ALGERIA IN THE SOVIET ORBIT: A MAGHRIBI MIRAGE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 3, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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March 1969
ALGERIA IN THE SOVIET ORBIT.. A MAGHRIBI MIRAGE?
Algeria's independence in July 1962 followed what was described
by one author as "the most violent anticolonial revolution of this
generation." The revolution lasted eight years, reduced much of rural
Algeria to desolation, and permanently changed the nature of her
society. Since independence, Algerian leadership has been consistent
on one point: the belief that, bereft of trained personnel and
indigenous capital, Algeria must follow the socialist path and that
in doing so there is much to be learned from the Soviet Union.
Soviet experience in the consolidation of political power into a
single party with a potential for marshaling all resources to fulfill
the national purpose has been seen as worth emulating. The Soviet
Union, in its turn, has nourished Algeria's leftist orientation in
order to gain support for her policies in this key region and at the
same time to restrict the freedom of action of her adversaries.
Both Ahmed Ben Bella, ousted by the 1965 coup, and President
Houari Boumedienne have tried to take advantage of Soviet policies
in Algeria in order to further Algerian national interests. The
question today is whether or not a compulsion for speed and expediency
may cause Boumedienne to become more influenced by and more dependent
on the Soviet Union than he really means to be. Both Soviet and
Algerian media have reflected sensitivity to recent Western press
stories heralding Algerian over-involvement with the USSR, which is
indicative of the delicacy with which both are trying to balance
their inter-relationships -- each country with its own motives.
The Soviet Presence
The combined force of Soviet economic and military technicians
currently in Algeria represents its largest single contingent in
any Third World country. Although the number of Soviets in Algeria
is most commonly estimated at 3,500, the London Economist, in a
4 January 1969 article, reported that there are believed to be
6,000 Soviets working in Algeria, half with the Algerian armed
forces and the rest employed in anything from petroleum prospecting
to medicine.
Algeria negotiated for most of its Soviet-origin military equip-
ment right after the Algerian National Army's (ANP) poor showing
against Moroccan forces in the Algerian-Moroccan border flareup of
1963. Since then, Soviet technicians have furnished some one-
quarter-billion dollars' worth of materiel supplied to the ground,
sea, and air branches of the ANP and have been training the Algerian
forces in the use of this materiel. Despite the large Soviet
military presence, operational control of all branches is believed
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to rest in Algerian hands. Russell Warren Howe wrote from Rabat,
Morocco, in the Baltimore Sun, 27 January 1969, that the Soviet
"instructors rate the Algerians the best Arab forces they have
trained -- superior, they indicate, to the Syrians, the Iraqis or
the Egyptians."
There has been much speculation about the upsurge in Soviet
military activity in Algeria following the 1968 exchanges of military
delegations and visits. Apart from refining arrangements to permit
Soviet use of facilities at Mers el Kebir and at Algerian airfields,
the USSR appears to have promised additional material to Algeria.
The London Economist (cited above) reported there are now about 600
pilots and air crewmen in training in the USSR. Since Algeria
already has on hand most, if not all, of the Soviet equipment
previously contracted for, the training of such an inordinately large
group outside of Algeria would hardly seem necessary unless new
equipment were expected.
Economic Relations
On the economic front, Algiers very early solicited economic aid
from Moscow notably for the further exploitation and "Algerianization"
of her only development resource: petroleum and natural gas. The
Soviets responded in 1963 with an overall credit grant of almost $250
million, but in five years have failed to produce more than about
ten per cent of their original commitment. The bulk of credits drawn
has paid for "technical services" to complete surveys for dams and
mineral and petroleum exploration; the remainder went into small-
scale projects for agricultural equipment, medical services, education,
and plant construction and management. Some blame for the limited
achievements of the Soviet economic aid program rests with faulty
Algerian planning and management ... but because this same planning
and management was taking place under Soviet guidance, the Soviets
must share the blame.
Summer of 1968 was the starting point for a true Soviet "upsurge"
in the Algerian economic sector. Negotiations for a new trade agree-
ment were begun in the summer, and concluded in January 1969; under
its terms the Soviet Union will take 110 million gallons of Algerian
wine annually for a period of seven years and one-half million tons
of petroleum annually for two years. It will be a barter arrange-
ment whereby the Algerian wine and oil will pay for Soviet capital
goods and technical aid. A new agreement for mineral prospecting in
the Sahara, expected to bring in an additional 200 Soviet technicians,
was signed at the same time.
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As long as France continues to be Algeria's main trading partner,
the pitfalls of the latest Soviet-Algerian trade agreement are not as
great as they may appear to be on the surface. But there are pit-
falls: France has always subsidized her wine purchases from Algeria;
by shifting some wine sales to the USSR, the new barter agreement
will cost Algeria, just as a starter, about $22 million in hard
currency annually. (For a country with about $450 million plus in
hard currency holdings -- this does not seem a danger for the moment,
but over a seven-year period it could cost over one-quarter of her
holdings,) The new Soviet agreement marks the first time that Algerian
trade will not be balanced on a year-to-year basis. Finally, the new
agreement could herald an attempt to implement a Soviet strategy that
has been extremely successful in other countries, particularly in
Cuba and in the UAR: that of gobbling up a given country's major
export commodity with the aim of building up a deficit balance of
trade and, subsequently, economic dependence on the USSR.
Sensitivity to Western Reaction
The London Economist (cited above) reports that Western concern
over the Soviet presence "sometimes takes too little account of what
the Algerians think about it or what the French might do." The
"question is" the article continues, "how much influence they (Soviets)
really have. The standard example has been Algerian acceptance,of
the Moscow line and the printing of TASS reports about Czechoslovakia;
but in private the Algerians felt considerable embarrassment and the
invasion was notably not one of the occasions when the foreign press
was banned."
After the French withdrew from the naval base at Mers el Kebir
in early 1968, rumors were rampant that the Soviet Union would take
over command of the base. They grew to the extent that, by November,
the Algerian Government officially and firmly denied press reports
concerning Soviet intentions while the Algerian press also rejected
arguments that Algeria was coming gradually under Soviet influence.
The Algerian Government repeated its opposition to the establish-
ment of foreign bases and said that "not an inch of Algerian soil
will be ceded to a foreign power."
On 15 November TASS also issued an official denial: "TASS has
been instructed emphatically to refute as an absolutely groundless
concoction the allegations circulated in the Western press about the
creation of a Soviet naval base at Mers el Kebir and a network of
Soviet rocket installations in Algeria."
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The Question
The extent of Algerian dependence on the Soviet Union -- despite
Algerian awareness of the dangers of such dependency -- and the
uncomfortable element of Soviet political pressuring of Algeria raise
many questions for the future. Robert Graham wrote in the London
Observer, 9 November: "By going exclusively to the Soviet Union for
heavy armaments, Algeria has thus become dependent upon Russian spare
parts -- and Russian training ... Algerian pilots are even reported
to contact ground control in the Russian language ..... Shopping
elsewhere -- France, at present, being the sole likely alternative --
is difficult. Three years ago soundings were made, but de Gaulle was
not prepared to prejudice his policy of detente with the Soviet Union.
Diplomatic sources say that the request has been made again and refused."
Algeria's militant stand on the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and
her condemnation of the Soviet Union for failing to intervene militarily
marked a temporary discord in the political harmony of Soviet-Algerian
relations. There was no outward break, however, since Algeria was a
willing abettor in hastening the Soviet arms resupply to the UAR forces.
Soviet media, on the other hand, practically ignored Algeria from June
1967 until the mid-December 1967 abortive anti-Boumedienne coup. Then,
in late December, a leading Soviet commentator on Arab affairs, Farid
Syful-Melyukov, claimed. that the upheavals in Algeria illustrated the
difficulties of countries recently freed from "colonialist yoke" and
implied that the imprisonment of Communists and other left-wingers was
partly responsible for the country's difficulties. Pravda, on 4
January 1968, warned the Algerian regime to take heed of the disturb-
ances by creating openings for left-wingers.
Western media, meanwhile, had been highlighting Algerian
socialism's slow progress because of the government's failure to have
an economic plan and its failure to implement many of its previously
announced socialist-type reforms. The same 4 January Pravda article,
cited above, was mainly devoted to denials that Algeria had abandoned
its commitment to socialism -- which may have been a reflection of
Soviet fears.
Perhaps it has been mere coincidence, but ... One month after
the French vacated Mers el Kebir, the Soviet leaders sent a letter
to President Boumedienne urging that the two countries renew their
harmonious political relations (New York Times, 17 November 1968);
since May 1968, Algiers has served as the jump-off spot for Soviet
commercial flights to Cuba; the latest Soviet-Algerian trade talks
came on the heels of a breakdown in French-Algerian talks and in the
wake of Algeria's nationalization of many private French firms; in
July 1968 Algeria published her plan of socialist economic develop-
ment, 1954-1976; and, in November, Boumedienne released from prison
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a number of Marxists and Ben Bella supporters who have since offered
to cooperate with Boumedienne in a broadened government. While
Algeria has had valid motives of her own for each action undertaken
in this series of coincidences, the question of the extent of Soviet
influence lurks in the background.
Attachments
"Algerian Socialism's Slow Leak," The New Republic, 6 May 1967
"Major Trends in Algerian Economy Development," 1'Actualite, Algiers,
13 July 1968 (excerpts only from the 195+-1976 plan of development)
"Boumedienne's Role Since Independence," Eurafrigue, No 195, 1968
"CNI Approves 32 Private Development Projects" and "Eighteen Companies
Nationalized in Algeria," La Republique, Oran, 12 and 15 June 1968
(excerpts only as illustrative of the regime's left-right, right-
left switches)
"Algeria Improves Ties with Soviet," New York Times, 17 November 1968
"Algeria Playing Fiance Against the Soviet Union in the Economic Sphere"
and "In Algeria: 'More Joy, a Little Money'," Henry Tanner,
special to the New York Times, 26 and 28 December 1968
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Algerian Socialism's
Slow Leak
Algiers
CPYRGHT
Despite the wave of nationalizations following inde-
pendence nearly five years ago, Algerian socialism is
hard to take seriously. For one thing, it has no economic
plan. One is promised this year, though lack of sta-
tistics will make it largely an exercise in guesswork.
Land reform scheduled for last year had to be post-
poned when private landowners threatened not to plant
their 18 million acres. An effort at self-management by
workers of factories, farms and small businesses has
been a fiasco, and many have been quietly returned to
private ownership, to the outrage of the hard-lining
labor union. Typical of Algeria's economic pragmatism
is the national oil company - SONATRACH - which
has hired American and Russian oil men, formed joint
drilling and geophysical companies with American
firms and last year negotiated a $15 million loan from
Bank of America and Manufacturer's Hanover Trust.
Colonel Boumediene doggedly makes speeches in
classical Arabic, but they are incomprehensible to most
Algerians until translated into either the local patois
or French. Egyptian teachers were brought in to push
Arabization in elementary schools, but the program
failed because their pupils could not understand them.
Mosques have been built throughout the country since
1962, but Sunday, not the Islamic Friday, is the day
off for government and business.
But if he cannot give Algeria a true Arab socialist
identity, Boumediene has given it 21 months of des-
perately needed stability. To all appearances, this has
been accomplished without any serious abrogation of
civil rights, though one of his first moves after taking
over in June 1965, was to suspend the constitution
and National Assembly. He has purposely not taken
the title of president. His official post is president of
the 24-man Revolutionary Council, which has become
the supreme authority. Army officers form the ma-
jority on the Council, and the government could not
make a move the army disapproved. Thus the balance
of power, always precarious, between the FLN and the
Anru',e Nationale Pohulaire, has shifted in favor of
e
eve
op
ng a taste for power. The last two months
have seen the first large photographs of the colonel -
in multi - posted in the capital. The colonel has kept
his post as defense minister, and the army has fared
exceeding well. Compared to September 1963, when
Moroccan troops easily defeated Algerian units in a
equipped armed forces in Africa, after Egypt and Soul
Erica. The Soviet Union has sent an estimated $18 -
and T-54 tanks, armored personnel carriers, MI
fighter planes, light jet bombers and transports, rocket
launching patrol boats and SAM missiles. About 1,oo
Russian military personnel are in Algeria as adviser ;
another thousand Algerian officers and enlisted tee
nicians have been trained in Russia. The govcrnme
justifies spending 30 percent or more of its budget o
its military by pointing to the "expansionist ambitions
of Morocco. 1 s if on cue, King Hassan II voice
Moroccan claims to southwestern Algeria regular)
enough to lend Boumediene unwitting support.
Economically, the slow downward spiral that begs
in 1962, when nine-tenths of the French populatio
pulled out in panic, is continuing. Rush-hour traffi
jams in Algiers give a surface impression of prosperity
but the government acknowledges that less than 5
percent of the active male population is employed
either full or part time. It relies heavily on emigratio
of Algerian workers to Europe (8oo,ooo are there, 2.percent of the active population) to reduce unemploy-
ment, improve its balance of payments and provid
job training. The $200 million sent home annually i
more than the country derives from all foreign aid o
even its Saharan oil.
Algeria is pinning its hopes to petroleum produc-
tion, which last year went from 26 million to 34 mil
lion tons of crude, thanks to a new, 5oo-mile, z8-inch
pipeline. SONATRACH, the first attempt by an oil
rich third world country to prospect, produce and mar-
ket its own petroleum, is well-managed. The general
investment climate could not be worse. When I asked
a prospering truck owner in Kabylie recently why he
did not buy another truck with his profits, he replied,
"It's better to remain small. That way you're safe."
The people are weary of politics, skeptical of prom-
ises. Municipal elections last February drew an 8o per-
the latter. vote - there was a choice between two candidates,
Austere and sh Boumediene whose exact age in both cleared by the FLN and the army, for each seat
y' ( in the Peoples' Municipal Assemblies-but many Al-
this secret-ridden country, is not known) quite possibly gerians said they saw no point to one-party elections.
would be glad to step down in favor of a civilian leader What they want is work, and eventual) the transistor
in whom he had confidence. But once burned, twice cau- Y
radios and it was he who entered Algiers at the head of his d automobiles so favored by the country's
troops and opened the way for Ben Bella in September budding middle class. For the majority, the goal is not
1962, after the newly independent nation erupted in a tom rbevolution . ttonnante, but the quickest possible
inter ecine strif r ourReorsementeat e N NARRIStti
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lic-U:I I,IIiLtl,ll.':, IE~LI. :;I CI: IN1-1:I'I:hI,LfICI.
(;oI tiollar'1 i,uul.ecdiennc has bccur.rc a d;lnf~trou:; man to his
attvtr!sarir:I. (Ili the eve of the attempt against. his life on
25 April, he presided over a spectacular ceremony, ivin-: the
name "(;lie Guevara" to the former Avenue of the I:eI,ubl is lit
Algiers. This is no longer a time when houkl-are-uba ;lul-anr,red
Ilea lirahiur, like his predecessor Icon l;el la, the sun oS' an Orals
peasant, and known during the war as Ilouari Bouiiiiedictme, call
retreat behind his colleagues.
dctween J9 June 1965, the date of the power Lakeover by'
.the present Algerian president, and the spring of 191,5, the
economic and social appearance of Algeria was prutoundly
modified. The oil industry, the country's principal resource,
has co nsulidated its position and he ;un to achieve its pro ran
of expansion, while broadening its independence from the big
foreign companies. I t has had all attractive effect within the
industrial sector and has created interest for numerous
investors.
The situation is less bright in the farm sector. The
type of cooperation which can be set up between the small full-Ill!
and the pui,lic remains to be determined, and the invasion of'
Ilea:cant Masses into suburbs of large cities, w,lere they re-
inforce the number o- unemployed, has not completely stoppeu.
hut a return to order of a type has already taken place in tire.
domains created by colonization, which have turned into scll?-
rrraulaged Tarn:s since independence.
AAIl~rrinit Socitct.v Ia:r:, ril,;cu h'e'n re ?; it IIs
of a recent census :;how that in AI1,,cria, tlit, 'ender-.'ii al;c
I:roup accounts for !)(, pw r'ce,nr uI' the I>e-pulat iuit of I1 e., i I I Ie,n
people. This means Hiatt half the country is rnatle lit, of 11 c I'/
1~enerations who have not. been polarized by the domestic
;trul;l;le s that their elders underwent.
The census shows that while 15 percent of' the population
are presently literate, a si-,niIicant increase in school enroll-
ment would rapidly change this proportion: there are presently
in difFerunt schools 1.0 million boys and girls from to to Z,J
years of age. The rural population, traditional support of
i'illayism, is not as important as inmost of the other African
countries. In a working population of four million, this figure
includes only 1.34 million farmers and 300,(1(10 workers. during
the three wars of Colonel uounledienne's rule, he has stated
that one sector has remained underdeveloped in relation to the
rest: the political sector. lie is endeavoring to make up for
this delay, but it is known that in politics, when one is not
conFined to prudent iuunobility, one quickly makes enemies. mie
must defend one's self and forge ahead, often deeply changing
one's behavior.
The man with the ascetic face, who does not like micro-
phones or television cameras, certainly has not lost his innate
sense of discretion. But events have forced him to change his
manner. I'hc Soumedicnne of 1908 no ion 'or resembles the
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 CPYRGHT
Wi('11 il!t Mitts tit)i:['1 111 1, , )OS) lie was accepted by
civilians; ;rllt Iii l itairv :t?; tilt.. ;a an who would least divide
t. IiCIII. (l 111iiIli\' 11.e curl: c'tt,it i;a; i,ilttllc bvv the army, which
t,nstiii( 1'I ~.~ I I i )nni 1 11" ?u ;t a cial i l'ied Strati. salt lie is
nut CUit t , CO' 1i ;I 11 aaa1'1,,v ;iu. ('i,rt:iill vo(Ill;? ca l;iit ins p refer t o
11i:il (It life a a1 1ca wiitia,l I. Icv aiii';i(icr' to he sI1'on}'?er. 'I'll is
1~trrit hia, the vl;tcei,l 01 Iltiacrous high ai'fir.i;-ls ol, tile
l ' I V i 1 i a l l a O i i i i Ii i S L r a t ion .
houinedienne discovered rapidly that his position oI' arbiter
i-1 not case Lo hold because-lie does not have adequate ilist rn-
C-ItS to Islay this role. The political inst i tut ions are not
ryas t: T; it, 11) 63 constitution provider; 'or the Fl.\ party
I o he tIia essential organ of national 1iI:?c, parliament being
i:,nl;,? a i?ccoruinr; chawl,cr, and the ~Jovcrn,iicnt only- an cxecutitc
l!,unt
Itut the 1A,N party exists only on paper. The I;;it ssvs
1.anri aloe>I 1caLl it. It t'unctions not only at Iiik;h levels. I t
but ti;L' t'o'rt,. .or it ,,r?ou11 of :great cadres promised
during the armed struggle. It furnishes a most favorable
ground for palace revolutions.
For more than a year the role of Roumedienne has been that
of a conciliator, but this man who tends naturally toward
action has perceived that reconciliation does not suffice to
,govern a country. His desire to associate in power the largest
possible number of the country's political families blocks the
operation of the govcrnlllent machine. Diverse pressure groups
find this a cause 1'(,.r satisfaction. This is the time when the
righteous Hosleni faction does not hesitate to flout the a(lthor-
'ity of the u;ove.rrrmcnt through the antennas of the RTA.
Therefore, Colonel I{oumedienne has the tendency to strongly
support the army, the sole truly political structure existing
in the country. But as he tries to consolidate the politi.cal-
military foundation, he tries at the same time to remain the
head of a nation and not of a ]'action. Foreign policy Fur-
nishes hilii this opportunity. Since independence, the Algerian
people have become sensitive to wars of liberation. :;trod Iy
impressed by Frantz Fanon, Colonel Boumedicnne speaks ,I
language which replies to the Algerian's attempt. ]luring the
Six-clay IVar in June 1967, his support of the Palestinians
considerably strengthened his prestige with the masses. Isis
support of the African nationalists of the Portuguese colonies,
of Rhodesia, and South Africa, was equally appreciated. This
i s the same way lien Iles la before him won part of his populari ty.
'I'bc present AIgeriait 1' resident, however, does not fall
into Iiie confusion that was fatal to his predecessor. "Alt'eria
is not Cuha," he says. In Havana, when Castro came into power,
there was a state which no longer exists in Algeria. 1f lie
supports (lie army, the only existing; structure, if he believes
sincerely in its i,ierits, he is not thinking that it should re-
place the state. lle is making efforts to give the country the
institutions which it does not have. The communal elections in
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 February 19 67 were the first step in achieving this goal the
S t c o n
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Colonel lioumedienne would like to orzanizc departmental elec-
tions immediately, then legislative elections and presidential
elections. fie wants to leave Algeria with a government which
gains a lel;itit.acy no regime could claim up to thtr present
because of the successive crises since independence.
I t: i s :ii:rportar,t, I,ce;iuse power has never yet s?ececdteci
in resting; on a truly popular consensus in Algeria. It is the
sane story for tire. opposition. ;cone of the large ,oli tical
upsets o1' the last three years 11as hroui,ht the 1>a111,1at ion out
of its apathy. The Algerians are relatively indifferent to
the events of 19 June 1965 and the 1967 rebellion of Colonel
'Bihar-Lbiri. They do not seem to be concerned. hut Colonel
Itoumedier-ne, by creating; the proper conditions for ;r poI it iC1I
lire, ought to keep his power. This explains the swing sotrc-
tiutcs to the right and sowetimes to the left which the Algerian
1'resident makes. The road is perilous and staked out with
barriers. In two years a certain number of incidents have show
that this period, which was marked in the beginning; by the iigli
between the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria
and the Politburo in 1962, is not yet out of the revolutionary
epoch. To the extent thatihe overcame the obstacles sprinkled
in his path by his adversaries, Colonel Boumedicnne has seen
his authority grow.
"tie should end up," he said, "with the process whereby all
Algerian political group which no longer agrees with the
majority roust take to the hills."
If he succeeds in improving the political climate of
Als,cria by ridding it of the anarchy frour which it has !,offered
for nearly six years, Colonel Bouracdicnne has a chance of being
assuxod a lon,, tenure in power. His adversaries sense the
approach of that date. The recent attempt against the Algerian
President is symptomatic of this unrest. Colonel i;oumediennne
seems to he adapted to a career resembling that of Nassiv.
Ie is. supported by the army to meet the nation and scents to be
well on his way. The popular demonstrations in his favor after
the failure of the 25 April attempt hear witness to that. The
critical support which was brought to hiii, on this occasion was
that of the students, who ordinarily disagree with hut, and
this must also he considered a "sign."
L'ACTUALITE
(-13 July 1968
MAJOR TRENDS IN ALGERIAN ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT (EXCERPTS)
-0 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
their aspirations to freedom led, thanks to Lheir struggle 1'or
national liberation, to the restoration of national. sovereignly
in July of 1962, after 300 years of foreign occupation. 'l'ho
Algerian people's determination to realize its aspirations to
social. justice and to human progress will lead, within a few
years. to the establishment of a socialist society, thanks Lu
man's labor and to the country's potential. In less than 20
years, an extraordinary succession of 'events and of political,
econoApproved Folr'Release 14468/ `4':"6IA-AbP78-090~1A00t4006~8607-d qiW
 CPYRGHT
~ppro, edF,oirtlRel l19 9Ji98 1v: Pd D8f8r@3Q1a1A09040OQ2WTrO
I'arih,io-nang it new society. The Algeria of 1976 will be a very
different place indeed from the Algeria of 1954. Between
those two eras, landmarks in time, the Algerian revolution is
being born.
I f we set about analyzing Algeria's economic develop-
ment and the major trends that characterize it over these two
decades. we should hesitate to leave out such essential factors
its historic, geographic, and sociological elements, but if we
are to limit this inquiry to the precise question, we must not
leave ourselves open to the risk of being incompleto or inade-
quate.
In the relatively short period of :;0 years, therefore,
the Algerian economy has moved from the phase of a liberal
colonial dependent, under-developed economy, predominantly
agricultural, to the stage of the independent socialist economy,
in the full swing of development, with predominance in the
industrial sector.
This slow and steady change falls into three distinct
periods, each of them lasting approximately 7 years:
}First, period (1954-1962), disorganization and artificial
growth within the liberal fri~m_-ework.
Second period (1.962-1969), a transitional phaso of
mutation and restructuring. Or the transition from capital ism
to socialism. Marked by a temporary slowdown in the economy.
Third E priod (1909-1970), acedlerated growth of the
socialist economy, or the economic take-off.
Those three periods were preceded by it p redomi n-an t.J y
at;.ricul Lural. colonial economy, and will be followed by a see it-
list economy in a state of harmonious growth and cievelopmohIt.
The population will have doubled, going from 9 to 10 million
inhabitants, and the national product will have quad rup.led......?
1)) Second period 1962-1909
When independence was proclaimed in 19o2, everyone knows
what happened. Algeria's institutions were stripped of porson-
ne L. There was a sudden falling-off in production. Capita l
flocs the country, archives and records were destroyed, etc.,
etc. In the face of so disastrous and disorganized a situation,
Algeria had to 'cope with some extremely urgent tasks. Prompt
action, backed by popular enthusiasm, made it possible within
it few months to set up an embryonic state apparatus, protect
what was left of the national heritage, get the vital economic
sectors moving again, protecting the maximum possible of ineans
of production, and provide such basic services as wel. fare and
schools, etc.
The most remarkable part of all this was unquestionably
t.ho take-over by the farm workers, and those who workee the
y the colonists, in order
b
lands and the factories abandoned
c
h
~ ~~a ,e ,9~ l~eelease ffig/ 4 t GlA--R P7T 0 1 A80W08 808f -ff~ c' 1 t -
 1 11.:~ ( I. i a1' L(1 ti1tuatT.on, w it 1e t las or sf'vNril 1110111 1;
wag suhsv(lucnti1('E'alize(I by laws known as '1t.Jt(? March (Jecfees.'1
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020007-0
Thi.; [Wt?io(I also witn(lssed the expropriation or ilrui-erL}'
(I1'claN I .tl)ittl(lollod by the lwollle, and 01v sLaCring in vacires
and IIer.`t(InneI of all Llle public sc?rvicc:1, as well its it r.en.wal
i. 11 erlc .ral (+vt'rydaN itctivi_ty.
'll,tl. was LIt1' Iij inn in; . T!ic ulliVatiO11 ut a (u111'1 -
L1.V11.('ll 11Lut? oC Lile! ( eulloill I1;!et.('(t 141) IIy it .`4tit tl' ti(?(?to
c-
was to, on LiLuto Lhc nucloua, Lite cciiLc+r around which col'
tivist economic management was to grow and clovulup, to crysta-
lize and to spread like an oil slick, on the sound foundation
of socialist principles.
This was thus the beginning of the prac Lical inll-lcm(euta-
tion of Algeria' s socialist choices Within a very Cow y(+ars,
part icula rl.y fu] lowing nationalization of th(+ colonists' land.;
Algeria had her own dualist economic structures, oxisLinl; side
by side: some of them capitalist, some of Lhem socialist.
without. any clear-cut distinction.
measures For RecoverinE, Wealth
After 19 June 1965, the revolutionary government. Look
several. measures to recover the national. wealth, or the moans
of production. The effect of these measures was a shift in
the balance between these two sectors by 1966: The socialist
s(;c t u r. by then had become more important than the private
sector. This was largely owing to nationalization of .insu.ranco,
banking, mining, distribution of oil and petroleum products,
Lhe heavy manufacturing and chemical industries, etc.
This trend will last into 1909. Once agrarian reform
is compl.e.te, and the nationalization of foreign trade is
accomplished, Algeria will have comp.letc+d the change-over in
Its economy, and will have finished the necessary and inevitablo
period of transition from capitalist to socialism.
It is worth noting that the agrarian reform as planncld
will affect only 10 thousand of the major Algerian landowners,
out of the total of 700 thousand individual owners of farm
lands.
The thr& o-year plan will make it possible to establish
the necessary means and conditions for .real. socialist planning.
it will provide for stable economic structures, tailored to the
needs of economic development.
i)ue's this mean that the private sector will perforce
tiIsapl-ear?l Ahso.1.uutply no, individual capiLal has its place.
It. will keep that place i.n Lhu economy, in the dog re" to whi.cIi
it, obeys Like ii 'rnancls of development,, Those nFleds are silr,1 ] vit
1mi. in the inv('stment, plan, The specifically national character;
of A1,I(~erian socialism in no way conflicts with utilizing nf1Lio-
nal savings and Lhe energies of all. honest citizens who 11'"si..re
141 c'orltri.hnte to the collect.iviLy. In any case, the present,
:,bate of affairs droves that, it is impossible Lo leave the
mu I ri x u I" I ha v-i till sectors of Like na Lional iieonom-v in the
Il;tlt,~s` ul'"~1~ va ( iniLi 1
IPI-rralKl1~,P(!~%e1rti'd4i`f#`t8iileg640q6db~~7
'1 1111 or !4(11' i -1 . ? ? 11 1 ( v
 roved t r: o .
' i 00020007-0
pp
1962-1909 (1) Estimate
The relative shares of socialist and
in production.
privately-owned sectors
Primary Sector (Agriculture)
Private Sector
1
30
. )0
Public Sector
99
70
50
Secondary Sector (Industry)
Public Sector
11
31
(15
Private Sector
89
69
3 5
Tertiary Sector (Business,
S(irvice, misc.)
Puh1 is Sector
20
50
80
Private Sector
80
50
31
(1) The concept of "Public Sector" in this table is und.trstoed
as including the whole of state-directed activities, (SN) semi-
owned state activities, (SM), collectivized enterprise (self-
management, cooperatives, etc.).
SHARD. OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
1950
1960
1970
100
3 2010
4 5%
SHARD. OF POPULATION P7",H ZON's
1950
1960
1970
Ru ra l
80%
oS%
;iU"n
U rha,
20010
35%
5 U?/'0
if wo wnr4+ to anrn up Lhe oconornic; siLuation UL L11n+ close
Lhi-4 poriocl, we would find a 1.oLul. roconvorsion iAndeer 11111:ia-
Usm, a tapering off in investments, and a I'i.rrn holding oI' the
overall. Devo:l of production, without any marked increase in
individual incomes.
'I'HE PROBLEMS OF EMPLOYMENT
According to recent estimates, Algerian omp) oyment breaks down
this way:
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020007-0
Agriculture
:Industry
Coinino rc e
Administration
Transportation
1,000,000 (1)
3;30,00o
200, 000
2~5(;, 000
200,000
Total. I , 780, 000
Employed in France 1.:,0, 000
A1.0,14 WS IBALA1'CE OF T1tlnV, FOR 1906
(it) Tons of Algerian Dinar)
1906
i,rnport,s :;3l,
217,
;t19
1".xporLy 266,
0a2,
842
(1)
Balance 63,184,477
( 1.) Since the. agricul.tural sector can provide full or pa.rL-
Lime employment for only about 1,000,000 people, one of 010
primary concerns of the Plan is absorbint under-ernploymont and
unemployment by assigning priority to productive investments
i.n the Secondary Sector.
(11 ) Third period (1969-1970)
This is t.ho period in which the conditions for our
economic: take-off will all be present. The socialist. struc-
turos will. be finally in place, and the human moans, it`, well
as tho rnal;eria'1 ones, will bo available. Our -'oreitn trade
will. have boon re-oriented, and reconversion and d ivers i r'ic:a-
Lion of our trade complete. The control of the state will
oxtend to all activity.
And so (luring this period, Algeria will resolutely
strik(, uu t on the path of industrialization, because agricul-
turo, owing to its feeble growth rate and to the enormous
investment it, requires, will no longer lie able to produce
((nough to satisfy the needs of the nation, and at the sarno
time produce a surplus for export. This is how the; generally
itccoptr,d concept of Algeria as a country whose vocation is
tiuroly agricultural is ovorturnod, and its abandonment is
inevitable.
Accelerated industrialization, on the contrary, wi:Il
make iiossi.hl.o a prof itablo exploitation of the nat.ionai re-
3ou re ti 9, an a(. t. ivi ty that g vo rise to uuw j ohs and h it;he r
incoinoy, t.hcts taking the upper. hand away from agri(:ult>re.
At somo later date, industrialization could even coino to
agriculture's rescue, by insuring it the investment goody it
needs: machinery, fertilizer, irrigation, financial. resoureea,
etc.
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 C:PYRnHT
Approv.F~~
WWR
A' 06 2 0 0 0 7 - 0
1961
1976
Agriculture
276
270
300
Industry
311
5 90
960
Gross Domestic Product
Business and Services
539
750
1,600
Total
1,126
1,610
2,260
Gross National Product
1,469
1,800
2,500
Not National Product
1,305
1,650
2,oOO
National Income
1,180
1,450
2,200
11,000,000
13,000,000
15,000,000
Active Population
4,100,000
4,500,000
5,200,000
Employed
2,300,000
2,500,000
2,800, 000
Primary (A riculture)
620,000
630,000
Secondary Industry)
620,000
650,000
900,000
Tertiary
(Business & Misc.)
900,000
98(), 000
1,200,00k)
Unemployed
1,800,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
PER CAPITA INCOME
1,070
1,115
1,500
Growth Rate
(Base Year 1954)
5.8%
5%
8%
Statistical Sources:
1) Statistics from the General Delegations of Algeria:
't'able of The Algerian Economy, 1960.
2) The Constantine Plan
3) Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture and from
Agrarian Reform.
4) Algeria's economic situation in 1965-1966.
5) Statistics from Algerian customs in 1966.
6) FAO statistical yearbook - 1966.
LA REPUBLZRUE, Oran
12 June 1968
CNI APPROVES 32 PRIVATE EEVEIAPMENT PROJECTS (EXCERPTS)
CPYRGHT
Tldrty-taro privately financed projects
National Investment Commission, with tax advantages, at the close of meetings
hold since 24 flay at the Algerian Development Bank (Caisse Algerienne de
revelopnont, CAD). Cherif Belkocem, State Finance and Planning Minister and
president of the Commission was chairman.
The ?oographic repartitioning of these investments was set up accord-
IAPF PO a1 1 b e(se 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020007-0
 The National Investment Commission approved the following projects:
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1. - The "Afric?.n Inovac" organization (Investment: 3 million dinars;
new employment: 42; located at Hussein-Eby)
2 - The Algerian Organization for Refineries (SAPIIE), (investment:
11? million dinars; now employment: 124; located at Boghni).
T:iroe projects were rejected because they did not meet the requirements
established by the cormnission, owing to low rate of integration, limited
training effects, etc.
LA REPUBLIQUE, Oran
15 June 1968
Eighteen Companies Nationalized in Algeria (Summary)
On 14 June it was officially announced that a number of private companies
had been nationalized. They fell into the following industrial categories:
food industries (three companies); chemical and maintenance products (nine
companies including Norcolor, Riploin-LeFranc, Franco-African Paint & Enamels,
rind Cotelle & Foucher); mechanical engineering (three companies), and construc-
tion mn.t,r,ri.n I n (thr ..
iiim YORK T1F11"S giers. The base has a natural
17 Navemhl~r 1nC~P deep sea harbor and sprawling
installations that include under-
ALGERIA IMPROVES
TIES WITH SOVIET
ground logistic facilities.
The French, for economic
reasons, evacuated Mers-el-
Kehir last February, 10 years
before the expiration of their
lease on the base. The French
Government says that it under-
,New Relations Raise issue stood that Algeria would allow
no foreign power to replace the
of Military Cooperation French at the base, at least
until the end of the lease.
CPYRGHT---- Since the French departure,
Snrr .l to The New Ynrk 71me9 however, there have been in-
ALGIERS, Nov. r en - termittent foreign press reports
shin and cooperation" is The that the Soviet Union would
deccrihe the ties between the -a base at Mers-el-Kebir. For-
Soviet Union and Algeria, And reign newsmen have not been
there have been signs of both invited to visit Mers-el-Kebir
friendship and cooperation. since the French withdrew.
A Soviet film week Is being The Algerian Government
held in the Algerian capital, strongly denied the press re-
and talks to increase trade be- ports concerning the Soviet
tween the two countries are Union's. It repeats its opposi-
'under way in Algiers, tion to the establishment of
The government-controlled foreign bases and says that not
press here continues to publish an inch of Algerian soil will be
the Soviet line on the Czech- ceded to a foreign power.
oslavak crisis. Ships Call At Algiers
Against this background bf cultural, commercial and poll- Since the end of last year's
tical cooperation, the question Middle East war, however,
of Soviet-Algerian cooperation units of the Soviet Mediter-
In the military field has been rancan fleet have made occa-
raised, at least abroad. Such sional calls at Algiers to re-
matters are not discussed open- fuel, to take on supplies and to
ly In Algeria. give shore leave to their crews.
The question specifically con- The Soviet Union has made
cerns recurrent reports that the It clear that it intends to stay
Soviet Mediterranean fleet in the , Mediterranean. Vice
rriight use the Mers-el-Keblr` Adm. Nikolal Amirnov. In a
V
ti
les
ublished In the
c
p
recent ar
CPYRGHT
Algerian leaders have re-' agreement to increase trade e-
peatedly expressed the view tween the two countries, pre-
that American power In the viously amounting to $60-
mil-Mediterranean Is a threat to:lion a year.
Arab revolutionary govern-I The Czechoslovak crisis pro-
ments. Algeria broke diploma vided an Insight Into present
tic relations with the United iAlgerian-Soviet relations. The
i
States during the Middle East
war of June, 1967.
'Tile close tics between Al-
geria and the Soviet Union date
from Algeria's war for indepen-
dence from France, when Al-
nnrinne had Soviet cnnnnrt_
g
i
ned
a
she h estab- AI rians want
dependence in in
1962
endshl
is rc goo relations witn re i p
Soviet Union, and Soviet tech-
nicians entered the count in
numbers presently estimated at
more than 2,000.
The Soviet Union provided
also .limited economic aid and
equipped almost all of. the Al-
gerian armed forces.
Ties Became Strained
The tics between the two
countries became strained dur-
ing last year's Middle East con-
flict when the Algerians ac-
cused the Soviet Union of let-
ting down the Arabs.
The Algerians were particu-;
larly disturbed at their depen-
dence on the Soviet Union for.
armaments. They sought to'
.lave an alternate arms surer
Ind approached the French,
who were reported to have de?
clined.
Last April, Soviet leaders
sent a letter to President
Iiouari Boumedicne urging that
the two countries should renew,
the Soviet said that ones soon afterward, an Algerian
r,vj511ebir .. 'K reason rasnayaFor Zvezda,
Mers-ct-Kcbir Its name prescncei delegation headed by Belaid
means "the big port
base se Is in the Mediterranean was toi Abdelsalam, the Minister of In-
of Oran of four All protect Arab countries from the; dustry, went to Moscow to dis-
rr f lilesormer French
northwest naval
of Oran cuss ade. The result was an
Approved F ~ ~9 ' T08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061
A600400020007-0
o
Government - controlled rad
and press here relied on the
Soviet press agency Tass in re-
porting the Invasion and Ig-
nored the Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment's side or the story.
candor: - "Me
to retain our
 CPYGHT
i p f P,Releasee19 10 14 : CIA-RDP78-0 061A000400020007-0
France Against the Soviet Union'
Algeria Playing
in the Economic Spherell
By HENRY TANNER
Spe-lsi ro The New to" Tlmei
ALGIERS, Dec. geria The Soviet-Algerian military
officials make no secret of th agreement goes back to 1963
fact that they regard their ex and was signed by Ahmed Ben
elusive military dependence o Bella, Mr. Boumediene's ousted
Moscow as undesirable. predecessor, at a time when he
They say that the Russian,
was faced with an armed rebel-
have always been correct
recen yy been lengthened an ad been operating at a f a ti
r c
could be used by the biggest of their capacity, with equip-
ment newest Soviet military planes.
ment that cautious French
owners had refused to renew,
Seen as Potential Bases
In the case of one company,
The Soviet Air Force, it Is
Soviet technicians moved in the
here, but they would muc border with Morocco
The Al- b
t nd
a south of d
we
f
B
l
id Abd
l
.
ases
ar
s
econ
,
e
a
esse
am
prefer to deal with at least gerlans like to say that Mr. Wheelus Field, the American the Minister of Industry and
two foreign powers In the Ben Bella could not have got- base in Libya. Mines and the driving spirit
military field, just as they have ten arms from any other source Most of the Algerian airfields behind the economic develop-
always sought safety and profit even If he had tried. are in the south of the country ment program, went to Mos-
In the economic field by dealing Early this year the Algerian -a good location for supply cow. There he received, anion
with several partners at once. armed forces were believed to and other operations in black other thins an offer from the
However, President Houari have 300 to 350 Soviet tanks, g '
's "anti-imperialist, Africa. In case of a new Israeli- Soviet Union to buy all the
B- about 200 Soviet planes and Arab conflict, Egyptian planes wine the Algerians wanted to
socialist oumediene and nationalist" perre
that If a newly eight or nine modern guided- on these fields would be far sell - at half the price the
londeg believes
Bgi plays patrol boats. The planes less vulnerable to Israeli air French were paying. The Rus-
inaim cs it lose are thought to Include about strikes than they would be in sians also agreed to provide
smart, den cohat
it can a maintain close 150 MIGs, the others being Egypt. Soviet technicians for many of
military with the Soviet Union without Ilyushin-28 bombers and An- There are occasional rumors the nationalized French com-
tonov transports. of comings and of un- panics.
jeopardizing its own independ- Informed sources believe goings
toes. that little if any equip- marked planes or planes with The Algerians then began the
y Soviet markings at some of negotiations with Paris_ Aeree-
'unction, therefore, about g,. Base Reports Discounted
ng the Soviet Union major Meanwhile, the Soviet Union'
i
strategic advantages In the Western diplomats here d
s- has been widening its economic
Mediterranean and Africa. But miss as false the rumors that
they drive hard bargains, some- Mers-el-Kebir, the former activities In Algeria. This op-
tiines amounting to brinkman- trench naval base near Oran, eration appears to have been
ship, when it comes to Soviet- is being turned over to the So- directly linked to a new set of
Algerian issues. vie[ Union. The base, which difficulties between Algeria and
Play Paris Against Moscow was abandoned by the French France. The Russians always
The have no hesitation for financial reasons a year seem to advance in Algeria
y ago, Is being converted to Alge- when the French retreat, and
about playing Soviet and rian use. French technicians are
French economic interests reported to be helping in the vice versa.
against each other. But they conversion. Period of Negotiations
are constantly on guard against The french also continue td A period of difficult negotia-
oolitical infiltration in their . -,:.._ t..# ......... Al- e,l Paric
tively easy. France agreed to
an increase and will take 37,000
a year. But negotiations on wino
broke down when the French
linked the discussion of all com-
mercial exchanges to the issue
of Algerian compensation for
the nationalized property.
The breakdown prevented the
Algerians from doing what they
like best-negotiating with two
rivals at the same time.
A Soviet trade delegation has
been here for a month engaged
In negotiations on the Imple-
weir om the anvi local l aa
a atIon, result, are confident that they all of the major financial and reached by Mr. Abdesselam In
away, efrom and know what is going on. economic issues between the Moscow.
Rece
newspapers and According to the best availa- two capitals are at stake.
Western when
cused them o them of turning Algeria ria ble informtion, a handful of One was the number of Alge- The Algerians. it seems, are
'Into a Soviet stronghold, the Soviet Instructors serving with rians allowed to work willing to sell the Soviet: Union
in a little less than half the wine
Government - controlled radio the Algerian Navy moved into France and send their earnings production over the next font
and television answered self- the base with the Algerian na- home-a vital contribution to years, thus making sure that
righteously that it was the vat units to which they were the Algerian economy, some of their wine will he
NATO that endangered the attached. Another is Algerian wine, available for sale to France
peace In the Mediterranean. French and other specialists after oil the country's most at the higher price.
The American Sixth Fleet, not' arc convinced that the Soviet valuable export. France, with While negotiating with the
the Soviet navy, is the foreign naval forces are not looking for an agricultural and financial Soviet Union and ranc, tiie-
Intruder In "our sea," accord permanent Algerian bases but crisis on her hands, had bought Algc~ians an oil e
are content to have their ships some 22 million gallons less ment with the Getty Petroleum
ing to the Algerian newspapers. openly call at Algerian civilian than she had promised. Company, an American inde-
Alge_ria's dependence on So- ports for supplies and a show In the offing, the financial ndent, which became the first
vlet arms and military instruc- of the flag. arrangements for French oil oli- reign company to give them
tors. unlike the stepped-up The French Government is erations In Algeria will be up what they had wanted all along
Soviet naval activity In the concerned, on the other hand, for renegotiation next year. -~--a 'majority partnership in a
western Mediterranean, is not over Soviet activities at the Just before the negotiations joint venture.
new. The bulk of the $250- dozen or so modern military started, the Algerians made This is presumably the pat-
million worth of planes, tanks, airfields that the Algerians in- two moves. tern the Algerians will insist on
patrol boats and artillery that herited at the time of independ- First, they nationalized most when the oil talks with the
the Soviet Union has supplied ence In 1882. The bench say of the remaining French Indus- French begin.
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11
 NEW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
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In Algeria: `More a Little Money'
Joy,
By HENRY TANNER
SD.,dtl le The Now York 11m 1
ALGIERS, Dec. 22 -- The
steep streets of this city are
'Clogged with autOrnobiles.
Dozens of downtown buildings
have recently received a new
coat of whitewash. ' '
"Things are better, there is
a little more joy. people have
a little money." said a young The Government has begun
employe at the central post of- to pump . some of its oil
Tice. "There is a feeling that revenues into the villages and
we know where we and the hamlets in the form of loans
going." for seeds and equipment. The
There is a feeling too, he latest allocations include $110-
said, that Algeria's leaders are million for development in
working seriously. Kabylia, the mountain region
To a visitor two things are cast of Algiers that is one of
apparent. President' finuari the most .overpopulated .and
Boumediene, who overthrew hence poorest in the country.
President Ahmed Tien Bella IT) About two-fifths of the coun-
1005, has consolidated his try's population still lives in
grip on Algeria and on his.rural areas.
regime. And, for the first time The improvement, of course,
since independence six and a is relative. Nearly three mil-
half years ago, there are lion Algerians, about half of
'th count 's active work
stocks With nice-looking.
good-quality, reasonably priced
derwear. i
A 100-page survey made re-'
Gently by the internationals
Monetary Fund hears out the
superficial impression of the
returning visitor. Living stand-
ards are reported slightly up'
even in the long-neglected, still
nor rnuntrVeirle. I
I ry
force, are 'still either' unem-
ployed or underemployed, ac-
Doubts on Drive for Industry (cording to the Government's
Two .years; ago, foreign figures.
tpcciallsts ' were still'' frankly This was an endemic prob-
doubtful that the ? Algerian lem even under the french. But
regime was realistic in push- Algerians point out that their
Ing the development of heavy problem of underemployment
industry instead of trying to cannot he compared with un-
provide immediately for more employment in an advanced so-
Jobs and better living.' ? ciety.' The , system iS differ-
"1f It takes them five years ent here. There is the cohesion
to get things going they may of the -clan, which embraces
make it politicallv," one.several families, and, almost
specialist said then. "if it takes always, the clan includes one
tell. they are in trouble." or two men who have work and
Now these same observers support the others. Then there
are cautiously confident that Is also a trickle. of money from
the gamble will pay off. The odd jobs.
gas and oil industry, which is The regime is handicapped
well run, is producing hard- by political problems of its
currency revenue. The great own making in dealing with
steel mill at Annaba. formerly agriculture. The self-manage-
Bone, Is taking shape. ment farms, which were in.
Algerian textile factories stituted after Independence in
l
imitation of the Yugos
made a false start two yearsav
nun and for several months model have proved to be un?
frnment technicians, who have, effective grassroots movement.
nationalized companies in thei ment conceded thul the drive
new industrial sector, would for mass enrollment in the
like to try similar methods in party had met with indif-
agriculture. Terence. Neither the "little peo-
Politically, Colonel Bou? pie." nor the managerial elite,
mediene. has ? streamlined the which is running the state en-
onc:e oversize, faction-ridden terprises, nor the young Intel-
regime. lectuals responded.
The Revolutionary Council, Now the regime has de-
ruling body after the Boume- "the year of the party." The
diene takeover, stir exists on attempt to mobilize the masses
paper but is virtually ignored. will continue, and President
It consisted largely of former Boumediene has made stern
military officers representing statements calling for popular
the regional -guerrilla units participation.
that had fought the war against From conversations with
the French. many Algerians emerges an
In t{re heyday of the council, almost general impression that
Colonel Boumediene was. 'an they respect the Boumedicncl
arbiter between rival factions.
Today, according to all ac-
counts, he makes his own de-
cisions.
The main reason for the
regime for its moderation and
its pragmatic approach to the
task of building the nation's
economy, but they have no
of its members were identified' The' power, struggle that con-
with an abortive' military,coup tinues within the regime is n
attempted against Colonel matter of a few hundred men
Boumediene a year ago. in powerful ppositions.
He Gets Warm Greeting Some of tho most important
Colonel Boumediene, a, shy things here are those that have
not
man who has long been a re- said a afe, few a young Alger-
mote and deliberately aloof tan said days ngo.
not thing, becolie me a mllid,
figure, has begun. to make. ap? Algeria For has s one
pearances In the countryside they dictatorship, eeven th I ough
and is said to have been sur- the coup against iPresident Ben
prised at the people's warmth. Bell was carried out His most important trip-was army. by th
d
to Kabylia. Although his secu- ' Colonel Boumediene and
rity along the wa was insured all .the key members of the
y regime, with the exception of
by hundreds of soldiers, this Bclaid Abdesalam, the Influen-
trip is widely regarded as a tial Minister of Industry, were
turning point in the countrys leading military commanders
internal political evolution. at. the time of Independence.
But Colonel Boumediene and None has been seen in uni-
his regime have failed in an form since they took over. And
attempt to mobilize the coun- at the time of the. attempted
try politically. . - cou pa year ago, Colonel Boll-
They proclaimed 1968 "the mediene addressed the officers'
year of the party." Their goal corps and said: "Jr you want
was to revive, the country's to get into politics, get out of
single political party, the Na, uniform."
tional Liberation Front. The. S
erian
Al
un
d th
econ
g
g
e yo
, produced goods nobody would productive and costly. front was the political Instru said "We do not have a Cuban
buy. Today the stores art But. they are part of the ment durintt,the war against regime:'
. ceRime's socialist image, and'
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :1?IA-RDP78-03061 A000400020007-0