SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 4, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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I 25X1 July 1968
President Nasser's Program for Political
and Economic Reform
In the weeks immediately prior to the June 1967 war, President Nasser
was riding high in the Middle East. The efforts of the U.S. and other
Western powers to lift the blockade of Eilat had gotten nowhere. Most
Arab States were rallying to the UAR's side: Jordan had signed a defense
pact, Kuwait had sent troops to Egypt, an Iraqi force was on the way to
Jordan, and there was mass enthusiasm within Egypt for the confrontation
with Israel. Then -- within four days -- the Egyptian Air Force was de-
stroyed, the Egyptian Army battered and routed, and the entire Sinai
Peninsula was in Israeli hands.
The past year has been traumatic for all the Arabs and perhaps most
of all for Nasser. The decisive Arab defeat by Israel was followed by
shock, rage, despair and bitter humiliation. Egypt, on the brink of, if
not actually in, bankruptcy, was thrust into an even more precarious
financial position with the loss of her major sources of foreign exchange:
the Suez Canal, the oil fields of Sinai and tourism.
Changes in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the single legal politi-
cal party of the UAR, along with a major government shakeup, began after
Egypt's defeat in the June war, following widespread charges that the
party had let Egypt dawn in the crisis. In a major speech on 30 March
1968, Nasser announced a program for comprehensive political, social and
economic reforms for the UAR, to be instituted primarily through the re-
organization of the ASU. Nasser submitted this program to a popular ref-
erendum on 2 May. The massive, stage-managed endorsement given the ref-
erendum was then touted as a vote of confidence in him and his regime:
out of 7.3 million votes cast, 99.98 percent were favorable! However,
there is more than a little question as to the genuine enthusiasm for
the 30 March program among the usually apathetic Egyptian masses. De-
spite the small number of "no" votes on 2 May, the program has aroused
little enthusiasm among students, professionals, and other middle class
elements. These groups consider Nasser's proposals meaningless and ques-
tion whether the UAR should accept a prolonged period of economic auster-
ity and the risk of a new war. They are also disSatisfied with Arab
socialism and believe the plans for the ASU are too heavily weighted in
favor of uneducated workers and peasants. They are concerned that con-
tinued dependence on the Soviet Union strengthens the influence of the
radical leftists within the regime. Even the workers have grievances
involving labor-management relations in the public economic sector as
well as demands for more housing and lower taxes. The UAR military re-
sent being made scapegoats for the June defeat, their loss of prestige
and privileges, and the authority exercised by Soviet military advisers.
The ASU, originally designed to generate mass enthusiasm for Cairo's
chosen policies, has been a continuing disappointment to the regime. As
was the case with earlier mass movements Nasser tried to create, the ASU
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failed to attract true mass support and was not a reliable instrument
for political control and manipulation. Disorderly demonstrations by
workers and students in February were the largest and most serious hos-
tile demonstrations since the regime came to power and reflected growing
public impatience with Nasser's domestic and foreign policies.
In his 30 March program, Nasser promised the Egyptians broad poll-
liticaLand constitutional changes, most of which would be implemented
only after "removal of the consequences of the aggression." His major
concession to the spirit of political unrest abroad in Egypt was the se-
lection of ASU cadres by election rather than appointment. Candidates for
election, however, are tightly controlled by the Nasser-appointed Pro-
visional Committee to supervise the elections. None of the proposed re-
forms is really new: the National Assembly has been fitfully drafting a
permanent constitution since 1964; the proposed elections for the National
Congress, which would in turn elect the powerful Central Committee, are
no more than a call for approval of procedures promised in the 1962 Na-
tional Charter.
The 2 May referendum has thus created an illusion of political unity
and reform which does not appear to be supported by facts. It may give
rise to a momentary euphoria that can be exploited propagandistically
both at home and abroad. The problems Nasser faces, however, are no dif-
ferent than they were before 2 May. The survival of the regime will ul-
timately depend on its ability to provide solutions for at least some of
the vexing political and economic problems that have been responsible for
the continuing public discontent. Nasser hopes the elections and other
promised political changes will restore waning confidence in his regime.
The Arab-Israeli conflict, however, limits the extent to which he can
accommodate growing popular demands for basic changes in the UAR political
system.
In the meantime, he has called for continued austerity, national
unity and resistance to what he describes as Israeli and imperialist
psychological warfare tactics intended to divide and dispirit the Egypt-
ian people. The mood of cautious optimism following the Khartoum Confer-
ence last September has been steadily eroded by the lack of progress in
implementing the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967 or in
achieving a UN or Big Power-mediated settlement. In the face of increas-
ing Israeli intransigence and incessant Soviet propaganda exploiting the
difficulties, the Arabs interpret what they believe to be U.S. failure to
use its influence upon Israel to be conclusive evidence of a U.S.-Israeli-
imperialist conspiracy. A classic example of this is the 4 June 1968
Izvestia article by V. Kudryavtsev, "The Smoldering Coals in the Near
East," a copy of which is attached.
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April 196
Egypt
- and 'Port Said. Russia has reached
the warm water at last. It is in the
Mediterranean to stay,.
Economic bonds- between Mos-
cow and Cairo are also strong.
Trade between them has reached
an ? annual figure of $243 million.
Among the items coming into Egypt
arc 300,000 tons of wheat and much
industrial equipment. From Czech-
oslovakia and East Germany, Egypt
has ordered a total of thirty complete
iflour mills. From the Egyptian side,
cotton, rice, textiles, and agricul-
tural products will he exported to
the Soviet Union.
Russians have been the all-impor-
tant partners in the Aswan High
Dam-, from which cheap power now
reaches as -far as Tahrir Province,
north of Cairo. The High Darn is
nearing completion, holding back
some 40 million cubic meters of
water and altering the society and
economy of the Nile region com-
pletely. The Iligh Dam Ministry
estimates that the dam has already
saved $150 million by preventing
flood damage. Much planning has
accompanied the dam's building.
Development of a. new diversified
industrial complex at Aswan -awaits
funds. This is being done under the
auspices of the Regional Planning
of Aswan office, under the gover-
norate of Aswan. It has had as con-
sultants experts on small industry
from the Ford Foundation and is,
now receiving further help from
the UN Development Program.
Meanwhile, newly irrigated land'
reclaimed from the desert already
produces two cotton crops or three
cereal crops where only one crop
was possible after normal Nile
floods. Altogether the dam will in-
crease Egypt's arable land by one
sixth and its agricultural output by
one quarter.
Tough line
In spite of the enormous Soviet
finarieial investment in Egypt over
the last ten years, political relations
between the two nations arc unde-
fined. There is no mutual defense
t?caty, although in the shock of
defeat last summer President Nasser
. Nationalism is More than ever
the dominant theme in Egyptian
political life this spring. The con-
sciously expressed concern not to
be engulfed in any .alien system
either of imperialism or of inter-
national Communism is insistent
.and genuine. Soviet militaryexperts
are in Egypt only "for specific tasks
and for specific periods," . writes
.
editor Mohammed Hassancin
in Al Ahram. They will not be al-
lowed to dominate thc. state, but, he
explains, Egypt is in great need of
specific aspects of military. training,
which Soviet technicians arc now
_providing.
In fact, a Russian i version . of a
Military Assistance Group such as
the United States has long deployed
in Asia now exists in Egypt. It
.involves an estimated 4000 officers
and engineers. They have come
. along with the simpler, mostly de-
fensive Russian weapons which have
restocked Egyptian arsenals since
last summer.- When it became ap-
parent that a .peasant army could
not master the intricacies of sophisti-
cated weapons, and that their officers
showed a fatal lack of 'understanding
and initiativei
n desert warfare,
Egypt appealed for basic training
as well as arms.
Russia in warm water.
The Russian presence is pervasive
but not conspicuous. Egypt's ;defeat
provided the opening for the Soviets
to move into the. planning of de-
fense; for the easy . negotiation of
landing rights for Russian planes
at Cairo West,. Alexandria, Luxor,
of the defeat would have been cata-
strophic for Egypt. Given these,
Cairo can maintain a tough line in
relation to Israel and reassert some
of its influence in the Arab world.
That influence survives. In recogni-
tion of it the Israelis publicly say ,
that no peace treaty without Nasser's
agreement would be worth having.
? Soviet diplomats find it impossible,
however, to influence Cairo's deci-
sions directly on the Palestine ques-
tion. They failed to win acceptance
of a moderate solution last summer
at the UN. They remain unable to
alter the government's position on
the Sdez Canal, or on its hope of
re-establishing diplomatic relations
with Washington.. Rather cautiously
they have been comparing Nasser's
"bourgeois" regime with that of the
more radical Boutnedienne in Al-
geria. Pravda's Igor Belyaycv in a
long article: in February wrote:
"Even in nationalist Egyptian _circles .
there are fairly open proponents of
an all-around rapprochment with
the United -States. These people
try to convince themselves that only
the Americans are in the position
to solve .the Middle East crisis. . . .
A very perfidious design is hidden ia
such claims. It is a question of the,
most genuine capitulation before
imperialism. Carry out the design
of the American Lobbyists in Cairo,
and the U.S. would be able to rely
? on those changes which would favor
its monopoly capitalism and reduce
to naught the gains of the Egyptian
revolution."
The Pravda article reflects a gen-
eral concern among the Egyptian
hierarchy that their posture of non-
alignment will be impossible to
maintain unless better relations with
the West arc cultivated. It was for
this reason that they were so eager
to restore relations with Great Brit-
ain last fall. They tried energeti-
cally, and have succeeded in retain-
ing their oil contracts with two .
:U.S. companies ? Pan American
in the Red Sea region, and Phillips
Petroleum in the western desert.
Within a year of the formation of a
joint company with Pan American
the Morgan field has reached a
land Aswan, and for port facilities wanted one. Without Moscow's ma- production of 100,000 barrels a day,
for the Soviet fleet at Alexandria terial and political support the effects thus offsetting the loss of the Sinai -
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fields captured by Israel. This oil
is now being processegliPPMMitiF19
Petroleum's refinery at Aden, pend-
ing the complete restoration of the
Suez refineries damaged in October.
This spring Egypt's third productive
field at El Alamein will add 30,000
barrels a day.
Official interpretation of the value
of these finds emphasizes their polit-
ical aspect. As the government
spokesman, Dr. Mohammed H. El-
Zayyat, put it, more Egyptian oil:
will help Egypt to resist pressure
from any side, to remain indepen-
dent. In terms of money, oil income
helps to rescue Egypt from the near
bankruptcy brought on by Suez
Canal closure and loss of tourism.
Political traffic '
These economic developments add
a new dimension to Egypt's future.
It ceases to bc a have-not country
and can anticipate- means of carrying
.out its ambitious industrial plans.
Planning is now in the hands of
Dr. Abdel Moneitri Kaissouriy, one
of the country's ablest 'financial
figures. His re-emergence in the
-cabinet is a sign of the regime's de-
:sire to re-establish itself in the inter-
national financial marketplace. One
of the, most promising projects under
discussion between Egyptian. plan-
ners and a British engineering firm
is for a large oil pipeline to bypass
free fifteen ship blocked there since_more responsive to Egyptian re-
Redejna,2Q WlatilZslalAnkRIBER-A3081A0G040.0030013)24 than have.
consulted at every step. When it American banks. Ever since the
became obvious that Egypt could!Yemeni war and its threat to the
physically clear the canal- at its stability of the Arabian peninsula,
northern end without Israeli American institutions have been in-.
terfcrence, because Israel does noCcreaSingly cool to Egyptian -appeals
?
occupy the eastern bank on the last for funds.
five miles at the northern end,
Israel protested. This put it in the
position of denying clearance of the
blocked ships for its own political
reasons. No amount of reasoning
or reassurance by United Nations
officials and observers that this was
to be a onetime operation, not a
reopening of the canal to traffic,
could budge Israel. Egypt then
stopped all attempts to free the
ships. It could simply wait until
the nine countries involved as owners
of the ships exerted more pressure
for clearance.
Cairo's. credit
In this case Egypt was in the
position to claim that a technical
service was in the general interest
and therefore above politics. This
has been a familiar argument in
Israel for many years ? when
swamps in demilitarized zones in
the north adjoining Syria were
drained, for example, to make them
productive. But on the canal, where
Israel now patrols the eastern bank
for all but the northern five-mile
the Suez Canal. The pipeline would stretch, the Israelis remain transfixed
have an initial capacity of 50 million by the prospect of joining in its
tons a year and would link the Gulf traffic at last.
of Suez with Port Said.or Alexandria. On ?the Egyptian side, it has taken
It is asserted that use of the line considerable persuasion by inter-
would be less expensive than trilarg- national interests to convince Egyp-
ing the Suez Canal to take giant tian planners that it is in their best
modern tankers. ? interest to establish an alternative
Aside from the technical advan-
to the canal. They have accepted
'
tages of a new pipeline, its construe-
the idea and begun to shift their
tion would diminish the symbolic im_ interest to it, encouraged by inter-
national petroleum companies in the
porta/Ice of the canal. Nationaliza-
ftion of the canal made president Arabian Gulf. But before any ,iiew
Nasser a hero in the Arab Nvorld in large projects can be carried out in
E
1956. It has always carried a heavy Egypt, it will be necessary to re-
freight of political traffic. It was establish Egyptian credit standing.
for this reason that Israel fought to The government has been trying to
use it. The amount of Israeli flag- reschedule its large debts to foreign
Shipping which could use it is small,
but the sensitivity of both countries
on this issue is acute. ?
Thus when Egypt started.. under
United Nations auspices to survey
the canal in January in order, to
The men from Moscow
At this stage Egyptian planners
must therefore reckon without
American help in any field except
jeducation. The American presence
on the Egyptian scene has never
been so slight. ...?.1'oday the small
contingent of diplomats who staff
the American Interests Section of
the Spanish EmbasSy stick to their
technical tasks. They observe the
novel activities of a whole new
breed or Soviet diplomats who orna-
ment the Cairo social scene, The
Russian ambassador, Serge Vinogra-
dov, has become the most sought-
after and honored guest at state
functions. He IS backstopped- by
about a thousand Russians speaking
good English and Egyptian Arabie.
The women of the contingent have
dropped the uncaring styles of the
past for the latest European modes.
On the surface they have replaced
the banished Europeans of another
age.
Mr. Vinogradov has easy access
to President Nasser, and likes to
appear as the President's mentor.
Still, government decisions so far
have not followed an all-out anti-
Western line. And within the Egyp-
tian official family there is known
to be much anxiety at the prepon-
dcrant role assumed by the men
front Moscow.
The generation of technocrats
which keeps Egypt from civil chaos
grew up under BritiSh and French
tutelage. Their leaders studied at
London School of Economics and
the Sorbonne or at Harvard. They
arc at home in the Western world,
arc nostalgic for contact with it,
and angry that much or it refuses
to see the justice of their position
commercial banks. Most important on Arab unity under Egypt, and on
is regularization of its standing with Israel. They are also weary of re- ?
sponsibility in a hectic Period of .
the International Monetary Fund,
w.ith which it is in default in the revolution; and some of them have
amount of some 550 million. Euro- found a way out by joining interna-
pean commercial banks have been tional services via the United Na-
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tions. Today It. is For tor, more of education for industry in a coun-
of these elite to leave if they choose.
Late in the fall of 1967 the govern-
ment decided that Egyptian families
could emigrate legally, taking with
them their household possessions and
sonic cash, There has been an
exodus of both Christians and Mus- ;
lims in the last six months. Many
go to Canada, some to the United
States. They represent a new kind
of loss for Egypt, of, educated and
skilled professionals, discouraged
with their position and anxious for
the future. If the tide of such emi-
gration increases, it Will he a sign
? that the regime can no longer offer
;real hope to the educated: class.
Dr. Kaissouny has underscored
the lack of educated manpower in a
'report on employment prospects up
to 1975. He predicts a shortage of
candidates for managerial and tech-
nical posts of some 30,000 by 1970.
The supply of intermediate technical
trainees will be short 160,000:candi-
dates. The implications for ;devel-
,opment of the economy are. obvious.
Egypt has not yet dealt with the
great technological gap exposed by
its military defeat last summer. But
Russian advisers have not spared
feelings in putting much of the mili-
tary failure down to lack of training.
Dr. Kaissmmy is saying that there
?vill be as fatal a gap in preparation
for industrialization if technical edu-
cation is not improved and increased.
Much United Nations technical
help has been sought by the gOvern-
ment in this field. UNESCO and
the International Labor Organiza-
tion have helped to set standards
and teach teachers of vocational
training. There has been help on
training for civil aviation, for rail-
way workers, and for industrial
management. The UN Develop-
try which envisions salvation through
industrialization; This shortage,
plus an artificial one caused by the
removal of many talented manage-
rial people for political reasons,
threatens the country's economic
future. There is as yet no mobiliza-
tion of talent, much of it still avail-
able in the country. The Israeli
war does not seem to have had the
Sputnik-like effect it might have
had in directing energies to Egypt's
technical deficiencies.
?
0400030032-1 . . ,
Western imperialism the region.
The Russians- play skillfully on this
theme, and Washington, preoccu-
pied with the Far East, has so far
failed to clarify any Middle East
The inevitable return of the whole
impasse to the Security Council
promises little relief for either side.
In the long run the Arabs have high
cards. But in the short run, Israel,
with its strong Western political
support and brilliant advocacy, may
have the votes. They are paper
votes, however, and will not force
the direct talks Israel says .t wants.
Opening doors
Any conventional interpretation
of last summer's Arab defeat would
have predicted Nasser's downfall,
Egypt's economic collapse, and per-
haps the West Bank and Jordan
working arrangements with Israel.
-
None of the seers Would have guessed
that the two oil monarchies under
chronic attack from Cairo, Saudi
Arabia and Libya, would be sending
Egypt a cash subsidy to keep it
going all year; or that all the NATO
.countries of the Mediterranean basin
would stand behind the Arabs and
keep open the dcor to the East
.which Moscow so eagerly rushed to
close.
Looking at Egypt today--;!. is pos-
sible to see either peace Ul war
ahead. The new Russian weapO.)ry
may be largely defensive and
provide the backdrop of defensive
power - needed before any govern-
ment can approach a settlement
with Israel. The Russians clearly
favor a settlement but do not have
the power to influence it politically.
Somewhat inconsistently, the Egyp-
tians and all other Arabs greatly
overestimate the influence of the
United States on Israel. It is no
exaggeration to say that we have
never had less influence in Tel
Aviv. This leaves any peace efforts
right where they are now, in the
hands of the patient and discreet
Dr. Gunnar Jarring. If he fails to
find an acceptable channel of com-
munication for both sides, the storm
signals will go up again all along the
Mediterranean shores.
High cards, paper votes
As time passes without a resolu-
tion of the political impasse with
Israel,. Egypt's terms have not soft-
ened. Cairo has made what it. con
siders its best offer. This is for
demilitarization of both sides of the
Sinai frontier after withdrawal of
Israeli forces; submission of the
Tiran strait question to the Inter-
national Court, with Open passage
meanwhile; return of Palestinians
to their land in the West Bank, at
least, in exchange for Israeli passage
through the canal; and negotiations
through the Mixed Armistice Com-
mission, which continues to exist
in spite of Israel's ten-year boycott
'of
of it. The Egyptians believe they
have taken "a giant step" in ad-
mitting Israel's right to exist. .They
say they have been talking directly
with Israel through the MAC since
1949, that this is the best way for
negotiations to be held, and that
they Cannot concede more. They
do not claim Gaza but are concerned
with its refugee population, of whom
some 12,000 single males are being
sheltered on a small dole in Egypt.
There is no Nvork for them, and.only
a few are qualified for university
training.
merit Program is concentrating on Even if President Nasser were dis-
. aiding projects for draining irrigated posed, on practical grounds, to
settle with Israel at peace talks, he
land, a necessity as more acreage
could not forfeit his long-standing
Comes under perennial irrigation
from the High Dam: It is also ?: position as the champion of the
vising on mineral development of Palestinian cause. There are doves
the Aswan region and on new indus- ? in Egypt who would like to see an
tries which can be developed as the accommodation so that Egypt could
power grid begins to extend across concentrate on its own affairs. But
the country. tliey are cornered by the arguments
that Israel really represents the
Such help adds up in the overall
U
development effort. But What strikes United States, and that a settlement
the Western observer is the shortage means accepting a new form of
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CHRISTIAN SCIEN E 1$401\11MA
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C.nanoonnokgy
noollactfieza5
1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty virtually ends
British protectorate in Egypt, but gives
Great Britain reserved rights including right
to station forces in Egypt; control of foreign
? affairs.
1939-45 World War II. Axis forces de-
feated in western desert. Direct interven-
tion in Egyptian affairs by British military.
Soviet liaison officers in British Middle East
supply center, Cairo.
1948 Egyptian Army shares defeat of
other Arab armies in Palestine. Gamal
Abdel Nasser and other officers begin plan-
ning revolution and reforms.
1952 Revolution of July 19. King Farouk
abdicates. Free Officers group takes power.
Sympathy from Washington and good rela-
tions with the United States; indifference
from U.S.S.R. Tension with Britain.
1954 Nasser rejects association with
Iraq, Turkey, and "northern tier" states
in Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact. He ne-
gotiates withdrawal of British forces from
Suez Canal zone, after period of Verdila
warfare there.
1955 United States and, Britain tempo-
rize on arms sales to Egypt. February raid
in Gaza by Israel, allegedly against bases
of terrorist fedayeen. Nasser concludes arms
deal with Czechoslovakia and begins rapid
expansion of relations with Moscow.
105G Secretary Dulles withdraws offer of
of United States financial aid to Aswan High
Dam. Tension with West. July: Nasser an-
nounces nationalization of Suez Canal Com-
pany. Egypt begins to operate the Canal it-.
self. July-October: Secret Anglo-French-
Israeli military preparations. November:
Israel invades Gaza and Sinai; British and
Irrench land in Canal Zone. UN Security
Council orders ceasefire after Soviet warn-
ings. December: British and French with-
draw.
1957 Israel :withdraws forces from Sinai
and Gaza after heavy UN and United States
pressure. Rapid consolidation of Soviet-
Egyptian relations. Egypt and most other
Arab states reject Eisenhower doctrine of
United States help for anti-Communist de-
lense.
1958 February: Union of Syria and Egypt,
at Syrian request, after Communist gains in
Syria. Nasser becomes President of the
United Arab Republic. May-September: Civil
?war In Lebanon between supporters of pro-
Western President Camille Chamoun"- and
Nasser elements. United States Marines land
in Lebanon; Moscow threatens but does not
intervene. July: Iraqi officers led by Abdel
?ffEi
-1D-11-1nniarmLAr,,lett
?3.
Karim Kassem overthrow Hashemite king-
dom in Iraq, establish pro-Nasser republic.
British forces land in Jordan to protect King
Hussein. Soviet-U.A.R. agreements for con-
struction of Aswan High Dam.
1959 New Soviet aid accords with U.A.R.
American-U.A.R. relations improve; re-
sumption of United States aid.
19G1) Soviet,U.A.R. relations cooler, main-
'ly over suppression of Egyptian Commu-
nists. New Soviet policy of support to "na-
tional revolutionary regimes," even when
non-Communist.
1961 Breakup of United Arab Republic,
as Syrian Army officers lead successful
secession movement. Wide measures of
nationalization and socialization in Egypt.
1962 End of Algerian war for independ-
ence, after strong Egyptian help for Al-
gerians. Soviet aid to Algeria, formerly
channeled through Cairo, now goes direct.
September: President Nabser barks revolu-
tion in Yemen; Egyptian troops land there;
,Yemen civil war begins.
1963 March. Baath (Arab socialist) Party
seizes power in Syria. Unsuccessful talks
on tripartite unity of U.A.R., Syria and Iraq
In Cairo, on initiative of Iraqi and Syrian
Ba a thists.
1964 Soviet-U.A.R. relations at high point:.
visit of Premier Khrushchev to Egypt in
May. Moscow recognizes Egypt's "sepa-
rate path toward socialism." U.A.R. opposes
American policies in Vietnam, Congo.
1965 Arrests of both pro-Soviet and pro.
Chinese Communists and Moslem Brother-
hood in Egypt for plots against Nasser re-
gime. Discontent reported ? in Yemen ex-
peditionary force after many victories by
opposing royalist tribesmen. August: Presi-
dent Nasser agrees with King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia to end intervention in Yemen;
accord never applied. ?
MG May: Visit of Premier Alexei ,N.
Kosygin to Cairo. Soviet aid and support
continues. Soviet diplomacy' encourages
Cairo-Damascus rapprochement. Septem-
ber: Israel chief of staff reportedly
'threatens invasion of Syria to change re-
gime and halt Arab terrorism. November:
U.A.R.-Syria defense pact. Vice-President
Amer visits Moscow for military talkt. So-
viets renew wheat sales to U.A.R. as Amer-
ican easy-term food sales end.
1967 January Many visits by Soviet spe-
cialists in industry, electric power, petro-
leum, land reclamation. New projects
discussed.
,
February-March Increase of Arab ter-
rorist raids against Israel from Syrian and
Jordan territory. Foreign Minister Gromyko
visits Cairo, March 29-April 1.
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onAtAF04gtil:YOrt?ReielkS6 208108Plaidc CIA-RtyPtsrowhitepowono82-11fter riot-
ei. a. . ous demonstrations in Cairo and other Arab
May 9 UN Secretary-General says he is
unable to confirm from own sources Arab
and Soviet accounts of Israeli mobilization
against Syria.
May 14 Egyptian forces begin to move
into Sinai.
May. 16 Egyptian military command or-
ders UNEF troops out of Sinai and Gaza
border areas facing Israel: '
May 17 Marshal Amer issues alert or-
ders to Egyptian armed forces.
May 18 Cafro asks for total withdrawal
of UNEF. U Thant agrees to request.
May 21 Egypt calls up reserves. Presi-
dent Nasser tells Mr Force officers he will
blockade Gulf of Aqaba.
May 25 Cairo 'Radio says Arabs "firmly
resolved to wipe Israel off the map."
May 27 :Soviets proclaim "support for
just position of the U.A.R., Syria and the
other Arab states who are opposing im-
perialist pressure."
May 30 King Hussein flies to Cairo, signs
'defense pact with Nasser.
May 31 Soviet naval reinforcements be-
gin moving through Turkish Straits into
Mediterranean. Some sail toward Egypt.
U.S. Sixth Fleet moves.
June 3 United States asks Egypt not to
fire first: supports "territorial integrity of
all Middle East states."
? June 4 Soviets ask Egypt not to attack;
warn that Soviet military help is unlikely
unless big powers become involved. Presi."
dent Nasser agrees. Iraq joins U.A.R.-
Jordan defense pact.
June 5 Israeli Air Force strikes; destroys
Egyptian Air Foeed tul giuhil.faraall
arinor mbvtia intofflnsI, righting in Jerusa.
len,. Soviet Government statement accuses
Israel of aggression, demands halt in fight-
ing and withdrawal.
June ro9 F,gyptian defeat in Sinai. Jor-
danian Army crushed, accepts ceasefire.
President Nasser accepts cease fire; offers
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 May 1968
m s of
By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
capitals.
June 11 Soviets break diplomatic relit-
tions with Israel.
June 19 Premier Kosygin's UN speech
calls for Israeli withdrawal but does no:
question Israel's right to exist as a state.
. June 21 Soviet Communist 'Party's Cen-
tral Committee rejects Chinese charges that
Soviets betrayed Arabs.
June 21-24 Soviet President Poclgorny
visits Cairo with Marshal Zakharov, chief
of general staff. Large-scale Soviet replace-
ments of lost war material begin, on airlift
through Yugoslavia and Algeria to Cairo.
June 24-25 Johns.nn?Kosygin talks at
Glassboro. N.J.: Mr. Kosygin says no accord
on withdrawal of Israeli troops.
July 0 Soviet naval vessels begin visits
to Port Said, Alexandria.
July 13 Egyptian military delegation tp
Moscow.
July 15,Aug, 10 Many exchanges of visits
between cast Woo sad Arta)
Aug. 14 Yugoslav President Tito visits
Egypt, reportedly with Mideast peace plan.
Aug. 28 Sergei Vinogradov replacing
Dmitri Pojadiaev as Soviet ambassador to
Egypt.
Aug. 20-Sept. 1 Khartoum Arab summit
conference. End of anti-Western oil em-
bargoes. Acceptance of Nasser-Hussein plan
to seek political rather than military solu-
tion. Moscow shows approval despite Syrian
boycott; Algerian reservatiens.
Sept. 4 Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad
visits Moscow. Another Soviet.flotilla arrive
at Port Said.
Sept. 23, 27 Heavy artillery clashes along
Suez Canal: Severe damage and casualties
in Ismailia.
Oct. 4 Nonessential civilians being evae-
'uated from Suez Canal zone.
Oct. 20 Soviet-made missiles sink Israeli
destroyer Eilat.
Oct. 24 Israeli artillery destroys tw?
Suez oil refineries.
reform stir m
Beirut, Lebanon
President Nasser has embarked on a
sweeping program of reform in the United
Arab Republic.
If completed, it could bring more change
than Egyptians have known since their 1952
revolution.
A May 2 referendum vote of nearly 100
percent in his favor has strengthened Mr.
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5
Nasser's hand, Now he is committed to im-
plementing his "March 30" program.
Mr. Nasser announced this program in
a speech ? on March 30. He described it as
"new revolution." He told Egyptian' min-
isters at 'a Cabinet meeting in Cairo May 5
they must carry it out to meet the peo-
ple's expectations:
Mr. Nasser has presented the program
at home and abroad as a strengthening of
the home 'front against an ultimate new
confrontation with Israel.
' Careful observers of his policies think it
:?CIALIMER,781-0&16 14449g44
is also an effort to reboiicidinciierfe.
CPYRGHT
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ferts ultimately bring about some kind of
peace settlement with Israel. Egyptian pub-
lic opinion presently is poorly prepared for
this.
Since last June's defeat by Israel, Egyp-
flans have been steadily calling for change.
This came to a dramatic climax in Feb-
run ry.
Students and workers rioted in the streets'
of Cairo and other Egyptian cities. They,
'demanded an end to police and military:
rule, better job opportunities, public lib-
erties, academic freedom, and many other
`things.
,New constitution planned
In speeches before the May referendum,
Mr. Nasser" assured his people these things
would come. He also promised to rebuild
the nation's strength for the expected next
major test with Israel.
The March 30 program provides for re-
forms in the political structure and the civil
?service. Ultimately?once Israeli troops are
,o longer occupying the Sinai Peninsula?
,Egypt is to get a new constitution.
Military reform began almost immediate-
;ly after the defeat. Highest-ranking officers
rind many others, including members of the
once all-powerful secret police and intelli-
gence services, have gone on trial fer negli-
gence, corruption, and other charges.
Soviet advisers in Egypt are trying to
mold its armed forces, into an effective
fighting force.
The 'March no reforms begin in the Arab
Socialist Union (ASV), This is Egypt's rut-
hog pohil ieni orgenifetion and his only legal
one. Only its card-holding members?more
than seven million of them?voted in the
May 2 referendum.
Previously the ASU Was entirely state-
controlled. Its leaders and cadremen were
appointed by the government. Now they are
to be elected. The polling Ara II be supervised
by a speciol committee to be appointed by
President Nasser..
The ASU is to elect a 1,500-member na-
tional congress to review progress and map?
future moves. The congress will have a six-
year mandate:
Elections ordered
President Nasser May 9 ordered the new
ASU elections for the first week in June.
The national congress will hold its first
'meeting on July 23-16th anniversary of.
the 1952. revolution. .
` Its first task will be to elect a president of
the ASU, who' is expected to be President'
Nasser,-The president will head the central
commitee, to In elected by the congress,
and also an 11-man executive committee
selected from the central committee's
members.
Mr. Nasser, remembering repeated past,
failures of the ASU to show much dyna-,
mism, is rolling up his sleeves to take per-
sonal charge. He has set up an office in'
Cairo's ASU headquarters.
This is rather as though President John-
son or Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey
had taken personal charge of efforts to re-_
vamp the Democratic Party from top to toe.
? Unlike the American leaders, Mr. Nasser
faces many clandestine foes. They are de-
termined, though perhaps relatively small,
in numbers. One is the ultrareligious Mos-,
lem Brotherhood. There is also a faction of
pro-Chinese Communists who resent Mr.
Nasser's policies and object to Soviet infiu-e
ence. Other fringe, extremist groups want,
his overthrow.
Question of definition
Some of these joined the popular demon-
strations in February. There is no know
evidence that any has even a toehold in t'
armed forces. Without military support, they
stand no chance of toppling Mr. Nasser.
Cairo's Carefully read daily, Al Ahram,
reported May 6 that the ASU henceforth
will be open . to all Egyptians. This im-
plies that a long-delayed choice between a
"mass" and an "elite" party has been
made in favor of the former alternative.
Al Ahram also said that dear definitions
would be made of "workers" and "farm-
ers." Under Egypt's 1962 National Charter,
these two categories are entitled to 50 per-
cent of scats in the new 1,500-member ASU
National Congress. The Charter said work-
ers' and. farmers must make up half' the
membership of all "popular" ? organize-
'tons, including the National Assembly, or
parliament.
There were many0 complaints. Critical
editors and publicists asked how many
members of the Assembly are really
"workers" or, "farmers."
Mr. Nasser in a speech May 1 definect,
a farmer or peasant as "one who owns
no more than 10 lecithins (about 10 acres)."
Egypt's legal upward limit on land hold.'
Lags per individual is 100 feddans.
A farmer also must have farming as his
sole source of income, Mr. Nasser said, and
live in a rural area.
A worker is "one who works with his
hands or mind, and lives off the income
resulting from this work."
In a Western country, the "mind" cab.
gory might be taken to include a stock.
broker or investment banker. In Egypt, it
definitely does not:
? ,
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Disillusionment spreads ?
Since the June, 1967, defeat, profound dis-
illusionment has spread among the former
"revolutionaries" of 1052?the military man-
agerial class which collapsed as a political
force whcn the Israeli Army swept into
Sinai June 5.
The ASU is intended to provide a new
class of young leaders to replace the old
ones. But while its reorganization goes for!
? ward, political reform is beginning.
All of Egypt's 11 district governors are be..
Ing replaced. So are leading executives in
? the state-run companies. P .
Ex-Army officers appointed as district
governors or company directors during Mr.
Nasser's sweeping campaign of socializa-
tion in 1961 will be the first to go.
Judges, engineers; and others With tee'S-.
nical and professional qualifications are
likely td replace them?just as such men
were given leading Cabinet posts to replace
ex-officers earlier this year.
IZVESTIYA, Moscow
4 June 1968
ARAB POLITICAL REGIMES MUST BE STRENGTHENED
[Article by V. KudryavtseV: "The Smoldering Goals in the Near East")
An acquaintance with the current situation in the Near East leaves one with
the first impression that no great changes have taken place there. Israel occupic,;
captured territory as before, gradually appropriating it or securing it for itself:as
is being done, for example. in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem. On the cease-fire
especially along the Jordan River, the Israeli. militarists are provoking armed in-
cidents, keeping their Jordanian neighbors in a state of tension. The 22 November
resolution and the subsequent decision of the Security Council are being sabotaged bj',
the Israelis, who are frustrating G. Jarring's mission.
The tense situation in the Near East is evidence that in this region of the world the
coals of military danger which were kindled by imperalist aggression are still
smoideri.ng and at any time the fire could flare up if measures are not taken to at
least localize it.
But this is merely a first impression. .Processes are under way in the Near East which
are completely antithetical to those which Israel tried to evoke by its aggression
last year. klmAilano the situation which made the Israeli aggression on 5 June
successful is no longer pwsible.
If one is to, view the Near East situation in the light of the international situation,
one is able to assert that with the present balance of power which lies in progress'
favor, no imperialist action in the world can bring its aitthors any real success,
if one understands that temporary gains are discounted. Israel must draw conclusions
from the American aggression in Vietnam, making, of course, the necessary adjustment
for the scale of aggression and Israel's location in the world. American imperialism
now has occasion to give more thought to pulling out of the Vietnam swamp to avoid
undermining even further and to no avail the severely depleted prestige of a great
power. It would not harm the Israeli ruling circles to give serious thought to this.
The Israeli aggression Was not just dreamed up as an action calculated to "round off"
the frontiers by capturing part of the territory of neighboring countries, It was to
have frustrated those revolutionary processes which are taking place in the Near East.,
The
The main goal of the aggression was to overthrow the progressive regimes in Arab coun-\-.,
tries and to weaken generally the national liberation movement of the Arab 'peoples, in
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7
CPYRGHT
. order to secure the oil interests of the monopolies. Nothing came of this, as everyone
Fk13121/8-151giAloto4r
knows. The PregrAVOISAerdieRtei ft
tegkell".reiR1
had thought, while the liberation process continues with new strength. n e sour
of the Arabian Peninsula, the Pe ,ple's Reoublic of South, Yemen has already come into
being since the beginning of the Israeli aggression. After the withdrawal of,the UAR's
armed forces, the Monarchist forces did not achieve success in the Yemen. And although
the struggle took place under conditions which were very difficult for the republicans. 4 j
the forces of ,progress have already shown their viability. .
The failure of the UAN in the course of military aotion was provoked to a certain extent': ,
by domestic policy reasons. The most important of these, in our opinion, was the fact
that the social foundation of the Egyptian revolution no longer answered the purposes
and tasks which the CAR is pursuing in realizing radical socioeconomic transformations
A proportion of the participanta in the 1952 revolution whioh achieved, along with
the whole nation, the liquidation of foreign domination in Egypt, did not have in mihd:
going 00 far as to make socialist transformations in the country their task. The dev-
iation .of these people from the present goals of the revolution is supported by those
treaties which the reaction organized against the policy of President Jamal Abd
In this respect the Egyptian reaction objectively joined forces with the Israeli aggras
aors by acting against the IJAHls progressive regime.
One must give President Nasiris policy its due, for he has already been taking steps,
for more than a year to involve the popular masses in the administration of the state.
However, the measures undertaken before the commencement of the Israeli aggression
turned out to be inadequate. The people, used to thinking that the army solves all
matters, turned out to be on the sidelines during the aggression. At the same ,time,
the mass demonstrations of 9 ang 10 June last year in support of President Nasir's
policy showed that the people had matured politically and:ware demanding active par-
ticipation in the affairs of state.
Consequently, to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression, it is essential.
to stren then the olitical re iMe8 and ut them on a mass social footin
This is why these consequences can and must primarily 1), eliminated by political means?:
It in not fortuitous that Israel is trying all the time to provoke new military aotion,
because it can still reckon on some kind of success, :if only temporary. The prospect
of strengthening progressive regimes in Arab states is dangerous forIsrael, fer then
it would have to have dealings directly with the Arab peoples,
From all accounts this task is already fulfilled in the main, and the UAR Government,
under Nasir's leadership, has been able to undertake measures for developing the
country's progressive course. .The "30 March program," which was supported by the
:overwhelming majority of the people during the referendum on 2 May, envisages the
'radisol reconstruction of the administrative apparatus, at the center of which lies
7.3he reorganization of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), transforming it to all intents
and purposes int' the leading force of the state. The realization of' the reforms
which rare app.,,od in the referendum has begun and will insure the involvement of the
broad masses of the people in the administration of the. country.
e VAR':. example which is there for all Arab countries t6 see, shown that )iquida'.:ion
of Jenults of Israeli aggression depends basically on strengtheing the progressive-
nos, of alp regime and On its reliance on a broader social basis. It in not fortuitous
either that the ruling circles of Israel chose Jordan as the basic targe'.; of their
provocation, since they consider it to be the weakest link in the anti-ii.perialit front
of Arat countries.. nut even here, Tel Aviv has suffered disenchantment, Linea people
in Jordan ave begun to understand the perfidious policy of the imperialist powers
better and to ndopt a high regard for anti-imperialist Arab unity.
The failures of military provocation-can, of course, intensify in Iarael the desire
to create a-certain "Israeli-Palestinian federation" or some other sort cf group which
would help Israel to tee root in the economy of Arab countries. Such a turn of events
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CPYRGH
is all the more likely, for during the year since the commencement of aggress!on, the
isolation sf Israel in the world arena has increased significantly. Even those
EUroppan circles which 'initially believed the cries of Tel Aviv propaganda about the
"Arab threat" to the existence of Israel and to the effect that Israel, by its
actions, was defending the safety of its frontiers are convinced of the Israeli
ruling circles' aggressiveness.
Israel's isolation will increase, not diminish, The fact is that Israel is needed by
the imperialist countries, particularly the United States, as a base for aggression in
the Near East and as a counterpose to the Arab countries -so that the oil monopolies
can plunder the riches of these countries. While Israel and the Arab countries remain
hostile to each other the United States can count on the role of the third, the winning
side.
However, people in the United States would not at all want to spoil relations with the
Arab world because of local Israeli interests and would not want to lose valuable
ranra in the Near East. Israel is valuable to the United States as a cudgel against
t'ae Arab national liberation movement. Israeli pretensions to establishing political
econonJ.: 1:esemony in the Near East have been greeted in the United States without
special .;atL.,faction. Taking into account the possible development of events in the
Near East and also public opinion in the capitalist countries, .the United States,
although only in words, was still forced to condemn the Israeli ruling circles when
they went to extremes, such as happened on 2 May 1963 in Jerusalem. Washington had to
consider feeling in the Catholic circles of the United States and Western Europe and
also in the Moslem world, which had been provoked by the unpardonable actions of the
Israeli invaders in Jerusalem, which is a sacred place not just for the adherents of
Judaism
Time is working against the Israeli aggressors in the Changes, at present little
noticed and gradual, but nevertheless very important, that are taking place in th,?
Arab East. By refusing to begin implementing the UN decision Which recommends a
political settlement of the.Near East crisis and the unconditional withdrawal of
.occupying forces from captured Arab territory, Israel is only sinking deeper
into the mire which it created by the June aggression. Incidentally, some
Israeli political figures arc beginning to understand this. Although in the
course of recent stormy debates. in the Israeli Government the supporters of the
"harsh line" have won, nevertheless it has become clear that it is growing
more difficult to keep to this line. There are people in the country who consider
that the challenge which Israel is yoking to the United Nations is bringing
them harm, and that Israel's foreign policy must be more realistie.
The Arab countries have done much to insure the success of G. Jarrings; mission
and to realize the Security Council's decision of 22 November of last year.
Their wise stand throws even deeper into the shade the aggression by Israel, whose
ruling circles continue to conduct the country along a suicidal path
The Soviet Union thoroughly supports the Arab countries; readiness to liquidate
th,- consequences of the aggression by political means. TN.& is the only sensine
way which will lead toward normalization of the Near East situation,
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9
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