PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 19, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(21 May to 19 June 1968)
1. Czechoslovakia
a. Soviet/Czech Mutual Interest vs. Mutual Irritation
For the most part, observers of the Czechoslovak scene have noted
that the past month has witnessed a disposition of prbpagandists,of the
Soviet Union and East Germany on the one hand and the news commentators
and writers in Czechoslovakia on the other to emphasize their mutuality
of interests andninimize the frictions between Czechoslovakia and the
rest of the Soviet Bloc. This is even more true on the part of the po-
litical leaders of each side, as the many professions of mutual under-
stading and confidence testify. Apart from the fitful flare-ups of
polemics on either side, the most serious discordant note was Pravda com-
mentator Konstantinov's passing mention of a key member of the Dubcek
regime, Cestmir Cisar, as an example of modern revisionism for Cisar's
alleged disparagement of Leninism as a universal doctrine. The attack
was a unique example of Soviet media directly attacking a current Czech
leader by name and was, moreover, gratuitious in that Konstantinov seems
to have distorted Cisar's words and intent in the process. It remains
to be seen whether this is, as some Czech journalists speculate, a renewal
of the polemical battle with even more ominous purposes than: heretofore.
b. Czech Press Freedom
In a month of seeming reconciliation between the nervous Russians
and East Germans with the centrist Dubcek leadership, the main bone of
contentions remained the uncensored press and other information media in
Czechoslovakia. With amazing indiscretion it still raised issues that
might throw in doubt, in the minds of many Soviets and East Germans the
Dubcek regime's ability to control subversive tendencies in Czechoslovakia
(i.e., threats to Czechoslovak Communist Party [CzCP] dominance and con-
trol). Cisar in fact cautioned the press to exercise self-restraipt in
reporting and commentary on sensitive matters, while later reiterating
that censorship would not be reimposed. This latter promise may have
been inspired by the recollection that press criticism was a major factor
in the deposition of conservative leader Novotny and a realization that
until the battle against the conservatives is decisively won the Dubcek
leadership depends on the support of the liberal-minded news media.
c. Victory over Conservatives
The conservative Communists are led by former President Novotny and
comprise some 4+0 members of the 110-member CzCP Central Committee. The
Central Committee Plenum (29 May to 1 June) was a major test of strength
between Dubcek and the conservatives. Among the issues were the future
status of Novotny and the early convening of a Party Congress (favored
by the liberals and opposed by the conservatives). The Plenum decided
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to deprive Novotny of hip seat on the Central Committee, and, in addi-
tion, to suspend his Party membership along with those of six other prom-
inent Communists, all apparently conservatives. A further victory over
the conservatives was the approval for convening a Congress in September,
at which a continuation of the attack on the conservatives is expected.
Some observers believed that the Soviets, if not intent on preserving in-
tact the conservative voice in the CzCP, would at least consider a con-
servative setback at the Plenum as an additional sign of the unreliabil-
ity of the Dubcek regime. Thus far, however, there has been no unequivo-
cal expression of Soviet disapproval of the purge of Novotny and the
other conservatives, which Soviet media reported promptly, briefly, and
without comment. It may be that the Soviets decided that the situation
called for maximum discretion.
d. Discouragement of Independent Political Parties
A major potential threat to the Dubcek regime was the mushrooming
of political and quasi-political movements which, in the wave of hope and
optimism engendered by the accession to power of Dubcek and the promulga-
tion of his liberalizing Action Program, strove for recognition as politi-
cal entities independent of the CzCP and of the rubber stamp parties con-
trolled by it in the National Front. During the past month the regime
served formal notice (apparently docilely accepted) that these incipient
:independent organizations were impermissible on the Czechoslovak scene.
On i6 May, Rude Pravo, the official organ of the CzCP, warned that such
movements -- in the form of clubs or other similar organizations -- could
not be legally fo1med or become active without prior approval by the
Interior Ministry. Shortly thereafter one such group (the Club of En-
gaged Non-Party Members) cancelled its meeting and another group was
prevented from carrying out a previously planned meeting. It does not
seem likely that such independent political organizations will gain ap-
proval from the Dubcek regime in'the future. Even moe recent (mid-June)
discussions of the National Front and the condemnation of proponents of
independent parties, such as Ivan Svitak,tend to confirm this view.
e. The Military Maneuvers
Though Soviet and Czech leaders have gone to great lengths to assure
the Czech public and the world at large that the military maneuvers on
Czech territory are a normal, planned, routine, innocuous exercise, there
can belittle doubt that, intended or not, it is a form of insurance that
any effort to overthrow the CzCP will not succeed. At the same time,
these maneuvers, coupled with the sporadic Soviet attacks on Czech publi-
cists, are a measure of the continuing concern, objectively warranted or
not, of the Soviet regime. And despite the leveling off of nervous reac-
tions, Soviet unqualified acceptance of the Czech Action Program of lib-
eralization and democratization is still in suspense.
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2. Extension of the Revolutionary Committee System in Communist China
The revolutionary committees are a device for administering provinces
since Mao's Red Guard and the Cultural Revolution destroyed the normal
processes for governing. They are composed of representatives of three
elements: the army, the Communist Party, and the Red Guard.
The establishment of a revolutionary committee in Szechwan Province
-- consisting of 70 million inhabitants and occupying a very important
strategic area -- was hailed in a Peking New China News Agency broadcast
on. 1 June 1968 as "a great victory for Chairman Mao's ... great proletar-
ian cultural revolution" and as signaling "the complete bankruptcy of
the criminal scheme of China's Khrushchev [President Liu Shao-chi], the
others in the handful of top capitalist-roaders in the Party, and their
agents to restore capitalism in Southwest China and Szechwan Province."
Szechwan is bigger than France in size and almost equal to East and
West Germany in population and is one of China's richest and most popu-
lous provinces. Bitter struggles have taken place in this region between
anti-and pro-Mao elements for the past two years. Even artillery and
anti-aircraft guns were reportedly used throughout last year during the
renewed outbreak of factional fighting. Since squabbling continued for
over a year even among members of a military team appointed by Peking to
form the revolutionary committee, some observers find it hard to consider
the establishment of Szechwan revolutionary committee as a "victory."
This new committee is the supreme body responsible for handling the af-
fairs of the region, which were previously handled by the Communist Party
Committee and local administrative offices.
Only five of Communist China's 26 provinces and autonomous regions
are still without such committees. They are Fukien, Yunan, Tibet, Sink-
iang and Kwangsi, Failure thus to establish revolutionary committees in
these provinces is reportedly considered pardonable because they are on
a "war footing." They border Russia, India, Burma, Laos, and North Viet-
nam or face Formosa. Szechwan was the last province in "peaceful" China to
create a revolutionary committee.
3. Chinese Communist Support of Insurgent Movements in Northeast India
Despite preoccupation with vast internal problems, Red China finds
time and energy to export revolution. In early June 1968, India report-
edly sealed its Nagaland border with Burma to prevent Naga rebel "na-
tionalists" -- armed, guerrilla-trained, guided and encouraged by Red
China -- from returning to resume their fight for the "national independ-
ence" of Nagaland and thus break the uneasy cease-fire so tortuously
negotiated in September 1963 that halted their eight-year war with India.
(The cease-fire is due to expire July 1st unless re-extended.) This pre-
ventive action was taken by the Indian government as a result of bloody
Indo-Burmese border clashes in May which resulted in the death of some
Indian troops and about 200 Naga rebels trying to return from China, the
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capture of 24 rebels, and the seizure of large quantities of Chinese arms,
ammunition and documents which, officials said, gave conclusive evidence
of Naga links with China.
The seriousness of Red Chinese subversive influence and designs on
Nagaland cannot be taken lightly. A Hindustan Times correspondent who
visited Nagaland in April (this area has been barred to foreign corres-
pondents for the past 8 years) and talked with the leaders and people was
privately told by a "political thinker" in the rebels' underground "par-
allel" government that the "political initiative and military direction
of a Cuban type revolution in the offing in Nagaland have passed to Peking
... that the solution of the Naga problem, is no longer in our hands,"
Coordination between China and the Naga rebels has greatly improved since
the first group of Naga rebels marched to China, via Burma, in January
1967 to enlist active Red Chinese support for their fight for "national
independence" and were told that "training a guerrilla force was not
enough," that the underground Naga political leadership must establish
direct contact with Peking and must send its "political representative"
there. This was evident when the second group of Naga rebels that left
for China in January 1968 found truck convoys waiting for them in northern
Burma. Over 1,000 Nagas are now reported to be in China -- receiving
guerrilla training, arms and indoctrination -- and are not expected to
return until the last quarter of 1968.
(Nagaland consists of 6300 square miles of dense forest and steep
hills, populated by 400,000 nature-worshipping animists, about three-
fifths of whom are today converted Christian Baptists and only about one-
fifth of whom can read and write. There 16 Naga tribes which set aside
their ancient feuds and formed a council seeking a more independent
status. They live in 800 Naga villages under a dual government -- the
official, elected regime, and the undergound nationalist one.)
Indian security forces, concerned as well about the growing evidence
of Red Chinese training and equipping of rebels from the Mizo Hills and
Manipur -- in northeastern India's remote hill country which adjoins
Nagaland, borders Burma and lies close to East Pakistan -- have also in-
tensified their security patrols in these border areas to prevent further
Chinese subversion there as well as to prevent further raiding and plund-
ering of the Union territory of Tripura by these rebels.
In late April 1968, the Government claimed a sudden outburst of hos-
tility in the Mizo Hills involved heavy casualties on both sides and it
confirmed officially that some of the weapons used by those indulging in
subversive activities in the Mizo Hills, Nagaland and Manipur are of Chi-
nese origin. About the same time, another report claimed that groups of
Mizo rebels, trained and equipped by the Chinese, entered the Mizo Hills
from, the Chittagong Hill tracts in East Pakistan and that Red China had
shipped weapons to Chittagong camps in East Pakistan to arm and train
Mizo rebels. Still another late April Indian Government report warned
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that India may have to resort to military operations to deal with increas-
ing instability in the remote hill areas of northeast India -- in Assam,
Manipur and Nagaland -- and added that "Mizos have also gone to China and
continue to conduct guerrilla operations" from there.
(The 300,000 members of the Mizo tribes, 90% of whom profess to be
Christian and nearly half of whom are literate, live in the Mizo Hills
-- in the southern finger of Assam state on India's northeast border with
Burma. Only about one-third of the Mizos are reportedly securely under
government control. Since 28 February 1966, the 7,000 square miles of
the Mizo Hills have been aflame with rebellion.)
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 FOR BAC4KURO Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000300~3u0~-y 1968
Ho Chi Minh's Domestic Problems and the Vietnam War
No war can be fought without problems, and the problems engendered
by war are never peculiar to one side. The world press has concentrated
so heavily on those with which the Allies must contend, however, that it
has been difficult to bring Hanoi's difficulties into the limelight. Like
anyone else, He Chi Minh has his troubles, both military and political,
and they are grave. Indications of those problems are not as readily
apparent to the free world as those of the Allies are to the Communist
world, but Hanoi's troubles are gradually being catalogued -- in captured
documents, in casualty lists, in the growing importance of defectors and
number of prisoners of war, in cullings from her press and radio. The
following are only a few of Hanoi's problems, but knowledge of a portion
of them makes it possible to deduce others now and is assurance that other
problems will gradually bob to the surface.
War weariness must be deduced for the most part, but it must inevi-
tably be part of the dreary life in North Vietnam -- for her people, her
leaders and possibly even her military establishment. Movies and eye-
witness accounts attest to the discomfort of life under regular air at-
tack, but life is undoubtedly uncomfortable also as a result of food and
consumer goods shortages. Resentment must be growing when those who can
afford to patronize the black market manage to feed and clothe themselves
with relative ease, and resentment -- even active disobedience to party
authority -- has actually been reflected in Hanoi's recent anti-subversion
law (see attachments). Water supply problems chronically plague North
Vietnam (Hanoi's propagandists, ignoring the fact that damage to reservoirs,
and other facilities is an annual phenomenon during the rainy season,
blame it on deliberate U.S. air attacks against water installations).
Housing shortages are also a problem as are the absence of hygiene, the
scarcity of medicine and medical aid, the separation of families, the loss
of Vietnam's young men -- all the ugly accompaniments of life for a people
whose country is waging war. It would be interesting to learn what those
who have and are undergoing these privations feel about He Chi Minh's
avowed intent to extend the war for 10, 15 or 20 years if necessary.
The dismal state of North Vietnamese agriculture is a major problem
for the country. For several rice harvests years have fallen seriously
below the four and one-half million ton averages of the early 1960's
partly as a result of bad weather, partly from mismanagement, partly from
the necessity to shift men and materiel from agriculture into more direct
support of the war effort. The diet of the general population has been
maintained at a bare minimum and even this has been accomplished only by
imports of rice, wheat, flour and other foodstuffs from Communist China
and the Soviet Bloc; imports have 'been massive they will unquestionably be
higher yet in 1968.
A third problem directly related to both of the above is the diffi-
cult and increasingly dangerous task of infiltrating more troops and
supplies from North Vietnam into the South -- North Vietnam could, in
fact, be viewed as a combination funnel and arsenal, which is permitted
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to consume only the minimum essentials while processing and transporting
to the South whatever is needed for the conduct of operations there. The
North Vietnamese people have apparently accepted this role -- as they do
living with a war -- without enthusiasm or much resistance. Although U.S.
bombing is today limited almost entirely to interdiction of the infiltra-
tion routes in the panhandle, the massive repairs to be made further
north and the task of maintaining and repairing the full lines of commu-
nication require more than 200,000 full-time workers and several hundred
thousand more part-time workers.
Manpower requirements, as represented only in small part by the 200,000
workers needed for the infiltration routes, are a burgeoning problem for
North Vietnam. Workers are needed with ever increasing urgency in trans-
portation, agriculture, communications, engineering and labor battalions,
industry, domestic defense and in North Vietnam's Armed forces (see at-
tachments for details). One of the means Hanoi is using to alleviate her
manpower requirements has recently been revealed in the assignment to
North Vietnam of 40-50,000 Chinese in engineering, labor and railway bat-
talions. This partial "solution" to the manpower problem may well create
an even more serious problem. The Chinese comprise a difficult-to-
assimilate part of the population and a potential menace for the future
(as they were in North Vietnam after World War II or in North Korea after
the fighting ended there in 1953). Many thousands of Chinese technicians
and laborers arrived during the past three years at Hanoi's request to
keep supplies moving, to build war-related facilities and to help cope
with the bomb damage; their political activities in giving the North Viet-
namese people daily lessons in the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung were their
own idea.
North Vietnamese geographic and economic dependence on China and the
Bloc is a virtually insoluble problem. North Vietnam's dependence upon
the Soviet Union and the Bloc for vast quantities of military supplies
and Peking's rift with Moscow further complicate Hanoi's efforts to steer
a careful course between the two Communist giants while attempting to
extract the maximum concessions from each with the minimum of repayment
or other commitments. The emphasis, in fact, has been on grant aid rather
than credits, since it is unrealistic to expect a poor country, and one
whose exports and foreign currency holdings are near the zero mark, to
repay the vast debts Hanoi is incurring in this war.
Peking's negative attitude regarding peace negotiations undoubtedly
exacerbates any friction which exists in the Lao Dong Politburo between
the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions as well as between the Politburo's
hawks and doves. It is difficult to see. how a country or people whose
armed forces are sustaining such heavy casualties could continue to view
warmly Peking's oft-repeated "suggestions" that the North Vietnamese
foreswear peace talks and confine themselves to military action, concen-
trate on battlefield victories and absorb the inevitable military losses.
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North Vietnamese casualties (as well as those of the Viet Cong) have
been frightful. Since January 1961, the number of enemy dead has been
over 360,000. Forty thousand of these deaths are estimated to have oc-
curred during the Tet offensive. (However, there are close to 350,000
men in the armed forces still in North Vietnam and Hanoi's militia and
security forces are at least that size. Out of a population of 18 mil-
lion, North Vietnam has nearly three million males between the ages of
17 and 35; and additional 200,000 males reach the age of 17 each year,
more than half of whom are fit for military service.)
Declining troop morale in the North Vietnamese Army is illustrated
by the increasing number of high-level defectors from the NVA as well as
a greater number of unit surrenders. The comments of these men in press
conferences, interviews, prisoner interrogations, etc., have vividly re-
vealed that life in the NVA is sometimes hungary, frequently depressing
and always hazardous (.:>ce cornmi3nts, of Lt. Colonel Dung and ot]-~er ,, a,ttticl c d) .
'ihc above points do not cover all of hanoi_'s prob.Lecn; others arc
referred to in the attached articles. While this evidence should not be
misinterpreted as meaning that North Vietnam will collapse in the near
future, it does effectively illustrate the terrible price Hanoi is pay-
ing in continuing the war ... a price that she has been at pains to con-
ceal.
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July 1968
Assessment of North Vietnam. Media:
Indications of Increasing Morale Problems in North Vietnam
(as of December 1966)
An article in the Hanoi Army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan of 1 November
revealed the North Vietnamese regime's fears about army morale. Written
by one Trung Cong, the article amounted to a warning to the Party to step
up ideological education before "rightist'," i.e. defeatist, thoughts ir-
remediably affected the army's fighting spirit.
In its theme of the conflict between "proletarian" and "non-prole-
tarian" thoughts, the article defined the latter as "rightist, negative
and individualistic thoughts when faced with new ordeals`." These were
said to take shape and develop if the "ideological task is not carried
out constantly'..` There were army units which had to struggle against
these negative thoughts because "the battleground of proletarian ideol-
ogy in these units is steadily consolidated every day'." Faced with hard-
ship and "temporary, partial losses," a number of soldiers were failing
to entertain "correct views and thoughts." Only a "thorough education"
could bring soldiers' thoughts into line with the Party's views, and a
careful check: should be kept on "the trend of the development of thought."
The article implied that the ideological leadership had failed in
its "central task" of "ensuring that everyone has a steadfast anti-U.S.
national salvation determination." It criticized the leadership for
lacking "an objective and scientific method of study as well as a firm
mass outlook." This had resulted in a failure to understand "the mind
of the masses."
Although it was hinted that "passive phenomena," (i.e. a war weari-
ness) had arisen after fierce battles, the article claimed that "suffer;.-
ing losses and making sacrifices do not mean that we are not winning".
If this thought was borne in mind, Trung Cong concluded, "we will always
be optimistic, confident and resolute."
Problems of morale are on the increase generally in North Vietnam.
It is clear that there is a strong body of opinion critical of the Hanoi
regime's aggressive policy which has exposed the North to US-South Viet-
namese bombing raids. The people who hold these views are certainly in
the leadership, as well as in the army and among the civilian population.
Evidence that they are in the leadership, possibly at a high level,
is to be found: in an article by Hoang Qtloc Viet in the July issue of the
party periodical, Hoc Tap.
Viet, one of the most influential members of the Communist (Lao Dong)
party leadership, who is believed to favor China's hard line, was much
concerned about the "new workers" who were becoming "very easily perplexed
when faced with difficulties and hardships'.'.' He considered that it had
become an "extremely urgent problem" to struggle resolutely against."
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"pacifist ideas." It had to be admitted, the article said, that "a number
of our comrades have lacked a correct view of the working class in con-
solidating and safeguarding the north and liberating the south. As a
result, certain front policies have not been strictly carried out."
As these "comrades" were in a position to prevent the implementation
of front policies, it can be assumed that they hold important Party or
Government posts.
On 8 October Hanoi Radio also admitted that in the present situation
"many of our people are worried" and it was likely that "their worries
might affect their struggle spirit." Some people, the broadcast said,
had thought that "we should be a little bit more yielding and flexible
in order to avoid bloodshed and killing. They believe that the use of
diplomatic skill may sometimes spare sacrifices." However, "For our part
we think otherwise ... we are deeply aware that independence and freedom
cannot be achieved through negotiations and talks but only through the
shedding of our blood."
The problems resulting from loss of morale have led to a general
tightening up of security and consequently to increased emphasis on the
role of the security forces. President Ho Chi Minh spoke to the North
Vietnamese People's Security Forces Emulation Conference (broadcast on
22 October) urging security officers and men to "perfect their organiza-
tion" and "strive to improve revolutionary morality." They should be
"sincerely united, must completely eliminate individualism, must thorough-
ly correct arrogant bureaucratic and overbearing manners, and must es-
tablish very good relations between the security forces and the people."
One of their principal tasks was to "deepen their hatred for the U.S. ag-
gressors."
The Party daily Nhan Dan, in an editorial on 22 October, stressed that
the security forces had been ordered to "check in time and suppress all
pilots of the reactionaries in order satisfactorily to protect our leading
organs and armed forces..."
An editorial on 27 November in Quan Doi Nhan Dan emphasized the need
to review regularly the rules governing "the preservation of secrets and
the prevention of enemy penetration in the units of the people's armed
forces, in the public authorities, schools and co-operatives" and to sup-
plement them when necessary. Security methods should be integrated "into
the firm pattern of our daily life." It was essential to "react skilfully
to all events as they occur, not letting them affect other localities
"Backward elements" must be reformed; "reactionary elements" should be
suppressed.
Combined with these warnings and exhortations to vigilance are attacks
on American "deceitful propaganda." The editorial warned that the United
States used "material means to buy up certain elements along with spread-
ing false rumors and putting forward hypocritical sugar-coated arguments
which had "the dark aim of paralyzing our army's and people's vigilance
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 PYRGH
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(Independent Melbourne weekly journal)
July 1968
PIER IX
IT IS SIMPLY not true, as we are tclld so often, that this
is an "unwinnable war", a "bottomless pit".
At the present time it is widely battles and they are being duly mas-
thought that the United states and its sacred. The North Vietnamese Inter-
allies have gained a m(lltary superi pretation may have bgren right twelve
ority In Viet Nam and that, as long as months ago - it seems to be com-
the United States remains firmly com- pletely wrong at the present time.
mitted, the Vietcong cannot achieve There appears to be littIO doubt that
a military victory. In fact, if it they should still be conducting small.
wanted to, the United States could sonic, guerrilla operations fphnse`+
practically wipe North Viet Nam off and two of Mao's strategy) rrtt it;c
the map in a matter of hours. it than engaging in largo-scaly battles
should be commended for the restraint (somewhere between phases two and.
it has shown. throe).
It seems that the old theory that it Balance has swuli,g
required a manpower ratio of at least It is possible, one must suppose,
10 guerrilla r 12 to r to successfully counter that the guerrillas could return to the
rendered warfare has s been en largely obsolete in phases of conflict. But even
Introduction of new n Viet techniques Nam by by the the If they did it must be doubtful
Introduction
United States, the most important whether this would be of any great
of them being the slow-moving troop advantage as the upper hand In terms
carrier, the parachute, chemical defoli- of that critical factor of mobility
ators, and particularly the helicopter within the confines of South Viet
which has given the counter-guerrilla Nam would remain with the United
forces a previously unknown degree States forces. It must be emphasised
of mobility. that the military balance, even In
such refined aspects, has altered corn
Military victory siderably over the last twelve months
or so.
As was pointed out in the chapter Having said that, North Viet Nam
on Revolutionary Guerrilla warfare, now appears to face four alternatives,
the first essential in counter-guerrilla excluding, of course, withdrawal. It
operations is This to have the do. may call in a major power such as
There are number f e t for to o h this is Russia or China; it may move lot
but b are a the mst of reasons important is that negotiations and attempt to gain at
but t y far thhe most conference table what it is losing
holy io ell. in the field (with reasonable chances
e In terms b have of gained lity li through superiority
c mobility words have of succeeding); it may broaden the
Cam-
akeor. In from the wguerrilla w we e have largely war Westwards across Laos and Cam-
printipal assets his into Thailand, where the neccs?
principal . two and of e eis Time. sary spadework has already been
seen what was said bpaaut greatly earlier, it can n be done; or it may do none of these
seen reat this contributes
the e r-st t to things but continue on as at present
the baking down of pinning Its hopes to outlasting the
firth re of the Vietcong apparatus. auiupsr-st. United States or to a favourable turd
Other important factors contributing in the South Vietnamese political
to the same end are, firstly the im? situation,
mense air power of the United States, S114rkirfs~ showdown
particularly evident In its 1352 bombing
raids, which are destroying the Viet. The first seems highly unlikely as
cong's underground network, and com neither Russia nor China would look
pletely demoralising many of the North with favour ' upon the prospect of
Vietnamese conscript guerrillas enter- coming into direct conflict with the
Ing the South and secondly, the fact United States. The second also
that North Vietnamese guerrillas are appears unlikely at the moment.
j now actually controlling the Viet. ilanoi let a golden opportunity to
cong's day-today operations in the negotiate from a reasonably sound
field. The problem for the Vietcong bargaining position pass it by last
with the latter is that the North Viet- January during the U.S, "peace offen?
namese consider the war to be in. tt sive". Decisions of this kind depend
different and more advanced phase very largely on the balance of power
than do the South Vietnamese who in the Lao Dent, Politburo and so
have a far better understanding of prediction is difficult. The third
the cotuttr and the present situation. course of action seems to be a real
ApproweidltFwth 64"SM 47 l lA-RDP7&6k3 6ilAOO01400 i?0iS0?,4?rnativa
Vietcong into fighting large scale has the advantage o being the
 CPYRGH
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decided disadvantage of not leading
to victory, at least militarily. Again,
any decision to deviate from the pre.
sent course of action may depend
on ` the power structure within the
Lao Dong.
The most plausible alternative
course of action to that presently
being pursued appears, therefore, to
be a widening of the area of conflict.
It. is reasonable. to expect that the
guerrillas, may nit^mpt to retrieve
undisputed superiority in terms of
Spare and Time by extending the
war into Thailand, if this is at all
possible, and that largely depends on
their resources and morale. Should
North Viet Nam win in the South it
will, of course, not have any great
support of South Viet Nam, such as
Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.,
Britain and Korea. In this field, the
battle Is being carried on by world
Communist organisations through the
manipulation of the press, radio, clergy,
peace fronts, trade unions, political
parties, intellectuals and bodies such
as "Viet Nam Day Committees". "Save
Our Sons" organisations with the
ultimate objective of bringing sufficient
world-wide pressure on the United
States Government to undermine its
will to continue and 'to persuade it
to leave Viet Nam and the Indo..
Chinese region or at least reduce its
commitment there.
problems in either of these respects. Whilst at the present time, the Com.
munists appear generally to be also
Breaking morale losing this aspect of the battle, no one
can be certain of its eventual out.
The most effective way of counter. come as the military conflict is likely
log this possibility Is to do all in our to continue in one form or another
power to undermine the guerrillas' for some years, during which cur-
morale, will and resources In the rently unforseen circumstances might
broadest sense of the term. For thissuddenly affect the political battle both
more intensive bombing of North Viet In Viet Nam and abroad, consequently
Nam may or may not be necessary. deciding the final outcome of the
What is necessary Is effective posltivewhole war.
action and preparatory counter. guer?
rilla operations in Thailand in order War can be won
to reduce the susceptibility of the
peasants to guerrilla exploitation and
that South Viet Nam, the United
States, Thailand and their allies stand,
firm and unyielding and clearly show
themselves as such.
Overall, there is little doubt that the
war can be won. Whether it is won
will depend very largely on the degree
of understanding shown by the United
States and its allies of the internal
Vietnamese political and social situ.
DAILY Ni':ws
War's Biggest Surrender:
Half 14. 'refs --
SAIGON, June 18 (UlP11- A company of cammu.
)ni.q troops laid down their arms and held up their
bands in Saigon toay in the largest mass surren-
der of the Vietnam War.
U. S. and South Vietnamese military spokesmen
said about half the 121 guerillas who su rendenid
were North Vietnamese, usually the toughcsl_of
the cammutist Troops.
They gave. up three miles northeast of down-
town Saigon after being hunto in house-to-house
fighting by South Vietnamese Marines who had
killed at least 60 of their comrades the past two
days.
"This is quite encouraging. We're happy to see
them turn themselves in this way rather than at
the cost of a number of our men," said Capt.
Charles Bentley, 28, of Richmond, Va., a U. S.
-adviser to the Marines.
Allied officials said the previous record surren-
der was 108 North Vietnatneso,who gave up to
U. S,. Army paratrooopers theree, months, ago
near the city of Hue, 380 miles north.
This conflict will be decided by the action and upon the firmness of their
battle of willpower as much as any. resolution to prevent further Com.
thing else. The military conflict In the munist expansion in Indo-China, with
field is only one part, although a the realisation that the fall of South
major part, of the whole war. The Viet Nam would in all probability be
ether aspect, which could be the decid. a prelude to the fall of South-East
log factor, irrespective of the military Asia, if not all Asia; to the destruction
situntion Is the political Batt,., of the freedom and welfare of the
being fought on two levels. Firstly, peoples of these countries and their
in Saigon and other important South slow, but steady, progress towards
Vietnamese urban areas where the Viet- democracy; to a major change in the
conk and its agents aim at arousing world balance of power; and to the
the maximum amount of discontent, isolation and probably the eventual
chaos and disorder, through the ox- capitulation of Australia.
ploitation of grievances, real or other- If it is won, a major stop will have
wise, in hope of a Government ,it least been taken towards the preservation of
neutralist in outlook coming to power world peace. The people of South
which would tell the United States and Viet Nam will be able to return to a
its ntlies to leave and allow the Viet. more normal mode of living and to
nanwese to settle their own problems the task of economically developing
"in peace" by coming to some form their country which in the mid-fifties
of occoruinodal ion with the Vietcong. of ir the counfastest carates pable of of growth in Secondly, it is being fought in a nun-
shadow of Red China hanging
over the "official conversa-
tions" between the United
States and the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam in Paris.
Approved FofN1691Q0WY0861 Ytlt:cCI.4
diplomatic assault course with
JAPAN TIMES
14 May 1968
i-
e- s From Europe talks, the only Chinese Cnrn.
munist pressman, the corre?
Peking Pressure in Peace Talks spondent of the New China
BY MA 1id71tU KTKUC1jj n? a.n Y obsta- News Agency, left for "a vaca.
-nuuence over tu". for Home.
Hanoi seems to On the other hand, Chinese;
be the most Ambassador Huang Chen, who
dlfricult one, has been home for "reed
uea-
With hun. lion" b t e? Iced Guards, is
-RDP7 JrOWIBdfA(36#)40fl613Q(i Alt back to Parts,
e gn pressmen He will no'ctoubt try to bring
coming t o strong pressure to bear on the
Paris for the I Hanoi delegatlon.
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030030-3
and undermining our will to fight'. Ho Chi Minh, in his speech to the
People's Security Forces' Emulation Conference, warned against an inten-
sification of intelligence and espionage activities by the enemy, who was
said to be attempting to "encourage and entice the reactionary elements
in the North to his side in order to oppose and sabotage the revolution."
By thus laying the blame for the opposition to the regime on the
shoulders of the United States, it is clearly hoped to direct the wide-
spread disaffection into anti-American channels and away from the Party
and Government.
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Observers believe that theI
Chinese are opposed to any
compromise solution. They
believe that the Russians,
support settlement of the
Vietnam problem through
some compromise because
they want a detente and are
now too busy in Eastern Eu-
rope. -_
Some observers believe that
there might he some oppor-
tunity for Washington to
reach agreement with Hanoi
despite Chinese opposition.
However, French sources said
that the chances seem slim
that North Vietnam will
climb down from the Mos
cow-Peking tightrope through
which it has hitherto mane
aged to preserve its indepcn:
dence. This is because, it
they reached an agreement.
it would mean that Hanoi
had chosen Washington and
Moscow rather than Peking..
On the other hand, if Hanoi
gives way to pressure from
Peking,. it would lose Its pres.
ent independence. In this
situation, the Chinese are ex-
pected to take every oppor?
tunity of complicating the
Paris talks. ,
Apart' from the Chinese
pressure and I-Ianoi's dlmcult
position', the negotiating time.
table is likely to be linked
with the American presiden-
tial election schedule. This
would obviously suit the pur-
poses of President Lyndon D.
.Johnson and Vice President;
Hubert Humphrey. At thel
same time, Hanoi would usel
the American, convention'
deadline as a lever to extract:
concessions from Washington:
JERUSALEM POST
1 March 1968
Vietnam: The story
one Hanoi sold ter
whO surrendered
By MARK YRANKI,AN D
SAIGON (Ofns). ---
riIHE Vietnam war has reached a stage
where statistics have taken the reality
out of suffering. In the past few weeks,
thousands of men have been killed, tens
of thousands wounded, There are hundreds
of thousands of refugees. As the figures
rattle off the typewriter you may just
hrwo it1ine to t
its quality
quantity of the suffering, uti l
has little chance to penetrate.
Let us, therefore, praise Dinh Cong Ba,
a 24-year-old North Vietnamese soldier
who one February morning crept out from
his foxhole. under the cover of smoke from
the heavy battle round him, and found his
way to a Vietnamese Catholic priest, to
Whom he surrendered. My purpose Is not
to praise hint because he gave himself up,
or chose. the "right" side. It is just that
his is the story of one living man, and
through it we can pay our respects to
nil the other sad stories of this war that
ate hidden forever behind statistics.
Ba is an open, ,,nilling young man. His
face is still pale from his months of liv-
ing in the jungle. and his arms are covered
with insect bites and scratches. Although
he now dresses in the brown shirt and
trousers of a lioi clash (soincone who
has surrendered under the Saigon Govern-
ment's Open Arms Programme) he still
wears his Vietcong rubber tyre sandals.
His toe-nails look like small, rough sea-
shells, South in a
Ba walked all the way
group that totalled five companies (750
men). Ills was called the "Finish the War"
Company. They entered Laos somewhere
near Tchepone, and at the end of June
crossed Into South Vietnam in Kontum
Province.
Jungle tracks
All along the route, at a distance of a
day's march apart, they cagle across liaison
posts where they were fed and provided
with a guide for the next day. These
guides chose the jungle tracks that were
free of American bombing and flareups.
It is a tribute to their skill that In all the
journey south. the group was bombed only
once, when entering South- Vietnam, and
one soldier was killed. Fifty others were
sent back because of illness. Usually they
travelled by day along paths completely
covered by jungle, but open spaces were
negotiated by night.
They carried on their backs food for
three months: akilo-and-a-half of dried
neat, the same amount of salt and 400
granunes of monosodium glutamate, which
they used to make soup with forest vege-
tables. They marched five or six hours a
day for five days, rested the sixth,
In August they met up with the Viet-
cong unit. , whose strength they were to
bolster. 3a joined the 92nd Artillery Com-
pany of the VC Fifth Divislon, armed with
five DKZ 75 iuni. recoilless anti-tank rifles
and IS AN 47s. Ills job, like most of the
soldiers. was to carry ammunition.
Although it was a mined Vietcong-
Northern unit, all the leaders, from section
chief up, were Southerners, Relations be-
tween the two groups, I3a said, were
"very good." He admired the political
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cadre very much - "he was our spiritual
element". The cadre said "our mission
was to attack the Americans, liberate the
South and unify the country. We were told
it would he enough to have one battle
and morale was very high."
The company took up a position in Bien
IIoa Province along the Dong Nai River,
sonic 20 miles from Saigon, but after
two months' waiting they had to move
back towards the Cambodian border, "be-
cause American tactics had caused a
shortage of rice." However, the company
never seems to have been scrtously ham-
pered in it s movements, which, say some-
thing about the limitations of American
and South Vietnamese intelligence and air
power.
Until January 1968, they occupied them.
selves In training and with transporting
rice which had to he brought from the
Cambodian side of the border. Some of
the Northern troops were surprised to
find the South' more prosperous than they
expected. The political cadre explained
that some people In the South "were
slaves of material things," and Ba said
the men agreed with him.
'Lost courage'
In January the corapany moved back
for the great battle. In fact It never went
into action properly because the VC plan
WASHINGTON POST
10 June 1968
In this case was caught off balance by an
American reaction that was lucky rather
than interrtlonal. "It was the worst battle-
field I've seen," said an American officer
later. "You could have walked an L-
shaped area covering three kilometres and
scarcely have touched the ground. I've
never seen so many bodies, not even after
the human. wave attacks in Korea." Who
can blame Bn for that moment when he
"lost courage 7"
ills future now is uncertain. He still
adinires Ho Chi Mint[ very much, and
does not know if there is anyone like him
in the South. He thinks the North could
go. on fighting for another six years or so,
"It will he difficult to arouse the ardour
of the troops now, but perhaps the. poll-
tical cadre will think of something."
He rather ilkcs the Americans he has
met but is not so sure about the South
Vietnamese officials. What he, would really
like is to somehow attach himself to
the American Army and go North with
them so that he could rejoin his family.
Be thinks "the Americans would destroy
the Communist Party but not the people."
Ba is a nice, open fellow, but goodness
knows what the war will end ill) doing
with him. He broke out of the world of
statlstics for a moment when he left his
foxhole, but he cannot escape its clutches
for ever,
A P
lectolf"
Ilies
By Lee Leseaze
Washington Pont Foreisru 8ervlce
SAIGON, June 9--Former
Vietcong Lt. Col. Phan Viet
1) ung, a high-ranking defector,
thinks the war will go on for a.
long time If the allies pursue
a military victory.
"If we want to crush
the other side militarily, It will
take a long time and the cost
will be high," Dung said.
"But there are other ways to
end the war. We can exploit
divisions on their side. We can
perhaps find a way to get
them to rally In groups, not
singly as I did,"
Dung, who had commanded
a regiment, is certain that
other Vietcong officers and
soldiers share his doubt that
the war will never be solved
militarily and he believes that
many also arc not certain they
Foe Seen Resigned
"Since 1965, everyone' (in
the Vietcong) has known that
there can be no military solu-
tion to the war," Dung said, in
a long interview.
Dung angered one military
interrogator several days car.
her by refusing to give de.
tailed information about the
Vietcong 165th Regiment,
tvhich he commanded before
he defected.
He had said that many of
the Vietcong are his rriends
and he is not eager to see
them killed. He wants to aid
the Saigon government but
not by simply informing on
his unit.
3 Phases Since 1963
The Colonel came back from
several years in North Viet.
nam in 1963. Ile divides the
years since then into three
phases.
In the first, "when there
were only American advisers.
f
ous difficulty-they had to
leave ten dead and one ma-
chine gun behind.
Dung fought most of the
time in the Highlands along
the Cambodian border. In the
second phase, he said, his
troops would usually have the
advantage at the start of each
battle because of surprise at-
tacks and slow Allied reac-
tions. But when the reaction
and the planes came, Dung
said, the advantage shifted.
The third phase began with
the Tet attacks on the cities,
he said, He found this fighting
extremely difficult for his reg.
inient.
VC Leaders' Concern
"Vietcong leaders want to
create an Impact In the world
and don't care about casual.
ties," Dung said. "There Is a
the r1 . ~.~.,,~~, a ~uuu uuicuvu
ViAt ,ok9 `F'aF f ea / i1 c
78-4~ tR i1' ~p4R
~t~
4; b
k
e
r
t
e
of tine Co unist bloc. where the Vietcong had seri?
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country anr.' became an trtil-
lons and guaranteeing victory, fiery Office in the North Viet?
ll
especia
y guaranteeing the
lives of our soldiers for whom
we are responsible,
"if we fulfilled our responsi-
bility to our troops, we failed
to satisfy our leaders; If we
satisfied- our leaders, we be-
trayed Our consciences."
Dung said he had difficulty
communicating the situation
he saw in the field to his supe-
riors. He was amused when an
American told him that U.S.
officials in Vietnam fre
quently make the same com-
plaint.
Dung, 38, gave up to'South
Vietnamese authorities in
l3lnhduoing Province May 7 as
the Vietcong made their sec-
ond major effort to attack Sai-
gon. Ile said that he first
thought of doing so 11 years
ago, "when It was clear there
would be no elections to re-
unify Vietnam."
Joined Vietminh at 15
He joined the Vietminh at
15; at 16 he was a member of
the Communist Party. He was
a 24year-old deputy battalion
commander when the French
were defeated In 1954.
Dung went to North Viet-
nam after the partition of the
namcse :+l'my.
"I am proud of joining the
Vietminh to fight against the
French," he said. ""But I began
to find that communism was
not the right doctrine for me,"
But three things made it dif-
ficult for him to decide to
ahandon the Communists,
Dung said.
He was not sure that the
government in Saigon was any
better than the government in
Hanoi; the Americans were
supporting Saigon and he
thought they were responsible
for blocking the national elec-
tions called for by the Geneva
agreements; also, he had many
friends on the Communist
side.
Thinks Capitalism Better
Dung said he knew little of
capitalism except what he
learned from Communist lec-
tures and books, but he believ-
ed that capitalism could make
the people happy and the coun-
try strong.
"It was not all good, but if
SAIGON DAILY NEWS
21 March 1968
9-
colonialism, communism is
better; If you compare com-
munism with capitalism, capi-
talism is better."
die decided that the Saigon
government had many faints,
but, was better than the gov-
ernment in Hanoi.
"As a Vietnamese," Dung
said. "I don't like to have for-
eigners--especially fore I g n
troops-in the country."
It took much thought before
he decided that the Americans
were not the aggressors and
were not seeking a colonial
empire in Vietnam, he said.
He compared the actions of
the United States in Vietnam
and the Soviet Union in Hun-
gary and found them Identical,
Dung said:. If Russia was not
an aggressor, neither was
America, lie said. Ile thinks no
encroachments by communists
an parts of the non-Commu-
nist world should be tolerated
by the United States.
As to the problem of having
to leave -- and perhaps fight
against-his friends if he ral-
lied to the Saigon govern.
ment, Dung said, ,If I had
waited for everything to be
right, I would never have been
able to rally,"
As told to Mekong Futures reporter, eporter, Thanh
Hiep, by 16 year old Nguyen Van J'ruong who es-
caped with Help of a North Vietnamese resistance
organization.
SAIGON (Ml') -. c Each per-
son is allowed a monthly food
ration of 6 kilo of rice ahd 4
kilo of maize, be this autficiont
or not ; while the entire family
gets half a cup of fish sauce,
two pieces of flint and enough
petroleum to last one day...
cEvory year they gave us a
ticket to buy 3 motors of state-
made fabric. No one could buy
allowance of 300 gm of meat
on the occasion of the TET
Now Lunar Year celebration,
But with the beginning of 1067
President Ho announced, oW.>
are to give up our TET ration
of meat to help our dear fellow
countryman of the South ...)>
Nghs An Province, North Viet.
nam near the 17th parallel
which ceparatos N,.erth from
South Vietnam, Truong mango
to escape in mid-1067 with the
help of a resistance movement
in NorthVietnarn called the Leea-
gue of the Holy Sword.
This description of actual ((Each detail of our liko,>r,
conditions in N(,ith Vietnam Truong c ntinuad, sour every
was given by 16 year old activity was controlled and ro-
Nguyen Van TRUONG who it. gulatod by the St-,tos, Ev ry one
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No's te-xchings which urged'.,.'
to work without paying attention
to the month of the year, to the
week of the month, to the d.,y
or the walk and to the hour of
the d,y.' In my village of
Quynh L,au most people earn
their living by farming or fish-
ing. Every day, at 2 o'clock in
the morning, I went with the
fish boats out to sea. We worn
not allowed to go beyond 7 or
8 kilometers from shore as the
Viet Cong (Vietnamese Com-
n'r)nist) officers are afraid ma-
ny of the fishermen would try
to escape, At five in the after-
noon, all the fishing boats had
to go back w port where
Party cadremen a-r,aited to
value and take our fish. Each
fisherman was allowed to keep
one kilogram of fish regardless
of the size of his family.))
: el may aff n m, o TRUONG
continued, ((that we were all
very angry with such prac.
tices but no one shred show
his discontent, Even so we
were a little bott9r.off, than the
farmers who got only their re-
gular monthly allowance of rice
and maize. However,)) TRUONG
added, seven the allowance of
rice and maize is not granted
to everyone, but only to those
who get marks for their
work, Those who cannot
work, even for some ill-
ness or any other reason, will
gat reduced marks and their
monthly rice allowance is cut
down. For example if a worker
Can not work for two-days, his
rice allowance for that month
is lesxoned by 700 gr-more
than 15%.
ln.addition to the. obligatory
hours to be wo.ked for the
State, the number of which was
never clearly fixed, p)oplo had
to work extra hours to increase
their family income. M Groover,
every one had to go to four or
five meetings a month
to hear the Communist Party
cadremen lecture on the policy
of resistance against American
Imperialism, and the false
government of the South,
((I do not know about the
other provinces of North Viet-
nam,a TRUONO continued, ((but
I know that in the district of
Quynh Lu:x no peasant owned a
radio set. Only Partly cadre-
men holding positions of villa-
ge commissar upwards own
these devices o.
c Walking and riding water
buffaloes and oxen are the cur-
rent modes of transport, in the
whole district of Quynh Lou,
only Party cerdre:nen and some
villagers own bicycles. Bicycle
owners, who wish to cell must
get permission from their villa-
ge authorities and pay a heavy
tax,)>
do North Vietnam the two
religions, Buddhist and C,th.
lic,_ are under constant pres-
sure from the C. tnm ini t Party
and the Government. Catholics'
aria the object of constant suspi-
ci'in, The Pa: ty cadremen tell
Christians, 'Srppos3 you live
a lazy life arid sit all day long
to worship the Christ, will hC
give you rice to eat and cl,thes
to put on... ?u They spread
among the people their propa-
g-rnda saying that Christians
include reacti>nary elements
always seeking to go over to
the enemy.((Christians are tho
foes of our psbple,)) they say.
TRUONG continued, eAft3r the
arrest of Futh?r Tran Dinh CAN,
,Priest of Quynh Luu parish on
August 7, 1066 the cadre-
men arrested Bishop
Tran Dinh NHIEM, of the
archdiocese of Vinh. Throe
months later Father CAN was
brought back to his church
where the cadremen aac5amblecr
the population and read. a ver-
dict condemning Father CAN as
g-lty of the - 'mos. against the
people, then be was taken away
and no one ever hoard from
agxinm
Many churches and pagoda,
have been turned into office3
and storage places for the Go-
vernment. TRUONG stated that
the little parish' in the village
of Quynh Ban has been used as
a State granary since 1065.
For public entertainment one
car, see prapaganda films and
plays occasionally if he has
enough money for the ticket,
Generally entertainment sub-
jects call for increase in produc
tion, or relate the battle of Dian
Bien Phu, the Chinese struggle
or the Russian revolution,
Marriages
All the young people in North
Vietnam must learn by heart
the following slogan, ,Delay
making a choice of you mate. If,
the choice has been made,
postpone the marriage, If the
marriage has been made, wait
to have c hildron, if the children
are born, limit their number ;
one child is not enough, two
children will do, three are too
many,e Marriage is not allowed
for men under 22 and wo.nen
under 2U. The engaged couple
must get permission from the
State and pay a tax which some
times is more than they can
raise.
After marriage the State
permits each couple to give
birth to two children.
If a third child is born, the
State can tolerate this . But if the wife has any
indication of a fourth pregnan-
cy, she is obliged Ito have an
abortion and submit to an opo.
ration which will prevent having
any more children, Boys and
girls convicted of illegal liai-
sons will . be brought before
popular criticism and then be
areaducateds in a dotention'ce,n-
ter. If they have a child from
their illegal liaison, the child is
not ali,.cated a normal monthly
ration of food.
Conscription
TRUONO reported that pre.
viously rho State only roanultod
young min 13 years of ago
upwards, except for Christian
youth who are jud jod unrolia.
hole. But within the past throe
y;>ars the age limit has boon
dropped to 14 and Chaistian
youth are inclu:led.
TRUONG said that the cadre-
mail told everyone that the
Northerners who fled South at
the time of partition of the
country in 1054 had be;n killed
by the Americana, -Most of
TRUONG'a own family was
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the cadrenrer TRUONG said,, der of the League agreo:i to
a so I k-apt looking for any help him join his (amity in the
ocea;ricn to escape' to the South. Once again he was
Sout%1. Soma rumors has circu- taken in a boat for $;x ar
latod among the fishermen seven hours and then placed
eb.3nt the 13aguo butt was not in a small bait and told to
sure if they ware true uctil one row to shore. When finally
of the Party cadr?om:n spent an ashore, he was taken to the
entire evening lecture attacking Danang R,uaption Center of the
the rum)ro and warning severe O;asn Arms program cf South
repeated them. Thin I was
sur o the rumors were trues,
As usual young TRUONO
wiat to Lis boat )o go fishing
but now he changed hie fishing
ar?oa and instead of q)fng close
to the shore, he sailed nearly
7 ,in off the coast. There an
A, rl 29, 1987 he mot a boat
from [tie League, TRUONG
waved and shouted to thorn,
He was taken abroad the
ship and afterwards blindfolded
was given a pass signed by M.
Vo CONG chief, of the Danang
Center, With this pass, TRUONG
obtained the right to reside in
any part of the Republic of
Vietnam.
TRUONG went to live with his
father and two sisters who had
fled to the south in 1954 and
are now living in Binh Tuy, I"-
km from Saigon. TRUONG said
that the League had told him
they would continua to stand
and brought to a mountainous against the Hanoi regime until
re?fion which was called the the true aspiratio'"s of . the
met, an
t
at others like him-
:elf would also be helped to
flea South.
aAs soon as I put my foot on
the ground of the South,a
TRUONG continued, amy eyes
were dazzled with arnazament
and l,was droaining.e Everything
app-ared new to him, At a tailor
shop he stopped in wonder at
the large display of clothes
((May I buy some ?s) he asked.
aOf course you may, provided
you may, provided you can pay
for theme, the shop
worod with a laugh,
c(People in the
TRUONG continued
SoutliD,
areally
and
enjoy to much freedom
they are very happy, As com-
pared with the Southerners'
standard of living that of. Nor"
tlierners does not attain the
thirtieth part of it. And yet thca
cadremen told us the people of
the South have been starving to
death Iu
YOMIURI, Tokyo.
29 April 1968
Vietnam
North Its Troub'es '
d Nil
IN Edwarecln,
CPYRGry
T
Vletnard (DRV).
The article says: "The strite
strictly prohibits and punishes
all acts of treason, opposition-
to the people's democratic sys-
tern, or opposition to .rcunificn?
Lion of the fatherland."
As defined In the decree,
counterrevolutionary crimes are
"opposition to the fatherland
and the people's denroer;etie
power, sabotage of socialist
transformat.ton and construe.
tion undermining national de-
fr:nse:. and the struggle against
US :iggrer slon for national
salvation aimed at defending
the north, liberating the south,
and reunifying the country."
Hong Kong (CNS)-Iteferr?ats The document was referred
to North Vietnam as n so. to in a broadcast by Radio
premely motivated, unified and nano( on March 21. It is a
ared to decree on the punishment of
monolithic nation
pre
,
p
fight "20 ye;rt?s or mere," `counterrevolutionary crimes.'
cteterndncd to "liberate" South This was the first time in
Vletnam at any cost, have recent years that Hanoi has
been heard often enough. suggested so openly that there
Ifut this statements aren't Were some cracks of this type
necessarily so. afr[?rearing' in North Vietnam's
There is ample evidence that national fabric.
North Vietnam has Its argnr- Hanoi's National- Assembly
iticr3ts, between hawks tad Standing Committee originally
doves, that the country has, Passed the decree on October.
Morale problems In the face 30, l.i)07. President IIo Chi
of intensive bombing and news Minh. signed. an order promul;
that seeps back about casuals gating it on November 10.
ties. 11owever, for reasons still
in )its writings about the unknown outside Ilanoi's ruli
ass Indochina ever North Viet- ins circles, the decree was not
The rule of thumb in "1lanoi
~amcsr Gen Vo NI;reycn (sell made public until more thsri Watching,' as in "China,
said, Psychological depression four months later, at a news watching," is that these rc
sets in from time to time rt, conference. };Imes seldom. resort to mention
the home front and even It can only be supposed that of such negative aspects of
among leaders, We must strive the ottlclals were arguing the socialist society unless the of
to combat this weakness." possible effects of announcing Tenses are already being; corn
rrritted flagrantly.
Fifteen specific crinu:s'spelled
the text of~a Notth Vlsstnamese effect imrnediatelsl. as fitting the definition or
document .rrtade avatlabie },t,i A r ho.it for the de.~ ec ins counterrevolutionary crime
At tptsatr~rd Foitrf leatsre 2u 5IO&tbY:: At DRI'W$430ri1A0004U00300819-3ar'SUrrrFCi that
Fong icons. the .. Democratic , Republic'. of most, if not al , of these crimes..
who Vietnam,
In early Dacombor 1987 ho
 CPYRGH
T
Iir;ted have already been com-' "The decri:e c,erfrons rIttis dc. ?.,
Treason, In collaboration
with a foreign country.
Plotting to overthrow the
"people's democratic power."
Espionage.
Intruding into DRV territory
to violate security.
Armed rebellion.
Banditry.
Defecting to the enemy.
Murder, assault and kidnap-
hip.
Sabotage.
Undermining "the people's
ary elements,
The crimes are broken down
according to. severity. There
pre punishment levels accord-
ing to whether a person Is
"the main plotter, `leader, prin-
cipal culprit, or one who
stubbornly opposes the revolu=
lion."
both "attempted crimes",
and "actual crimes" are punish-
able, according to the decree.
In commenting on the decree
In an editorial, the official
North Viet,nariiese newspaper
Nha.n Ilan gave further hint
that Hanoi was having trouble
with some dissenters:
:solidarity."
:t)birupting public' order ands
security.
Opposing state policies' and
laws.
Disseminating counterrevolu-
Ilonary pr?opagand a.
Attacking- detention camps
and freeing convicts.
harboring counterrevolution.
the line and policy of cluVnc.it- Sounds, in effect, as though
Ing the cour-terrevohitionaries the 'North Vietnamese have a
of our country, in the present guerilla problem of their oyVr,
phase. (quite likely- spurred by some
"These people are the stul. clandestine Infiltrators from,
born elements in the former South Vietnam).
exploiting classes, landlords In the 1,,s, criticism of army
and capitalists, reactionary ele officers is called dissent or ex-
former puppet pproupfipet profiting by .reli`ion,army ercise of free speech. In North
ot6ctais,
t
elemental not wanting to trans. Vietnam, it's called "disrupting;
public order and t;ecur Wy"
fore,, themselves. the and is
"They are Instigated by t?S ment of punishable 51 to r 15 icyears.
imperialists to weaken our na- Another crime is "di-Storting
tional defense force." tile US role and spreading.
In the US, the press and rumors that confuse the peo-
other venues of debate and p)e-" .
opinion insure that opposition, Iii other words, If farmee,,
voices can he heard. Nguyen Van Lee says, "Well.''
In North Vietnam, which the Americans aren't so bad,
ranks with North Korea as the after ail," and suggests to a
world's most closed society, friend in the next rice paddy
opposition to the administra- that he should think this over,
t.lon and Its policies can only farmer Nguyen Is liable to
lIe gauged' obliquely by care- imprisonment for up to 10,
fully studying statements and years.
decrees. - - The decree has a doting
note which must be one of
The text of some of the tlae world's most sweeping
articles of the decree refer to retroactive clauses:
crimes which probably have "The counterrevolutionary
taker, place on some scale. It crimes which were committed
is unlikely that they would prior to this decree and which
be mentioned only as hypothe- have not yet been tried itll
bell cases. be tried in , accordance with
Punlshment for banditry, for this decree,"
le, will be handed out The signature on the decree,
exam"to those who for counter- is it. was submitted to No Chi
Minh for promulgation, was
revolutionary purposes engage that of National Assembly
in armed activities in moral- Standing Committee, Chairman
tainous or coastal areas; kill, rruong Chinh, regarded as the
cadres, civil servants, military leader of the pro-]'eking wing
mere, policemen, or the people, Df Hanoi's elite:
and disturb, security and or,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 April 1968
iOMBING TOLL IN NORTH VIETNAM
HONG KONG
Afore than 1.5 million tons of
bombs have been dropped on North
Vietnam - as much as the total
dropped on Europe in all of World
Wa r 11.
As the Hanoi regime prepares for
talks with the United States, here are
the latest intelligence reports of the
damage;
The industrial stale -IIo Chi Minh
started to build lids been leveled.
Not a single important factory is op-
crating. Cement plants, thcrinoclcc-
tric plants, steel-fabricating plants-
all are in ruins.
Only a few small factories, moved
in to the countryside, survive, Waste-
ful portalrlc generators provide what
electricity is available at many vital
ins tal hl ions.
poorest peasant in South Vietnam is
getting perhaps twice as much rice
as his North Vietnamese counterpart.
North Vietnam was forced to im-
port 500,000 tons of rice last year.
The Covcrnment-fixed price is more
than double the price in Saigon, On
the "free market" the price of white
rice is often 8 to 10 tints as high as
in Government-controlled stores. The
cost of basic commodities in North
Vietnam has- increased at least 300
per cent since early 1965, when
bombing started.
The Government has warned of a
possible poor rice crop this suninier
because of bad weather. It has coni-
plained of the breakdown in planting
of secondary crops, warned of cattle
disease, and protested the slaughter-
f tan
s
oo m
i
y p
g
Every.
very effort has been made to spare ids of l i r ran c ate c . a
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residential areas, docks at Haiphong,
and a few other facilities. But damage,
over all, is staggering.
Bombing has kept 500,000 inch
and women busy repairing transpor-
tation routes. An additional 150,000
arc tied clown at antiaircraft defenses.
These are people who normally would
lie in the fields.
Fond rationing is severe. Black
markets abound. In fact, tLie Ilanoi
regime grudgingly looks the other
way at this free-enterprise system.
North Vietnamese arc able to buy
on tlie "free market" with impunity,
as long as they have the money. Afon-
cy is not plentiful, however. Families
scrape together what they can to buy
foodstuffs to augment the meager ra-
tions the Government permits legally.
Rice is in short supply by stand-
 cc F T 68/7-2
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AGRICULTURE: A CONSPICUOUS WEAKNESS OF COMMUNISM
1. Agriculture has been labelled the "Achilles heel" of Commu-
nism. Communist agriculture has bitterly disappointed the reasonble
expectations of people in Communist-run countries. The total amount
and quality of agricultural products are lower than the land and farmers
could produce under less restrictive conditions. The prices are higher
than they would be if economic forces determined the rates of production
and means of distribution. Thus, Communist agriculture fails to yield
a fair return for the work of either the farmer or the consumer.
2. Assets addressing mass audiences may emphasize the historical
pattern of unreliability of Soviet farm production, the brutal treat-
ment of farmers during collectivization, and the subsequent neglect
of farmers and of the development of farming, as well as the current
limited and less than whole-hearted efforts to correct the accumulated
deficiencies of Soviet agriculture.
3. Addressing intellectuals, assets may draw on both the scholarly
conclusions of the Britisher Dr. Klatt and the acid criticisms of Czech
writer Jan Prochazka concerning the ideological shortcomings of Marxist
agriculture (see unclassified attachments). Emphasis can be given to
the shallowness of Soviet attempts to uphold Marx' and Lenin's formu-
lations on agriculture.
4. Continued attention to the shortcomings of Communist agricul-
ture is especially important in developing areas whose populations are
predominantly agrarian. Governments and intellectuals in these coun-
tries may be dazzled by the (true and alleged) advances of Soviet,
Chicom and other Communist industry, military technology, etc. Our
assets should keep reminding them that their first problem is to pro-
vide adequate food for their rapidly increasing populations and that
no Communist country can effectively assist them in fulfilling this
most fundamental and truly vital task.
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SECRET