NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 5, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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 25X1A2G
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November 1968
NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION
"... the serious violations by Stalin of
Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repres-
sions against honorable Soviet people, and other
activities in the period of the personality
cult make it impossible to leave the bier with
his body in the mausoleum of V.I. Lenin."
N.S. Khrushchev at Twenty-
second Party Congress,
October 1961
Double or triple the guard
beside his grave,
So that he will not rise again,
and with him -- the past...
We carried him away --
threw him out of the mausoleum,
But how shall we remove Stalin
from within Stalin's heirs?...
True, there are those who hurl abuse
at Stalin from the platform,
Who secretly at night
ponder their former glory...
They were the former pillars:
with no liking for empty slave camps,
Or halls jammed with people
where poets recite their verses...
As long as the heirs of Stalin
remain on this earth,
I shall feel Stalin is still there
in the mausoleum.
From "Stalin's Heirs," by Yevgeny Yevtushenko,
The term "Stalinism" has come to signify many things -- the arbitrary
rule of a nation by a despot, the rigid control of a nation's economy,
the collectivization of agriculture, the massive displacements of minority
groups, the purge trials, forced labor camps, manic secretiveness, a mas-
sive secret police system, and, pervading everything, a reign of terror.
The word can legitimately be stretched to fit the entire gamut of develop-
ments in the Soviet Union from the late 20's until Stalin's death in 1953,
during most of which time Stalin literally was responsible for every major
action.
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Stalin made a mockery of legality and justice. He stifled the entire
intelligentsia of the country, insisting that all artistic work conform
to the principles of "socialist realism." Internationally, he demanded,
and obtained, total, blind obedience from Communist parties throughout
the world. His conduct of diplomatic relations was marked by a mania for
espionage and subversion which was in turn only a reflection of a basic
paranoia. All these features nurtured in the Soviet leadership, perhaps
as a permanent ineradicable legacy, a frame of mind we can call Stalinism
-- an orthodoxy ever inclined to preserve those features of the past that
proved. successful (whatever its failures) in preserving the Party's unchal-
lenged strangle hold on political power, a frame of mind that shies away
from experimentation with new forms.
The total cost of Stalinism can never be reckoned. In terms of human
lives, Soviet scientist Andrei D. Sakharov estimates that 10 to 15 million
people perished from hardship, torture and execution. Robert Conquest,
in his recent, definitive book, The Great Terror, estimates that Stalin's
death toll may be as high as 20 million.
Stalin's death in 1953, after 29 years of rule, left his successor,
Georgi Malenkov faced with the necessity of consolidating his hold on the
reins of power and the need to set a new direction for the nation's eco-
nomic and political life which would be devoid of the worst of Stalin's
excesses. Gradually, a decompression process began. Beria, head of the
secret police, was defeated in his bid for power and executed. The secret
police forces were purged. Huge numbers of prisoners were released from
Stalin's labor camps (leaving millions in the camps, however). The
Malenkov leadership gradually developed an economic program designed to
sharply increase the availability of food, clothing and housing. This
program came to be known as the "New Course."
Early in 1955 Khrushchev came to power, deposing Malenkov and one
year later made the "secret speech" that radically changed the entire po-
litical. life of the nation. In this lengthy speech to the 20th Congress
of the CPSU, February 1956, Khrushchev vehemently attacked the entire "cult
of Stalin's personality" -- his person, his mistakes, and his misdeeds,
particularly the wholesale Party purges. Then, having exposed some of
Stalin's greater crimes (although Khrushchev came far from telling the
entire truth, which would have implicated the whole Soviet leadership,
himself included, in the crimes), Khrushchev was committed "rectifying the
errors" of Stalin's time.
Under Khrushchev, de-Stalinization had its ups and downs. Its rapid
growth early in 1956 was almost entirely reversed by the end of the year
as a consequence of the riots in Poland and the Revolution which exploded
in Hungary. Nevertheless, insofar as the person of Stalin was concerned
there was no letup and Stalin became an unperson almost overnight.
Although Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was more an attack on his
political foes than an effort to right the wrongs which still persisted
in the Soviet Union, many first steps were taken under Khrushchev to re-
move the stain left by Stalin. One of Khrushchev's most dramatic steps
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was the large-scale of freeing hundreds of thousands of political prisoners.
Those disposed of earlier could only be rehabilitated posthumously: in
1936-39, according to Sakharov, more than 1,200,000 Communist Party members,
or half of the total membership, were arrested, and of those only 50,000
regained freedom.
Other steps toward de-Stalinization were carried out in each major
sector of Soviet society. In the cultural sphere, significant books and
articles began to appear in the liberal press, particularly in the monthly
Novy Mir (New World). These included Vladimir Dudintsev's novel Not by
Bread Alone (1956), a number of Ilya Ehrenburg's thought-provoking essays
(1957 through 1964), and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's politically momentous
novel about Stalin's camps, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962).
In the economy, Khrushchev attempted to decentralize management in
order to break the bureaucracy's strangle hold on initiative. He abol-
ished most of the old-line industrial ministries in 1957, and transferred
many of their functions to regional economic councils, He also broke with
Stalin's self-defeating chauvinism when he strongly encouraged Soviet
engineers to study foreign techniques, especially American, and apply them
in their own work.
In military policy, Khrushchev downgraded conventional arms in favor
of missiles and nuclear weapons. (This policy also enabled Khrushchev to
release military men from service at a time when the USSR was suffering
labor shortages.)
Khrushchev ordered that the laws of the USSR be exhaustively studied,
set up a commission to'draft a new constitution to take the place of the
unimplemented Stalin Constitution of 1936, and extended feelers to the
outside world. Not only did Khrushchev and his leading associates travel
widely throughout the world, but so did relatively large numbers of tech-
nical and cultural representatives of the USSR, Exchange programs were
encouraged. Tourists became almost commonplace in major Soviet cities,
Moreover, jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was almost completely halted.
In the political sphere Khrushchev scored some notable successes.
He removed from the party's top ruling body most of the dead dictator's
oldest accomplices; he exposed himself and his views to millions of So-
viet citizens in his travels throughout the country (notably to farm areas);
his frequent speeches were published; Central Committee meetings were pub-
licized and the populace began to feel that their opinions were being con-
sidered by the country's leadership. Khrushchev was unsuccessful, however,
in his move in November 1962 to divide the bulk of Communist Party func-
tionaries into two groups, those concerned with industry and those con-
cerned with agriculture, a move which antagonized and alarmed Party offi-
cials who had become set in the bureaucratic ways of Stalinism.
The changes of the de-Stalinization period, however, were superficial
for Khrushchev, himself, remained a dictator and made use of the same
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machinery built by Stalin. (The secret police was curbed primarily by
agreement among the leadership that no one single leader should ever
again be able to use the weapon to terrorize the Party as Stalin had done.
The police remained just as vigilant, and potentially just as arbitrary
and brutal, toward the ordinary citizen.) And unceasing resistance to de-
Stalinization by entrenched officials was effective in restricting the ac-
tual scope of changes. Moreover, Khrushchev, who had himself served Stalin
and was not free of the Stalinist taint, did not consistently press for
changes. Thus, many aspects of de-Stalinization are remembered more as
proposals, partly formed ideas, or attitudes than as accomplished acts.
Nevertheless, the USSR of October 1961+, when Khrushchev was overthrown,
was a far different country from the USSR of March 1953, when Stalin died.
Khrushchev's ouster resulted in part from the Stalinists' resistance
to change. After all, the key party, government and military leaders of
1961+ were almost all appointed and advanced by Stalin in the 15 years
between the Great Purges and his death. They had shown the aptitude and
ability to survive the Stalinist system, and many feared that they would
lose status in any other system. There were undoubtedly other reasons
for ousting Khrushchev: he impulsively launched substantial programs with-
out thoroughly airing'them with his fellow Presidium members; he spoke
intemperately and crudely, embarrassing many Soviet leaders; he posed a
threat to the security of top military leaders; Soviet foreign relations
had been a series of failures, such as the disastrous Cuban missile affair,
the ever-worsening conflict with Communist Chinese leaders, and the weak-
ening solidarity of the world. Communist movement. Of immediate alarm to
his opponents, he had made tentative plans to seek a detente with Bonn.
The new Kremlin leaders had united in opposing Khrushchev. There is
little evidence, however, that they have subsequently been able to agree
consistently on much else. Neither party boss Leonid Brezhnev, nor any
of the other leaders has been able to establish his clear-cut primacy.
One result of this situation has been top-level indecision in the USSR,
an unusual circumstance for a ,Party boasting a monolithic structure.
In this circumstance, it is hardly surprising that the developments
of the four years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have been marked by
increasing reversions to Stalinist mentality and practices. This pattern
became evident soon after the new regime took over, and has been accent-
uated as the years have gone by. Criticism of Stalin's person and his
mistakes virtually stopped within five months after Brezhnev and Kosygin
displaced Khrushchev. Rehabilitations of Stalin's victims dwindled and,
contrary to earlier practice, no longer mentioned Stalin's guilt or the
euphemistic "period of the cult of the individual" when they exonerated
"victims of false accusations" who had been "illegally repressed" or whose
lives had been "tragically broken off."
The measure of the political climate in Moscow is perhaps most fre-
quently taken from the state of affairs among the intelligentsia; this is
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due to a number of factors, among them the relative volubility of this
group, its access to westerners, and its quick reflection in the press,
theater, and artistic styles. Therefore the infamous trial of the two
Soviet writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966 was correctly viewed
at the time as the harbinger of much more stringent controls over society.
The pressure on Soviet citizens to toe the line gradually built up there-
after. Fewer and fewer truly creative works were published in the press,
art shows of anything not conforming to the worst "socialist realism" were
halted, travel to and cultural exchanges with foreign countries were
gradually curtailed, Soviet tourists ceased traveling, etc.
By April 1968, not only had the de-Stalinization campaign come to a
complete end, but a new period -- which can perhaps best be described as
"Neo-Stalinism" -- began. The occasion was the plenum meeting of the
Central Committee on 9-10 April at the end of which a communique was
issued which warned of a "sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle
between capitalism and socialism." The committee also warned against
contact with foreigners -- even foreign Communists -- since any of them
might be agents of capitalist subversion. This typically Stalinist
xenophobia did not pass unnoticed. Brezhnev personally addressed the
meeting, but his speech has never been released. Following the plenum
meeting, Brezhnev -- who seemed to have taken charge of the new campaign
against "foreign ideological subversion" -- and other top party leaders
traveled throughout the country addressing party groups. It was evident
from the speeches and statements during that period that the Soviet leader-
ship was deeply concerned over widespread dissent within the Soviet Union
and throughout the Soviet bloc. In the face of this mounting problem,
however, their reaction, significantly, was to retreat into the cocoon of
the safe, Stalinist practices of the past, however discredited, rather
than to move ahead with new, progressive solutions to their problems,
A leading Swiss journalist has described Neo-Stalinism in the follow-
ing terms:
"Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and
methods of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after
1953 and to make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy.
The neo-Stalinist turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party
Congress and a rejection of developments since then, including
reform communism, recognition of the "individual road," and
West-East coexistence. The opinion seems to prevail in present-
day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies did not produce
the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexistence only
undermined the Soviet power base, while in Stalin's time there was
"quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet govern-
ment inspired fear and respect in the outside world."
*"Czechoslovak Reforms Squashed by Soviet Neo-Stalinism," by Kux, Neue
Zuercher Zeitung, 25 September 1968. The complete text of this outstand-
ing article is attached.
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The nature of the neo-Stalinist reaction which has set in is to be
found in both major and minor incidents. Obviously the overwhelming evi-
dence was given in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. As Kux points
out, this was actually a step not to correct a deviation, a counter-
revolution that had already broken out, but rather a step to eliminate the
possibility that something might happen. This act was based on the same
reasoning employed by Stalin when he purged potential enemies of the Party
-- before they had become such.
Among the major events in the re-emergence of Stalinism has been the
lengthy series of political trials, some well known, but others totally
unknown. The first and most sensational was the trial of Daniel and
Sinyavsky in February 1966. Another, involving Alexander Ginzberg and
three of his friends, took place in January 1968. The most recent case
is that of Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Yuli Daniel and three others, which is
mentioned below. However the publicity attending these trials should not
be allowed to obscure the fact that literally dozens of other political
trials have been held in what has been a growing wave of deliberate ter-
rorism during the past three years. Occasional glimpses of the nature
and extent of these trials are afforded by documents smuggled to the free
world, as was the case in the Chornovil papers -- a series of documents
by an imprisoned Ukrainian lawyer which have revealed a major wave of
repression which swept across the Ukraine, beginning in 1965.
Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Daniel and their colleagues, most of whom had
joined in earlier protests against the denial of freedom, demonstrated
on 25 August in Red Square for a free and independent Czechoslovakia, for
Czech-Soviet friendship, and against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslo-
vakia. They were beaten (one had four front teeth knocked out and looked
so bad he was not included among those later tried semi-publicly) and
locked. up by plainclothesmen said to be KGB personnel. At the trial the
courtroom was packed with spectators loudly hostile to the accused, while
only a, small number of close relatives of the accused were allowed in.
The accused were peremptorily found guilty of disturbing public order, and
even their closing statements were interrupted and disputed by the judge.
Their sentences were up to three years at hard labor (for the poet Vadim
Delone) and 5 years exile to an as yet unannounced location for Litvinov
and Mme. Daniel. The manner in which this trial was conducted indicates
that its basic purpose was to serve notice on Soviet citizens that no
form of overt protest will be permitted. The semi-secrecy of the trial
was designed to limit, to the extent possible, foreign repercussions.
One measure of the extent of re-Stalinization was provided by
Mme. Daniel who described the reticence of those who hold divergent views
but do not express them. She appeared to be criticizing those who play
important roles in Soviet society and have made names for themselves, but
fail to use the weight this gives them to state their dissent.
Dozens of less dramatic incidents may be cited exemplify the turn
toward. Stalinism, among them:
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-- Soviet historiographers are sharply split in attempting to
describe and explain events which occurred during Stalin's reign, such as
the collectivization of agriculture. Typically, a book published in 1966
which denounced Stalin's mistakes in the collectivization was violently
criticized in Questions of CPSU History No. 6 (June 1968). The attack
implicitly absolves Stalin of all blame and even goes so far as to assert
that collectivization "developed on a sound basis with observance of the
principle of voluntariness."
-- In much the same sense, a recent book by General Shtemenko,
The General Staff During the War, whitewashes the Soviet war record and in
the process refurbishes Stalin's reputation as a wartime leader. It main-
tains that his military prowess and personal courage were exemplary and
it attempts to minimize the culpability of Stalin and his coterie for the
disasters that befell the Red Army in 1941.
-- The Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zyezda recently attacked the
popular Taganka Theater and Theater magazine for their modernist view of
the arts and recommended that the Taganka Theater produce more works by
Mikhail Sholokhov, Alexander Fadeyev, Alexander Korneichuk and other pil-
lars of Stalinist thought.
-- The invasion of Czechoslovakia was accompanied by a resump-
tion of the jamming of BBC and Voice of America broadcasts, which had
ceased five years earlier.
-- Sovetskaya Rossiya, of 4 October, devoted three columns to
attacking Russian drama critic V. Kadrin for a book in which he had been
"too favorable toward the contemporary theater, while dismissing works of
the Stalin period.... There is no room for such views in Soviet art,"
the paper said.
The president of the Soviet Academy of Art, Nikolai V. Tomsky,
wrote an article for Pravda, published 24 September, in which he severely
criticized nonconformist artists who do not create in the school of "so-
cialist realism." Even more significantly, he attacked persons who are
members of exhibition committees who determine what is to be shown and
who thus have life and death control over all Soviet art.
-- Work is underway on a new epic film about World War II in
which Stalin is depicted as a "kindly, wise and trusted leader." This is
the first major film portrayal of Stalin since "The Fall of Berlin," a
hero-worship spectacular made shortly before Stalin's death in 1953.
Other examples will be found in the attached materials. While these
examples appear to be relatively minor froth on the surface, they are in
truth only surface manifestations of very major conflicts going on behind
the locked doors of the Kremlin.
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And where do the ordinary Soviet citizens stand on these issues?
Again, one can only judge from the few instances of dissidence that come
into view, such as the protests by a limited number of intellectuals in
Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is hard to imagine
that the peasant or the worker welcomes any return to Stalinism -- it was
they who paid by far the highest toll for his despotism. One cannot help
but think of the roughly parallel case of Czechoslovakia which only a
short time ago was considered to be the most Stalinist of the satellites.
However, when a real possibility of change came, the people unanimously
stepped forward to hail the leaders who promised a total renunciation of
the past.
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 CURZSTLiN SCIENCE MONITOR
6ctobe r 3968
Neo-Staiinism gains in
Written for The Christian Science Monitor
A new rMtittcal idt"'1@ now appear to hold
away In the Soviet Union -- neo-Stalinism.. The Kremlin was ready to fight before
Behind it is a hard-line philosophy con- Hitler attacked.
cerned with the greatness of the Soviet state : At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in
;and with the mission of its ruling party. 7038, we are told, Moscow twice offered to
Neo-Stalinism has a modern, efficiency- go to war for, Czechoslovakia--even if France
conscious, flexible approach to policy forma- would not fulfill her treaty obligations to-
tion and considers many of Stalin's meth- ward Prague. The first time, the authors
ods archaic. But, by restoring Stalin to his say, was on April 26 in a speech by then
historic.role as a great leader and architect, President Mikhail I. Kalinin; the second
of the Soviet communism, neo-Stalinism was at the time of Munich when apparently
pays tribute to the continuity of the Soviet Stalin informed Czechoslovak President Ed-
state and sets up a barrier against criticism ward Benes through the Czech Communist
of the Communist Party. Party leader Klement Gottwald of the Soviet
The neo-Stalinists are believed to be Union's readiness to fight on.Czechoslo-
dominant in the politbureau. Their spokes- ,yn}tih+h 010tH,
man is second party secretary Mikhail A. The authors omit to mention that at the
Suslov, he is seconded by trade-union chief time of Munich Czechoslovakia and the So-
Alexandr N. Shelpin, the politbdreau's viet Union had no common border; and that
youngest member. the 40 divisions and three tank corps which
. The politbareau's so-called Jkranian fac-' Moscow allegedly held in readiness would
tion (Pyotr Y. Shelest, Nikolai V. Podgorny,' have had to cross Romanian territory in or-
Dmitri S. Polyansky) also, is neo-Stalinist dder to reach a remote and mountainous part
inclined. General Secretary Leonid I. Brezlt, bf Czechoslovakia.
nev is close to this group. Western historians question the serious-
ness of Moscow's offer to fight. But the story
ew line spelled out of the offer has been revived of late in order
The latest move of the neo-Stalinists on to place the Soviet Union in the role of the'
Ale domestic scene was the exoneration of providential protector of Czechoslovakia.
Stalin of what was believed to.have been his In elaborating this episode, the authors
,greatest blunder: his trust in Hitler and his tend a bouquet to Stalin and accuse Mr.
-i,.,,a ..a C..-4..4 a.,r..,,- ,,,, 41'. a,rA Mf +11o Benes of having betrayed his people by re-
The new line was spelled out in Ivo. IZ 01
;Iommunist, the leading political and theo- Nonaggression pact explained
;etical journal of the party's central com- British and French offers to negotiate
mittee.,There the history of the years from with the Soviet Union about a common de-
}t1938 to 1941 was authoritatively rewritten fense against Hitler are pictured as decep-
liy two historians of the neo-Stalinist school,, tive. The alleged purpose of the offers was
X. Klrvostov and A. Grilev. Dr. Vladimir to involve the Soviet Union prematurely in
1~. Khvostov is the director of the institute a war with the Nazis without offering ade-
'R the history of the Communist Party of quate guarantee of Western aid.
ltlne Soviet Union of the Academy of Sci: Only after reports of secret deals between
$cnces. London and Berlin. had reached Moscow
{.,1' The thesis of the two authors is that the was the Soviet-Nazi Nonaggression Pact
;9bviets were not taken by surprise in June, of August, 1939, concluded. Stalin, the au-
thatat 1941, that that haadd they
used never the time trusted er gained Nazis, through and thors assert, had no illusions about the pact:
th
.the. Stalin-Hitler pact for intensive war The Soviet Government never believed
in the loyalty of the Nazis concerning the
elude, a although h Consequently, nuummer riccall ally in the authors to con the - fufiliment of their (treaty] obligations,"
elude, wriCas.
Nazis, the Soviets entered the war under they The entry of Soviet forces into Poland the
more favorable conditions than would have
been the case at an earlier date. September is described as a "lib-
.
crating move."
Soviet war preparations, the authors re-
call, started at an early date. In 1930-1931 The period from then until June,. 1941,
the war industry turned out 860 planes and is described as a time of "intensive Soviet
740 tanks. The corresponding figures in 1938 war preparations to ward off imperialist
were 5,469 planes and 2,270 tanks. aggression." Allocations for military needs.
were increased from 25.6 percent of, the
Role of protector total budget in 1939 to 43.4 percent In 1941.
BetmApp Sea f6vMeM sCo%V }7 : CIAJ }s sQm9oW?~ fW19O4(O 13-2 tput of
try preduced 17,000 planes and 7,600 tanks. ..The Army was ? overhauled. antiaircraft,
CPYRGH
T
 CPYRGH
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,defenses reorganized. In June, .194.1, the
military schools had five times as many
students as in 1937. ,
Quoting from the archives of: the defense
department the authors claim' that large-
scale mobilization started in the beginning
of 1941. Part of the forces stationed in Si
beria, in the Far East, and in the Urals were
then transferred to the western border, and
nearly 800,000 reservists called up.
According to the authors, the Soviets were
well informed of Hitler's intentions-they did
not need Churchill's warning-belt they tried
1o the very end to delay the attack through
diplomatic maneuvers in order to gain
lime.
Two mistakes admitted
Only two Soviet mistakes are admitted:
the assumption that the armies could be
placed on war footing within a few hours
and belated transmission of the Kremlin's
telephoned order to fight.
In this context the authors mention, in
passing, the "negative effects of the cult of
'personality and of unfounded repressions of
the military and political cadres of tho
armed forces."
Although the 'odds were staked against
them; the Soviets did not give in, "The
party [meaning Stalin] took energetic meas-
ures to weld together the efforts of the
front and of the rear to defeat the enemy.
A State Defence Committee was formed 'un-
der the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin."
This now reading of history is diametri-
cally opposed to the carefully documented
fhidings of Prof. Alexander M. Nekrichi in
his, book "June 21, 1041," At the height of
the Khruschev era this book pinned the
blame for the lack of 'preparations squarely
on Stalin. . ,
After Mr. Khruslichev's fall from power
the neoStalinists counterattacked.-In 1967
Professor Nekrich was expelled from the
party, but for awhile his views still con%
tinued to gain recognition.
Izvestia Stands Forsqure for Sothdist
liwwus-uid B Art
Rejoinder: LIGHT AND SHADOWS. (By B. Shcherbakov,
artist. Izvestia, Sept. 20, p. 4. Complete text:) The Art Pub-
lishing House has issued V. Antonova's "The State Tretyakov
Gallery" in a large edition in the "Cities and Museums of the
World" series. The book provides information about the fa-
mous art gallery, Its history and social significance. It tells
how the collection grew during Soviet years as works of Soviet
art were added. The book is richly illustrated. All this prom-
ises the reader an interesting acquaintance with the genuine
masterpieces of this national treasure-house. But As he gets
deeper into the book, a sense of puzzlement and disillusion-
ment grows in connection with the treatment of the work of in-
dividual artists and the tendentious'selection of the illustra-
tions.
One would expect the gallery's most important works of art
to be chosen for illustrations. But the book does not contain
reproductions of works of Soviet art that have become clas-
sics, such as loganson's "At an Old Urals Factory" and "In-
terrogation of Communists," the Kukryniksy canvas "The
End," Nesterov's "Portrait of Academician I. G. Pavlov," the
paintings of Grekov and Brodsky or sculptures by Mukhina,
Shadr, Konenkov, Vuchetich and Tomsky. On the other hand, in-
significant works, remote from realism, are reproduced. The
writer tries to give a vivid presentation of works of the mod-
ernist trend. For example, Kandinsky's canvas "Vagueness"
is reproduced in color, whereas marry splendid works of clas-
sical Russian art and Soviet art appear in black and white,
The principle by which the works of prominent artists were
chosen also seems strange. Out of the whole rich heritage of
M. V. Nesterov, why was his pasteboard "The Birth of Christ,"
painted in 1891, reproduced, but not ,a single work of the Soviet
period of his activity? The selection of works of the wonder-
ful artist Konclialovsky also causes chagrin. Our contempo-
raries knowvery well that most of his paintings were produced
in Soviet times. But his work is represented among the illus-
trations by the far from best still life "Dry Paint," produced
in 19131
It is utterly incomprehensible why such masterpieces by
Valentin Serov as "Girl With Peaches" or "Portrait of Mika
Morozov" were Ignored, whereas his copies of ikons were
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One of the important distinctive features of Soviet art is Its
multinational character. Yet the book reproduces paintings
only of Russian Republic artists. An exception has been made
only for the Azerbaidzhanian Salakhov. Where are the artists
of other republics-Saryan, Nikoladze, Azgur, Mikenas,
Shovkunenko, Salkalns, Tansykbayev, Dzliaparidze, Yablon-
skaya, and many others?
It is hard to agree with the interpretation of individual
movements in art. It is widely known, for instance, that
Kazimir Malevich rejected the representational principle In
art and was a follower of abstractionism. But the writer of
the book says, not without symp ithy, that Malevich "sought to
convey in art empty space, endlessness, trajectories inhabited
by visible but weightless substance" and emphasized Male-
vich's great popularity among adherents of abstract art.
The legitimate question arises: What guided the publishing
house in Issuing such a book?
Our Thoughts and Disputes: LIFE IS THE SOURCE OF CRE-
ATIVITY. (By U.S.S.R. People's Artist Yu. Vuchetich. Izves-
tia, Sept. 21, p. 2. Complete text:) One morning I gathered a
bouquet of peonies in the garden. The white flowers with the
soft pink spots gave off the most subtle frangrance. I placed
the bouquet in a vase before the mirror. It was an early
.morning in summer. The sun penetrated the room through the
green crowns of tall trees. The sunlight seemed to take on the
fresh colors of the outdoors. The peonies, reflected twice, In
the mirror and in the sunlit window pane, suddenly glowed with
such color that I forgot everything as I stood looking at them.
At that moment one of my artist friends came to visit me.
I showed him the peonies and he, like myself, froze in delight.
We stood in worshipful silence before this beauty. Finally
I asked him to take canvas and paint this bouquet in the whole
gamut of colors created by the light and the reflections in
mirror and window pane.
But my friend was silent and hung his head. What was
wrong? Had I offended him somehow? Then he said:
"I can't. I can't convey all this beauty. I have forgotten
how. If I were to try, the peonies would fade while I searched
for the right combination of colors."
I believed him. 'A fine painter, talented, yet he had lost the
ability. What had happened?
Let us not hide the fact that the demands on the artist's
mastery have declined; we have begun to regard hack work
with tolerance.
But this is not all.
Some artists' searches have drowned in floods of short-
lived "fashionable" trends, have dissolved in them and ac-
quired an overall grey and inexpressive tone. Shallowness of
theme swallowed up other artists; it broke down, mixed up and
confused the criteria we set for art. Man with his individual
diversity and beauty began to disappear from their paintings,
and even the background, the "architectural structure" and so
on, entered the paintings only as an external indication of the
times. For the image of man, left undisclosed, did not show
the signs of the times, not to mention expressive social class
signs.
The impatient desire of some to "criticize," "to expose,"
began to spread. Artistry became secondary to satire on
canvas.
A noisy pseudo-artistic milieu reveled in portrayals of
everyday scenes; genre superficiality was presented as a
discovery, as the birth of the art of "the little man." The in-
significant personality was counterposed to the purposeful,
heroic personality. And for this purpose they invented con-
flicts between "the little man" and "the huge, cold world," in
which individuality allegedly is suppressed by the collective.
In a related art, the art of the cinema, neorealism, a much
talked of trend, one that evidently had some progressive sig-
nificance in the conditions of Italy, became popular in this
period. To spy upon "real life" with the eye of the movie
camera and record the picture with photographic preciseness
became the goal of such cinematographers. Not to mention
those who, with amazing persistence, kept dragging us into
pro auMV4 16?a0W21009MffPft `:s9j41 l*0- 'fA00040003001
 ?Mwft*4
"neorealism"? Why is it new? Had the old realism of L.
Tolstoy and Balzac exhausted itself? Or, for example, had
the realism of Repin and Surikov somehow sinned against art?
And was the conflict of "the little man" with society new to
art? Let us be more precise: with capitalist society! No,
there was nothing new in this conflict. The Italians in the
cinema were following a long and well explored path, the path
of showing what bourgeois society and the crazy world of fear
and desperation does to man and his feelings and aspirations.
But some people were overjoyed at this "discovery" of the
neorealists and in our country too dashed off in search of the
conflict of the "common man," the "little man," with society.
With which society? With the society of this same person
who was described as "common" and "little." There never
were "common" and "little" people, only people; each person
constitutes a huge world of feelings and thoughts, for "man is
the greatest of the marvels he has created."
For some reason at our artists' meetings we began to talk
little of the heroic nature of Soviet man, of creating his image
in art. It is by no means a matter of mechanically borrowing
the Italian "neorealists'" method. If it were only that! Phil-
istinism overwhelmed some artists, and ugliness in all its unex-
pected varieties took the place of the beauty of the world around us.
But the best artists of socialist art did indeed create mas-
terpieces that amazed the world with the majesty of the ac-
complishments and wealth of spirit of the new mail.
Their work opened up a new era In the artistic development
of mankind, they portrayed deeply and truthfully the birth,
development and victory of the socialist social system. In ?
images of enormous ideological and emotional power, images
that educated the broad masses, Soviet artists affirmed the
communist ideal. I shall not mention the names of the best of
our artists-there are many of t.henm.
Soviet artists created a highly artistic gallery, vast in
scope, of typical images of Soviet people, a chronicle of their
heroic deeds. And when we speak how of those who are falling
into hack work and shallowness of theme or unthinkingly chas-
ing after each latest zigzag of the silly Western art fashions,
we have in mind, of course, only a few carriers of unhealthy
trends in our artistic milieu.
Genuinely progressive art, capable of retaining its signifi-
cance for centuries, was always lofty In mastery and deeply
human In content, filled with thoughts and aspirations of man-
kind and concern for man.
Great writers and artists have always understood that art
never left man's side, always corresponded to his needs and
his ideal, always helped him In pursuit of this ideal-was born
with man and developed along with his historical life.
Who of us does not remember "Chapayev," the famous film
made by the Vasilyevs? These directors created an image of
a hero that even our ill-wisher:; applauded. Or in art: "Lenin
the Leader," "Lenin on the Platform" "At an Old Urals Fac-
tory," "Transportation Being Sept in Order," "Interrogation of
Communists," "The Sentry," "Worker and Collective Farm
Woman"-there is enough in these canvases to show the face
of our artistic culture, which is counterposed to modern dec-
adent bourgeois art.
But let us return to the discussion of so-called "new"
trends, whatever names they bear. Do we see in them the
humanistic Ideals of the vra, its heroic content? Ilan time
been merciful toward the "iiispired" discoveries in the style
of the "new trends' that were at first greeted lith extraordi-
nary fuss, with tremendous pretensions and with chagrin at
nonrecognition? What has remained of them in the memory
of the people?
With amazing wastefulness and with the bitterness of petty
nihilists, people who called themselves artists trampled on
beauty and rejected even what ancient )Hellas had left them as
a heritage. They even hastened to replace the beauty of man's
body, its plasticity and perfection, with angular features,
putting outrageous images on shameless display and thereby
opening the gates to bad taste. Sonic loot themselves in the
flood of short-lived trends or simply became confused by the
diversity of the world around them. The very colors on these
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CPYRGH
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trophip(I c ispropor ions that, even artists of the vlom' age wercr
as hano'd oL
In the age of thermonuclear reactions, supersoulc speeds
aid the conquest of outer space,?solnc ills Is suddenly turned
out to be on the periphery of society's life.
It seems to me that this is because, in the pursuit of sup-
posed innovation and cheap success, they somehow forgot
about the chief function of art: to look into the soul of its con-
temporary, the fighter and builder of the new life; to look
deep, as deep as our times demand.
In a half century elan has matured by a century, yet we still
cannot portray this suitably. flow will we render account to
posterity? It is -generally recognized that the flourishing of
the personality is judged not from formless lumps but from
lofty artistic images that disclose t[te concepts of beauty and
harnNniy.
Who is he, the hero of our Soviet times? The worker,
whose hands create the material benefits of socialist society)
the collective farmer, growing the grain for our daily bread!
The Soviet soldier, who cleansed the world of fascism I The
scientist splitting the atomic nucleus, the surgeon operating
on the hu tan heart! Apparently no one would object to calling
thein heroes. But [low are they to be portrayed? After all,
they are utterly incompatible with shallowness of theme. What
Is more, the heroic is difficult! For worthy portrayal of our
contemporary one needs far-!runt-exhausted potentialities of
art, one needs all the richness ;tnd diversity of color. But not
only this. One must also be able to rise to the level of the
hero, to penetrate his spirit, to be able to read and reflect his
huge and complicated inner world. "Neo" does not help here.
No coin ma shapes, not even a comma of wild color superim-
posed on a chaotic intersection of lines and spots, can substi-
tute for the image of our contemporary; it cannot substitute for
the depth of his thought, his courage and, Ititally, his beauty!
Raphael's "Sistine Madonna" - has been attracting pilgrims
for several centuries. I lti:; paintini', has only (only!) beauty.
The beauty of nialern:tl love, Maternal tenderness, eternal
fonifninity, disclosed with :in a iar.ing palette :nil virtuosity fit
handling this pal)Lie.
Leonardo da Vinci loved to tell his pupils the story of the
razor. A ray of light once struck the razor, and the latter saw
its reflection in a mirror. It was delighted with how it looked
and complained at having to shave men's coarse beards. The
razor was offended that its hr illiant blade had to be sharpened
ton a rough whetstone, strapped and honed, it decided to hide.
'l'ime passed, and eventually fill' razor nt:tiiaged to see its re-
fluction again. But. the blade np longer shcittc, it was eroded
with coarse rust and had become ns rough-edged as a saw.
R was no accident that. this story sprang from the artist's
iniagination. As long as art serves a fully idea and its noble
purpose of helping; people to retake our life beautiful, it dues not,
lose its shine and it glistens as the sun. This is exactly how
the art of socialist t?ealistit is.
rl'?i. R, 1,761 THE WA SIB INGTON POST
Soviets _111 cif Crackdown
Ry Anatole Shub holfdavs, has resumed with who stood so close to the ern-
w-ns,hli,ctnn Fnst rmel 1, 9crrlar VigM?? In Addition to Chills, dent inventions of imperialist
MOSCOW, Oct, 5--Soviet Yugoslavia and long-favored propaganda concerning file
Communist critics, seeking to targets in Czechoslovakia, the 'occupation' of Czechosinva-
restore the "monolithic" politi? Soviet press Is probing deeper For Krasnays Zvezcla, the
cal and cultural unity of the in exposing unacceptable "do- army paper, the targets were
early 1950s, have been lashing, vint.ions." the lively Taganka Thealer
out at heretics in Russia Itself Toda.v's Pravda contained a and Theater magazine.
as Well as in Czechoslovakia long attack on Ernest Fischer, ?'f life and -deuce Communist. Party.
And the world Communist retfbian and Marxist plliloso? mindedness---these aspects of
movement. pher? socialist esthetics are indissn-
I t t gether,"' the
ro~v' c iF ePe~l 8"' '/08/ ~' :? '~f4dRiP) Edo 0E# 00 p0 `01r4. It recom-
egun n prl anc emporar rnong the ran s of omrnu?
ily slowed during the summer s nlst Party members any mended that, the i'aganka
where," Pravda said, "a person T1 nfer prndnce more works
 by Mikhail Sholnkhnv, Alexan-
der i'artevev, Alexander Kor-
ncichuk and other stalwarts of
she Stalin period.
The foreign affairs weekly
Za Rubezhom takes after the
Czechoslovak press, in add!-
lion to Yugoslav and Western
publications. The Soviet
weekly at:lncks the satirical
lnsgsrilles halloo and i)ikn.
braz, the Bratislava dailies
Pravda and Smena, the Kosice
daily Vyehndnslovenske Novi
iny, the Moravian paper Nova
Svnhndna, Sc
well as Czeehol
sfovak theaters and publishing
houses.
Friday's Sovietskaya Rossiys
devoted three columns to a
Russian drama critic, V. Kad-
Frirbn'. ()rt. 18. 1968
gosi
By Anatole Shub
We'hiniton Poet Toretin service
BELGRADE, Oct. 17-Yu-
goslav Communists fear the
Soviet Union has entered
what may he a long period
of neo-Stalinism which yvtll
permit neither Czechoslovak
reformers nor other mode-'
pendent-minded forces in
Eastern Europe much room
for maneuver.
Despite Moscow's promise
eventually to remove most
of Its occupation army from
Czechoslovakia, qualified
sources here believe the So-
viet, aim is to reduce that
country in the status of East
Germany, Poland and Bul-
garia--without even the de-
gree of cultural freedom
and economic reform
achieved by Hungary in re-
cent years.
The Soviet aim, It Is said
here, Is to make Czechoslo?
vakia an object lesson for
other Communist parties
and peoples in Eastern Eu-
rope who might contemplate
embarking on political or
economic experimentation
without full Kremlin clear-
Ance. The lesson, directed
primarily now at Independ-
enceaninded Rumania and
Internally moderate Hun-
gary, is that states which
rebel can expect harsher
treatment than those which
remain 100 per cent loyal td
Moscow. Approved,For
rin, for a book "The 17ignity of
Art." Kadrin had been too fa-
vorable toward the Savre.
menik (contemporary) theater
and other cultural phenomena,
while dismissing works of the
Stalin period.
"There is no room for such
views In Soviet art," The news.
paper said--urging greater at.
tention to Vaevolod Kouhetov,
Anatoly Sofronov, Korncichuk
and' other Stalinist and neo-
Stalinist. authors.
For the party theoretical
monthly Kommuniet, the tar.
gets were two philosophers, Y.
A. Milner-Ir?inin and I', M.
Egidec, whose contrthulions to
a recent symposium on ethics
V
were found to be permeated
with "anarchist. idealism" and
Kant.ian views. Kommunist
was extremely critical of the
Department of Ethics at, Tbil-
isi University, which spun-'
cored ' the symposium anti
"permitted the publication of
bheoreatically erroneous mate-
TTals."
A long glintstion from T%Iil.
neu?-Irinin provider a hint of
the views underlying all these
objectionable heresies.
"Ethics," he writes, "is far
from being the science of
what is, has been and will be
. lit is the only science
which concerns what, tit the
moral consciousness of man-
kind, should be."
F Arll
4 sou
O-~ '( a ism
With the signing yester-
day In Prague of a treaty
legitimizing the "tempo.
rary" stationing of Soviet
troops, the Kremlin has ale
ready achieved one of Its In.
RIM goals In Czechoslova-
kia. The next step Is to ob-
tain a statement from
Czechoslovak authorities
that there was a danger of
`counterrevolution" In Au'
gust which justified the So-
viet Intervention.
Observers here believe
that continuous Soviet pres-
sure on Prague will produce
such a statement In a matter
of weeks or, at most, a few
months.
These formalities are
needed by Moscow In order
to bring back into line the
West European Communist
parties which condemned
the Invasion. The Kremlin
still hopes to stage a world
summit conference of loyal'
parties to consolidate pro.
Soviet ranks. Some 65 par-
ties had originally agreed to
hold such a conference In
Moscow on Nov. 25, but
Western Communist Pro-
tests over the occupation of
Czechoslovakia forced a
key Western parties whose
ranks are split over the
Czechoslovak events.
in the French, Italian And
Finnish parties, an esti-
mated 20 to 30 per cent of
the leadership disagreed
originally with their parties'
condemnation of the Inva,
sion. The Soviet Party has
made clear its readiness to
split these parties If need
he, and is reported also to
have withheld funds on
which these parties are lit
large measure dependent.
The Italian Party, In it
Central Committee plenary
meeting this week, Is dis-
cussing for the first time
whether It should make the
break for genuine independ-
ence of Moscow. The out,
come of the discussion is un-
certain, but compromise and
delay are in the Italian tra-
dition.
However the Italians de-
cide, it is now cod'sidered
likely that the nextinterna-
tionat Communists pr+'para?
tors meeting, to be held in
Budapest on Nov. 17, will,
agree in principle to a cone
ference early next year,
without setting a precise
date,
postponement. Such a conference would
While pressing Prague foe deal with "common tasks iii
Justification of the Invasion, the struggle against imperi'
the Soviet Party has algo alism" and would not dis-
cuss Czechoslovakia. It
R'M as `'2oOS/69Pf?re df'A-RDR7S8wIItOfn41400OO4?803O13-2
CPYRGH
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 Approved or Release - - -
Chinese and Yugoslav here- Mocow is spared the trou-
sles, reaffirm the hard So- ble of coiitriving his dis-
viet line on the German and missal. If he stays and exe,
Mideast questions, and pro- cutes Moscow's harsh terms,
claim collectively the Krem- he loses popularity among
lin thesis that "sharpening" the Czechs and Slovaks --
of the struggle against the and can then more easily be
West requires strengthening discarded later, as one
of supranational control source here puts it, "like a
both In the East European squeezed lemon."
bloc and in the international' Despite the syrface unity
Communist movement. displayed in .Prague thus
By the time such a confer- far, differences In view have
ence Is held next spring, ,the already emerged among the
Soviet Union expects to reformers, and there are
have the Czechoslovak Party fears that with continued
well in hand. Already, such, Soviet. pressure Prime Min-
collaborators as Alois Indra ist.er Oldrich Cernik and
and Vasil Bllak-ostract zed possibly President Ludvik
for weeks by the Czechoslo-, Svoboda may yet be induced
vak progressives-are sit- to collaborate with a new
ting in on meetings of the
Czechoslovak leadership. Soviet-controlled Party lead-
Old Stalinists like Anton ership of the Indra-Bilak
Kapek and Karel Mestek type.
have organized a hard-line As for differences within
pressure group on the out- the Soviet leadership con-
side. c' e r n I n g Czechoslovakia,
At the same time, the
process of undermining the
unity of the original reform-
ers is exected to continue,
as occupied Czechoslovakia
tends to he abandoned by
the outside world and espe'
Bally by the foreign Coin-
munist parties.
Czechoslovakia's Popular
National Assembly Presi-
dent, Josef Smrkovsky, is
high on the Soviet purge list
and his resignation or dig,
missal is considered merely
a matter of time. Party
leader Alexander Dubcek
has been placed in an Imnos-
sihie position. If he resigns,
Instead, the reputed
Kremlin doves either cited
the diffticult repercussions
which might he expected in
the West: and in the Commu-
nist movement - or argued
that further attempts should
he made to halt the Czerho.
slovak demorratizntlon by
political pressures "short of
war" before turning to the
last resort of the Red Army,
Yugoslav observers be-
lieve the present Soviet
Central Committee to be
dominated by long-en-
trenched Stalinist and neo-
Stalinist bureaucrats god.
erned largely by fear foe
.their own positions.
These stalwarts of the
Party apparatus, the army
and the political police fear
that even the slightest At.
tempt at internal democrati-
zation, economic reform or
relaxation of tensions with
these were not disagrees ' the West would open a Pan.
inents over principle but dora's box and jeopardize
only over timing and tactic, their entire system.
Premier Kosygin, ideologist Under such conditions, liti
Mikhail Suslov, trade union
chief Alexander Shelepin,
Deputy Premier Dmitry Po-
lyansky and Party Secretary
Boris Ponomarev argued
against the Invasion of Aug.
20. None or them did so,
hdwever, out of sympathy
logue In the near. future,
Contrary to some Western
d i p I o in atic assessments,
qualified Yugoslavs believe
that Russia is not at all In.
terested In an early settle-
for the Czechoslovak experi? menu of the Middle East
ment or belief In the inde, problem, but would prefer,
pendence of small nations, to keep the pot boiling for
(Yugoslav leaders are now five ot six years - time
recalling for the first time enough to establish a solid
ill years the fate of the Ba1- Soviet military and eco-
tic republics incorporated nomic presence in Mediter.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE i' )NITOR'by Russia'in 1940). ranean Sea.
13 June 1968
Soviet trend?
Grigory Svirsky, a well-known novelist,
was excluded from the Communist Party
because of a speech he made before a Mos-
cow writers meeting on Jan. 16, in which
he attacked censorship and complained,
"Everything that seeks to overcome the
fatal consequences of the cult of person-
ality Is burned out with a red-hot iron. One
sometimes is not even allowed to mention
,that the cult of personality existed."
Party expulsion hinted
Stalin hack on his pedestal," received a The critic and essayist Lev Kopelev, nvho'
medal for 'distinguished work on the occa- in December, in the Austrian Communist
sion of the 50th anniversary of the revolu- journal Tagebuch attacked those Soviet
tionplpO leb W CIq B'}iP3b 0@4#6bW0f 2n, also
mission to travel abroad. Is Bal to have been expelled from the
'111*alsud
C.,,ain . i -
I By Patti Wohi
Written for The Christian Science Monitor
Once again, Stalin is being honored in the
Soviet Union, albeit cautiously.
Although no one talks of the Stalin cult
of personality any longer there are Indica
tions that it is being revived.
An otherwise undistinguished young poet,
Feliks Chuyev, who published a.poem glori-
lying Stalin and publicly demanded: "Put'
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the rehabilitation of Stalin has spread
to military writings. In February, even
Kommunist, magazine of the Central Com-
mittee, gave credit to Stalin for having
"taken part in organizing the struggle
.against white guardists" and for having
had a big stake in winning World War II.
Far more serious than such indicatiofl
of the party leadership's attempt to re-
store Stalin to a distinguished place. in his-
tory 1s the reaction of much of the people
at large.
When Defense Minister Marshal Andrel
,.A. Grechko, In a speech on the occasion of
the 50th anniversary of the Red Army on
Feb. 23, mentioned Stalin's role as chair-
man of the State Defense Committee, he
was interrupted by' loud applause. When
reminiscing about' the war, many older
people often raise toastsyto Stalin, not only
in the late dictator's native Georgia but all
over the Soviet Union.
Secret police glorificll
Hand in hand with a thnewed Stalin cult
goes the glorification of the state security
services, formerly called the secret police.
A theater play by Sergei Mikhalkov, which
was favorably reviewed by Pravda and Red
Star, the daily of the armed forces, referred
to secret police agents or Chekistj as "those
admirable people, courageous, intrepid,
heroic, true knights without fear and re-
proach,"
NO wonder that the Soviets are, disturbed
about Czechoslovakian periodicals implicat
ing Stalin's friend, former Soviet President
' Mikoyan, in the Czech trials of the early
flftles and the honoring of Stalin's victims.
Mr. Svirsky, in his speech before the
Moscow writers, singled out a novel by V,
'Zakhrutin among the works rehabilitating
Stalin. It appeared last year in the con-
servative journal Oktyabr.
"Do not tackle [the] Stalin (problem-],"
says Mr. Zakhrutin's positive hero. "We
know why Stalin got stuck in your throat.
. , , Because he defended the ideas of Lenin
i and cut short all attempts to betray him,"
`Loyal and dediculcd'
"Who knows, perhaps prison, exile, the
solitude of the taiga (Siberian forest), the
cold and hunger which he endured, hard-
ened his soul, made his brusque and rude,
,but he wads loyal afid dedicated to Lenin
like -a soldier. With all his strength and
will power he defended Lenin's teachings
against the rabble of the opposition and
watched over the purity and discipline of
the party."
Another example of Stalin idolatry are
the verses of the well-known writer Sorge!
Srhirnov, in the journal Moskva of last Oc-
tober, "It was Stalin who, in the years of
trial, did not leave his command post. And.
Nwe, ? legitimately, honored in him out own
strength. . ."
All this, Complained Mr. Svirsky, goes on
"with the approval of Glavlit (the censor.
ship office], , . , Anyone who praises Stalin
Js encouraged. . ; . Critics of the survival
of the [Stalinist] past are told 'Ono %must
not stir up the past, one most not open up
old wounds etc,",'
CZECHOSLOVAK REFORMS SO11ASiit?D BY SOVTCT NEO-STALINISM
(Artlrle by Kx; Zurich, None Zuerclrer Zeitung, German, 25 September
1968, pp 1, 2(
The intervention in Czechoslovakia has clearly brought out a
fundamental reorientation in the Soviet "general line." Against
the background of the invasion of Prague, we can now detect the most
'profound changes in Soviet policies since Stalin's death. Czecho-
-;lovakia wanted to catch up with the "de-Stalinization" ushered in
by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1.956 at a very late
:late because it had missed this opportunity in 1956; on the other
hand, the exact opposite development in the Soviet Union has brought
a return to the Formerl.v c:ritiirtzed totalitarian methods of rule and
Stalin's ideological dogmas. The irreconcilability of these two
development tendencies -- away from "Stalinism" in Prague, back to
"Stalinism" in Moscow -- constituted the basis for the tensions be-
tween the Czechoslovak and the Soviet leaderships and inescapably led
to an attempt to resolve the situation by force. There was quite oh-
virntsly much more at stake here for the Soviet leadership than the
new forward-strategy of the Warsaw pact and quarantine measures against
the revisionist source of infection, that is to say, the fundamental
decision on the future "general line" of Soviet domestic and foreign
policy. Appror"i Or Re1ent3;e,20W017 td PtrF F37t8~03tQ6Es1AtQQQ4AQQ3Qili1
gation of a party eager to institute reforms, the further splitting
8
 CPYRGH
o f Uifgvp",R~ Nea ~ic 0~5c~~ /11i7t ~~QeR r ~39 I 9 z09913ii31 am e
of power, but it also signified the first phase of an upheaval in
Soviet policy with as yet unforeseeable consequences.
Counter-Reform Movement
Since Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, there has been a
silent "de-Khrushchevization movement" parallel to the beginning of
a "re-Stalinization." These tendencies of course were nqt expressed
in any fundamental and comprehensively political and theoretical manner,
such as the dramatic turn away from the Stalin era in Khrushchev's
secret speech and in the resolutions of the 20th Party Congress, some-
$hing which was done un,lc?r I he again of neo-LeniniSin. The changes ninc,e
1964 were sneaked in through the back door in that a veil of complete
oblivion was spread over Khrushchev and his era, while a more positive
.evaluation of the Stalin era was undertaken and while the list of sins
of 1956 was increasingly ignored. This creeping re-Stalinization
burst into open neo-Stal.ini.sm after the 9 and 1.0 April 1968 CC Plenum,
when hitherto rejected theories of Stalin were once again upgraded.
This involved not onI.y a better evaluation of the Stalin era, a re-
habilitation of Stalin and other problems of coping with the past, but
it also involved the development of. new ideological perspectives and
of the future political. line.
Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and methods
of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after 1953 and to
make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy. The neo-Stalinist
turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party Congress and a rejection
of developments since then, along with reform communism, recognition
of the "individual road" and West-East coexistence. The opinion seems
to prevail in present-day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies
did not produce the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexist-
ence only undermined the Soviet power base, while at Stalin's time
there was "quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet gov-
ernment inspired fear and respect in the outside world.
This attitude so far has not produced any actual restoration of
Stalin's "old regime" with permanent purges, secret police terror,
and slave labor camps. In addition to the jingoistic and anti-Semitic
relics which have been swept forward again, neo-Stalinism -- like
most counter-reform movements -- also contains modernistic and dynamic
features. By falling back on tried methods, the Moscow neo-Stalinists
want to extricate the country from the stagnations of reforms, from
the decay of the economy and society, and from the corruption of con-
stant compromises; they want to alter the status quo and they want once
again to restore "order" at home and power and hegemony abroad. For
this purpose, they have upgraded the decisive ideological, political,
and military dogmas from Stalin's textbook more in spirit than in the
letter and they have combined these dogmas into a new "general line"
which is by no means identical with Stalin's line. His methods and
teachings are today being applied more roughly, more brutally, and
more uninhibited than the sly and coolly calculating Stalin himself
used to do or the way he would have done it now in similar situations.
The neo-Stalinist renegades obviously are also lacking in stature and
capability so that they cannot step into Stalin's shoes without creat-
ing a danger to themselves and to the rest of the world.
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 rPYRGH
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The most visible outward sign of this Stalinist reaction is the
increased secrecy and concealment of Soviet policy, such as it was
customary prior to 1953. 1here is no more Giuseppe Boffa to recount
the internal secrets of the Kremlin and the CIA likewise does not
so far seem to have succeeded in getting its hands on the texts of
Brezhnev's secret speeches to the April and July Plenums. Once again
one must read between the lines, one must sift through ideological
t.rncts, and one must listen for indirect signals.
Just how severe the current about-face is and just how radical
the revocation of the 20th Party Congress really is can be seen from
a contribution in the Party journal Komunist, No 12, on the outbreak
of World War II. In the past, Hitler'_s attack on Russia and Stalin's
behavior in 1941 were a debated key topic of "de-Stalinization" and
only recently did Soviet historian Nekrich in his heavily attacked
book The 22nd of June 1941 document and criticize the mistakes on the
basis of sources. This historical dispute has always constituted a
concealment of present-day clashes. The interpretation of Stalin's
failure in 1.941, which so far has been accepted even in official
histories, has now been turned upsidg down in Komunist by key Party
historian V. Khvostov and his associate A. Grilev.
They now assert that the Party and the Soviet leadership (they
mention Stalin by name only twice) from the very beginning did not
trust in the pact with Hitler and used the time between 1939 and 1.941
as n breather, for the expansion of Soviet armament. Stalin supposedly
was, right when he avoided the danger of a two-front war in Europe and
In the Far East through his pact with Hitler. The Soviet Union sup-
posedly strictly carried out this agreement and tried to stop the
attack with dipl.om,atic means until, the very last. The Soviet leader-
ship allegedly was informed on Hitler's attack preparations -- some-
thing that has so far been doubted and challenged by Soviet historians,
military men, and writers -- and did take the necessary precautions.
The blame for the outbreak of World War II is placed entirely on the
Western governments. With he conclusion that the Soviet leadership
30 years ago foresaw the "Imperialist attack" and took the correct
countermeasures, the authors are now concentrating on current matters
through a revision of the image of Stalin. By the way, this essay
draws a parallel between the antecedents of World War II and present-
day developments. Although the article went to print on 12 August,
it: reads as If it were an announcement and justification of the capture
of Prague.
Preventive Purge
More frightening than the threadbare justification of Soviet in-
tervention in Prague is the reappearance of the Stalinist concept of
preventive punishment used in this connection. It was not a "counter-
rovotution" that had already broken out -- as it was alleged in Hungary
in 1956 -- but rather the danger of a threatening "counterrevolution,"
in other words, a possible and not a real deviation, that was to be
liquidated. This is exactly the same argumentation that was used for
Stalin's purges which were directed against all possible and poten-
tial "enemies of the Party." The thought scheme of total suspicion,
which determined the charges and the explanation of the sentences
handed down during the Moscow trials, returned with dangerous threat
in the acAppsWedf tfeaset2O05tOW4fferiC c P78e(I3Olail3AS664gBWOP98-2
 Approve or Release 2005/08/17 : - -
tured as right-wing revisionist traitors" and accomplices o Mao and
of the Western Imperialists.
With the allegation of a counterrevolutionary danger in Czeclio-
slovakia, there has now been wiped out as inapplicable a thesis set
up by Khrushchev according to which the East Bloc countries have al-
ready progressed so far on the road to communism that a relapse into
capitalism has become impossible. This ideological justification of
a "Communist commonwealth" of Communist countries with equal rights,
moving along "their own road," has now been replaced with the old
Comintern formula of Stalin according to which all parties must take
the CPSU as a model and prove their loyalty to the line by giving
Moscow unconditional support. This demand is already being waved in
front of all parties that dare criticize the capture of Prague.
Not even in theory does Moscow want any more "sister nations" and
equal partners in world communism; instead, it wants powerless tools
and satellites, as in Stalin's time.
Revival of Class Struggle
CPYRGH
Chin new "5t.al Inlr;m wil.houit Stalin" is in the process of replac--
tng the reformist theory of "the [arty and the state of the entire
people" in the 1961 Party Program with the outdated thesis of the
"class struggle in socl.nii.st society," as this has already been done
by Party Secretary Demichev in Komunist (No 10, 10 July). Stalin and
Molotov were blamed for this class struggle theory on the occasion of
the rehabilitation of their victims in 1956. The reappearance of this
thesis as to the continuing class struggle is a signal for a domestic-
policy hardening and challenges all of the past reform endeavots. Here
we also find one of the decisive causes of the Czechoslovak crisis:
while the Czechoslovak CP with its action program and statute draft
was tying In with'Khrushchev's 1961 and 1962 Party reforms and while
it wanted to develop these reforms radically, the CPSU revoked these
reforms and is now once again trying to reintroduce the old-style Strict
Party order. In this connection, the dispute between the. Soviet
reformers and the neo-Stalinists was continued via the polemic with
Prague.
Although neo-Stalinist theory and practice have not yet been
canonized by a Party Congress and although it is still disputed among
the leadership and in the Party, it nevertheless increasingly influ-
ences the Soviet scene and promises Little that is good for the future.
The reimposed formulas of "class struggle" and "counterrevolution"
alone would rather seem to point to convulsions and tensions, cer-
tainly not to a restoration of "calm and order." Another thing that
sounds ominous is the repeated hint at a ban on the formation of
fractions and on a return to Party discipline, something which Stalin
used to keep bringing up during the power struggles and purges.
This theoretical and practical development of neo-Stalinism is
undoubtedly backed up by forces that want to push their power aspira-
tions through. The last consequence of neo-Stalinism would actually
be a return to one-man rule. The present "collective leadership"
under Brezhnev and Kosygin (lid grow up under Stalin and was molded by
the Stalin era, but it. Is on the other hand closely tied in with the
Klurusliche~v era and the reform endeavvnrs. The real. protagonists of.
ii -S
rFtovei4-t< o,'r' ~ef to am otis m . tfla y eaders who O
o f necess~c
 CPYRGHT
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only constitute a compact fraction and who need not necessarily pur-
sue identical objectives. slut in the history of the Bolshevik Party
a sudden upheaval, such as -It now seems to emerge with the neo-
Stalinist about-face, was always connected with personnel changes at
the top.
Confrontation Instead of Coexistence
Anyone who today contlnuall.y reads the Soviet press and theo-
retIcal treatises on foreign policy will feel as if he were back in
the Cold War during the late. 40's. Corresponding to the revived thesie
of the continuing class struggles within the Communist cotrntr.:les we
now have the assumption of growing international tensions between
the two camps. This fatal dialectic has already been used against
the Czechoslovak "counterrevolution," when an alleged cooperation be-
tween "class enemies" in Czechoslovakia and foreign "imperialists"
was construed. Since the Resolutions of the April Plenum demanded
increased defense against "subversive imperialist propaganda," we find
that a "continuing contrast between the socialist and the imperialist
-camp" is being emphasized increasingly clearly in the Soviet Union.
Very quietly and hardly noticed, there has been a return to the theory
of the "two camps" which was set up'by Zhdanov,in 1947 and the Image
of "imperialist encirclement" was recalled through the tie-in between
the Vietnam War, the Israeli campaign, "West German revenge-mongering"
and 1 I u ' n i b et;edly 1vv NATO plans.,
The St al inI st ron11 icV theory h;is been expanded and aggravated
inasmuch as there IS now nn t. oni.y t..IIk of a threat of force from t: lie
outside; in addition, the real threat is considered to reside in the
internal softening which has been promoted by peaceful means, in
other words, in the form of -Johnson's "bridge building" and Bonn's
Eastern policy. 'Conjuring up a "foreign enemy" to justify internal
suppression is now turning into a much more offensive effort, in
combination with expressions of the arrogance of power and the ex-
pansion drive. The neo-Stalinists in the Kremlin seem to have less
inhibitions and a greater readiness to take risks than their re-
awakened model Stalin.
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