(SANITIZED)WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400050006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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 - 50X1-HUM
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.~ SECRET
World-wide
Perspectives
KEY DATES
3 September -South Vietnamese elections
19 September - UN General Assembly convenes
7 November - 50th Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution
SECRET
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ument Denied
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' ~ FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
P~incipa,l Developments in World Communist Affairs
(to 16 August 1967)
1. The month was marked by numerous clashes -- physical and verbal,
explicit and implicit -- between Communist parties and regimes around
the .world, including:
a. ChiCom-Soviet, reaching a r~ew peak of hostility a;n the Chinese Red
Guard attacks on the Soviet ship SVIRSK detained in Dairen and its crew,
Kosygin's persona-1 note threatening rupture of trade relations and Chi-
nese compliance, new Peking mob demonstrations and attacks against the
Soviet Embassy, and a 3-page PRAVDA denunciation of Maoist policies and
actions.
b.. ChiCom-Mongolian, with new Peking demonstrations against the Mongo-
li~n Embassy.
c. ChiCom-N. Vietnamese-Soviet. Observers saw new evidence of "serious
political differences" (AFP) in a 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on
the arrival of a NV economic delegation in Peking: the USSR jumped in
with a 2~+ July note to Hanoi pledging more political and military aid.
d. Soviet-Rumanian. As the 2~+ July Rumanian National Assembly session
opened, PRAVDA issued a thinly veiled, conciliatory appeal to Rumania to
get back into line with the Warsaw Pact. GenSecy Ceausescu reaffirmed
Rumanian adherence to the WP in his keynote speech, even while he reit-
erated R's refusal to take sides with the others against Israel. Next
day Premier Maurer strongly attacked interference and pressure in rela-
tions between Communist countries, leaving little doubt that he~meant
the USSR. Seemingly waving a rig stick,.Radio Moscow on 28 July caxries
a Rumanian-language commentary by Soviet hero of "the liberation of
Bucharest" Ivan Lakonugov, who, inter alia, relates how the "Soviet
Russian territory of Bessarabia" was "illegally attached to the Rumanian
kingdom in January 1918" and "how festively the Bessarabian people
received the Red Arir~y" when "Bessarabia reunited with the motherland"
in June 19+0. Similarly, the Soviet monthly VOPROSY ISTORII (Questions
of History) featured in its June issue an article by L.G. Beskrovny
entitled "The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Liberation
Struggle of the Balkan Peoples," which seemed to some observers as
designed especially to show that Rumania has historically been an unre-
liable ally of Russia's and to imply that the current Russian leaders
have merely resurrected the old "bourgeois" Rumanian foreign policy line.
e. Cuban-Soviet. The story of the Havana LASO meeting is one long
account of the hassle between Castro and his sympathizers on one hand
and the Soviet-line Communists on the other, with public recriminations
between Castro and Moscow: see separate item.
2. Reporting out of China indicates that the chaos of the Cultural
revolution has degenerated into bloody strife in widespread areas, with
large-scale loss of life, especially in the major city of C_@,nton.
~ f:nnt _
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3. Serious confusion and ferment within the Poli~;h Party and regime is
reported, resulting from general disapproval of Gomulka's hard line
toward Israel and its sympathizers.
~+. Increasing Soviet concern over adv~srse develo~~me~nts threatening to
"spoil" the propaganda impact of the 50th anniver..a~~ is reflected in
the strange maneuvers of agent Victor Louis to spread a Soviet version of
the Svetlana Alliluyeva memoirs in advance of authorized publication,
also in media commentary. The Soviets have made r.~umerous private
approaches to Westerners whom they consider influe~ncial and sympathetic
in efforts to discourage non=Communist comment (e~~pecially U.S.) which
might reflect discredit on the Soviet state, political and economic
systems, and foreign policy on the eve of the anni.ve~rsary.
5. The Soviet-urged project for a world CP meeting is "kept alive" via
endorsements in a 22 July Bulgarian-Mongolian communique signed by party-
state delegations in Ulan Bator and in a 28 July speech by Tiungarian
Party leader Kadar.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1967
Latin American Solidartty Conference
At the first conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organiza-
tion -- LASO (Havana, Cuba, 31 July-10 August 1967), held under the slogan
"The Duty of Every Revolutionary Is To Make Revolution," Cuba demon-
strated that it has pret~ritons to revolutionary leadership. Castro and
his fidelista supporters insisted that "armed struggle" is the only
viable
course
toward achieving national liberation in Latin America.
Castro
wants
to be the final fudge of Communist theory and practice
within
Latin
America." There are theses which are 40 years old,"
Castro
said.
"Marxism has acquired certain characterisiics of a church,
and those characteristics must be overcome ... We consider ours a
Communist Party; it is not a problem of words, it is a problem of deeds."
As expected, dissension and rivalries between Castro's extrem%st groups
and the orthodox Latin American Communist Parties over the proper course
to national liberation arose early in the conference which condemned
the "Socialist" countries' aid and trade policies with Latin American
dictatorships and d~ligarchies.~' Significantly, however, this resolution
was not published; presumably the fidelistas did not dare openly condemn
"Socialist" trade and aid while Cuba still depdnds on Soviet assistance
(see accompanying article). In many respects, the conference and partic-
ularly Castro's 3-hour-and-~+0-minute closing speech (see condensed
version) were a two-pronged attack: directly and vehemently on the
United States and indirectly on conventional Communists, leaving the
question open whether the Cuban-led LASO will seek to coordinate and
give impetus to the struggle against "U.S. imperialism and other
oppressive forces in Latin America."
The conventional Communist Parties probably expected to be out-
numbered at the Conference but they were also clearly outmaneuvered
through voting manipulations. Castro himself launched a bitter attack
on the .absent Venezuelan Communist Party (VCP), which he labeled "the
enemy of revolution" as well as "a tool of imperialism." The VCP has
for over five months been involved in an ideological dispute with Cuba
over such issues as the "Socialist" countries' aid and trade with Latin
American governments and the question of armed revolution. Venezuela
was represented at the Conference by members of the Castro-oriented
guerrilla forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) which are
locked in a dispute with the VCP. This portion of Castro's speech was
possibly an answer to a plea presumably made by Soviet Premier Kosygin
that Cuba "de-escalate" its support for .revolutionary movements in the
hemisphere in favor of supporting less risky approaches. Castro said
"we are true revolutionaries; no true Communist in the hemisphere will
ever allow himself to be dragged into an alliance with imperialism."
'The Soviet Union and several East European countries began to increase
economic support activities to Latin American countries in 1966. In a
speech in March 1967, Castro also condemned the aid and trade activ-
ities of the European Communist Bloc countries in Latin America.
(cont.)
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Castro also said that while there are other forms of struggle, it is
imperative that revolutionaries never lose si~;h1; of they fact that it would
be deceiving the masses to think: that revolutionaries can come to power
peacefully. Tn the end, most of the non- Castroite Communists present
appeared convinced that armed struggle may well be needed to achieve
political power but a few did not applaud Casi;ro's speech.
On the eve of the Conference, on 30 July,, l?RAVDA publisY:~ed a demand
of the Secretary General of the Chilean Commrznist Party, Luis Corvalan,
(see full text) that Castro stop meddling in i;he revolutionary affairs
of other Latin American nati.ans. In a bid agai~zst Castro, Corvalan's
article said that efforts to impose views on other ranker of t;he
anti-imperialist forces do rrot help the achievement of unity. Corvalan.
said:
"In this national struggle, the revolutionaries of every
country determine in a]_1 its aspects the d:irectior.~ and concrete
tasks which emerge on t;he path to their ow~1 revolution. They know
better than anyone else the reality and the conditions i.n which they
fight and have the greatest opportunity fo:c correctly determining
the goals of the struggle and the methods of achieving them. They
may err, but they are t;he least likely to ~~rr..."
Corvalan accused Castro of :>eeking to destroy other Communist; parties
and thus provide "a gift to imperialism." He d:isagreecl with Castro's
analysis that some Latin American Communist Parties are' weak because tYiey
rely on "bourgeois elements." On 1 August, in a broadcast to Latin
America on the LASO confe.rerice Moscow's Radio Peace and Progx?ess argued
that the most consistent po]_icy promoting the u~zity of the widest strata
of the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical forces is pursued by the
Communist Parties of the Latin American countries.
China was not represented. At the meeting of the Afro-Asian Latin
American Peoples Organization (AALAF'SO) in Hava:~a in January 1966, at
which LASO was set up, the Chinese delegation was the most vociferous.
The hard line taken at the present conference o:n the revolutionary strug-
,Qle is consistent with Chinese views whereas -the Soviet; Union, which was
represented 'by observers, propagates achieving; the same ends primarily
by coexistence. The LASO line was also consistent with the views of the
theoretician of the Euban revolution, Major CIZe Guevara, whose shadowy
figure officially presided over the conference as honorary chairman
"in absentia." The Viet Conte, represented by observers, were credited
with having initiated succe:~sful "armed revolution" against i;he United
States and most delegates paid tribL.te to the hwroic struggle of the
Vietnamese, some of the more militant demanding "two, i;hree ... severa]_
Vietnams." Black power advocate Stokely Carmichael, an honor^ary guest,
delivered a bitter speech, ciescribirag the situation of U.S. I~Tegroes as
that of a colonized and exploited people with more in common with Asians,
Africans and Latin Americans than with their white fellow cii;izens. A
resolution declares support of the '"liberatio:n struggle" of ~~nerican
2 (cont.,)
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negroes and declares 18 August, the anniversary of the 1965 Watts riots a
"Day of Solidarity with American Negroes." The conference took the posi-
tion that from the exploited and oppressed Negro sector will emerge the
revolutionary movement of the United States and American-'Negroes were ex-
horted to action. A number of recently captured "North American agents"
were put on display as proof of U.S. subversionary activity against Cuba.
The conference,attended by 162 delegates from 27 countries, and by
observers from Communist and some Afro-Asian countries and from the Commu-
nist international front organizations, passed somewhat repetitive general
resolutions which declared (in summary) that:
a. (Work Committee No. 1 )-- armed struggle is the primary path and
that unarmed forms of action must help and not hinder insurrectional strug-
gle; that it is necessary to unify political and military leadership in the
revolutionary war and that the most important task for the majority of the
countries of America is to organize, initiate, and carry out revolutionary
war; that the task ff the revolutionary movement in the hemisphere must be
that of reaching the highest forms of class struggle and through these
forms to achieve liberation; that the historic task imposed on some coon-
tries is the need to give impetus to the revolutionary war already initi-
ated, in others the task is firm, determined help to those who struggle;
that the primary forms of struggle are armed violence and the preparation
of the revolutionary movement in each country; and that in countries where
the guerrillas are fighting, unification of political and military command
becomes a need of the revolutionary movement;
b. (The general resolution drafted by Work Committee No. 2 determines
the position and common action against the politico-military intervention
and economic and ideological penetration by imperialism in Latin America.
After describing the imperialist:exp~.oitation , the resolution declared)
the only alternative that will free Latin American countries is anti-:'
imperialist revolution which must also be a profou~id social revolution;
that the creation of a common political strategy of struggle by Latin
American peoples is based on the premise that the: main enemy is North
American imperialism; in all Latin American countries conditions are ripe
for beginning an armed struggle of such a type that it will insure the de-
feat of the imperialists and the seizure of power by the people;
c. (Work Committee No. 3) --armed struggle in each country is the
most effective means of exercising solidarity. Solidarity is part of the
common struggle of the peoples opposed to the continental repressive stra -
tegycof Yankee imperialism; impetus to the armed struggle is sought through
firm determined support expressed by the presence of revolutionary fighters
from any country in each of the places where these struggles develop; and
points at the example of solidarity offered by the Vietnamese people in
their struggle against the aggression by U.S. imperialism, the main enemy
of the people of the world.
d. (Work Committee No. ~+) -- Havana is the permanent site for LASO,
3 (cont.)
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The purpose of LASO is to participate :in and give impetus to the unity of
revolutionary movements and anti-imperialist organizations within each of
the Latin American r_ountries. The supreme organs of the organization will
meet every two years with the national committees of the member countries.
After pointing out that the main fr~nct:ions of the permanent LASO committee
will be to give impetus to effective solidarity with the peoples struggling
for national liberation, the draft by-laws declare that in countries where
there is armed struggle, those movements which participate in i~t or support
it effectively will be considered~as anti-imperialist.
A Resolution (see full text) harshly condemr.~ed the servility of
the Organization of American States (OAS) to U.S. :imperialism and called.
on all revolutionary fighters ~to oppose the maneuvers of that organization.
A final Declaration was read summarizing ,principles emerging from
the Conference
STAT
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1967
PRAVDA, 30 July 1967
Article by Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Central Commit-
tee of the Chilean Communist Party, "The Alliance of Revolutionary and
Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America."
The
October Socialist Revolution which this year will celebrate
its
50th
anniversary marked the beginning of the end of capitalist rule
over
the
world. It opened the era of socialism, the epoch of the libera-
tion
of
the workers class and the peoples, oppressed by imperialism.
At present socialism is being built on American soil in Cuba.
.Social conflicts are shaking our continent, which has become an impor-
tant front of the world-wide struggle against imperialism, for democracy,
peace, and socialism.
1n view of the fact that imperialism, in complicity with the local
oligarchies, disregards the principle of noninterference, encroaches
upon the sovereignty of Latin American countries, and does not respect
geographical borders but is guided by the doctrine of ideological borders,
revolutionaries are called upon to raise their solidarity to a new peak.
This presupposes, specifically, the direct participation in the libera-
tion struggle of fraternal peoples -- naturally on those occasions when
it is required by the revolutionary movement of these peoples and on
condition that such participation serves the resolution of their tasks
and is implemented under their leadership.
The basic contribution of revolutionaries to the cause of the
universal liberation of peoples and the victory of the workers class
on the international scale, however, consists primarily in the struggle
for this cause in their own country and the manifestation on this basis
of the utmost moral and material solidarity with the revolutionary
struggle of other countries. As early as the "Communist Manifesto"
Marx and Engels, the creators of Marxism and the founders of proletar-
ian internationalism, stressed that "the struggle of the proletariat
against the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle, in form if not
in content. The proletariat of each country naturally must first finish
with its own bourgeoisie."
In this national struggle the revolutionaries of every country
determine in all its aspects the direction and concrete tasks which
emerge on the path to their own revolution. They know better than any-
one else the reality and the conditions in which they fight and have
the greatest opportunity for correctly determining the goals of the
struggle and the methods of achieving them. They may err, but they are
the least likely to err. In any case, the revolutionaries of every
country can work out a correct line by assuming the responsibility, by
studying above all their own experience, their own successes and fail-
ures.
(cont.)
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Naturally this does not exclude the exchange of opinaon and, in
certain cases, fraternal advice.
The Cuban revolution constitutes obvious pr?oof of how life breaks
up all schemes and serves as an additional rerriinder that we must not
deal with the generalization of peculiar, specific features of this or
that experience. It would be wrong, however, to deny on this basis that
the specific features of one revolution -- in tYie given case of the
Cuban revolution -- could repeat themselves in ~~nother place (even
though not in a completely analogous form).
It is naturally not .very easy to determine the place and the exact
moment to begin partisan operations or some other form of the armed
struggle which may serve as a starting point for? winning power. Lenin
warned against the danger of adventures which, ass a rule, lead to the
useless loss of valuable lives of revolutionaries and to a retreat of
that movement. Leninism, however, always excelled by its creative
daring, by its striving to advance the revolutionary process. There-
fore, one must neither condemn outright nor accecpi; blindly any form of
the struggle. The main thing is to embark resol.ui;ely upon the path of
the struggle, striving to assess the situation, a.s well as possible, to
feel for the most correct path, to continuously correct tactics by
relating them to practical experience. It is necessary always to be
ready for attack as well as retreat and to search diligently for the
favorable situation which would make it possible~t;o open the :path of
the revolution.
The liberation struggle of Latin America included :representatives
of the most diverse trends: men, women, and youahs of different
political directions and social extraction. It i:; impo:rtant :for the
cause of the revolution to expand and not to contract t:he ant:i-
imperialist frof~t .
Any attempt by the communists to force their viewpoint upon the
other detachments of the anti-imperialist forces as well as attempts
of the latter to force their views upon others do not promote the
achievement of the necessary unity of action and fail to lend the
struggle against the common enemy an extensive c:haracte:r. Fo:r this
very reason the tasks which unite, and not those which divide, must
be put to the fore. This means conc7?ete tasks on whose necessary
implementation we have all agreed.
In this connection we think that the Latin American Solidarity
Organization (LASO) and the corresponding national. comm:it-tees of every
country must concentrate their activities on the development and coordina-
tion of international solidarity and on achieving unity of action in they
struggle for resolving ,joint tasks. We ardently desire that all revolu-
tionaries, all anti-imperialists, al]_ people's movements in Latin America,
should arrive at a point mode of
2 (cont.]
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revolutionary thinking. This, however, can only be achieved as a result
of a certain developmental process. We can accelerate this process, but
we cannot regard it as already finished.
It is no secret that among Latin American revolutionaries there
existdifferent approaches to several problems of the revolution.
These trends emerged and manifested themselves with greatest force after
considerable masses of new fighters joined the ranks of the Latin
.American revolutionary movement, fighters coming from the politically
most backward strata of the proletariat and also from the petty bour-
geoisie, while in the international arena. divergencies emerged in the
ranks of the revolutionary forces, divergencies which hamper the cause
of the struggle being waged in all parts of the world.
Thus, what matters here are problems of growth which cannot be
overcome within a few-days. It is, however, also an objective fact
that imperialism tries to profit and actually does profit from the
divergencies between the revolutionary forces, and mainly between the
communist parties.
From this follows the duty to act in such a manner that the
divergencies under no circumstances obstruct the attainment of action
unity in the struggle against the common enemy ,. since in the opposite
case it would only promote the implementation of his plans. The
divergencies between communist. parties are not. insurmountable obstacles
for their mutual understanding. Similarly, the divergencies between
them and other revolutionary forces must not hinder their ,joint struggle
against imperialism.
Experience shows that open polemics lead only to unnecessary name-
calling and arbitrary evaluations. The-main result of-such polemics is
an aggravation and not an o~sercoming of difficulties. Sometimes, under
certain conditions the parties may be forced to publicly express their
views on this or that question. We are not against that. But we are
confident that the best means for achieving mutual understanding are
direct contacts, bilateral and multilateral meetings, a fraternal
dialogue without slander, and, chiefly, the continuous development of
joint actions.
The driving forces of the revolution in Latin America are the
workers class, the peasantry (most of whom are Indians in many countries)
the students, the middle strata, and some groups of the national bour-
geoisie. Though contradictions exist between these forces, the common
interests of the struggle against North .American imperialism and
oligarchy constitute a predominant factor. Hence real possibilities of
uniting them exist.
While pursuing a policy of unity of action of the broadest possible
anti-imperialist and antioligarchic forces, we communists always proceed
3 (cont.)
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from the fact that an alliance of the workers class witri the peasantry,
an alliance of the proletariat with the nonprole~~arian strata of the
people, is the best guarantee of the creation of a solid and militant
united front. Mutual understanding between proletarian and petty
bourgeois revolutionaries is the main factor for advancement i.n this
direction.
The proletariat constitlztes the most powerful social cla:;s on our
continent, a class which is in a process of stormy development.
Communist parties exist in a_1 countries of the continent. The pro-
gressive part of the workers class anal the finest; repre:sentati.ves of
the Latin American intelligentsia are in the ran:~.s of the communist
parties. All communist parties are the offspring; of the proletariat of
their countries and of the October revolution, the fruit of tYie victory
of Leninism, and of the victory of tree revolutionaries over reformism.
The creation and strengthening of the Latin American connnunist parties
is a valuable gain of the revolutionary proletariat.
The opportunities for the development of th~a communist parties and
for the transformation of small parties into brig ones ar.e being imple-
mented to the extent to which the parties take their place in the van-
guard of social battles. The proletarian masses are accurr~ulating all-
round experience. Finally they unite? around the communist pa3?ties.
But we are also confronted with another objective phenomenon which
must be given constant consideration, and this is precisely the fact
that not only the conscious proletariat but also a considerable portion
of the petty bourgeoisie is switching; to revolutionary positions, is
selflessly struggling for the liberation of the Latin American countries,
and is advancing the building of socialism as its goal. This has
become manifest with particu:Lar force' i.n Latin America since the
victory of the socialist revolution in Cuba.
Objectively, the phenom~cnon represents success and p:rogrf=ss, and
hence it must not only be regarded from the viewpoint of the erroneous
positions of petty bourgeois revolutionaries or of the acts o:E' despera-
tion which they sometimes commit.
The revolutionary possibilities of the broad strata of t]ze rural
and town petty bourgeoisie must not be underrated. Whereas tlae Latin
American bourgeoisie obviously is no longer capable of heading revolu-
tionary processes (although some of its groups may participate in
them), the petty bourgeoisie on the contrary possess ample possibilities
of acting as a revolutionary force and even of playing a 1ead:ing role in
those countries where the proletariat is relatively weak either numeri-
cally or politically.
One of the lessons of history consists of the' fact that 'the petty
bourgeoisie possesses revolutionary reserves of heroism in the struggle
~ (cont.)
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for national liberation and socialism. Ties of unity and struggle exist
between the revolutionary currents developing among the proletariat on
the one hand and among the petty bourgeoisie on the other hand. Many
things unite them, but there also are quite a few things separating them.
The revolutionary current which emerges on a petty bourgeois basis
usually underrates the proletariat and the communist parties, is more
disposed toward nationalism, adventurism, and terrorism, and sometimes
permits anticommunist and anti-Soviet attitudes. It also is more prone
to .slip into desperation and subjectivism. Nevertheless, it is a
revolutionary current with respect to which the proletariat must adopt
a position of unity rather than a position of struggle.
A struggle for the leadership of the movement -- which is to a
certain .extent an ideological struggle -- is taking place between these
two trends. But any attempt to exacerbate this struggle and to turn it
into a "struggle for the annihilation" of one or another revolutionary
trend is nothing else. but a present to imperialism. Proof of this is
the fact that imperialism and its agents strive precisely to exacerbate
this struggle and to carry it to a rupture.
The so-called national bourgeoisie on its own part, in order to
preserve or expand its class positions also strives to make the
revolutionary currents of the petty bourgeoisie and of the proletariat
move increasingly away from each other.
The mutual understanding, collaborat.io.n, and joint actions of the
revolutionary proletariat and of the revolutionary circles of the petty
bourgeoisie are now the main problem and the primary duty in Latin
America. The revolutionaries of all Latin American countries are now
confronted with the task of searching for ways toward a mutual under-
standing between the revolutionary currents among the proletariat and
the petty bourgeoisie. It is absolutely clear that the revolutionaries
of each country themselves are selecting these ways and that at the
same time this places great emphasis on the need for the broadest
possible dissemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a genuine
education of the masses in the spirit of proletarian ideology. It can
be confirmed that the question in most Latin American countries con-
cerns not only the need far joint actions of the communist parties and
other revolutionary forces, but also the need for the implementation of
this collaboration of the level of a joint leadership of the liberation-
al struggle for each people by the revolutionary forces which in a
certain sense are sharing in the vanguard function.
A vanguard cannot be created arbitrarily or artificially around a
leader or around people who individually adopt most radical -- in any
case this is what they think -- positions and are preparing some type
or other of revolutionary actions. Exceptions from this rule do not
disprove it. The vanguard emerges as a result of the merger of
Marxism and the workers movement, of the forming of revolutionary ideas
5 (cont.)
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(primarily in the ranks of the proletariat.). .and of the application of
Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of each country, that is,
as a result of a purposeful activity and. not. of a spontaneous process.
On the other hand, as Lenin said, it is sufficient to term oneself a
vanguard and foremost detachment; it also is necessary to act in such
a manner that the other detachments :realize ar~d cannot ignore that we
are advancing.
The communist parties in Latin America emer'ge'd at different times;
they are operating in different social. and pol.itic:al.conditions. Some
parties are trying to shift from the. popularization of the ideas of
scientific socialism to the stage of strengthen3.ng their contacts with
the masses, and to the period of organizing and leading a massive
struggle and of intense social and political work among the people, a
feature which will permit them to open the road toward the conquest of
power. At the same time this represents the road toward a rapid
development of all Latin American co~~nmunist powers and toward their
transformation into a leading force in the revolutionary movement.
But the communist are far from considering this prospect the only
one possible. On behalf of the interests of the' proletariat and on the
basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism they are ready to raise the
collaboration and unity with. the other revolutionary forces to the
highest possible level.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1967
We, representatives of the peoples of our America, conscious of the
conditions which exist on the continent, knowing of the existence of a
common counterrevolutionary strategy directed by Yankee imperialism, pro-
claim:
1--That it is the right and duty of the peoples of Latin America to make
revolution;
2--That revolution in Latin America has its deepest historic roots in the
liberation movement against European colonialism of the 19th Century and
against the imperialism of this century. The epic of the peoples of Ameri-
ca and the great class battles against imperialism waged by our peoples in
previous decades are the sources of historic inspiration for the Latin Amer-
ican revolutionary movement;
3--That the essential meaning of the revolution in Latin America is given
by its confrontation of .imperialism, the oligarchies, and bourgeois land-
owners. Consequently, the character of the revolution is that of a struggle
for national independence, emancipation from oligarchies,. and the socialist
path for complete economic and social development;
~+--That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement
of Latin America;
S--That the armed revolutionary struggle is the primary path of the revolu-
tion in Latin America;
6--That all the other forms of struggle must serve and not hinder the pro-
gress of the primary line which is armed struggle;
7--That for the majority of the countries of the continent the problem of
organizing, initiating, developing,and culminating armed struggle is today
the immediate and primary task of the revolutionary movement;
B--That those countries in which this task is not being considered as an
immediate task should at any rate consider it as an inevitable prospect in
the development of the revolutionary struggle in their country..
9--That the people of each country and their revolutionary vanguards will
have the historic responsibility for advancing the revolution in each of
them.
10--That the guerrillas, as the embryo of the armies of liberation, are the
most effective means for initiating and developing revolutionary struggle
in the ma~ority~of our countries;
11--That the leadership of the revolution demands, as an organizational
(cont.)
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pr9:nciple, the existence of a unified pc>litical and military command as a
guarantee for its success;
12---That the most effective solidarity that revolutionary movements can
give each other is the development and culmination of their own struggle
in each country;
13--That solidarity with Cuba and collaboration and cooperation with the
revolutionary movement in arms are unavoidable duties of an :inter?national
type for all anti.-imperialist organizations of the continent,
1~+--That the Cuban revolution as a symbol of the victory of the armed revo-~
lutionary movement is the vanguard of the Latin American anti-imperialist
movement. As the people who carry out armed struggle advance along that
path, they also place themselves in the vanguard;
15---That the people directly colonized by the European mother countries or
subjected to direct colonial domination by the United. States,, while on
their way to liberation,have as their immediate and primary objective the
fight for independence and the maintenance of lin:~s to the general struggle
of the continent as the only manner of avoiding being absorbed by North
American neocolonialism;
16---That the Second Declaration of Havana, which contains the beautiful and
glorious revolutionary tradition of the last 150 years of Americw generation of
journalists that the real restriction. on our freedom exists w~'_thin our-
selves and that was the reas challenge to our mission today. During the:
past 30 years Egyptian society has lived under abnormal condii;ions."
"Take myself. I began my journalistic career in 1q~+2, when World Warr
II was still raging. Martial law was in force b;y order of the: British occu-
pation forces, censorship was imposed., and the darkness was complete.. After
the war the darkness was not complete: d.issipat~'d. The restrictions which
had existed since September 1939 continued until the oui;break of the revolu-
tion in July 1952. Even after the revolution martial law continued in force
for several years because of the revolutionary battles on the political and
social fronts. Restrictions were removed only after discussion and acttaal
Ccont.;)
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various attempts to seek reality. On the Arab level, the searching process
took the form of talks in Egypt and several Arab states. This process cul-
mnaty~~ in the summit meetings in Cairo attended by Boumedience, Arif, Al-
Afasi, Al-Athari, and Abd an-Nasir. This was in addition to the Arab for-
eign ministers' meetings in Kuwait and New York."
"On the level of Soviet-Arab relations, the searching process took the
form of extremely important talks between Egypt and the USSR. These talks
culminated in the visit of Soviet President Podgorny and Chief of Staff
Zakharov to Cairo. On the international level, the process took the form
of the activities of the Security Council and the General Assembly, bo~~h
in the meeting halls and in the lobbies."
"All this shows that the quiet period was not actually one of complete
inactivity and paralysis. Nevertheless, it should be followed by actions,
and by action I do not mean hurried action. The action now required on the
domestic front must stem from full awareness of reality and an accurate
and faithful analysis of all circumstances. Reflex action cannot be con-
sidered action but nervous twitching."
"Second, the first step to take in our action--and this is unavoida-
able--is to again place the Egyptian armed forces in a state of readiness.
I would like to say that nothing short of a miracle can prevent a return
to the battlefield; and I do not think that we are lining in an age of mir-
acles. Even if a miracle were to bring about a solution that did not re-
quire such preparation, the preparation would be the first factor that
would help bring about such a miracle."
"The first thing we must be aware of is that the enemy cannot intimi-
date us, that we are capable at all costs of making his life on our Arab
territory impossible. All this can only take place by again placing the
Egyptian Armed Forces in a state of readiness. It is fair to immediately
add that action in this direction was given top priority even when the home
front was still engaged in the process of absorbing the shock caused by
the setback."
"Third, the popular forces are the real backbone of armed resistance
and the real support behind the frontline. This leads us to the role of
an important and vital process--the process of unleashing the masses'
forces and of reorganizing them to serve the objectives of the battle and
the aftermath of the battle... The masses--and this has been proved by ex-
perience--unreservedly give all that they have when the position is clear
to them, when they themselves are part of the situation, when their role
in the battle is defined, and when they have a clear picture of the after-
math of the battle, even if it is a general outline."
"We cannot say that war is waged for the sake of war, but for the sake
of life-:.. This is the only justification accepted by people for declaring
war and going through the sufferings and torture which result from it.
3 (cont.)
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Life means people, masses of people. This leads u~, 1;o discussing the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU),: which constitutes the frarrie~;rork of the alliance of
the people's working forces as well as 'the center of their political and
social action."
"The theory on which the ASU is based--that it; :Ls an alliance of the
people's working forces, a broader front of the mas;se~s run by a political
organization committed to state policy--is in my o~>inion theoretically a
correct formula for political action in the deve].o~>ing world and, its com-
plicated circumstances. But this formula, which is theoretically correct,
has not been given a full opportunity to succeed iri practice." There are
several reasons for this:
1--Many times the ASU has become a center or centeY?s of authority. Con-
sequently, at times the ASU seemed as if it were trya.ng tc becorrce a govern-
ment above the government, or a government adjacent to the government.
`Phis is wrong. The .ASU should remain under the go~re:~nment, which is in
fact its progressive executive instrument.
2--]3y becoming a center or centers of authority t;hey ASU was bogged down in
ideologies which expressed the thoughts of individltals rather tY~.an collect-
ive thought which could serve as the basis for pol:i.tical action for the
masses.
3--Organizational formalities have preoccupied soma members from the real
provision of the organization. There were more mefangs than subjects to
be discussed; there were more people employed in political. action than there
were volunteers; there were more reports than studies on problems and how
to solve them; and the publications which were pasl;ed on the walls lacked
correct ideas that could move the masses. All thi:a was wrong.
l+--A number of ASU leaders did not try 'to learn from work among the masses,
but from books or from others. This was wrong, pa:.^ticularly with regard to
those leaders who were not in t;he first place read;r for popular action.
Furthermore, their previous experience was not close to tYAe masses' pulsat-
ing hearts. Perhaps Abd an-Nasir's firm link with the masses results from
his not once having tried to expound an ideology before the masses. He
ha,s always spoken what was in Y.iis heart and always reached the hearts of
others. Thus, the new role which Abd an-Nasir has assumecL in the ASU has
prepared the ground for an essential change in the ASU's rriethod of work
and the daily exercise of its r?ale among the masse~~.
"However, we have to be fair by saying that the ASU has succeeded in
certain fields-. It is now cle~~r that the ASU's popular political action
under the effective and direct leadership of Jamal Abd an-Nasir? to whom
on y and 10 June the masses gave authorization for change? consists of two
stages: an urgent'stage calling for mabilizatiorl '.for the battle and a la-?
ter stage calling for a program for the period a:fte~r the battle so that a
(cont.)
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clear view of the future will help strengthen present decisive efforts."
"How can we mobilize the masses for the urgent stage, and how can we
mobilize them for the latter stage? Jamal Abd an-Nasir has already answer-
ed when he said: "The only course is democratic action." I cannot say,
that the great achievements of the 23 July revolution were not made through
real mobilization, or rather without true democratic action. To say that
would be to commit a horrible crime against the epic of the modern Egyptian
revolutionary struggle. But there are various kinds of democracy. Many of
our revolutionary achievements have been made through what we may call
democratic action. Because of their close contact with the feelings and
attitude of the people, our leaders have made decisions which later were
completely approved by the masses. Examples are the decision to national=
ize the Suez Canal disregarding the danger, the decision to build the High
Dam no matter what the sacrifices, and the socialist decisions which liq-
uidated the 0.5 percent of the population that dominated Egyptian society.
But now that the decision is one of life or death, victory or defeat, we
nee d. what we call democracy by cooperation. In other words, the masses
should participate in evolving a measure before a decision is made. This
calls for discussions with greater public participation--which need not be
held in public if the circumstances so demand."
"To achieve this it is necessary to eliminate all the elements of fear,
including fear of fear. In this connection I spoke previously ~f the need
for guarantees regarding arrest, custody, and dismissal. I also touched
on the question of consolidation of the institutions of independent think-
ing which are committed to the objectives of political and social struggle.
These include the universities and the press. I then stressed that law
should be the determining factor so that it "will be above all positions
of power and above the will of individuals," as President Abd an-Nasir said
in his speech in November 1966 when he opened the National Assembly session.
I am not saying that after this it should not be permissable to arrest any-
one, but that there should be predefinition of when such a measure is ne-
cessary. I do not mean by what I said about the question of custody that
great wealth should be given back to the half of one percent; the question
of wealth has been settled and resolved. But what remains unsettled is
the question of the individual members of this class as human beings who
have the right to live in dignity in society and to work, if they can,
under society's new laws, without continuing to be ghosts lost in Egyptian
society like disturbed, unsettled souls."
"Further, I am not saying that the penalty of dismissal should disap-
pear from Egyptian society, but that dismissal should not be carried out
without prior study, indictment, and defense. The rule of law does not
mean that the right of legislation should stop now; it means that we can
today, tomorrow, or at some time in the future issue any number of laws
in accordance with the requirements of our circumstances."
"Socialist legality does not separate the spirit of the law from the
5 (cont.)
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spirit of the revolution, but combines the two spix?ii;s. Hardly anyone
raises an innocent voice when people accuse him of saying things he did
not say. So then they appoint themselves as prosecutors, sentence him,
and carry out the sentence. Egyptian patriotism is; i;he history of this
entire people. There is no need for new teachers. .Egypt's history did
not begin with the 23 July revolution. The value of the 23 July revolution
is that it is a link in a long chain, but it is ri?;h1, to say that it is the
strongest link. The socialist revolution has had its biggest successes
without anyone's guardianship. Those w:ho use terror are not men of princi-
ple no matter what they say."
"Fourth, work is now playing and will play an increasingly influential
role on the conduct of the battle. This puts before us the problem of pro-
cution and consumption. During the battle, conp]_ei;e mobilization is essen-
tial within every production unit no matter what tY~e,.circumstances. The
task of enlightened political action in such circurns~tances is. not to oppose
the administration (of production--ed.) but to ~>upport it and see that it
has men capable of understanding the technological revolutian, which is
the strongest motivating :force in our world. With regard to cor.~sumptian,
the masses have given, and are ready to give everyl;h:ing. A11 th~.e masses
want to know is that what they give is being used _'o:r the purpoe,e for which
it is given and no other purpose."
"Fifth, the various information media should night the way before the
masses' movement. Any attempt to hide the facts w:i.ll be wrong i.n a world
whose frontiers have disappeared thanks to the advanced means of communica-
tions. Truth always finds its way to the one who wants it. The danger is
that it often reaches him fraught with hostile intentions. Moreover, the
attempt to arouse enthusiasm and excitement and to consider it as a form
of" mobilization has proved worthless. It has prove>_d that it is incapable
of supplying stamina in a war ,whose battles demand stamina. Information
media do not make news, but convey it. They may add their viewpoint when-
ever that is necessary. If news media resort torso=crecy and to making
news, then what reaches the masses most of the t:~me is vague and incompre-?
hensible verbiage, which hardly quenches the masse, thirst; or helps mobil-?
ize them for action."
"This and other fields of action on the domestic front will undoubted-
ly be the subject of full discussion during the process of reorganizing
the ASU Central Committee. The committee also knows that the U~3 plan was
and still is aimed at the Egyptian domestic front, ~.t overt;hrowing the revo-
lutionary regime. If the massE;s' movement of 9 and: 10 June has blocked
th.e way for any attempt to capitalize on the military setbar_k by laying a
siege around the entire domestic political situati~en, other kinds of at-
tempts still continue. Therefore, the strengthening of tYie domestic
front's defenses, the bridging of gaps in this front, the mobilization of
the entire people's forces, and their alertness in their positions are nec-
essary to frustrate US attempts preparatory to our seizing; the :Lnitiative
and passing from defense to offense backed by a consolidated. and a solid
base.
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~~~ ~ ~0~~~~~,
t8~e pup~~~
"Cransl2ted from l.E Nt7l1VCl. OQSERVATEUR, Paris
Why did the Soviet Union unleash U.A.R. dlc#ator
Nasser's army to confront the Israelis on the Sinai
frontier?' Wha made the blockade decision? Who was
behind the demand for withdrawal of U.N. peace-
keeping forces? This report is attributed #o a high
Soviet fonctronnaire and was obtained in Moscow by
a reporter for the leftist French journal. Le Nouvel
Observateur.
these forces and to immediately get iri touch..
TJR INTELLIGENCE was disturbed by the Is-
raeli plan to make a raid into Syria to destroy.
the nests of the Palestinian commandos and
eventually push onward to Damascus to over-
throw the Syrian Government. It was with our
approval that Nasser massed his ,troops 'on the
Sinai frontier to demonstrate to the Israelis that
if they launched an offensive against Syria, that
country would not fight alone. Nasser believed
this would discourage Israel from initialing the
attack.
.On the other hand, Nasser made the grave
decisions of demanding the withdrawal of the
U.N. "blue helmets" from the Suez Canal zone and
blockading the Gulf of Aqaba on his own and then
informed us about them. We told him that by
playing these two cards at this time he was run-
ning the risk of unpredictable reactions. But lre
seemed confident, and U Thant's decision to with-
draw the iJ.N. forces, whiclY came sooner than
expected, appeared to justify this confidence. At
that point we advised Nasser that we were only
committed to neutralizing the United States-that
is, we would respond with an escalation equal to
any escalation Washington might undertake-
and that our support rVould not go beyond that.
When it appeared that the Israelis considered
the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba as a castes bell{
and that the situation had become grave, the hot
line between Washington and Moscow began.
operating. Kosygin and Johnson agreed to work
on their allies-the one on Egypt and Syria, the
other on Israel-in order to prevent them -from
resorting to awns. They also decided to keep mili-
taryfarces out of the theater of operations, to take
the measures necessary to avoid contact between
' should an incident occur so that it would not de-
generate into a serious conflict. (This is why
Washington promptly notified us when planes
tools off from the.Sixth Fleet after an American
~ vessel had been attacked through an error by ?',
jthe Israelis,)
' Nasser, knowing our reservations,
promised he would not be the first to
attack, but he committed the crrbr of
believing that the agreement betwecrr the two big
powers allowed hirn all tare tinrc lrc needed for
diplomatic maneuvers. In fact, he was partially a
victim of his own propaganda. which claimed
that tlre'Tcl Aviv Govarrttnent was rncrcly Wasl~-
fngton's pawn. Iic did not want to believe -that
this pawn might -act on its own. Furthermore,
he made a major mistake hl nc&lecting the mill-
tary side of the crisis. It did not even occur to lum
to put his airfrclds in a state o? alert. This lack of
foresight t;or sabotage by some top officers hostile
[o Nasser} cause:l the destruction of the excellent
military material we had given Lgypt. Tlrc truth
is we had overrated the ability of the command-
ing staff and logistics _of the Egyptian military
al)1)1ratU9. Silrcc 19,~G, the Lgyptian Army units
U1) t0 bal,t:allUll Icvcl haci mach, great progress in
terms of courage and rnancuvcrability, i~ut the
shortcomings above this level turned out to be
ShoCliIllg.
The second crchange on tlre. hot line between
Johnson and Kn~;ygin clcalt with an American
proposal for a ~;crreral settlement of- the Middle
East problem. Wanting to protect their oil in-
tcrests on the Arab peninsula and tir~_ ~.:.:'itical
positions in ,iurclan, the An1CriC:rnS prvjroscd to
settle the gUC5UU11 of frecdorrl of navigation in
.the Gulf of Aqaba try a compromise between the
Israeli and Aral] viewpoints. `The Israelis would
he CUilll)CnSaICCI by substantial ~ economic and
frnanciai aid from the Lfnitcd States, and alarge-
scale plan of economic aid similar to that which
had been i~.ojectccl for the "Alliance for Progress"
in Latin Amcric:r wo~)lcl be launched for the
benefiC of all the Arab countries, including Egypt .
and Syria. The Soviet Union was invited to
mat;c a parallel effort. Kosygin replied that
he nccclccl more facts, but that a priori
he w;IS clot opposed to this project.
1n order to test the reactions of the
? Egyptians to the plan, Johnson invited rn~e of the
men closest to Nasser, Zakarin Mohieddin, to come
' to Washington. On our advice, Mohieddin ac-
cepted the invitation which only strengthened-
Nasser's convictions that hostilities would not
erupt. In addition, the Israelis skillfully hood-
winked him. At the very moment when Dayan was
'making the final preparations for his lightning
offensive, he stated at a press conference that his
`country would not attack first. But in fact the Is-
raelis had decided to act and confront the world
with the fait accompli of their military victory.
The drama unfolded at dawn on Monday, June
5. Almost all of the Jordanian and Syrian air
forces and two-thirds of the Egyptian air force
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were destroyed on the firound. llratnat.ic con vcr- The latest events I~rovc the imperialism of Is-
sations took place in Cairo between Nasser and raeli policy and our attitudr, toward Tel Aviv is
our ambassador and in Moscow between the going to get ever:. tougher. T'lae I~rarlis are now
Egyptian Ambassador .and the top members of the mad dogs of thr?~ Miclcllc East. 'd'ot: don't kill a
the Soviet collective Ieadcrsh}p which. had been mad dog because he has a. right la Jive, but you. ?
calicd into an emergency meeting. The Egyptians do have to punish I,i~n. We now firmly believe dais
demanc3ec} that we, the Soviets, immediately punishment is requin?eci to 17ring Israel to its senses
replace their cicstroyed ait?force. But where were and that undoubtedly it will take place some day,.
the new craft to be Iandecl7 All the rgyplian air- Tlae Israelis have pointed out the road the Araba
ficlcls war4 uncter flee by Tsraeli planQS o?xcept must talcel to latanch a surprise air attack ona
Luxor anti Aswan in Lipper rgypt, and these fields day on the vulnerable trrrit.ory of tiny Israel. -
?were poorly equipped to handle such attacks. The The political and diplomatic struggle we are '
Egyptians suggested sending the planes to the go}ng to wage alongside the Arabs,. especially the
Sudan, to Iraq or to Libya; we refused because the Syrians and Nasser, will be dilTicult, As far the
two or three airfields in the Sudan and Iran are Ameiticans, we shall exploit to the,. utmost the
small and inaclcquate. As for sending Soviet blac:krnailing of tl?~~ei:r oil interests aria. ~,. ration
planes into T ibya. a few miles from the American through the Suez t'anal.
base, ~Vhcrlus ricld, Washington would regard We shall fight at all the conference tables to
it as a provocation-and we diti not want war force the Israelis i:o evacuate the territories they
with the United States. conquered. And we shalt wago an :incessant pro-
The dialo
ues between the E
ti
d
g
gyp
ans an
. us paganda war, particularly among the young Arab
~trt.1'r' z3trttiitrc}; F'}ir'.~ aECt~~ni~i tin MF tiWtt+rtii~ii~i'ri~ gCnetation, aga1115t :lll tI]C cowards, O OrtUnists
them in the hour of need. We rcplled that we had And elements linked to the An lo-Amcrlcane whfl
committed ourselves to supporting them against g
American stction brit not a~afi?~st Israel, whose sh?~v ~Y readiness to coo~eratC wit}i Israel---as
power they had underestimated. After the success. l n as I ra 1 doe:3 a of ra tt1' t]te cancesalorrs
t~iawe slsiat~ derrcrtn~ ?f~i'or.
of the Israeli offensive we decided, without cnn-
s~lting the Egyptians, that the could accept an'
immediate cease-fire in tlae Security Council be-
cause the Arab positions on the ground were still
not catastrophic. De Gaulle, who was in coan-
munication with Kosygin, shared our view.
The Egyptians mistakenly believed r]~cy could
take the first punch thrown by tlae Israelis in
ground fighting. Once that danger had passed,
they would begin. a long war wlaiclt tlacy could win
clue to the large area and nurnerical superiority
of the Arab world. VVc told them they were sub-
stituting tlacir wishes for realities since their tanlts
would be beaten without air cover. Nasser did not
want to believe tts and launched his counter-
offensive, which failed. IIc closed the door on tlae
only reasonable solution: to pay the price in
ground fighting under. floe least disadvantageous
conditions possible and gain precious time during
which he would Ue able to quietly rebuild his tdr
force.
As Nasser continued Isis desperate struggle, eve
became aware that the Arab world and a large
part of the Third ~'Vorld, not to mention the
Chinese, disapproved of the inadequacy of our
support to L},rypt. Suddenly, some of our leaders
began thinking of tatting floe risk of limited mili-
tary action on beIYalf of rtrypt w}thin the frame-
work of a "prudent challenge" to the United
States. however, dais solution was finally re-
jected. /As elsew}acre, tlac pressure of Jewish.
opinionia`~ade its weight felt in the U.S.S.R. right
up to the leading circles. )
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MANCIi1;ST1;R GUARDIAN
12 August 1 g67
The struggle in theEgyptian leadershipp, 'which has
lycen boiling up under the surface of public.life since the
end of the war, came out into the open yesterday with an
article in " Al A~llra~m," which accused the Arab Socialist
Union of trying to take aver the government of the. country.
117r Haykal, the editor of " Al Ahrarrt," strongly
counter-attacked the extremists tivho had earlier accused
hii11 of beingt~a "defeatist" will make it possible for Egyp?
who wanted reconciliation tiara "doves ? to divert from;
with Israel." thoughts of revenge those forces
There ought indeed to be in. Egypt that can think of noth-
action, he said, "-hut I do not ing but the ultimato solution.
s ?
C~~~L ~~~~~ _ ~~~ C~~~~
By vlcroR zoRZn
action is " to be hurried, then
inaction is far better." A,ny new
action -had to stem from reality
and from a full analysis of the
situation. " Reflex action cannot
be considered actfon - it is
merely nervous twitching." What
he wanted was " a calculated
pause " during which the mili-
tary forces should be brought to
a state of readiness.
The miracle
And then what ? " I would
like .to say that nothing short of
a miracle can prevent a return
to the battlefield-and I do not
believe that we are living in an
age of miracles." Docs this
mean, then, that a resumption of
the war is inevitable ? Not quite
-and this is presumably why'
"Al Gomhouria 'denounced him
and those' in whose name he
speaks as "defeatist."
lie explained : "Even if a
miracle were to bring about a
solution that did not require such
(military) preparations, these
would be a primary factor in
brirngin;g about such a miracia"
So the mlrade 1n which he did
not believe in the preceding
sentence becomes a practical
proposition, capable of bringing
about a solution that ~nfght
otherwise not require military
preparations-that fs, a settle-
ment. without war.
of course, any such proposi-'
tion has. to be wrapped up in
Egypt today fn a thick fog of
words-and b2r Haykal fs a past-,
master at this game. lie is, no'
doubt, .addressing himself as
much to the Israelis as to Egypt's+
own ? hawks." Ito wants politi-'
cal concessions from Israoi that'
be.tnveen those who want a
resumption od hosti9fties, if only
by way of gucrrilLa warfare and
infiltratnon, and those who
beTiev~e that any bho~ugh~t of war
should be aband?oned~-certa?irnly
for the timte trring and pvssi~b'ly
for go~nd.
bIr Iiaykai's main stress, on the
need for a programme of dornes?
tic development, presumably
reflects the views of those
Egyptian leaders who have had
enough military adventures.~
Hence the criticism of him as a
"defeatist'.' in "Al Gom-
houria," the olI'icfal organ of the
Arab Socia~tis~t Urnion, which also
took him to task for advocating
the re-establishment of diplo?
matic relations with the United
States.
i?s foun+l a ++':.Y through the
frontiers, s+)anla to mr+~lcrn
r>tcdia of cnnununication.
TLa aL"~mpt in arouse cnthus-
la,m l+y wnr.i~ alone Clad pr+)+?ecl
incapz~)lc of prnvidirtlt slrcr)fitlt
in time of uar. :'hc informattcn
media did not mal:c netts, they
rnnccyccl it. If they Karl
" recourse to secrecy and to .
mal;in~T nr+ts, then what re.:cch~s
the masses r~~nst of the time is
ca^uc and tncantprehensible
vrrhiaFC: '
,1L llaykaPs insistence tlcat l:r
;s ~peakin~ in his own name, or
at tt'~O most in the name of his
paper, only hots the question,
for in 1':fiyi>t only those ore
a,lo+re~! to nsc the press to
express their "own" views who
happen to share tlu: views of the
autl:oritles.
P,nth " Al C.ornho~:ria,' which
attsclrerl ? Revised
second edition (paperback) by Vintage Books, 1962. {First; ed. 1956)
This symposium by a number of specialists was intended '_'to i1.lust.rate
the main trends in Soviet historical writing in the field of Russian his-
tpry." Except for the first chapter, which was rew:r.itten for the end
edition, the essays refer primarily to the Stalin period.
RUSSIAN HISTORIANS AND THE SOVIET STATE, by Konstantin F. Shteppa.
New Brunswic}~, N,J.: Rutgers University Press, :L962. An in-depth study
by a former Soviet Professor of History at Kiev TJnLversity and Senior
Associate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences w}.~o "went West" during
WWII.
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SURVEY, London
April 1967 ~, .
~~'~ '~ THE P~~~?hT.A-~,I'~'~ CULT
We reproduce below two recent documents reflecting the continuotts
struggle about Stalin's role in Soviet history. One of them is a shortened
' version of a discussion on the proposed text of the third volume of the
new '~-Iistory of the CPSU. It tank place at a closed meeting held at
nc~ rn.~tituta o}` MarxLrn:-,~enl+risrrr betwren some old I~olshaviks and
. Party ^lristorians. The other document is a verbatim report of a similar
discussion held there about the book by the historian A; M. Nekrich.
22 Juue 1941, published in the spring of 1965, of which the relevant
passages are also reproduced below to glue the background of the dis-
cussion.
It is clear that the question of the historical interpretation of Stalin
remains a most sensitive one both in the Sino-Soviet dispute and inside
the Soviet Union. Although the suggestion that the twenty-third party
congress would produce a partial rehabilitation of Stalin was not borne
out, references to Stalin in the Soviet press have since become more
f avoura6le. The reappraisal is limited to his role in the war: ~ other aspects
!~` are played down. On the twenty-frfth anniversary of the German attack
on tl:e Soviet Union, Marshal Grechko wrote ~in New Times that Stalin
had rgnored warnings of the impending German attack and had been
wrong in his assessment of the political-military situation. But the
anniversary of the defence of ~ Moscow provided an opportunity to
mention Stalin favourably. Marshal Zhukov in Sovetskaya Moldaviya
(20 October 1966) said that he ' did a colossal job in organising the
necessary strategic reserves and .. ,achieved, orre might say, the near-
impossible'. Marshal Rakossovsky in Moskovskaya Pravda (18 October
1966) paid a tribute to Stalin as an inspiring leader who was able
to encourage military commanders in a di)~cult situation ' with a few
words'. Marshal Budenny (Izvestiya, 6 November 1966), described the
7 November 1941 military parade in Red Square before .Stalin as a
' tur~ring point in the psychological attitude of the masses'.
Other favourable comments appeared in Pravda (S November 1966),
Komsomolskaya Pravda (6 November 1966), and .Economic Gazette (no.
4~. Brezhnev in his speech at Tbilisi on 1 November 1966 named
Stalin among Georgian `ardent revolutionaries' acrd this, according to
Pravda, received prolonged applause.
Such remarks, although relatively mild 'as rehabilitation, stand in
striking contrast with the tone of the book by Nekrich and of the two
discussions-reproduced below.
l3iscussion of the draft third volume of The '
History of the CPSU
Present: 250.
Presidium of the conference: Academician P. N. Pospelov, member
of CPSU since 1896; F. N. Petrov; Academician I. I. Mints; D. M. Kukin,
vice-chairman of IML editorial board; Glebov and others, representing
the ideological section of the CC of the party.
Pospelov (IML): More than 1,000 comrades have taken part in
the discussion' of the manuscript and draft of the third volume. The
authors were guided by the documents of the founders of Marxism-
Leninism and by material already published and in the archives. There
were many difficulties, as layers of subjectivist judgments which had
. been included in earlier decades, including the last few years, had to
be stripped off. We must tell the truth about this .. .
Fofanova, M. B.... From the middle 30s onwards the influence
of Stalin's cult of personality made itself felt, particularly in 1938.
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The Short Course played a major role in the distortio~z of party hi:;tory. ,
In the Short Course Stalin ovcrshac[owed the party, tine people? and
Lenin. I-lis influence was felt in many books on the history of the party,
making them unreadable. In the third volume of th.e present Hdstary
I am mentioned, I am supposed to have said that Lenin arrived in
Petersburg. at the end of September. I said nothing of the kind. There
are docunicnts proving that Lenin returned before the CC decision.
here are two shorthand records of mine and comrade ltakhya's cxam-
in:atac~n on t)ie eve of 1934 (readsy. ITcre arc N. K. Krupskaya's memoirs
?,,?.~.iw~. Vtrli is this material not used by the editors? I and comrade
iz..,,.;.~a wcr~e questioned for the party, history, but on 1 December 1934
Scrgci vlironovich Kirov was killed, and you know what became of
the history o~ the party and of the party itself .. .
I3orisav (old Bolshevik): Comradcsl The editors avoid the awkward
question of Stalin's and Kamencv's position during the preparations
for ~e*uber. Together with Bolshevik delegates I visited Stalin after
~$` rebruary revolution. We asked: `Why is the duestion o~f the
5$viets' seizing power not being considercd7' Stalin replied: `The
Provisional Government is not al[ that weak; it is about the samo as the
Soviets'. That was his statement.
,__.~, At the time we did not know Lenin's position. We: missed Lenin,
we missed his letters in which he talked about the party's tasks. The
'"? party was not told about Lenin's letters. Tltat was the fault of Kamenev
and Stalin. They were in charge of the All-Russian March conference.
We did not hear a word i'rom them about Lenin's letters and his
position, although they knew., And later? Stalin had the impertinence to
say that he and the party both made a mistake. Lenin characterised-
- Stalin's desire for unification as treason to socialism. Hc~w is it possible
not>co write about this? .. .
Romanavsky (old Bolshevik): NEF should be defined as Lenin
defined it at the tenth party congress. It must be note+:i that the sixth
congress rejected Stalin's proposal, when the current situation was being
discussed, that Lenin should appear before the court. It should be
shown that Stalin spoke at the congress in favour of I,erun's appearance
before the court on condition that the Provisional Government gave
a safe conduct. And at that: time they would have offered every kind
of guarantee, but Lenin would have been. physically liquidated... .
Chairman : Comrades : As there is a meeting of the Presidium of
the academy of Sciences today, to confirm the appoinament of corre-
sponding members of the Academy, comrades Pospcilov and Mints
have gone there. They will take part in our meeting tomorrow.
Oslikovskaya (old Bolshevik): ...The more I study the question,
of collectivisation, the more I am convinced that Stalin put Trotsky's
ideas -into practice. He became more of a Trotskyite than. Lev
Davydovich himself.
Comrade Pospelov named organisations and people from whom he
received comments. on the t}-nird volume of the History, but he did not
say to what extent these comments were used. What will happen about
our statements here? Are our observations and suggesticns made merely
far later editions and not for this oneT Why is our criticism not heeded?
Dinitas (old Bolshevik) : `Ne are all interested in malting the I-Iistory
objective. The fourth and fifth chapters are not bad. One cannot say
the same about the earlier chapters. The editors write; that the party
was faced with difficult tasks after it emerged from underground, but ,
they do not say what these tasks were. Documents ~ean be read in
different ways. Borisov's speech was very good. :[t is necessary to
consider his remarks on the March conference and on ~stalin's position.
.The fact that Stalin did not publish Lenin's letters must not be passed
over in silence. He only published one, and that laelatedly. It is
necessary to say this. Future generations will learn frc-m our History.
j Stalin is not the only guilty one. Much should be disclosed. .
References should be made to sources.... The distribution of forces
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 .~
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on the eve- of October is wrongly presented. It should be shown who
were the mezhraiontsy-Manuilsky, Uritsky, Lozovsky. Trotsky was
at the head of them.- They left their mark on the revolution. This must
be mentioned.
" Milonav {old Bolshevik): .About Stalin's speech on Lenin's
~fifiieth birthday: Stalin said that he had corrected his mistakes. But
jpok at the original source. Stalin said one thing, while during the
personality cult period his speech on Lenin's anniversary looked
di~ffcrcnt.
`- About the date of the rising: ,there are some lapses into Stalinism:
the 2~tiY is too early, tlac 26th is tocr Late. This is not Lenin's point
of ,.view, but Trotsky's, t?~l~icii Stalin shared. (Voices from the hall
' I=~actly', "That's right.') ~ihis unfortunately also crept into Khrush-
che+r's speech, slipped in by some adviser who was ignorant of the facts.
It also got into the letter about differences with the Chinese Communist
;Party.
On 6 November 1918 Stalin published an article in Pravda maintain-
ing that Trotsky, Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, participated directly
in all the work connected with the leadership of the rising. Stalin
maintained that tho party owed its victory in October first and foremost
to Trotsky. Strange as it is, this article was reprinted in -the collection
October Revolution, published in 1932... .
Vol}son (old Bolshevik): ...Lenin said that the listeners should
be told the whole truth. We sinned in teaching party history from the
Short Course. How is it possible to maintain now that it was useful!
The authors write that Stalin was the head of the Revolutionary Military
Council (RVS) of the southern front. They maintain that the RVS put
a quick end to the actions of traitors. But we know that Lenin sharply
criticised Stalin and Voroshilov far -their erroneous attitude towards
military experts. At the eighth party congress, Stalin's position is
presented as cor~cet. This is wrong, Stalin objected to the criticism
of the Tenth Army command. That means he was practically in agree-
ment with the military opposition. Together he and Voroshilov liqui-
dated many military experts loyal to the Soviet regime. It was for this
;that Lenin criticised them at the eighth congress. Why should Stalin
be whitewashed? This gives rise to Stalinism and it is very difl"icult to
fight with this weapon against our ideological opponents. It is not our
weapon. ,
On page 218 the mistaken position of Bukharin and Pyatakov on the
.nationalities question and on the right of workers to self-determination
is mentioned. However, only Pyatakov is criticised. If Bukharin was
wrong, he should be criticised too. But there is silence on this. Why?
Because at the eighth congress Bukharin stated that on the question
of workers' self-determination he was following Stalin's statement to
the Third Soviet Congress.
This is an anti,Leninist assertion, since Stalin's mistakes should
'~-'not be covered over; his anti-Leninist assertions, his anti-Leninist
position, must be mentioned.
I have taught in universities for a long time. Stalin and his nearest
comrades-in-arms Mekhlis and Ezhov did everything possible in order
that our party should be portrayed in history .as a party of `spies'
and `enemies of the people'. Young people-often ask me: `.How
could Lenin find himself surrounded with "enemies " and "traitors "~
Who supported him and why? 'The twentieth and twenty-second party
congresses rehabilitated many names.
Stalin made Lenin's nearest comrades-in-arms into so-called spies
.and saboteurs.
The authors of the draft have no single point of view, they swing
from side to side. They follow the methods of the Short Course. The
editors print portraits of outstanding party activists, leaders of the
Central Committee (Trotsky, Kamenev. Zinoviev,
Bukharin, Rykov),
-while in the text they only talk about their mistakes, and nothing is
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said about their positive rdle. ? {
This must end, so that history can become truly scientific.
Rashal (oId Bolshevik) : Principles have not bee~;r sufficiently clarified
in this work. We must remember that it is to alspear for the fiftieth
annigcrsary of October. We expert a precise and truthful description.
Views about the past are still influenced by temporary factors. This
can also be seen in the six-volume History. How is it possible to praise
the Sftort Course in a new textbook? Overcoming the conszquerrces
~. ti".e: ;rsonaity cult is a c. -e~:::?:e o? toe grrty, bat how is ;~.s
t be written vividly
and convincingly. This is not yet?the case. There is no vivid interesting
material. The writer must be convinced of his ria,hcness if he is to be
able to convey it to the people. Stalin's cult was very harmful for the
party and its history. :Many facts and events were distorted. None of
the congresses suffered such distortion as the sixth. There is no steno-
graphic record, while as regards minutes the sam~w questions are intea-
preted in different ways. How are they being usedl? Persistent attempts
are made to show that Stalin led the congress: That eve^ after the
sixth congress Stalin alone prepared the revolukion. Thirty years of
Stalin's dictatorship, and later of its consequences, could not pass
without a trace. This found its reflection in the Short Course which
is -again being popularised by the present huthors. When l: looked at
the composition of the sixth congress, [found that of 28 members
17 had been subject to repression and the activity of then; comrades
was distorted in the History. T'1-e activity of such Bolsheviks as
Bukharin and Bubnov was etTace:d and distorted. Repressions with
regard to them cannot be justified? Slandering th~er~an secEor untiX sev
?er ~vee. s ago, when they
started spreading. In ail, there
have been 200 incidents along
the Dh4Z this year.
The second decision to come
out of the October meeting in
Pyongyang was to probe the
possibilities of guerrilla war
and to expand the already ex?
lsting espionage and subvcr-
slve action, North Koreans
have begun recru[ting South
Korean hoodlums and prost4
tutee to star up trouble and to
ga.thcr tnformation.
To combat all of this, South
Korea has. extensive security
forces. Hovvever, they are ham?
pored by the Lack oP fast boats
to patrol the coast and lack of
helicopters for spotting any
quick movement against North
Korean teams.
Comparison hiade ~~
Compared with Vlelnam,
South Korea has several ad?
vant