BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 19, 1967
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Signhicant Dates
[ASTERISK DENOTES ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
AUG
20* Leon Trotsky murdered in Mexico City. 1940
23* Soviet Union and Nazi Germany conclude non-aggression pact, opening way for
German attack on Poland, and its partition between Germany and the USSR. 1939.
25* Paris liberated by Free French forces with UOS. Army. 1944.
27* Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) signed, renouncing war as instrument
of policy. 1928.
28 Aug-Sept 2. 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest. (Includes
S EP
non'-Communist participants.)
"
I*
Germany invades Poland; World War II begins. 1939.
Now
3-8
17th Pugwash Conference on "Scientists and World Affairs," Ronneby, Sweden.
8
Summit meeting of Organization of African Unity, Kinshasa, Congo.
II* Constituent Assembly election, South Vietnam. Despite Viet Cong threats,
80.8% of voters turn out. 1966.
13-15 Conference on Portuguese Colonies, South and South-West Africa, Zimbabwe,
and Rhodesia, Conakry, Guinea. Sponsored by- the World Peace Council (Com-
munist front).
17* (Old Style: 4 Sep) Trotsky released from jail. Becomes head of Petrograd
Soviet, sets stage for "October Revodition." 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
17* Soviet Union invades Poland, proceeds to occupy eastern half of country.
(See under 23 Aug and I Sept above.) 1939.
18* UN Secretary General Dag Hanm arskjold dies in plane crash near Ndola,
Northern Rhodesia. 1961.
25 (to I October) Fdurth General Conference of BITEJ (Travel Bureau of World
Federation of Democratic Youth -- Communist)meets in Budapest
in conjunction with FIYTO (federation of non-communist commercial travel
agencies).
OCT
I* Indonesia Communist attempt coup, defeated by army. Sukarno's power reduced.
1965.
...2* Mohandas Gandhi born. (Assassinated 30 January 1948.) 1862.
4* USSR launches first artificial earth satellite ("Sputnik"). 1957. 10th Anniv.
10* Wuchang Uprising begins revolution, leading to end of Chinese monarchy.
Chinese Nationalist holiday: 1911.
14* Coup in Kremlin removes Khrushchev from power. Succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev
as'CPSU First Secretary and Aleksei Kosygin as Premier. 1964.
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Unsolicited
French
Initiative
Showed Wel-
come Results
Briefly Noted 0001"
Popular Support of
U.S. Policy Reflect-
ed in Letters
Soviet Asset WORLD MARXIST REVIEW
Not Unilateral
An effective method of
encouraging expressions
of appreciation for what the United
States is doing in Vietnam and in
other world trouble spots is the
"Letter to the editor" of local news-
papers signed by citizens of the
foreign country.
An excellent example of this is
the letter (see attached reproduction)
in the 25 April L'AURORE of Paris
signed by a certain Monsieur Hummel
urging Frenchmen to send cards to the
American Embassy to show that demon-
strations of antipathy toward the
United States actually come from only
a minority of Frenchmen. (The Embassy
subsequently reported that it had
received, as a result of this private
initiative, a flood of mail supporting
U.S. policy in Vietnam and saying
"Merci" to Americans for their
assistance in World Wars I and II.)
O b
For the second time in five
months, the Rumanian edition (March
1967) of WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (PROB-
LEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM) omitted
the lead article contained in the Eng-
lish, Russian and other language
editions. The article in question,
attributed to Gus Hall, American
Communist leader, was entitled "The
Foe Does not Succumb to Slogans".
The Rumanians objected to it because
of remarks it contained which were
highly critical of the Chinese Commun-
ist Party leaders (specifically naming
Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao). In Novem-
ber 1966, the Rumanians also omitted
the lead article in their edition.
Entitled "October and Progress", it
dealt with the differences between
the more industrially developed
countries of the Soviet Bloc such as
East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
and the essentially agrarian countries,
which certainly included Rumania.
That article also contained oblique
remarks intended to be critical of
Red China, such as a reference to
the "nihilistic theories of Bakunin".
Another article dealing with South
and Southeast Asia was also omitted
from the November Rumanian edition,
apparently because of critical remarks
concerning India, Ceylon, and other
countries with which the Rumanians
would like to maintain cordial rela-
tions. As WMR is the authoritative
Soviet international review -- though
published in Prague, it is Soviet-
supported, and its editor is a high
CPSU official -- these instances of
Rumanian censorship are undoubtedly
highly displeasing to the Soviet
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propaganda, bosses and further evi-
dence of the widening split between
the Rumanian and Soviet Communist
Parties. (Unclassified)
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Communist United Nations to Consider
Nations Draft Convention on Elim-
Put on mating Religious Intoler-
the Spot ance
Also Attacks New Clandestine Radio
Socialist Urges Danish Support
Government for Viet C,
This :fall the U.N. General
Assembly w.:il.L discuss implementation
machinery for an International Conven-
tion, unanimously adopted by the human
Rights Commission at its last session,
on the "Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance." Nations
which ratify the Convention would be
committed to give individuals freedom
to believe or not to believe, to
change their belief, to manifest it
to acts of worship, and to teach it
to their children without threat of
civil sanctions. These nations would
also be obligated to adopt immediate
and effective measures to combat
^eligious prejudice.
Quite obviously nations of the
Communist Bloc will be reluctant to
append their signatures to such a
document, or if they do it certainly
will be with a considerable amount of
mental reservation. During the next
few months, therefore, assets should
he encouraged to play up evidence of
religious persecution and exploitation
in Communist countries in an effort to
throw as much light as possible on this
unsavory aspect of life under Communism
before the world community of nations
votes on the issue. Suitable back-
ground material for this is carried
regularly in PRESS COMMENT, and the
latest in the series of BPG items in
the series on "Communism vs. Religion"
On 22 May a clandestine :radio
broadcast was heard-in Denmark call-
ing for donations for the Viet Cong
and urging that demonstrations be
held to protest against the visit of
Secretary of State Rusk t:o Copenhagen
15-16 June. The broadcast also de-
nounced Denmark's Socialist Govern-
ment as "a faithful lackey of the
capitalists." (See BPG :[.tem #1043
of 1.8 July 1966 for details of how
the Communists were courting the
Danish Social Democrats last year
in the obvious ' l:iope , not since real--
ized., of infiltrating the Government
via the "popular front" strategy.)
Sourcesquoted.by AP on the follow-
ing day said the clandestine station
is run by "extreme leftists" who say
they w`_11 soon have a transmitter
strong enough to reach all of Denmark.
Danish authorities said, they would
attempt to trace the transmitter and
if it is located on Danish soil they
will close it down since the law for-
bids all radio stations except Govern-
ment owned ones
While the possibility exists that
local activists of the Danish C.P. are
operating a portable transmitter either
inside the country or from a ship
anchored offshore., there is also reason
to believe that transmitters located
in East Germany might be used for this
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the Communist clandestine radio "net-
work" operates from transmitters
in East Germany and elsewhere.)
Assets may speculate on either loca-
tion, but in any case should make
the point that this is just one more
piece of evidence that the Communists
continually flaunt all types of
international agreements (in this
respect international broadcasting
regulations) in their campaign to
denigrate the United States and all
Free World nations which support
its policies in Vietnam.
Professional Communist and Free
Meeting Con- World Journalists
verted Into Debate in Europe_
ideological
Forum A five-day so-called
"international con-
ference of European journalists" end-
ed in the Italian resort of Lignano
on 16 May. TASS reports that it was
attended by some 120 delegates from
Italy, France, West Germany, the
Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Ger-
many, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia,
"and other countries". Representatives
of the Communist-front International
Organization of Journalists, head-
quartered in Prague, and its Free
World counterpart, the Brussels-based
International Federation of Journal-
ists, met for the first time to dis-
cuss such purely professional matters
as salaries, social insurance, medical
services, and information gathering.
As to be expected in any such
forum, however, the Communist dele-
gates seized the opportunity to ex-
pound their own political ideology
and, as TASS put it, the professional
discussions went beyond their "narrow
framework and developed into a wide
conversation about the future of
Europe, European security, and Europ-
ean unity." The ensuing debates be-
tween East and West representatives
were marked, according to the TASS
report, by a "spirit of mutual toler-
ance" and highlighted by the remarks
of the head of the Soviet delegation,
IZVESTIYA Editor in Chief, L. N.
Tolkunov, who said:
"No one will deny that we have
fundamental ideological differences,
but the fact that they did not be-
come a stumbling block in our contacts
testifies to the high sense of res-
ponsibility for the destinies of
European and universal peace as shown
in Lignano. This proves that the
all-European political barometer can
indicate fair weather with more con-
fidence and with less fluctuations
and zigzags."
In view of the fact that the
conference set up working commissions
to maintain contacts with journalists'
organizations in various European
countries the advice given in BPG
Item #1126 of 22 May on the Inter-
national Organization of Journalists
becomes all the more timely, espec-
ially since European media comment
on the situation in Vietnam gets
such worldwide play. The TASS report
notes that (unspecified) "major
racial problems" were surfaced during
the Lignano debates, but we can con-
fidently predict that every Communist
wile -- or to use Comrade Tolkunov's
word, "zigzag" -- will be employed
henceforth to overcome these problems
and infiltrate as many sectors of
public opinion molding as possible.
Attached is an article from the
17 May issue of Rome's Socialist
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AVANTI (with translation) contain-
ing some further details on the Lignano
session, which apparently passed re:_a-
tively unnoticed in the West European
press. Note that the Rome newspaper
version, says the meeting heard a speech
by Italian Minister of Tourism and
Entertainment Corona on "the close
correlation between tourism and the
press." A short news item in the 1E6
May issue of Milan's CORRIERE DELLA
SERA reported that the Lignano
meeting had been organized by the
Italian Press Federation and local
enterprises in the overnight lodging
business. Selected assets might
speculate that the tourism angle is
not mentioned in the TASS report,
perhaps among other reasons because
of Communist sensitivities concerning
their own tourists who have fled to the
Free World while on foreign tours.
Egypt Use of Poison Gas Verified
Bombs by Red Cross Yemen-is
With Gas The International Committee
of the Red Cross in Geneva
issued on 2 June a press release,
reporting that its delegates in Yemen
had gone on 15 and 16 May to a vil-
lage in northern Yemen, and had found
there evidence indicating the use
of asphyxiating poison bombing.
Many inhabitants of the village had
died of asphyxiation, and the Red
Cross team had itself been delayed
in reaching the site by an air attack
(apparently not involving use of gas).
There have been reports of use of
poison gas in Yemen for some time,
but this is the most authoritative
and impartial. report to appear so
far. The Red Cross did not name the
culprit government, but other reports
make it clear that the Egyptian
government bears the blame in this
situation. (For text of Red Cross:
statement and other coverage, see
PRESS COMMENT, 5 and 6 June 1967.)
The report of the Red Cross did.
not receive as much attention as it
otherwise might have, due to its
appearance just before the outbreak
of Near Eastern Arab-Israeli hostili-
ties, though West German and U.S.
sales of gas masks to Isra.el were
widely linked with this report.
Where the situation permits and
assets have not previously played
the Red Cross and other reports, we
recommend play on this subject.
Egypt signed (in 1928) the
Geneva protocol!- of 17 June 1925
against the use of poison and asphyx-
iating gases. It also voted in
November 1966 for a Hungarian-
originated UN resolution outlawing
the use of poison gas. In the case
of Yemen, unlike the use of gas in
World War I,those attacked are inno-
cent civilians, including women and
children, not soldiers.
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1135 FE. ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Europe's sensationally successful Common Market has put
a new luster on the concept of'regional organizations. Other brands of
regional organizations -'political military, etc. - have their parts
to play at various stages of regional development, but eventually seem
to be surpassed in impact and viability by effective economic organizations.
Asia has no equivalent to the Common Market, nor indeed has it Europe's
post-war remains of a developed industrial base and communications
system. However, despite Asia's diversity of races, culture, languages
and economic development - a variety greater than that of any other
continent - there are indications that Asia is able and even willing to
work at regional cooperation. In reviewing progress made along these
lines in 1966, the conservative and influential TOKYO SHIMBUN told its
1,600,000 daily readers that "1966 has been a year when awareness and
confidence in Asia for the Asians germinated" citing as evidence the
establishment of the 32-member billion-dollar Asian Development Bank',
Japan's hosting of a regional economic conference, economic construc-
tion in South Korea and Taiwan, etc.
25X1C10b
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v et Government $1 billion to :;72 billion for military
equipment. According to Baic1:w:in, Syria had. received about 400 tanks and
self-propelled guns and about 150 aircraft from the USSR. Other sources,
including NEWSWEEK and U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, refer to similar amounts
of Soviet Aid in tvae r art,a.cIes. A detailed listing of tanks, aircraft, and
naval ves-^els, With by type, is given in, the London publication
FORUM WORLD FEATURES (FACTS TO FILE) of May 27, 1967.
Quality and. Effectiveness
Although military commentators usually term Soviet military equipment
good, some of them are raising serious questions about the suitability of
such equipment for Middle Eastern conditions. For example it has been
widely publicized that the Israelis modified their old World War II tanks
by widening the tracks, raising the suspension, and increasing the fire-
power by replacing the 9O-mm guns with 105-mm guns. There is no indication
that the Soviets made extensive modifications of their all-climate tanks
in order to adapt them for desert warfare
Analogous information tends to bear out the possibility that the
Soviets were negligent in this regard. For example, a recent article from
Informations d'Outre-Mer (Paris, May 24, 1967) states:
The motors with which the Soviet trucks of the Algerian Army are
equipped are too fragile and consume too much fuel; moreover, it is
difficult to use them in the Sahara. For this reason, they will be
an
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Earlier, the Egyptians, when building the Aswan High Dam, found they
had to replace large amounts of Soviet construction equipment (including
caterpillar-type tractors) with British and American equipment. Furthermore,
there have been persistent reports that the Soviets have sent tractors and
trucks to equatorial Africa with elaborate enclosures and heating facilities
for the cabs.
The age of the tanks supplied by the USSR is considered by some to
have been a factor of possible significance in the poor performance of the
UAR's tanks. About half of them were Soviet World War II models, and thus
manufactured between 1942 and 1917. Considering the Soviets' generally
poor record on the maintenance of all kinds of equipment, and the fact that
the maintenance manuals for Soviet tanks were in English, it is not hard to
understand that the Arabs would find it difficult to keep the tanks in
operating condition.
The matter of inadequate Soviet instruction in the use of equipment
may have been a major factor in the inability of the Arabs to use the Soviet
equipment effectively. Publication of the manuals in English, a language
foreign to Russian instructors and Arab trainees alike, undoubtedly resulted
in inadequate understanding. This is illustrated by the Soviet S.AM which
was captured on the Sinai. Besides instructions in Russian, the missiles
had written on them in English, these words: "By operating with plunger the
drive should be engaged to reduction gear. It is not allowed to operate
with plunger at accelerated gear."' Would any two people interpret these
instructions the same way? Not only were the manuals unclear, but frequently
they were non-existent. Often the equipment had to be repacked and kept
in crates for months while the Arabs awaited the arrival of the manuals.
Doctrinal and Tactical Training
Very likely, the Soviets' military training of the Arabs will be found
upon investigation to have been woefully inadequate and even misleading.
By virtue of the differences in terrain between the USSR and the Middle
East, the Soviet instructors probably had an inadequate'grasp of desert
warfare. But the Soviets' major short--.comings probably arose from a tend-
ency to refer to their own military experience when instructing the Arabs.
For example, the Egyptians dug pits for their T--54 Soviet tanks and
were using them as stationary artillery to cover the town of Gaza in the
early stages of the conflict. Later, in the Sinai, the UAR troops again
dug their tanks in in a vain effort to protect them against air bombardment.
This tactic deprived the UAR tanks of mobility, the cardinal principle of
tank warfare, while the Israeli tanks could freely manuever. This tactic
is similar to that used by Soviet tank forces in World War II, as shown in
Soviet films of the war. It is possible that the Soviet training officers
prepared the Arab military for today's war by teaching them the successful
tactics of yesterday's war.
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the conduct of the UAR mili-
tary effort reflected Soviet tactical doctrine, which necessitates central
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direction. This doctrine is considered ineffective against any foe which
relies on the use of initiative. Moreover, the UAR's situation may have
been aggravated by communications which were inadequate to the desert con-
ditions.
A major oversight in the Soviets' preparation of the UAR may have been
in the arrangement of the radar network. Soviet tactics in antiaircraft
warfare are focused -- almost exclusively -- on defense against assaults
over land approaches. This may explain the disastrous gap which the UAR
left in its radar defense against an air assault from the direction of the
Mediterranean.
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June 1967
Soviet Trade and Aid
In 1954 the USSR launched a trade and aid program in the developing
countries* with the announced or evident intention of providing material
needed for its own economy, expanding and increasing its influence world-
wide, and reducing non-Communist influence in the developing countries.
While the USSR's program embraces some 45 countries, it has concentrated
on Asia and the Middle East, and about two thirds of its exports to develop-
ing countries have gone to India, the UAR, Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Communist countries, in gaining access to the markets of the
developing countries, have used a classic commercial approach. They offer-
ed goods at lower prices and on more favorable terms (deferment of first
payment; more years to pay; low interest rates). They offered to trade
industrial products for what would otherwise be surplus raw materials
unsalable at an acceptable price in Western markets. Furthermore, the
Soviets dangled industrialization and economic independence in front of
the leaders of the developing countries.
Through 1966 the total amount of Communist credits and grants to
developing countries was about $9 billion, of which the USSR accounted
for roughly four fifths. However, only about $3 billion, or one third,
of the total amount has been put into effect; the balance remains to be
drawn. This large discrepancy actually between offers and drawings results
mainly from typically prolonged construction schedules on foreign aid
projects.
The composition of the USSR's trade with developing countries is
similar to that of other industrialized (or, in Soviet terms, "imperialist")
countries.- even if the intent differs. About 85% of its imports are
comprised of raw materials and food. The USSR's shipments of machinery
and equipment and manufactured goods have made up about two-thirds of its
exports to developing countries.
The military part of the Soviet program is much less publicized
in the recipient countries than is economic aid. Nevertheless, the
monetary value of military aid actually rendered is 12 to 2 times as
much as the economic aid. The emphasis on military aid to certain
countries is much more pronounced; for example, in the UAR military aid
had amounted to almost 3 times as much as economic aid, and in Syria to
more than 4 times as much. Almost half of the Communist military aid
is provided to developing countries as outright grants or with discounts
from the list price of the military hardware.
*Developing countries also called less developed, underdeveloped or emerging
countries) include: All African countries except the Republic of South Africa;
all Asian countries except Japan; most Latin American countries; Middle East-
ern countries, including Cyprus, Greece, Syria, Turkey and the UAR. Designa-
tion as a developing country is based on a number of factors, including: per-
sonal consumption per capita; per capita national product (gross national pro-
duct, national income); share of labor force in agriculture.
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Benefits to the USSR: The Kremlin's continued expanson since 1964 of
aid agreements with developing countries clearly indicates that the
Brezh.nev-Kosygin regime views the trade and aid program as a satisfac-
tory means of obtaining raw materials and foodstuff useful to the
Soviet economy and, more significantly, of pursuing Soviet foreign policy
objectives. Using economic means, the Soviet leaders evidently hope to
continue to exploit the USSR's recently acquired or increased. presence
in the developing countries by:
--propagandizing its contributions of technology, skilled manpower,
and materials;
--gaining influence over economic planning and administration;
--working to introduce Soviet methods and ideas to replace Western-
inspired traditions;
--increasing the developing countries' dependence on the USSR for
credit, new machinery and equipment, spare parts, and technicians
to operate new plants.
Through military aid the Soviet leaders will undoubtedly continue to
try to enhance the USSR's position as a supplier of arms and a trainer
of the armed forces of developing countries. The lure of low Soviet prices
and quick delivery of military equipment is often irres:istable. The
acceptance of weapons results in the need to send trainees to the USSR
and to receive military instructors from the USSR; furthermore, ammunition
and spare parts need to be supplied on a continuing basis. Thus, the
acceptance of Soviet military aid is often a first step towards dependence
on the USSR.
The Soviet leaders have varied their approach to target countries.
To gain a foothold in some countries (Eqypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen) military
aid was offered first. More frequently, however, the initial agreement
with a developing country is based on economic assistance. The use of
either approach has often been followed by the other, as indicated by the
fact that about half the developing countries receiving economic aid
from the USSR also receive military aid. In combination, economic and
military aid is a potent tool to increase the dependence of a. developing
country on the USSR and other Bloc countries.
The ultimate benefits the USSR hopes to derive from its aid program
are political. Support for Soviet policies in the UN by developing;
countries, for example, has risen sharply since the launching of the
Soviets' aid program in the mid-50's. More important, the Soviets have
thereby acquired greater contact and communication with leaders of the
developing countries and have also built up their influence with large
numbers of potential leaders who are now middle-rung officials or military
officers.
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Drawbacks for the USSR: Although the trade and aid program has so far
absorbed only a very small share (according to one estimate .1%) of
the Soviet economy's gross national product, it will require increasingly
advanced industrial and military equipment during the next several years.
Thus, instead of involving industrial equipment that is generally obsolescent
or surplus to the USSR's needs, the Soviet export program will -have to
compete with domestic industrial programs for the relatively scarce tech-
nologically-advanced equipment produced by the USSR. Similarly, future
shipments of military hardware will consist far less of surplus or discarded
goods and more of the equipment being currently manufactured for the
Soviet armed forces.
A far more threatening drawback of the program, from the Kremlin's
standpoint, is the possible adverse affect of unsatisfactory performance
of Soviet aid commitments. On the economic side, the Soviets' record is
spotty and is marred by long delays in carrying out construction projects,
the poor quality of industrial equipment and consumer goods, failure to
supply enough spare parts of the needed sorts, and the glaring errors in
the planning of industrial development. The quality of Soviet military
aid, for many years unassessed, now appears to be deficient to some ex-
tent with respect to equipment and to be woefully low with respect to
training in military tactics, use of weapons, and maintenance of equipment.
(See attachment for details).
On balance, the Soviet leaders probably view their trade and aid
program as a commitment they couldn't avoid even if its costs should begin
to outweigh the foreseeable benefits. For a withdrawal in the face of
adverse developments would compound their problem.
Attractiveness to developing countries: Soviet offers of trade and aid
are hard for leaders of developing countries to resist. The kind of
goods offered--industrial and transport equipment, industrial materials
such as steel and petroleum--in exchange for surplus raw material and
food which can't be absorbed in Free World markets, appears to represent
a clear-cut gain for the developing countries. The deferment of initial
payments and the stretch-out of the repayment of credits at 22 percent
interest has added to the attractiveness of Soviet aid offers, especially
prior to 1966. Furthermore, Soviet prices usually seem to be low. Finally,
Soviet aid seems to offer leaders of developing countries a means of
countering the economic influence of their traditional trading partners
(usually the former colonial power).
Military aid is usually even more attractively presented than economic
aid. Very little, if any, down payment is demanded. The price of the
equipment is reduced by almost half by means of discounts and outright
grants. The equipment can usually be shipped soon after ordered because
of the large portion of Soviet merchant ships specializing almost exclusively
in arms shipments. Finally, comprehensive instruction is offered in the
use of the military equipment, and in military doctrine. Thus, leaders of
developing countries have painted for them a picture of rapid development
of a powerful military force with modern weapons and led by well-trained
officers.
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3 (Cont.)
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Detractions of Soviet aid: Soviet performance has tarnished the apparent
attractiveness of Soviet economic arid. First, -the quality of Soviet
goods usually does not meet what the Soviets term "world standards."
This is particularly true of machinery and equipment used. in-production
lines. The machinery itself is usually outmoded, and thus the products
of the machinery are also outmoded and cannot be sold at world market
prices. Second, the real cost of Soviet goods is nowhere near as low as
the price tags indicate, when the poor quality is taken into account.
Furthermore, Soviet-built plants are more expensive than their estimated
cost because of the added expenses* incurred by the exceptionally long
duration of construction. (See below). Third, the reliability of the USSR
is open to serious question. As a trading partner the USSR has not been
dependable, in that it has attached post-agreement political conditions
to its aid ( in spite of pretenses to the contrary) and. in that it has not
been able to sustain its deliveries of commodities (for example, Soviet
wheat was not available in the amount required. by developing countries
after the poor Soviet harvests of 1963 and .1965). The USSR, faced with
budget problems at home, has trimmed some of the attractive features of
its aid program; for example, in 1966 the Kremlin extended almost a
billion dollars in aid, over 40% of which was in the form of commercial
credits. The significnace of this lies in the change from state credits
(12 years at 21-2% interest) to commercial credits (5 to 10 years at up
to 4% interest). At the same time the Soviets increased their requirements
of hard currency for down payments. Developing countries have also mis-
takenly relied on Soviet economic advice and, as a result, have committed
themselves to courses of industrial. development not in keeping with their
own economic realities. The Soviets seem to have recognized their mis-
takes in this regard, inasmuch as they now subject new projects to pro-
tracted scrutiny before approving them; yet the Soviets still give no in-
dication that they grasp the proven methods for establishing economic
feasibility of industrial programs.
Some of the most serious deficiencies in the Kremlin's aid program
show up in the performance and quality of industrial construction projects.
The time actually required for construction has exceeded the contracted
duration by an average of more than a third, and has in some cases stretched
out to double the contracted duration. Furthermore, Soviet aid projects
have taken much longer than comparable U.S. aid projects. For example: a
Soviet aid fertilizer plant in Indonesia took 3 years longer than a U.S.
aid project of the same kind in the same country; a Soviet aid oil refinery
in India took 40 months to build, or 26 months longer than the construction
of an oil refinery of almost the same capacity built under the U.S. aid
program in South Korea. The poor quality of Soviet construction has been
transmitted to developing countries through the aid program; this is largely
attributable to inferior designs of the structures and. inept supervision
of construction. Equally serious is the general backwardness of the
industrial facilities the Soviets have provided. For example, the !Soviets
admit to themselves that their pharmaceutical industry lags far behind
that industry in the West, yet the Soviets are building pharmaceutical
-;The cost of Soviet "experts" sometimes amounts to up to a quarter of aid
spendipg on a project.
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plants for developing countries under their aid program. Similarly,
Soviet fish canneries are obsolete by Western standards; still, the
Soviets are sponsoring the construction of such plants under their aid
program.
Parenthetically, it should be borne in mind that showcase Soviet
aid projects are of high quality. For example, the Aswan High Dam on the
Nile is a credit to Soviet engineering, even though the Egyptians found
they had to replace Soviet heavy construction equipment with British and
U.S. equipment. Also, the Bhilai steel mill in India is one of the most
modern in the world, so modern in fact that at the time of its construction
the Bhilai plant had the very best of Soviet equipment, such as no single
Soviet plant could equal.. The use of such modern equipment at Bhilai
appears extravagant, however, when it is considered that it cost more and
took almost twice as long to build Bhilai with a capacity of 1 million
tons as the expansion of India's privately owned Tata steel mill with a
capacity increase of up to 2 million tons.
Until recently, Soviet military aid has been held in high regard
by most developing countries. Such a regard is considerably clouded,
however, by preliminary assessments of the value of such aid to the UAR
recently. The Soviet-supplied equipment was not effective. For example,
almost half of the UAR's tanks were manufactured in the USSR between the
middle of World War II and 1947. There is no indication that the Soviets
modified the tanks adequately for the particular rigors of desert warfare.
The Soviet-supplied radar and anti-aircraft weapons, including expensive
surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), failed to prevent the Israeli air force
from making devastating attacks. Also ineffective, apparently, was the
Soviets' training of UAR officers in military doctrine and tactics. It
is reported, for example, that UAR tanks were dug in and used as stationary
artillery; this violates the cardinal principle of modern armored warfare
that mobility should be maximized. This tactic used by the UAR's armored
units is identical to the one used by Soviet forces in World War II, as
portrayed in Soviet films of the war. It is thus indicated that Soviet
training officers may have tried to prepare the Arab military for today's
war by teaching them the successful tactics of yesterday's war.
Some conclusions concerning Soviet aid: On the economic aid side, it is
cltear that leaders of the developing countries were mistaken when they
expected Soviet aid to benefit them substantially. In the final analysis,
the economic balance sheet may even show that the developing countries
have had to pay a high price in terms of their own products and hard
currency in exchange for goods and plants which they can't employ effectively.
On the military aid side it may dawn on these same leaders ( as it un-
doubtedly occurred tra the LIAR's Nassar) that the net result of Soviet aid
has been their own false sense of confidence.
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Prensa Latina, Havana June 1967
23 February 1967
LASO Solidarity Conference Agenda
The draft agenda for the first solidarity conference of the Latin
American countries, which will be held in Havana from 28 July to 5 August
this year, has been made public. The text of the draft agenda follows:
1--The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in Latin America.
A. Experiences of the several forms of revolutionary struggle; armed
insurrection in the national liberation process for Latin America.
B. Consideration of the specific struggles of the working class, the
peasantry, the students, the intellectuals, and the rest of the progres-
sive sectors in relation to the national liberation process.
C. Eradication of all forms of colonialism in Latin America.
2--Common position and action against imperialism's political-military
intervention and economic and ideological penetration in Latin America.
A. The political-military intervention of Yankee imperialism in the
internal affairs of the Latin American countries; the imperialist policy
of repressive coordination against the liberation movements: the OAS,
the inter-American peace force, the Central American Defense Board, the
bases, missions, and other military pacts.
B. The imperialist economic policy of submission and exploitation of
the Latin American countries; its control mechanism; financial resources
and foreign trade.
C. The imperialist policy of ideological penetration on the socio-cultural
level as part of its continental strategy; the struggle against all forms
of discrimination in Latin`'America.
D. The policy of reform as a means to lessen social conflicts and deflect
the peoples from their true path; economic and political independence.
E. The oligarchic and .coi4pist policy of open aggressiont ;against the
national liberation movements and for the preservation of exploitation
of the Latin American peoples.
F. The need to achieve a common strategy for all the Latin American revo-
lutionary movements in order to defeat continental strategy, which im-
perialism has drawn up in its determination to maintain domination over
the Latin American peoples.
3--The solidarity of the Latin American peoples with the national libera-
tion struggles.
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(Cont.)
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A. Anti-imperialist solidarity in Latin America.
B, The most effective aid for the peoples who are waging the armed
struggle against imperialism and colonialism.
C. Support for the Negro people of the United States in their struggle
against racial segregation and for their rights to equality and freedom.
D. Defense of the Cuban revolution: struggle against the economic
blockage, isolation, and other forms of Yankee imperialist aggression
against the Cuban revolution.
4--Statutes of the Latin American Solidarity Organization.
A. The organizing committee of the Latin American Solidarity Organiza-
tion is made up of:
Cuba: Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado, delegate.
Brazil: Aluisio PALLANO, delegate.
Colombia: Manuel CEPEDA` Vargas, delegate.
Guatemala: Oscar Edmundo PALMA and Francisco MARROQUIN, delegates.
Guyana: Lial BAHADAR, delegate.
Peru: Jesus MAZA, delegate.
Venezuela: Silvia MORENO, delegate.
B. The national committees will be made up in each Latin American
country by the revolutionary organizations which meet the following
requirements:
.1. Anti-imperialist.
2. Unitarian.
3. Representative.
4. Accept the resolutions of the First Tri-Continental Conference.
5. Accept the bases or principles of the Latin American Solidarity
Organization.
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Prensa Latina
Havana, 4 March--An exhaustive anti-imperialist sociological survey
is being conducted in 27 Latin''American countries by the national commit-
tees participating in the First Latin American Solidarity Organization
(LASO) conference. Jesus Maza Peruvian representative to LASO told the
Cuban press: "Above all, the questionnaire aims to ascertain the degree
of awareness of the people's liberation struggle against imperialist
domination." He added that the questionnaire deals with six fundamental
points and has been sent to outstanding figures, historians, researchers,
sociologists, and progressive organizations on the American Continent.
About 1,000 persons are working in Cuba on this survey with the partici-
pation of organizations and institutes of the Revolutionary Government
and under the guidance of the Communist Party. Maza added that this
LASO project is directed toward finding out the real situation in each
country and measuring the extent of enemy infiltration of Latin American
society. He said that the data produced by this survey will contribute
valuably to the first LASO conference "because there we will pool all
experiences of the revolutionary struggle within the American Continent."
(Excerpts from) LASO Questionnaire
I. Questions in the Political and Social field
A. Political system and imperialist penetration:composition of the
government, from the viewpoint of the class situation and class ties of
its members, as determined by listing members of the following organiza-
tions: Presidency of the Republic, Cabinet or council of Ministers,
Legislative power or body (not including the local legislators, where
any exist), and governors of state, province or department.
Place these members in one of the following categories: land ownerfy
farmer (large, medium, or small), farm worker, businessman (importer or
exporter, large, medium or small), industrialist (large, medium or small),
income receiver, banker, professional man, attorney (of national or
foreign enterprises, large, medium or small), labor union leader, worker,
military (officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier), public employee,
housewife, and clergyman.
Is there security for the exercise of universal and direct suffrage
and if they exist, for what,'osition? What percent of the population
represents those excluded from the exercise of suffrage? To what social
strata do they belong and what are the causes of their exclusion?
How many women's organizations exist, what is their composition,
international affiliation and what are the tasks they develop?
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Which are the strata of the bourgeoisie whose specific interests
are harmed by imperialist penetration and to which activities of produc-
tion do these strata belong? In the national economy- what is the compara-
tive importance of the independent entrepreneurs not associated with
imperialism?
How do the armed forces and other repressive instruments operate
within the bodies of state power and in relation to the political-social
process of the country?
Border conflicts: Countries and Regions. Origins. Do such con-
flicts arise from given national interests? How do the imperialist
nations, and especially the United States, participate in such conflicts?
B. Class Organization
Which are the dividing factors of the labor union movement and how
do they operate?
Which organized sectors of the labor class have won the right, both
to participate effectively in national policy, and to free expression
regarding the events of a continental or world order?
What social victories has the organized labor class won?
How have stikes developed as an instrument of struggle during the
pat 10 years? Has?'bhe organized labor movement carried out work stoppages
of a political nature? Were these stoppages done with demands of interest
for the class or out of solidarity with student and professional sectors?
Are there any peasant organizations and what is their nature?
Do the peasants, under law, enjoy the same rights as the urban
working class, or no rights?
How much have peasant women participated and do they participate in
the jieoplets and national liberation struggles?
How are the student movements repressed?
Which are the class organizations of a national character which com-
prise the native industrial bourgeoisie?
C. Native Population
What is its economic: and cultural importance?
Is it the target of special forms of discrimination and exploitation?
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What is the relationship between the social castes and the holding
of the land?
What class interests are represented by agrarian legislation and
whom do they favor?
How much land has been expropriated from the large land holders,
individuals or enterprises, national or-foreign?
II. Social Problems
What is the status of women?
Does political imprisonment exist? Are political prisoners tortured?
What is the extent of juvenile delinquency?
What is the index of prostitution, alchoholism, gambling and other
vices and similar phenomena resulting from the social structure?
How and to what degree is begging manifest? Are children used to
beg?
To what extent are scientific methods applied to intensify the
exploitation of human labor? What are the effects df such methods as to
physical and moral degradation of the worker?
How is the child labor exploited?
III. Migration and Tourism
Is there heavy migration from the countryside to the city? What is
the reason? What are its economic and social effects?
To what extent does income from tourism, by its volume, constitute
an indirect factor of imperialist political pressure?
Which churches with headquarters in the United States have: influence
in the country?
What is the amount of state subsidies which the churches receive?
Which societies, associations, establishments, enterprises, founda-
tions, etc. have relations, are subordinate to, or are controlled by
the churches?
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Havana,Cuba
2 June 1967
The anti-imperialist delegations of the 27 Latin American nations attending
the First Tricontinental Conference founded, on 16 January 1966, in Havana,
Cuba, the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). Its aims, according
to the constitution of the organization., are to ur+ite, coordinate, and give impetus
to the struggle against North American imperialism by all the exploited peoples
of Latin America.
AALAPSO-..the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization--was created
by the First Tricontinental Conference, while LSO was created by a special
and exclusive meeting of the Latin American delegations participating in its
debates. They are two distinct organizations, utterly independent of each other.
.There is no organic or functional subordination between them. .Sven though they'
,were born almost at the same time and place and established headquarters in the
same country, they could have been born on distinct occasions and places, and
could have established distinct headquarters.
The international climate created by American imperialism's global strategy as
well as that of other colonialist powers for the forceful domination of all the
underdeveloped nations of the world, and the need of the underdeveloped, colonialized,
and dependent nations to help each other effectively, to coordinate their efforts
in the national, liberation struggle, to shore up the liberated nations, and to
give a united reply to imperialist aggression and to defeat its aims, made the
creation of the two organizations necessary and possible. AALAPSO aims to unite,
coordinate, and press forward the struggle against colonialism and imperialism in
the sphere of three continents; LASO, in the sphere of a single continent--Latin
America. Hence, relations between the two are those of fraternal support and
cooperation.
On 16 January an organizing committee was designated including Brazil, Cuba,
Colombia, Guyana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Its basic
tasks are the orientation of the work of the new organization in cooperation
'with the national committees of each nation and the organization of the first
Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference.
The internal structure of the organizing committee is not based on permanent
secretariats but rather on work groups whose life is only as long as necessary
to complete assigned tasks; once completed, new groups are immediately staffed
to implement new tasks. Only the General Secretariat, ,a post filled by the
representative of the Cuban national committee, Haydee Santamaria, and the work
group for the LASO bulletin, are permanent. The organizing committee holds
weekly meetings to.approve, disapprove, or amend what is resolved by the work
groups. Unanimous resolution is the ever present aim, but if unanimity is
impossible, a resolution may pass with a two-thirds majority. So far, however,
it has not been necessary to apply this rule for substantive resolutions.
Among many other tasks, the organizing committee has accomplished the following:
Early this year it revised the makeup of the national committees of the large
majority of nations that comprise the organization, and consulted with them on the
;date of the conference, the criteria to be followed in constituting and revamping the
national committees, agenda topics, and other proposals that they could make. On
this basis, the month of July 1967 was selected as the date for the first Latin
,American Peoples Solidarity Conference. The draft agenda and rules for the--
.conference, have already been prepared.
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 T A 9,YP4FQ~r ~e~ s2 ~se~r~ 'tF QPoZB QAIAQP9AQMOOOr 1
cultural realities in the countries of the continent, a research which must be done
by the national committees, within the limits of their potential, with the objective
of contributing sufficient information to the conference for evaluation. The
national committees represent the most active anti-imperialist sectors with the
deepest roots among the people in each of the Latin American countries. They
consist of one or more truly anti-imperialist, representative, unitarian organizationa
accepting the general. declaration of the First Tricontinental Conference and the
bases on which Laso was formed. The starting point for the formation of each
national committee was established by the international preparatory committee of
the First Trioontinental Conference. This in principle is the, way the national
.committee of any one* country is formed by the organizatiots that were invited to
,participate in it. However, some important organizations were not invited to the
First Tricontinental Conference, and perhaps some others which did not meet entry
requirements were invited. It also happens that some political forces which were
taken into account have disappeared and others may go the same route. Some
organizations--and there may be more in the future--merged, and new anti-imperialist
movements with popular support have risen. These realities have determined the
dynamic character of the composition of the national committees. No organization
may belong in perpetuity to the national committee if it loses the qualities which
.made possible its admission. On the other hand, organizations acquiring those
qualities must be admitted. The national committees must always represent the most
active anti-imperialist sectors, and those with the most profound and extensive roots
among the people in each of the Latin American countries.
The dynamic character of the national committees is also a characteristic of LASO
and is its contribution to the international revolutionary institutions. The first
review of the national committees was carried out in accordance with this basic
criterion. Today their composition is determined by the results of that work
and no longer only by the decisions of the international preparatory committee of
the First Trioontinental Conference. Every anti-imperialist organization aspiring
to become part of the national committee of its country presents entry applications
simultaneously to the pertinent national committee and to the LASO organizing
committee. In its application it indicates that it fulfills the requirements for
admission. Once it is received, the national committee sends its favorable or
,unfavorable decision, based on confirmation of entry requirements, to the organizing
committee. If the favorable decision on the new applicant is unanimous, the
organizing committee, after also confirming the fulfillment of entry requirements,
recognizes the integration of the new organization into the national committee. If
there is an objection, it makes a decision by itself. In like manner, this
procedure is followed when an organization is expelled which has lost the necessary
qualities for belonging to a national committee. This request must come from the
organizations making up the national committee or from the organizing committee
itself.
Rational committees consist basically of anti-imperialist political organizations
since they are organizations which perform,'and will perform, political functions.
However, in certain cases, mass organizations may belong to them when, in addition
to fulfilling entry requirements, they bring in essential sectors of the population,
contribute toward attracting new political forces to the national committee, and help
to develop and consolidate the unifying work of the organizations that make it up.
The fact that basically political organizations make up the national committees
does not mean any restrictions ri their work. When they hold meetings, demonstrations,
conferences, roundtables, when hey publish something, and so forth, they act in the
same manner as any regular political organization. They take advantage of the
influence each of them has in mass organizations to promote their work. Campaigns
of solidarity are convoked directly by the national committee, separately by each of
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the organizati s in it, or by mass organization in whicu they have influence. Like-
w:i..^.e, they create committees of solidarity or other forms of organization to achieve
their objectives, all in accordance with the existing situation of the anti-imperialist
organizations in each country.
,The difference between the national committee and the organizations through which :.t
performs its work is the some as that between the political organizations and'the
mass organizations. Organizationally the national committee is also flexible. It
functions, whenever possible, on the basis of periodic meetings of the delegates of
the va -Lous organizations which make it up, but also when the situation of clandestine-
ness or repression prevents organic functioning, it functions on the basis of contacts
>or liaison with the memb:r organizations.
The agreement on the foundatiot:.c?i LASO was adopted by the national committees of the
following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guadaloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, French Guiana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico,
,Dominican Republic, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Surinam joined later.
LASO and the national committees that make it up carry out, and must carry out in
the future, an intensive campaign for the unity of anti-imperialist movements in
.each"of our countries. They must prevent sectarianism from causing the havoc that is,
known in Latin America and the proliferation of division among anti-imperialist
organizations.
With their practical activity they must instill the conviction that only the most
determined unity will make the anti-imperialist movement in each country strong. They
must also demonstrate by their policy that only by uniting, coordinating, giving
impetus to the anti-imperialist struggle in all Latin American countries, and giving
each other support and solidarity, particularly to the people engaged in armed
struggle, can an effective reply be made to the continental strategy of domination by
.North American imperialism. By knowing each other, helping each other, coordinating,
and giving impetus to the scattered efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle, our
people will find the path to victory.
If the Latin American Solidarity Organization and the national committees that make
it up advance in the fulfillment of these tasks, the future of our struggle.is a
future of joint struggle and solidarity, a future of success for our present efforts.
"The duty of all revolutionaries is to make revolutiont
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THE ARAB WORLD
MAY 9, 1967
TODAY'S MAIN NEWS .AND TRENDS
From Today's Latest News&Reoorts]
S Lrj a.
SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARES TWO ShUDI
DIPLOMATS PERSONA NON GRATA RR THEIR
ALLEGED CONNECTION WITH "CONSPIRACY"
Assets of Sheikh Habanakah and 45 Merchants Are
Seized Under Order Of The Military Governor
Khalid Al Jundi, Labour Leader, Says Religion
Is "Opiate of People", Disagrees With Official
Line Atheistic Article W..s of CIA Making, Notes
That W -iter of Article In Army W.:ekly "Sincere"
The Syrian Government has declared the First and Second fe
cretaries of the Saudi Embas&y in Damascus persona non grata
and asked them to leave the country within 24 hours. They were
accused of playing a role in the right-wing "?lot" which the Sy-
rian Regime said it has crushed. This was announced today by the
state-run Damascus press.
The Syrian newspapers, furthermore, reported that assets of
Sheikh Hassan Habanakah, head of the Syrian League of Ulema
now under arrest for anti-regime sermons and activity, and 45
prominent merchants in Damascus have been seized by the state.
The seizure was by order issued by the Syrian "Military Gov-
ernor." t , proclamation by the Military Governor earlier char-
ged the US, Jordanian and Saudi rulers of being behind L. plot
against the.Syrian revolutionary regime. A Syrian army offic-
er who has returned to e-'mman from Jordan, where he had def-
ected last September, claimed in a radio and television inter-
view that Habanakah was' agent in Damascus of Lt-Col. I-elim
Hf.toum, the escaped Syrian officer said to be plotting a come-
back to Syria from Jordan. E.heikh Habanakah had earlier been
accused of working for the Saudis, and sponsoring, inside Syria,
King Feisal' s alleged bid to create an Islamic alliance.
Sheikh Habanakah is now posed by the Lyrian regime as the sy-
mbol of "reaction" in Syria. According to press reports from
the Syrian capital,Habanakah was arrested last Friday after he
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Today'- Main News & Trends, Cont'd
delivered a sermon at the mosque of his quarter, Al Midan, in Damascus, in which he denounced the
Baathist regime as "Godless."
Although shops in other Damascus souks were forced open by the "Workers Militia", of the Fe-
deration of Labour, shops at Al Midan remained closed yesterday. Khalid Al Jundi, President of
the Federation of Labour, declared in an interview with three foreign correspondents last night
that he had sent a warning to merchants and residents of the Al Midan quarter that if shops and wort
shops did not open by 9 a.m. today men of the Workers Militia would reopen them by force.
Workers Militia and N~_.tionLl Guardsmen had already reopened shuttered shops in the central
town souks Sunday and yesterday, using sledge hammers to break padlocks, according to press re-
ports this morning.
"Opiate Of the People." Khalid Al Jundi, who, with his bderation of L...bour and Workers r
tia, is symbol of the extremist faction of a regime already considered extreme by Arab standards,
made rather interesting remarks in his interview with the three forei gn correspondents last night.
He declared that he disc ;reed with the "belief" by some of the B. ath party leaders that the US Q nt-
ral Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the atheistic article which had appeared in the military
weekly, AL JAISH AL SHAABI --the article which had triggered off the current crisis in Syria.
Jundi said that he rather thought the author had been sincere but that the article had been publish-
ed without any clearance with the Governmert.
The author and editor of the magazine had been arxested and will be referred to trial. The pro-
clamation by the Military Governor Sunday night (see our bulletin yesterday) accused CIA of being
behind the article. '
Jundi, in the interview, indicated that he himself was an atheist. He said that he adhered to
Marxist doctrine that religion "is the opiate of the people."
Jundi' statements were an example of extremism that characterizes the present regime in Sy-
ria, --although the other Baath leaders now in power may be milder. In fact, Jundi, in the inter-
view, said that he disagreed with the government "mildness" in dealing with the "counter-revolut-
ionaries." He said that some blood-letting -"makes good revolutionary medicine", adding that he
kind of hopes the strikers at Al Midan today would not respond to his call to open their shops, so
strict measures could be applied against them. He said that they must be shown that the revolution
will brook no interference.
No Neutralism. Jundi declared that "neutralism" in the world struggle between socialism and
capitalism meant a partial victory for reaction. Socialist Syria, he said, must be completely wed-
!ded to the socialist camp. He said that the Ba. th Party doctrine of neutralism had been written
by the right-wing leaders and founders of the Party, Michel Aflak and Salah Bitar, who were oust-
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1
Executions. Yesterday, the weekly AL ISHTIRAKI, which speaks for Jundi's F.:deration of La-
bour, demanded in an editorial that reactionaries in Syria should be treated in the same manner
Egypt had treated leaders of the Moslem Brotherhood, when they plotted against the regime of Pre-
sident Nasser in 1965.
Since three of the Brotherhood leaders were executed after a court found them guilty of conspi-
racy against the regime, Beirut's independent right-wing AL JA RIDA , reproducing excerpts from
A L ISHTIRA KI' s article, concluded that several right-wing Syrian leaders may be headed for exe-
cution. In fact, the pager's D~mascus correspondent reported that the Syrian authorities have pre-
pared a list of persons who will be referred to trial and executed.
Press Reports. Newspapers here today continued to lead with Syrian developments, End carried
various reports about what is allegedly happening there. According to AL NAHi R, the Syriac Ca-
thrlic and Greek Catholic bishops in D,:.mascus were released after questioning by the authorities,
afWthat more than ten CLtholic clergymen in Damascus have been placed under house arrest. Also,
there were reports that a number of Greek Orthodox clergymen were arrested in Hama after they ha
tried to march in a demonstration with Moslem Ulema under Hama Is Mufti, ;,heikh Mohammed Al Ha-
med.
Both AL NAHAR and AL HAYAT reported that about 129 civil servants have been arrested for
signing a note protesting against the atheistic article in AL JAISH AL SHAABI. The movement, AL
NA HA R said, had spread to the northern town of Aleppo. The paper said that Aleppo citizens ment-
ioned that the real reason for the call for strike in the city was not only because of the article in
question but also due to the general discontent which had spread among merchants and businessmen
because of the regime's' policies.
AIL, HAYA T said that clashes took place between the demonstrators in Damascus and security
men,and that Damascenes Sunday and t.aturday night heard explosions, which were said to have takes
place near the head office of the Ruling Bath Party. AL HA YA T said that tanks and other military
vF' `cles were sent to Damascus to try to keep order, and that Syrian leaders had been holding con-
sc..rt meetings at the Baath Party headquarters.
At its meeting yest erday, the Syrian Council of Ministers, under Premier Dr Youssef Zayyen,
.discussed whatt SANA , the Syrian official news agency, called "the conspiracies being prepared by
imperialism and its agents in the area". The Council, the agency added, also discussed the "firm
stand taken by the revolution to -crush the plot and liquidate the remnants of reaction."
FIVE ESCAPE FROM JORDAN N. Meanwhile, A L NA HA R reported in a private dispatch from A m-
man, that five Syrian army officers, who had defected to Jordan with Lt-Col. Hatoum, tried to es-
cape to Syria last .`unday --but that only three made it. The escapees exchanged fire with the Jor-
danian border guards. One was hit, and another captured. The other three managed to cross into
Syrian territory. [The three presumably include Hardan Al Zu'bi, the officer who appeared on Sy-
rian television Sunday night to tell about H&.toum's alleged conspiracy against the Syrian regime --
see details on Pages 6&71.
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3
 -,Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-(iPYRGHT
ARMY OF THE PEOPLE
APRIL 25, 1967
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