IS A SPLIT DEVELOPING BETWEEN PEKING AND HANOI?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY December 1968
IS A SPLIT DEVELOPING BETWEEN PEKING AND HANOI?
Observers of the Far East scene are concluding with increasing assur-
ance that Hanoi and Peking are having their differences and that the dif-
ferences are even more deep-seated than those that would arise naturally
from their long term donor-dependent relationship. There is considerable
direct evidence of serious quarrels, such as their openly opposed stands
on certain major issues and the increasingly polemical turn of their pub-
lic references to one another. There is other evidence which can most
logically be explained in terms of a quarrel between the two countries,
such as the withdrawal of Chinese technicians and military personnel from
North Vietnam, and the prolonged absences of North Vietnam's diplomatic
personnel from Peking.
Divided Views Over Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
The most significant recent example of serious differences between
Hanoi and Peking occurred when the two nations took diametrically oppo-
site views on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hanoi leapt in im-
mediately to give unqualified support to the USSR, even going so far as
to repeat verbatim the lengthy TASS justification of the invasion. This
move gave Hanoi a black eye not just in the free world, but also in the
view of leftist organizations which ordinarily support Hanoi in the
Vietnam war. Moreover, Hanoi's support for Moscow has estranged her
from the great majority of the fraternal Communist parties which strongly
condemned the USSR. Hanoi's endorsement of the Soviet action may be an
indication that she has decided to follow Soviet rather than Chinese
leadership of the world Communist movement; it could be that Moscow had
extracted from Hanoi a promise of support for an action the USSR knew
would bring down world censure; it could be that Hanoi hoped the inva-
sion would put a crimp in any possible U.S.-USSR detente, or that
Czechoslovakia's fate would bring Moscow's Eastern European satellites
into line on other issues, including more help to Hanoi. It is possible
that Hanoi's decision was primarily based on ideological grounds since
the Lao Dong, as one of the most conservative ruling Communist parties
in the world, would rejoice to see the stamping out of what it undoubt-
edly viewed as dangerous revisionist tendencies on the part of Czecho-
slovakia.
As for China's view of the attack on Czechoslovakia, CHOU En-lai
and a number of China's leaders used North Vietnamese National Day
celebrations to criticize Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and to
flail Hanoi for her defense of the Soviet move, Peking was not by any
means defending the down-trodden, out-powered Czechs; she was merely
taking another opportunity to excoriate her erstwhile ally, Moscow, and
to charge that the invasion is evidence of a Soviet-U.S. bargain on
"spheres of influence" giving Moscow a free hand in Eastern Europe in
return for a U.S. free hand in Southeast Asia. Whatever the reasons
for Hanoi's and Peking's respective defense and attack on Moscow,
the drama of Czechoslovakia revealed a definite schism between these
formerly closeknit allies.
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Paris Peace Talks
China's brief appearance as a critic of aggression and invasion in
Europe would have been more impressive had it not been for her attitude
in April and May of 1968 when North Vietnam agreed to meet U.S. repre-
sentatives in Paris for peace negotiations. Chinese leaders roundly and
openly criticized the North Vietnamese for agreeing to participate in the
talks. Reports came out of the Chinese mainland in mid-June that Red
Guards had demonstrated outside the three North Vietnamese consulates in
China -- at Canton, Nanning and Kunming. The demonstrations were osten-
sibly in support of the continued Vietnamese "struggle," but seasoned
observers viewed them as a further condemnation by China of the Paris
talks on Vietnam. On 29 June, the International Herald Tribune (Paris)
reported that "public demonstrations against local North Vietnamese
diplomatic officials" in China had supported demands that "these officials
repudiate the Paris talks," and an Indian press agency report from New
Delhi on 22 June said "it is presumed that they (Red Guards) were
demonstrating against North Vietnam's talks with the United States."
Two days after Foreign Minister CHEN Yi attacked the announcement
that peace negotiations were to begin in Paris, Ngo Minh Loan, the North
Vietnamess Ambassador to China, abruptly departed from Peking. On
8 July, the deputy chief of the National. Liberation Front mission in
Peking, Nguyen Minh Phuong, was recalled and has not returned to China,
Evidence of split or the inevitable results of problems confronting
allies?.,, It doesn't actually matter into which category the foregoing
evidence falls. However these factors may be categorized, they seem to
indicate a deterioration cot the close relations which existed between
Hanoi and Peking a. year ago,
Other Indications of Possible Rift
Newspaper men in Hanoi have expressed the opinion that the Chinese
are ? Withdrawing their troops from North "Iietnarn as a result of Hanoi's
conviction that the bombing will. not be resumed. Rumors have also been
circulating in Paris that the Chinese have withdrawn 40% of their tech-
nical and paramilitary personnel from North Vietnam, including bridge
builders, railroad engineers and anti-aircraft units. (Chinese manpower
in North Vietnam in the past has been estimated by military observers
as between 30,000 and 50,000,) The withdrawal of these Chinese may be
by mutual agreement between Hanoi and Peking On the other hand there
may be another explanation, Numerous stories are circulating in Hanoi,
in fact,?that the Chinese were evacuated at. North Vietnam's insistence
because of Chinese _ins~;=teri;e on distributing Mao badges and propaganda
material including the "`i.,.i_rtle Red Book of Quotations." The Hong Kong
South China Morning Post., of 2 May reported that the North Vietnamese
had barred Mao badges and becks and that Chinese seamen had been warned
not to wear their badges ashore. Despite these warnings, there have been
reports that. Chinese sailors have been. seeking to create incidents among
the crews of other shipping at Haiphong. A few months ago, when the
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Chinese offered to repair the Paul Doumer Bridge in Hanoi again, the North
Vietnamese refused the offer, recalling the last repair job on the bridge
carried out by the Chinese in December 1967 when the Chinese workmen put
up a flagrant display of Mao posters for all of Hanoi to see. It has been
recalled -- in the general context of withdrawal of technicians and ad-
visors -- that the first sign of the Sino-Soviet split was the withdrawal
of Soviet technicians from China in 1960, heralding the eventual cut-off
of Soviet economic aid to China.
Arrangements for negotiating economic aid from China to North Vietnam
were markedly changed this year when Le Thanh Nghi's economic delegation
(which in past years went first to China) signed its first agreement in
Hungary, after which it went to Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany and the USSR. The Peking-Hanoi agreement on further economic
and technical aid to North Vietnam was eventually signed in an atmosphere
of mutual misgivings, primarily caused by the continued hold-up in China
of supplies for Vietnam. Fifteen convoys of Soviet aid and military equip-
ment were reportedly bogged down in Chinese territory at the very time
the economic protocols were. being signed. Small wonder that the North
Vietnamese tried other nations before falling back on an ally whose inter-
nal chaos makes cross country rail transportation so uncertain. The
15 Soviet convoys were believed to be caught on the south:rn border of
Kwangsi province, which was then riven by factional disorders finally
brought under control by the Red Army. But can the Red Army maintain
order, manufacture the goods Peking has just promised Hanoi, keep the
railroads running to deliver the goods Eastern Europe countries have
promised Hanoi and serve the real functions of an Army? For that matter,
how can China claim to be in the protective, guiding hands of Communism
when all that keeps order in the country and maintains the Party in
power is the Army?
Hanoi's unflattering views on her Chinese ally have been indicated
directly or obliquely in her public statements, in her news media cover-
age of Chinese affairs, in the statements of her diplomats and consular
officials, and sometimes in her very failure to comment on such vital
factors as the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese scene.
China has revealed her own unflattering views on Hanoi in similar
fashion: in the recent protests in Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces against
the shipping of scarce goods such as rice and medical supplies to North
Vietnam, and in her open resentment over the growing warmth of the Hanoi-
Moscow relationship and over Hanoi's apparent ingratitude for what Peking
has done for her.
The objective viewer could say "small wonder" in either situation,
considering the polemics and the extremist behavior indulged in by both
Hanoi and Peking. Peking's resentment against such an inconstant ally
is comprehensible, as'is Hanoi's concern over what the war is costing in
North Vietnamese lives -- an entire generation, which can never be replaced.
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Hanoi is also certainly worried about what China plans to extract from
North Vietnam in ultimate payment for her assistance during this
long war. And while Hanoi worries over paying her mounting debts to
China, she will have to consider that the further she moves towards
Moscow, the further in debt she will be there. She is already, in
fact, mortgaging her future to two nations, the USSR and China, both
of which have repeatedly demonstrated that they will exploit to the
hilt any obligations owed them. Whether the quarrels between Hanoi
and her giant Chinese neighbor and "benefactor" eventually lead to
serious rifts or not, she is in a position few countries in Asia
or Europe would envy. She has only to look to Czechoslovakia to see
a vivid example of the price the small debtor must pay to a Communist-
style friend.
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PHILIPPINES HERALD T
4 October 1968
North'
Vietnam Is Talking with` U.S. in Paris
AginsUComjnjnjs ' thing's Advice
'PARIS (UPI) -- Diplo- the Mainich, newspaper talk-fight policy of the that the Soviet. Union,
i matic sources in Pa- of Tokyo in an interview Vietnamese, which they following its policy ' of de-
iris have backed up chief recorded last week and used so successfully ag- tente with the United
U.S. delegate W. Avereli released this week. ainst the French, is not In States urged the North
;H a r riman's contention The sources said that agreement w i t h the Vietnamese to negotlaU 4
.that North Vietnam is Peking made it clear In thoughts of Mao Tse- an end to the Vietnam
talking ' with the United May when the conversa- tung on' the fighting: of war with the U.S.
!States against the wishes tions began in Paris that wars of national libera- The North Vietnamese
tof the Chinese Commu- they were unhappy that tion. probably a r e allowing
!flist. Hanoi had agreed to talk.
The Chinese want the themselves to be influ
"They (the North Viet- At' that time the Chinese Vietnamese to keep fight-" enced by the Soviet Union'
Aamese) are in Paris with recalled their press re- Ing and to win on the bat- as a' means of decreasing
the support of the Soviet presentatives in Paris and tlefield, thus p r o v i n g Chinese influence and
government and. against have ignored the talked again that Mao Is right, pressure on North Viet-
''the advice and pressure of ever since. the sources said. nam, the sources specula.;
yoking," Fiarrinaian told The. fiources said? that _ , -,The same sources said ted...
WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1968
` Concern Over Moscow Rises
Peking Celebration`;
Downgrades, Hanoi'
By Stanley Karnow
washinaton Poet Foreign Service
i Oct. The,
Chinese communists have sig-i
nificantly downgraded their
,expressions of support for
`North Vietnam and the Viet
,cong while displaying In-
,creased 'concern at the poss-
ibility of a clash with the So-
viet Ux=i".
This was apparent today in
major statements delivered by
both Premier Chou En-lai and
,Lin - Piao, China's Defense
Minister, at Peking celebra-
tions marking the Chinese
Communist regime's 19th year)
In power.
The two Chinese leaders al-I
so indicated domestic policiesi
ra on ea urea 17735 n i
wife Chiang Ching, and other
luminaries.
Notably missing for the sec-
ond straight year was Li
Shao-chi, the head of state
who has been repeatedly de
flounced as "China's Khrush
chev" for allegedly having fa
vored such Soviet-style "revs
i sionist" reforms as material
rewards for workers and peas
ants. But the presence or ab-
sence of key figures, though
usually a revealing clue to the
status of Communist hierarch
ies, appeared to analysts her
to be less important today
than the style of the anniver
pointing to the further decline
of Mao Tse-tung's Cultura,I !substance of its oratory.
pect
The most important aspect
Revolution and the rise of
moderate military and civilian
Authority in China.
Held in Peking's Tien-an
Men Square-the, Plaza of
of the celebration, in the view
of these analysts, was the shift
in focus by the Chinese away
from the Vietnam war to the
potential danger of collision
with the Soviet Union.
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This switch is thought to re- sion and for national salvo-'y
fleet increasingly strained re? tion."
lations between Peking and ' asTa sloganedu ing I stryear's!
Hanoi and, at the same time,' anniversary ' demonstrations.
mirror growing Chinese fears 1 None of the slogans in the cur
that the Russians may violate .rent celebration has men-
chrir northern and western tinned Vietnam, however.
borders just as they invaded I Similarly, speaking at recep?I
Czechoslovakia. tion In Peking last night, Chou!
Peking's attitudes towards En-lai referred to Vietnam;
Hanoi and Moscow are linked, perfunctorily, placing Chinese
moreover. since the Vietnam- support for the "heroic Viet
ese Communists backed Soviet namese" after Peking's devo-.
int-rvention in Czechoslovakia tion to the "fraternal Albanian.
while the Chinese bitterly ex- people."
coriated the Russians for their Last year, Chou not only
action. / matched Lin Piao's promise of
The new change in their, "resolute support" for Hanoi
utlook, some experts here and the Vietcong but also;
uggest, may also mean that j stressed that China would
he Chinese are now less wor-
ied by the threat of war with
he United States than they
ere earlier this year, when
American aircraft were bomb-
ng close to their southern
ordefs. -
Speaking at this morning's
ally In Peking, Lin Piao
ointedly omitted any refer-
nee to the Vietnam conflict,
"maximum na-tio?nal sacrifices"
in its determination to aid'
them.
In another speech yesterday,
Chou voiced Peking's appre-
hension at the possibility of
Russian attack, accusing Mos.
cow of encircling China by
"staltioning massive troops
along The Sino-Soviet and
nd instead called on Chinese) ~ina-iviongoilan borders" and
coops to "remain vigilant" "even more frequently send-
nd strengthen their country's, ing planes to violate China's
i airspace."
defenses." ."
On Sept. 16, in their first ex.
At last year's celebration, in change of protests on the sub-~
ontrast, Lin urged China to ject, the Chinese complained'
ive "resolute support'to the to Moscow against 29 Intru..
Vietnamese people in their lions over their territory by'
reat war against U.S.,aggres-, Sovieteircraft.
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Pnmar~ly advanced
phasis on Vietnam was also
evident last night in the order
,of prominence accorded the
"distingulsed? foreign guests"
who attended the National
Day reception given by Chou
.irn Peking.
il, As listed In an official New
'China News Agency dispatch
received here, the two North'
Vietnamese vice-minsters and?
a Vietcong Central Committee
member present at the recep--
tion were outrankd by half a
dozen Albanians, four mem-
bers of a Pakistan delegation,
a Burmese and an Indonesian.
mmunist, and a Communist
from Auckland, New Zealand.
At last year's celebration,
the Hanoi and Vietcong repre-
sentatives were. second only, to
the Albanians.
Meanwhile today the gov-,
ernment press rimade It clear:'
that the drive to curb the Cul-
WASHINGTON POST
22 October 1968
Red Guard activities will con- elements among the industrial
The official editorial said
] that "the working class must
exercise leadership In every.
thing", insisting that workers
and peasants mobilized Into
,so-called "Mao Tse-tung's
Thought Propaganda Teams"
would play a predominant role
In schools, offices, factories
and other enterprises.
These teams, essentially dis-
ciplinary platoons organized
to crack down on unruly Red
Guards and other agitators,
are Instruments of the army,-
which now rules the country
through Revolutionary Com-
mittees set up In all of China's
29 provinces and special mu-
nicipalities.
The editorial indicated that
at'tention' may soon be tuyned
towards constructing a new
Communist Party apparatus.
"New blood" in the apparatus
;workers," the newspapers said..
It is unlikely that the mod-'
crate military and civilian
:leaders now in the ascendency
will call a party congress to
make such a change until they
are able to reinforce their con-
trol down to the country's low
est levels.
I This appears to be their
objective In their program to
establish Revolutionary Com-
mittees in every town, county,
school, factory, office and;
,other enterprise in the coun-
try.
Judging from the subdued
tone of the National Day cele
i bration,, they are evidently ap-
proaching this challenge with,
a .sobriety starkly different,
from the demonstrations of
two years ago, when Mao en .
couraged disorder and vio-
lease.
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jI~nOiVC Split Seen on Reply
By Stanley Karnow Divergent Views - 'tle -to show for years of'sac.,
Washington Post Foreign Service These differences hav rifice.
e This apprehension hasd
HONG KONG, Oct. 22-_~ b+'r'n brought to the fore by been reflected, for exampleNorth Vietnamese and Viet- the White House proposal, in Front propaganda attack','
cong leaders appear to West which the factions view ei- ing figures like Gen. Duong
ther as a hazard or an op- Van Minh, a former South
ern ;
analysts here to be di ,portunity, ' depending on Vietnamese Premier now in
vided in their efforts to their particular hopes, fears Saigon, whom Hanoi spokesw"
shape a response to Presi- or dogmas. men publicly treat with re-:
dent Johnson. reported pack- - The Communist group $Peet and privately concedei
age plan to break the dead- most sensitive to the nego to be a potential member of'
lock in the Paris peace nego- tiatlons is the National Lib an acceptable coalition,
tiations. eration Front, the official` A sharper sign of nervous-
'In the opinion of these an- arm of the Vietcong, which ness was mirrored today in a;
alysts, the Communists are, seems to fear that its inter- statement by the Front that
united in their determina- ests may be forgotten by the jumped the gun on Hanoi in
tion to "talk I and fight," North Vietnamese as they' seemingly rejecting Mr.
which means they have no seek a settlement favorable. Johnson's offer.
intention of either quitting Apparently striving town-!
Paris or stopping military : to themselves. dercuit any 'deal between,
operations in South Viet- In contrast to ' Hanoi, Washington and Hanoi to in-.
nam. : whose basic aim Is eventual elude the Saigon regime in'
They, are apparently split,, unification of Vietnam, the peacg talks, the Front as-.
however, on the key ques- Front puts its focus on gain- sorted that the "puppet ad-.
tion of how much emphasis ing political power in the ministration .... does not
to place on diplomatic ac-, South. represent anybody."
tion as a way to achieve. Front's Apprehension Three Hanoi Factions
their objectives. ' Hence the Southern Com In the estimation of Doug-
This crucial question, munists appear aPPre ']as- Pike, a foremost Ameri-`'.
which will largely decide
slue that Hanoi may strike, can authority here on Viet-'
whether the Communists ac- bargain with the United' Jnam, there are roughly
cept or, reject the Johnson States that relegates the !three factions in Hanoi that,
Administration's reported Front to a relatively minor have long been pressing to
offer, is complicated by the position in a ? Saigon coali. Impose their strategies.
'fact that Communist fac- tion.
,tions in North' and' outhI - All, Pike has pointed out,'
Such
a Possibility, the fundamentally agree that
Vietnam evidently. advocate
Fronts leaders realize,- "revolutionary.'violence" is
`different tactics to attain would demoralize their fol' the proper approach against
'different coals..
lo
'mies. But they differ over'
.methods.
One Faction's View
One faction; according to?
Pike, is headed by the Pol?it~+
buro member Truong Chinh,
who has .argued for "pro-:
tracted warfare" on 'the
grounds that time Is on the
side of the Communists. '
Chino has stressed the ne-'
cessity -to "shift to the de-"
fensive to gain time, dis-
hearten the enemy and
build up our forces for a
new offAnsive."
This line apparently bass
brought Chinh close to 'the'
Front, which also favors'
slow, small-scale -tactics, and,
it has earned him the repu-~
Cation of being pro-Chinese,,
since "protracted warfare"
is a pet theory of Mao Tse-
tung.
Over the past year, how,
ever, the Chinh approach'
has been overhsadowed bye
-that of Gen. Vo Nguyen..
;Giap, the North Vietnamese,
Defense Minister, who in
Pike's view Is the predom:i-'
nant Communist strategist;
In Hanoi.
.Giap's Contention
Presumably backed by.
President Ho Chi Minh and
Premier Pham Van Dong,
wers, who would ~i? have - to Giap contended that the
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.war" In the face of over. headed,-by Foreign Mintsterl has been matched by a stale-,
whelming American might. Nguyen Duy Trinh ,seel~inq 'mate in Vietnam, and Hanoi;
Thus he launched the dew-1 (to increase North Vietnam's ' is now facing the problem of :t
astating Tet offensive in] options py pushing fox' a dfp? onfriving a new doctrine.
'hopes of a decisive victory: lomatic offensive. ' It can, as. Truong Chine
In the shortest possible 11 1 Approach E. G advises, phase back to gxier~,
time, regardless of casual- /rilla war and fight forever'
Since spring, the: North -or it can dilute Its de-
Vietnamese have been pro-I ?hnands and 'make eonees- ,
ties.
That offensive seams to',' moting a dual approach,,. sions to Washington In, an"
have had a far greater polit- combining: Map's battlefxeld'~ attempt to turn a political
thrust *4h Trinh's dipto- settlement in its favor.'
~icai 'and . psycholog1ea matic drive, the two being+ These are the alternatives"
paet In the 'United., 4t'atc.1,1 1 related, in the sense that, the North Vietnames'e'- anct
?progress at the conferencefi Vietcong have undoubtedly;'.
and elsewhere than It had
militarily. table would reflect military ,been debating. Their choice
That Jmpaci , yidex ty...le progress: remains to be;'seen s z
SAIGON POST
15 August 1968
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T I
Bombing, Troops, Advisers
BY V14 T EMN,
,. at!
CPYRG 1
THAT AMERICA is willing to help North Vietnam economically is set forth in the
joint communique between Presidents Johnson and Thieu of South Vietnam, dated in
Honolulu July 21, 1968, as follows : . Questo ricat-
o delta fame, a dire 11 vero, non
osca. Ma tutto lascia prevedere
he to sara .fatalmente dopo it 17
ovembre, se it PCI non si alli-
eerh. "- a'' *-06
LE MONDE, 2i October 1968
Mme Jeannette Thor
Nee le 26 novembre 1910 4
Lille, Lucie Marie Bite Jean-
nette Vermeersch a douze ans
lorsqu'elle entre comma tisse-
rande dans une usine de tex-
tiles du Nord ; elle a dix-huit
ans lorsqu'elle adhere au parti
communists ; ells en a vingt-
trois lorsqu'elle rencontre, au
ours d'un meeting de la jeu-
nesse communiste, Maurice
I'hores, qui est depuis trots ans
aeretaire general du parti
.ommuniste. Devenue sa com-
agne, cite a de tut trots en-
ants, Jean, Paul at Pierre nes
espectivement en 1935, en 1941
t en 1946, at l'epouse en 1947.
Membre du secretariat des
eunesses conam.unistes du Nord
(1930-1931), puffs ae ;c? eommis-
ion rationale des jeunes syn-
iques de Ia. C.G.T.U. (1931-
932, ells accede a.u bureau na-
tonal des jeunesses commu-
istes, oft ells siege de 1932
1934; De 1935 a 1939 ells
onde puts dirige avec Danielle
asanova et Marie -Claude
Vaillant-Couturier a l'Union
as feunes filtes de France a.
M. Roger Ga
Ne d Marseille le 17 juillet
913, M. Roger Garaudy est
grege de philosophic at doc-
eur es lettres.
Apres trente mois d'interne-
ent dans un camp de concen-
ration allemand, it regagne la
rance. Depute du Tarn our
eux Assemblees constituantes
1945-1946), it est elu membre
e la premiere Assemblee
ationale, mais ne conserve pas
on mandat le 17 juin 1951. 11
retrouve an 1956 comme de-
ute de la Seine. Vice-presi-
ant de I'Assemblee rationale
e 1956.4 1958, it siege ensuite
u Senat d'avril 1959 4 novem-
re 1962, date 4 laquelle if
bandonne son mandat pour se
onsaerer d Ia philosophic, qu'UI
nseigne actuellement d Ia fa-
ults des lettres de Poitiers.
Membre du F.C.F. depuis
z-Vermeersch
guerre mop a e, qu e e pass
en U.R.S.S., ells entre en 194,
au comite central du P.C.F.
qui d'elira en 1950 membre di
bureau politique du parti. A
sein de la direction ells adopt
souvent des positions intran-
sigeantes, notamment au mo-
ment des manifestations anti-
americaines de 1952 at de noz--
veau apres le XX, con res,
preeonisant alors une desta-
linisation tres lente at . pru-
dente. La mdladie et I'absence
du secretaire general, dont elle
est l'agent de liaison avec Ia
direction du P.C.F. et au nom
duquel ells s'exprime avec au-
torite, l'amene d intervenir, non
sans se heurter parfois avec tel
on tel dirigeant, dans le re-
glement des successives u a/-
faires a Tillon, Marty, Lecceur
qui seeouent entre 1950 at 1956
l'etat-major du parti.
Membre des deux Assemblees
constituantes (1945-1946), puffs
depute de la Seine de 1946 d
1959, ells siege ensuite au Senat
d'avril 1959 jusqu'au 22 sep-
tembre 1968, date d laquelle
,elle ne sollicite pas le renou-
aady
1933, it entre au comitd centre
en 1945. Membre suppleant d?
bureau politique de 1956 d 1961
it y siege d a part entiere
depuis lors.
Directeur des a Cahiers d
communisme a at du Centre
d'etudes at de recherche
marxistes (C.E,R.M.), it est l'au
teur de plusieurs livres parm
lesquels, l'Humanisme marxiste
De Vanatheme au dialogue
Marxisme du vingtieme siecle
If a public tout recemmen
Prague 1968 : Ia llberte en cur
sis (voir le Monde des 6-7 oc
tobre) et vient de faire parat
tre, Pour un modele frangal
du socialisme (voir le lylond
du 16 octobre).
M. Roger Garaudy est do
teur As sciences de i'Institut d
philosophic de I'Academie de
sciences d'U.R.S.S..
po, oltreApprdQediFOPii @ 2405/08/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000
favore lie finanze-esauste: e cioe
CPYRGH
T
CPYRGH
T
CPYRGH
T
suscitare un certo risentlmen
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
EXCERPTS FROM
L'ESPRESSO, Rome
27 October 1968
(PCI Objects to Soviet Pressures)
by Mino Monicelli
"The roots of evil lie in via delle Botteghe Oscure [Italian
Communist Party headquarters.] Even at the cost of a serious mutila-
tion it must be eradicated before it is too late." This statement,
which was made in Moscow by a Soviet leader, marked the beginning of
the decisive offensive against the Italian Communist Party [PCI].
Autumn promises to be fraught with unknown factors for the PCI.
Stormy clouds are gathering on the horizon. They are clouds which are
moving in along with anonymous letters and pamphlets from Dresden,
Warsaw, East Berlin, and the Warsaw Pact countries. They form an
avalanche of propaganda against the PCI which, together with the ma-
terial distributed by the Soviet and Polish Embassies in Rome and by
the USSR Novosty news agency, is spilling onto the regional sections
and the houses of the rank and file militants. After having practi-
cally liquidated the new Czechoslovak leadership, the Soviet Union is
determined to get rid of the Italian heretics. The top PCI leaders
are convinced of this. They know that November will be the month of
truth; the crucial date is 17 November when the conference preparatory
to the Congress of the Communist Parties called by Moscow will be held
in Budapest.
It is possible that by that time the Kremlin will definitely have
succeeded in controlling the Prague heresy and that Bilak and Indra
or any other stray puppet will have replaced Dubcek and his comrades
in the push button room. In that case, the Italian communist leaders
will have to face the final offensive of the "tank drivers" [carristi]
with their backs practically to the wall. They already know that
Moscow is ready for anything, even an ultimatum, excommunication, or
a break, as long as it can destroy the hotbed of infection which is
lodged in via delle Botteghe Oscure, and that the party will only
have one alternative: either to surrender shamefully or to expose
itself to mutilation, the importance and consequences of which are
unpredictable at this time....
The statements uttered at the Central Committee on Saturday,
19 October -- an outright explicit one by D'Onofrio, and the more
toned down, but perhaps more insidious one by Secchia -- undoubtedly
reflect a situation with which they are well acquainted and which they
have been closely following for some time. Perhaps it will be these
two men who will officially bring about the explosion of the crisis
and point out that the proclaimed unity of the Italian communist gov-
erning group no longer exists.
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Donini had also voiced his reservations, as it was said, at the
last but one Central Committee meeting, but Donini never has been a
summit man. He is an intellectual, with greater ties to the Kremlin
that to via delle Botteghe Oscure, but without any following. In the
case of Secchia and D'Oncfrio the situation is different: Secchia
has been deputy secretary of the party, the number two man immediately
after Togliatti; D'Onofrio is an old, still influential militant. A
former member of the secretariat, for years he directed the PCI cadres
office, that is, the Russian inquisition organ, Donini's speech was
a matter of letting off steam. more than anything else.
The speech by Secchia, and particularly that of D'Onofrio, assume
quite a different meaning because behind them lies a long-term politi-
cal plan.
Edoardo D'Onofrio wculd now like to be the interpreter of the wave
of criticism coming from the Stalinist rank and file. It must be said
that his papers are in perfect order for seeking this leadership. His
pro-.Soviet stand is not an intellectual stance, but a basic instinct.
His Communist past, as a militant who has been in jail and who has
spent many years in exile in Moscow, is unimpeachable. D'Onofrio never
did hide, even at the most difficult moments (such as during the Hungar-
ian events) his unshakable loyalty to the Soviet Union. He has always
openly said that he does not share the doubts and the perplexities of
many of his comrades in the party leadership (even those with the great-
est prestige, such as Palmirc Togliatti), but he rejects the attribute
of "Tank Driver," However, as soon as he learned that the PCI leader-
ship had condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (he was
.in Bulgaria at the time), he sent a protest letter to Longo.
Today D'Onofrio is convinced that the time has come to make his
voice heard. He is well aware that the rank and file do not share the
PCI leadership's stand with regard to the USSR, and it is obvious that
he would like to become the leader of this dissenting group. It is a
dissention which for the time being is spcntaneous, but which nothing
prevents from becoming an organized faction inside the party (for the
time being) because D'Onofric is not alone, He has many friends and it
would not be difficult for him to proselytise among the Mao, Guevara,
Marcuse type dissidents and among all the malcontents who recall the
revolutionary and working class origins of the party...,
However, the signs of the imminent and very grave crisis which
threatens the PCI are not restricted to the statements read by Secchia
and D'Onofrio at the latest PCI Central Committee meeting, We have
referred to the flood of propaganda from Polish, East German, and
Soviet sources in which the party's regional organizations and many
comrades are being immersed. They are kinds of bulletins, open letters,
and anonymous pamphlets in which the Czechoslovak leaders are attacked,
and indirectly those who support them. The influx of such material has
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2
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in recent weeks increased to such an extent that of late L'UNITA had to
issue an article warning its comrades and to denounce these "inadmissable
methods." In this propaganda pounding, of particular importance was a
series of open letters to the comrades violently denouncing Longo's policy.
To these forms of pressure another more fraught with consequences
has been recently added. It is well known that the Kremlin has already
begun to cut off its subsidies to the French Communist Party, which until
two months ago was considered the most orthodox of western communist .
parties. This measure of reprisal for "reproaching" the Soviet interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia, which was publicly reported by the French commu-
nists, has created a crisis inside several enterprises controlled by
the French Communist Party whose existence depended on exchanges with
the Soviet Union (for example the Interagra, which specialized in the
trade of grain products, or the CDLP [Centre de Diffusion du Livre et
de la Press] which had a monopoly on Soviet publications.
The Moscow sanctions have aggravated an already precarious financial
situation as a result of which Waldeck Rochet is now faced with the prob-
lem of reaching a compromise with Moscow which will allow him to avoid
the worst, that is, bankruptcy. A sign of this incipient availability
for a compromise on the part of the French Communist Party is the ap-
peasement offered to the Soviets with the "censure" of Roger Garaudy,
the leader of the party's pro-Czechoslovak faction. The suppression,
officially attributed to financial motives, of the journal Democratie
Nouvelle, which backs the Prague cuase, might serve the same purpose.
There is a rumor in this connection that the existence of Lettres
Francaises, directed by Aragon, who issued an extremely violent condem-
nation of the Soviet intervention, is also threatened. In any case, to
all these financial pressures is now added the political blackmail of the
resignation from the party by Jeannette Vermeersch, Maurice Thorez'
widow and the standardbearer of the "unconditional" pro-Soviet faction.
It is obvious that in the case of the French Communist Party, it is
a matter of signs that are more than disquieting and, in fact, they have
not failed to deeply alarm those responsible for the PCI's financial
situation, particularly the administrators of the party organ. The
possibility that Moscow might cut off its subsidy to the PCI would also
have grave consequences, if one remembers that already several years
ago there was talk of abolishing the Rome edition of L'Unita. If the
PCI does not yield to a compromise, it is certain that the Rome edition
will be abolished and the number of the pages in the Weekly Rinascita
reduced. The alarm created by these possibilities can be seen from the
Central Committee speeches Anelito Barontini and Luciano Barca who em-
phasized that the party must mobilize in order to meet the economic de-
mands. Actually, the appeal to the party also had a purpose other than
that of mobilizing it in favor of the exhausted funds and that was to
arouse a certain.anti-Soviet resentment among the bureaucrats of the
apparati whose personnel are threatened by having their salaries cut as
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a result of Moscow's financial blackmail. "So, comrades, no sooner
had we displayed a little independence, than they want to starve us to
our knees. To tell the truth, Moscow has not yet put this blackmail by
starvation into practice, but there is every reason to believe that it
will inevitable after 17 November, if the PCI does not fall into line...."
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000 QED20
Go aom0
cog 1100 Canrosso
0
CPYRGH
T
Diamo qui di segufto un ampio re?
soconto del rapporto svolto dal coni-
pagno Alessandro Natta at Comitato
Centraie.
distrutt.ore, e pesano anche le diffl?
colt,il dcll'azione unitaria dello stesso
sch:eramento di pace e antimpe?
rialistico. Questa consapevo-ezza dei
dart nuovi, complessi e contraddit-
tors dells realty del mondo a dells
In questa sessione del CC e del- '
mo decidere sulla move, de11'emergere dl question-
la CCC convocazione dobbiadel XII congresso del rco deve Impegno del ells nostro base del dlbattlno-
o e ?
r essuale
partito per it quale proponiamo la s e
to co
g
data del 26 gennaio e in sede di
rendiamo . conto the @ una
Bologna. La direzione ha prepara? in
forte atte tesa eel partito nelle altre
la nostra politica, 1.autonomia e
l'internazionallsmo del nostro par-
i tito e la profonda units dei gruppi
dlrigenti e del complesso del par-
tito su questa Linea.
Un d c.c ento
to tin progetto di documento po? forte politiche, tra I lavoratort e
litico the occorre ora discutere a nell' Il progetto di documento
nostro pubbl Qong ressodemocr esso non propone, tuttavia, un ri-
definire e the dovrA quindi costl? per it opinione
un chiamo sistematico a tutti
tuire la piattaforma del congresso. not ci t accingiamo . muovendo Ad da esso
not
I segni dei tempi indicano gran- ben saldo retroterra. Il terreno so- bali o azione ti dells nostra cla?
di a sconvolgcnti avvenimenti. Una lido, da cut guardiamo le cose nuo? Lando doneell'attpolitics de tin hi-
crisl, tin complesso di ribellioni e ve per compiere passi in avanti, a sncio per del parti?
di scontri - ultimo quello tragico to. Avrcmo, per 1'approfon-
quello dell'elaborazione teorica e dimento, tin rapporto di atti-
&l Messico - fanno gravare it sun- delle lotte sulla via itallana al so-
s.; di tin sommovimento profondo. cialismo; i7 terreno 8 quello dei fate vits del partito chc sari
con-
Le splnte sempre p1b imperiose ai? ti the abbiamo saputo promuove- gresso. so a disposizione cnn-
la pace,' alla liberty delle nazioni, re, con la direzione del compagno reucziose intcso the o f. ~mpec sffronla Di
alN liberazione dell'uomo - the Longo, confermando la validity del- con j i t docurnento p Do-
sollecitano la lotta di forze sem- in nostra linea politica e la fun- c chc p
pre piu imponenti e nuove - si zione di avanguardia del nostro pone per ii t congresso c
scontrano con Il sistema e la po. partito, fatti the hanno trovato ? quello di misurarci In me-
litica dell'imperialismo e .del capi espresslone it 19 maggio eel suc- -do aperto con I dati nuovi,
tal:smo, ma to vie " della ?loro at- cesso nostro e dello schleramento e a di verificare in avamodo nti nti critico
sono faticose, comples? un-tario delle sinistre; Il terreno b a' port it no
so, e su dl esse pesa innanzi tutto quello del fatti che, pill recente- felclile epolitics Hello bbia
11 condizionamento delle arm- ato? mento," di fronte alla crisi di Ce- ilo Per questo a documento
miche ed iI rlschio del loro tuoco cos~lovacchia hanno testimonlato la mo teso ad tin d
g I Patti decisivi
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 ARgrovNtJ A Relp~Rug jg,~tg8/jj :& g77j0306IAOAO4Q(QQ3QpQ?ist$azione del
e indica:sse, a is i o
prohlematico, le tendcnze di carattere stesso delta guerra, del lavoratori, di riscossa dal co-
lonialismo la costruzione di
ll
, t
d
tutti gli aspetti e the delta
nostra linen politica richia-
masse gel clcinenti esscnzia-
li, tin documento, clue, can
una piu accentuata impron-
to politica per stimulate Ia
ricerca a in discussione.
Proponiamo, ciob, un congresso
eftf terl/taat a da utq t ltititifiLO M1OI'
to su problemi aperti, the stimu-
li un piu largo jmpegno di elabo-
razione anche - nel limite in cut
b possibile - nel campo dell'Im?
postazione teorica. II punto i quel-
lo di unire In discussione nel par.
tito all'iniziativa e alla battaglia
politica. La saldatura d'altra parts
b obbiigatoria di fronte alle sea-
denze elettorall (turno di novem?
lire), alle lotte operaic e contadi
ne. agli impegni internazionall.
lacco percn(b abbiamo bisogno dl
un dibattito aperto alia partecipa'
zione piu larga. in cut l'affermazio-
na di unit precisa lines politica e
l'unit& del partito su di essa corn-
porta un confronto aperto e schietr
to, in cui la poi=PrT ca ideate e pu?
litica ha pie..:.a a.ittadinanza, men-
tre non roc tin e non put) averna+
l ^+ntuta tra la ac scomunica>
aaotura a.
1'1 quadro the alabiamo di cron?
to quello, drammatico, di una
rcfJtit in sommoviment0? Il pro-
ea so fit trasformazione a f,omples-
o :ton univoco. Le fiamn-*~ del?
enuncia e delta prot.esta ., e
accendono in part! diverse ban-
no aliaa loro origine a conuiziont
can re piu Intolierabili per I po-
poll e per gli uomini, cletermina-
P =i.alla loc,ica rel captalisirto. A
zl as?sta radice occorre icondurre -
lai denun!.i~- c venuta dalla stes?
sa Chiesa cattolica - io sfrutta-
rocrito a l'oppressione coloniale, 10
state di sottosviluppo, In fame, In
esistenza al limite animale di tan-
ta parte dell'umanith, 11 divario net-
le risorse c eg'i Staatt. A questa ra-
dice va ricondotta In politica con
cut 1'imperaisrno e gii USA hall-
no teso a 1-_occare e svuotare it
moto di irriipendenza e (it libera-
zione nazion.ale, ricorrendo aila vio-
lenza, ail'attgresslone -- dine iiei
Vietnam - rile guerre iucau, agii
interventi armati. Questa lines ao-
centua, d'altra parse. 'alI'internu del
sistema impcriaiistico, le contrad-
dizioni the diventanO sempre piu
laceranti, da cui emergono poi le
tenderize, the anche in un passe
come l'Italia vengono in lute, alla
concentrazione del potere economi-
co e politico. ail'autoritarismo. ai-
10 svuotamento degli istituti e del
diritti democratici.
AIl'origine delta crisi dobbiamo
pore it fatto nuovo the queste ten-
denze aggressive e autoritarle si
collocano nel quadro della condi-
er.
s arm
e
otere distruttivo
monucleari per le stesse basi del. una potenra economics e
In civilth. Siamo di Ironte ad un
potenziale distruttivo the per In sus
enormitd finisce per stimolare unas
crescente concentrazione del pote-
re e del meccanismi di decisione,
find al punto di ridurre, in sostan-
za, nelle mans di gruppi ristretti
In sorte del popoli. L'umanith av.
verve questo unite iaurosb, terrt-
fieante chap oggi b posto at mote
dl emancipazione e di progresso e
vi n nello stesso tempo in coscien-
za del contrasto assurdo e striden-
to tra le conquiste dell'intelligenza
umana, della scienza e della tecni-
ca e 1'incapacith 'a creare un mon.
do di pace, di liberth e di uguaglian-
za del popoli f degli uomini.
Scie zti e
cuhhurc
E vi b ancora In funzione e In
'collocazione nuova the in scienza
e la cultura sono venute assurnen?
do nelle societh avanzate, la co-
scienza in strati notevoli dell'intel
lettualith. nei giovani studenti di
un nuovo ruolo the non pub e non
vuole essere piu quello del tessuto
connetti.?, del sistema capitalistico.
Questa A nnizione nuova delta cultu?
ra e dell'intellettualita entra in con-
trasto con it sistema the l'ha evo-
cats e stimolata e it capitalismo e
i siuoi regimi si trovano di fronts
al maturare di nuovi antagwJ.svi.
Alcuni di questi problemi - co
me quello dell'autonomia, delta 11
berth, delta funzione nuova della
culture e della scienza - investo?
no anche le societh socialiste, do
va, del resto. si pongono anche esi-
genze di sviluppo delta partecipa
zione dells ma:.,e nella vita eta
nori'ra e politica, in un quadro
tuttavia the vede si sorgere contrad?
dizioni, ma non antagonistiche s
she sollecitano soluzioni organiche
tegiate al processo storico, allo di,
v:rnc c concrete condizAini rlei di-
versl paesi socialiste. '
Un immediato impuiso a
questa carica di liberth e di
progresso a venuto dalla re-
sistcnza a dally lotta del po-
polo victnatnita, dal colpo
cite esso ha Hato alla strate.
gia. aggressiva degli USA, dal-
la mohilitazione di soliclarie-
th the quel moto di libera-
zione nazionale ha deterini-
nato net mondo. Ma piu a
[undo - nella prospettiva
storica - bisogna indicate
iI mutamento del rapporti
di forza net mondo, the ha
alla sua origins In rivoiuzio.
ne d'Ottobre, la costruzione
del soeialismo in URSS, lo
impulso. cite da qui a venuto
militate, come quella sovicti-
ca, the ha contribuito in mo-
do decisive ad aprire nuove
vie all'espansione dell'area e
all'affermazione dells ides
del socialismo. Intendiamo
sottolineare - e chiaro -
tin dato the non riguarda
mulct ha steria di quoNti sin,
quant`anni, ma 11 presente e
I'avvenire; Il peso oggettivo,
In funzione determinante del
paesi socialisti a dell'URSS
in primo luogo nello schicra-
mento antimperialistico.
La cosclenza di, tale peso ci fa
guardare con preoccupazione ai ri-
tardi nell'opera di rinnovamento
aperta dal XX congresso, at con-
trasts a alle divisioni the segnano
is vita del campo socialista e del
movimento comunista - dal con-
trasto determinato dalle posizioni
cinesi alla crisi cecoslovacca - the
hanno senza dubbio indebolito an-
che l'unith e 1'efficacia della lotta
delle forze antimperialistiche e di
pace. Questa consapevolezza stimo-
Ia ad assumere sempre piu co-
scienza delta neeessita per it no-
stra movimento di affront :re e ri-
solvere i problemi, the 1o stet-
so sviluppo delle societh socialiste
e delta nostra forza ci impone.
Cib b Canto piu urgente net mo-
mento in cut in crisi delta strats-
gia imperialistica trova un limits
net fatto the in questi v.nni Sono
state colpiti I falsi miti del benes-
sere, di tin capitalismo capace di
correggere le proprie brutture e di
farsi popolare. Siamo di fronte, su
'scala mondiale, ad un processo the
preme verso una tra:,formazione
pi?ofonda; ma b un processo nun
lineare, ne univoco, in cui non so-
no da escludere sbocchi Involutivi
e soluzioni reazionarie, talvolta fe-
roel (Indonesia, Grecia), in cui' it
pericolo di una guerra di sterminio
note b nb spezzato ne scongturatu.
Ma tutto cib non fa the conferma-
re - come hanno? confermato que-
sti anni di lotte e di allargameti-
to dcl1'opposizione antimperialisti.
ca - In validity delle nostre teu-
rie economiche e socials, dell'idea
socialista dell'abolizione dello sirut-
tamento dellfuomo sull'uomo e del-
ta socializzazione del mezzi di pro-
duzione, 1'idea del socialismo come
('espressione piu alta e compluta
delta liberth e della democrazia.
Vahbienivo
kklk ,INce
La lotta per it socialismo propo-
no aIcur.1 grandl obiettivi. Al p:irno
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posto not abba ndicato - e avvero la via realistica at. ]'Italia deve restare Hells NATO
ribadiamo - l'obiettivo delta pace. traverso cui dovrebbe passare la per ragioni di sicurezza. Nessuno
.Cl richiamiamo a tutta la nostra pace. Questo non b altro che it
elaborazione e in particolare allo modo americano di intendere la
Impegno che Togliatti pose nello coesistenza.
mo ora vedere quail raglonl ab mo non renderci conto delle
biano determinato un'attenuazione esigenze di difesa dci pas
dell'iniziativa nostra. Per assicura- si socialisti, non possiamo
nsmento atomico, eliminare dalle , , ti di posizioni che oggi, ncl-
sempre presente, dell'urto e delta Patto di Varsavia, sembrano
catastrofe termonucleare. Di qui ... voter riproporre, in seguito
tutto it valore di necessity della ally crisi cecoslovacca, coil.
Idea e dells lotta per la coesisten- cezioni sostanzialmente re?
ea pacifica. II problema di fronte strittive del campo delle
al quale ci troviamo non b quello forze socialiste ed antimpe-
di una qualehe alternativa, perchd ' rialistiche, ed enuuciazioni
se dovesse cadere la prospettiva di Irrigidimento del blocco
della coesistenza pacifica cadrebbe socialista o di limitazione
tutto it resto, tutte le ipotesi di dell'autonomia e sovranita,di
liberty del popoli e di emancipa, ciasctuio Stato, in base a va-
zione del lavoratorl. lutazioni della situazione in-
II problema che abbiamo di fron ternazionale' e di quella in.
to b quello dei contenuti attuall terns del paesc In questio-
della lotta e dells forme dl lotta ne, valutazioni delle quail
contro 1'aggressivith USA e delta non si sa chi e a qualc ti-
bat.taglia ideale per distingu,~re cib tolo sarebbe giudice o arbi-
che la coesistenza pacifica deve es- tro. Sono posizioni che ci '
sere da cib che coesistenza pacifi- appaiono in contraddizione
ca non b. 11 documento richiama sia con 1'esigenza, dall'URSS
a questo proposito una serie di te- piu volte affermata, di una
si. A me importa ora sottolinea- lotta per la coesistenza the
re solo l'idea fondamentale della veda partecipi, a su basi ai
lotto per la coesistenza come un uguaglianza, tutti gli Stati
processo the deve lnvestire tutti del mondo, sia con lc lines
I camp! - politico, i.deale, econo- fissate dai PC d'Europa,
mico - deve fondarsi sulla parte- a Karlovy Vary, per it sit-
cipazione, come protagonisti, di peramento dci blocchi, sia
tutti gli stati e i movimenti di li- con posizioni di principio
berazione e di indipendenza nazio- tante volte affermate net no-
nale; deve far leva sullo sviluppo stro movimento.
del process! rivoluzionari e di rin-
novamento dells diverse part! del La logica dei blocchi b stata quella
mondo, delta guerra fredda. Il suo supera-
Ii punto al quale soprattutto si mento b dunque obbiettivo essen-
volge la nostra attenzione, nel mo- ziale della politica di coesistenza per
i'autonomia e l'indipendenza dells
mento presence, b quello del cost nazioni, per la liberty delle scelte
delto a bipolarismo -a, la visione social! e politiche e per it libero
cioi:, del rapport! e della politica Progresso di ogni paese.
internazionale, secondo la logics Lc spinte in questa direzione so-
del blocchi e, in essi, delle due mag- no cresciute, anche nell'ambito oc-
giori poter,ze, E qui non importa cidentale. La realty che Ci trovia-
tarito respingere i- come del resto mo di fronte non b pliz solo quella
abbiamo fatto - l'attacco defor- del blocchi, ma anche quella di una
mante calunnioso che permane, ma serie di esperienze da parte di pae-
ha scarsa incidenza, da parte ci- si che hanno importanza e peso
nese, ai fondamenti stessi della 1i? nell'Europa e nel mondo, I quail
nez di coesistenza e alla politica sono venuti impegnandosi in una
dell'URSS, in ogni suo atto, pre- politica attiva, autonoma, restando
sentata costantemente, senza preoc- fuori, o allentando progressivamen-
cupazione della verita o del vero- to i loro vincoli militari e politi-
simile, come it frutto di un'intesa ci net blocco in cui erano inseriti.
con 1'imperialismo americano. La I govern! italiani sono andati e
insidia da respingere per un giu- vanno invece in una direzione op?
sto orientamento dells lotta per la posta, anche con it centro-sinistra
pace b soprattutto quella che viene e la presenza del socialist!. Nei
net, nostro paese dai fautori incal- moment! decisivi ha sempre ope-
liti dell'atlantismo ed oggi del suo rato it vincolo atlantico, la subor-
rilahcio militare, che prospettano dinazione alla politica aggressiva
In definitiva la politica del bloc- degli USA. Bisogna cambiare radi-
chi, it a bipolarismo a come se Si calmente tale politica perchd I'Ita-
trattasse di un equilibrio 'salutare, lia deve essere garantita contro it
it Cu! turbamento porterebbe ad rischio di essere trascinata in guer-
dells divergenze ideologi-
una nuova guerra, come se questa ra. E' puro. pretesto affermare che che. La sofferta coscienza re-
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minaccia, nessuno ha minacciato la
nostra indipendenza. Il limite ve.
,ro, pesante, alla nostra sicurezza e
alla nostra indipendenza a stato ed
'b questa politica di asservimento.
Noi ci preoccupiamo e dobbia-
mo preoccuparci dellu sorte delta
Italia che vogliamo sia oggi e sin
nell'avvenire, anche in un regime
socialista, al di fuori di ogni a
qualsiasi blocco. Noi rivendichiamo'
per ]'Italia it bens primo della pa-
ce, a ad ogni conto. Abbiamo alle
spalle 1'esperienza tragica di due
guerre. E' un'esperienza che non
dove ripetersi. L'Italia non deve es-
sere to scudo dell'impurialismo
americano!
L'Italia deve in ogni caso restar
fuori da ogni conflitto. Al movi-
menti politici e ideal!, ai social!-
sti, ai cattolici che hanno vissuto
le dure esperienze belliche del pas-
s Sato, resistendo per I valor! delta
pace e della neutrality, not rinno-
viamo l'appello ad un'azione comu-
ne per salvaguardare la pace del
nostro paese. E' un, appello che" ha
per not anche it senso di un impe-
gno a non esitare, per quanto cl
riguarda, a mobilitare le masse del
lavoratori e del popolo e a guidar-
le contro chiunque volesse trasci-
narci in una guerra.
Ma l'azione del governo italiano
v.i nella direzione di un aggrava-
mento della tensione come dimo-
strano anche le ultime Iniziative
per l'armamento atomico e la po-
sizione circa la firma del trattato
anti-H.
La linea della coesistenza, la lot-
', to per una politica attiva di pace
e di neutrality, alle quail sono stret-
tamente legati it rinnovamento de-
mocratico e l'avanzata al sociali-
sm, del nostro paese, collocano
chiaramente it PCI sul terreno de-
gli interessi permanenti e fonda-
mentali della nostra gente e
to schierano nello stesso tempo nel
grande movimento mondiale di lot-
ta per in pace e contro l'imperia-
lismo.
Abbiamo dato - credo giu-
stamente - grande rilievo
alle novita che Si sono veri-
ficate a Si verificano net mo-
vimento cattolico. La svolta
di Giovanni XXIII e del
Concilio ha dato it via ad
un processo che spinge mas-
se cattoliche a lottare con-
tro l'imperialismo e 11 colo-
nialismo, per la pace, e a
cercare tin rapporto nuovo,
un dialogo con alLre forze,
su obbiettivi pratici, al di la
 A pqroved FRr Relpise~g~~~~~ 03061AQQO,Q,QAA~-4 taus an
ligiosa - it ~rflo apocu I? s o reb _
ni- dni tranmi stories a vivi
co del cattolicesimo - giun-
ge, da parte di avanguardie,
find all'appello alts lotta ri
voinzionaria. Non ci srugge
eerie la complcssita c la con-,
traddittorieta del processo.,
Vediamo i gesti di cautela,.
di controllo pesante. di ritor?:
no indietro delle piu alto ge?;
rarchie. Ma le manifestazio-
ni del dissenso cattolico, la
contestazionc aperta di atti
e poMhdlonl dello 0e+1"o pen
tefice dicono anche quail po
tenzialita democratichc_ esi-
stone nelle masse cattoliche
su scala mondiale e net no-
stro paese.
E' sulla base di questo giudizio
the not riaffermiamo la validity
dells nostra linea, volts alla ricer-
ca di un avvicinamento, di un rap?
porto, d.i un'intesa try movimento
operaio di ispirazione marxista a
movimento catttolico..Per questo not
riteniamo di grande interesse it re-
cente documento sul dialogo del se?
gretariato per i non credenti, a it
complesso delta sue affermazioni
sul valore del pluralismo, sulla ma-
turith e liberty c?ei1'uomo, sulla ve-
rity come r.,Lato Bella ricerca e,
':oprattutto, ulla legittimith e pos-
l~als?w del dialogo per fins pratici,
.,el Campo deil'azione sociaie e po-
stica.
crisi delta
s~c~~l~e1Gcraz~~
In tin ambito diverso europeo si
i,ovs ii problema delle forze, e del
r-sa?tit! socialisti e socialdemocrati-
c:. Vediamo la crisi che investe og-
F,i la politics delta socialdemocra-
ata. Al. noaa si trovano i mitt tra-
;. =r a alt del riformismo e le a scel-
te di civilty a the i, dirigenti social-
democratici hanno compiuto schie-
randosi su una lines, quella dello
atlantismo, cite ha diviso l'Eurq-
pa e the, con l'anticomunismo as-
surdo, ha tolto ally classe operaia
la possibiiita di esercitare davvero
una funzione dirigente nell'azione
per la pace e per ii socialismo.
La crisi delle concezioni dell'in-
tegrazione della classe operaia e
della gestione del sistema capitali-
stico, per razionalizzarlo e umaniz-
zarlo, la crisi deli' atlantismo di
stampo socialdemocratico hanno
giy, avuto un riflesso net diversi
paesi europei, incrinature vi sono
state net tradizionale orientamento
anticomunista, tra le masse del la-
voratori, del militanti delta sociaide-
mocrazia in Europa.
t.'altro dato che occorre sottoli-
neare a che not muoviamo sempre
dalla valutazione della consistenza
e dell'influenza reale in Europa del-
tamento di rapporti di forza, per
superare in politica del blocchi e I
rischi reazionari. La nostra dura
polemica contro la socialdemocra-
zia non pub quindi prescindere
mat dalla paziente ricerca della
units.
La visione dell'estendersi e del
diversificarsi insieme delle forte
(sti.ti, partiti, movimenti politici e
idenll) the net divers! continent!
riono venuti assumendo un sempre
piu chiaro impegno di lotta antim-
perialista e per 11 soclalismo fa
sorgere it problema del punts di
Iniziativa comune. Qui h gi~ pre-
sente I'idea nosUm delie vie e del
metodo dell'unith, che a not sem?
bra opportuno riaffermaro, come
un fatto necessario, una condizio-
ne dello sviluppo rivoluzionario, di
fronte aile dimensioni mondiali del
nostro movimento, all'incoritro del-
la nostra concezione marxista e le-
ninista con civilty, con culture, con
popoli 'dei diversi contintnti. Que-
sta idea, che fonda l'unila sulla
diversity., sulla realty effettuale che
giy indica caratteristiche assai dif-
ferenziate nello sviluppo di una se-
rie di stati socialista - da quell!
europei alla Gina, a Cuba, al Viet-
nam, aila Corea - pur sulla base
di rivolgimenti 'strutturali e di
oblettivi comuni, e sulla autonomia
des partiti e degli stati, a not ap-
pare sempre pill un dato essenziale
e irrinunciabile.
ddel cc~ro - saasrc
Il compagno Natta ha quindi for-
nito al CC e alla CCC un'ampia
analisi dells crisi economica socia-
le e politica che travaglia la no-
stra economia, e del fallimento del
Centro sinistra. L'affermazione cen-
trale che it documento sottolinea
- ha detto Natta - e quella della
improponibilith del centro sinistra.
Su questo punto la nostra opposi-
zione a netta e decisa. Di qua muo-
ve it nostro appello a tutte le for-
ze democratiche e di sinistra, lal-
che e cattoliche, perche riflettano
sullo stato di malessere, ' di ten-
stone e perche cerchino, con since-
rita, le vie nuove che bisogna. co-
che; dal fatto ch ti3' is oc' on t che minciar a r r 1 Centro si-
1~'r ved`0orAelease 2 `05'~b,j`~ l~r-RSA78-03061A0004800 ~0~0 -~
biamo bisogno >.
Quando parliamo di nuovo
internazionaiismo vogliamo
sottolineare i'avanzata di
forze nuove e 1'estensionc
dello schieramento antimpe-
rialistico, e indicare una
concezione dei rapporti, un
modo nuovo di costruirc la
units. Il nostro dissenso
dagli altri partiti - quando
c'e state - e. nato da uno
questo to respingiamo. Ma
pub essere units che si crci
neella divcrsita a originality
delle singole esperienze, si
alimenti del rcciproco spiri?
to critico, si rafforzi nella
autonomia del singoli partiti.
Riprendendo it tema dells Ceco-
slovacchia it compagno Natta ha
affermato le ragioni della nostra
posizione di appoggio alla linea po-
litica e all'impegno di rinnovamen-
to e di sviluppo della democrazia
socialista del PCC e del nostro dis-
serlbp 0 riprovasiono dell'intervento
militare del cinque paesi del patto
di Varsavia. Ribadiamo tali posi-
zioni - ha detto Natta - perchd
tutti I fatti provano che era infon-
data 1'ipotesi catastrofica sulfa gra-
vitt, e imminenza del pericolo con-
trorivoluzionario. Restano la nostra
preoccupazione e la nostra ansia
per uno stato di rose In cut la pro-
senza In Cecoslovacchia delle trup-
pe del patto di Varsavia. si riflet-
te negativamente sulla autorit.l de-
gll organisms legali, democratica-
mente eletti, dello Stato e del Par-
tito e sul libero svolgimento della
lord attivith, e net rapporti tra I
partiti comunisti.
I! nostro partito ha sempre evi-
tato la delineazione e la proposta
di un modello astratto di sociali-
smo. La via italiana a per not un
processo rivoluzionario che muove
dall'incapacity delle classi dirigenti,
net sistema del capitalismo mono-
, polistico di Stato, di risolvere I.
problem! del paese - quells stori-
ci e quelli nuovi - che fa levy
sulla tensione sociaie, politica ed
ideale e sulla combattivity delle
masse, suite ' idee e sull'impegno
socialista di un complesso di for-
ze politiche e Ideali diverse, che
nella prospettiva socialista vedono,
,oggi, in garanzia del progresso, del
rinnovamento, della liberth e della
indipendenza delta nazione. La va?
lidith di questa lines emerge dal
cammino che abbiamo compiuto in
quest! anni ed h convalidata dalla
realty attuale del nostro paese.
servile cdinindir zzi~ ariruinc Imp ppeni iIi$~
La nostra critica a] mono-
litismo, non critics c ri-
fiuto dell'unita, ma critica e
rifiuto di un crrore perche
in quel modo si fa dell'uni-
ta no fatto formale c autori?
tario, illusoria quindi, alla
prova des Patti. Su questa
base teorica a politica giy
all'VIII congresso Togliatti
aveva affermato che l'unita
si pub ottenere in due mo-
di: come n risultato di una
costrizione proveniente dal-
I'esterno di una trasnnsizio-
spirito di profonda soiidarie-
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PLATFORM FOR 12TH PARTY CONGRESS PLANNED
[Article; "Natta's Report on Draft Theses for 12th Party Congress"; Rome;
L'Unita(organ of Italian CP), Italian, 17 October 1968, pp 5-6]
"At this sessipn of the Central Committee and Central Control Commis-
sion, we must decide when to convoke the party's 12th Congress: we propose
that the Congress beheld on 26 January in Bologna. The Directorate (Executive
Committee) has prepared a draft of the political document that must now be
discussed and finalized and that will then be the platform of the congress.....
THt; CRISIS OF SOCIAL D! 1OCRACY
"The problem of the forces and the socialist and social-democratic
parties is posed in a different.11u opean framework. We can see the crisis
that today invests the policy of social democracy. At the center are found
,the traditional myths of reformism and the "choices for civilization" that
the social-democratic leaders have made by aligning themselves with the
line of Atlantism, which has divided 'Trope and, with an absurd anticoninunism,
has prevented the working class from availing itself of the opportunity to
exercise in fact a .eading role in the. action for peace and socialism.
"The crisis of the conceptions concerning the integration of the
working class and involving the administration of the capitalist system
to rationalize and humanize it and the crisis of the Atlantism of the social
democratic brand have already had a repercussion in various European states,
and cracks have appeared in traditional anticommunist orientation among
the masses of the workers and the militants Cactivists?]of social democracy
in F grope.
"We must also emphasize the following: we always proceed from an
evaluation of the persistence and genuine influence in ikrope of the social
;democratic organizations; we proceed from the fact that the unity between
socialists and communists would be a decisive element for determining a
change in the balance of forces and surmounting the policy of blocs and
reactionary risks. Our hard polemic against social democracy must then al-
ways proceed with a view to a patient search for unity.
"The extension and diversification of the forces (states, parties,
political and ideological movements) that in this various continents have
been assuming an ever-increasingly clear commitment to the anti-imperialist
struggle and for socialism give rise to the problem of a common initiative.
Hero we already find our idea about the ways toward and method of unity,
which we feel it is time to reaffirm as a necessary fact and a condition
oC revolutionary development, given the worldwide dimensions of our move-
mont and the encounter of our Marxist and Leninist conception with cultures
and peoples of diverse continents. This idea, which bases unity on diversity,
on an effectual reality that is already indicating very different character-
istics in the development of a series of socialist states -- from the European
group to China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Korea --, although on the basis of structural
changes and common objectives and on the autonomy of the parties and states
-- this idea, it seems to us, is an essential and irrenounceable facto.-
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1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9 .
"Our criticism of monolithism is not a criticism of unity and its
rejection. Rather it is the criticism and the rejection of an error bemuse,
otherwise, unity becomes a formal and authoritarian fact, an illusion when
nut to the test. On this theoretical and nolitical basis, Togliatti had
affirmed back at the 8th Congress that unity can be attained in two ways:
'as a result of compulsion from the outside, of a-mechanical transposition
or servile imitation of others' directions -- and this we reject. But there
can be a unity that is created in the diversity and originality of single
experiences; they nourish one another with a reciprocal critical spirit.
And they are strengthened in the autonomy of the single parties. We neod
this second unity.'
"then we speak of a new internationalism, we wish to emphasize the
advancement of new forces and the extension of the anti-imperialist align-
ment and point out a way to conceive relations, a new way to build unity.
Whenever we had a disagreement with other parties, it was born because of
.a spirit of profound solidarity, the acknowledgement that our strength also
:items from the historical and viable ties with the USSR and the other social-
ist countries and communist parties in the world."
Then returning to the subject of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Nata affirmed
the reasons for our position of supporting the Czechoslovak Party's political
line and its conmUtment to renewal and the development of socialist democracy
and disapproving the military intervention of the five I;arsaw Pact countries,
a" f; emphasize these positions," Natta said, "because all the facts concerning
the imminent and grave danger of counterrevolution were without foundation
Our preoccupation and anxiety persist because the presence of the 'iarsaw Pact
troops in Czechoslovakia reflects adversely on the authority-of the legal,
democratically elected organs of the state and party and on the uninhibited
discharge of their, responsibilities, on the relations between communist parties.
"Our parth has E.lways refrained from delineating and proposing an
abstract model of socialism. The Italian path it for us a revolutionary
process that proceeds from the inability of the :..eading classes in the system
of state monopoly capitalism to. solve the countries problems, both historical,
3M new, that affect social, political, and ideological tensions'and the
4 ombativone ss of the manses, the ideas and socialist comnditmont of a complex
of political forces and diverse ideals, which in the socialist prospect see
today a guarantee of the progress, renewral, freedom, and independence of
the nation. This line has been validated by the path we have traversed in
recent years; it has been confirmed by the current reality of our country,"
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
socialization of the means of production are not enough. Who
in the end. has the power? For an answer I am given this
euphemism: the workers and the peasants. But in Czechoslovakia,
the working people wanted to seize power and this undertaking
was denounced as counterrevolutionary by the occupying forces.
I believe that the scientific and technical revolution is one
of the essential conditions of a humane socialism. And this was
the great merit of Professor Radovan Richta -- to show this in
Czechoslovakia. But watch out: without democracy, the tech-
nological revolution will not produce humane socialism, but a
barracks communism."
This Radovan Richta to whom Fischer refers is still un-
known to the public at large. And yet this man in his 50's,
.sick, tubercular, nervously exhausted, is in the process of
,splintering an ideological empire. One knows the name of
Mr.Ota Sik or Mr. Dubcek. However, more than anyone else, this
professor, the director of the Institute of Philosophy at the
Academy of Sciences in Prague, where thousands of communist
intellectuals like Roger Garaudy are being trained today, was
indeed the great craftsman of the Czech experiment. .
Six'years ago, when it was clear that the country was
headed for bankruptcy and that for a Czechoslovakia deprived
of raw materials and of ports, there was only one solution,
"technological reconversion," Mr. Antonin Novotny turned to
Professor Richta and asked him to study what might be a "model
of technical civilization" within the framework of a socialist
society. Richta recruited the best sociologists, economists
and psychologists the country had and set to work.
His "reports" were a series of bombshells. In January
1968 he saw his ideas triumph. The French Communist Party
review Democratie nouvelle (New Democracy)had, in a special
issue, set forth the essence of them, but this issue was never
,to see the light of day. The party saw fit to kill it. The
editor in chief, Paul Noirot (communist), wrote in an intro-
ductory article: "The basic idea of this new-path was that
each. citizen of a socialist country should, finally, have not
less, nor the same, but greater freedom of speech,.of expression,
of assembly, of movement and of travel than the freedoms
offered by the most fully developed bourgeois societies."
And here is something which may at first glance seem
idealistic and literary. But Richta's strength is in saying
not "it must be so because this is good," but "it must be so
or we will perish." Why? Because in a certain sense socialism
was conceived within the framework of a civilization which is
in the process of disappearing. "That civilization was based
on two conflicting components: more and more powerful and
complex machines, on the one hand, and ever larger armies of
unskilled manpower, on the other. Now the technological revo-
lution is tending to invert these terms completely."
Can one still speak of "proletarian democracy" as in
Moscow, when a ease !&A/0t
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Approved or elease
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
vaster scale of basic manipulative functions carried out by
man,"' when the tertiary sector is expanding increasingly?
Complete automation., says Richta, requires "40 percent skilled
workers, 40 percent of the personnel with secondary education,
and 20 percent of the personnel with higher education."
And in view of the future he adds: "In the course of
the coming decades, it will be the work of regulation which
will predominate in production (of the adjustment type). Later,
this will yield to the preparatory phase, to technical manage-
ment and to the drafting of plans (of the engineering type).
By the end of the century, production will have'ceased to be
a labor process in the sense it is today."
In other words,, the very frontier which separates the
"workers' class" from the "intelligentsia" is tending to dis,-
appear. The most effective means of increasing the creative
capacities of society is not production in itself, but invest-
ment in man, education, and also "participation.`,' Finally,
notes Richta, the "expansion of mass consumption is becoming
quite as essential a condition for economic growth as the limita-
tio?t-, of mass consumption was in the past."
Each phrase here opens up vast horizons of consequences
following one after the other: the strength of this "model"
is that it is not merely moral, it does not appeal merely to
an abstract concept of freedom. Richta sets forth with, rare
scientific precision the fact that the socialism of tomorrow
remains entirely to be defined. What can tanks do against that?
In a month, for thousands of communists in the west,
this vague apprehension has come to the forefront. In the
issue of the French Communist Party review La Nouvelle Critique
(The New Criticism) which will come out next mont , the ollow-
ing lines will appear under the byline of~Andre Gisselbrecht:
"The renewal of a concept of socialism saw the light of day
within the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
itself, through mutual understanding between statesmen.and m.en
of science. Thus it involves something other than adding
'additional liberty' to a socialist model.. It is a matter of
a scientific analysis of the development of productive forces."
The discussion concerns not only communists, but con-
temporary men as well..
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 CPYRGH
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L'EXPRESS, Paris
28 October 1968
Pourquoi les jeunes
choisissent Che Guevara
t Si vous voulez que le socialisme
offrc de nouveau a la jeunesse son
visage attrayant, vous devez denoncer
Ics dirigeants t faillis s qui aouvorncnt
aujourd'hul le Kremlin.*
Failli : le mot a etc prononce par
M. Roger Garaudy a la dernierc session
du Comite central du P.c. francais. Et
it n'y cut pcrsonne pour siftler, pro-
tester ou taper du pied. En deux mois,
cc qui etait blaspheme cst dcvenu bana-
lite. Aujourd'hui, a Rome, a Helsinki,
a Vienne comme a Paris, on no se
pose deja plus la question : t Avec les
Russes jusqu'ob ? s mais bien cello-ci
e Le socialisme pour quoi faire ? s
Un nouvcl accord de Moscou a etc
signe. Los soldats sovictiques rcsteront
on Tchecoslovaquie et M. Alexandre
Dubcck n'obtiendra un sursis qu'a
condition d'etre son propre geolier.
e L'espoir d'une victoire immediate
d'un socialismc attractif, democratique,
Vest effondre s, nous dit, avec ? une
infinic tristesse, Ernst Fischer, un des
philosopher marxistes les plus connus
daps Ic monde, ancien seeretaire d'Etat
a la Culture a Vienne et membre du
Comite central du P.c. autrichien, le
t Garaudy local s.
Qu'a signifie pour 'vous 1'annonce
de l'intervention russe a Prague ?
- J'ecrivais a cc moment, en toute
quietude, un livre dans une petite vallce
styrienne. Le 21 aout, a 7 heures du
matin, ma femme entra, le visage dcfi-
gure, mains tremblantes d'cmotion,
Bans ma chambre. Elle portait un tran
istor. t Suis-je folle? s'ecria-t-elle.
.Ecoute done, cc West pas possible. s
Et Ton cntendit. effectivement la nou-
velle de l'intervention. J'ctais stupefait,
consterne, cpouvante. Deux jours plus
tard, je. dcclarais devant le Comite
central de man parti qu'il s'agissait non
seulement d'une faute, mais aussi d'un
crime. s
Grignotage. Depuis, insensibles aux
protestations qui inontaient des tangs
de leurs amis, les Sovietiques ont,
semaine apres semaine, accentue lour
pression. Le 27 septembre, a Budapest,
Ics principaux partis communistes
ctaient do nouveau rcunis on presence
des Sovietiques pour mettre au point
]a prochaine conference au somniet
prevue? a Moscou. M. Boris Ponomarev;
le representant russe, ecarta toutes les
critiques en arguant du danger d'une.
troisicme guerre mondiale qui imposait
des t precautions strategiqucs -s, et it
repliqua a ceux qui' exprimaient 'leur
trouble : < e ne vois pas pourquoi cc
qui se passe on Tchecoslovaquie nous
emp@cherait de resserrer nos rangs afin
de faire face au revanchisme allemand
ainsi qu'aux agressions americaines
au Vietnam et au Moyen-Orient. s
En fait, derriere cette apparente
decontraction, it y a plus grave : les
dirigeants russes croient par experience
a la vertu du long grignotagc et ont
commence do l'intericur un travail do
recuperation au sein des P.c. eontesta-
taires. L'affaire Jeannette Vermeersch
(voir section France) n'en est- qu'un
excmple. En Italic, on assists a un
effort particulicr de propagandc on
direction des federations communistes
d'Emilic. En Finlande, alors quo la
direction du Parti communiste a
reprouve l'invasion, l'organisation locale
du port do Turku l'approuva d'enthou-
siasmc. La t Pravda s no voulut
connaitre quo cette prise de position
particulierc. M. Arvid Pclchc, membre
t lctton s du Bureau politiquc du P.c.
sovictique, se rcndit a Helsinki oil it
tenta de s'appuyer sur I'ancien leader
du Parti finlandais, M. Aimo Aaltoncn,
trees lie a Moscou, contrc son president
actuel plus ind6pc6dant',- M. Aarne
Saarinen. Cos mano:uvres do division
n'ont certainement pas aceru I'audicnce
du P.c. finlandais, qui a subi un veri-
table desastre au cours des elections
municipales.
Grandes manoeuvres. Autre exem-
pie : alors que le secretaire general du
P.c. sucdois, 'M. Carl-Henrik Hermans-
son, condamnait vivement l'initiative
sovictique, un quotidien du Parti
public a Lulea, le c Norskens Flam-
man s, continua d'approuver la ligne
russe. Aussitot, Moscou fcignit de
considercr M. Hcrmansson commc lc
chef t d'un groupe rcvisionniste et la
radio moscovite le qualifia de brail-
lard intempcrant s.
Comme si cola ne suffisait pas, le
journal de Berlin-Est t Neues Deutsch-
land a ccrivit quo a sa femme avait
hcrite d'une fortune so chiffrant a un
demi-million do couronnes s. Curicux
prelude a la campagne electorale. Les
communistes sucdois, qui espcraient un
succes; s'effondrent et - se retrouvbnt
avec trois deputes au lieu do huit.
Plus dramatiquc encore : le P.c. grec
a cclatc ct I'U.R.S.S. manipule une
t directions extcricure presidee par
M. Kostas Koliyannis, qui, naturelle-
mcnt, a approuve le coup do Prague.
11 a fallu quo des milliers de commu-
nistes emprisonnes au bagne do Laros
-- dont Manolis Glezos, l'homme qui
arracha pendant la guerre le drapcau
CPYRGH
T
ecrivent acs
Icttres indignccs pour faire savoir quc
cette c directions no represeniait ricn.
Jusqu'iei, Ics grander man uuvres
cusses ont echoue. Et elks ont d'autant
plus do chances do so revclcr vainer quo
Ic probleme do 1'approbation ou do In
reprobation est biers dcpasse. Cc dont
on vicnt do prendre conscience on Occi-
dent, c'est do I'absencc dramatiquc d'un
modcle do socialismc qui soil simpic-
ment credible Bans une socictc entrant
dans 1'ere de la revolution technolo-
gique.
Vieux seh6mas. t La jeunesse, nous
(lit encore Ernst Fischer, vcut sortir
des vicux schemas. Ni la hierarchic
catholiquc ni la hierarchic moscovite,
avec (curs vicilies manicres de penser,
no peuvent exercer unc attraction sur
elie. C'cst pourquoi elle choisit Che
Guevara ou Mao Tse-toung. Moi, je
crois au communisme, mais pas a
n'importe quel communisme. Le pou-
voir politique et la socialisation des
moyens de production, cola no suffit
pas. A qui revient cc pouvoir ? On. me
repond par cet cuphemisme : aux
ouvriers et aux paysans. Mais, on
Tchecoslovaquie, Ic peuple des travail-
leurs a voulu prcndre Ic pouvoir et
cette entreprise a etC taxer do contre-
revolution par les occupants. Je crois
,quo la revolution scientifique et tech-
nique est une des conditions essenticlles
d'un socialismc humain. Et ce fut on
Tchecoslovaquie le grand merite du
Pr Radovan Richta quo de Ic montrcr.
Mais attention : sans democratib, la
revolution tcchnotogique no produira
pas do socialisme humain, mais un
communisme de caserne. y
Cc nom de Radovan Richta, auquel
Fischer fait allusion, est encore inconnu
du grand public. Et pourtant, cot
homme d'unc cinquantaine d'annees,
malade, tuberculeux, fatigue nerveuse-
ment, est en train do faire eclater un
empire idcologique. On connait M. Ota
Sik ou M. Dubcek. Et pourtant, plus
que quiconque, cc professeur, dirce-
teur de l'Institut do philosophic de
I'Acadcmie des sciences a Prague, dont
des milliers d'intcllectucls communistes,
comme Roger Garaudy, so nourrisscnt
aujourd'hui, fut bicn Ic grand artisan
do I'expericncc tchCque.
Il y a six ans, quand it fut clair quo
le pays allait a la faillite, et que pour
une Tchecoslovaquie dcpourvue . de
matii res premieres et do ports it n'y
avait qu'une solution, t la reconversion
technolegique s, M. Antonin Novotny
se tourna very- le Pr Richta et lui
demanda d'ctudier cc quo pourrait titre
un -g-modClc de civilisation techni-
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cicnnc' dans Ic cadre d'une societ6
socialists. Richta s'cntoura des meil-
leurs sociologues, economistes, psycho-
logues que comptait le pays et Sc mit
au travail.
Bombes. Ses c communications
furent une suite de bombes. Janvier
1968 vit lc triomphc de scs idees. La
revue du P.c. franyais, . Democratic
nouvelle >, on avait, dans un numero
special, degage ('esprit : mais cc numero
no verra jamais le jour. Le Parti a pre-
fers tuer la revue. Son redacteur on
chef (communists), Paul Noirot, ecri-
vait dans le preambulc : c L'idec fonda-
mentale de cc nouveau cours etait
que chaque citoyen d'un pays socia-
liste doit finalement disposer non pas
dune plus petite, ou de la mcme, mais
d'une plus grande liberte de parole,
d'expression, de reunion, de mouve-
ment et de deplacements que' cellos
qu'offre la plus epanouie des societes
bourgeoises. '
Voila qui peut paraitre a premiere
vue idealiste et litteraire. Mais la force
de Richta est de dire non pas : < 11 faut
que cc soit ainsi parce que c'est bien *,
mais : c 11 faut que ce soit ainsi, sans
quoi nous perirons. s Pourquoi ? Parce
qu'une certaine forme do socialisme a
etc cor cue dans le cadre d'une civili-
sation qui est on train de disparaitre :
c Celle qui etait fondcc sur ces deux
composantes on opposition, des
machines de plus en plus puissantes et.
complexes, d'une part, des armecs de
plus on plus grandes de main-d'ceuvre
humaine non qualifies d'autre part. Or,
Is revolution tcchnologique tend
renverser completement ces termes. s
Petit-on encore paricr de r demo-
cratic proletarienne a comme fi Moscou
quand on va vcrs c l'abolition a une
Cchellc do plus on plus vaste des fonc-
tions fondamentales de manipulation
exercecs par'I'homme 3~, quand le see-
tour tertiaire s'etend de plus 'en plus ?
L'automation complCte, dit Richta,
exigc c 40 % d'ouvriers qualiftes,,40 %
do personnel ayant recu une.formation
secondaire et 20 % do personnel ayant
regu une formation supcrieure :.
Participation. Et it ajoute dans une
vision prospective : r Au cours des
prochaines decennies, c'est le travail de
regulation qui dominera dans la pro-
duction (type de 1'ajusteur) ; plus tard,
it cedera la place a la phase prepara-
toire, a Ia direction technique et a
l'etablisscmcnt des projets (type do
l'ingenicur). A la fin du siccle, la pro-
duction aura cesse d'ctre un processus
do travail au sens d'aujourd'hui.
Autremcnt dit, la frontiers memo qui
separc la a classe ouvriere do
1' ,intelligentsia . tend a disparaitre.
Le moyen le plus efficace pour accroitre
les capacites creatrices de la societe
est non pas la production on soi, mais
l'investissement dans l'hanune, l'cduca-
tion, et aussi la a participation x. Enfin,
note Richta, 1' < elargissemcnt de la
consommation des masses devient tout
autant une condition necessaire de la
croissance economique que 1'etait prec--
demment la limitation de la consom-
mation des masses *.
Chaque phrase, ici, ouvrc tin champ
infini do consequences en chains : Ia
force de cc c modele * est qu'il n'est
pas simplement moral, qu'il ne 'so
reclame pas d'une We abstraite de la
liberte. Richta constate avec une rare
rigueur scientifique que le socialisme
de demain reste totalement a definir...
Quc peuvent les tanks contre cola ?
En un mois, pour des millicrs de
communist.:s en Occident,, cctte vague
apprehension s'est transformee en evi-
dence. Dans le numero de a La Nou-
velle Critique >, revue du P.c. francais,
qui paraltra le mois prochain, on
pourra lire sous la signature d'Andre
Gisselbrecht ces lignes : < Le renouvel
lement de 1'idee du socialisme prit nais-
sance dans le Comite central du P.c.;
tcheque lui-mcme, par ('entente cntrc,
hommes d'Etat et hdnimes do sciences.'
11 s'agissait done d'autre chose quo
d'ajoutcr a un modele socialiste un
< supplement de liberte A, il s'agissait
d'une analyse scientifique de l'evolution
des ' forces productives. s
Le debat concerne non seulcment
les communistes, ' mais enalement
1'hommc modern. J.-F. K. Itt
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II f)gcember 1968
RISING SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The conspicuous display of a Soviet naval-amphibious presence in the
Mediterranean during and since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 has dram-
atized to the West the Soviet Union's efforts to improve the mobility of
its traditionally land-based military power. As early as 1964, however,
the Soviets gradually began to establish a naval presence in the Mediter-
ranean, using regular submarine patrols and other vessels during the Cyprus
crisis. It was only after Brezhnev demanded withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet in April 1967, just before the Arab-Israeli conflict, that the ap-
pearance of additional Soviet naval units in the eastern Mediterranean at-
tracted widespread attention. The presence of a number of tank and troop-
landing ships in the increased force of about thirty to forty combat and
auxiliary vessels drew particular notice, for the Soviets thereby created
the impression they were willing to intervene by means of local landing
operations. This turned out to be merely a gesture, for even at the height
of the six-day war the Soviets gave no sign of wishing to become militarily
involved in Arab-Israeli fighting.
Increase in Soviet Ships
During 1967, 152 Soviet naval vessels entered the Mediterranean through
the Dardanelles, and all but about forty of them entered after the Arab-
Israeli war in June. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
sixty-two of these ships have not re-entered the Black Sea, although some
have probably left the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar to join
the Pacific and Baltic fleets or to join whatever Soviet naval units may
be in the Indian Ocean.
Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, important elements of
the Soviet navy have entered the Mediterranean, also from the Black Sea,
The addition of these ships reinforces the apparently permanent Soviet pres-
ence in the Mediterranean to a total of over fifty warships, supply vessels
and other auxiliaries. These include two cruisers, at least four fast es-
cort vessels, a nuclear submarine plus several conventional submarines, and
six intelligence collecting ships. Most significant was the appearance in
mid-September of the first of the Soviet Union's helicopter carriers, Moskva,
a 25,000 ton vessel commissioned last year, which can carry thirty heli-
copters or operate V.T.O.L. aircraft. The Moskva,is also equipped with
guided missiles, with the launchers on the forecastle. By late October
there was an estimated total of sixty Soviet ships in the Mediterranean,
although there have been indications that the Soviets may have altered or
duplicated the numbers on some of the vessels, in an attempt to mislead
Western observers. So far the ships have been operating in small groups
rather than as a fleet, and in some instances becoming mixed up with Ameri-
can naval units during the latter's maneuvers and.snooping on American
radar or counter-radar wave-lengths. (Concurrently, the Soviet press has
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carried direct attacks against the U,S.. Sixth Fleet, claiming that the So-
viet naval buildup is in the interest of national security as it is intended
to counter "foreign machinations" near USSR territory.)
There have been recent rumors that there will soon be a major rotation
of the Soviet ships, with the Moskva and three missile-armed units scheduled
to return to the Black Sea, If true, the rotation will reduce the force
level to between thirty and forty ships, which was the average number main-
tained during the Arab-Israeli war Nevertheless, all evidence points to
a. permanent Soviet presence and a long-term Soviet interest in the Mediter-
ranean and North Africa. This evidence includes reports that the Soviets
are building more helicopter carriers and other ships especially designed
for use in the Mediterranean and African waters,, Moreover, the Soviets are
developing an amphibious force, similar to the U.S. Marines, with special
equipment for landing operations, (See attached Time article of 23 February
1968.)
Soviets Seek Port Facilities
In addition to their fleet buildup, the Soviets are seeking special
facilities in North African ports besides the repair facilities already
available to them in Alexandria and Port Said, Egypt, and in Latakia, Syria.
These facilities, together with the provisions and fuel carried by their
own supply vessels, greatly extend their capability for long-term cruising
'in the Mediterranean,
.In October a Soviet military delegation arrived in Algeria, probably
to discuss additional military assistance, (Algeria has already received
some $235 million in military aid from the Soviet Union, and major economic
agreements include Soviet assistance to the Algerian fishing industry and,
over the next few years, purchase by the Soviets of five million hectoliters
of Algerian wines.', It is believed that the Soviets also urged the Algerian
government to agree to grant the Soviet fleet fuller use of the facilities
at the former French strategic base of Mers-el-Kebir in the western Medi-
terranean in return for Soviet maintenance of the base and Soviet training
of the Algerian navy,
Earlier, the Algerians had asked the French for assistance in reor-
ganizing their navy, which is Soviet-equipped and tra.Lned, and in renovating
Mers-el-Kebir as an Algerian naval base, but to date there has been no
reply from Paris to this proposal. The French decided to quit the base
Last, year, a decade earlier than agreed upon in 1962, and since then Alger-
an officials have repeatedly emphasized that no power, Soviet or other-
wise, would be allowed to establish a base anywhere in Algeria,
Although units of the Soviet fleet have made a number of visits to
Algeria in the past eighteen months, the use which they can currently make
of Mers-el-Kebir facilities is limited, and they are not known to have used
any of the available maintenance facilities in Algiers. As of mid-1968,
total Communist military personnel in Algeria were estimated at between
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1500 and 3000, with probably no more than 60-100 Soviet technical advisers
at Mers-el=Kebir. Thus, recent European press reports that the Soviets have
assumed maintenance of Mers-el-Kebir and that there are now 10,000 to 18,000
Soviet civilian and military technicians in Algeria appear exaggerated.
(On 23 October Izvestia published an article by its Algerian correspondent
in which he ridiculed as a "desert mirage" an article appearing in the
8 October issue of the conservative French paper Aurore reporting 18,000
Soviet "military experts" in Algeria, but such a refutation from the Soviets
may have been designed to counter the growing attention of the Western press
to the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.)
While French officials doubt the accuracy of these press reports, at
the same time they have expressed genuine concern over growing Soviet influ-
ence on the Algerian economy and the increasing military dependence of Al-
geria on the Soviets. Yet the costs involved, the basic political insta-
bility of Algeria and pressure from various French interest groups would
appear to restrict France's ability to compete with the Soviet Union in
Algeria.
The Soviets are also apparently interested in the Moroccan port of
Casablanca, for they finally received permission from the Moroccan govern-
ment for several ships to visit the port for the first time in mid-October.
The usual routine of calls and entertainment was arranged for them, but
in general their reception was only correct at best. It is rumored that
at the time of the visit, the Moroccans were offered the necessary spare
parts to recommission the dozen or so MLG fighter and trainer aircraft which
the Soviets delivered to them in 1961, but which have not been operational
since late 1965 for lack of spare parts. Apparently a number of Soviet
military technicians who arrived with the fleet have remained in Morocco
to survey maintenance requirements of the aircraft before servicing them.
Widespread Concern over Soviet Presence
In the meantime, there are indications of widespread growing concern
in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East over the Soviet naval thrust
into the Mediterranean. At a mid-October meeting in Lisbon of the Atlantic
Treaty Association, an organization' made up of private citizens interested
in promoting understanding and support of alliance policies, General Lyman
Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe, commented that the So-
viet naval buildup was of "serious concern," but he did not endorse the
alarmist view of it taken by the European press. Most recently the subject
was raised before the five-day NATO meeting in Brussels, which was concerned
with revising political and military plans as a consequence of the Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia. U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson told the meet-
ing the Soviet Union was apparently building its forces not only in the
Mediterranean, but in the Indian Ocean and Norwegian Sea as well.
The Spanish press has reflected, if not helped to create, the anxiety
of Spaniards over Soviet fleet operations in the Mediterranean, including
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articles on the presence of Soviet ships a few miles from the joint U.S.-
Spanish base at Rota. Spanish concern is heightened, moreover, by their
awareness of the smallness of their own navy and their dependence on West-
ern forces for their defense.
Although Yugoslavia has allowed Soviet naval units to use shipyard
repair facilities on its coast, it has recently been concentrating on rais-
Ing the combat readiness of its navy since the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and the reinforcement of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, which could now
be used to pressure either Yugoslavia or Albania for base facilities. (The
Soviets lost a submarine base in Albania because of the Sino-Soviet conflict.)
The Yugoslav government has also announced a supplementary defense alloca-
tion of $32 million for 1968, citing the current world world situation as
the reason. This brings the Yugoslav defense budget to approximately twenty
percent above the 1967 allocation.
Some observers see Moscow's next move, as part of its drive toward
the Mediterranean, in using Bulgaria to pressure Yugoslavia over Macedonia.
For some time Bulgarian newspapers have recalled old Bulgarian claims that
much of Yugoslav territory is really Bulgarian. This press campaign has
become more intense since the beginning of the Czech crisis. Last March
Sofia commemorated the 90th anniversary of the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano,
which aimed to create a "greater Bulgaria" in what is now Yugoslav and
Greek territory. Intervention in that year by the Western powers and the
resulting Berlin Treaty prevented most of Macedonia from coming under
Bulgarian-Russian domination and denied to Russia an outlet on the Aegean
Sea and control of the Turkish Straits, both traditional goals of its
foreign policy. Thus, apprehension in Yugoslav Macedonia -- fed by the So-
viet naval presence in the Mediterranean, Arab-Israeli tension and Soviet
threats to Yugoslavia since the occupation of Czechoslovakia -- has now
spread to Greek Macedonia. The fear there is that any Soviet-backed Bul-
garian move against Yugoslav Macedonia could develop into a serious threat
to itself'.
Others reported to be concerned over the increased Soviet naval
strength include the Tunisian government, whose fears of subversion or ag-
gression by Algeria or Egypt -- since its boycott of the Arab League --
have been heightened by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Tunisia's
condemnation of it; also the Iranian government, whose concern is apparently
based on the possibility that one of the Soviet goals in strengthening its
naval forces is to reopen the Suez Canal, by which the Soviet presence could
then be easily extended into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. In fact,
it has been increasingly rumored that the Egyptians may have already agreed
to a Soviet request to reopen the southern end of the Suez Canal.
Counteraction by the Western alliance
The Soviet fleet buildup in the Mediterranean has been watched closely,
however, by both NATO and SHAPE, and the reports of additions to the Soviet
fleet have coincided with the announcement that the Western alliance is
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HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, Hamburg
3 October 1968
Italians KQnimniteh
im Osten niche beiiebt
Die ? Konte'rrevolut ona" re" von Rom
Eigener Bericht.
Rom, 3.Oktobej
Aus den Zeitungt.standen Moskaus, Warschaus and Ost-Berlins
ist die ?Units" verschwunden. Das Organ der italienischen Kom-
munisten, die sich neben den Russen and Chinesen immer mehr ais
dritter B'ruder in der uneinigen Familie herauskristallisieren, wird '
im Osten gehalit and gefiirchtet
Es ist in sein
L
it
ik
,
e
e
art
eln der,
dritten Seite noch ,konterrevolutionlirer, , als es Dub
kd
e
c.. an
Cernik jemals zu sein wagten. Fast ist es zur Fahne der unter-
driickten Freiheiten ,des Ostens geworden, auch wenn die wenigen
Exemplare, die meist eine Woche alt rind, nur heimlich von Hand
zu Hand gehen.
L Blatt nicht ileben. Die Hartnt'ickig-
keit, mit der es das Modell einer sozia-
listischen Perspektive der Vlelzahl der
Meinungen and der nationalen Eigen-
arten vertritt, ist ihnen ungemein lastig.
Obwohl man in Moskau jede Polemik
mit,der Stellung der KPI vermeidet and
Iman sie In Warschau and Ost-Berlin
verdreht and zerredet, hat sick unter
den Volksmassen der Ostlander die
Wahrheit doch Behr schnell verbreitet.
Man. spricht von Lugo wie von einem
Apostel der sozialistischen Freiheit. Man
sagt: ?Wir haben .den Sozialismus, aber
nicht die Freiheit; in Westeuropa hat
man die Freiheit, aber nicht den Sozia-
lisrnus. Die KPI hingegen hat spit To-
gliatti das Problem tier sozialistischen
Demokratie, das heil3t der Freiheit aufs
Tapet gebracht. Nur das kann der Weg-
welser in die Zukunft spin."
tlberall weil3 man auch, da13 seat. Ja-
nusr niemand die Reformbestrebungen
Dubceks mehr unterstutzt hatte als die
italienlschen Kommunisten. Viele be-
trachteten die CSSR als Vorfeld des ita-
lienischen Experiments eines liberali=
CPYRGH
T
ern un der,, die zar stischen ?raditionen Ruliland
roten Orthodoxie wei:+ergeht. nennen, nannte Ingrao die Fatalitat de
Der 21. August wurde vom Gros des !biirokratischen Zentralismus and de
KPI-Parteivolks verurteilt. Es hatte Zusammendrangung der ganzen Macht i
much gar./ nicht anders sein konnen, einem engen Staatsapparat. Dagegei
nachdem die Parteilokale jahrelang mit babe Bich die CSSR zu Recht erhebe
Schriften fiber einen Kommunismus wollen. Von Rom aus gesehen loge dii
Uberschwemmt worden waren, der offen Gefahrenquelle fur den Sozialismu
sein wollte zur ,Zusammenarbeit mit nicht 1m Prager Freiheitsstreben, . son
den sozlalistischen and katholischen dern in den Methoden, die Moskau mi
Volkskraften". Nur von den alten Par- den Panzern am Leben erhalte.
crate Land aes oozialismus" noch immer Die Revolution steht auf dem Spiel
im Blute liegt, kam Zustimmung zu dent
russischen tlberfall. Ingrao schlol3: ?Wir verlangen da
Ende der biirokratischen Degeneration.
Suche nach ?neuen Ufern" Wir verlangen eine Ausweitung :der ?in..
Aber im KPI-Hauptquartier will man neren Parteidemokratie, and.rq'eshalfl
den. Bruch zwischen den 'Generationen Dubcek. Deen wir die Gretipe um
zd
verhindern. Einheitlich solle die Partei Zukunft dec r Rev Revolution. gaht
,,die Strafe zu den neuen Ufern" suchen. marxistt R. Die ga
Hinter dieser poetischen Sprache ver- sick piche nur h nurni auf die diehe Zustimmung mmign hat
birgt sich die Notwendigkeit, eine Dok Bich nicht Zder
trin and Taktik fir die Lander der, bewuBt.. Mobil si r ngern der ruck auf Arbeiterr
fortgeschrittenen Industriekultur aus?~~ klasse asse und die kollekt r
zuarbeiten, ?die in entsetzter Abweh allein scpferische ner ,sus der:
dem ostlichen Kommunismus :die sk n Energien des;
Uberstehen", gegen- 5ozialisrnus kommen kd konnen."
Viele Beobachter mogen sich fragen
Die Konsequenz solch scharf umrlsse.'
,
Wer heute, trotz, der eingedrungenen ob die Kampfansage Longos an die rus- per Thesen 1st kiar: Wenn sich der rus-
rupsischen Panzer welter an einen sol- sische Gewaltherrschaft wirklich, auf- s'ische Block den Liberalisierungsforde=
chen Kommunismus glaubt, setzt allein richtig oder nur taktisch ist. Wir zwei- rungen der italienischen Kommunisten
auf die moralische Zugkraft der KPI. feln nicht an der Aufrichtigkeit, well, verschliel3t - and bis zum Augenblick
Bich Longo bereits viel zu welt vorge-( tut er das hartnackig -, dann ward die
4-rgumente, aber keine Divisionen wagt hat, ads dal er noch zuriickkonnte. ideologische and organisatorische' Tren
Itahens. KPI-Chef ist fiber Nacht fur aIl* nung von ihm unvermeidlich. Dartiber
,FUhlen sick die FUhrer des italieni- Trostsuchenden des Ostens zu elnem scheint sick Longo thit den franzosi
schen Kommunismus stark genug, die in Mythos geworden, and von einem sol- schen, spanischen and englischen Ge-
ale gesetzten Hoffnungen auch nur in then Mythos kann er sich nicht losen, nossen bereits einig zu:sein. Das Wort
etwa zu erfi:illen? Zweifellos haben sie wenn er sich nicht selbst and seine Par Schisma ist nosh nicht gefallen, um die
zahllose gultige Argumente, 'aber kelne tel einaschern Parteimasse, die in ih'tem Reifungsgrad
Divisionen. Sip wissen Behr wohl, dal In der letzten Nummer der KPI-Wo zurtickgeblleben.1st, nicht in die .vollige
der Kompromii3 von Moskau. nur pin chenzeitschrift ,Rinascita'griff der' Verwirrung zu sturzeri; aber in der
hintercheiniger Waffenstillstand ist, j eo~g~7~g~~g }jfa ttllcklung bewegt sick die
hinter dem ygy,hr;irYrCl6f?k~Fii a?9~i tiutllet 2 ergruppe darauf zu.
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
Der Weg wird lang ..;
Der Weg wird lang and schulerig
sein. Er wird um so schneller zuruckge
legt, je scharfer sich der russische Druck
auf die tschechoslowakische Freiheit,
erweist, je mehr das Moskauer Diktat
die ideologischen Motive des Marxis-;
mus-Leninismus zusammenschlagt, je
starker die Preasezensur and das Ver
samrnlungsverbo den Bankrott des
kommunistischen Messianismus um-
schreiben. Mit 'Entsetzen beobachtet'
man 1m KPI-Hauptquartier die fort-
schreitende Prager Involution, die von
den Gewaltherren fresh ?Nlormallsie
rung" genannt wird. Ein Schlag nachi
dem anderen kommt gegen das, was,
Togliatti die ,Humanisierung des Sozia
lismus",nannte. Die , Reaktidn der KPI'
daraut ware nosh scharfer; wenh:I,,o'ngO
nicht Angst hatter-derSozialdem6krati-
sierung bezicbtfgt zu. werden.. Gut . do-
$ert setst er,liesbalb?lneben _ipde;p-
griff auf Moskau.elnen.Angrtff auf: den
Westen.
Die Furcht vor Sprungen ins Unge
Wisse lahmt. Deshalb. ist es such noclt.
nicht zur Einberufung einer Konferenz
der kommunistischen Parteien Westeu-
ropes gekommen, die man in Rom schon
vor zwei Wochen ins Auge fatlte and zu
der ich Bermut gten. Bisher hatemanl es bet
zweiseitigen Zusammentreffenl bewen-
den lassen.
Aber wenn Moskau die eineschlage
ne Stral3e weitergeht, wird die KPI ihre
Position in einer autonomen 1 onferenz
der westlichen Kommunisten bestatigen
mussen; denn der Punkt, an dem sie
angekommen 1st, wiirde Resignation,
Verwirrung and schiieBlich Verfall Ve ,
deuten. Longo hat die ganze Zukunft
seiner Partei auf die, Waagschale ge-
Worfen. Nach solchem Wagemut kanner
.nicht mehr'kapitulieren.
Dr. Fritz Gor dia,ri
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, Hamburg
30 October 1968
ITALIAN COMMUNISTS NOT FAVORED IN THE EAST
The "Counterrevolutionaries" of Rome
L'Unita has disappeared from the newsstands of Moscow, Warsaw,
and East Berlin. The organ of Italy's communists, who along with the
Russians and Chinese are emerging more and more like a third brother
in a disunited family, is hated and feared in the East. In its edi-
torials of the third page it is even more "counterrevolutionary" than
Dubcek and Cernik in their time dared to be. It is as if it has become
the flag of the suppressed freedoms of the East, even though the few
copies available (which usually are a week old) are passed secretly
from hand to hand.
"The fraternal parties" cannot like this paper. The persistence
with which it represents the model of a socialist perspective based
on a multitude of opinions and national peculiarities is uncommonly
burdensome to them. Though Moscow avoids all polemics with the position
of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) and though Warsaw and East Berlin
twisted and distorted its position, the truth nevertheless has quickly
spread among the popular masses of the eastern countries.
Longo is spoken of as an apostle of socialist freedom. In the
East, people say: "We have socialism but not freedom; in Western
Europe they have freedom but not socialism. But the PCI since
Togliatti has brought to the fore the problem of socialist democracy,
i.e., freedom. That is the only way to the future."
It is known everywhere also that since January no one has supported
Dubcek's efforts at reform more than the Italian communists. Many
regarded Czechoslovakia as the testing ground for the Italian experiment
of a liberalized, humanistic communism. Whoever currently, despite the
intrusion of Russian tanks, can still believe in such a communism now
must rely on the PCI's moral attraction alone.
Arguments but no Divisions
Do the leaders of Italian communist feel strong enough to fulfill
substantially the hopes rested in them? They certainly have countless
valid arguments, but no military divisions. They know very well that
the Moscow compromise is only a fake armistice behind which the dramatic
tug of war continues between the Prague reformers and Red orthodoxy.
The 21st of August was massively condemned by the PCI rank-and-file.
It could hardly be otherwise, after the local party units for years had
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
been. swamped with writings about a communism which claimed to be open to
"cooperation with socialistic and Catholic forces." Only the old party
members to whom Russia remains the "first land of socialism" could approve
of the Russian invasion.
Search for "New Shores"
But the PCI headquarters wants to prevent the break between genera-
tions. With unity the party is to seek "the way to new shores." Be-
hind. this political language hides the necessity to work out the doc-
trine and tactics of countries with an advanced industrial culture "which
stand clear of Eastern communism in defensive disengagement."
Many observers may ask whether Longo's challenge to Russian hegemony
is genuine or merely tactical. We have no doubt as to its genuineness,
because Longo has already ventured too far to be able to turn back. Italy's
PCI chief has become overnight a mythical figure for all those in the East
who are seeking solace, and he cannot destroy this myth without smashing
himself and his party to smithereens.
In the last issue of the PCI weekly journal Rinascita, the young party
ideologic Ingrao made a frontal attack on the whole structure in the East.
What others called the Czarist tradition of Russia, Ingrao called the fa-
tal flaw of bureaucratic centralism and the concentration of all power
in a narrow state apparatus. Czechoslovakia justifiably protested against
it. From Rome's point of view the real danger of socialism was not to
be found in Prague's strivings for freedom but in Moscow's methods, which
it tries to keep alive with the help of tanks, according to Ingrao.
The Revolution Is at Stake
Ingrao concluded "we demand the end of bureaucratic degeneration,
we demand an extension of inner party democracy and therefore we sup-
port the group around Dubcek. For here the future of the revolution is
being decided. The whole Marxist-Leninist tradition has based itself
not only on the consent of the masses but also on the conscious mobili-
zation of the working class and on collective work, out of which alone
the creative energies of socialism can arise."
The consequence of such sharply delineated theses is clear: if the
Russiai bloc closes its mind to the liberalizing demands of the Italian
communists -- and up to now it is doing just that and very stubbornly --
then an ideological and organizational parting of the ways will be inevi-
table. In this, Longo already seems to be of one mind with the French,
Spanish, and English comrades.. The word "schism" has not yet been men-
tioned because it would throw the party masses, who lag behind in their
degree of maturity, into complete confusion. But in terms of practical
development, the intellectual leader group is moving in this direction.
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
The Revolution Will be Loner. ...
The road will be long and difficult. But the road will be traversed
so much the more quickly, the more sharply, Russian pressure is exerted
on Czechoslovak freedom, the more the Moscow "diktat" smashes the ideo-
logical motive force of Marxism-Leninism, the more strongly press cen-
sorship and the ban on free assembly demonstrate the bankruptcy of commu-
nist messianism. With horror, the PCI headquarters watched the continu-
ing Prague-involution which the power lords impudently call "normaliza-
tion." One blow after another is being delivered against what Togliatti
called "the humanization of socialism." The reaction of the PCI would
be even sharper if Longo were not afraid of being accused of being a
social democrat. With even doses, he therefore accompanies every attack
on Moscow with an attack on the West.
The fear of a leap-into the unknown is paralyzing. For this reason
it has not yet come to the point of convoking a conference of West Euro-
pean communist parties, an idea which arose two weeks ago in Rome and
which Belgrade and Bucharest independently encouraged. Before that, bi-
lateral meetings were more the order of the day.
But if Moscow persists in the course it has undertaken, the PCI will
have to confirm its position in an autonomous conference of Western com-
munists; for it has come to a point where resignation, confusion, and
finally failure is to be expected. Longo has thrown the whole future of
his party in the balance. After such boldness he can no longer capitu-
late.
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 I
Approved
nistra serve solo all'attuale gruppo
dirigente delta DC. Se si vuol dun-
que battere it prepotere dc occor?
re far cadere.ogni tentativo, ogni
velleity di ripresa o di rilanclo del.
centro sinistra.
In verity, quello the pg7l pre-:
doinina nella discussione politica,
b it problema del rapportocon not
comunisti e con l'opposizione di
sinistra. Si parla cost dell'csigenza I
di far cadere it principio delta de?
limitazione delta maggioranza, st;
atrerms ohe sarebboro da instau-
rare nuovi e corretti rapporti ira'
maggioranza e opposizione; si di-
ce che comunque sarebbe da ri-
prendere quella sfida che l'gnore-
vole Moro lancib baldanzosarpente
:contra di noi net congresso Na-
oh delta DC e che ha fatt una
tine cosi miseranda. Non sottgvalu-
iamo 41 travaglio di molti ' degli
ominl politici che avanzano que-
i9ta ipotesi, sia net PSU the nella?
DC. Lssi testimoniano I'esaurimen-
to del centro sinistra e is coscien- -
zz, delta direzione in cut occorre'
cercare una soluzione.. Ma proprio.
pe, questo non possiamo in alcun
-:~ ido avallare alibi o contribuire
s.d alimentare equivoci.
Dobbiamo denunciare ii tentati-,
vo di quanti parlano di a corretti
rapporti a con i comunisti o di su-
peramento delta delimitazione del-
la maggioranza, per ridare credito
ally formula fallimentare del cen-
tr, sinistra, per mascherare it loro
cedimento. Vaneggia chi parla di
volonty di Inserimento del comuni-
sti net centro sinistra. Quests A
una pure e semplice calunnia. Ben
altro vogliamo. Per ben altro ci
battiamo.
It dibattito svoltosi in prepara?
stone dell'imminente Congresso del
partito socialista unificato ha la-
sciato in ombra I problemi pill at-
tuali delta vita economics e socia-
le del Paese. Una discussione per
formule, a volte astratta e incom-
prensibile. Esciuse le posizioni del
tut.to nette delta sinistra, tutte to
altre tendevano a sfumarsi ed a
lasciare aperte le pill diverse ipo-
tesi per to combinazioni di vertice
dopo it Congresso. Un dibattito che
per cib non .poteva interessare le
grandi masse, caratterizzato da me-
tocU clientelari ed anche peggio sui
quale it giudizio, per quanto se-
vero, b superato da quello che gll
stessi dirigenti del PSU sono coo-.-
stretti ad esprimere.
Costruire
un'aItern hva
bilancio sull'azione svoita in
questi, ultimi anni e sui gua-
sti che la rottura a sinistra
e net moviinento operaio ha
determinate. Quanti manten-
gone vivi gli ideali del so-
cialismo e le tradizioni del
vecchio PSI dovranno riflet-
Lere su quanto sia costata
I'unificazione socialdemocra-
tica in termini di cedimento
c di abbandono di posizioni di
principio. In questi mesi net-
to file socln&INte sl 6 levato
1'allarme per I'offuscarsi del
earattere socialista e classi-
terna a di copertura a sine.
stra delta D.C. A noi sembra
indispensabile un riprnsa-,
gii ha consentito di affermarsi co,
me forza nazionale dirigente dally
Resistenza ad oggi. Non siamo riu-
sciti, 6 vero, ad impedire is restau-
ionecadpminato dai un tipo di
svi
sviluppo
nb ad imporre un diverso tipo di
sviluppo basato sulle riforme di
struttura, su trasformazioni demo-
cratiche e socialiste delta societu.
` Ma abbiamo realizzato conquiste
assat importanti slit piano econo?
mico-sociale Partiito politico: e, sapratt,y
zati co t a
nb'vita del moviinento Belle masse.
.Not dibattito congressuale tutto 11
sta del partito, per In poll. partito deve approfondire critica-
politica, ideate e sociale delta so-
clety itahana non C certo casuale.
Rivendichiamo anche ails politica
sti anni, pcrchb 11 PSU Po.';- ed all'azione del nostro partito una
sa arrivare ad an cambia- parte importante del merito per
mento di linea e dl impo- questo nuovo volto del nostro Pae.
staiione. In questo sense, sa- se. Esso a stato investito in questi
lutiamo fraternamente tutti anni da processi economici e socia-
i compagni del PSU che av- It propri delle society capitalisti-
vertono come is sconfitta che cosiddette avanzate, anche Be
elettorale del loro partito it fenomeno si intreccia con anti-
debba attribuirsi ad una po- che contraddizioni e squilibri.
litica profondamente shaglia- Ma tutta 1'evoluzione dells situa-
ta, sentono la necessity di zione di questi venticinque anni b
cambiare, vogliono ricercare caratterizzata dalla presenza e dal-
le strade per una nuova uni? la lotta del movimento operaio. su
ti delle sinistre. lottare per una Linea strategica e - politica che
t'avvenire socialista dcll'Ita- gli ha consentitd ?di affermarsi co.
lia. me forza nazionale dirigente dalla
all'ordlne ' Resistenza , ad oggi. Non siamo riu-
Il problema mature, sciti, 6 vero, ad impedire"la restau-
del giorno in Italia - ha continua razione ca stylistics ed un tipo di
tics at centro sinistra. Questa emer.
ge come necessity dai problemi del-
la society italiana, dalle lotte dei
Iavoratori, dallo sviluppo del pro-
cesso unitario delle forze di sini-
stra, laiche e cattoliche. Da quali
condizioni nasce is possibility e ne-
cessity di quest'alternativa? Come
dare unity a forze politiche e so-
ciali, a gruppi e movimenti auto-
nomi diversi? Su quali obiettivi
concentrare it movimento e la lotta?
ne ad imporre un diverso tipo dl
sviluppo basato sulie riforme dl
struttura, su trasformazioni demo-
cratiche e socialiste delta societu.
Ma abbiamo realizzato conquiste
assai importanti sul piano econo-
mico-sociale e politico: siamo avan-
zatl come Partito e, soprattutto,
abbiamo fatto avanzare is coscien-
za ' della necessity e ? it moth per
un cambiamento profondo. L'impor-
tanza di questa lotta si avverte og-
gi, poichd di fronte at tipo di svi-
La prima condizione 0 data dal- luppo economico monopolistico ed
1'amplezza, dalla profondith e dalle ale sue tendenze autoritarie, si al-
novity del movimento delle masse. larga la combattivity democratica
Net dibattito congressuale tutto it di masse sempre piii vaste e delta
partito deve approfondire critica- gioventii.
mente queste esperienze. Il quadro Siamo di fronte ad una vlgoro-
di movimento, di lotte, di tensione sa ripresa unitaria Belle lotte ope-
politica, ideate e sociale della so' rase, le quali abbracciano tutta la
cietit Italians non a eerto casuale. condizione di fabbrica e riguarda-
Rivendichiamo anche alla politica no anche it potere contrattuale del
ed all'azione del nostro partito una sindacati e dei lavoratori. Si sono
parte importante del merito per corseguiti notevoli risultati sul pia-
questo nuovo volto del nostro Pae- no degli accordi aziendali.
se. Esso a stato investito in questi Importanti movimenti si svilup-
anm da processi economici e soda- pano inoltre sul problems delle
It propri delle societu capitalists- pensioni, nelle lotte per rompere
che cosiddette avanzate, anche se le gabble salariali, contro le smo-
il fenomeno si intreccia con anti- bil'tazioni e i licenziamenti che
Grave e seria b la respon- che contraddizioni e squilibri. provocano la reazione di intere cit-
sability dei delegati che si Ma tutta 1'evoluzione delta situa- ty, da Trieste a Pisa, da Palermo
riuniranno' per it I Congres- zione di questi venticinque anni e a Roma e a Napoli.
so del PSU. Essi dovranno caratterizzata dalla presenza e dal- Mal redo i punts deboli in prime luogo, trarre un is lotto del mo mento operaio, he moviinento offre. un quadro questo
com?
Approved, For Release 2010 1 ' : tW- go 7AMMAn 000400030007-9
 plessivo di unit c ApArg& i? elease 24RA/c% P78~0306Q~ 9to0j0(~10300 a ni e ad altri
battaglie del 1969 per ii rinnovo
dei contratti di lavoro. A queste
lotte debbono guardare tutu colo-.
to the ritengono ' necessario un
cambiamento della situazione po-'
litica italiana. Senza tentativi di
strunientalizzazione politica dells
autonome battaglie sindacall, non
pub tuttavia sfuggire the la spin-
ta operaia tende a im,porre un
nuovo tipo di sviluppo. Nel cor-
so delle lotte the hanno mobilita-
to milloni di lavoratori b andato
avanti it processo di unlth sinda-
cale: un problema the interessa
tutta la democrazia italiana.
Anche nelle campagne si b allar-
gato it movimento dei lavoratori
dells terra e del contadini. Dopo
in elezioni it movimento ha cono-
sciuto uno sviluppo nuovo e im-
petuoso. La durezza e la difficolta
incontrate da queste lotte deriva-
no dal fatto the suite masse dei
contadini e dei lavoratori .delta ter-
ra a caduto it 'peso maggiore del
processo di trasformazione delta
society italiana. Ma pur ' in queste
difficili condizioni mat b state am-
mainata la bandiera della riforma
a graria.
Nuove furze sono scene in cam-pia rhaest'anno, a rivendicare una
a !ova politica agraria di riforme
e trasformazioni produttive. Ii mo-
vimento per I'unitb del movimento
c ontadlno b senza dubbio piu len-
to e difficile. Tuttavia, anche qua
registriarno fatti nuovi e' interes-
;intl.
: i b rivelato inconsistente it ton-
iativo scissionistico messo in plo?
cis due anni fa dal PSU. Sintomi
Ali crisl e difficoltb si sono avver?
t1 neila confederazione bopomia-
.a- Sono senza dubbio un altro
.d;utomo delta situazione.
Accanto able lotto dc?Ilc or-
ganizzazioni lradizionall. opc-
raic: e contadinc, it.movimen-
to rcgistra la presenza atti-
va di forze non organizzate
nei Fiartiti a nei movimen 1
di classe, ma the tutlavia
si pongono sul terreno del
rinnovaniento dcmocratleo c
socialista del Paesc: si trat-
ta in prinio luogo del mo
vimento studentcsco. La sua
lotta ha conseguito importan-
ti risultati. lfa dato un col-
po ai propositi di ristruttu-
razione conservatrice del cen-
tro-sinistra, ha ratio emer-
gere con forza la coscienza
dells crisi strutturale delta
nostra scuola. ha indcholito
11 sistema autoritario neile
turata nello scontro la co.
scienza del rapporto organi-
co the deve esserci tra la
hattaglia per ii rinnovamen-
to Bella scuola con la ]otta
generate contro it sistema ca-
pitalistico.
Noi abbiaino clalo it no-
stro appoggio al movimento
studentcsco, in un rapporto
non solo di comprensione e
per la scuola, ma per tutta
la societal italiana.
aluto, ma di diliattito apex.
to, di collaborazionc critica.
Vogliamo lavorare ad una ri-
presa del moviniento, ad uno
sviluppo (lei sun carattere di
massa. Far crescere it movi-
nieitto studentcsco a giovani.
be, nella sua autonomic e net.
In sua forza di massa, a una
csigcnza cssenzialc non solo
it fenomeno va oltre t] movimen-
to studentesco. Investe to sviluppo
Sidi circoli, di riviste, di gruppi di-
versa net cameo cattolico e socia-
lista, the esprimono una tenden-
za generate all'estensione delta par.
tecipazione alla vita politica, the
cercano la via per imporre un
cambiamento dells situazione ita-
liana e un proprio ruolo autono-
mo nella lotta per 11 socialismo.
Nol esprimiamo una comprensio-
ne profonda verso questl gruppi,
It consideriamo forze partecipi del-
l'incessante processo degli orienta-
mentl e delta lotta per avanzare
verso it socialismo. Nel vastissimo
panorama fin qua considerato an-
drebbero compresi altri lmpor
tanti gruppi social!, come quelli
del ceto medio produttivo dells
cittb., the si muovono anch'essi su
un terreno antimonopolistico.
Accanto a] moto delle forze so-
ciali, : guardiamo a quanto avvie.
no nello schieramcnto politico, den-
tro e fuori del centro-sinistra per
individuaro le condizioni di una
alternativa democratica. 11 succes
so elettorale delle forte unitarie
di sinistra ha confermato la giu.
stezza dl una scelta del PCI, del
PS'* UP e di altri gruppi volta ad
operare un'inversione dt tenden-
za per dare vita ad una base di
aggregazione dl forte sociallste e
dernocratiche. II processo a anda
to e pub andare ancora piu avant.!.
Ho gib detto del PST] - ha con-
tinuato Natt.a - delle manovre per
farlo tornare all'ovile dcl centro?
sinistra, del deterio amento subito
con l'unificazione slocialdcmocrati-
ca. Non posslamo tuttavia dimen-
ticare fatti important!, come la
collaborazione tuttora esistente in
tante amminlstrazioni comunali;
net sindacati, nelle cooperative,
nelle organizzazioni contadine. NO
dimenticare come sin stata finora
battuta, in gran parte dagli stes.
si compagni socialisti, !'idea del
u sindacato socialists a. In quests
st*uazione rtteniamo the non saris
realizzare it piano delta ripresa
del centro-sinistra. Noi faremo co-
munque iI possibile perchb questo
non avvenga.
LID a UN num
ce t -ss~ QsC~1~
I fenomeni the caratterizzano it
processo in atto nel movimento
cat tolico investono ancho is D.C.
L'ultirno consiglio nazionale ha
dovuto registrare it fallimento del-
ls linen seguita con it centro-sini-
stra, riponoscere' 11 crescere di
gruppi politici e di orient.amenti
nuovi in gruppi come be ACLI the
contestano ormai la concezione
dell'interclassismo e in funziono
stessa dells D. C. Ha visto
In sinistra svolgere un duro attac-
co contro le posizioni moderate e
conservatrici del gruppo dirigen.
to attuale e gli stessi personaggi
dorotei formulare ipotesi the ave-
vano, tutte, I'assillo di fare i cootj
con la realtb del paese e con ii
nostro partito. Oltre la a filosofia
di luglio a, la DC non b finora an-
data net definite una linea, men.
tre ? sono cresciuti it disagio a la
opposizione della sinistra. Quanto
del resto sin aspro' it cammino
per In ricucitura del centro-sini-
;strn to dimostrano tutte le ultimo
vicende politico-parlamentarl.
Tutto i1 partito dove avers chin-
ro 11 senso di una battaglin aper-
ta: nelle prossime settimane, b
possibile far saltare i calcoli e le
speranze delle forze conservatrici
itallane, di Rumor e di Nenrii.
E' possibile imporre un cam-
; biamento, far avviare la vita poli?
ilea del Paese su una nuova stra-
da, far crescere l'ondata del 19
magglo, contro la DC e contro it
Centro sinistra.
Ecco le bas! per un cam-
biamento, a la costruzione df
una alternativa democratica:
sviluppo e allargamento (lei.
le lotte operaic, contadinc,
di tutte In form antimono-
polistiche; presenza combat-
tiva di movimenti autono.
mi, cone quello studentesco;
avanzamento del processo
unitario era forze sociali di-
verse in fnnzione antimono-
polistica; collegamento ogget-
tivo e ricerca di units fra
forze politiche di sinistra Iai-
che e cattolichc, interne ed
esterne al centro-sinistra.
Questo processo per. Ila for-.
-azione di una nuova mag
gioranza a per l'unita, Belle
sinistre, non a ni; breve ne
facile. Tuttavia pull essere
portato avanti con un com.
plesso e vario sviluppo di
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6
 detto fAPRr vie*JiP.~' ReLea*.fhi2QQr?604/1t7at4. PPW"3961A0004?O9&OOO a9 delta partcc-
Innanzi tutto la riaffermazio?
no piena del concetto leninl?
sta e gramsciano del partito
came organizzazione politica
the fa politica in rapporto
,vivo con la reaitx, stimolan.
do la partecipazione ally bat
taglia del complesso del ? mi-
litanti, formando, per via de-
mocratica, una coscicnza uni?
(aria e una volontx colletti?
va del partito, agendo In
modo the to grand! masse
complano la propria espe?
rienza e su questa base mi?
surino e si convincano delta
giustezza delta lines e delta
direzione politica del par.
tito.
zioni industriali (Fiat-Citroen, Eni-
Montedison) dimostra l'inesistenza
di una programmazione economica
net nostro Paese.
Altro punto controverso b 11 giu-
dizio sul tipo di sviluppo economi? '
co verificatosi in Italia in quest!
anni, orientato sulfa ricerca del
massimo profitto e non nell'int.e-
resse del Paese. In questo indiriz-
zo generale stanno le cause della'
marginalizzazione crescente e del
1'aggravarsi dei problems dell'agri-
coltura, dell'accresciuto squilibrio,
fra Nord a Sud, dell'accantona-
mento di ogni proposta di rifor?
ma, delta mancata soluzione del
problems delta scuola e dell'Uni-
versitb,, ecc. Terzo punto, per not
centrale, riguarda l'accrescersi de-
gli squilibri sociali a danno degli
opera!, di larghi strati di contadi-
ni, delta povera gente. Non b pos-
sibile, a nostro parere, parlare dT;
allargamento del mercato interno,
se non si parte da questo proble.
ma, dagli intollerabili salari ope-
iai, dalla poverth del reddito con-
tadino. dai minima di fame delle ?
pensions.
Per porre fine al mali dl cut sof-
fre it Paese, not proponiamo una
politica di riforme the affronts
organicamente le cause del di-
storto sviluppo economico. Tale po-
,litica di riforme non significa rin?!
viare la soluzione del problems in
tempi lunghi. Una organica poll-
`tea di riforme parte anti dalle
question! immediate, per dar lavo-
ro a chi non no ha, migliorare le
condizioni di vita degli )perai e
del contadini, per dare sdlievo at
pensionati. Cib b anche ec)nomica-
mente indisponsabile per l'allarga-
mento del mercato internocor?
ro inoltre una diversa scelta sugli
investimenti, spostare to risorso
verso le esigenze veramente essen?
ziali a partire dalla difesa del sup.
lo, dalle trasformazioni fondiarie,
dall'irrigazione per rendere piu
produttiva l'agricoltura. Questo si.
gnifica programmaziono democra-
tica e antimonopolistica, intesa co-
me una linea. Qui giungiamo anche
al carattere meridionalistico the
deve avere la programmazione de-
mocratica.
Tutto questo significa dare pre-
minenza al settore pubblico della
economia assicurando la sua ge-
stione democratica, ponendosi it
problema di eliminare gii sprechi
e di fare to riforme, in primp luo?_
go quella agraria e quells urban!-,
sties.
solo una esigenza al ronao
per la progranunazione the
not indichiamo, ma una ne?
cessitl per In sviluppo del
Paese in tuttt 1 campi. Queslo
tema sottende a quello deci-
sivo del rapporto fra - demo.
crazia e socialismo, - e to
sottolinciamo - non solo
per dissipare equivoei sill
carattere < pacifico > delta
via italiana. non solo per ri?
badire la visionc di essa
come un processo di lotto di
massa, tanto pia agevoli e
decisive quanto pia it terre?
no dl combattimento c quel-
lo di un regime democratico.
11 sistema capitalistico, net
sun sviluppo monopolistico
e nella sua difesa di fronte
she lotte sociali e politiche,
reagisce non solo sill terre-
no economico, ma su quel-
In politico, con le tendenze
autoritaric, to svuotamento
degli istituti democratici e,
nei momenti pia acuti, con
1'attacco reazionario.
Riaffermare questo carattere del.
partito b oggi importante. Questa
.concezione del partito assume in-
fatti un significato critico, di, fron-
te ad altre esperienze. Inoltre, da
una parte, b necessario respingere
e battere le tenderize riaffioranti
di tipo estremistico, the approda-
no allo spontaneismo, al primiti?
vismo organizzativo delle forma-
zioni settarie; dail'altra dobbiamo
respingere le spinte the emergono
dal sistema economico in atto con-
tro gal istituti democratici e 11 si-
stema del partiti. ,
Net fenomeno positivo delta ri-:
cerca ?di espressioni e forme nuove'
deli'impegno politico c'b tuttavla
anche 11 riflesso dei limit!, e degli.
Impacci ad una reale e democrati-
ca partecipazione alla vita a alla
battaglia politics attraverso I par-
titi. La polemics del giovani - no-
riteniamo contrail e docisivi in que-
sro momento riguardano una nuo-
va politics estera di pace, di supe?
ramento del blocchi e di neutral!-
tb, attivita, a to sviluppo economico,;
fI consolidamento e l'allargamento
delta vita democratica.
to rogra,913012e1P
SIM
Non Intendiamo fornire un giua-
dro della situazione economics del
Paese a indicare tutto II comples-
so di proposte the not avanziamo.
Intendiamo sottolineare I punt!
sui quali b necessario premere per
un cambiamento generale e com-
plessivo e the costituiscono al tem
po stesso obbiettivi immediati dei?
movimento e della pressione delle
;masse lavoratrici. Il primo di quo
sti punt! riguarda it naufeagio del
programma di sviluppo economi-
co del governo Moro-Nenni. A par-
to la cifra dell'incremento del red-
dito the si mantiene a stento, tut.
ti ill altri dati del Piano Pierac-
Le questions delta demo-
crazia sono strcttamente Ic-
gate a quelle dello sviluppo
economico e delle riforme
sociali. In questo legame sta
uno del momenti essenziali
di tutta la nostra strategia.
D'altro canto, non solo neila clas-
se operaia ma in. altri strati socia-
li, tra I giovani, matura is persua-
,sione the le conquiste sul terreno
sociale e delle riforme debbono
saldarsi, per essere consistent!, ad
un piu ampio intervento, democra-
tico, a possibllitx di gestione e
controllo da parte delle masse. Di
qui ii valore di esperienze the, pur
nei Toro limits net nostro Paese, ed
anche net loro insuccessi come in
Francis, hanno proposto f one
nuove ed original! di partecipazio-
no e di potere democratico nelle
fabbriche, nelle universitik. After.
miamo the non vi b contrasto tra
t'obbiettivo del rinnovamento degli
istituti della democrazia rappresen.
tativa e is loro funzione, e la ricer-
ca di forme ed istituti nuovi di de-
mocrazia diretta; al contrasio, le
due, esigenze sono inseparabili e
connesse l'una con 1'altra.
Su questa lines ss - muovono he
proposte nostre, volte a far cresce-
re la partecipazione democratica e
a realizzare degli spostamenti net
rapport! di forza. Qui sono gli ob-
biettivi della lotta per it rinnova-
mento o to sviluppo della democra-
zia, per una riforma democratica
dello State. E qui sono nello stes-
so tempo he leve per la crescita di
un movimento democratico e po-
polare articolato, vivo e di - tale
ampiezza da riuscire a garantire
successo aile conquiste sociali, al-
la lotta per to riforme e da esse-
re in grado di far fronte alle rea--
zioni del gruppi dirigenti capitali-
stici e di batterie, quale the fosse
it terreno su cut volessero avventu-
rarsi,
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7
 torah del 19 maggio? Not lavoria?
mo per mandare avanti it processo
di' unity fra tutte le forte di sini?
stra laiche' e cattoliche, fra forze
politiche e socials diverse, gruppi e
i
t
ti
t
E'
hi
h
men
au
.
onom
c
aro t
e
II pericolo del ricorso ally vio?: mov
lenza. a agli attentati antidemocra? 11 PCI e questo schieramento han?
tic] b sempre aperto e politicamen- no una funzlone decisiva nelle bat.:
to attuale. Occorre non sottpvalu? taglie di opposizione. Noi ci batt.ia-
tarlo. Occorre essere pronti alts ri? mo perb anche ~sul piano parla-
sposta. Ma la garanzia prima per mentare per soluzioni Cho non s1-
evitare it rischio b lo sviluppo con- gnifichino alcun ritorno, comunque
seguente della lotta e delle istitu? inascherato, al centro-sinistra, ma
zioni democratiche, dela orgafi!zza?
zione polilica e sindacale. #ella segnino un passo avant! per l'av
combattivita e partecipazione 4elle vie a soluzione del piu urgent! pro?
larghe masse del lavoratori e'. del blemi del Paese e del lavoratori,
popolo. Il valore di rottura the og? e ' verso la ,formazione di una nuo?
gi sempre piu assumono le rifor- va maggioranza. Per questo sumo
nee net regime di capitalismo mo- disposti a discutere con tutte Is
nbpolistico di Stato, la spinta e le forze di sinistra, animati solo dal.
dsperienze nuove sul terreno dells
partecipazione ci riconducono a la volonta di far progredire la so
quel panto nodale della nostra luzione del problems della society
strategic the a it rapporto tea ri-' italiana, clegli operai, del contadini,
forme e democrazia, tea riforme e di tutti i lavoratori, pronti a spe-
rivoluzione, Ribadiamo the qui b - rimentare forme nuove di units e
quells di un profondn, audace svi-
luppo democratico, della partecipa?
zione del pii.l grande numero pos?
sibile di militants comunisti fills
sceite a alla lotta del partito.
la ragione di radicale differenza anche soltanto di convergenze a di
tra la nostra strategia rivoluziona?
ria e le tradizionali imnostazioni collaborazione, a tutti i livelli, e
del riformismo. Le vicende di que? in tutte Is assemblee elettive, dal
sti anni ci scmbra confermino un comuni al Parlamento.
giudizio the tuttavia deve essere I punt! programmatici the not
aperto aI dibattito, ma la nostra nostante In grande prova di fidu-
lotta - anche sul terreno teorico' cia del 19 maggio -- investe anche
-- deve sempre piu riuscire a spe- IT nostro partito e coglie problemi
rimentare questa the b in verita ed esigenzc real! the sarebbe gra.
dells via italiana al socialismo. ve se non val itaasimo giust.amente.
A conclusions del suo rap-, Siamo in verith di fronto a si-
porto s1 compagno Natta ha tuazioni move per i] ranporto fra
tl partito a 11 complesso del mo-
affrontato I problemi del vimenti, delie organizzazioni a del
partito, Bella sus organizza? gruppi politics e culturali the si
zione e dells sua vita inter- collocano sul terrero delta lotta
na. Qucllo the occorre - ha democratica e socialista. Per que-
Iotte,. di convergenze units. sto b necessaria una forte azione
He e momenti di collahora? di orientamento del partito perchb
zione anche su obbiettivi li? emerga con pia ehiarcz7a the tut.
mitati a parziali. Qucsto ' ii to la nostra lines politica esiae
compito, urgente e attuale, un rafforzamentn della funzione di-
(lei comunisti. Senza di. not rigento del partito, esige un im-
sarebbe imnensahile e impos?. penno senza eguall del partito e del
sibile, in Italia, un preens- comunisti, dl presenza e di inizia-
so unitario di questo tipo. tiva in tutta la soeietiti. in tutte le
organizzazioni; un impecno di chia-
Si pongono in questo quadro rezza e combattJT1DH\ ir(:ologic P
anche i problemi della piu ravvi- politica, di mobilitazione delle
cinata prospettiva politica. Mi energie e della partecipazione po-
srmhra perfino inutPe ribadire la polare, di conquista del consenso.
necessity the I'attuale governo sic Pluralismo? autonomia del movi-
spazzato' via. Gi'a gravi danni ha menti di classe, e democratic!, po-
arrecato al Paese. La sua soeran- litica di unith, strategia delle ri?
za di sopravvivenza sta nell'evita- forme fanno contare di piu it par.
ro i problems, net farli marcire, tito e it comnito the Cleve esserali
net non far lavorare it Parlamen- proprio di sintesi, di direzione no.
to L 'Italia non put) sopportare litica, di strumerto di egemonla,
una tale politica. D'altra parte ri- secondo it metodo del confronto
teniamo del' tutto improponibile un critico, della dialettica aperta, del
rilancio del centro-sinistra: e pen- rapporto tra eguali con le altre
slamo che, ove` questo tentativo forze del movimento operaio e de?
venisse compiuto, assal gray! po- mocratico. Ma proprio per questo
trebbero essere le conscguenze sul it partito deve mantenere e rae-
piano del rapport! socials e poll- forzare i suol caratteri peculiari di
ticl. organizzazione politica di massy e
E allora? Come risolvera, nello di lotta, dove tendere sempre piii
Immediate lI problema delta Crisi a d'venire l'intellettuale colletti-
politica aperta dal fallimento del vo di cui parlava Gramsci. Il do-
Centro sinistra a Adaj~
~ A~P~F2ele 03'7 9'R9 a (5PAistt[5'78`-63061A000400030007-9
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
 TIME Approved For Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400(Fo _qH
22 November 1968
NEW REALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AS the 78,000-ton aircraft carrier
U.S.S. Forrestal slid out of the
Greek port of Salonica one grey dawn
last week, a 900-ton escort ship waited
for her just outside the harbor. The
Forrestal turned southward into the Ae-
gean Sea, and the escort dutifully took
up station a mile astern, rolling gently
in the huge carrier's wake. At midday,
when the Forrestal catapulted her Phan-
tom jets into clearing skies, the escort
drew alongside to within 50 yards of
the carrier. But not a signal was ex-
changed. The escort vessel was Russian,
a super gunboat of the Mirka class,
and the Forrestal had not invited her
to tag along.
Invited or not, the Soviet navy has
made itself at home all over the Med-
iterranean in sharply increasing num-
bers. Acting as if they had nothing to
lose but their anchor chains, the Rus-
sians are everywhere now-tailing the
U.S. Sixth Fleet, showing the Red Flag
from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, re-
sorting to old-fashioned gunboat diplo-
macy to keep the big powers baffled
and the smaller ones uneasy.
Snap of the Fingers. Black-bereted
naval infantrymen, the Soviet version
of Marines, stroll the streets of Da-
mascus. Intelligence trawlers refuel at
what has become the Soviets' main Med-
iterranean port of call, Alexandria. So-
viet patrol boats tie up 1,700 miles to
the west at the Algerian port of Mers-cl-
Kebir. Soviet subs play hide-and-seek
with NATO patrols underneath the heel
of Italy. Overhead, from bases in Egypt,
Soviet "Badger" class planes, their red
stars painted over with Egyptian mark-
ings, wing daily across the Mediter-
ranean to shadow Allied fleets.
What are the Russians up to? NATO
commanders do not know the answer,
but they do know that the new Soviet
presence has radically changed the Med-
iterranean equation. Only ten years ago,
when Nasserite terrorists were trying to
overthrow the government of Lebanon,
its President, Camille Chamoun, could
reassure a doubting Cabinet minister:
"If things get too tough, I can call for
the Sixth Fleet, just like this . . ."
And the President snapped his fingers.
Chamoun did call for help; the U.S.
Sixth Fleet landed its Marines. Lebanon
proceeded to settle its affairs without fur-
ther outside interference. Russia's Ni-
kita Khrushchev, who had been loudly
rattling his rockets and threatening war
if the U.S. intervened in Lebanon, quick-
ly backed down in the face of the U.S.
show of strength.
Impact on Israel. In those days, the
M d't w considered an Amer-
an as
U.S.
f~?lcrs el Kebir. r ~.~m. .d+r. i 1
Gi ? Malta ?e ~.-a..!`.. Cyprus
.
OTU ~'SIA ..~. Crete 0 4 i AL Ef2IA`;' _&i._
U.S. SIXTH FLEET ISRAEI.Y,
d~ ;?,"'.? .., 50 thips (Inc. 2 aircraft carrion), u I
'
t~-- Soviet anchorage topen water)
Port of colt '
} Pdssiblo future brio'
begun to awaken to the potentialities
of seapower. In the early '60s, the So-
viets began to build up their navy all
over the world (TIME cover, Feb. 23).
Now the U.S. must reckon with the So-
viet force in the Mediterranean-and
so must the Israelis. When Soviet-made
Styx missiles, fired from a torpedo boat
by Egyptians, sank the Israeli destroyer
Elath off Port Said in an incident in Oc-
tober 1967, the Israelis dared not re-
taliate directly for fear of hitting So-
viet warships near by. Now the Soviets
have brought a dredge into the Med-
iterranean; should they y to use it to
pry open the Suez Canfil, the Israelis
would face an agonizing dilemma.
In recent weeks, the Soviets have
put yet another x into the equation. To
the Soviet eskadra (squadron) in the
Mediterranean, which has numbered as
many as 52 ships, including two cruis-
ers, ten submarines and six intelligence-
collecting trawlers, the Russians added
an entirely new kind of vessel on the
face of the oceans-a multipurpose, mis-
sile-firing helicopter carrier. The Rus-
sians so far have built no Western-style
aircraft carriers because they consider
them vulnerable to missile attack. In-
stead, into the Mediterranean glided the
Moskva, a sleek 25,000-ton vessel that
combines the features of a cruiser and
a carrier. The craft has four pads marked
with red and white bull's-eyes on her.
100-yd. flight deck for launching up to
30 helicopters of the Hormone type
used in antisubmarine warfare, The
Moskva is the first Soviet vessel in the
Mediterranean equipped with ship-to-
air as well as ship-to-ship missiles, and
each time a U.S. Navy P-2 patrol plane
tries to take a peek, the Russians swift-
ly swing the missiles below decks on el-
evator platfot?nis. In a crunch, the hel-
00 aircraft 'OeO
1n.n r ?
7 . A.n wQ ? rt $$la.
_ +~ glcsarSc~rlu?'-k ' Ito
I;~`"YA EGYPT.
TIME. flap by J.TJ no nn
VTOL (vertical take-off, landing) planes
as well as helicopters.
Altering the Balance. In the opinion
of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Medi-
terranean force, lacking big aircraft car-
riers, would be no match for the Sixth
Fleet, with its 50 combat ships, in-
cluding two carriers and two cruisers,
200 aircraft and 25,000 men. The Rus-
sian squadron in the Mediterranean is,
in fact, smaller than the Italian navy.
But as U.S. Admiral Horacio Rivcro,
commander of NATO forces in Southern
Europe, notes: "While the Soviet flo-
tilla is a potential military threat, its
greatest importance is political and psy-
chological. The number of ships is not
too important. The presence of one ship'
has a political impact."
A coup attempt in Egypt or Syria, a
blockade thrown against Israel for
Egypt, a pro-Soviet political upheaval
in Albania, a Soviet power play against
Yugoslavia-all are situations in which
the Soviets could use their new sea-
power with unpredictable results. Some
Western strategists worry that the friend-
ly neighborhood presence of Russian
ships may tempt the Arabs to take fool-
ish chances soon against Israel, in the be-
lief that the Russians would rush to
their aid if Israel lashed back in force.
Nothing of the sort has yet hap-
e i
i og~g ar }r~ Xrt
Jean lake, , andAptr~+eidtd~ra42gle~r s a vS1I fb a to an A000400030007-9
 pened, and in fact the Russians so far - "in a concerted attempts to alter the bat.-
7 : Q AcRQPj7Arft3QA1A0QQ4a00Q3QOJ-9
tries along the Mediterranean, including keep the balance even that this week Out-
Algeria and Egypt, to permit them to law, whose name the Italians have hap-
build a full-fledged naval base. But even pily translated as Ii I3andito, takes cont-
without such bases, the Soviets now .mind of Maritime Air Forces, Mcd-
drop anchor all along the rim of the 'iterranean (NIA1RAIRtiMED), the special
Mediterranean and sail binocular-to-bin- new NWI*0 naval air arni created area-
ocular alongside the allies. The Russians ordinate the watch on the Russians
muscled into the Mediterranean, says watching NATO.
U.S. Rear Admiral Richard C. Outlaw,
23 February 1968
RUSSIA
Power Play on the Oceans
The fin, of the Soviet navy now
pcoaclly flies over the oceans of the
world, Sooner or later, the U.S. will
have to tttulerstand that it no longer
has mastery of the seas.
-Admiral Sergei Gorshkov
'l he author of that, threatening boast
v.alkeui ill) to a snake charmer in the In-
dian city of Agra last week and, while
his a;idcs looked on aghast, seized ai
thick, six-foot-long python in his strong
'funds and draped iz'over his shoulders.
Making a ten-day 'tour of India, the
contrnandwr, of the Russian navy was
acting like the,traditional sailor on shore
leave. He viewed the 'raj Mahal by
moonlight, visited the Nehru Museum
and the site where Mahatma Gandhi's
body was cremated, and shopped for
souvenirs. But Admiral Sergei Georgic-.
vich Gorshkov's trip to India had an
entirely serious, purpose, as do all his
,rips these days. Vie is trying to line up
is trldwide system of ports of call
and bases for his navy, and he hoped
to persuade India, which is about to re-
ecivt at least three submarines front
tide ioviet Union, to reciprocate by af-
lowi lg Soviet men of-war to fuel and
maik " repairs in Indian (forts.
While the attention of the. U.S. is fo-
cused on Viet Nam, the Russians are
inounUne at sea a, new challenge that
the U.S. and its allies will have to deal
with Ion!" after tire fighting in South-
east Asia is ended. 'this may collie as a
surprise to most laymen-but not to
J.S. naval experts. While Russia's stock
cii intercontinental missiles and its huge
land army on l~.urope s periphery still rc-
iaiaa the major military threats to the
Wrest. in recent years the tcussians have
developed it global navy second only to
he U.S. in sine and v,-capotlry. As a
:aorv,parison between the two navies
,trews (are' chart), the U.S. remains in-
iisputatfly the waffle s greatest sea
,"'tit'er, tail, In as rem airkatble turnaround
:rdc World War It, Moscow has tra ris-
;urined a relatively insignificant coaast-
al-dcfensc force that seldom ventured(
far from land into a real blue-water
fleet.
If any one man is responsible for
this change, it is Admiral Gorshkov,
.57, who became the youngest admiral
in Soviet history at 31 and has guided
the growth of the navy as its chief for
the past twelve years. He has totally re-
shaped the Soviet Union's once con-
servative naval strategy and transformed
the fleet into the most effective and flexi-
ble arm of Soviet foreign policy.
U. S. U. S.S.R.
NAVAL STRENGTH
a
a
aua:
15
0
Attack calriars
Helicopter and
17
2C
Helicopter carriers
sklppart corners
~~-.-
s ul`Isst,ip and
l4
19
Cluisurs
Clllit NrA
y
D Iruy. r;
frieores
330
170 ,
Destroyers, fri;~otes
,
7, d orover escr r 1
,
. 66strQyer es'-alts
h u[!e ar-nav err. i !
75
' 55
Nalco-powered
sobrvinnes
submaanes-
Cti r svlamonnes
80
O5
Other submarines'
' und:iig crafi
105
i 100
Landing craft
0 580 Torpedo and
i~ rn:sr,ta iauo''.
a
s
a
?tERCtt4' T FLEET
000 1.3st7 +x.~.a ..
runa
B rr tt i : ` ~~ I .u n ai~n d.w
tik C't5 i?rJc
~.~
f=ormidable Fleets. Since 19.57, Rus-
sia has added to its navy virtually all
of the ships that now make up its inl-
pressive striking, power. It has a mod-
era force of 19 cruisers, 170 destroy-
i's, itlltisiic frigates and destroyer
escorts, and 560 motor torpedo boats.
is 360 submarines, 55 of them nu-
ciear, give Russia the world's largest
submarine fleet, far exceeding the U.S.
total of 155 subs but falling short of
the U.S. fleet of 75 nuclear subs.
Moreover, unlike other naval pow-
ers, the Soviet Union uses its merchant
marine and other seagoing services as
important arms of the navy. Russia has
the world's fastest-growing merchant
fleet, which will pass the lagging U.S.
merchant marine in tonnage in the ear-
ly 1970s. Its high-seas fishing fleet is
the world's largest and most modern;
many of its 4,000 craft fish for vigil in-
formation along foreign coasts as
as for the creatures of the sea. The Sd
et Union also has the largest oceano-
graphic fleet, whose 200 ships plunib
the earth's waters for ntilitaunily vela
able data on depths, currents, bottom`
topography and other information of in-
terest. to its ships and submarines, Says
Admiral John McCain Jr., commander
in chief of U.S. naval forces in I;tr?
rope: "`The Russian program to devel-
op its scapowcr is more advanced and':
fully developed today than most people
realize. It encompasses the full spec
tram of the uses of the .sea-in its,
military, economic, political and corn
mercial connotations."
power represents a major strategic dcci=
sion. With its arsenal of 720 ICBMs
terrent, with its huge land army nit
ty in the middle of the great Eur tsiar,
land mass, Russia has turned to the sea
to break out of its own gcographic con
power.
Using the navy as a political as well
as a military force, the Kremlin hopes
that its mere presence in many places". '
will act as a deterrent to the U.S. More-
over, the Russians want to be ready to
move quickly into any areas where U.S.
power and prestige May recede. 1110y
not only plan to project a more tangi
veloped world but also, by using their
merchant fleet, to get a strong hold ors
the raw materials vital to Soviet----.in.t
often to American---industry. Ultimate-
ly, though, the Russint navy's hi? gtast
threat is a military one. Its offensive
strategy not only zeroes submarine-car-
yied nuclear missiles 'in on U.S. cities.,
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2
 P rro ed For Release 2OO5/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
but aims to isolate r h America from o support its growl lg naval activi- the speedy Osa and Komar torpedo
Europe and Asia in case of war. ty, Russia is searching for new bases boats are armed with Styx missiles.
Bridge of Trouble. The imperial and ports of call. Sovie diplomats are whose effective range is 20 miles. A
reach of the Soviet navy has already setting up an embassy n the new re- Styx fired by the Egyptians from a
begun to have its impact on world public of South Yemen, where the Rus- Komar sank the Israeli destroyer Hails
events. In the tense Sea of Japan, a sians have their eye on ::ie former Brit- off Port Said last October. U.S. Navy-
flotilla of 16 Soviet cruisers and tnis- , ish naval installation at Aden; the men insist that their planes would knock
sile frigates has in the past few. weeks ! J installation not only c.: ntrols entry to out Soviet ships before they got within
shouldered its way between the coast the Red Sea but is an dc,il hasc from firing range of U.S. warships or, fail-
of North Korea and the U.S. Navy' Which to expand influence into the oil lug that, that U.S. antiaircraft rockets
task force that was sent into the area' rich sheikdoms of the 'ersian Gulf, would intercept the missiles in flight.
to add some muscle to U.S. diplomatic The Soviets may also b able to use But the U.S. Navy has now started
demands for the return of the Pueblo the facilities of the big British naval work on ship-to-ship missiles of its own.
and its crew. Soviet destroyers have base at Singapore, Which Prime Minis. Admiral Gorshkov is also developing
also closely shadowed the carrier Err- ter. Lee Kuan Yew hay said he will a new force that will give the Russians
terprise, which withdrew because of rent to all comers after t c Royal Navy the ability to intervene in trouble spots_,
North Korean protests ? shortly before pulls out in 1971. The '-ig question in much as the U.S. did in Lebanon and'
the Soviet navy's approach. The Soviet the Mediterranean is w; ether the Rus- the Dominican Republic. The Soviet
presence checkmates the U.S. pressure sians will move into the Algerian naval navy has built its first carrier, a new
on North Korea and gives the Kremlin base at Mers-el-Kehir, which the French ,25,000-tonner called the Moscow, which
a local pressure point without having evacuated last. month; it is only 315 is now on a training course in the
to resort to nuclear threats. miles east of Gibraltar
ve Black Sea
and is readying a second
ssians h
R
,
,
.
a
u
Soviet seapower sustains the two - also used their influence with the Arabs the Leningrad, for sea trials; some West- -
countries that are giving the U.S. the to set up secret stockpiles of spare ern sea experts feel that the Russians
most trouble. A bridge of 150 freight parts within trucking distance of Arab may build many more. The Soviet car-
ers from Russian ports carries to Hai- ports. riers have landing areas only on the
phong the SAMs, the petroleum, the Russian Marines. Admiral Gorshkov's rear and can thus handle only hel-
rockets, the assault rifles and the am- shi
s
r
t
ti
ft
t
i
l
t
k
ff
i
Th
l
id
i
b
p
a
e no
ers or ver
eo
rcra
cop
ca
-
a
a
.
ey
on
y w
e-rang
ng
ut
munition that keep North Viet Nam among the world's newest and best; are similar, in fact, to the American
fighting and killing U.S. soldiers. More- equipped. Unlike the U.S. and Britain, Iwo Jima-type LPH (for Landing Pad
over, ' tt is the fear of hitting those both of which emerged from World Helicopter), of which the U.S. Navy
Russian ships that has so far kept the War II with large surface fleets, Russia has eight, two of them stationed in
U.S. from bombing Haiphong's piers or had to start practically from scratch Viet Nam waters as offshore bases for
.mining the harbor. And it is another after the war. The result: while 60% Marines. So far, the Soviets have giv-
bridge of Soviet ships that carries the of the U.S. fleet consists of ships 25 en no indication that they will advance
i $1,000,000-a-day in supplies that sus- years old oi- older, the Soviet navy's sur- to the large U.S.-style attack carriers,
tains Castro's Cuba as the only Com face fleet is sleek and modern. "Almost since they consider such carriers vulner-
munist foothold in the Hemisphere. every time you go into a harbor," says able to attacks by missiles.
Outflanking NATO. In the Mcdi- U.S. Navy Captain Harry Allendorfer, The Russians do have, however, a
terranean, the impact of the Soviet fleet an expert on Soviet seapower, "if there force similar to the U.S. Marines. It is
has been particularly dramatic. Where are no flag markings and you pick out the so-called Naval Infantry that fought
Russia had only half a dozen ships a the cleanest and best-looking ships, nine as regular ground units during World
year ago, it now -has 46 ships, almost out of ten of them will be Russian." 'War II but was later disbanded. Re-
as many as the 50-ship U.S. fleet, which The Soviet Union is adding to its organized in 1964 just after the con-
for years had made the "Med" practical- fleet of 55 nuclear-powered submarines struction of the carriers began, the
ly an American lake. Many of the So- at the rate of five a year. Most of the So- Naval Infantry now numbers 10,000
viet ships came through the Dardanelles viet nukes arc hunter-killers whose mis- 'men who wear distinctive black berets,
during the Six-Day War, and their ar- sion is to destroy U.S. Polaris subs in are chosen for outstanding physical fit-
rival helped persuade the Israelis to time of war, but a growing number fire ?ness and aggressiveness. The Naval In-
accept a cease-fire. The Soviets have en- a new underwater missile that has a fantry are carried on special landing
hanccd their new image as the protec- range of at least 1,500 miles (v. the craft and have tanks that can "swim"
tor of their Arab allies by keeping a U.S. missile's range of 2,500 miles). 'from ship to shore in amphibious
few ships in Alexandria and Port Said Since he believes that naval guns are ob- landings.
so that Israeli bombers will not be soicte, Admiral Gorshkov has equipped Collecting Lovers. The Soviet surge
tempted to . blast away at the vast almost all Soviet surface ships, from at sea should come as no surprise to
amount of war materiel that is flowing the smallest to the largest, with ship-to- the West. Actually, the Russians have
into those ports. ship missiles. The Soviet missiles are been reaching out to the oceans since
One main Soviet objective is to out- so-called "cruise missiles" that fly about Peter the Great ascended the throne in
flank NATO's land-based defenses-a 700 miles an hour, steer themselves ci- 1689. Under the guise of Peter Mi-.
goal that the Russian navy has partial- then by radar or heat-seeking systems khailov, carpenter, the young Czar tray-
ly reached by penetrating the Mcdi- and carry either conventional or nu- eled to The Netherlands and England
terranean. In a report to the Western clear warheads. The U.S. experimented to learn how to build ships. In 1714,
European Union last November, Dutch with similar weapons in the 1950s but his fleet defeated the Swedes at Hango,
Delegate Frans Goedhart warned: "it dropped them in favor of concentrating thus opening through the Baltic a "Win-
is no longer correct to speak of the 'dan- on the Polaris and airpower. No West- dow to the West" for his backward
ger' of the Soviet Union outflanking ern navy, in fact, has such missiles, country. the NATO southern flank. This 'danger' Soviet cruisers and the Kresta- and Peter's- successors frittered away the
has become a reality." To the north, Kynda-class destroyers carry the SS- fleet, but when Catherine the Great
the Russians have also turned the Bal- N-3 missile, which can hit enemy ships came 'to power .in 1762, she began a
tic into a virtual Red Sea on which at a range of 200 miles. The Krupay- massive rebuilding program. To find
their warships now outnumber NATO and Kildin-class destroyers carry the enough officers to command her new
forces 5 to 1. Approved`?For`Reled-4-2Ctf451@6047SSP!-RDPVe.O3O I ( 94Q80t3f19Dtegccted foreign naval
 men almost as la tr o9esTie orlRelease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9 co cte hel
ed cha
th
p
se
e Turks from the Black
lovers. Among them was the American Sea. Unfortunately, his morals were
Revolutionary War hero, John Paul, nearly as bad as Catherine's, and rival
Jones, who, despite his hravery and gift admirals used a scandal about his de-
for quick phrasemaking, had risen no flowering a young Russian girl to chase
higher than captain in the U.S Navy. him out.
In return for an admiral's rank, Jones Throughout the 19th century, Russia
took command of a Russian sailing remained the world's third largest na-
feet composed of four battleships, eight viii power (after Britain and France),
frigates and assorted smaller craft that but it was a largely untested one. The
CLF3ti
b~`Fn~ma
earl Harbor
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f
(40 warships)
Utaki
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BLACK SEA FLEET
Adm. Chursin - 700 ships
6 50 40 150
.rmi 2 new helicopter carriers
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Adm. Mikhaiiin
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Haiphong
Japan. In the straits of Tsushima, the
Japanese met a fleet of 37 Russian
ships and sank or captured all but four
of them. It was the last time the Rus-
sians fought a naval engagement on
the high seas,
What was left of the navy became a
hotbed of anti-czarist agitation. In
1917, the guns of the cruiser Aurora
PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET
Adm. Amelko -750 ships
r 6 50 100 150
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A F R 1 0 A
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Cruisers
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Submarines
(nuclear & other)
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(torpedo & missile)
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ships (35)
- Fishing fleet
a
?--- -?--- Shipping routes
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
fired a blank salvo at the Winter Pal- The assignment turned out to be it oil- is far greater than in the U.S. or Brit-
ace in Petrograd and started the Oc- ter one. Khrushchev believed that mis- ish navy. The officers' quarters are far
1tober Revolution. At first, sailors were sites had made surface ships "silting more spacious, their food far tastier,
the new Soviet government's most trust- ducks." He derided cruisers as "fit only their dining rooms more elegant, their
Ii ed fighters, but Lenin managed to alien-, for traveling on state visits," and uniforms much fancier. The disparity
ate them. He put in charge of the navy scrapped four that were still under con- in pay between officers and men is
commissar who was, of all things, a struction. He even passed the word to ! right out of the times that drove Karl
'woman, named Larisa Reisner-Raskol- the admirals to stay away from the Marx to write Das Kapital; a first-term
nikova, and refused to allow the sailors round of receptions and parties during seaman earns $5 a month, a lieutenant
to organize their own self-ruling local the 1956 air force day celebrations. earns 100 times more, and a rear ad-
governments. As a result, the Baltic Spotting four soldiers rowing a boat miral 400 times that much. There is an
Fleet suddenly mutinied in 1921. Lenin on a Moscow pond, Khrushchev, joked additional discrimination that probably
crushed the revolt, but he never for. to one of his American guests: "There is due to the Soviet Union's problem
gave the navy. He demoted it to the is our navyl" He went as far its to con- with alcoholism. While officers may tip-
inglorious position of "naval forces of template disbanding the navy and trans- ple in moderation onshore--and those
the Red Army" and decreed a new strat- ferring its missile-firing submarines to of the Black Sea Fleet may even enjoy
egy that called for only a defensive a new unified missile command. white wine at meals-Soviet sailors are
fleet whose main weaponry would he As a party member since 1942, forbidden at all times to drink on ei.
submarines. Gorshkov knew better than to openly ther land or sea. From all indications,
By 1932, the U.S.S.R. had some 25 oppose Khrushchev. But as a skilled pol- the order is surprisingly well obeyed.
subs, but Lenin's successor, Stalin, was itician himself, he knew well how to Russia's seamen-nearly all are draft-
dissatisfied with such an invisible fleet, stall. He subtly resisted the missile en- ees who serve for three years--nonetlte-
In the mid-1930s, he reinstated the navy thusiasts in the Kremlin, kept alive the less live better than many factory work=
as an independent service and started concept of surface ships. Then Khru- ers. The food is plentiful, and the crew
building it huge surface fleet. The Cier- shchev decided to put missiles in Cas- quarters are relatively comfortable and
mans captured the partly finished hulks tro's Cuba-and the . whole game clean. The ships have air conditioning,
when they swept into Russia in 1941. changed. The humiliation of their back- well-stocked libraries, TV sets for recep-
Thus the mission of defending the Red down under the guns of the U.S. Navy lion in ports and coastal areas and
Army's coastal flanks fell to the Soviet impressed on the Soviet leaders the movies twice a week. Sailors organize
navy's ragtag fleet. Most seagoing men value of naval power. Shortly after the singing and' nursic groups, play dont?
would have chafed at such a coastline crisis, Khrushchev sent an order to the inocs and chess and. at every opportuni-
assignment, but a young captain named admiral: Create a Surface fleet. ty, sunbathe on deck in what U.S.
Sergei Gorshkov welcomed it as an op- Gorshkov's own status reflects the Navymen call the "Soviet uniform"-
portunity. navy's elevation to a place of impor- white jockey shorts.
Youngest Admiral. Born in the lance. His fleet ranks in the top troika Unlike their Western counterparts,
Ukraine, Gorshkov joined the navy of Russian weaponry, alongside the the Soviet sailors are not allowed to
when he was 17, and graduated from ICBM command, a separate service in let off steam in foreign- ports. They go,
Leningrad's Frunze Academy, the Rus- the Soviet setup, and the air force strate- ashore only in groups escorted by it
sian equivalent of Annapolis, four years gic bombers. In the chain of command, apetty oilicer, take in local' museums,
later. When war broke out, he was the Gorshkov reports directly to the Dc- points of historical interest, and win-
dow-shop. of a handful of antiquated (ease Ministry. He was elected to the dow-shop. They buy few souvenirs,
cruisers and assorted small craft in the Central Committee in 1961, became a avoid bars and prostitutes and never
Black Sea. As the German invaders Hero of the Soviet Union in 1965 and tip. Usually they return, to their ships
rushed toward the oilfields of the Cart- was promoted last year to the exalted by nightfall. In the ports along the Medi-
casus, Gorshkov became expert at am- five-star rank of Admiral of the Fleet ict'rancan where the Soviet fleet has
phibious operations, plucking trapped of. the Soviet. Union, only the third to
Soviet troops from the Crimean coasts get that honor in the history of the Sovi- displaced the Western ones, hawkers
and landin them farther eastward to and whores are dismayed by the spar-
yr
fight again. g et As bhis rank, he is chauffeured tan conduct and serious demeanor of
.. As befits e
During those years, Gorshkov also each morning from his spacious Mos the Russian sailors.
formed the attachment for heavily cow apartment to the Defense Ministry , Harassment Policy. The Soviet
armed small craft that is reflected to- in Arbatskaya Square. Gorshkov set- ; navy s 465,000 men are also deadly se
day in the Soviet navy's emphasis on dom entertains and rarely appears at rious about their chief task: a potcntial-
Kontar and Osa torpedo boats. He weld- diplomatic functions. Married, he oftenly lethal game of espionage and . tag.
ed the turrets from T'-34 tanks to motor- spends weekends with his wife at their' Gorshkov's fleet has expanded its activi-
boats and formed a river fleet that government-supplied dacha near Mos- ty on the seas by three hjndredfold in
harassed the Germans from Rostov-on- cow. Like most high-ranking Soviet of-'the last ten years, and much of its cf-
Don to Vienna on the Danube. The ficers, he is withdrawn even from his fort is devoted to it determined policy
young admiral impressed sonic Red personal staff, spent most of the time of harassment, probing and provocation.
Army officers who were fighting in the that he was not traveling about in In- Across the oceans of the world, the
area, One was a major general named Ilia alone in his bedroom. light-grey-hulled Soviet warships are
Leonid Brczhncv, another a lieutenant Czarist Traditions. Peter the Great watching, trailing and sometimes crowd-
ally ships of the Western fleets,
gener?al named Nikita Khrushchev. ? would probably feel more at, home in esp the
. Sitting Ducks. After the war, Stalin the Soviet navy than Lenin or Trotsky. esp those of the U.S. Navy.
started building big warships again, but Aside from the fact that nearly all of- Soviet warships and electronic intelli-
only 15, cruisers had been completed ficers are party' members and that each gence trawlers stalk U.S., British and
by the time he died in 1953. The new ship has a political officer who gives other Western fleets far from the shores
chief in the Kremlin had no sympathy daily indoctrination lectures for every- of the Soviet Union. Soviet subs and
for Stalin's plans. Nikita Khrushchev onenavy life reflects the traditions of destroyers shadow the U.S. carriers in
fired Stalin's navy chief, Admiral Kuz- the czars more than those of the com- the Mediterranean, keeping a watch off-
netsov, and brought in Gorshkov, who missars. Discipline is extremely rigid, shore when the carriers go into port
by then was naval chief of stuff. n tw odic nd men and taking up the chase again when
Approved For Release J 0U5/6W'f : I9k-RDg~ 9 03061 A000400030007-9
 a g 17 : CI RDQ78-03061A000400030007-9
they come out. ~I~~tvPOit~o .s mt es out an to `escort" the The Russians lag well behind the'
ships keeps watch off U.S. Polaris sub- Russians as they fly over the U.S. task U.S. in submarine warfare. One reason
marine bases at such places as Holy force. is that their ships are slower (about 25
Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain and Search for Scars. The most danger- knots submerged), make more noise and
Charleston, S.C. Other snoopers sit off ous game of all takes place beneath the cannot dive so deeply as U.S. subs,'
Seattle, New England, and. Cape Ken- seas. For the U.S., the game involves and are thus easier to detect. But the So- -
nedy, where the Soviets monitor the chiefly' the detection and tracking down viers are continually trying to improve.
U.S. space shots. of Soviet subs. For the Russians, it is They are using their big hydrographic
Soviet behavior at sea is becoming in- largely a matter of attempting to elude fleet to learn more about the sea en-
creasingly cocky. From the Mediter- the American searchers. vironment and to find hiding places in
ratiean to . the Sea of Japan. Soviet As they pass through the ocean the canyons of the ocean for future gen-
destroyers and trawlers boldly maneuver depths, submarines invariably give off erations of deep-diving submarines. The
into the midst of formations of U.S, scars"-traces of heat and turbulence U.S. Navy tries to keep up with even
ships. Frequently, the intruders suddenly caused by the ship's passage through the most minor changes in the develop-
cut across the how of an American the waters. The U.S. employs ultra- ment and deployment of Soviet subs.
ship to test the skill and technique of sensitive infra-red devices in satellites One reason that Pueblo was cruising
the helmsmen, The Russians also try to and planes to look down into the oceans off Wonsan was to check on a report
ruin maneuvers between the U.S. and and detect the scars. Submarines also that, because of ice in Vladivostok, the
its allies. III the Sea of Japan last.year. give off what Navymen call "an elec- Soviets had temporarily switched their
Soviet warships scraped the U.S. de- tronic signature" that, like a human Pacific sub base to Wonsan and the
stroycr Walk
fin
twi
i
i
t
i
i
b
i
er
gerpr
ce
n
,
n an o
v
s un
ous at-
que. The signature is nearby island of Mayang-Do. The U.S.
tempt to break up a joint antisub ex- the s.im total of the sub's sounds-the is also equipping its nuclear submarines
ercise between U.S. and Japanese fleets, beat of its screw, thump of its pumps, with silent pumps and heat-dispersal sys-
Seafaring nations for centuries have alp rustle of its wake. To detect those sig- tems so that the Soviets will not be
lowed ships to proceed peacefully on natures, the U.S. uses a variety of acute able to use infra-red detection systems
the high seas," says Vice Admiral Wil- listening devices, including two net- to locate the scars of American subs.
liam I. Martin. commander of the U.S. works of sonar cables, called Caesar Soviet Sixth Fleet. One reason the
Sixth Fleet. "This is quite new-to and Sosus, that are placed in the ocean Soviets watch the U.S. Navy so close-
barge in on a formation." depths in areas frequented by Soviet ly is that they learn so much from it
Carrier Y. Bomber. Because the Rus- subs. U.S. planes, destroyers and hunt- As perceptive students of naval war-
sians consider the U.S.'s seaborne air- er-killer subs also use sonar devices to fare, Gorshkov and his admirals were
power to be a major threat in case of trace Soviet subs. Through such Sys- impressed with the performance of the
all-out war, one of their favorite tricks tems, the U.S. Navy is able to track U.S. Navy in World War II. When
is to harass and probe U.S. carriers. So- Soviet subs with uncanny accuracy they began to build their own navy,
viet destroyers and trawlers try to break' throughout most of the world's waters. they consciously patterned much of it
a carrier's screen of protective smaller Sub Hunting. A sonar operator needs on the successful American model. So-
ships in order to force the flattop to a highly trained ear to sort out the viet admirals even refer to their new
change course while launching or land- sounds of the sea. Apart from a sub's Mediterranean flotilla as "our Sixth
ing aircraft and thus maybe dump a noises, the sea is full of other sounds, Fleet."
few planes into the sea. In the air, bomb- a syncopated symphony of crackling The Soviets have a long way to go be-
ers of the Soviet navy's 750-plane
land- sh
i
l
ki
,
r
mp, c
uc
ng sea robins and grunt- fore they catch up with their American
based air force continually test to see ing whales; there is even the engine- teachers. They lag far behind in per-
how close they can approach U.S. car- like throb of an unknown sea animal haps the most important aspect of all:
riers before they are detected by radar that Navymen call the "130-r.p.h. fish." combat experience. Many Western ex-
and intercepted by the carrier's own Once the various sounds have been sort- perts refuse to rate the Soviet navy as
planes. Their aim is to avoid being ed out, the American sub hunters flash a truly efficient seapower until its untest-
caught until they have got within 100 the details of the sub's signature to a ed officers have been called upon to
miles of the carrier. Reason: from that Navy base in the U.S., where a com- handle their complicated modern weap-
range,. the Russians would have a good puter has memorized the signatures of onry under combat conditions. Nor have
chance ofsti losscoring
before kwith ttheir could air- the vast majority of the Soviet subma- the Russians yet mastered the sophis-
to-ship files b shoot down thud rives. Within seconds, the computer ticated technique of refueling and rc-
ble to flashes back the name and description plenishing their ships while under way,
bombers. of the sub.
The U.S. Navy has become increa%- On some occasions, the U.S. hunters great as U.S. t amounts sdo. of tiThus, me me they spend
an-
ingly watchful and wary of the Soviet pounce on the Soviet sub in what the where tar-
navy. keep track of its movements, where they would be easy t-
Y~ , Navy euphemistically calls "informal gets in time of war. Because their navy
U.S. reconnaissance planes overfly So- exercises." The object of the chase is has no large attack carriers, Soviet war-
viet warships at sea at least once daily to give the Soviet submarines a healthy ships lack air coverage when they ven-
and sometimes more often in areas near respect for the capabilities of the U.S. ture away from their own shores, even
the U.S. coasts and Viet Nam. U.S. Navy's ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) though Gorshkov himself has conceded
planners lt ship p plot the the Pacific course on of every forces. In a duel reminiscent of the fic- that no fleet can fight successfully on
vi he a huge map tional shoot-out in The Bedford In- the high seas without air protection.
the war room of the
headquarters oom Pacific cident, a U.S. destroyer locks on the American Response. Such drawbacks
Fleet e dqin tahe U. Hawaii; the enemy boat and tracks his every move. are unlikely to deter the Soviet Union
Atlantic Mediterranean of fleets Red keep Sometimes, to impress on the Soviets from placing increasing emphasis on
grids on the location the futility of their plight, an American seapower. Moscow not only relishes the
ships. As a precautionary measure, U.S. skipper will play The Volga Boatmen new global reach that Admiral Gorsh-
carriers keep a so-called Air Cap of over and over again on his' destroyer's kov's navy has finally brought it, but it
three or four fighters in the air at all underwater sound system until the ears
times whenever they sail within range of also views a an ideal opportunity the
of Soviet navy bombers. The Air Cap the Russian sonar operator are chance to capitalize on the U.S.'s preoc-
of by the noise and, the Soviet c
u ati n wt V' am and Britain's
mission is to ins%Wpo & P~ V gteWds 8tMt4QU:tcC4*r4 P78-0306AAQO WA i East of Suez.
 CPYRGHT
Approved Fob
CPYRGHT
Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP78
seeking to impose its own presence
where Western influence is diminishing.
The West, and especially ti U.S.,
has no alternative but to accept he So-
viet challenge on the seas, beta ise the
welfare of the U.S.-and of the entire
free world-is so solidly tied to the sea
and to the untrammeled flow of trade.
It would be a historic error if a nation
as powerful as the U.S. allowed a cri-
sis elsewhere, no matter how trouble-
some, to distract it from its determi-
nation to retain the mastery of the sea
that Admiral Gorshkov is so anxious
to wrest from it.
demand is difficult to pin down J
The bustling affluence and coin
placent calm apparent from the;
"traffic jams and crowded cafes
of Cairo can be misleading;"
and with the Suez Canal:
blocked, there is grave hard=
ship in places like Port Said,
and among the many thousands,
of people evacuated from Suezi
and Ismalia.
Still, Egypt's economic situa-
tion is a lot stronger than it
was a year ago. This is largely:
thanks to the #100 million`
annual subsidy which Kuwait,`
SUNDAY TRIES, London
10 Jove;nber 1968
Anthony Nutting
reports on prospects for
Arab-Israeli peace after
_t'aIKS with- 'resident Nasse
Russia
CPYRGHT Libya and Saudi Arabia are
paying to make good the loss!
ecause we want peace an of Canal revenues. Also, ifa
because continuation of the the projected oil pipe-line from?
} war will bring only destruction the Gulf of Suez to Alexandria;
to both sides. But Israel's materialises, Egypt may expect'
interpretation of the resolution to draw revenue in five or six"
does not admit of complete years' time from the passage:
withdrawal from occupied Arab of up to 200 million tons of oil"
territories; and without this a year. Cotton prices have
there can be no settlement." been high and new markets aref
Both the President and his opening up overseas. Thanks
closest advisers whom I saw in to the Aswan High Dam, rice;
Cairo were at pains to pro- exports have boomed from,
claim their support for the U N 60,000 tons in 1966 to an
r; intermediary, Dr Barring, to estimated 1,000,000 tons for
whom they had confirmed the current year. So, as long'
Egypt's readiness to concede as the Arab subsidy continues
all that the UN resolution and the Soviet Bloc goes on',
demanded and had proposed a uying and delivering the;
time-table for carrying out its oods, Egypt, should be able.
provisions so that neither side o stand a long siege.
could at any stage be at a dis- The Army and Air Force"
advantage vis-a-vis its adver- Lave been completely re-.
sary but as the President's: c uipped and, after a purge,
oreign affairs adviser Mah' r some 200 senior officers, re--
-hold I 1 0 19
,the balai"Otce
,M1
^
"I WANT a settlement with
Israel, not a surrender; and so
far Israel' has only offered us
4erms of stirrender." In these
words, President N a s s e r.
expressed ti me last weeks
Egyptian th 'king about peace,
prospects in'ie Middle. East.
" We ' acceplti*'last November's
U N . resolution," A rom#F
oud Fawzi, told me, " the ' rganised. About two-thirds of
I emon of 'concessions has been is strength-100,000 men-..
queezed dry "; and today are dug in along the Canal's''
obody in Cairo gives Dr. est bank, with many hun-(
arring more than an outside reds of . gun emplacements
Nance of accomplishing any-' nd shelters for fighter air-,
hing. They despair of Ameri raft well concealed and with
an pressure bringing Israel to ussian advisers directing the'.
ithdraw, saying that if King efences. Neutral military
ussein cannot so persuade his, xperts believe not only that'
riends in Washington, nobody' srael could scarcely repeat last.
Ise can. And, failing an ear's surprise attack on these?
sraeli withdrawal, any settle efences but' that the balance;
ent would be made under f strength on the Canal front
uress and would mean for any e today with Egypt, always
rab ruler who accepted it rovided she remains on the
olitical, if not physical, efensive.
uicide. The question, therefore, isj
Therefore Egypt's leaders tally w far the Egyptians can go
re resigned to the inevitability their efforts to force thel
emy out of Sinai by makings
if a " long-haul " strategy of e intolerable for the numer-x
reventive defence to re-create weaker Israeli army oni
balance of military power in Me Canal's cast bank. Thea
heir favour, as the only way ctober 26 attack on Israeli
o induce Israel to retire from issue sites threatening thea
ccupled territory:; In 'the uez refinery clearly shows?
resident's ? own words,. " we at the Egyptian artillery can
ust be patient and prepare use the Israelis more hurt
urselves for a long struggle.'.' an vice-versa, a n d t h a t
How well equipped, Egypt is gyptian commandos can cross'
o withstand the pressures, tie Canal' with relative im-i
olitical and economic,. :'which unity to harass Israeli com
r Release 2005/0 A7' :JO A-1R9 7"$ ' 1 g p 7ii9 the Mitla Pass.
CPYRGH
13061A`600
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
Russia's naval presence in" to Egypt---about a score of
Rgvpttan waters also acts as a: T.U.16 bombers are spread
,deterrent to Israeli reprisals; between Iraq, Sudan, Egypt and
a g a i n s t Port Said and Algeria. The American Phan-
Alexandria. But against this, toms deal with Israel may
the recent Israeli commando change this: and Moscow will
raid on the isolated Naga probably be asked for a match.
Hamadi power station was an ing contribution, But Russia is
equally clear warning that, if under no illusions about
Egypt continues to exploit her Egypt's ability to conduct a war
advantage on the Canal, Israel of liberation and Mr Brezhnev
will strike at vital installations has clearly warned in the
far behind the lines. And, strongest terms against launch-
though I was assured that Ing a premature offensive and
Aswan was well defended getting trapped again to Sinai.
against aerial or commando In all these strategic and
attack, it is doubtful that the political calculations, Egypt is
newly-planned home guard will concerned primarily with the .
be able to protect every Nile problem of clearing the Israeli
barrage and power station invaders from her own terri-
from similar reprisals. tory. Her leaders are very
Ii' Israel can thus checkmate evidently disenchanted with
Egypt's military advantage on some of their more belligerent,
the Canal, what will happen though hitherto non-combatant,
then? Egypt is in no position Arab allies; and their attitude
to take the offensive. Yet to the Persian Gulf and South
public opinion, in one of its Arabia is today that of the
periodical bouts of euphoria, spectator rather than the
could override the caution of partisan. This is not to say that
the regime and the young President Nasser is contemplat-
officers now in command might ing a separate peace. Egypt
try to liberate Sinai by force remains the core of Arab
and itestore the injured image resistance and cannot escape
of the Army. With each recent that responsibility. But, as he
Israeli strike, these young men candidly admitted to me, there
have strained at the leash,' has been since last year a
although the President seemed noticeable abdication from his
coiiiident that neither the army former role as leader of the
nor the public would force a Arab world, and the accents of
Flash with the present leader- Arab spokesmanship which
ship which offered them "the previously emanated from
only real hope of ultimate Cairo have been perceptibly
liberation." toned down. With no army left
The key to this _problem lies after the war, he could hardly
largely with the Russians, for speak for anyone outside
whose help President Nasser Egypt, he said. But he was not
frankly admitted his indebted-' dismayed. " Beforehand every-
ness. Though normally claus- one was depending on us, as
trophobic about getting over- the war in Yemen showed: now
committed to any great Power everyone is depending upon
bloc. he had had no alterna- himself and this is much
tive but to let Russia plug the healthier."
gaping holes in' Egypt's Nevertheless there is con-
defences. cern in Egypt for the critical
" only the Russians helped situation of King Hussein,
us after the June war, with whose survival is not only
emergency aid from wheat to essential to prevent Jordan
fighter aircraft, while the collapsing into anarchy, but
American;, were helping our also necessary for President
enemy. And they have asked Nasser to continue to hold the
nothing of us in return, except balance against the forces of
out to Israel. Indeed, even if
he wanted to, last week's
clashes in Amman show that
he could scarcely do so with
the Palestine resistance move-
ment based on his kingdom.
For the Resistance is a new
element, born in the failure of
the Arab armies last year, and
whose dedication and effective.
ness commands approbation
and attention in every Arab
capital. Still Cairo wonders
how long Jordan can feed her.
self with no West Bank.
But, anxiety for Jordan
apart, Egypt is very much
minding her own business
these days. Her President is a
lonely, embattled, though still
resolute, figure who knows far
better what he cannot do than
what he can. Unable to make
peace or war, he has little
choice but to keep on leaning
against the occupiers of his
territory in the hope that such
pressure may ultimately bend,
if not break, their iron resist-
ance to all concessions.;
facilities for their navy to use extremism in the Arab world. I
Port Said and Alexandria." Not For if Jordan were taken over
a pound had Egypt paid for the by the Al Fatah the President
re-equipment of her defence would find it more difficult
forces or for the military to resist the demands of
advisers whom Russia had sup- extremists to take the offen-
plied at the President's insis- sive. Although Jordan also
tence, But, he asserted, Russia receives generous help from
wanted a peaceful solution and the oil-rich Arab states, her
did not want to be involved economic plight inevitably
in another conflagration. makes her the weak link in the
,'Russia has certainly been Arab chain.
scrupulously careful to supply The King has reassured the
ttha h wi
hardly any en ive o Egyptians
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 CURRENT H1 /ed For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
November 1968
Pointing out that the "old imperial principle of divide and rule" applies to
Soviet policies in the Arab world, this article shows how "Russia stands to
gain more by exploiting the weaknesses and the special circumstances of individ-
ttal it rub states than by dealing with a stronger unified organism."
Soviet Policy in the Middle East
BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI
Professor of Political Scicnce, University of California at Berkeley
B IOINNiNC IN 1955, the Soviet Union
undertook an offensive of rapproche-
ment wills the countries of the Middle
mast. '['his ofrcnsivc was aimed primarily at
he Arab stales, but it cncornpassc(l also such
ion-Aral> countries as 'i'tirkey, Iran and
fghanistan. Soviet progress in the North-
rn 't'ier was, slower because 'I'nrkey and
ran,.ruinclful of Russian aggressiveness in the
rst postwar decade, were suspicious of Soviet
i iotives and preferred to link themselves to
is West through such multilateral instru-
rents as the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
t on (NA'T'O) and the Baghdad Pact (sub-
w(luently CENTO).
To contrast, Russia scored considerable
s recesses in the Aral) world, espccia11y hc-
t Veen 1955 and 1957. The Soviet-Egyptian
. ?nis (Teal and the, Suez crisis marked high
41 ints in tine Soviet policy of building friend-
ill with the Arabs. A decade later, the
rah-Israeli war and tire resulting cornplica-'
li ins in Arab-Westcr?rl relations provided an-
o her opportunity for the Soviet Union to
if crease its influence and stature in the
]\ iddlc last. This time its success was even
n ore pronounced than it was during the Suez
c Isis of 1956. While at that time the
I. S.S.R. and the United States both ranged
ti inselves against the combined Anglo-
] ench and Tsracli aggression, in 1967 Russia
el Joyc(1 a monopoly of pro-Arch posUUr.
In a more general sense, the decade of
t1 w I'Itill's has been c?haraclcrirt'rl by intensive
.S viet penetration of the Middle East in the
p litical, economic and cultural sectors. This
p netration has been aided by a number of;
fa .tors, of which the following could be
id utifed as most significant:
Approved
(a) putting its cintihasis on peaceful coexistence,
Soviet policy avoided violence and threats;
b) the Soviet l union displayed a marked will-
ingncss to deal with the established Middle
Eastern governments regardless of their hue,
while at the same time dc-emphasizing its
support for local Communist parties;
(c) major carrots were made to identify Russia
with Arab nationalist aspirations; the strug-
gle against Zionism, imperialism and feudal-
ism became standard catchwords of both the
Aral) and Soviet political vocabularies;
(d) Russia was willing and able to respond to
the urgent quest of Middle East govern-
ntents for speedy development irrespective
of the political structure of the recipient
countries;
Socialist trends in sonic states, expressed in
the expansion of the public sectors of na-
liolral 1?re iii titrlt'V, were 1'0mini ice to closer
links between Russia and the Middle Eastern
"clients" inasmuch as they led to an en-
larged volume of government-to-government
transactions;
the weakening of the United States alliance
system (both NATO and CENTO) was-
enhancing the Soviet opportunities of pene-
tration;
the diversion of the major American effort
to the war in Vietnam weakened the rela-
tive position of the United States in the
Middle liasi, thereby slrenglhening Russia's
inllnenrc;
(h) a draniatic loss of United States influence in
the Arab world on account of the Arab-
Israeli war of June, 1967, worked to the
direct advantage of the Soviet Union.
In its policy of penetration, the U.S.S.R.
was seconded by other countries of the Soviet
bloc. Numerous aid-and-trade transactions
and cultural cooperation agreements con-
cluded between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, East (:errnany, Rumania and Bulgaria,
on the one lnurd, and the countries of the
Middle East, on the other, greatly added to
the overall cumulative We t
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 CHARMff F8f ease 2005/08/17
SOVIET PENETRATION
In spite of the intensity of the Soviet pene-
tration, none of the Soviet Union's Middle
Eastern partners was ever linked to it by an
alliance. From the formal point of view, all
Soviet transactions were conducted with gov-
ernments which were either neutralist (most
of the Arab states and Afghanistan) or allied
to the West ('Ftir?key and Iran). However,
behind the facade of formal neutralism, cer-
'tain Arab countries, most notably the United
Arab Republic, were in fact rather closely
aligned with the Soviet Union on most major.
,issues of foreign policy. An attempt to mca-,
sure the intensity of Soviet penetration might,
therefore, lead to the following tentative cate-
rization in a descending order from high to
Pow:
1. political ties and arms aid (the U.A.R., Syria,
Iraq, Algeria, Yemen) ;
2. political tics and economic assistance (the
U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen);
3. economic assistance hit no political tics (Iran,
Afghanistan, Turkey) ;
4. arms aid but no political ties (Iran, Sudan).
Some clarification of the terms used here
may be in order. "Economic assistance" em-
braces a wide spectrum of transactions which
may include cash credits, long-range loans at
a low interest rate, direct Soviet participation
in major construction projects and barter
agreements. Soviet preference has generally
been to assist, through direct participation, in
major---sometimes inonumental-works, such
as big river dams, steel plants and similar
basic infrastructural ventures. But occasion-
ally Russia would also undertake a major
consumption project provided it had a
proper publicity value (such as paving streets
in Kabul). Generally, Soviet economic as-
sistance has tended to be directed toward in-
dustrial objectives, but agriculture has not
been altogether neglected, as evidenced by
Soviet aid in erecting silos in Iran and regu-
lating certain rivets. Tit recent years, i.e.,
beginning with the mid-1960's, Russia began
modest expansion in the oil sector by conclud-
ing exploration or pipeline construction con-
tracts with such countries as Iran, Syria and
Iraq.
T'he term "arms aid" similarly embraces
a variety of transactions ranging from barter
deals (arms for cotton in Egypt), through
other forms of payment to outright grants.
Approved
CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400030007-9
Both the economic assistance and the arms
aid have involved the participation of Soviet
experts-civil and military. Scant informa-
tion about the activities of these technicians
and officers seems to indicate that their con-
tacts with local populations are restricted to
the transaction of essential business with their
opposite numbers; that there is little or no
socializing; and that they have not been
caught engaging in any obvious propaganda
or indoctrination activity. In fact, it would
appear that the relative isolation of these
Soviet-imported communities (experts are
sometimes accompanied by their families)
has been imposed upon them by Soviet
authorities out of fear of having them "con-
taminated" by the "bourgeois" ways and
thinking still prevalent even among the So-
cialist bureaucrats of certain recipient coun-
tries.
On the military side, "arms aid" should
also be understood to encompass the training
of Middle Eastern, particularly Arab, officers
in the use of more sophisticated weaponry in
Russia or the Soviet satellite states. The most
pronounced type of military assistance is in
the form of Soviet airplanes and pilots, units
of the Soviet navy, or crews handling missile
sites in the recipient countries. Thus far,
there has been no firm evidence of the Rus-
sians or satellite nationals having shared in
actual military operations, in spite of the
rumors about the activity of Soviet pilots in
the civil war in Yemen.
Soviet "cultural" penetration may be re-
garded almost as a misnomer because there
has really been no significant export of Soviet
proletarian culture to the countries of the
Middle East. What little activity there is has
usually taken two forms: it has consisted
either ill sponsoring occasional lectures, con-
certs and art exhibits by Soviet scholars and
artists (with fairly negligible impact on the
target t;roiips in the Middle East), or in niak-
ing scholarships available for Middle Eastern
students in Russia and the Soviet bloc coun-
tries. Regardless of country or social class,
Arabs, Iranians and Turks still prefer United
States or European films, books and illus-
trated magazines (if admitted by local cen-
sorship). By the same token, young girls in
those countries follow "decadent" patterns of
miniskirts, bikinis, lipstick and discotheque
addiction rather than the models set by squat,
hard working and. drably dressed Soviet
women.
 In ('OA Rll",o ll hit ,]9eJgi* Z9Q5196117
and East European institutions of higher
learning make an impact upon the education
particularly technical-of substantial num-
bers of young men, especially from Arab.
countries. ']'here is no conclusive evidence
that such educational experience in the East-
ern bloc has resulted in massive conversions
to Communist ideology. In fact, there is some
evidence of the opposite result. For example,
Iraqi students studying engineering in Odessa
protested to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow
against the attempt to introduce into their
curriculum a course on the history of the
Communist party of the Soviet Union as
irrelevant to their academic objectives and
as a possible device of indoctrination. As a
result, Soviet authorities abandoned the idea.
It would be obviously improper to disre-
gard the presence of the local Communist
parties in the Arab countries and in Iran.
Generally outlawed, they tend to operate in
secrecy but in some cases, notably in Syria,
Iraq and Lebanon, they have (depending on
the period and the circumstances) operated
almost openly. However, their existence
antedates the intensive Soviet policy of pene-
tration and their fortunes arc not invariably
linked with the success of Russian dealings
with the established governments. In fact,
sometimes closer government-to-government
relations have had an adverse effect on the
growth of the local Communist movements.
Perhaps the closest point to real ideological
penetration has occurred when the ruling
parties of Russia and Syria (i.e. the C.P.S.U.
and the Ra'ath) have organized mutual visits
of their representative groups to discuss their
ideological and organizational problems. It
is not unlikely that in a dialogue of this sort
the discovered similarity of approaches of the
two parties on a number of issues might result
in a greater tolerance toward communism on
the part of the Ra'ath, although again firm
evidence on this matter is lacking.
U.S.S.R. AND TURKEY AND IRAN
Between 1966 and 1968, relations between
the Soviet Union and Turkey and Iran
showed a marked improvement. Not only
were previous threats and hostile propaganda
campaigns abandoned, but many positive
steps were taken. While a detente and coop-
eration were characteristic of the new Soviet
policy toward both southern neighbors, major
successes could. be registered particularly in
Gl ePZ8ZkWQ61"01-AQOI DAQdnf~re-
hensive Soviet-Iranian agreement provided
for Soviet assistance in erecting a steel plant
and a metallurgical complex in the vicinity
of Isfahan, a provincial capital located in the
center of Iran, remote from the traditional
sphere of Russian influence in the north.
The agreement also pledged Soviet assistance
in the construction of grain elevators through.
out Iran, joint regulation of the border rivers
of Aras and Atrak, and aid in a number of
other industrial projects. Payment for the
steel plant was to be effected by supplies of
natural gas from Iran's southern oil fields,
which in turn would be conveyed to the So-
viet Union's Caucasian border by a pipeline
to be constructed partly by Tran and partly
by the Soviet Union.
Hand-in-hand with this basic agreement
went complementary deals concluded with
Rumania (Iranian oil for a $131-million trac-
tor factory to be built in Tabriz), Czecho-
slovakia (a $100-million generator factory to
be constructed by Skoda works), and other
East European countries, generally providing
for barter-type transactions. Furthermore,
for the first time since the abortive attempt
in 1916, the Soviet Union made its entry into
the Iranian oil sector. On April 15, 1967, the
National Iranian Oil Company and the
U.S.S.R. reached an agreement giving the
Soviet Union the right to explore and drill
for oil in certain areas outside the territory
exploited by the Western-owned consortium.
An interesting innovation in Soviet-Iranian
relations was the conclusion, on February 9,
1967, of an arms agreement worth $110 mil-
lion. Russia undertook to provide armored
troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns in
exchange for light goods. This was the first
tithe that a country linked to a Western de-
fense system became a recipient of Soviet
military equipment. This agreement was
symbolic of gradual Iranian emancipation
from the United States-sponsored system of
political and military guarantees. It was
based on the conviction of Tran's ruling group
that strict tics with the West should be re-
laxed inasmuch as the Soviet Union ceased
to present an immediate threat to Iran. This
view of the Soviet Union stemmed from the
Iranian evaluation of Soviet internal changes
since Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and
Soviet preoccupation with China. Thus,
Iranian policy underwent is modification: it
began stressing the economic aspects of
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11
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9
CENTO while playing down the military,
without, however, repudiating the alliance in
any formal way. This new mood in Soviet-
Iranian relations was enhanced by Soviet
Premier Alexci Kosygin's visit to Iran in
April, 1968, to be followed by the state visit
of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the
Soviet Union in September.
.Similarly, Turkish-Soviet relations took a
friendlier turn after 1966, partly because
Turkish appraisal of the Soviet reality and
motives coincided with the Iranian and partly
as a reaction to the much-criticized American
neutrality in the Turkish-Greek conflict over
Cyprus. Kosvgin's visit to Ankara in Decem-
ber, 1966, the signing of border settlement
protocols and economic cooperation agree-
ments, and the return visit of Turkish Pre-
mier Suleiman Demirel in Russia in Septem-
ber. 1967, marked the steps in the normaliza-
tion of Turkish-Soviet relations. Commenting
on his visit to Moscow upon his return, De-
olirel stated that "the traces of hostility" in
their mutual relations have been eliminated.
Not unlike Iran, Turkey maintained het alli-
ance ties with the West through NATO,
CENTO, and the bilateral security agree-
ment with the United States. However, the
presence of a sizable American military es-
tablishnient on Turkish soil caused certain
anti-American manifestations in the summer
of 1968, thlrs further strengthening the linger-
ing neutralist trends to Russia's implicit ad-
vantage.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE
ARAB WORLD
with the Arabs have to
steadfastly refusing to open diplomatic rela-
tions with Moscow despite the latter's infor-
inal solicitations,
Soviet trnnpartitm4 viitit fhw "tlrmtral"
Aral) camp (in terms of inter-Arab align-
merits) have varied from trade relations with
Lebanon, through cultural relations with the
guided democracy of Tunisia '(the June 22,
1967, agreeineut), to arms aid to Sudan (the
September; 1967, negotiations in Khartoum).
The main thrust of Soviet endeavors, how-
ever, has been directed toward the cementing
of political friendship with the Arab military
dictatorships born of coups and revolutions.
l".gypt has been the principal target since the
1955 so-called Czeclloslovak-Egyptian arms
deal (later publicly acknowledged to repre-
sent a Soviet-Egyptian agreement) and
U.A.R. President Carnal Abdel Nasser's at-
tack against the 11'c-stern-sponsored Baghdad
Pact. Soviet diplomatic: support to Cairo
during the Suez crisis coupled with the under-
taking to build the high Aswan ])am consti-
tuted the highlights of Russia's politico-eco-
nowic, offensive. Front that time oil, Soviet
ties with Egypt, through arms supplies, barter
deals and support of various development
projects, have been steadily maintained and
strengthened. Because of the firm grip of
Nasser's govermncnt on the. domestic situa-
tion, this close friendship frith Russia and the
Soviet bloc did not result in the growth of
communism in Egypt. But the prestige ac-
cruing to the Soviet Union through its deal-
ings with a. leading Arab nationalist country
did have an eneoura,e,ing effect on the growth
and influence of (anlnlunist movements in
other countries of the revolutionary camp,
especially Syria and Iraq and, to some extent,
in Jordan as well.
Egypt's ambitious development programs
together with her militant Pa.n-Arab policy
and experimentation with socialism produced
serious economic strains and an unceasing
need for foreign economic assistance. Al-
though Egypt: (later the U.A.R.) did not
limit her search for aid and credits to the
Soviet bloc and availed herself both of United
States surplus food assistance and West Euro-
pean credits, her main provider was the
U.S.S.R. This ire turn created a degree of
Jgyptian dependence on the Soviet Union---
economic, technical, nlilita,ry and ultimately
political-which to a lark extent contra-
dicted Nasser's claim of ha'ing achieved- the
full emancipation of his corintr front fo i
e't
some extent been conditioned by the nature
of the Arab political systems. Thus, invari-
ably, Russia would maintain closer and more
friendly relations with the states of the Arab
revolutionary camp (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq,
Algeria, Republican Yemen, and more re-
cently the People's Republic of South Ye-
men) than with the right-wing monarchies or
such "neutrals" as Lebanon, Tunisia and
Sudan. It should be pointed out, however,
that the political conservatism or monarchical
structure of certain Arab states have not, per
se, deterred the Soviet Union from maintain-
ing or seeking to maintain diplomatic and
economic relations with them.. The Soviet
Union has embassies in Jordan, Kuwait,
.Libya and Morocco. The Kingdom, of Saudi
Arabia has thus far been the only Arab state.
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forming a new Mediterranean command, to be called Maritime Air Forces, Medi-
terranean, or MAIRAIRMED. It is based at Naples and will provide an added
watch over the Mediterranean. The decision to set up this new command was
made in June at the NATO ministerial meeting in Iceland, and it was acti-
vated on 21 November, when a base at Naples was opened. This new element
is made up of American, British and Italian forces, with Greek and Turkish
forces scheduled to join it later.
Continued Soviet penetration in the Middle East
The Soviet drive into the Mediterranean follows years of Soviet pene-
tration, through military and economic aid, into the Arab world. Since
the Arab-Israeli war the Soviets have used the disastrous state of the Arab
armies and air forces as leverage to increase Arab dependence on the Soviet
Union. They have replaced an estimated eighty percent of all equipment
lost by the Arabs in the war, and in addition have given Egypt, Syria and
Algeria about forty patrol boats which carry the Styx missile, of the type
that sank the Israeli destroyer Elath off Port Said in October 1967. They
have doubled the number of military advisers in Egypt to at least 2,000 and
have sent large training missions to Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
In addition to its "hard-core" clients, the UAR, Syria and Iraq, with
each of whom it has recently concluded new military aid agreements, the So-
viet Union has made military and economic deals with Iran, Sudan and both
the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Republic of South Yemen; it has
also made progress in expanding its influence in the oil-rich nation of
Kuwait.
In all, Soviet teams are working on an estimated 100 or more projects
throughout the area, including a dam on the Euphrates that will supply
electricity to much of Syria, making oil surveys in Egypt, and constructing
a railroad in Iraq, a steel plant in Algeria and a machine-tool plant in
Iran. Accompanying the military and economic penetration is the Soviet
cultural drive, with Soviet dance groups and circus troupes touring major
Arab cities, local cinemas and television networks featuring Soviet films,
universities offering Russian language courses and local bookstores filled
with Soviet books and periodicals translated into Arabic.
5
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 AlpproveidbFor Reel ~y ,04~5/Aq/17 ;
woulc a or 1
control, t n
that Egypt freed herself politically from the
remnants of British tutelage to fall under an
increasing Soviet influence.
This influence was particularly enhanced
as a result of the June, 1967, war. The de-
struction of the U.A.R. army, together with
its equipment and most of its airplanes,
opened the floodgate to massive Soviet arms
supplies. Egypt not only became a target
for Soviet penetration but began playing an
ever-increasing role as a transit route and
staging point for Soviet ventures in Yemen,
South Arabia and Africa. While thus reap-
ing political benefits from the crisis of 1967,
the Soviet Union suffered also the incon-
venience of being denied (along with other
nations) the use of the Suez Canal. In
purely strategic terms due to the war in
Vietnam, the continuous passage through the
canal would probably benefit the Soviet
Union more than the United States and its
Western allies.
Substantial Soviet effort was also exerted
in Syria after 1957 and in Iraq after the'revo-
lution of 1958. In both cases, Russia under-
took to supply quantities of arms and to assist
in a variety of development projects. Eco-
i nomic and technical penetration of Syria by
j the Soviet bloc countries was especially
noticeable. An oil refinery at IIoms was con-
structed by a Czechoslovak firm in the late
1950's, while in 1967 Russia undertook to'
assist in the development of Syrian oilfields in
the Jezira province (Karachuk and Rum-
aylan). Even more important was the agree-
ment reached on December 27, 1967, whereby
the Soviet Union undertook to supervise the
construction of the Euphrates Dam. In con-
trast to Egypt, this cordiality in Soviet-Syrian
relations was partly reflected in the more
1 favorable treatment accorded to Syria's do-
mestic Communists. In 1967, Syria's leading
Communist, Khalcd Bakdash, was not only
allowed to return from exile in the Soviet
Union but also to make public statements and
grant press interviews. By the same token,
there were two members of Syria's cabinet
in 1967 who were regarded as members of-
or closely affiliated with-Syria's Communist
party. A brief visit to Damascus paid in
,,July, 1967, by Soviet President N. V. Pod-
1. gorny was indicative of the Soviet desire to
take full advantage of Syria's pro-Soviet and
anti-American stood in tlic wake of the Arab-
Israeli war.
Ch~kR f?7, e9i cQt liO(lf('Rm 9taWMQ7 cl a
similar pattern. Assisted by its European
satellites, the Soviet Union concluded with
Iraq a number of economic, cultural and
arms aid agreements, including an oil agree-;
tncnt of 1)cccntbcr, 1967. In spite of these,
similarities, however, Iraqi-Soviet relations;
j differed in five important respects from the.
Soviet-Syrian pattern:
(a) the excesses committed by the overconfident
Iraqi Communist party during the era of
Abdul lvn?im Kassnn in 1959 alienated
many hitherto vacillating elements from
communism and, implicitly, from Moscow;
(b) the Soviet Union did not undertake in Iraq
a protect of a magnitude comparable to the
Aswan or Euphrates Dams;
(c) Iraq's cconomy continued to have a close
relationship to the West through the reve-
nues derived from the operations of the
Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company;
(d) the Kurdish problem in the north of Iraq,
with an ever-present possibility of interfer-
ence by outside powers (including Russia)
added another note of caution to Iraqi-So-
viet relations;
the Damascus maverick regime of left-wing
Ita'ath (since Fc)ruary, 1966) has effectively
isolated Syria fronm the West and from the j
Aral) commnnnity of nations, thus inevitably
drawing the. country toward close ties with
the Soviet bloc; except for a period of Kas-
situ's regime (1958-1959) no such isola-
tion has occurred in Iraq's relationship with
the non-Communist and Arab nations.
Soviet relations with Algeria and Re
ipublican Yemen followed the lines broadly'
1Iraced in Egypl, Syria and Iraq. The same
political vocabulary of common struggle
against imperialism, Zionism and reaction
was used, and similar offers of economic and
arms aid were made and accepted. It is
doubtful whether the Soviet Union could
ever count on a position of near-monopoly of
influence in Algeria as it did in Egypt and,
Syria because of Algeria's close economic in-
volvcinent with France. As for Yemen,'
Soviet penetration was intensified by the
withdrawal of U.A.R. troops from Yemeni
territory following the debacle in the June
it war in Sinai and the subsequent Saudi-Egyp-;
t.ian agreement (at the end of August, 1967). i
Soviet equipment and military advisers began
increasingly to fill the gal) left by the U.A.R.'
evacuation; their presence in Yemen has
probably been a major factor in preventing
the collapse of the Republican regime under
a renewed tribal-royalist offensive.
The Arab revolutionary camp has been
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ule"tttted with the slogans of Arab unity.
Aware of the emotional impact of such slo-
"ans upon the Arab masses, the Soviet Union
has generally paid lip service to the idea of
Arah unity. Thus, in November, 1966, when
Syria and the U.A.R. concluded a military
cooperation pact, Soviet official comments
spoke favorably of the "unity of progressive
forces" in the Arab world. In reality, it is
doubtful whether the U.S.S.R. really desired
Arab unity. In fact, it gave indications of
opposing it. In February, 1958, when Syria's
last parliament voted for union with Egypt,
the only Communist deputy, Khalcd Balcdash,
cast a dissenting vote, went into hiding, and
eventually appeared in Moscow to remain in
exile until 1967. There is no reason to think
that the old imperial principle of divide and
rule does not apply to Soviet policies in the
Arab world as well. Profiting from the na-
tural tendency toward Arab revolutionary
polycentrism, the U.S.S.R. stands to gain
more by exploiting the weaknesses and the
special circumstances of individual Arab
states than by dealing with a stronger unified
organism.
RUSSIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT
'File essentials of the Arab-Israeli relation-
ship have favored the Soviet position from the
outset. In November, 1947, the Soviet Union
cast its vote in the United Nations for the
partition of Palestine, because the existence
of a Jewish state in the midst of a hostile
Arab world would inevitably provide a con-
stant irritant in Arab-Western relations. The
Soviet policy was not limited to voting in
favor of the creation of Israel; it materially
contributed to the entrenchment of Israel's
independence by providing her--through
clandestine channels-with arms during her
war with the Arabs in 1948. BBy tiie same
token, the U.S.S.R. was one of the, first major
Powers to extend recognition to Israel within
hours of the proclamation of her independ-
e n ce.
Assured that Israel was there to stay, the
Soviet Union promptly aligned itself on the
side of the Arabs, invariably supporting Arab
nationalist aspirations, but never formally en-
dorsing repeated Arab calls for the annihila-
tion of the state of Israel.
The Soviet Union played a significant role
in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In the first
,place, it may, be asserted that it had ma-
Approved
terialiv contributed to the mrtbrrak of the
cf,nllic't in two, yYil s; (a) by lrea-illy arming
I he U.A.R. and Syria and thus assisting in
the growth of exaggerated self-confidence of
the military rulers in Cairo and in I)antascus;
(b) by warning Syria of an impending Israeli
invasion on the eve of the war, and thus
setting in motion a politico-military chain
reaction leading to U.A.R. President Nasser's
expulsion of the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEP) from the U.A.R.'s territory.
Once the war broke out, Soviet support to
the Arab states was limited to verbal attacks
against Israel. Soviet political leadership
clearly resolved to avoid direct involvement
and a possibility of armed confrontation with
the United States; neither Nasser nor Israeli
I'riruc Minister Levi Eshkol would be per-
ruitted to choose for the Soviet Union the
time and place of a third world war. How-
ever, the Russians did their utniost to give
verbal support to the Arabs. In the U.N. de-
hales, They were at one with tine Arab delega-
Iinns in ignoring the elements of provocation
supplied by Nasser's removal of UNEF from
Sinai and by his announced blockade of the
Gulf of Aqaba. In fact, they made massive
use of the U.N. deliberations to give maxi-
tnum publicity to their pro-Arab stand and
to contrast it with the timid and vacillating
policies of the United States. To give all
even greater effect to this strategy, Premier,
Kosygin appeared personally in the United
Nations, while, sirnuitaneonsly, President
Podgorny paid visits to Cairo, Damascus and
Baghdad. Personal involvement in this
matter of the highest Soviet office-holders
testified to the importance attached to the
Middle East in Soviet global strategy.
American press comments on Soviet poli-
cies at that time inclined toward oversimpli-
fied optimism by dwelling on two facts: (a)
that the Soviet Union's prestige had suffered
because its arms supplied to the Arabs proved
of no avail in the contest with the Israelis;
(b) that it suffered a political defeat by
having its strongly pro-Arab motion rejected
by the U.N. General Assembly. In the light
of subsequent developments, these opinions
appear unwarranted. Soviet proposals in the
U.N. were made not for the purpose of being
accepted by the majority (which the Soviet
delegation knew was unrealistic), but with
an eye to the maximum publicity advantage
to be derived from their oncisided tenor. As
for the defeat of Soviet arms
it was not th
,
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arms but the Egyptians and Syrians using
them who were defeated.
This was not inconsistent with long-range
Soviet policy objectives in the region. It
created among the Arabs a sense of deep
frustration coupled with a sense of alienation
from the United States and invariably drove
many of them into the proffered Soviet ent-
brace. Furthermore, Russia immediately
offered to-and did-replace most of the de-
stroyed weapons, equipment and planes with
new ones. At the same time, the Arab gov-
ernments were offered critical suggestions
from Moscow on how to replace their officer
corps by a new one whose social origins would
assure a greater class harrvtony with ordinary
soldiers. Another lesson to be learned by the
Arabs was that to use the new weapons effec-
tively, they would have to rely more com-
pletely on expert Soviet advice.
111 suns, it may be asserted with good rea-
son that on balance, despite the inconvenience
.of the blockage of the Suez Canal, the Soviet
Union emerged from the Arab-Israeli conflict
with impressive gains. The defeated Arab
states, resentful at what they regard as definite
American partiality toward Israel, tend to
turn to the U.S.S.R. as their one remaining
friend among the big powers. Rupture of
diplomatic relations, trade boycott, temporary
oil embargoes, and the continuing refusal of
Syria, Iraq and Egypt to grant to airlines of
United States registry overflight rights has
created a real vacuum in' American-Arab re-
lations, into which the Soviet Union and its
satellites are stepping ,with eagerness and
success. The presence of 'a large Soviet naval
contingent (45 ships) in the Mediterranean
further adds to the weight of Soviet influence
in the area.
As these lines are written, the Soviet-
Czechoslovak crisis seems to have reached its
peak, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia and the capitulation of her political
leaders. There is already evidence to indicate
that this act of undisguised aggression has
offered sobering thoughts to those Northern
Tier states like Turkey and Iran which in
recent years were inclined to accept Soviet
protestations of peaceful coexistence at face
value. The effect of the Soviet aggression on
attitudes in the Arab world will be less clear.
In the Arab non-revolutionary states it will
confirm the already existing suspicion and
fears of Soviet and Communist designs. But
in the Arab revolutionary camp the immedi-
ate effects may be negligible. Just because
the Soviet Union is settling its accounts with
a rather remote (from the Arab point of
view) Czechoslovak Communist leadership,
the basic pro-Soviet orientation of Cairo or
t .onascus- dictated as it is l,v their own con
kept of their tree national interest--is not
likely to be upset. One indication that in-
difference is to be expected may be found in
the behavior of their controlled press during
the crisis; relatively scant attention was paid
to news about Soviet-Czechoslovak tensions
and negotiations preceding the invasion and
often the only sources of news and comments
were ''ass (Soviet press agency) dispatches
and articles reprinted from I'rnvda (the Soviet
Communist party publication). While even
the controlled newspapers could not avoid
printing the actual news of the invasion, they
gew,rally :winded editorializing in an obvious
attcutpt to avoid nnttual embarrassment.
George Lcnezowski is a frequent visitor to the
Middle Last. His most recent trip to that
area was made this past summer to Saudi
Arabia. He is the author of The Middle
East in World Affairs (3d ed.; Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1962).
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