WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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 NEW YORK TIME roved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
12 December
RUSSIAN nlii~~~ tonight that a Russian was shot! Pilot Was a Captain planes. When the first planes
down late last week by royalist These documents were re- ',were seen, partly assembled, at
r ~j ~} ~t 11 r V ~j tribes a few miles north of the Sana airport on Nov. 20,
D~ 1I N ttL h1r~~1J Sana, the Yemeni capital. He ported to show that the pilot! there was no evidence that So-
was reported when was a Soviet Force captain. viet pilots were also on hand.
Ported to have died His name was not given.
There was no immediate indi-
'his plane crashed. From this and other reports,
Intelligence reports indicate cation of the size of the Soviet
rofficials here have concluded
~U.S. Gets Reports Soviet that he had* been on a bombin contingent. But American offi-
and strafing mission anains his as ahat some airmen are serving cials put the total number of
Pilots Aid Republicans Ro alist sitions when combat pilots for !,shipment ; :,Soviet military advisers and
MI
y
t d
h
yht
fi
-
-
- -
own.
o
er. was s
L
--o~r?,????? ???? ?? .c.uc.. ,
iau
---
WAbtl,~lVlt.,tVl`~r UeC. 1l..--lne~
,have been inspected by Royal- no known qualified pilots for
i;United States has received reli- fists and European mercenaries ' these jets.
able reports that Soviet pilots fighting with them, some of : Diplomatic reports from Ye-
?have been flying combat mis- whom read Russian. According men last month indicated that
sions for the republican Gov- to reports from Yemen, the the Soviet Union had promised
ernment of Yemen in recent pilot carried Sovietidentifica- to send the Yemen Government
fighting there. 'don papers, maps and other 24 MIG-19's and about 40 tech-
t` ..American officials reported documentation in Russian. nicians to help assemble the
'Egyptian planes to hold the
royalists at bay in the coun-
t.iy.'S five - year - old civil war.
Uut' this support was removed
when the United Arab Republic
agreed in late September to
.:pull its forces out of Yemen.
NEW YORK TIMES
lii December 196
Soviet Airlift Said to Aid Yemeni ~4e, ubli cans
,rourth the number of flights Eurfopean mercenaries have tian contingent is reported to
By HEDRICK SMITH in the Soviet military airlift seen Russian maps, documents be imminent.
6Declel to The New York Times to Egypt after the Arab-Israeli and other markings identifying The United States and Brit-
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 -war. But for Yemen and the him as a Soviet Air Force cap- tin, which regard Yemen of
The Soviet Union has uietl modest scale of Its five-year-old tain. Western diplomats believe little strategic value, are puz-
q y that ossibl a dozen Soviet zled by Moscow's eagerness to
carried o out supplyy the emergency embattled led"maa,ssive effort effort and a not consider it In. a combat pilots are flying for the replace Cairo as the political
lift t
significant Soviet commitment republican regime. patron of the Yemeni Republic,
ement republican regime with "For , especially while it is so weak
to the survival of the Yemeni all intentc and purposes politically and militarily.
military aid; Western diplo-Republic. you could say there is a Rus- American officials speculate
matic sources reported today. The Soviet decision to pro- scan MIG squadron operating that the Russians, if successful
These sources regarded the vide the Yemeni regime with in Yemen," said one well-in-
e re-
Soviet support, which has in-military aid first came to light formed analyst. "The markings publican regime, Intend d th to use
Soviet the use of Soviet Air in late November when some on the planes are Yemeni. But Yemen regim me, as a base for mounting
Force pilots for combat raids, partly assembled MIG-19's were the planes are Russian-built subversion in East Africa and
as a major factor in tipping the seen at the airfield near Sana, and supplied, the ground crews other parts of the Arabian Pen-
balance, at least ternporarily,!the Yemeni capital. But not un- are Russians, and most of the insula. Somalia and Ethiopia lie
in favor of th
bl:... ..~-...-r ... - . '
th
i1oth s
b
R
ians 11 __
t
e repu
e p
em
e
uss
xtent of
o
li
t
the roya
s
s ho seek to over-
throw it.
Diplomatic sources said there
were 75 to 100 flights of So-
viet AN-12 transports and
Ilyushin-28 bombers, apparently
serving as transport planes, into
Yemen In the last three weeks.
They have been carrying
MIG fighters, crews, techni-
cians, bombs and other muni-
tions, and ground equipment,
diplomatic sources reported. At
least 24 MIG-19 fighter-bomb-,
ers have been included in the
shipments, according to these
reports.
Diplomatic sources describeItions a few miles outside Sana.
the airlift as approximately one-1
neyUt is 1A U111 l e,llct, ",tltintc Sea from ,Yemen.
that the air attacks have in-
flicted ~_._...._ ~Y
severe casualties on
royalist forces and have slowed
the momentum of their drive to
capture Sana.
For five years the republic
was propped up by the presence
of Egyptian troops, -which num=
bered 70,000 at their peak in.
late 1965. But President Gamel
Abdel Nasser has withdrawn
all but a few hundred Egyptian
soldiers under an agreement
with King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia, who `has armed and
financed the royalists. The
departure of the final Egyp-
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1
P o
G-19 fighter-bombers hur- ;technicians in Yemen at about
plane, a Soviet-built MIG riedly sent to Yemen in Novem_
5O men.
Soviet support to the Yemeni
Republic become known.
. Western analysts now esti-
mate that Soviet transports,
reaching Yemen after flights
over Egypt, have. ferried about
10,000 tons of equipment to
Yemen. Because royalist forces
have been closing in on Sana,
most of the flights have been
to the airfield at Hodeida, the
Soviet-built port on the Red
Sea.
At least one Russian pilot
been shot down during a straf-
ing raid against royalist posi-
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THE EVENING STAR
6 December 1967
,-s ,
Soviet Presence in. Mideast
Growing Wa i sAftermath
~n
i-eueirauon
By ANDREW BOROWIEC P
situation from the Russians
Foreign Correspondent of The Star , Israeli intelligence sources in Republican Yemen.
g themselves. Those rare Soviet, But there are persistent re-
B E I R UT -0 a the western, discern four stages in Russia's diplomats willing to engage in a ports of new arrivals of Soviet
bank of the Suez Canal, Soviet penetration of the Arab World: discussion with a Western re- officers in the Republican capi-
military experts man Egyptian 1. Passive military and econ- porter speak of the need for ltal of San's, while the Jenad
army missiles pointed toward Is-1lomic aid which began with the { peace and withdrawal of "Is- airbase, some 12 miles east of
raell positions. arms agreement with Egypt in 1 rael the aggressor" from the Taiz, is now reportedly staffed
Between 40 and 50 Soviet war-:' 1955. occupied territories. by Russians.
ships criss-cross the Mediterra 2. The encouragement of Arab Obviously, .they do not talk of There are also reports Soviet
neon, until recently almost a pri- neutralism to undermine the tra- any Arab concessions. agents have uistributcd money
vate preserve of the U.S. 6th ditional links of Arab states with it would seem logical that and some 10,000 rifles to Yemeni
Fleet. the West. Russia wants peace in the Mid- tribesmen around San'a to win
en-
de
Creation of stron
3
bli
R
h
p
g
.
can cause.
epu
em to the
die East. Yet it is difficult to t
And in the craggy 8ashid
Mountains of Yemen, Soviet dente on Russia in the military reconcile this with the massive While the Mediterranean is no
distribute silver coins field and through economic pro- arms shi
ments to the "revolu- longer a private American lake
t
p
s
agen
and rifles to Royalist tribesmen jects such as Egypt's Aswan tionary" Arab countries and the and Soviet arms have become
High Dam
d S
l th
bi
f
th
h
ousan
e .
or
. presence of severa
g-
e.
o- standard equipment in t
to buy their allegiance
Re ublican. regime. . Strengthening of ideological viet advisers in Arab armies.
p gesf Arab armies, much of the
left win
i
th various
Six months after the So? links w
g One explanation for the influx Middle East is still largely out-
viet-hacked Arab armies were political parties in the Arab of military experts is that Rus- side Soviet influence.
the Soviet world. sia wants sole control of the Such oil-
roducing countries
Israel
d b
f
t
d
p
,
y
ea
e
e
resence in the Arab world con- Militarily, Egypt, Syria and more sophisticated weapons, as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are
.
p
tinues to make a steady pro- Iraq in the Middle East proper, such as the Luna ballistic mis- strongly pro-Western-either by
th Afric
N
i
i
or
a
n
a, siles installed in the Suez Zone. inclination or by nature of theiti
gross. Even pro-Western King and Alger
like It
Iran
Sh
th
,
aa of
? ..__t
e
w Moscow and
, a pro-American bastion on Since the June defeat, Russia -?",
the; violations of the cease-fire. all Arab countries have to pay a
fringes of the Middle East, has ! s believed to have restored en- The Russians, obviously, are least lip service to Nasser's sia
tirel 5 ria s military pateatfal
announced he plans to buy arms' Y Y not interested in seeing their gars, of revenge against Israel.
from Russia. and replenished 80 percent of material smashed again. An Arab statesman can hardly R
Algeria and
t s arsenal
E
k
i
i
t t
i
h
i
.
gyp
It is
o ma
nteres
r
ssue
n the
is
e compo mise on t
Defender's Role Iraq did not suffer much in the sure that the Arab armies re- regardlress of his interest and
A year, the Russian bear was hostilities. semble somewhat their more so- allegiances.
These measures were not nee-
t E
uropean coun-
still cautiously eyeing the sands phisticated Eas
essarii taken because Russia
and oilfields of the D4iddle East. Y terparts.
Russia is deeply involved believes in the inevitability of a Hence the Soviet Union in ef-
Toda
y
in Middle Eastern politics and, }new conflict in the Middle East feet imposed on Egypt's presi-
or feels that another clash would
to a great extent, can influence ~ dent Gamal Abdel Nasser a
any future conflict between Is- foster its aims. But to the seeth- par-reaching reform of the cad-
reel and the Arabs. ,ing and frustrated Arab coup- res now supervised by between
The fiercely independent Arabs tries sending arms was the only four and six Soviet generals.
the hour of neeussia s To boost Egyptian morale and
have accepted a partnership s y of demonstr
with Soviet Russia for lack of a possibly deter more daring Is
better, more powerful ally. On Bitterness Felt raei attacks, Soviet warships
the international. scene, Russia visit the klgyptian ports of Alex
has emerged as the defender of That also does not mean that andria and Port Said almost
the Arabs while the United the Arabs are satisfied with the continuously...
States is becoming more and degree of Soviet backing. There
more Identified with Israel. was a great deal of bitterness in Boosting Nasser
Saviet aims in the complicat the Arab world when Russia
failed to rush to the Arab side at In the diplomatic field, the
ed, risky, frustrating and den- the time of defeat. Kremlin has ?appointed Serge
gerous Middle Eastern political Angry Soviet speeches at the Vinogradov, one of its top dip-;
game can be summed up as fol- United Nations, the breaking of Iro. There saon doubt tha~Viilao
lows: diplomatic relations with Israel
Russia does not need Middle and the subsequent airlift of gradov has some influence on
Eastern oil but wants to make it arms have somewhat alleviated{ Nasser. But whether or not he
difficult for the West to get it. can keep Nasser permanently
Apparently it does not want a this feeling. Nevertheless more sophisticat- "on the leash" is still a ques-
major war
ob e . ever the Its to maain- n- ed Arab leaders are convinced tion.
problem. Yet it roasts that there is a limit to Soviet The Egyptian disengagement
n to ly In the so-called progres- its inff mluence, friendshi while the believe in Yemen after a futile four-year
not o Ar b ries b t in the e that the United States would not war apparently prompted more
whoile Arab area as pa aun crt t of of its n t hesitate to help Israel all the Soviet interest in that part of
wh a its global way if it were really menaced. the Arab world. It is not clear
power politics. ,It is. difficult to obtain an yet to wht extent the Russians
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2
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(17 November to 12 December 1967)
1. Exactly three weeks after the anniversary of the Soviet Revolu-
tion, the CPStJ and 17 other Communist Parties announced agreement to
hold a "consultative meeting in February 1968 for a collective exchange
of opinion concerning the convocation of an international meeting of
Communist and workers' parties" and they called upon all fraternal
parties to support the initiative and to take part in it. The communi-
que named 18 parties which attended the consultative meeting in Moscow
in March 1965 and which held bilateral consultations on the new move.
Of course, there was no mention of the fact that 26 parties had been
invited in 1965 (they were originally the members of the "drafting
committee" for the 1960 81-party conference) and that seven (Rumania,
Albania, and the Far East) parties had boycotted that meeting. Nor was
mention made of Cuba, which participated in the 1965 meeting.
1~ The communique stated the objectives of the international meeting
as strengthening the unity of the Communist movement" and "rallying
all socialist, democratic forces ... against imperialism, for national
and social liberation ... and for world peace." A front-page Pravda
editorial on the 28th disavowed any attempt at interference in the
internal affairs of, or the excommunication of, any other party. Re-
action by other Communist media followed the pre-announcement pattern
with endorsement by a considerable number of those claimed by the
Soviets as supporting the move, no mention by Rumania, objection by
Yugoslavia, and denunciation by China and Albania.
2. The Rumanians continue to play the role of maverick in inter-
national and internal affairs. Further strains in Rumanian-Soviet rela-
tions became evident as the Rumanian Party refused to yield to intense
Soviet pressure to associate itself with the call for an international
Communist conference. Shortly after, it was leaked to correspondents
in Bucharest that Soviet-Rumanian talks on renewing their 1948 twenty-
year bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaty (which expires
in February) had broken down over Moscow's refusal to agree to changes
in the wording of the old treaty, especially in its references to the
menace of West Germany and its requirement for mutual consultations on
important foreign policy questions. After a series of apparently
unsuccessful lower-level bilateral talks between the two, a strong
Rumanian delegation headed by Ceausescu departed for Moscow on 12 December,
apparently to attempt to salvage some sort of agreement on the many
points at issue. Within Rumania, meanwhile, the party held its first
National Conference since 1945. During that conference Secretary
General Ceausescu implicitly rebuked the Soviet Union for breaking
a number of economic agreements in efforts to influence Rumanian
policies. During the conference he also "yielded" to a "unanimous re-
quest" that he take over the top government position, President of the
State Council, along with his party post. This was part of a broad
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program of measures aimed to fuse power between the Party and Govern-
ment, r1confirmed" immediately afterward by a meeting of the Grand Na-
tional Assembly. Observers saw two objectives behind the move: central-
ization of political power to counterbalance recent decentralization of
control of the economy; and increased stature for Ceausescu in his inter-
national role.
3. Serious internal dissension is evident in recent developments
in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, while the conflict in China continues
to spread, despite Peking's "moderation" line. Against a background of
steady deterioration of the Czech economy and stirred by the courageous
stand of a large group of intellectuals against regime policies-at the
Prague Writers Congress in June and the student riots in October, gen-
eral dissatisfaction with the Party-State leadership has reportedly be-
come widespread within the power structure as well as among the public.
Observers had predicted top-level personnel changes at a Central Commit-
tee plenum scheduled to convene on 13 December, and speculation was
heightened when Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev made an unexpected visit,
obviously hastily arranged, to Prague on 8-9 December. A last-minute
postponement of the plenum for a week seemed to confirm the forecasts
of serious troubles.
Meanwhile, dissident intellectuals in Moscow told reporters that
secret trials were scheduled to begin 11 December against Ginzburg,
Galanskov and several other young writers who had been held incommun-
icado since January, presumably for emulating and defending the cele-
brated martyrs Sinyavsky and Daniel. They described petitions on be-
half of these writers which had been signed by large numbers of Soviet
intellectuals of various professions during the past year. Also, the
publication in Paris of a collection of Ukrainian manuscripts smuggled
out of that largest of the non-Russian republics of the USSR revealed
widespread intellectual dissidence in the Ukraine which is further in-
tensified by a strong nationalistic resentment against Moscow's rule.
(Latest reports indicate that the Moscow trials did not start on 11
December, but no further details are known.)
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 HINDUSTAN TI
41 Decflvf
16, , 'm- -a t M''e"' d d le' d.
Indian s ec- on
From Krlshan Bhatla
Hindustan Times Correspondent
Washington, Dec. 3-Shouting
?Spy" Is a game that two can
. When questioned about al-
flay
eged revelations made by. Mr
John Smith, a former U.S. Em.
`bassy employee who has defect-
ed to the Soviet Union. U.S. au-
thorities suggest that Mr Smith's
'statement recklessly hurling
espionage charges against the
U.S. Is indeed a hurriedly con.
trived device on the part of the
Soviet Government to draw the
attention away from the disclo.
sures made some weeks ago by
;a Soviet agent. Mr Y. N. Loxti
nov.
Mr Loginov. described as a
%WkINDUSTAN TIMES
'1 December 1967
K.G.B. agent, was, arrested . In
South Africa and, ccording to
reports appearing in several
European and American news-
papers, he has furnished a fairly
detailed account of Soviet opera.
tions in India, especially the So-
viet effort to interfere with the
last general elections.
Mr Loginov has described how
a high-ranking K.G.S. officer,
whose real name was Mr
Lyudin, was sent last year as a
political counsellor in the Soviet
Embassy' In Delhi where. under
the assumed, name of Mr Yuri
Modin, he organized Soviet
Union's "election campaign" in
Ir la Mr Loginov has reonrt???ily
mentioned many Soviet and In-
That Moscow meddled in the
Indian elections was confirmed by
the Indian Government's own in-
quiries. Authorities here tend to
measure every Indian attitude
towards the U.S. against the In.
dian attitude in similar circum.
stances towards the Soviet Union.
Consequently they are upset that
the alleged disclosures by a for-
mer American Embassy clerk
should receive so much attention
in India, while attacks on the
Indian Government and leaders
by "Radio Peace and. Progress"
of Moscow and other Soviet ac.
tivities such as attemnts to In.
flu-nee the Thai-in elect'on have
gent. virt-ally unnot'ced.
IB to work for Russian
New Delhi, Nov. news Publicity
contract with the Soviet iet news and feature agency Novosti, the
Press Information Bureau of the West dtenat to suppress Justified ?
Government of India will circa. Its lister ors not to shed too not own direct responsibility for g
i late Russian publicity material mane -s over the dismissal of the broadcasts. It told the Gov. protest of workers and people
and photographs to Indian news- the OF civernment and with ap. ernment of India that Radio through strikes and demonstra..
papers, a Job hitherto done by ~rropriat references to Maoist Peace and Progress was control for democratic WFTU demands lite,sppec
the Information Department of jargon n id revolution could notled by private organizations" dam r
ithe Russian Embassy here. a ach :,vcd through the "parlia- l'ke . ovosi, Russian Union of toration democratic i res.
The PIB undertaking, which mentarr road." Journalists, Union of Soviet So- and release of all those arrest-
' might be considered unusual at cleties of Friendship and Cul ed.,.
Radl- Peace and Progress had trral Relation with Foreign: The message has been circa.
The
any time, is particularly intrigu- hithe +?> listed Swatontra leaders Countries, All_Union Society of
now because Novosti is Rat'is! -ialachari and N. G. Knowledge, Soviet Peace Com- lated to newspapers here by the
among the half a dozen Soviet Ranr:, Jan Sangh leader Balraj mitres. Soviet Women's Commit. secretary of the All-India Trade
,agencies responsible for props- Madh ?< and Congress leaders tee and Committee of Soviet Union C:oagress.
Qanda tirades
against the Gov- j Tike .tr S
K. Patel and Mr Youth Organizations.
d
i
.
i
l
?c nacho r spec
a
overseas ?_?d rea~it~iffieliedr9w$0(i3'/( l ? : f0flAi4ttD
M eon -
allst line" of the West. maintain con 1 o e s a Yo
Even the Red Chinese atomic arsenal is thing for the future to show. Chinese already
being used as an element in a propaganda have considerable influence In Tanzania, a
i campaign with strong racial overtones. Red country that leans far more toward socialism
,China's atom bomb, for instance, is termed than toward Western democracy.
"the 'colored atomic bomb," implying that it The railroad project is certainly high on
is a weapon on the side of colored races of the President Kaunda's priority list. Copper-pro.
vt
suin
Zambia has found itself pressed more
o
g
a;:ld programs in Africa, the Red' program.'?is galls hefmust haveoanlithin resiall to dolwth
Y g
pureiy destructive, aimed at smashing U164"*
Ietlnk order. Rhodesia. But Zambia's best current outlet to
s
Th
s
shi
-1'r-
e `a
-J to -Jr
backing' Red Chinese causes as they support
The' Red deals declared its unilateral independence of
t
ti
h
i
nen
e con
sts on t
n national
. Afri
.~Chinfse have latched onto the most vio)ept of Great Britain nearly two years ago would
f have.beenthe old way, across Rhodesia. This
with
the saltl-white movements in Africa,or- tue, South Africa and Rhodesia the prii4ary might have earned vital foreign exchange for
targets. Funds collected in the Western VMrld Zambia.
tp s sist "African freedom movements' In But, under African nationalist pressure,
tthesc countries often help African you s President Kaunda has elected to be the lead. .
ittudy in Red China. ing anti-Rhodesian nationalist in his part of
the world. This role calls for him to be more
? ceased Portugal concerned about what is happening in Rhode-
In Rhodesia and South Africa, numerous sia than about any economic harm his own
people, especially those on the government country might be experiencing. So Zambia
;,route for funnelling Chinese-trained guerrillas, tation routes, at what promises to be a high
'into southern Africa. Portugal became so in- price. The proposed rail link is one of the
ceased at this activity not long ago that it alternatives. So expensive in this route that
temporarily suspended shipments of Zambian the World Bank figures it to be uneconomic.
copper over its railroad in Angola as a warn- The rail link could be expensive indeed for
tog to the Zambian government. Zambia in political terms, too, It the line be-
"Thus, Red China's offer to build the pro- comes a route for bringing Red Guards
jected new railroad may be part of a broader Into the country.
subversion plan. Whether or not African na-
And the Rhodesian rebellion-
whether it succeeds or fails, nomic answer to Rhodesia's; plan, that no political develop- export its 70 , as a
non unist
men
it is a proposed la's mile white-ruledinsate.n Ifn it does' uptt iwas t, thatlythe eiZambian world se econd la -Com t produc-
perbe from om Zaanzan por
perbelt to the Tanzanian ian port not work, it will increase economy was unlikely to be t;on. It was also important to
aes Britain, Zambia's biggest cos-I
and capital of Dar es Salaam. Black Africa's already sour way system, afford a second that if rail-
It is comparable to Aswan feelings about Rhodesia. ways needed to the north would and and.
million price tag makes it the Zambia's future leaders east a road
off better.
third large ~,t, (fores ic~ ppro bout the
sfrikllF~R[iR/tt-rP &AUW1?etdrlC"DP78-03061A000400040006-9
LUSAKA, Zambia, Nov. 14, Ghana's Volta River dam-and ey a R olilically
--The Tanzam Railway ap? political sensitivity. The West ening when the World Bank hodesia's railways p
pears likely to become as im. so far has declined to back it turned thumbs down on the unthinkable,
portant a benchmark in AM. and Communist China has idea in 1964 on the grounds An alternative thus became Rhode
Zam ca's political and economic de- stepped In with an that s tranexist o through was the a life-and-death rmat er Af lean
veloprnent as the Aswan Dam offer.
It IQ Zambia's main eco-only economically sensible standards so 1000 t nsta year
East and West Are Involved country achieved independ- Alternative Necessary
ence in 1964, when they real- One of the Bank's basic
'continue they would not want to premises disappeared in 1965
-In Efforts to 'i.nance Line continue dependent on a when Rhodesia took indepcnd-
(white-ruled Rhodesia for ex- once with no intention of I,iv-
By Anthony Astrachan porting their copper and im- ing black Africans a signifi-
washinston Post roreian service porting everything. cant political role, and thus
Th h d a first rude awak- made Zambian dependence on
Becomes an African issue
WASHINGTON POST
.1.6 November 1967
.r P oropose
'd'-Tanzam Railway
 tourer, and the Unite LeA.
base of one of the iiP'r i
mining companies.
Britain and America pitched
in with an emergency airlift
and a road improvement and
truck program to keep copper
'to
~3 d ; 1- t'la r
.!
tianac a
rr amrs an ana a an m aa e,;
ter of political and diplomatic
by three firms headed by Max- maneuvers that surround the
fists. well It Stamp puts , the cost e of o con- - railway and obscure the eco-
of
struction and rolling stock at nomie debate on it.
$353 million, plus $33 million The American Embassy in
coming out and oil coming to enlarge the harbor at Dar
Into Zambia, whose Rhodesian!~es Salaam to handle an esti-
supplies were cut off when'.
sanctions stopped the flow oft
oil to Rhodesia's refinery from;
Beira in Mozambique. But
they did not become converts
to the idea of the Tanzam
Railway.
Tanzania became as enthu?
?,siastic as Zambia, however,
not only because it. wanted to
help a sister African state but
even more because the railway
offered the first hope of open-
Ing up the agricultural poten-
tial of the Kilomhero valley
and the mineral resources of'.
the Mbeya area, both In south-
west Tanzania and both sty-
mied by lack of transport. I
The two countries did not
become so obsessed with the
Idea of the railroad that they
ignored other means of trans-
port, Improvements to the
Great North road are under
way, some with American
help, but economists and
transport experts In Lusaka
and Dar es Salaam do not be-
lieve the road can handle
Zambia's export and import
needs by itself.
Pipeline Being Built
A 1060-mile, eight-inch pipe-
line Is under construction to
carry oil from Dar to the Zam-
bian copperbelt town of
Bwana Mkuhwa (a Swahili
phrase that means Big Boss
and is under attack in East Af-
rica as a colonialist inherit-
ance). It is being built by Ital-
ian contractors and will carry
oil from the Dar refinery run
by Italy's LFC, but the $42.5
million it costs is basically an
Investment of the two African
nations.
They believe the Tanzam
railway Is still a necessity,
particularly since road and
pipeline projects will not by
themselves eliminate Zambia's
dependence on Rhodesian rail-
ways, still carrying about a
third of Its copper exports and
three-quarters of all Its im-
ports, and the equally unreli-
hble rail routes through the
Congo and Angola, Malawi
and Mozambique.
The two countries now have
a Western produced survey
that says the railway makes
economic sense, and Peking's
mated 2.5 million tons more of
cargo if the railway is complet-
ed by the early 1970s. That
puts the total cost at $386 mil-
lion.
The Stamp report assumes
that the railway will make a
profit if It carries two million
tons or more, a profit estimat-
ed at $51.8 million In 1981 as-
suming that the Tanzam oper-
ational costs will be below
those on the older Rhodesian
railway system.
Question of Method
The Stamp team assumed
the railway would be built by
modern methods, while the
Chinese are believed to be
planning a labor -intensive
method, which would add
three years to construction
and affect profit estimates. If
the Chinese build the railway
the some way they built the
Friendship Textile Mill In
Tanzania, it will also operate
by labor intensive methods in
an antiquated style (the textile
mill uses 1938 equipment, ac-
cording to a Zambian source)
which may also reduce the
profits. '
But the Stamp report specifi-
y says the Tanzam link
"would be profitable even if
there were no political objec
tion to using Rhodesia rail
ways, because the Zambian!
economy has developed so
much faster than the World
Bank anticipated. The
Rhode- sian system would have to
make a large capital invest-
ment to cope with the Increase
in Zambian traffic, which af-
fects the comparison.
Complete comparisons of
rail versus road systems have
not been made. But copperbelt
experts point out that most of
the rail traffic will travel the
full 1000 miles. American and
European arguments for the
superiority of roads assume
that traffic will be picked up
and let off at many points
along the route, not true In
this case.
Report Quarded
The Stamp report , though
Its basic estimates and conclu-
sions have been published un-
officially, is carefully guarded
offer to build It. Approv $PWt31-I4 W M '}2
waa9 'of their dance
team that came for the cele.
bration of Zambia's Independ-'
lonce anniversary last month
and the zeal of some Chinese
have raised some Zambian
l eyebrows. Government offi
t
th
ea
ci
s
ut
ons wi
a all.
seen the Stamp report,! 1hou
a?
ette of ??
President Kenneth
th
h A
i
oug
mer
can diplomats,
htve been seen with copies'
of It. United States officials
seem to recognize little
'??-.- -` ` But the correct Chinese be
railway, though underneath havior and profitable produc
they are defensive about the.} Lion at the Dar es Salaam tex-
fact that the U.S. Congress is the mill are what the Zam.
highly unlikely to appropriate
anything like the sum 'bians hope will be the model
needed for Chinese
to build It. Sunnorters of the J or In'
railway wish the U.S. would
get an International consor-
tium started like the one that
arranged finance for the Niger
River dam In northern Nigeria. l
(They say the Tanzam link Is,
Just the kind of regional pro-1
3 ject that U.S. aid to Africa is,
,supposed to favor.
Zambia has released no de-
tails of the Chinese offer,'
though an agreement has been'
signed. One source who has
seen the agreement says it
goes much further than the
$4-million two-year survey of
the route reported as the only
commitment by some Wash-
ington sources. He says it com-
mits the Chinese to an Inter-
est-free loan to build the
whole link. Other sources
have estimated the Chinese
commitment at $280-million,
but it is likely that this is an
order of magnitude rather
than a precise figure
An important and un-
answered question' is how
(many Chinese will pour' into
Zambia to conduct the survey,
and build the railway.
Don't Seem Committed
The Zambians do not seem
to be committed to accepting
the Chinese offer. They say
they have asked for Western
indications of interest. West-
ern embassies deny this. Zam-
bia did ask Canada, West Ger-
many, France and Japan, as
well as China, for help in 1065.
Zambian Vice President
Simon Kapwepwe said in an
interview that he had asked
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
for help on the railway when
he visited Washington as For-
eign Minister last year. But in
Western diplomat practice,
asking Rusk for help in con-
versation Is not the same as
exchanging formal papers
with technical specifications.
The Chinese have behaved
fairly well In Zambia, where
Kaunda, widely believed to be
intended to halt the. wearing
of Mao buttons distributed by.
in the Tanzam Railway, if it,
occurs.
China watchers believe Pc..
king can 'a afford the for
eign exchange cost of the rail-
way, though it is larger than
all Red Chinese assistance to
Black Africa an far
But they
.
wonder If the Great Proleta-
rian Cultural Revolution will
allow China to spend such re-
source of money and manpow
er so far from home. .
thi@tAbR@pl78-OU6gg3000040006-9
like those In Kenya. But the I
 25X1C1OB
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 FORAj*FSGjjatff . Re .2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000400066-anuary 1968
Evidence of Hanoi's Control and Direction
of the Viet Cong and the !IFLSVN
In January 1967 elements of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division
overran a. strategically vital Viet Cong field headquarters in South
Vietnam. This headquarters turned out to be the link between Hanoi
and Communist military forces fighting in South Vietnam -- in effect,
the command post through which Hanoi's Communist party, the Lao Dong,
issued orders to its fighting units south of Vietnam's demilitarized
zone. It was learned later from interrogations of captured NJA regu-
lars, who were Lao Dong members, that the parent unit for this head-
quarters had been set up in 1961 by the Lao Dong in Hanoi. The par-
ent unit-, called the Lao Dong Party Military Committee, is a classic
example of Party control of the state via the interlocking directorate,
for the Military Committee is at the same time a Lao Dong organ and a
section within the North Vietnamese military establishment directly
under Defense Minister Giap.
The command post in South Vietnam overrun by the 101st Airborne
was called the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and proved
to contain a rich lode of Communist documents. These included de-
tailed instructions from the Lao Dong to its branch in South Vietnam
called the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). One of the most sig-
nificant documents found in this haul, written by the Lao Dong's
First Secretary, Le Duan, emphasized the importance and necessity of
Lao Dong control at every level of Viet Cong operations. The tone
of Duan's letter was one of unquestioned command -- that of a su-
perior to a subordinate element.
Lao Dong control of Communist elements in South Vietnam has been
clearly apparent since 1961 when a Lao Dong Central Committee reso-
lution was discovered among documents captured by South Vietnamese
Government forces. The document read in part, " it must be clearly
understood that ... although the overt name is different (PRP) from
what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly ... the party
segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under
the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman
Ho (Chi Minh) Other documentary evidence has since substantiated
and clarified the role of the PRP as-a mere cadet branch of the Lao
Dong. In early 1962 the Lao Dong, finding the PREP leadership and
spirit in the South lacking in verve, circulated a statement among
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) cadres which com-
plained that despite the Lao Dong's "six years of efforts in the
South the revolutionary movement continues to lack organization and
leadership .... It is required that the revolution in the South be
placed under a unified system. Only by this means can the revolution
be accelerated ... the PRP (has been) ... established to assure that
the revolution in the South will have proper leadership."
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This claim of Party leadership of the Northern forces was readily
acknowledged by the NFLSVN in a captured document dated 1962: "The
Party is the highest organization. It is responsible for the leader-
ship of all other organizations, the liberation association, the mu-
tual aid associations, as well as the leadership of all the people
who will overthrow the old regime for the sake of the new. The Party
is the paramount organization."
Between the evidence offered. by captured Lao Dong, Viet Cong and
NFLSVN documents and the statements made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners
and defectors, the pattern of control emerges clearly: Through the
standard Communist mechanism of interlocking membership of ranking Com-
munist leaders in parallel Party and state posts, the Lao Dong controls
the North Vietnamese Government. The Lao Dong Party in the North also
controls the PRP in the South ("the party segment in South Vietnam is
a segment of the Lao Dong Party ... headed by Chairman Ho"). The PRP
in turn controls and directs the National Liberation Front and its
military arm the Viet Cong ("The Party is the highest organization .
it is responsible for the leadership of all other organizations,...").
Communist control of this command structure is freely-acknowledged
by the Lao Dong to such subordinate elements as Viet Cong fighting
units and PRP members. Typical is the statement of a Viet Cong lieu-
tenant and PRP member who defected to the South Vietnamese Government
in May 1966: "The PRP in the South and the Lao Dong Party of the
North are one and the same. It's the Communist party. The only
difference ,..-I was, told ,-was that a Party member in the North
had to observe more rules than his counterpart in the South."
Another document picked up by soldiers of the U.S. 101st Airborne
Division when they captured COSVN headquarters in January was the
record made of a speech delivered by North Vietnamese General Nguyen
Van Vinh concerning North Vietnamese-Viet Cong policy. Vinh's speech,
which has been widely circulated in the press, was replete with ref-
erences to Lao Dong Central Committee resolutions which must be ex-
ecuted, with "our" and "we" references, statements about Northern
reinforcements for the forces fighting in the South, and possibly
most damning of all, in the context of negotiations, an anticipated
"opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our
military attacks ... (until) ... the Americans would withdraw their
troops and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success."
General Vinh is head of both the North Vietnamese Government and Lao
Dong Party organs concerned with reunification of North and South
Vietnam -- again the interlocking arrangement which ensures Party
control of the state.
In April 1967 another rich haul of captured documents added to
earlier knowledge gained from NVA and Viet Cong defectors regarding
specific provinces in South Vietnam where the North Vietnamese Army
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has direct responsibility for military activities. These include Kon-
tum, Pleiku and Darlac provinces in Western Central Vietnam as well as
a large sector in Southeast Laos. According to captured documents,Quang
Doc province, bordering Cambodia, has also been organized under North
Vietnam's direct supervision as a base for safeguarding communications
between the NFLSVN and Hanoi and possibly as a new location for COSVN
(mentioned in above as Hanoi's command post for issuing orders to its
fighting units in the South). In addition, the five northernmost pro-
vinces of South Vietnam are believed to be under direct North Vietnam-
ese military control.
North Vietnamese military control of Communist forces fighting
in South Vietnam is carried out by ranking members of the NVA command
structure. There are at least eight NVA generals and a number of
senior NVA colonels now permanently assigned to command posts in the
South.
The frequent combination of these military positions with a cor-
responding political (Party) role has been regularly reported by NVA
and Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. For example, Major General Tran
Do, Political Officer in COSVN, is a Lao Dong Central Committee member.
Along with Lieutenant. General Tran Van Tra, also a Central Committee
member, Do is responsible for implementing Lao Dong/PRP control of the
Viet Cong.
Both of these men were deputies to General Nguyen Chi Thanh prior
to his death in July 1967. Thanh, the senior political officer in the
South, was a four-star general in the NVA, second in military rank only
to North Vietnam's Defense Minister Giap and commander of all Viet Cong
forces in the South. He was buried with highest military honors, his
funeral being attended by ranking members of Hanoi's heirarchy, including
President Ho Chi Minh.
According to claims made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners, Thanh's re-
placement as commander of Viet Cong troops is Major General Hoang Van
Thai, well-known as one of the founders of North Vietnam's military and
political machinery and a close comrade of Ho Chi Minh and General Giap.
Prisoners have also reported hearing rumors that Thanh's replacement may
be General Van Tien Dung. Dung is Chief of Staff of the NVA, a ranking
member of the Lao Dong and is also an old comrade in arms of President
Ho and Defense Minister Giap.
Major General Hoang Van Thi, one of Giap's deputies and a Deputy
Chief of Staff for the NVA, is the Commanding Officer (and Political
Officer) for Military Region V in South Vietnam. Two other NVA general
officers assigned to Military Region V in South Vietnam are Major Gen-
eral Nguyen Don, a Lao Dong Central Committee member, and Major General
Le Chuong, who is Chief of Propaganda and Training for the NVA.
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It is not necessary to employ speculation, guess work and rumor
in trying to piece together the command structure for the forces fight-
ing against the South Vietnamese Government in this war. D?cumentary
evidence, biographic data, photographs, prisoner and defector interro-
gations, even general knowledge of Communist, methods, all lead inev-
itably to the conclusion that the NFLSVN and the Viet Cong are dominated
by the PRP, that the PRP is merely a cadet branch, a subordinate ele-
ment of the Lao Dong and that the Lao Dong controls the North Vietnamese
Army and the Government of North Vietnam. The case has been concisely
stated by a'senior Viet Cong officer, Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen,who re-
cently defected to the South Vietnamese Government: "the Viet Cong
is nothing but an extension of the (North Vietnam) People's Army."
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January 1968
(1)
North Vietnamese Intervention in South Vietnam
Information and comment on North Vietnamese troop disposition in South
Vietnam from official U.S. and South Vietnamese sources, North Vietnamese
news releases, etc:
The number of North Vietnamese military personnel confirmed in the South
in 1959-60 were 1,800; in 1964, )+,400. The first complete units began
arriving in 1965. (US State Dept., February 1965).
Since May 1966 North Vietnamese regulars have infiltrated both through
Laos and through the DMZ, a fact which the North Vietnamese Government
has not recently taken pains to deny.
On 12 December 1966, NFLSVN President, Nguyen Huu Tho, in a message to
North Vietnamese leaders, acknowledged that the "North Vietnamese people
are doing their best to fulfill their task as the major rear area, the
cradle of the revolution for the whole country." (VNA, 16 December 1966).
In a tape recording captured early in 1967 and made public by the South
Vietnamese Government, a North Vietnamese Army officer told a Lao Dong
Party (Central Committee meeting that despite the decrease in Viet Cong
guerrilla personnel, total main force strength had nevertheless increased
sharply owing to the arrival of more men from North Vietnam. Well-known
Viet Cong military units, such as the 271st Main Force Regiment, are now
50% manned by NVA regulars as the demand from the Viet Cong for additional
support grows.
North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in an interview with a
reporter from JEUNE AFRIQUE, said of the U.S. demand for reciprocal de-
escalation: "We are in our own country and we shall fight as long as
the aggressors remain on our soil." (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 April 1967).
It was estimated in April 1967 that nearly half the Communist forces
in the South were North Vietnamese (US State Dept., 15 May 1967).
On 28 May 1967, the Liberation Armed Forces Command, reporting 1966-67
winter-spring fighting, spoke of "emulating North Vietnam ... our great
rear area ... and co-ordinating our activities with it ...." (VNA, 30
May 1967).
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oven~ber
lHla~oi's Dilemma: Cut Losses
In South or use Home Army me no great':
r AMONG the informed Be stressed that this was AT THE ti '
,leaders and analysts, as. al- no more than a possibility, stress was, laid upon this
ready reported'in this space, Ile stressed, too, that there NLF proposal of coalition,
there are two almost dia- were no new indicators--of. More recently. however, the:
metrically' opposed views increased troop movements, top Soviet leaders have;
'about the next stage in for instance-to turn the taken to referring to it fairly'
`Vietnam. Both have the possibility into a semi?.p'rob pointedly, in one context on
dame basic- assumption: that 'ability. , another. The Soviets' East,
the North Vietnamese can. He merely remarked that prn . European allies have
no longer carry the huge this was something he had gone even further, finding
,manpower burdkn of the to be ready for; and he all sorts of ways to pass th#
',Southern war on the old added that he was complete. word to American diplomats
system, 'ly ready. Indeed, he pre. that the NLF platform wal
The difference is about dieted that the Hanoi lead- f -a most important documents
hl h the United States
`
iv s would lose rather thharl.. ; tow
the way this dilemma will
kbe resolved In Hanoi. If you gain by the, additional hu had given too little weight.
lire heavily over-spending man investment in South "It has beef' like the over-
your iticome,you can either 'Vietnam that he was talk; ture of the symphony twd
'reduce your rate of expends ing about. ;years ago," one of the wiser
'tore, or else you can draw Any hunch of General Kremllnologists has said,
W tm eland's must be' !'The symphony" in question
r
tat YOU may MA ave.
.The more hopeful view is n6 one else has anything ap- orchestrated, loudly revel'-
letEastern Eu'
x
b
S
i
b
,further upon whatever caps- es o
ll h profoundly respected, for.. was the wonderfully well-
,
a e
that the Hanoi leaders will' proacaing compara
'choose the first alternative, 'perlence. it must be added[
reducing their over-ambi- however, that whichever way
ttious troop structure in the they resolve their dilemma
,south, and thereby cutting the Hanoi leaders rather
tau monthly loitssesh new m they plainly share General Wc
troops. The cc w replace view oreland's expectation that
t
is that the Hanoi leaders there may be bad trouble
will, in effect, draw upon ahead for them.
their remaining capital, by The fact of the matter is
'rising their home army in that in an extremely deft
north Vietnam to provide and secretive way, Hanoi
-reinforcements and replace- long ago began planting ccr-
'3nents In South Vietnam. tai, obscure seeds. And
The first thing to say these seeds, if the war in
Y'bout this second view is the South goes badly for
,that there's no evidence to Hanoi, can then be watered
Support It. Indeed, It runs `^d brought to bloom as a
'counter to the more impor-, ,drive to open the kind of
"
"
negotiations
that may be
(cant recent evidence, such
as the, Increasingly peculiar supremely dangerous, yet
behavior of Prince Norodom will appeal to many unin?
6ihanouk ' concerning the formed people in this coun-
grrobiein of the Cambodian t'ano'tuarles. Last summer, + in brief,
Hanoi's southern puppets of
"THE SECOND thing to the National Liberation
"y, however, is that those Front rather inconspicuously
;Who have tentatively taken Issued a kind of political
this view are men of great platform. The great novelty
experience and sound In- In the platform was a call
atinct, not ab I y Including for "free general elections"
Gen. William C. Westmore- which would lead, in turn, to
land. While In Washington, a "national union democratic;
Westmoreland privately government," including NLI!',
stated that he thought it
,quite possible that the Hanoi
1Ieaclers would soon send
[three to five more regi-
ov
ng
erat
ropean drive in the autumn
(2)
of 1965, to secure a, long
bombing pause which, so the
Soviets intimated, would
then lead to fruitful talks.
In the present instance;
the wisest Kremlinologist,',
feel that no "symphony" it-
self will begin without a deg
clsive signal from Hanoi--:
which was lacking in 1965.
Captured documents, ex-
plaining what Hanoi really
means by coalition govern,
ment in South Vietnam.
meanwhile indicate that the
signal may conceivably be
given later on, if worst
comes to worst.
Coalition, it is stated, will
be nothing but a tactic,
which will be necessitated, if
and when that time comes,
by the Vietcong's inability
to win "complete victory",
without further ado. Under
the cloak of coalition, it l3"i
further stated, the country-'
side Is to be "occupied"; t
after that, the towns are to'
be "surrounded"; and when
that moment arrives, "com.'
plete victory" will then be
Within easy'grasp. "Complete
representatives but not ex' victory," of course, means
elusively recruited from the the Communist subjugation
Communists' adherents, of the South.
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vnawftv riml,F21 P
scant Pose
Oi YC Chief
Seen Filled
I SAIGON, Sept. 10 (UPI)-
:The general who was ch;ef of
staff of the army when Viet-
minh forces defeated the
French 13 years ag has been
named commander of Viet-
cong tromps In South Vietnam,
Intelligence reports from pri
ooers Indicated today.
Informed military sources In
Snlgon identified the North
Vietnamese commander as
lit
l*Loc4NJ Pro"' jib
I JAiaj, Gen. Roans; Van Thai, a JIOANG VAN' THAI
f versed In guerrilla warfare
i rs
North Vie sc Dcfensejpredecessor to the Victcong,.~~-
Chief Vo Nguyen Giap, the ar=land later joined Clap and 1Io`I~<
chitect of the Vietminh victory Chi Minh In establishing the!
,1~14
F
'
over t h(
rench. Clap
s theo North FIetnamcse army. 11
!
ties on warfare have become a
i nisi Insurgency. "
Thai, one of the founders ofi,
%" North Vietnam's military and k.
i political mnchincry, has appar.
?p
} cntiy been a pp o I n t c difl
commander of Vietcong forces j
: Iin Southvictnarn to replace+' i
Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh.
osition is kn
The
wn a
th
p
o
s
e, l
;.Y head of the Central Office for'' '
Sout Vietnam. This controls)
South Vietnamese Comtnunistl~
c political and military act-vI-; %,
nann, accortan, to r(nc:lol'
anoi
died on Jt:iy of a
,
jy.
Iheart attack.
as the new commander camel
ns no surprise to the V.S. Co,n?
f mand. fie is rate4 as a "bril?,'
liant strategist" who Is very,`
popular with his Tten and not not content to Issue commands
from a desk. [Joe Was reported
Ito have been In South Viet-
nam prior to hit sppointment~
During 1Verld War 11, Thai
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1ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Tokyo
21 November 1961
C",
a o is
JCamp in
y George McArthur and Horst 'Faas
'ON THE CAMBODIAN `BOR ,
Chidden beneath .lush jungle about
Your miles inside neutral Cam-
zbodia.
f '~l he signs were unmistakable,
:,despite Cambodian denials, that
"many hundreds of. men and tons
Of supplies had crossed this jungle
site tend gone on to the war in
South Vietnam. It offered hard
?evidence from the Cambodian side
of the frontier that such camps
exist. -?
The camp had sheltered several
hundred men, probably from, a
major headquarters command'
group. The occupants had left
barely days before. Some had
been in the area the previous night,?
.::But Premier Son Sarin -said an
investigation will. be made' by
Cambodian officials.
"It is impossible that the camp
was used for any long period of
time," the Premier ? said. "it was
not a sanctuary." , .
He acknowledged that there had
been some crossings of the frontier
by Communist forces, but he'said
the Cambodian Government has
always demanded withdrawal as
soon as the intrusions were dis-
covered.
-Reporters visited the frontie(
at tithe invitation of the Prince.,
Diplomats in Phnom Penh felt
that despite his stated sympathies
with the Viet Cong he did not'
believe the Communists were
seriously using Cambodian ter-
ritory as a stage area.
as Chown by fresh footprints fol invitation to the frontier. He
lowing a hca4y rain the day be- l offered military escorts and order-
fore. One soldier had left behind . jed provincial officials to coope-
a khaki mosquito net, still rigged ! !rate with Western newsmen. They,
From the camp and stretching
toward the unmarked frontier with
Vietnam was a heavily traveled
military road, running through
,Virtually uninhabited jungle. Mon-
soon rains had turned stretches of
it into a bog. Engineers had laid
down a carpet of neatly 'trimmed
logs. The corduroy surface was
capable' of supporting heavy
trucks, and countless tracks indi-
cated many had passed that way.
The road crossed the border
barely nine miles from the South
Vietnamese district `town of Loc
Ninb. scene of a bitter battle this
month when the Viet Cong kept
up an assault by two regiments,
perhaps 5,000 men, for a full
week.
American commanders said that
,battlefield was selected by the
Viet Cong because of its nearness
to the sanctuary of the order-a
did.
When we drove to the district
capital of Mimot, about 15 miles
from the Vietnamese frontier,
and pointed out prccisley where we'
wanted to go, no difficulties were
raised. On a map, we pinpoint-
ed a jungled area of the border
within a hundred miles of Saigon.
The district administrator, Oung
Hong Cheng for, an affable 39.
year-old career civil servant,
laughed and said we would find
nothing. Then he hospitably laid
out a three-hour Lunch:
Our preselected site, on the
basis of information from qualifi-
ed sources, was a thin track
branching off National Route 7
and barely marked even on detail-
ed maps. From the paved high-
way which parallels the border
north of War Zone C,-the track
was barely noticeable-the en--
ditch.
It was late afternoon and the
small military escort was em-
barrassed. A young lieutenant
said perhaps the road was used'
by timber thieves. Another sug-
gested it was built by the forestry
department. -
ON THE CAMBODIAN BOR-]
DER, Nov. 21-We asked to
come back the next day, with a
bigger military escort to go deeper
into the jungle. The Army major
'in charge of our escort agreed but
the friendliness shown earlier in
the day was gone. Prince Sisa
wath, a cousin of Prince Norodom
-who was along, remarked some-
what bitterly: "I suppose you will'
Write about the Sihanouk trail."
Next morning, when we started
back into the jungle with a larger
escort, the Prince was absent but
there was a full escort including
an Army truck with a 20 mm.
cannon which stayed on the paved
road to protect us, it was explain-.
ed, from possible attack by in-
truding American planes.
Back in the jungle, with troops
deployed on all sides, a little path
off the .corduroy road led within
half a mile to the Viet Cong
camp site.
There was no mistaking the
neat military order,' the shelter,
the little bamboo desks arad
tables.
Drainaged ditches were dug
around each shelter. Everything
was camouflaged. Some shelters
'also contained the little bamboo
pens used by the Viet Cong to.
house pigs or chickens. A khaki
mosquito net dangled in one pal-
metto-roofed shelter.
Although the Communist forces
always police their camps
thoroughly, there were incrimi
mnating bits and pieces. In what
was evidently a dispensary, a lit-
tle pasteboard container for Japa-'-
nese-made hypodermic needles
was found. Other medical labels
-from Cambodia and South
Vietnam-turned up. There was
also a little plastic North Viet-
'tramese medical supply bag. A
{soap container made in Saigon
` sanctuary denied by Cambodia's ' `trance thickly shrouded by trees.
neutralist ruler Prince Norodoml On each side were ordinary
Sihanouk although he has recently signs warning against smoking,
qualified his position by saying forest fires. or the unauthorized
his 34,000-man army could not cutting of timer. Walking down
possibly seal the 500-mile border. the twisting trail, there r was
.Cambodian military officers on nothing out of the ordinary save
the frontier indicated little effort the unusual number of tire and
had been made. They claimed, cart trucks on a small dirt toad
however, that there were no per. that ostensibly led nowhere.
manent Viet Cong camps and no Then, a few hundred yards into,
serious incursions. the heavy woods, the corduroy
Prince Sihanouk has been In- road burst into view-a road
focmedqp,pt vt deF~arryFdlt a 2~@O8tO41~F*qs
~hA;F:[~Rs7&d 3061
camp. lis reaction has not been ly deserted area. To one side -3
disclosed. was a small' camouflaged clearing
Beneath sonic leaves was burl-'
ed a page from an old notebook
-written in Vietnamese and the
evident record of the camp's sup-
, ?Pst~cdated Oct.
~r*h-itcros as
as
sugar, vegetables, cloth, tea, pigs, '
X4)
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traveled.' The tracks ineludtdt
those of big double-wheeled trucks
as well as countless bicycles and
oxcarts-both favored means of
transportation by the Viet Cong.
The location of the camp in-
ilicates that the Viet Cong is rc-
gularly using Cambodian Route 7
which runs east from the capital
of Phnom Penh and roughly
parallels the South Vietnamese
border for about 40 miles above
War Zone C where much of the
fighting in Vietnam has taken
place in the past year.
Checkpoints along Route 7 ate
virtually nonexistent. Any
Ordinary civilian truck coming
down from the North would pass
unnoticed,
Parking areas along the, cordu-
roy jungle road we located could
easily handle 20 trucks without
danger of discovery. Loads were
evidently taken off the trucks here
LOS A'VET,ES TIMS
26 April 1967
and placed on oxcarts or bicgclei,
for onward transport
There were 20 or more log
platforms which could serve to
keep rice or other stores off the"?
damp earth. All platforms were
constructed in precisely the same
manner, 12 inches from the
ground and with five log cross-
members.
One such Viet Cong camp, of
course, does not prove the Amer-
ican contention that the Viet Gong
systematically violates the Cambo-
dian frontier and use Cambodian
territory as a sanctuary. The
American say, however, that such
camps are numerous along the
northern " half of the 500-mile
Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier.
It takes a week or more on foot
to get to areas where such camps
might be located. The Cambodian
Army has almost no troops there.
in his arrest for involve-
- ment with "anti-Khmer
Cambodia ears in' Crisis reCam", pp Cambodia has never de-
nied that the Viet C
ong
'were receiving food and
Over Viet medicine from Cambodian
, Cong?
Suppl Line sources. Sihanouk has in
recent months declared
DY ROBERT S. ELEGANT -publicly that he would
HONG KONG-A gigantic pipe. limn $tmt wtner like reinforcement of the
line through Cambodia supplying supplied through the overseas mixed Polish, Indian' and
the Viet Cong with arms
Chinese and Vietn
ammu
i
,
n
-
amese merchants Canadian teams of the I:
tion, food and medicines--operated who control that trade. International C o n t r o l with the cooperation of senior ram. Within the past few cla
..
s Prin
y
c
rr~~?o ~v uc u4uw- - --.vun, home mlrusrer uon it is to investigate
in
g up into a major polith:al crisis 1h of the kingdom, has arrested five allegations that Cambo.
the Cambodian kingdom
Cambodian officials and cl
th
d th
.
ose
e
an neutrality is being '
Overt events of the past few d
country even more tightly than violated
.
ays,
combined with painstaking analyses usual to foreign correspondents.' He has admitted that he
made b
Since
We
t
f th
y
s
one o
ern intelligence speei-
e men arrested let himself cannot be perfect-
alists, offer it picture of intrigue and Chao Seng, a leftist who ,.._. ly sure that the Viet Cong
smuggling of vast quantities of virtually controlled the supply operation may well do not take shelter on
coritraband which would do credit to Cambodian economy until be at the heart of Slhan- Cambodi
an territory nor
a high-flown suspense thriller, late last year, specialists ouk's difficulties, since it i l receive su lies th
b
l
pp
h
r
u
arge part of the
M
g
the specialists make a most feel that Sihanouk is striv- nvoves a
Cambodia
He has
Cambodi
h
i
i
,
,
owev-
conv
an power struc.
ng to solve a major inter-
ncing case of their reconstruc-
.
tion of the manner in wht..h et,_ wi_. Hai crisis in an atmru . lure. Chao Song, who re- er, always said that the
Cong dissidents to South -Vietnam phere of as much seclusion turned only a mouth or so hurt, of atnanouicvilie was
and Cambodian chat 30
motor torpedo boats, and 200 landing craft. It is diic\1t
,.
C....__
cc~~.
to give an
ate
a
for auxi
as they run into thousands, and many mercantile vessels
are used for ancillary purposes and constitute Para mili't.ary
support.
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Merchant Fleet of the USSR
Year Number of Ships
1946 507
1950 515
1956 716
1960 873
1965 1,345
Deadweight tons
2,699,000
2,583,000
3,439,000
4,939,000
9,561,000
World total Deadweight tons
97,884,000
107,215,000
136,880,000
171,890,000
217,229,000
1970 13,900,000,(Soviet 260,600,000
estimate)
Source: The Soviet Merchant Marine, U.S. Department of Commerce/Maritime
Administration, 1967
Fish Catch of the USSR
(In metric tons; includes whales and sea animals)
Year
1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1966
1970 (plan)
Tonnage
1,542,000
1,575,000
2,737,000
3,541,000
5,774,000
6,093,000
8,500,000 to 9,000,000
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
Soviet Fish Catch in Selected Areas
(In thousands of centners; 1 centner = .1 metric ton)'
1960
% of total
1965,
%,.of total
1966
Catch
Catch
I
North East Atlantic
11,340
32.3%
10,410
18.2%
11,477
II
North West Atlantid
2,850
8.1%
8,531
14.9%
7,112'
IV
West Central Atlantic
567
1.0%
374
III
East Central Atlantic
695
1.2%
793
V
South East'Atlantic
470
1.3%
3,671
6.4%
3,612
VI
South West Atlantic
733
VII
VIII
North West Indian Ocean
South West Indian Ocean
347
o.6%
IX
XI
South East Indian Ocean
North Pacific Ocean
8,555
24.4%
18,260
31.9%
16,352
~rr-
XIX
ian Sea
Cas
3,669
10.5%
4,480
7.7%
3,758
XX
p
Azov and Black Seas
1,526
4.3%
2,265
3.9%
3,077
Sources: Economic Handbooks of the USSR Food and Agriculture Organizatiop
~eo~__ ~2D' _Fp
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THE COMMUNIST CONCLAVE AT BUDAPEST
The "Consultative Conference" of Communist parties to be held
in Budapest in February 1968 offers remarkable opportunities for dis-
ruptive attacks against the Communist movement. The major divisive
issues are discussed in the enclosed background paper and news articles.
Media and organizational assets -- political, labor, youth, etc.
-- can seize on the Budapest meeting to attack the Communists on a wide
variety of issues. These issues will vary radically according to the
local Communist position, the nature of the asset employed, and the
inventiveness of case officers and agents. The following suggested
lines of attack may stimulate further ideas for treatment.
1. Discrediting the Communist movement as a whole. The Budapest
meeting proves once again the basic allegiance of Communist groups to
an international movement and ultimately to the Soviet Union. Thus talk
of independence, autonomy, and true commitment to popular fronts and
other forms of united action is false and dishonest. The meeting
threatens to create a new Comintern. Gross Soviet efforts to force
Rumania and other Communists striving for autonomy into line prove once
again the monolithic nature and Soviet domination of the movement.
Efforts of the Italians and others to claim their autonomy are eyewash
designed to deceive potential collaborators. The division of the move-
ment into three camps, the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban centers, shows
that Communism is ultimately only a means of attaining and keeping power
and uses ideology solely to assist in reaching this objective. It
further shows the disintegration of the movement, a point emphasized
by the object of the Budapest conference: to try to rebuild Communist
unity in the face of the "imperialist offensive."
2. Exploiting the issue of Communist China. The absence of the
Chinese Communists and their allies from Budapest proves they have
excommunicated themselves from the movement, or that the Budapest meet-
ing is not representative of the Communist movement -- depending on
how one views it. A move against the Chinese Communists at the meeting
is a move against independence and autonomy of Communist parties; it
makes permanent a breach which might otherwise heal; it places North
Vietnam in an impossible position, since that country requires the
support of the entire Communist world; it rejects the right of such
parties as the North Korean to maintain contact with Moscow and China.
On the other hand China's vituperative attacks against the USSR, despite
the Soviet restraint, its refusal to participate in the normal activi-
ties of the international movement, its sectarianism, its hindrance of
joint Communist aid to the war effort in Vietnam, its splitting activi-
ties in local parties around the world, its absurd praise of Mao's
thoughts -- all these things show that it is the Chinese who have effec-
tively withdrawn from the international Communist movement. These points
can be played against local pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese factions to
heighten their mutual antipathies.
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3. Representativeness of the Budapest meeting. Not only will the
participants at Budapest represent only a part of the Communist move-
ment, but that movement itself is not truly representative of the entire
revolutionary movement in the world. Many militant revolutionary groups
in Africa and Latin America do not consider themselves Communist. Thus
the Communists are presumptuous in speaking for all revolutionaries.
4. Black operations. Mutual antagonisms, jealousies, and special
interests make the occasion of the Budapest meeting an ideal occasion
for disruptive black operations. Local Communist and leftist factions
will attack each other on various grounds such as subservience to
Moscow, allegiance to Peking, Lack of representativeness, and so on.
These attacks can be started or stimulated by carefully planned black
operations.
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SECRET
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY January .1968
The Communist Conclave at Budapest
Since the beginning, a major problem of the Soviet Union has been
to preserve and extend its authority over the international Communist
movement. Lenin and Stalin accomplished this through formal international
organizations, notably the Comintern. However, under Khrushchev a new
system developed: international gatherings of Communist parties. He
convened international conferences in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 and was
in the process of organizing a third when he was ousted in 1964. All
of these meetings were called in -response to signs of the crumbling
of Communist unity and the erosion of Soviet domination. That they
proved generally ineffective in bolstering the Soviet position or the
unity of the communist movement has not deterred the present Soviet
leadership from calling a new "Consultative Conference" to be held in
Budapest in February 1968.
The conference of ruling Communist parties was called in 1957
following the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary of 1956. It
was held in Moscow in conjunction with the fortieth anniversary of
the Soviet revolution and resulted in a call for unity in the bloc, with
Moscow "at its head." The 1960 Conference was attended by representa-
tives of 81 Communist and Workers' parties and resulted in the issuance
of a lengthy General Statement that was intended to serve is a doctrinal
guide for the entire Communist movement. However this statement, which
recognized the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement, but not
its "head," was only a compromise between the Soviet and Chinese
ideological positions and did little more than paper over the profound
cracks then developing in world Communist unity.
Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated rapidly after the 1960 Con-
ference and Soviet efforts to force the Chinese Communists back into
line by the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid served only to increase
dissent in the movement. It soon became apparent to the Soviets that
a new meeting was needed to re-define the international Communist line
and to tackle the problem of Communist China. Under Khrushchev's
leadership the Soviet Union invited the 26 parties which had organized
the 1960 Conference and had drafted its General Statement to a Consul-
tative Meeting in Moscow in 1964 to prepare for a new world Communist
Conference. The ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 forced a postpone-
ment of this meeting, which was eventually held in March 1965 with only
19 of the 26 invitees present; missing were China, Albania, North
Vietnam, North Korea, Rumania, Japan and Indonesia.
At the March 1965 meeting it soon became apparent that the divi-
sions in the Communist movement were so serious that a world conference
would cause more problems than it would solve. It was therefore agreed
that while a world meeting should eventually be convened, it should be
preceded by further consultations among the Communist parties.
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Since then Sino-Soviet relations have, if anything, worsened and
other problems have arisen to challenge Soviet leadership of the move-
ment, notably the growing independence of both Cuba and Rumania. Thus
a deblaration by Bulgarian party General Secretary Todor Zhivkov in
November 1966 that "conditions are ripening" for the convening of a new
world Communist conference was not entirely unexpected. During the
following year other Soviet-dominated parties took up the call and by
the time of the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Revo-
lution in November 1967 the Soviets were able to claim that "some 70
parties" supported the convening of a conference.
Apparently final agreement was reached during the Anniversary cele-
brations and on 24+ November 1967 it was announced that a Consultative
Meeting would be held in February 1968 in Budapest, hosted by the Hungar-
ian Party. The organizers will be 18 of the 19 parties which met in
Moscow in March 1965; the absentee will be Cuba. The 18 are: Australia,
Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Britain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Finland, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, USA,
USSR, and West Germany. According to the original announcement, invita-
tions have been sent to all other Communist parties (the latest Soviet
count lists 88).
The purpose of the Budapest conference, according to the official
communique, is to permit "a collective exchange of opinion concerning
the convocation of an international meeting of Communist and workers
parties." That international meeting, in turn, will have as its objec-
tive the "strengthening o:' the unity of the Communist; movement and also
the rallying of all socialist, democratic forces in the struggle against
imperialism, for national and social liberation of the peoples, and for
world peace." This statement is deliberately vague on whether or not a
subsequent international meeting will actually be held. Later comment
by Soviet, Polish, and'French Communist makes it clear, however, that
those groups, at least, expect to convert the "consultative" meeting
into a "preparatory" one. The Polish paper Trybuna Ludu, for example,
stated on 26 November that the "consultative" meeting will draw up
preliminary draft documents and an agenda for a future world conference.
The French party noted in L'Humanite on 29 November that the Budapest
meeting will require documents to be worked out collectively by all
interested parties. However, the vagueness of the statement regarding
a future meeting was necessary to avoid presenting certain recalcitrant
parties with a fait accompli; these parties have no desire to commit
themselves to a later international conference without more precise
agreement on its composition, purpose, and likely stand on certain cru-
cial issues. Indeed, the convocation of the Budapest meeting is only
the first of the problems which must be resolved before an international
conference is held.
One major question is: who is to be invited to such a meeting?
The Yugoslav and Italian parties, especially, have pointed out that a
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closed meeting of Communist parties would~-is,olate the Communists from,
other leftists, increasing the difficulties of forming popular fronts
and other forms of "joint action," and would greatly increase the
apprehensiveness of others who would see in this a resurrection of the
Comintern. Moreover, a closed Communist meeting would exclude other
groups which in many cases are more representative of the leftist and
revolutionary forces in their countries than miniscule or non-existent
Communist parties. The Soviets are believed to support the concept of
strictly Communist meeting since, if the main aim of the conference is
to promote the identity and unity of the world Communist movement, there
is little point in diluting it with non-party members. The question
becomes even more complicated when one considers that in some countries
there are several Communist parties, in others there are both Communist
and revolutionary parties, often bitterly opposed to each other, and in
yet others the important revolutionary organizations may even be anti-
Communist.
Another major problem faces the conference organizers: that of
Communist China. The Soviets have had to recognize that there is too
much opposition to any move to cast the Chinese out of the Communist
movement to make such an effort worthwhile. In an effort to attract as
large an attendance as possible to the Budapest meeting the Soviets
declared in a statement in Pravda on 28 November that "the purpose of
the conference cannot be interference in the affairs of any fraternal
Party whatever or, still less, excommunication of anybody from the
Communist movement." This disavowal was repeated in a Pravda article
on 5 December by Vitaly Korionov who wrote: "The ostracizing of anybody
from the Communist movement cannot be the purpose of the conference.
The opponents of Communism should have learned long ago that ostracism
runs counter to the very nature of the Communist movement." (Korionov
seemed to have conveniently forgotten about Yugoslavia's ostracism by
the Soviets in 1948.) Actually it is hardly necessary to?cas'b--out the
Chinese since they have effectively excommunicated themselves. More-
over, past opposition has diminished; the Italian Party, which for years
had opposed the convening of a world conference because it believed such
an act would aggravate the division between Moscow and Peking, now says
its doubts have been invalidated by Chinese behavior and that a confer-
ence now is timely.
While the Italians may believe that a world conference might not
make matters worse, they evidently expect the conference shot to take
action against the Chinese Communists. Whether this will turn out to
be the case remains to be seen; the anti-Chinese statements in many of
the recent calls by Communist leaders for a world conference may indi-
cate that China will figure on the agenda no matter what. A further
consideration is that the war in Vietnam will surely loom large as a
conference topic. But it is difficult to envisage a discussion of this
subject avoiding for long the question of Chinese hindrance of joint
Communist aid to North Vietnam.
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The final major problem to be resolved before convening a world
co ference of Communist and workers? parties involves the fundamental
ie of Moscow's hegemony over the Communist movement versus party
autonomy. Few Soviet Communists have lost their deep emotional convic-
tion that Moscow is and must be the leader of the world Communist
movement, even though some of them have perhaps recognized the ration-
ality of claims to equality by other Communist parties, Knowing this,
leaders of other Communist parties are attempting to circumscribe the
nature of a possible world conference. Waldeck Rochet of the French
Communist Party, for example, asserts that "it would be wrong to adopt
a general and universal document like the 1.960 Declaration." The
Italian Party, progenitor of "polycentrism," insists that the prerequi-
site to a world conference is the acceptance of a new attitude through-
out the world movement, the acceptance of differences without accusa-
tions of treason: "Strict autonomy for each party is what is needed
without professing to impose obligatory lines and courses, and without
implying hostile attitudes to parties which do not agree to some common
decisions," Luigi Longo wrote in the party weekly, R.inascita, on
20 October 1967.
Rumania has been one of the chief proponents of national autonomy
within the Communist movement. Its position was clearly stated by
Nicolae Ceausescu in an article published in Pravda on 17 October in
which he stated the Rumanian insistence on sovereignty, national inde?-
pend'ence and a Communist party's obligations to its own working class
and its own people. He called for "relations of a new type" among Com-
munist countries to create "favorable conditions for the affirmation
of their national essence and individuality, for closeness and coopera-
tion between governments, between free and sovereign nations."
This degree of autonomy is not without strong opposition in the
Communist movement. Rumania's position was denounced by Hungarian
party leader Janos Kadar in Pravda on 17 September: "It is impossible
to approve the position sometimes taken which expresses itself inra
neutral attitude to disputed questions or even in direct refusal of
international contacts and comradely exchanges of opinion. It is also
impossible to consider internationalist" any party which -- "even for
the best of intentions -?- declares its own particular interpretation
of the international situation." And Czechoslovak Party Secretary
Vladimir Koucky wrote in the August issue of the World Marxist Review
that "there can be no internationalism that is neutral and not binding
on parties, no departure from the "application of generally obligatory
norms for the individua-_ detachments of the Communist movement."
If such strictures were not sufficient to alarm those Communists
seeking greater independence from Moscow's grip, Ceausescu's speech tol
the Rumanian National Party Conference on 6 December should give pause
for reflection. Ceausescu rebuked the Soviet Union for putting economic
pressure on Rumania and unilaterally violating economic agreements
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4
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between the two countries. "Differences of opinion" over international
and party affairs should not be an excuse for "influencing economic
relatibns," he said, declaring Rumania "will not tolerate such viola-
tions. It was clear that one of the "differences of opinion'was over
the Budapest conference and its possible sequel in the form of an
international conclave. If the Soviets were prepared to apply this
degree of pressure to a ruling Communist party, what might be the
pressures on lesser Communist groups?
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Tlil? ECONOMIST fECEM]3rR 2, 1967
Moscow prepares to
stop the rot
are already signs of divisions over Cuban
t After months of hesitation and endless. ideas inside some pro-Moscow Latin
]confabulations with other party leaders, ,American parties. Havana, however odd l
the Russians have at last made up theirl? its interpretation of marxism-Leninism.!
!'Hinds to take an important step towards' secins set on becoming a third centre of +
holding a world communist conference. world conini rn';m,j,, t?:t , rr!rnt f'rm, it'
According to an official statement put out will be very ;,,c t;ubaits'
in Moscow on November 23rd, the Soviet_ consent to have anything to do with any
I and 17 other communist parties have Moscow-oriented meeting.
decided to convene a meeting in Budapest' ' The Russians have other worries apart
for a "collective exchange of opinions"! from the Cubans. Tern is no sign that
1 1 about' a world communist conference. It: the important and influential parties of:
should be quite an impressive turn-out.--IJugoslavia, Rumania, North Vietnam and
I'he number of communist parties which, North Korea have overcome their dis
have openly committed themselves to an: taste for a conference, And to secure the
international conference has risen from amount of support they can now claim,'
around 40 to more than 65 ; presumably, the Russians have had to make consider
gat any rate all these will accept the !able concessions about the kind of meeting
,invitation to go to Budapest.
On the other hand, in spite of their
impressive majority support, the Russians municating the Chinese, partly because
have to face the fact that the communist they have in effect excommunicated
movement is now. virtually split into three -!themselves, but partly also because there
land that the conference they want to' was too much opposition to this project
hold is more likely to draw attention to among the pro-Moscow parties. There
these divisions than to paper them over. is no question either of getting the
The quarrel with Peking must have .participants to sign any grand new
become an accepted fact of life in f statement of ideological principles. The
Moscow. With Chinese spokesmen pro- Russians have had to abandon this
claiming Peking as the new ce,,i. ? of because of the lively fears of individual
and urging the,Russian people to get' rid
of their present rulers, it is clear that for
the time being-which does not necessarily
'mean for always-the breach between,
Moscow and Peking will remain unhealed.
But there is also the rapidly widening;
gal) between Moscow and Havana. Dr
Castro has ? no use at all for. Russia's'
cautious attitude towards revolutionary;
violence. It can be small consolation to,
the Russians to know that Havana's
relations with Peking are also distinctly
d cool. Indeed, Dr Castro's theories about
revolutionary tactics-in so far as they
have been distinctly fornmlated-arc:
! coniuntist, whether he is pro-Moscow
or pro-Peking, for they spring from the
belief that the party should play second
fiddle to the guerrilla forces when it:
is a question of organising a revolution.
They could, however, catch on in parts t
of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therci
they would be willing to settle for. There
is no question now of formally excom-
parties that it would amount to an at-j
tempt to sabotage their autonomy.
There will also be difficulties about]
exactly who is to be invited to the meet-
ing. The Italian communists, whose views
carry weight, feel as strongly as do the:
Jugoslavs that the communist movement
should not divorce itself from other pro-
gressive but non-communist movements
and that representatives of these groups
should be invited to attend any world
communist meeting. The Russians are
believed to oppose this-not surprisingly,
since if their main aim in pushing for
a conference is to reassert the identity
of the communist movement, they will
not want .it to be diluted by delegates
who may be very worthy men but lack
party cards. All the same, the Russians
may in the end have to give way on this.
Why then, one wonders, are the
Russians so doggedly determined to have
a meeting at all ? One reason is that
Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
WASHINGTON MUST
17 Dvccrnber 1967
Rumanian,
:soviet Ties
a Crisis
$y Anatole Shub
i Ws,hlneton Pnat rorelan service
MOSCOW, Dec. t6-The So-
viet Union today stood at the
brink of a major crisis with in-
dependent Communist Ruma-
nla which might prove as fate-
ful as. Aloscow's break with
]Yugoslavia 20 years ago.
The -next moves on both
sides remained unclear after
;Kremlin summit talks Thurs-
day and Friday, led by Rus-
61a's Lconld Brezhnev and Ru-
~rrania's Nicolas Ceaucescur
failed to clear the air of Ru?
rnantan charges that the So-
Iviet Union -was applying eco-
nomic pressures because o#
k9e political differences be-
'twecn the two countries.
Unofficial Soviet sources re.-
ported tonight that Brczhnev
and other Soviet leaders
lvould go to Bucharest next
:1tnonth in a last-ditch attempt
1.o heal the breach. However,
Rumanian sources said they
had heard nothing of a visit so
soon. It would be more logical,
they said, for the Russians to
come after the Budapest Inter-
rational Communist "consults-
tlve meeting" scheduled for
late February,
The Budapest meeting re- !exchange of views on past -resulted In Rumanian pgftici-
mains one of the main sUh= trade pacts, but pledges to im-l patios In joint lt'arsa ? ]?a
jects of disagreement between prove future t ade? i maneuvers and other rr? fs-
the Soviet Unlonft
?'stronfilY pi'o Although Rumania has been ; ores to reduce tensions: 4p-
moting a world Cornmunlst shifting its trade westward;
during the past five years, the, tween Moscow and Bueharelt.1
conference, and Rumania, p' lie took part in the Thursday
,Which suspects the Soviet pur? Soviet Union remains its lead-I and Friday Kremlin talks
pose to be the production of a ing trade partner. Russia has! with Ceaucescu, althoijg he,
joint policy declaration unac. not only supplied massive: was conspicuously a art O n t
.ceptable to China, with which quantities of coal and iron ore; from even the social e.vcj#th
Rumania remains on good but has also pledged hea+y during the visit by f astF
terms. machinery Or au+eh key Pro)*, many's Walter Uibrlc Arkr:
Other major areas of dis- sets 'as the Galati xtecl gem-t,in the week,
I Some
cord Include the German prob- bine and the Iron Gotes hgdro
observers 5r d'
lcm, the Middle East, arms electric Station and dam on that the Soviet stand tysl 1r1
control and the Soviet-Ruma? the Danube. not be fully clarified untie.
nian friendship treaty due to A massive Soviet cconomicl next plenum of the Pari Ci~n?
squeeze, as, applied by Josef 1 y >
expire next month. tral Committee. Accordtni;'_`-to
However, all thes,~ policy Stalin to Yugoslavia in 1048 ors some rumors, a plenum -pay
differences are said to pale byi by Nikita'K h r u s h c h e v to be held in the coming ++re k,
comparison with the contro-! China in 1000, could hurt Ru? but some reports, appareAtly'
,versy over alleged Soviet tail, mania seriously despite Its moro substantial,, say its krill
'ore to deliver ra+t materials steadily Increasing commerce take place in January, v,th
and industrial goods ,aromised with West Germany, France, Communist unity, the.
`I lz'tta?i
to Rumania under long-term Italy and other Western states. pest meeting and the Ryrwa?
Trade agreements. However, the present Soviet nian problem high ~1C th
Neither Russian, BBumanianl leaders are . generally con agenda.
for Western sources have sidered unlikely to behave In The difficulties of t?reEir::.
been able. to confirm or deny so impetuous a manner. Sevl Lion are Increased by toe, ec-
whether Soviet deliveries have) oral of them, notably Presi? ollection that w he n tit'lin
been tardy or lnstifi dent, oil dent Nlkolat Podgorny, are expelled Yugoslavia fr rp 1ha
to specify which if any goodst known to favor a live-and-let- Communist bloc on J4 1 2a
were being hold hack Ilive policy with the Rumanian 1048, It became know 0 ly;
!? Nevertheless. observers Dept, as well as the Yugoslav "Na. then that the crisis bet en
stressed the inciiisin^ in Fri-i tionai Communists." Belgrade and Moscow had
',day night's o t" rwi+e bland` Podgorny was reported to. been under way for near]
Soviet'tum h'^.r c ,im:,nr~ue have paid a secret visit tol)'ear.,
`pf the ilhra~c that the, two Rumania last summer-whlch
sides had "exchanged opin-
Sons" on the fulfillment of
earlier trade agreements. Ob-
servers said that had the So-
vlets denied any conscious
pressures, agreed to Investi-
I gate non-deliveries, or pro-
vided reasonable technical ex-
planations, the communique
would not have registered an
they apparently feel obliged to demon-
strate, somehow or other, that the com-
munist movement is still a force that
counts on the international scene, and
.this feeling may be reinforced, perhaps,
misguidedly, by the defiance of- Peking
and Havana. A second reason is probably'
?the problem of their own standing in the
communist movement. Brought up as the
direct heirs of the Bolshevik revolution,
,Russia's leaders cannot, it seems, quite
shake off the feeling that all-or at any.
rate, most-communist parties ought to
look up to Moscow in some kind of
,special way. They cannot resist hankering
after some kind of communist consensus
that would be initiated in Moscow and
more or less meekly accepted by the rest.
But what kind of a consensus ' Not
about the ' correct path of internal
deve~Qj~ ! t nt f a cmnis state
be~a iW RL't ?CrBe 3 Q4.~21
experimentation going on (in eastern
Europe) and anyway the Russians can
hardly claim to be giving a lead here.
They may, however, argue that a con-
ference confined to specific issues that
can all he presented as part of an " anti.
l imperialist " crusade might well secure
virtually unanimous agreement. After all,
every good communist is against " US
imperialism." Other issues, like' Germany
and the Middle East, 111i [it be more
difficult to manage because dbnmtunists in
;power are increasingly sensitive to the
]national interests and prejudices of the
`countries they govern.
In fact, enlightened self-interest rather
than loyalty to Moscow will be the pre-
dominant feeling at any world communist
meeting. Everyone will be on their guard
against any attempt by the Russians to
circumscribe their freedom of action. It
used to be the Chinese whose position
was under scrutiny at international conr-
munist gatherings. In ' future, however
much criticism may be hurled at the
( llr0i R78d08i;t6(VAOO40f1040D06
be the Russians who are on trial,