers, published in 24 languages and with a cir-
culation of 10,000,000 copies per issue; television, radio and films;
that the Komsomol Central Committee's Young Guard Publishing House alone
puts out 37,000,000 copies of books annually." From these data, Pavlov
concludes: "it becomes evident what a powerful ideological weapon we
possess."
Such a weapon, combined with access to the wide range of interna-
tional. activities cited above, provides the Komsomol with abundant
opportunities to pursue the objectives outlined by Brezhnev in February.
With the helping hand of the KGB, there is probably little to restrict
the Komsomol in the pursuit of those objectives. 25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(1110 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2 -RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
25XIC10b
Approved For Release 2000/QP/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
- .F (1110.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 . 1,AROP78-03061AO0040PQ?QQA7- 67
IIII WH. SUMMIT.MEETING IN URUGUAY:
Communist Disorders Likely
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The "Summit Conference" of. the presidents of the Ameri-
can republics will be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 12 to 14+
April 1967. Past experience and advance information indicate that the
Uruguayan Communists will mount a major propaganda campaign to harass
and disrupt the conference, using the standard tactics of strikes,
street riots, protest marches, printed propaganda, sabotage of public
utilities, etc. In fact, a vitriolic campaign in the Uruguayan Commu-
nist press began late in February. Their ultimate objectives will be
to hinder the conference itself and to create the impression abroad
that the great mass of the Uruguayan people abhors and rejects the con-
ference and most of its participants -- especially U.S. President Johnson.
The Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) and its allies in the electoral
front known as FIDEL (Frente Izguierda de Liberacion) polled only 6 per-
cent of the total vote in the national elections held on 27 November
1966. (This was twice its showing in the 1962 elections.) While the
PCU's electoral strength is weak, and its influence on international
questions is slight it has long been increasing its influence among
students and organized labor. Indeed, the Communists now have a domi-
nant voice in the major labor confederation, which they are using to
good advantage to create an almost constant turmoil of strikes and
protests.
The PCU's growth in the recent past can be attributed in large meas-
ure to an economic crisis which has been developing for several years in
Uruguay. The result has been rampant inflation--435 percent between 1962
and 1966, and possibly 80 percent this year. This has led to an endless
round of strikes; an.estimated 500 last year, which reached a climax
just before the elections.
The PCU -- which closely follows the Soviet line -- also derives
part of its strength from close support from the Communist bloc countries.
The Soviet embassy in Montevideo numbers some 20 officials (versus 7
Uruguayans in Moscow). In October 1966 four Soviet officials were
expelled from Uruguay for "interventing in labor affairs and inciting
strikes." Earlier in the year four North Koreans and two East Germans
were expelled and two other East Germans were ordered to leave though
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060007-6
(1111 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 200"'"" 'fl - " RDP78-03061 A000400060007-6
they have managed to stall their departure thus far. A series of strikes
from April to December 1965 ended on 14 December 1565 -- after the
Uruguayan government had threatened to break diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union.
An unclassified. attachmerit to this guidance gives useful facts on
the PCU, its influence on labor, students, and the press, and its plans
for harassing the Conference.
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/0$/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(llll.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CPYRGHT
NE6d YORK TIM S
5 March 1967
]Popularity of U. S. Rights Hymn Irks German Reds
specf*1 to The New York Times
BERLIN, March 3-"We
Shall Overcome," the 'song of
the American civil rights
marchers, has been adopted in
the last few months as a kind
of spiritual hymn by young
East Germans, much to the
chagrin of the Communist
leadership.
Pete Seeger, the American
folksinger, introduced the song
at a concert in East Berlin this
winter.
Without touching upon rea-
sons for the song's success,
the party newspaper Neues
'Deutsch1 nd said today its use
'as a sdrt of hymn" in East
Germany was not acceptable.
;'~ "It is no longer sufficient,"
tare paper commented, "to say
peace is good if we do not say
who threatens peace - the
United States and West Ger-
many."
New songs urged
The party, the Communist
youth groups and other organ-
izations, meanwhile have called
for the creation 1'of fighting
songs of our own." New songs,
praised by the party paper,
bear such titles as "The Song
of the Red Flag" and "Youth
Greets the S.E.D.," the Initials
of the Sozialistische Einhelts
partei Deutschlands (Socialist
;Unity Party), the name of the
Communist party ? in East Ger-
many.
The attacks on We Shall
Overcome" and other popular
American and Western; tunes
repression of any attempts by
East Germans to find access to
Western Ideas.
Criticism has been - directed
by the party and its organiza-
tions at painters, musicians,
writers, dramatists, theatrical
producers and movie makers
alike, for their alleged failure to
recognize the Socialist develop-
ment" of East Germany.
The attacks are in line with
East Germany's self-isolation
from all things Western and in
particular things West German.
They have been timed in prepa-
ration for the 'East German
party congress the middle of
April at which Walter Ulbricht
intends to pronounce the "com-
pletion of socialism" in his
realm.
Neues Deutschland this week
chided East Berlin producers
for excluding from, the stage
modern gait German plays.
Among 46 plays on the reper-
tory of East' Berlin's theaters,
the paper said, only two repre-
sented modern Socialist Ger.
man drama." It said that 16
pro-Communist authors had
written 10 new plays and begun
14 others but. had been unable
to find directors to produce
their works. - .
The Communist paper, in the
same issue, told painters that,
"the much-praised term artistic'
freedom is nothing but naked
self-deception." The party or-
gan accused Willibald Sitte,
East German painter known in
the past for his adherence to
come at et time of intensified)
the Communist principle of So-
cialist Realism, of having intro-
duced "surrealist conceptions"
in his latest work.
Mr. Sitte and some of his col-
leagues were told they lacked
clarity "in recognizing the role
of the German Democratic Re-
public as the greatest historic
achievement in Germany."
You are not painting to win
the acclaim of decadent art rep-
resentatives in West Germany,"
the paper warned.
Another target of criticism
Is Peter Hacks, 38-year old
dramaist and Brecht-follower,
whose latest play, "Moritz Tas-
sow," was banned in East Ger-
many but had considerable suc-
cess at Its West German pre-
miere in Wuppertal last, week.
Mr. Hacks, came from the West
to live ,in East Germany 12
years ago.
Two. other East German au-
thors, Manfred Bieler, a novel=
1st, and Wolf Biermann, poet
and folksinger, have moved to
Prague to escape East German
censors.
"Moritz Tassow," a comedy,
deals with the failure of an
idealistic Communist in setting
up a collective farm in East
Germany at the end of the war.
The play was produced by the
Deutsches Theater in East Ber-
lin, but taken out of the reper-
tory after a few weeks--because
it did not meet the party's re-
quirement that plays stress
Communist success. .
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CPYRGHT
Granma, Havana
4 February 1967
IBM
e S NO TR U V
tyres iruncoona
res
ECIL de:C
go
O CAMAGUEY.-- En el local del Comite Pro-
vincial del Partido se efectu6 una reunion en
la que participaron compafieros de la direc-
ci6n de la Empresa Consolidada de Industrias
LActeas,. MINCIN, OFICODA, y ]as organizacio-
nes de masa y que fue presidida por el capiten
Julian Rizo Alvarez; y Miguel Garcia Calero, pri-
mere y segundo secretario del Partido en la pro-
vincia, y el teniente Pedro Pupo, delegado pro-
vincial del MININT en Camaguey.
.das por la ECIL en cuanto a la distribuciOri de 'Ante los hechos planteados yy la *ran irrespon-.
leche a los consumidores de Camaguey, infor- sabilidad demostrada por la direction de la,
mandose. sobre los antecedentes que dieron Ju- ECIL, se acordb destituir de sus cargos a los
-gar a su aplicaci6n. siguientes funcionarios de esta empresa a nivel
Se inform6 que la merma en la produccibn de provincial: Joaquin Aguilar, director; Fidel Mon-
teagudo, subdireator; y Jose Aranda, ' responsa-:
'leche que se produce en esta epoca del aflo, con ble de distribucidn.
motivo de la seca, falta de pastos y menor
rendimiento de las vacas en ordeflo, provoc6 Finalmente se conoci6 que se adoptaron medidas
que ya en diciembre existiera un deficit de 80erieaminadas a superar las deficiencias de Jos
mil kilograms de leche. Entre las medidas que datos del censo de consumidores de IA ECIL a
se adoptaron en aquel entonces figuraron la pa-
ralizaci6n de la production de queso, yogurt, fin de evitar la repeticibn de estos hechos que
etcetera. causan molestias innecesarias at pueblo.
dido a 110 mil kilogramos, to que hacla necesa-
rio la adopci6n de medidas que garantizaran
el suministro de leche a los niflos, fundamental
mente a los comprendidos entre las edades de
0 a 6 afios.
En el anAlisis efectuado qued6 demostrado que
Jos datos elaborados or la- ECIL, en cuanto
at censo de consumidores en Camaguey eran
inexactos, y que la aplicaci6n burocratica de
]as medidas adoptadas con base a esos datos
dio lugar a irregularidades en la distribucidn,,
de leche fresca en esta eiudad. .
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6 CPYRGHT
Granma, Havana
21 February 1967
gunas tartaletas de iresa, con fresa de p- nnnmin del pals v +para el pueblo, no
Banao, pasteles de un nuevo tipo que es- es-digno de dirigir ninguna unidad de
tan elaborarido, helados _Coppelia de j nrn(iuiecibn sociallsta (APLAUSOS). Es
'ducir en cualquier parte del mundo ,,.v..w..`., ~? __._._ ____ _
(APLAUSOS). Hoy los producen de 26 da mantenerse en clrcunstancias digamos
.,n~.msilae
ae que comenzo a xunciona.r ester f abrica Cie de praductos- Porque existio la vo-
l
. ni una soda irez ha faltado uno de
os sa? iuntad de que se hiciera asi, porque se
bores. (DEL PUBL.ICO LE DICEN ATE- _r_r tin nne dehia ser asi.
Eso depende de los gustos. Pero," sin du- ao' C9h~;; Ginn nue se incrementara el
das, el de chocolate es uno de los,que tie.
nen mas partidarios. Ni un solo dia ha fal- n umero de snores, y llegaremos a 40 o
42 sabores en ese helado (APLAUSOS)-!
permitir jamas que descienda un spice la hods ICIL laaindustria alimenticia, donde tene-
igPor que no podemos producirlos de mejor riec ad de prod- tos part el cbnsumo, pro- 1
.calidad que los capitalistas? (APLAU ductos de dulceria y de pasteleria, cara-
:SOS) jQue razones puede _ tener un ca- melos: confituras. Tiene que llegar el dia
EI capitalista'produce para las ganancias, da~producir en aquel:los paises mas avan-
En muchas ocaslanes lanza.n al mercado Adne en esos productos.
cuando ese producto gana lama, gana tea produciremos decenas de variedades
prestigio, gana mercado, comienza a dis- de queso. Y en este imomento tenemos en
pitalista es 18gico que influya la compe- "" `tudiando la
tintos paises de Europa, es tee-,
-
_.
entre si los productores capitalistas Para "?~? ~~ -?- -_ .~_~_____
de todas las variedades
hater una calidad standard, se preocu- a?" r_ _ _. _- _. ,
,' mas famosas de qucso que se producen
La'economia socialista produce para el pue-. rt i s Haicterias, cor:cespondientes a cada
pars las, necesidades. Cuando frente a, distintos tipos de queso,
cualquier empresa de producci6n socialis-
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release, 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CPYRGHT
Granma, Havana
17 February 1967
Toms posesion el capitan Carlos Chain Como
viceministro de Relations Exteriores
o En horas de la mafiana do ayer, tomb pose-
si6n coma viceministro de Relaciones Exterio.
res, at capitdn Carlos Chafn Soler, quien serfi
presentado esta tarde at Cuerpo Diplomitico
acreditado on nuestro pats.
El compafiero Chafn prest6 juramento de su
nuevo cargo ante el ministro de Relaciones Ex- ,
teriores, 'doctor Rail Roa ?Garcfa, en acto cele-
brado en )a Cancillerfa, at que asistieron fun-
cionarlos del MINREX.
? baton biogrbficos
Durante los sucesos del 90 de noviembre de
1946. en Santiago de Cuba, el compafiero Chafn
?..e detenido par la tiranfa.
E1 nuevo viceministro do Relaclones Exteriores,
fue Coordinador Provincial del Movimiento 26
de Julio en Camaguey durante la clandestinidad.
M&s tarde se trasladb a la Sierra Maestra, donde
obtuvo el grado de capitiln. Can posterioridad
.fue Coordinador del M-26-7 on Oriente.
.At triunfo de la Revoluci6n ocupb los cargos
de Comisionado Provincial de Oriente, jefe de
una Bona de desarrollo agrarlo en Baracoa y
Delegado Alterno de Cuba ante la OEA.
Ei fecha miss reoiente desempefib un alto cargo.
el-Mioisterio del Interior.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-030.61A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
WORLD PRESS COMMENT ON FRENCH C? ELECTION SUCCESSES
"The non-Communist left is no longer afraid to vote for the Commu-
nists, an observer said today. The center, which split on the second
round of the presidential elections of 1965 (60 percent for de Gaulle
and 4+0 percent for the left) divided in exactly the opposite ratio this
time. Centrist leader_Sen. Lecanuet charged today that it was Gaullist
tactics which had caused the Communist gains." WASHINGTON POST 14 March
1967.
"De Gaulle has largely himself to blame for the Communist resurgence:
his fervent courting of Communist countries and his criticism of U.S.
policies have given a new respectability to France's Communists." TIME
Magazine 17 March 1967.
"Time was when President de Gaulle stood for stability in France.
But his efforts to court Moscow have given~a measure of respectability
to the Communists in''France,'so that Mr.`Mitterand's appeal to the
electorate for a government in which Communists have a say is by no means
a wild gamble." HINDUSTAN TIMES (New-Delhi-) 9 March 1967.
"For the remarkable effectiveness of the pact between the Federation
and the Communist Party, General de Gaulle himself must surely claim a
share of the credit. Throughout the campaign the desire of the Communists
for acceptance and respectability had been striking... If the electorate
no longer visualizes M. Waldeck Rochet with a blood-smeared blade between
his teeth (to quote the enchanting -image of'M.Beuve-Mery, editor of LE
MONDE) has not General de'Gaulle done much to reassure them? He has
traveled through Russia with open arms ; `he has put down the red carpet
for Mr. Kosygin; he has welcomed trade agreements and shared cultures;
he stresses continually the need for an opening to the East. It is
impossible to equate all this with the idea of the Communists as a race
of ogres." MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 14 March 1967.
"Independent observers pointed out that President de Gaulle himself
had contributed to making the Communists 'respectable' in the eyes of
the voters. He did so, they said, by making French-Soviet friendship one
of the main elements of his foreign policy, by going to the Soviet Union
last summer and, more recently, by giving. the Soviet Premier, Aleksei
Kosygin, a triumphal welcome in France." N.Y. TIMES, 13 March 1967.
"President Charles de Gaulle, who is not a candidate (his seven-
year term does not expire until 1972), has identified the principal issue
in today's balloting as 'the republic and liberty,' which he maintains
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060007-6
are threatened because of the nature of 'the main opposition and its
dominant element,' a direct slap at the French Communists. This is some-
thing of a paradox., since the prime plank of. Gaullist for'e'ign policy con-
tinues to be accommodation with the nations of, the.Communiest east,
ranging from Hungary to North Vietnam." WASHINGTON STAR,'1L2 March 1967.
I "There are those who feel that by deliberately conducting the internal
political struggle in such a way that the non-Gaullist center was crushed
and the Left emerged as the only alternative to Gaullism,'tihe President
has created an explosive situation which may one day.haunt his heirs."
N.Y. TIMES, 12 March 1967.
"President de Gaulle himself has done more than any other Frenchman
to make communism acceptable. He.has cooperated in foreign affairs with
Moscow, often aga'Lnst.his Western ' allies. He has'projeeted a reunified
Europe on the basis of Frcnph-Soviet c9llaboratio;1. In they election, to
be sure, he raised the 'ned scare" to try to win votes in the second
round. It did not work. The elections turned out much.more to Moscow's
liking than to General de Gaulle"s. It suited the Kremlin that Gaullists
should stay in power with their policies for reducing American influence
in Europe. But it suited Soviet leaders just as well that Gaullist power
should be whittled down in France while Cgmmunist Party strength increased
more than any other single group." CHRI$TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Boston)
15 March 1967.
"The remarkable success of the Cgmmunists.and their steady cooperation
with the Socialists is a double blow. There will be increasing pressure
from the left that now looks like a possible future government. This
has been brought about by a serious miscalculation by'the President, who
thought his friendship with Russia and hostility to America would win
him much of the Communist vote. On the contrary, making the Communist
Party respectable has given it a boost and a future." LONDON DAILY
TELEGRAPH (as quoted by the BBC) 14 March 1967.
"In many cases, the extreme right, which kept repeating 'De Gaulle
equals Communism,' gave powerful support to the partisans of Waldeck
Rochet. Eliminating the myth of the Communist Party, the-personal work of
the Head of State, reacted against him... At the moment, opinion across
the Channel contents itself with observing that the electorate was unim-
pressed by the last-minute efforts of the Elysee to persuade it that an
advance by the Communists,'or a possible success of the oppos=ition parties,
would result in the certainty of chaos for France. In this connection,
one notes particularly that the part that General de Gaulle himself
played by undertaking a major improvement of relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, detracted considerably from his argkunen;."
LE FIGARO` (Paris) 11+ March 1967.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
"The Communist Party has gained votes, it has gained seats; it is
plainly making headway. One should not be astonished. The visit of the
General to Moscow, the 101-gun salute to Kosygin have liberated more than
one elector from the scruples which would have prevented him from sup-
porting a party more or less dependent upon a foreign power, and which
the General himself described as 'separatist' not long ago." (Editorial
by Andre Francois-Poncet of the French Academy) LE FIGARO (Paris)
15 March 1967.
"Certainly, over a period of several years the Communist Party has
made desperate efforts to come out of its ghetto. Its attitude at the
time of the presidential election gave the first evidence of this.
But this was not sufficient. The evolution of the international situation
toward detente, the recent Sino-Soviet conflict in which the USSR seemed
to put on again the boots of social democracy, and above all the Franco-
Soviet rapprochement, all this necessarily made an impression on the
average voter of the non-Communist left. In effect, one cannot take every
opportunity to extol Franco-Soviet amity, as the President of the Repub-
lic does, and at the same time continue to denounce, as the Premier does,
the 'red dictatorship' rampant in the Soviet Union, a dictatorship of
which the French Communist Party is supposed to be the recognized repre-
sentative in our country." AUX ECOUTES (Paris)16 March 1967.
"There is no one outside of the Communist Party ranks who thinks
that the success is attributed to sudden confidence in the Communist
Party, although de Gaulle's new East policy may have made the Party some-
what acceptable to a number of voters." ATFETTPOSTEN (Oslo) 14 March 1967.
"The Gaullist seback in the Sunday run-offs resulted primarily from
the agreement between the Reds and two socialist parties to run a single
slate of candidates. De Gaulle reportedly had welcomed this polarization
of French politics on the theory that the French voter's long standing
fear of the Communists would give the Gaullist candidates and advantage.
As he told a cabinet meeting last week, the issue is between the Republic
and freedom. Obviously, the general miscalculated. The elections
demonstrated that the big Communist Party has become more respectable,
due mostly to De Gaulle's own open courtship of the Soviet Union. A
recent poll showed that most Frenchmen now view the possibility of Red
participation in the government without alarm. If the coalition of the
left comes unglued, then the Gaullist forces presumably will be able to
continue their control of France even after De Gaulle departs from the
scene. But if the marriage sticks, then the unholy alliance of Communists
and socialists may well be the dominating force in post-de Gaulle France.
That is an unsettling prospect not only for sensible Frenchmen,, but for
Americans who recognize France's key role in Europe." LOS ANGELES'.
TIMES 15 March 1967.
3
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
"One could hear on television last Monday evening a well-known Dutch
journalist, Mr. Hilterman, who had made a special trip to Paris, comment
on the results of the French election. The Communists are no longer in
quarantine, he said, and their notable advance is due not only to the dis-
cipline of the parties of the left, but also to the encouragement which
some individuals have been able to find in different aspects of the
policy of General. de Gaulle with his overtures to the East, his trip to
Moscow, the withdrawal of France from NATO, his anti-Americana attitudes."
(from an article by the special correspondent in The Hague, Jean Felix-
Faure) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March 1967..
"Analyzing the loss by the Fifth Republic, the liberal German-
language newspaper BASLER NACHRICHTEN opined that General de Gaulle had
only reaped the fruits of his foreign policy: 'One who makes himself
the propagandist of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, who allows
himself to be acclaimed in the Soviet Union..., who boasts to other
Western countries of his excellent relations with the Eastern bloc, should
not be astonished. when the fear of communism no longer plays its former
scarecrow role in. his own country."' (from an article by the special
correspondent in Bern) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March .967.
"Paradoxically, by his overtures toward the East and his close
relationship with the USSR, de Gaulle has made Communism respectable in
the eyes of his fellow citizens, wrote in effect N.T. and BERLINGSKE
AF'TENAVIS. Thus it was useless to give warnings at the last minute
against a red peril in which the great mass had ceased to be--ieve because
of him." (from a report by Camille Olsen, special correspondent in
Copenhagen) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March 1967.
"It is this feeling which caused individuals, organizations; and
parties to seek the essential unity of action, which, moreover, Gaullism
imposed upon them. In this sense, de Gaulle rendered service. He
acted in such a way that no one could talte exception to hj5 decisions, on
foreign policy without placing himself 'to the right of Gaullism'. He
violated French conservatism by tearing away its colonialist tendencies
and its visceral anticommunism. Without the beneficent conjunction of
t;he Gaullist attitude and the feeling of unity of the left, there would
have been no leap forward. It is not in the least embarrassing to admit
it." (from an article by Jean Daniel) LE NOUVEL OBSERVATE''JR (Paris
liberal leftist weekly) 15-21 March 1967.
"It turned out, despite'all the prophesies and anti-Communist propa-
ganda, that the followers of the leftist parties, almost everywhere,
voted in a disciplined manner for the unity candidate, eve:a if this can-
didate was a Communist... With the exception of a. few rightist candidates
the foreign policy of the President was not attacked very mush in the
election campaign.... The left, primarily the Communists, also supports
the most positive elements of this foreign policy. The social policy,
the economic situation of the country, primarily the development of the
living and working circumstances of the workers and other :Little people
counted for much more... As a result of the constitution the government
is threatened for the time being (as long as General De Gaulle is presi-
dent) by a few unpleasantnesses at most...." MAGYARORSZAG (Budapest)
19 l 4ioid For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
Moscow TASS international Service in English 0553 GMT 24 February 1967
(Text) Moscow--"The meeting in the Polish capital is of great importance for the
further practical implementation of the Bucharest declaration, which has already
played a positive role in strengthening peace and security in Europe," B. Pyadyshev
and R. Sergeyev write in today's PRAVDA.
In their article they discuss European security problems in the light of the
recent Warsaw meeting of foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact states. They recall
that trends toward easing tension, removing cold war consequences, clearing
obstacles hampering normal development of European cooperation, and settling
disputes through improved mutual understanding have grown stronger in Europe
in the seven months that have passed since adoption of the Bucharest declaration.
This is due, above all, to the vigorous and persistent effort of fraternal
socialist countries, the article says.
There is also another aspect to the European situation. "Opposing these trends
toward-easing tensions are the forces of aggression and reaction which seek to work
up tension and vitiate relations between, European states. "A direct threat to
European peace comes from U.S. policy, which in another region of the world,
southeast Asia, has already led to unleashing a?war of aggression against the
Vietnamese people.
kmerican policy is all the more dangerous to the European pcoples,.since it
relies ever more heavily on a collusion with the militarist and revanchist
forces of the German Federal Republic.",
After noting that Kiesinger's government his left the Adenauer-Erhard policy basically
unchanged, the writers of the article say that present Bonn rulers have somewhat
modified their tactics in pursuing this policy.
"NDw," the article says, "the Federal Government no longer Fares to openly oppose
the line toward detente in Europe. Bonn now tries to camou.'lage the old dangerous
policy with haranguing about.a readiness for settled exist-nce, the desire to
discuss, and peace in Europe.' The Kiesinger government ha,. considerably
enlivened the so-called 'Eastern policy,' the main aim of which is to undermine
the united front of the socialist countries in their strugg.e for security in
Europe and to isolate the GDR, to make it more difficult to follow the line adupted
by the Warsaw Pact members in the Bucharest declaration."o
"German Federal Republic ruling circles pin special hopes," the article says, "on
the Kiesinger government's deciared wish to establish diploca.tic relations with th
e
European socialist countries with which the Federal Republic does riot have such
relations. Bonn leaders are quite eloquent in their efforts to convince public
opinion that the establishment of diplomatic relations in itself means a relaxation
of tension, and attests to a change in the foreign policy life of the German
Federal Republic."
But these policy maneuvers "in the eastern direction" are needed by Federal
Republic ruling circles not for relieving tension and develo?ing relations, but
as a screen to cover up their revanchist and militarist course, the art
A i -For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-030.61A0004000c
66007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
"European countries t ,.kirg 3tron,;er European security can on y welcome a reasonable,
critical approach by Federal Republic leaders to problems which caused the political
crisis and the change of government in Bonn. This approach of course nus?; be
based on an understandin,*, and recognition of the key conditi.ns necessary for
European security, which cannot contradict the correctly int(greted interests of
the Federal Republic."
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
N ;-YORK TYAV?S
27 February 3.967
Conferences Is Planned by European Communists
MOSCOW, Feb. 26--Thee id
ers of most European Commit
nist parties plant to meet i
Czechoslavakfa April 24 to 2
will be the first step toward a
world conference of Communist
parties.
The meeting Is scheduled to
take place in Karlovy Vary,
once the favorite watering
place of the Habsburg Empire's
royalty and their friends. The
once-plush hotels, dating from
the days when the spa was bet-
ter known as Karisbad, are to
provide the setting.
The conference was an-
nounced here tonight by Tass,
the Soviet press agency, at the
conclusion of a preparatory
meeting in Warsaw. The first
session, which opened Wednes-
day, drafted documents for
submission to the April confer-
ence and discussed its organi-
zation, Tass said.
Fraternal Atmosphere
The Warsanv ' meeting was
eld in a fraternal atmosphere,
he' Soviet agency declared.
his can be explained in large
easure by the fact that most
f the parties that oppose a
orld .conference did not at-
end.
Among the absentees were
he ruling Communist parties
Moscow Hopes April Meetin
at Czechoslovak Spa Will
Lead to World Parley
Western European parties th
did not attend were those
way and Iceland.
Communist sources to be p
pared to extend their boyco
to the Karlovy Vary meetin;
ich is to be attended by th
arties' top leaders. Efforts ti
ersuade them to change thei
inds are expected to continue
In these efforts, the pro
oscow parties appear certali
make use of a significan
hange of tack by the leade
f the. Italian Communists, the
can party member who ba!
itherto opposed the calling o;
world conference.
Usefuhiess Doubted
In a speech Friday to th
lenary session of his party'.
he Italian General Secretary
mphasized that he had neve
pposed the principle of a wort
onference, Tass reported. Th
talian party had doubts onl
mber.
rian party congress in No-
my to deepen the split among)
rence called to condemn the
Until recently, the Italia
arty leadership. had consist
ngo was reported to hay
d.
But In his speech Friday, M
Longo declared that the leader
of the Chinese party had "de
stroyed any passibility of rela
tions with Communist partie
that do not agree with the;
position and that denounce an
reject their disorgarizatior
and disruptive activities,"
Preliminary Ta1Hs Urged
The ]:tallan Communist leade
stressed that preliminary dis
cussions are needed before
world meeting can be called. A
least a year is needed for sue
discussions, he said.
Because of the leading roll
,the Italian party has taken I
the idological dispute in th
Communist movement and th
respect in which it Is held b
significant elements in all Corn
munist parties. Mr. Long?o's ne
statement Is viewed as an im
portant concession toward th
Soviet Union's desire to ho1
a world meeting.
To persuade the Italians t
attend the Warsaw meeting
assuranoea had to be given tha
the parley would adhere to it
announced program of discuss
Ing "European' security" an
that the issue of world Com?
munist unity would not b
raised.
While . the Karlovy Var
meeting again has only Europe
on its agenda, the Soviet Union
and Its supporters are expected
to try to turn It Into the re-
global foreret of a world
conference.
CIA- DP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
THE ECONOMIST MARCH 4, 1967
-3-
CPYRGHT
You must hand it to the Russians ; they
never give up easily. Representatives of t9
European communist parties met in War-
saw from February 22nd to 26th with the
proclaimed object of preparing the ground
for a conference on European security
problems. There is no reason to doubt that
that was what they in fact did ; the confer-
r.=ice was fixed for April 24th to 27th at
Karlovy Vary in C-Acchoslovakia. But, in
spite of all the denials, it is widely sus-
pected that for the Russians the real signi-
ficance of next month's conference is that
it will-they hope-be a milestone on the
road to a world communist conference, not
just a European one. It seems that the
Russians refuse to give up this goal, how-
ever devious the route to it, because they
cannot think of any better way of re-forming
the ragged ranks of the communist move-
ment and getting their friends to accept the
policy Russia wants to follow in Asia.
The most notable absentees at last week's
Warsaw meeting (apart from the Jugoslavs)
were the Rumanians. Two years ago they
refused to attend a meeting of communist
parties in Moscow ; but that meeting was
specifically concerned with.the Sino-Soviet
quarrel, into which the Rumanians have al-
ways refused to be drawn. The Warsaw
meeting, however, was called to discuss
European security-that is, the German
problem-and the Rumanians should not
have objected to that. Probably, even more
than most people, they suspect the motives
behind the proposed European communist
meeting, and prudently refused to embark
on something that might end by making
theta appear a good deal closer to Moscow
than they have any intention of getting.
Other parties, notably the Italian one,
seem to have decided to play along with the
Russians but without abandoning any of
their prejudices against a world meeting.
The top Italian communists stayed away
from Warsaw last week ; instead they held
a central committee meeting at which all
their cautious reservations about a world
meeting were fully ventilated. Signor
Longo, the party secretary, told his col-
leagues that it would take at least twelve
months to prepare adequately for a con-
ference. He added that his party would not
let itself get dragged into any old confer-
ence ; it would go to one only with a pre-
viously agreed agenda that really would
promote the unity of the communist move-
ment. Altogether, it looks as if the Russians
will have to take care lest their ploy for
reuniting the movement does not end by
merely underlining its differences.
On the other hand the German problem-
the ostensible reason for next month's meet-
ing at Karlovy Vary-now seems to be
much less of an apple of discord among the
east European countries than it was a few
weeks ago. Although the Rumanians remain
the odd men out, the rest have been care-
fully letting Herr Ulbricht know they still
love him, In Czechoslovakia and in Poland
some prominent men have been making
speeches in which they took a very tough
line towards west Germany.
On Wednesday in Warsaw Mr Novotny
signed a new treaty of friendship with the
Poles to replace the 20-year treaty signed
in 1947 ; the occasion was of course used
to reaffirm the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact
states against the " pretensions and tactical
manceuvres of Bonn." But perhaps more
significant than all the anti-Bonn diatribes
is the report that later this month Herr
Ulbricht is to go to Warsaw and Prague to
sign treaties of friendship with the Poles
and the Czechs. It looks as if the
word has gone round that even if most of
the east Europeans decide to recognise west
Germany, Herr Ulbricht must not be
allowed to feel totally abandoned.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 20116/be/l?':'CIA-RDP78-03061AO0040M;b O 4
Li. _
BALTIMORE SUN
7 March 1967
ROMANIA TO SHUN
BAST-BLOC TALKS
Says April Parley Agenda
Threatens Party Unity
By STUART S. SMITH
r vnw.. o...sn., n1 Th. Rnnl
Bonn, March 6 ---Romanian
Communist leaders will, boycott
the party conference to be held
from April 24 to April 27 in
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia,
Romanian sources said today.
The meeting, it was e;cplained.
is being planned around an
agenda which the Romanian
party opposes as a threat to
party unity.
The conference was called dur?
Eastern and Western European
Communist officials held in War-
saw between February 22 and
February 2G. A communique is-
sued the last day announced
that the April conference would
deal with the "question of Euro-
pean security."
A Common Policy
Political observers here as-
sume that this can be inter-
preted as an attempt to estab-
lish a common policy toward
West Germany. ,
Romania boycottedr the Feb-
ruary talks, too, as did the Com-
munist parties of Yugoslavia,
Albania, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden and Iceland.
I nthis connection Romanian
sources called attention to a
recent editorial in Scinteio, \the
Romanian party newspaper,
which made pointed remarks
LOS ANGELES TIMES CPYRGHT
Sunday 12 March 1967
41
I ti,
Boycoll :ed
J 6 6afhen'n~p.
Says Meeting
Would, .Deepen'
Communism' Split
BY LOUIS B. FLEIVING
times Staff Writer'
Romania has made. clear
its intention to boycott the
European - Comrrfflnist
meeting next, month in
Czechoslovakia. .
An'editoria1,in, the
Romanian Communist
Party newspaper- Sci4teia,
which. means "S_paa r. k,"
suggests that such a; njeet-
ing would. deepen'' tho,lex-
isting division.., rn. ,;world ,
communism.
apravedafeai'i le
editorialdid not come.as a
the sharpness of the, thinly
veiled criticism of ,the
Soviet Union was : iziter-
preted by some as, more
intense than usual.,
Absent at Sesslnn
They meeting of : Eu-
ropean Communist `Party
leaders 'is ' scheduled to
begin April .24 in Karlovy,
Vary,-.a ,Czech resort .The
meeting was ? arranged" at a
p 1 a n,n i n g session,;. in
Warsaw last mon'tb.;but
the parties. - of' Romania
.and Yugoslavia, as.well as
those of the Netherlands,
Sweden, Norway',&nd
Iceland did no t atte''xid the
planning sessions',-"-'--
There had been 1r id.jca-
tions that the Soviet
Union, hopes that the
meeting of European par-
,ties will lead to a world
C o in munist .conference.
,The idea ofa world confer-
-ence was raised again,.last
November aC, the .$.uIga
rian party congress,. p esu-
;mably . at the.. behest: of
Moscow, and was~-subse-
quently ,promoted it ',the
Hu D .I
uncalled, or
interference with other parties'
affairs.
The editorial, titled "The uni-
ty of the Communist movement
is our supreme duty," warned,
in effect, that he Romanian
party would not feel bound by
the April conference's decisions.
"Neither bilateral nor multi
lateral consultations of Commu
nist parties are entited to dis-
cuss internal and foreign poli-
cies of other parities. Even less
are they entitled to pass judg-
ment on their activity or to set
up rules and recipes on what is
right and what in wrong in all
circumstances and for all coun-
tries"
The comment would appear to
be a rejection of the criticism
directed at Romz:nia for estab-
,lishing diplomatic relations with
I Bonn last month.
CPYRGHT
w oases.
-A suspicion .hat Mos-
cow is seeking the confer-
ence as a platform to de-
nounce 't h e Communist
leadership of manland.
China.
-A feeling that Moscow
will also use the confer-,
ence to seek to assert its
leadership of world com-
munirm.
There is an' additional
anxiety now on the part of
RomanIa, a fear' that
Moscow, with the support
of Poland and East
Germany, will use the
European conference to
embarrass the diplomatic
relations established be-
'tween Romania and West
Germany at the end of
January.
New Manifesto
Thi new Romanian cri..
ticisti-,Of the conference
idea:3nd of Soviet policies
r.in the' world Communist
,?thoverr ent appears to. re-
'present a new manifesto
`'of the kind of nationally
oriented communism
-'espoused both in Buch.-
se 2YOUID -RD 6480 1 AOQ0400060007-6
pposi ion aces The engt y s.rticle oc-
R n in ania's _' Opposition cupied:,.rnost of the space
in Scirfteia-on Feb.8. but
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
the' tzsusl foreign transla- ;"the:?us'uat ,Rox4iaii is ` nsfs--
tions.'91ipareritly were de- tence on equality and in-
liberately -delayed to avoid de p e n d e n c e.',-.16r.- a 11
the:: impression., that Ro- Communist p a't f e s. It
mania was opening a -pro- 'adds a demand, that the
paganda~ campaign against Soviet Union; and others,
M,o s c o w. h e - English cease immediately med=
translation has just been dling'fn the, new problem
,made a v a'i,1 a,b Fe . here of Communist parties that
,through Ag 0pres53: the of have been: split into pro.
ficial It a m n i,a z} news , Peking and pro-Moscow
agency. :' factions.
Seen as Aitac~C Any tendency of im-
Within the article, there printing from the outside
is no ;? reference tot, the a certain orientation or a
conferenc' pr oposa> as certain mode of solving
such,. nor is any;:'of . the these problems to a party
criticism . of the..c$oyiet means inadmissible inter.
..;Union directed by name at ference in its internal
Moscow. But expet`.ts in. affairs," Scinteia asserts.
such matters report that The opposition to the
there is no questiolr:about proposed conference ap.
the object."of the.: article, pears to be summed in this
and Eastern European di- statement:
plomats' here have.; corro-
boratedthe interpretation.
THE G U AIR D I A N Friday'. March 3 1967
Herr.. Ulbricht urges
-terms'
answer to Bonn
From NORMAN CROSSLAND '
Bonn, March 2
West Germany's policy towards Eastern Europe, which
scored a notable success when diplomatic relations were
established with Rumania last month, is encountering
stiffening resistance in other Warsaw Pact States whose
support against Bonn is being energetically rallied by the
'East German Communist leader, Herr Ulbricht..
The renewal of the friendship treaty between Poland
and Czechoslovakia in Warsaw yesterday provided a further
opportunity for a t t a c k s
against West German policy' fulfi[To did lment of these edemands~a,,
in Eastern Europe, and the condition of Czechoslovak agree-
words of the Czech leader, . 'Mr , ment to establish diplomatic
Novotny, were another blow to relations with West Germany, as
Bonn's hopes that Czecho- the Poles have done. Herr
slovakia might be prepared to Ulbricht's aim is to obtain from
fqllow Rumania's example. his allies a hard and fast under-
Although Mr Novotny was taking that normalisation of
more restrained than the Polish relations with West Germany Is
only possible if Bonn accepts the
Communist Party leader, Mr
facts life
Gomulka, in his.comments about, and, in addition.
renounces for ever any kind of
West Germany, he. also rejected
Bonn's claim to reprepent all nuclear role.
p Germans and sa ed ~theat 16460/UCMp l
reeDg i rFOG ~tne arf p0V,,
recognise the Oder-Nelsse line
and accept the existence-of two among the Warsaw Pact coun-
German States. tries, the response to Bonns
"It is the firm belief of
the Romanian Communist
Party, a belief stemming
from the most profound
requirements of the deve-
lopment of the Communist
movement, that in the
conditions of today, noth-
ing, absolutely nothing,
must be undertaken that
might aggravate the diver-
gencies, worsen the pre-
sent state of affairs, might
add new elements of ten-
sion and deepen the dan-
ger of diversion."
In discussion of inter
party relations, the Ro.
manian party argues that
socialist internationalism
"should proceed from the
observance of the right of
each party to indepen.
dently establish its politi-
cal line and objectives."
CPYRGHT
GPYRGHT
initiative served to lay bare the
disharmony in the Communist
camp. The hurriedly called
Foreign Ministers' conference In
Warsaw after the establishment
of diplomatic relations between
Bonn and Bucharest did not pro?
duce the results which Herr
Ulbricht desired although now
there are signs that his campaign
may not be altogether
unsuccessful.
Like disturbed ? ants, Com-
munist statesmen have been
rushing hither and thither to'
regroup their forces. and the i
I Inference of European Com?
munist parties in Karisbad in
April to decide on a common
approach. -
The West German Government
ad every reason to believe that
ungary would follow Rumania
n agreeing to full diplomatic
elations, but recent press com-
ents in Budapest have not been
ncouraging and the Hungarian.
arty leader, Mr Kadar, has not
een in Moscow this week for the,
enefit of his health.
I The Bulgarian Aoreign Minister
ecepted an Invitation to call at
ast Berlin on his way to Scan?
inavia, and it can be assumed
at Herr Ulbricht has been
autloning his guest against .
(ling for Dr Kiesinger's charms.
~rROOaaooosooor-a
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CPYRGHT
_.6-
What Bonn referred to as the'
"hard tier" of the Warsaw Pact
-East Germany, the Soviet
,Union, and Poland-could have !
been expected anyway to react'
as they have, to the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations
between West Germany and
Rumania; but the outcry in West
Germany against the non-pro.
Iiferation treaty is providing
them with further propaganda
to use In persuading their
at softer " partners to i g n o r e
Bonn's offers. This Is Just what
the moderate members of the
West German Government had
feared would happen.
BALTU'ORE SUPT
17 March 1967
1,51 EXCLUSION;
FROM EUROPE
TALKS DENIED
East Germany Asserts
Bonn Is Preventing
Security Parley
Bonn, March 16 - East Ger-
many today denied that the War-
s;::: Pact nations, are trying to
arrange a European security
conference without United States
participation.
Some observers Interpreted
the action as a possible first
step in breathing new life into
the long-dormant proposal to
hold high-level talks about the
continent's political future.
Without United States repre-
sentation, neither Washington
nor any other Atlantic alliance
capital with the possible excep-
tion of Paris would be willing to
meet with Europe's Communist
leaders to discuss the matter.
Magazine Criticized Bonn
Heretofore, Warsaw alliance
officials have either belittled the
United States' right to be pres-
ent or confused the issue with
imprecise remarks.
Today, however,, the semi-of-
ficial East Berlin magazine
'rof 12
P an anc~ e w rc un-.
braided. West Germany for al-'
CPYRGHT
By artificially exaggerating
who should not attend, Bonn has
"Complete Falsification"
from Europe, the [Jlbricht re.
The "Bonn version," to the
question of European, security in
general and an all-European
conference in particular," it ad.
,.Last summer's Warsaw al.
communique, the magazine.
sion, [European security talks]
the Warsaw Treaty states make
no exception.
Each Can Choose
"It is of the competence of
each country to choose whether
to participate or not, to partici-
pate in the discussion and the
solving of European probs
lems...
"The states represented at
the [Bucharest] meeting are
convinced that neither are the
countries on other continents in-
different to the turn the 'Eu-
ropean problems take... .
"Therefore, any government
Europe 011d,71111116t but blul
such effo.cts."
Last April, following an au.
dience with Pope Paul VI, An.
drei Gromyko, the Soviel
Foreign Minister, proposed ar
ail-European summit meeting
without the United States.
However, at about the same
time Adam Itapacki, the Polish
Foreign Minister, said the Unit-
ed States would of course be ex-
pected to be present.
During Soviet Premier Alexei!
N. Kosygin's trip to London four
weeks ago, he and Prime Minis-
ter Harold Wilson agreed a Eu-
ropean security conference
would be "valuable, subject to
the necessary preparations."
The new :Kiesinger Adminis-
tration's flexibility in Eastern
European affairs might make a
conference more, appealing to
the U.S;S.R., but even assuming
Moscow and the other Warsaw;
Pact members strongly desire;
such talks, which Is by no!
means sure, it seems unlikely
they would be launched until
West Germany signs the pro-
posed nuclear non-proliferation
itreaty.;
t> rt~M- r 8-03061 A000400060007
step that leads to detente and
improvement of the situation ir.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW ON BELGRADE
FOR CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CP'S
IL GIORNO, Milan, Italy
8 January 1967
According to information from a good source, the Central Committee
of the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter to the Central Committee of
the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the letter, it seems, the Soviet leaders
asked Tito to modify his attitude with regard to a conference of the
European communist parties, which, officially, is to be devoted to European
security. Tito had expressed the opinion that this conference should not
be held, or that, if it were, the communist parties in power should not
participate, It is not difficult to understand the real motives of Tito's
reservations. The Yugoslav leaders, while not saying so, indicate that
they fear that an intercommunist conference dedicated. to European security
would, instead, develop into a conference condemning the Chinese,
The Soviet document, furthermore, asked for clarification in terms
of reproof, about the Yugoslav proposals for the reorganization of the
communist party; proposals aimed at lessening the "hold" of the party on
the internal affairs of the country and at creating in Yugoslavia other
centers of state power (for example, a parliament independent of the Party).
The Soviet letter stated that they spoke in the name of all communist par-
ties in power. But this declaration, it seems, is inexact. The Rumanians,
in fact, have already let Belgrade know that they are not in sympathy with
the Soviet initiative.
This information came to light a few days prior to the meeting (set
for next Tuesday) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugo-
slavia and several weeks prior to the trip that Tito intends to make to
Moscow. For some time, as is known, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have shown
a certain amount of worsening. In September of last year, Brezhnev came
to Yugoslavia to propose this very thing, the convocation of an inter-
communist conference to condemn China and to ask, it seems, for clarifica-
tion on the Rankovic affair - the neo-Stalinist leader ousted by the Yugo-
slav Communist Party for being opposed to the economic reform which the
country is carrying out; Rankovic, according to others, was also very much
allied with Moscow. Brezhnev on the occasion of this visit got nothing
from Tito.
The Yugoslav economic reform and the proposals for democratization
of the domestic life of the country (of which confirmation was recently
noted with the liberation of Djilas), have caused a certain amount of
anxiety in the Soviet leaders. On their side, the Yugoslavs, while show-
ing toward Maoism the same severe judgment as the Soviets, are not in
accord with the idea of a conference condemning the Chinese; they fear
that the condemnation of Mao will at the same time also serve the Russians
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
in reestablishing over the European communist countries a policy of strict
obedience to the Moscow center. In this double series of fears, of one
against the other, lies the primary reason for the letter sent by the
Russians to the Yugoslavs.
This letter, furthermore, bears witness to a new state of tension
in relations between the two countries, perhaps one of the ir..ost serious
in years in this respect. This situation will certainly be discussed in
the forthcoming :plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist
Party. The meeting has on its agenda, in fact, "the current problems of
the international Communist movement." Then Tito, while in Moscow, will
probably seek a direct meeting with Brezhnev. In any case, it is possible
that, as of now, a new phase in Yugoslav-Soviet relations has probably been
opened - a phase open to any possible development.
In this regard, it should be recalled that recently, and on more than
one occasion, the Yugoslav leaders have openly shown their irritation in
the face of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the country.
A scarcely veiled specific reference to this problem was made recently by
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Nikezic in the text of an interview over
Belgrade television. Nikezic, referring to the "Rankovic affair," stated
that "certain dogmatic and bureaucratic forces, not finding support within
the country, sought it abroad, thus exposing Yugoslavia to a series of
possible pressures." The principal Yugoslav daily, BORBA, has hastened to
declare that "Yugoslavia possesses the strongest desire and decision to
oppose any sort of pressure whatsoever." It is needless to say that
"pressures" of this type are attributed to Moscow. But Belgrade, it seems,
has decided to resist. -- Raffaelo Uboldi.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
Basic Guidance for Komsomols in International Youth Activities
(excerpts from: Ra1~h T. Fisher, "Pattern
for Soviet Youth", Columbia University Press,
New York, 1959, concerning the report of
Komsomol Central Committee member Lazar Shatskin
to the Third Komsomol Congress, Moscow,
October 2-10, 1920.)
How Komsomolites were expected to think and act in regard to the
"Y (Communist International of Youth) was indicated in Lazar' Shatskin's
report to the Third Komsomol Congress. Shatskin had been one of the
Komsomol delegates present at the founding of the CIY, and he had been
elected to its Executive Committee. He discussed first the question
of the relation of the various Communist Leagues of Youth to their re-
spective Communist Parties, and, correspondingly, of the new CIY to
the Comintern. In the beginning, the Western Communists at 3erlin all
insisted that their Communist youth organizations must have "absolute
independence" from any party. Why was this? Shatskin explained it
this way: The revolutionary youth of the West had had previous ex-
perience with adult "social patriots" who, being afraid of the "rev-
olutionary spirit of youth," had tried to control the youth organiza-
tions. Youth had therefore developed a "hatred toward adult organiza-
tions in general." Furthermore, during the World War the Communist
youth groups in Western Europe "had been obliged against their will to
take upon themselves the functions of political parties,'' inasmuch as
the adult parties had forsaken social democracy for "social patriot-
ism" in supporting their governments in the war. But the situation
now, declared Chatskin, had changed. Communist Parties had been
organized in Western Europe. They "had no need to fear the revolution-
ary youth organizations," and therefore were not inclined to hamper
their development. Moreover, these Communist Parties could now re-
lieve the youth organizations of their "functions as political parties,"
which the youth groups had ''fulfilled involuntarily during the war."
Therefore, Shatskin explained, the old slogan of "absolute independ-
ence of the youth movement" --- which had been necessary in;-order to
break youth off from the "social patriotic parties" -- was out of
date. The type of relationship suited to the present, he went on,
was that which obtained in Russia. Here, "we can have full confidence
in the Communist Party," which is "model in all respects." Therefore,
he said, "we, while recognizing the necessity of youth's spontaneous
activity in organizational work, at the same time recognize the
necessity for the centralization of all Communist forces, including
the League, under the guidance of the Party." The Russian type of
relationship between Youth League and Communist Party was character-
ized as the most advanced," and the relationships prevailing in all
other countries were graded, from the most "backward" (as in Denmark
and France) through the "intermediate" or "transitional" stare of
greater "'trust" and centralization (as in Germany) to the "'most ad-
vanced" type as in Russia.
That gradation was not merely an acknowledgement of a trend.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
Shatskin made it clear that the Komsomol delegates had to "bring
the Western European youth organizations over to the platform that
we have in Soviet Russia." At the Berlin Congress, Shatskin and
his Russian colleague had found all the Western Europeans opposed
to the Soviet view. But after the application of what he called
'pressure (theoretical)," and "an extremely.great struggle," he
had managed to persuade the other youth organizations to "relinquish
the functions of political parties and accept the program of the
Communist Parties of their countries." By the same logic, apparently,
the Western delegates were persuaded to make the CIY a part of the
Third International. But dissenters remained, and only by continued
elf-Port had they been brought around to the Russian view. As of
October, 1920, Shatskin exulted, "We may with complete justification
announce that on this question the Russian Communist League of Youth...
is now the victor in all respects."
Thus, by October, 1920, the reins of authority in the Communist
International of Youth were already securely in Bolshevik hands.
Obviously facilitating this was the great prestige enjoyed by the one
Communist Party that had ridden successfully through a revolution.
But the Russian Communists were not relying on that prestige alone.
They had obliged those youth groups that wished to call themselves
"Communist" to acknowledge the authority both of the Comintern and
also of the Communist Parties in their respective countries. Mean-
while, at the Second Congress of the Comintern (July 17 to August 7,
1920), the Bolsheviks had obtained the enactment of regulations which
required all Communist Parties to subordinate themselves to the
Executive Committee of the Comintern and which, at the same time,
guaranteed that the Executive Committee of the Comintern would be
controlled by the Russian Communist Party. The result was that the
leaders of the Russian Communist Party had created a system of multiple
controls leading from the apex of the RCP down to all foreign Communist
youth groups. One line of control went through the Comintern to the
CP of each country concerned, and thence to the national youth league.
A second line went through the Comintern to the CIY, and thence to
the various national youth leagues. And still a third line went through
the CC of the Komsomol to the CIY, and thence to the other youth
leagues.
Not content with annulling the CIY's claim to independence, the
Russian Komsomol representatives strove to achieve unity of outlook in
the CIY. Some of the foreign youth groups, for example, had been
clamoring for universal disarmament. The Soviet position at the
moment was that "the slogan of universal disarmament is in fact counter-
revolutionary, for it suggests to the workers the thought that they
can seize power without using arms." The Russians had succeeded, re-
ported Shatskin, in having the CIY reject pacifism and come out for
the Soviet position. In order to insure conformity in the future,
the Russian delegates had insisted that the policies to be followed
by youth groups in other countries must be determined by "the experience
of the Russian youth league, whose basic principles are suited to any
youth organization under conditions of proletarian dictatorship." The
Russian leaders were alert to safeguard the CIY against the "yellow"
(i.e., procapitalist) or "social patriotic" youth groups, the
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
"socialist center" youth groups, and the "super-Lefts". Very perni-
cious, said Shatskin, were the "socialist center" people who had
tried to join the CIY in order to "demoralize" it by urging "auton-
omy" for youth groups within the CIY. But the Communists, Shatskin
reported with satisfaction, had turned the tables on them and in
several cases had managed either to split the rival organizations or
to take them over from within.
Acting in response to Shatskin's report, the Third Congress
ratified the entry of the Komsomol into the CIY. The delegates
promised "spiritual and material help [probably meaning money] to
the youth of the countries oppressed by capitalism." They declared
their obligation "to serve as a model for the international youth
movement and to take the most active part in all the struggle and
work of the Communist International of Youth." The delegates also
accepted it as their task "to rear the members of the League in the
spirit of the international solidarity of the young proletarians of
all countries." The new League Program adopted at the Third Congress
characterized the CIY as the "military staff directing the struggle
of the young workers and peasants of the whole world" and the
Komsomol as "the foremost detachment of the international army of
proletarian youth." What specific activity this might :Wean for the
rank-and-file Komsomolite was not clear. The Central Committee hailed
the establishment of "close ties" with Western youth. But so far,
under the conditions of the Civil War, it had not been possible either
for many foreign youths to come to Russia or for many Komsomolites to
go abroad. It remained to be seen how much contact would prevail
later, after the return of relative peace. For the time being the
demands upon Komsomolites in regard to world affairs would, for the
most part, be restricted to propaganda among Soviet youth. Only a
few selected Komsomolites, like Shatskin, could work directly with
pro-Communist youths of other countries, persuading or obliging them
to follow the Soviet leadership.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
Selected Trips Abroad of Shelepin, Semichastny and Pavlov
A. Shelepin*
Year Purpose
1946 Attended founding session of IUS in Prague; was elected
vice-president of IUS in 1947 and re-elected in 1950 and
1952.
1947 Headed Soviet delegation to First world Festival of Youth
and Students in Prague, in August.
1952 Headed Soviet youth delegation to the 4th Congress of the
League of Free German Youth.
1953 Attended Third World Youth Congress in Bucharest, in March.
1954 Headed Soviet youth delegation to Communist China.
1959 Member of delegation to Peking for 10th anniversary of
establishment of Chinese Communist regime.
1962 Headed CPSU delegation to Hungary.
B. Semichastny
Year Purpose
1951 Traveled to finland for World Youth Week.
1953 Traveled to Communist China and Vienna on youth matters.
1954 Traveled to Vienna on youth business.
1955 Traveled to France on youth business.
1956 Traveled to Berlin and Yugolslavia on youth business.
1957 Traveled to Peking and Berlin on youth business.
1958 Traveled to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on youth business.
*As a member of the All-Union Committee for Physical Culture and Sport,
Shelepin' was in a position to help select and approve Soviet atheletic
teams representing the USSR in the Olympic Games and other competitions.
In 1945=53.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
(Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
C. Pavlov
Year Purpose
1959 Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival in Vienna.
1960 Member of Soviet youth delegation to Guinea.
1961 Headed Komsbmol delegation to Cuba.
1962 Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival in Helsinki.
1962 Member Party and Government delegation to Bulgaria.
1963 Headed Komsomol delegation to Congress of East German
youth organization..
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
Occupants of Top Jobs in Komsomol and KGB since 1952
Year First Secretary
of Komsomol
1954
Aleksandr Nikoloyevich
Shelepin was promoted from
Second to First Secretary
in November.
195 Vladimir Yefimovich
Semichastny was pro-
moted from Secretary to
First Secretary in April;
he had also been a member
of the Foreign Affairs
Commission of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR.
1959 Sergey PavLovich Pavlov
was promoted from Second
to First Secretary in
March.
1961
196#
Chairman Other Assignments
of KGB
Shelepin became a
member of the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
Shelepin, while a
deputy to the Supreme
Soviet ,was appointed
to the Commission
for Foreign Affairs of
the Soviet of Nationali-
ties.
Shelepin In April Shelepin became
appointed head of Central Committee
Chairman Party Organs #ect.ion for
in Decem- the Union Republics
ber. (personnel and organiza-
tional work).
In March Semichast.n r
succeeded Shelepin
in the staff of the
Central Committee of
the CPSU. In August
1959 Semichastny was
transferred to position
of Second Secretary of
the Azerbaydzh an CP
Central Committee.
Semichastny Pavlov became a member
replaced of the Central Committee
Shelepin of the CPSU.
in December.
Semichastr r became a
member of the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
Shelepin became a mem-
ber of the Presidium of
the Central Committee of
the CPSU (now called
"Politburo").
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CURRENT DIGEST
of the SOVIET PRESS
22 February 1967
TASKS OF YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE IN PRESENT- owever, struggle is struggle-as we know, this is always a
P R ITIONS.-From Report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, two-way process. The imperialists are not idle, either. They
General Secretary of C.P.S.U. Central Committee, at Plenary
Session of Y.C.L. Central Committee on Feb. 1, 1967. (Pravda,
Feb. 4, pp. 1-2. 2,000 words. Condensed text;) ComradesI
The whole country is now devoloping the preparations for the
50th anniversary of the October Revolution. The C.P.S.U.
Central Committee has adopted and published the first resolu-
tion on this question.* I must say, comrades, that the Party
attaches exceptional importance to this document. Its theses
must underly the present activity of all the working people, of
all our public organizations, and of course, not last of all, of
our Leninist Y.C.L....
Soviet youth is not a sidelines observer of international life,
it takes a constant and active part in it. The international
bonds of the Y.C.L. and the variegated contacts of our young
men and women with their coevals and class brothers abroad-
these, comrades, are a very important sector of our country's
foreign-policy work as a whole.
It is sufficient to mention the Y.C.L,'fl cooperation with fra-
ternal Young Communist Leagues, which now unite more than
70,000,000 young men and women in 80 countries around the
world. Seventy million fearless young hearts aflame with rev-
olutionary enthusiasm and dedicated to the cause of commu-
nismareatremendous international force, comrades! This is
one of the factors that will assure our final victory in the
struggle between the two systems now being waged in the
world. It is also gratifying that the ties between Soviet youth
and the young people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are
growing stronger year by year. This is one of the manifesta-
tions of our party's policy of fraternal alliance with the forces
of national liberation in joint struggle against imperialism and
for peace and the freedom of peoples.
Matters are far from limited to official contacts with youth
organizations. How many interesting, varied forms of inter-
national ties and contact have young people invented! I have
in mind the numerous delegations to various countries of the
world, friendship trains and international youth camps, con-
struction detachments and geological prospecting groups, and
the assistance of teachers and doctors to our friends in the
liberated countries of Asia and Africa.
Obviously, these ties will continue to grow; the number of
Soviet young people who have traveled abroad will increase
each year. The number of our guests is also increasing con-
stantly. Last year alone Soviet young people played host to
more than 200,000 youth delegations and some 50,000 tourists
from 90 countries.
We must think of how to take still better and more active
advantage of these relations for deeper and more convincing
propaganda of our ideas and our way of life, Each Soviet
young man and each Soviet girl must become a worthy ambas-
sador of the Soviet land, a good propagandist of the cause of
communist construction in the U.S.S.R., must help to will new
friends for our country and be at the same time modest and
questing, absorbing everything that helps to improve our
activity.
pie in their own countries and also to extend their influence to
some part of the population of the socialist countries. They
are feverishly seeking out our weak spots, trying to utilize
even the smallest of them for their propaganda to the detri-
ment of the cause of socialism and communism.
What can one say about these efforts of our class enemies?
History itself has more than once given a convincing answer
to all their attempts at ideological subversion. Today we can
proudly say to you, comrades, that the older generation of
Communists passed through all the difficulties and tests of the
past with honor. Faithfulness to the behests of Lenin, bound-
less devotion to the cause of the working people, helped us In
the complicated years of the first five-year plans, when we r
had to blaze the previously untrod paths of socialist construc-
tion, and in the grim times of the war's tests. Marxism-Len-
inism Is our lodestar, our compass, by which we have always
checked and continue to check our course.
It is a pleasure to recognize that the Young Communists of
today are carefully guarding the traditions of their fathers,
the revolutionary traditions of our party. We, the older gen-
eration of Communists, want very much to be firmly confident
that those to whom we are passing the baton in the Leninist
relay will carry it honorably across the expanses of our great
motherland, will hold sacred the purity of our banner, the im-
mortal Marxist- I,entniit teaching.
For this to be indeed so, the mere wish alone is not enough, t
comrades. For this one must work long and hard, tirelessly
training our young people and steeling them ideologically. It
would be an unforgivable mistake not to notice that we have
some young people-no matter how insignificant their number-
who, lacking life experience and sufficient theoretical prepara-
tion, display political shakiness, unconcern and, I would say, a
scornfully thoughtless attitude toward life. We cannot put up
with this. Today we can no longer be satisfied with the fact
that the absolute majority of Soviet young people perform their
civic duty with a high sense of responsibility, thoroughly under-
stand and actively carry out Party policy. Our task is to fight
for every young person, for his convictions and for his active
stand in life. This is, surely, the most honorable and noble
mission of the Leninist Young Communist League-to train
staunch, ideologically convinced, boundlessly devoted fighters
for the great cause of building communism.
What conclusions stem from the above, comrades? What
tasks are particularly important for the Young Communist
League in today's conditions?
The task of the Young Communist League consists above all
in teaching all our young people to master Marxist-Leninist
theory deeply and comprehensively. Without firm knowledge of
the scientific fundamentals of communism, it is practically im-
possible for a young person to understand all the intricacies of
contemporary politics and especially to be an active aide of the
We must not forget, comrades, that we live in the circum- Party in its principled struggle for the purity of the ideas of
stances of a fierce class struggle of two worlds, the world of communism.
socialism and the world of capitalism. In ideology, as in The revolutionary universities for today's young person be-
other spheres of our relations with the capitalist world, so- gin with Marxist literature. A taste for it must be cultivated
cialism is on the historical offensive, capitalism on the de- in each person, the ability to work seriously with it. Remem-
fensivo. The ideological influence of socialism, the effect of ber how Vladimir Ilyich Lenin put the question of the political
our Marxist-Leninist ideology and of our successes in build- education of a Communist: "If I know that I know little, I shall
ing the new socJaty upon the minds of the broad masses in
capitalist countries, is tremendous: And this influence is
growing day by day, undermining the foundations of capitalism
from within.
and says he doesn't need sound knowledge, nothing like a Com-
munist will come of him." Only systematic study, not me-
chanical, but conscious and deep assimilation of Marxist- Lenin-
ist views will help each young person to develop firm inner
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6.
convictions. And only then will lie easily understand any com- mental research is being conducted and documents are resur-
plicated situation, will he be able to reach a correct appraisal recting more and more n w pages of history. An atmosphere
of the events and phenomena of life and chart a correct course. of political and creative upsurge reigns In the country. Things
The task of the Young Communist. League is to help the young; should be so arranged that every young person now goes
generation of Soviet people to fulfill Lenin's behest to enrich
their memory with knowledge of all, the treasures that mankind
ha:. built up. The wisdom of this behest of Lenin is perhaps
mote evident today than ever before. Now that we have under-
taken the building of communism, questions of science and cul-
ture are acquiring extraordinary, unprecedented importance.
The generation of Soviet people coining in place of us should
continue and itself create the highest achievements of modern
science and culture. This is absolutely necessary, comrades.
Without this we shall not be able to build true communism.
through a real school of revolutionary training.
Finally, the task of the Y.C.L. is to train all our young peo-
ple consistently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.
While concerning ourselves with the welfare of our people and
with the construction of communism in the U.S.S.R., we at the
same time regard ourselves as a pa,-t of the world socialist
system, as one of the detachments of the worldwide army of
fighters for the freedom and happiness of peoples, for the vic-
tory of socialism and communism throughout the world. 'Phis
is our fundamental Ix,sition. It as bequeathed to us by V. I.
The task of the Y.C.L. is, further, to train our young people I Lenin. It is necessary to impart to every young man and wom-
awareness of their filial duty to their people, to their socialist of mankind by the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries
fatherland. The inculcation of civic qualities, the inculcation and Communists of the entire world..
of patriotism, begins in us at the school bench. It rises to a Lately the ruling circles of im;)erialist countries and their
new and higher level in the atmosphere of common creative propaganda apparatus have been especially active in trying to
work, in the army setting, and in the political life of the Soviet
collective. And everywhere the Y.C.L. can exert its beneficial
influence.
Comrades, we must raise a new generation of genuine patri-
ots, prepared for feats of labor and arms. The Communist
Party, the Soviet government and our people, in fraternal unity
with the peoples of the countries of socialism and with the sup-
port of all the progressive forces of the world, are doing
everything to prevent a new war. But we know the aggressive
nature of the imperialists and should be prepared for anything.
If the grim hour strikes, Soviet youth should be ready to fulfill
its sacred duty-to defend the homeland by arms, to defend the
life, honor and freedom of its people. Our Central Committee
is confident, comrades, that, if necessary, our young people
will fulfill this duty of theirs as befits Soviet people, they will
fulfill it no worse than their fathers did in the Great Patriotic War.
The task of the Y.C.L. is constantly to develop class con-
sciousness in young people and to train them in the glorious
revolutionary traditions of our party and proletariat Particu-
larly favorable conditions for such work have taken shape at
the present time. The Land of the Soviets is summing up the
half-century results of its life and struggle and conducting a
general review of all of October's achievements. The living
word of the veterans of the Revolution is being heard, functa-
weaken and shatter the unity of the socialist countries and to
disrupt the friendship and cooperation among the peoples of
these countries and their public organizations, including youth
organizations. We counteract these efforts by a consistent
policy of strengthening the solidarity of our countries and
Marxist-Leninist parties and the friendship of peoples. Vere
too the Y.C.L. can anct should be a valuable assistant to the
Party, helping to raise our young men and women to be real
internationalists, strengthening friendship with the youth of the
fraternal countries of socialism, ne,v independent states and
the progressive circles of young people in capitalist countries.
The young generation of the Land of the Soviets has always
been and, we arc sure, will always he an example of militant
class solidarity with the revolut..onary fighters against oppros-
lion and exploitatioi, against imperialist aggression, for the
freedom and indcpe!idcnce of peoples.
Comrades! The ^,nnununist Party and the Soviet state face
important and complex tasks. They are of prime signtficnnce
not only for the desiny of our country. We look ahead with
confidence. Before us is a clear and noble goal-to complete
1 he great cause of cdnstructing conun,mism. In the solution of a.ll
these vast tasks the Y. C. L. has been- and now should be ever, more
a firm support and an active assistantto the Communist Party ...
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
CPYRGHT
CURRENT DIGEST
of the SOVIET PRESS
22 February 1967
CENTRAL COMMITTEE. (Komsomolskaya pravda, Feb. 4,
p. 1. Complete text:) Discussion of the report of Comrade
S. P. Pavlov, First Secretary of the Y.C.L. Central Committee,
"On Further Improvement of the WQrk of the Y.C.L. in Guiding
the All-Union V. I. Lenin Young Pioneers' Organization" con-
tinued Feb. 3 at the plenary session of the All-Union Y.C.L.
Central Committee. The following spoke in the discussion:
Yu. D. Poroikov, First Secretary of the Bashkiria Province
Y.C.L. Committee; O. V. Zinchenko, assistant head (for Y.C.L.
work) of the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army
and Navy; N. M. Chernova, editor-in-chief of Pionerskaya
pravda; S. Namatbayev, First Secretary of the Kirgizia Y.C.L.
Central Committee; U.S.S.R. Honored Master of Sports I. A.
Novikov; L. S. Sobolev, Chairman of the Board of the Russian
Republic Writers' Union; Hero of Socialist Labor G. V. Zai-
chenko, director of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and Deputy
to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; and T. A. Gaidar, a Pravda
correspondent.
The plenary session adopted a resolution on the question
under discussion.
Comrade B. N. Pastukhov, Secretary of the Y.C.L. Central
Committee, presented an announcement of measures for the
participation of Young Communists and young people generally
in the^peeparation for the 50th anniversary of the Great Octo-
ber Socialist Revolution.
The plenary session approved the proposed measures.
Organizational questions were also considered.
The plenary session released Yu. P. Belov from the duties
of a member of the bureau of the Y.C.L. Central Committee in
connection with his transfer to Party work. O. Ye.Cherkezia,
First Secretary of the Georgian Y.C.L. Central Committee,
was elected a member of the bureau of the Y.C.L. Central
Committee. R. Kh. Abdullayeva, First Secretary of the
Uzbekistan Y.C.L. Central Committee, was elected a candidate
member of the bureau.
The plenary session removed T. A. Suuresaar from member
ship in the Y.C.L. Central Committee.
This concluded the work of the third plenary session of the
Y.C.L. Central Committee.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
March 1967
The Communist Party of Uruguay
The Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) had its origin in a split
within the Socialist Party of Uruguay. In 1920, at the Eighth Congress
of the Socialist Party --- an affiliate of the Second International --
three-fourths of the approximately 1700 members voted to affiliate with
the Moscow-led Third International and thus became the PCU.
The party made little progress during the 1920's and 1930's, though
it developed a small following among labor groups. During and immedi--
ately after World War II the party extended its influence significantly,
largely due to the prestige gained by the Soviet Union in its fight
against Hitler's Nazis. However its post-war upsurge was short-lived;
as the party more and more clearly revealed itself to be the creation of
an international Communist movement diametrically opposed to the true
interests of Uruguay, its supporters among the workers and the middle
class began to drift away. However, following the death of Stalin, the
party began to concentrate on exploiting domestic issues appealing to
organized labor and other mass groups and its fortunes again improved.
In 1955 the longtime (since 1920) Secretary General Eugenio Gomez Car-
reno, was expelled for `'deviationism"; the fact that he was able to take
only a handful of members out of the party with him is an indication of
the strength of PCU discipline.
Since 1955 the PCU has tried to form a united leftist political
front which it could dominate. In July 1962 it was successful in at-
tracting some smaller revolutionary groups into an alliance known as the
Leftist Liberation Front (Frente Izquierda de Liberation -- FIDEL).
Although the PCU especially has sought the cooperation of the Socialist
Party, the latter group has repeatedly refused to join any electoral
alliance with the Communists, fearing that their voice would be dominated
by the PCU. The Party won 5% of the national vote in the 19+6 elections,
but its electoral strength fell off abruptly after that and averaged
approximately 3% during the ensuing decade. However, in the elections
of November 1966 it made a substantial gain, doubling its vote to 6% of
the total. This increase can be largely attributed to the effective
Communist exploitation of the economic slump which has characterized
the Uruguayan economy for the past several years.
Party membership, not published by the PCU for several years, is
estimated at 15,000 to 20,000. In addition, the Union of Communist
Youth (UJC) has an estimated membership of about 8,000 or 10,000. The
PCU is based almost entirely in urban areas, with a heavy concentration
in Montevideo, whose population is half of the country's total of
2,750,000. The party finds its main membership among workers and exerts
its major efforts in the field of labor. One of the chief sources of
party strength has been its remarkably stable leadership. Following the
overtrhow of Gomez in 1955, Rodney Arismendi became and is still its
principal leader. Many of the top party offices are still filled by
the same people who filled them 10 and, in some cases, 20 years ago.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000600. )
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
As mentioned above, a steady decline in Uruguay's economy since
the mid--1950's has been a major basis for Communist growth. The bases
of tha difficulties may be characterized as: a public welfare system
more lavish than the country can afford; excessive governmental inter-
vention in and mismanagement of the economy; and a failure to increase
productivity in line with spending. These problems in turn derived in
good part from an unwieldly governmental system based on a nine-man
governing council; this was changed by a constitutional reform, approved
by the electorate in the November 1966 elections, which established a
presidential system. Local and foreign observers are optimistic that
the new single leadership, under President Oscar D. Gestido, will be
able to deal effectively with the economic and political problems which
face Uruguay.
Among the problems the new government will have to face is a steady
decline in percapita gross domestic product of almost 1% annually over
the past ten years. This is a result of falling markets for Uruguay's
chief exports, wool, beef, and hides, and also of low productivity in
the country's manufacturing industries. Falling production has meant
a growing rate of unemployment, which has risen to about 12% of the
total labor force of approximately one million. In addition, it is
estimated that some 25% to 30% of the work force is underemployed. At
the same time that the per capita product has been falling and unemploy---
merlt has been rising, the nation has been suffering a soaring cost of
living, which rose 38% in 1964, 85% in 1965, and an estimated 70% in
1966. Predictably, the result has been an unending series of strikes
-- estimated at around 700 in the year preceding the elections of November
of last year. Since one of the two major sources of strength of the PCU
is organized labor (the other being teachers and students), it has both
fomented and profited by these strikes.
Communist exploitation of worker discontent has increased in pro-
portion to the economic decay. Until late 1965 the PCU followed a policy
of keeping labor militancy within acceptable bounds in order not to
provoke repressive government countermeasures. The party supported
demands by independent unions, as well as by those it controlled, for
improved working conditions and above all wage increases to match the
inflation. The most severe labor crisis in many years occurred late in
1965 when the PCU changed its policy from one of caution to an active
attempt to prolong labor tensions. Widespread strikes among bank em-
ployees and employees of the many autonomous government agencies led to
emergency security measures by the government.
The turmoil came to a head in December 1965 when several leaders in
the governmental council demanded that Uruguay break diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union which, they asserted, was actively backing the
wave of strikes. Significantly, labor's demands were immediately atten-
uated and it was possible for the government to lift its emergency se.-
curity measures shortly thereafter. However the respite was only tem-
porary. During 1966 labor tensions again built up. In mid-September the
Communists were able to stage a general strike for purely political
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00040006PAU
q
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
purposes -- the first time this had been achieved. Early in October
four Soviet officials were expelled from Uruguay for "intervening in labor
affairs and inciting strikes.' According to the Uruguayan Minister of
Interior, Nicolas Storace, the Soviets- 0 were all members of the Soviet
secret services. An official_ overnmeiat memorandum stated that the
objectives of the Soviets were: to precipitate labor paralysis through
strikes and stoppages; to aggravate Uruguay's economic difficulties by
disorganization of work, industrial sabotage and economic subversion;
and to strengthen the position of Communist agents in labor unions.
Although the strikes reached a climax just before the November elections,
they have not ceased since then. During the first months of 1967 strikes
and stoppages reached a rate exceeding that of the previous year and
involved public health workers, taxi drivers, bank employees, bus drivers,
street cleaners, municipal employees, government workers, airport per-
sonnel, and weather bureau employees, among others.
The Communist hold on Uruguayan labor has been exercised princi-
pally through a general confederation which was first known as the
General Union of Workers (UGT) and then as the Center of Uruguayan Workers
(CTU), which was formed in April 1.961. The Communists also organized
another labor group, the National Workers' Convention (CNT), in 1964 to
attract support from union groups that would not cooperate with the
openly Communist-controlled CTU. At a Congress of Trade Union Unity,
called by the Communist led unions in Montevideo from 28 September to
2 October 1966, the CTU and CNT merged into a nationwide labor confed-
eration known as the National Workers' Central (Central Nacional de
Trabajadores e?,v, CNT), which has also gained the support of several inde-
pendent unions. The confederation represents some 300,000 members --
which is one third of the nation's total work force and a major portion
of all organized labor. While the PCU does not exercize absolute control
over the CNT, it does have a very strong influence and is increasingly
striving to augment its political influence among the unions organized
in the CNT.
The second major base of strength of the PCU is among the students.
The Communists, though few, dominate student policy through the use of
classic Communist parliamentary maneuvers, through their militancy and
superior organization, and by virtue of the fact that most Uruguayan
students are indifferent to university politics, are inclined toward
Marxism, and are disillusioned with democracy as practiced in Uruguay.
By forming coalitions with other radical groups (such as leftwing
Catholics, Socialists, Trotskyites, and others) they have been able to
win key positions in the student political organization, the Federation
of Uruguayan University Students (FEUU). The Secretary General of the
FEUU, Horacio Bazzano, is a Communist. Party efforts have mainly been
directed toward the University of the Republic of Uruguay, the country's
only university, where 500 UJC members have considerable influence over
the student body of 15,000.
Communist success in organizing secondary students has increased;
there are some 8,000 UJC members in secondary schools. There are UJC
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
3 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
circles in most high schools, and Communist or Communist coalition
candidates have won offices in many of them.
The PCU has also had considerable success in organizing primary
and secondary school teachers. They control the principal primary school
'teachers' union; in the secondary schools the Communist-dominated union
is smaller but more active.
Organized Communist activity among professional groups in Uruguay
is carried on chiefly through the Association of Intellectuals, Artists,
Reporters, and Writers. The association extends party influence by
providing a meeting place outside the PCU for Communist intellectuals
in the arts and professions. Its membership includes people prominent
in national cultural activities. The Uruguayan Press Association,
strongly influenced by the PCU, does not include the majority of top-
level professional journalists, but does count most reporters of lower
rank and nonprofessional workers and employees of both press and radio.
The Communists conduct extensive propaganda activities in Uruguay.
The party newspaper, EL POPULAR (formerly known as Justicia) has a
circulation of approximately 8,000. ESTUDIOS, another PCU publication,
has a small circulation, but reaches an important number of students
and intellectuals.A pro-Castro and pro-Communist newspaper, EPOCA,
ceased publication in February 1967 as a result of the government's
termination of a general subsidy to the press. In addition, a weekly
publication, MARC.HA, frequently supports Communist causes, though it
is owned by a non-Communist. MARCHA has a wide circulation throughout
the hemisphere and is very influential among students, professionals,
and intellectuals. At least one publishing house, the United Peoples'
Publications, specializes in Communist literature. The PCU and FIDEL
also are able to use the RADIO NACIONAL extensively to present programs
aimed at workers.
The Uruguayan Communist Party has been steadfastly pro-Soviet in
the quarrels which have divided the Communist bloc in recent years. It
has always had very close relations with the Soviet and Eastern European
embassies in Montevideo, and PCU envoys are constantly travelling to the
world Communist movement's gatherings. There could be no clearer evi-
dence of its subservience to Soviet control than the circumstances
surrounding the expulsion of the four Soviet diplomats in 1966.
The Uruguayan Communists are making a major effort to mobilize
extensive propaganda and labor agitation against the "'Summit Conference"
of American presidents which will be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
from 12 to 14 April 1967. The outlines of the PCU's intentions have
been clearly proclaimed in the Communist press. EL POPULAR, for example,
published an article on 11 March 1967 announcing the plans of the CNT
against the "imperialist aggressors, assassins, dictators and "gorillas."'
In essence the CNT plans to expand labor agitation in order to create a
tense political climate for the conference. At the same time the
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000600 TA )
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
propaganda campaign will be spearheaded by the UJC and will escalate
as the conference date nears. The usual Communist tactics are to be
expected: posters, wall writings, leaflets, strikes and sympathy
strikes, protest marches, etc.
If the Communist plans succeed, they will have managed to give the
impression outside Uruguay that the great mass of the Uruguayan people
repudiates the entire conference. How false such an impression would
be is evident from the inescapable fact that the PCU obtained only 6%
of the vote last November. Those who realize that the party's political
and propaganda strength are distortedly magnified by its influence among
organized labor and students will be able to keep any such outburst in
proper perspective.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6