BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300060003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 14, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A2Ub
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14 February 1966
Briefly Noted 0000,
Reason Stalin Back in the
or Picture
Repression?
Although Stalinism
never died in the
USSR, Stalin as a person had been so
smothered by condemnations that he
became virtually invisible on the
landscape of official Soviet society.
Recent developments in the USSR, how-
ever, indicate that even Stalin might
be rehabilitated, if only part-way.
Primary evidence is the plan to
make available, for the first time
since 1956, two of Stalin's books:
"Marxism and the Nationalities Ques-
tion" (pre-1917) and "Problems of
Leninism" (early 1920's).
Increasingly frequent references
to Stalin have been made by Soviet
political leaders and in the press.
It is rumored that the memorial to
Stalin in his birthplace of Gori will
be reopened. As a means of solving
the cultural crisis (see guidance
#985 in this issue) Stalinist-like
measures have been used. Further-
more, the country's youth have been
scored for indifference to the Sta-
linist period's achievements (indus-
trialization, victory in WW II).
Some have suggested that a "bal-
anced view" of Stalin is being re-
stored -- i.e., accent the positive
and forget the negative. If so, there
would be relatively little cause for
concern -- except that this chapter
in history should not be forgotten,
in the hope it will prevent recur-
rence.
But if, as seems equally likely,
the present leaders should seek Stalin-
ist solutions to their vexing economic,
cultural and international problems
(or yield to die-hard Stalinist pres-
sures at home or abroad), then this
possibility should be widely consid-
ered and attention should be directed
to the disgust of the whole world
with the documented misdeeds of the
demonstrably unbalanced Stalin.
Soviet UN Resolution Scores
Resolution Infiltration and Sub-
Boomerangs version
Soviet delegates have
for a long time been attempting to
maneuver a resolution into the UN
which would be used in propaganda
to charge the US and other "imperial-
ist powers" with illegal intervention
in the internal affairs of other na-
tions. They introduced a resolution
in the 20th Session of the General
Assembly -- "Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States..." How-
ever, substantial statements listing
communist type subversive-aggression
were added by other delegations, the
Soviets were placed in a position
where they could not refuse to vote,
and the resolution was passed.
US Representative Charles Yost
praised the resolution for having
spoken out "clearly and explicitly"
against new forms of intervention
that have plagued the world in recent
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(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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years. In the second point in the
"declares" section, the UN Resolu-
tion says:
"... no State shall organize, as-
sist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards
the violent overthrow of the re-
gime of another State, or inter-,
fere in civil strife in another
State."
has frequently proved a handy way
for.. Communists to turn a fast buck.
In recent months Guatemalan Commu-
nists have taken in an estimated
$300,000 in ransom for businessmen
seized by terrorist sections of the
party: There would have been more
but sloppy modus operandi resulted
in the death of one intended hostage
and another was wounded during the
attempted abduction, resulting in
his permanent paralysis from the
neck down.
Many sections in the resolution per-
tain to activities being carried on
by non-communist countries (e.g., in
Africa) as well as by communist na-
tions. Assets should refer to, and
quote from, this resolution whenever
appropriate in the context of attack-
ing external subversion, unlawful
pressures etc. against a friendly
country. [See attachment for text.]
Kid- Communist Fund Raising
napping Techniques: Bartering
Pays People for Goods
With their cynical con-
tempt for human lives and for basic
moral values, Communist parties and
governments do not hesitate to use
criminal techniques to raise needed
money. Joseph Stalin robbed banks
in the early days before he learned
the ins and outs of reneging on gov-
ernment savings bonds. Kidnapping
Fidel Castro developed the ran-
som tactic on a large scale when he
found he could trade off his prisoners
captured in the abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion for $53 million worth of
food, drugs, and medical supplies.
Walter Ulbricht has eagerly
learned from Castro's cynical sales
technique and is putting it to good
use. For a price -- reputed to be
more than $24 million worth of con-
sumer goods -- he is kindly releas-
ing some 2600 prisoners held it East
German jails. They were mostly per-
sons caught trying to escape, or
helping others to escape, the Commu-
nist paradise. For a further con-
sideration he apparently will also
be willing to release more than 2000
children presently detained in East
Germany, even though their parents
live in West Germany. (See unclas-
sified attachment: New York Times
article of 1 February 1966.)
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Significant Dates
MAR
2 First Congress of Third (Communist) International -- COMMINTERN. 1919.
5 Churchill delivers "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri: denounces
Soviet "expansive and proselytizing tendencies" -- "an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent." 1946. 20th anniversary.
5 Joseph Stalin dies. (Born 21 Dec 1879). 1953.
8 International Women's Day, appropriated since 1945 by the Communist WIDF.
8 February Revolution in Russia 8-15; Tsar Nicholas II abdicates. 1917.
10 Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk dies in fall. 1948.
12 Brief Finnish war with USSR ends. Finland yields territory to aggressor.
1940.
13 Chinese Communist attempt arrest Dalai Lama precipitates general revolt.
1959.
13 President Kennedy proposes "Alliance for Progress" for Latin America.
1961. Fifth anniversary.
14 Karl Marx dies. (Born 5 May 1818). 1883.
18 Kronstadt Uprising crushed (see 23 Feb) 1921. Forty-fifth anniversary.
21 Hungarian Republic of Soviets formed with Soviet financial assistance
to Bela Kun (overturned I August) 1919. Bela Kun executed in USSR purges
of 30's.
23 Pakistan assumed full independent republic status. 1952.
25 Treaties creating Common Market (EEC) and Euratom signed. 1957.
29 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow.
I Berlin Blockade begins. 1948. (Ended by Soviets, after successful US
airlift, 12 May 1949).
2 Molotov disclaims Soviet desire acquire new territory or change
Rumania's social structure when Red Army enters, WW II. 1944.
4 First World Festival and Congress of Negro Arts, Dakar, Senegal April
4-24, sponsored by UNESCO and Society of African Culture.
7 Milovan Djilas arrested (see 17-18 Jan 1954). 1962.
II International Day of Liberation from Fascism, celebrated annually by
International Fed. of Resistance Movements (communist).
12 Major Gagarin, USSR, first orbits Earth. 1961. Fifth anniversary.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
Commentary
19 January-1 February 1966
Printi:pal Developments:
1. The relative lull in public polemics continues, except for a few more
Chinese and Albanian blasts on the themes of Soviet collaboration with the
U.S., with the Japanese, and with the Indians -- against China.
2. On the Soviet side, we have only the Western press reports from Moscow
of the circulation by the CPSU among its membership of a long indictment of
Chinese policies, the main thrust of which is that Peking has now abandoned
its 5-year ideological war and advanced to direct attacks on the national
interests of the Soviet Union.*
3. The recent spate of secret, top-level, bilateral meetings between Euro-
pean parties continues: the Czechs to Moscow, to Poland, and entertaining
the Spanish CP; the Poles to Budapest; and Rumanian Premier Maurer to Yugo-
slavia.
4. The 11th Congress of the Italian CP was attended by delegations from 4+1
CPs, including the CPSU and most of the major parties aligned with it -- but
not the Chinese or any parties aligned with it. The Rumanian Party was
represented -- and heard attacks on the Chinese by PCI GenSecy Longo and
French CP speaker Duclos. The 14th Congress of the Finnish CP brought less
than a dozen delegations, also limited to the Soviet camp in Europe. The
Rumanians again heard attacks on the Chinese by GenSecy Pessi and Politburo
member Hertta Kuusinen.
5. The Czech-Spanish communique includes an endorsement of "an international
conference of CPs, convoked at a convenient time." (A Prague Nova Mysl edi-
torial on ~9 Jan is less specific: "a wide international consultative meeting
... is possible and desirable, after careful preparations.")
6. There have been several divergent clandestine reports on Soviet plans or
prospects for dealing with the Chinese challenge at the 23rd Congress, but
nothing firm enough for forecasting. Most drastic is the reported comment by
a TASS correspondent in Japan that the Congress would mark a "turning point"
in the ICM -- no further explanation.
*Reuters reports from Moscow on Feb. 1 that the CPSU has distributed a
similar letter to foreign CPs: see Press Comment for reproductions of
these Moscow reportss 3 February.
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4F$*(" (Commentary Cont.)
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7. Clandestine reporting indicates that the Japanese CP leadership is trying
to move away from its close identification with the CCP and hoping to attend
the CPSU Congress: the Miyamoto-led delegation to Peking (#70) is reportedly
charged with explaining the leadership's problems and intentions to the CCP.
The new shift is said to reflect the leadership's concern over growing pres-
sure and danger of further dissidence among Jap*p'ese-Cbmmunists (the Indo-
nesian CP's fate has been a severe shock to Chinese-line elements), as well as
apprehension over possible isolation in the ICM.
8. Belgrade Radio's correspondent in Moscow reports Soviet confidence that
"China has almost completely lost its influence in N. Korea" and that N. Viet-
nam is moving in that direction.
9. Two conflicting clandestine reports have been received on plans for a 1966
conference of West European CPs: one says that it will be held in France over
the Pentecost week-end (27-29 May); and the other that it will be held in
Vienna in May.
Significance:
Soviet plans and prospects for convening a wide CP meeting -- whether
one limited to "unity in action in aiding Vietnam," one utilizing the assem-
blage of world CP delegations to the 23rd CPSU Congress, or the full-fledged
world meeting so long discussed and delayed -- are still completely obscure.
The Italian CP Congress seems to demonstrate that the PCI has moved a step
further toward alignment with the Soviets against the Chinese, and, perhaps,
that even the Rumanians are now ready to be counted on the Soviet side (the
latter seemingly further confirmed as the Rumanians repeated at the Finnish
Congress).
In any case, it is clear that the 23rd CPSU Congress, due to convene on
29 March, will hold the center of the stage in the ICM, at least for the next
several months. 25X1C1Ob
2
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9 16 V R L I (Commentary.)
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CHROi4OLC)GY -- CO1,211tJT1IST DISSENSIONS
#71
19 January-1 February 1966
January 19: Budapest MTI reports that the Gomulka-led Polish Party
delegation had a friendly meeting on 18-19 January in Budapest' with
a xun.arian Party group led by Kadar. They discussed "further develop-
ment of cooperation between their countries and parties and exchanged
opinions about topical foreign political problems and topical problems
of the international Communist and workers movement," with "complete
identity of views on all problems discussed."
Prague CTK reports a joint communique on an 11-19 January visit
of a apish CP delegation led by Chairman Dolores Ibarruri with a
Novotny-led Czech Party delegation, in a cordial and comradely atmos-
phere where agreement was common.'` It includes the statement that
"both parties are also firmly convinced of the usefulness of an inter-
national meeting of Communist parties, convoked at a convenient time....
January 19-20: A Novotny--led Czech Party delegation in Moscow meets
in an atmosphere of fraternal friendshi
mutual understanding" with the top CPSU leadership: TA Sdonothee20th
reports that "the two sides stressed a complete identity of views in
appraising the present international situation and the situation in
the ICM.
January 22: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit editorial is pegged
to Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to Moscow: 'The New Rap-
prochement Between the K Revisionists and the Japanese Militarists
Encourages Imperialist Aggression in Asia.'' Such rapprochement, it
declares, "constitutes one of the most important steps in the foreign
policy of the two governments who thus propose to 'put a brake on
China' and strike a blow against the liberation movement of the peoples
in Asia." Later, ZIP expands its charges:
The Soviet leaders are trying in every possible way to erect
a wall around China. These machinations have been stepped up by
the Soviet leaders to such a point that former British PM Lord
Home is of the opinion that there is now a hope of seeing the cre-
ation of a natural Asian coalition based on India and Russia....`'
January 24: Bel rade Radio correspondent in Moscow Sundic reports
that "it is confidently asserted in Moscow that China has almost com-
pletely lost its influence in N. Korea, and that the same signs are
also noted in the attitude of N. Vietnam. N. Korea's positive attitude
toward the Soviet Union is explained by the fact that the Korean leader-
ship itself reached the conclusion that it cannot follow and support
the Peking adventurist policy.'4
(Chronology Cont.)
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NYTimes Bucharest correspondent Binder describes a "country-wide
celebration of the 107th anniversary of the union of. Moldavia and
Walachia, two principalities that form the basis of modern Rumania."
He notes that the 100th anniversary of the event was given only perfunc-
tory treatment in the Rumanian press and adds that "some observers"feel
that the present ostentatious celebrations are "intended to reassert a
'residual' claim to Bessarabia (once a major part of Moldavia which was
incorporated into the Soviet Union during WwiI) and to remind the
Soviet Union of Rumania's interest in the fate of the Rumanians who
make up 60% of the population of present-day Soviet Moldavia."
January 21+-25: A Novotny-led Czech Party delegation and a Gomulka-led
Polish Party delegation meet at Wisla, Poland, to discuss questions of
`all-round cooperation between the two countries," in "a cordial and
friendly atmosphere." "The most important issues of the present inter-
national situation and of the ICM were also discussed," with "an iden-
tity of views on all issues discussed.'`
January 25-31: The Italian CP holds its llth Congress in Rome, with
41 party delegations, including a Suslov-led CPSU group and Rumanian
representation, as guests, but none from the Chinese or any other Asian
(except the Mongolian) or other Chinese-aligned CP. PCI GenSecy Longo
openly criticizes the Chinese in his opening speech (according to TASS:
we have not yet seen the PCI's own reporting), saying that the aid
given to the Vietnamese by the USSR and other socialist countries
"could have been more effective" had the Soviet proposals for unity
been accepted by the Chinese, that the CCP leaders are "leveling absurd
charges against the Soviet Union" on this subject. Suslov's long speech
tactfully accentuates the positive and makes no mention of difficulties
in the movement. French CP speaker Duclos denounces (according to TASS)
"the rejection by the Chinese leaders of the proposal for agreement
among the socialist countries to render more effective assistance to
the Vietnamese."
January 26-30: Rumanian Premier Maurer pays "a friendly visit'` to
Yugoslavia, -- with no co=unique published as of 1 February.
"
January 22: Czech Party theoretical weekly Nova Mysl editorial "regrets"
Chinese "allegations about the 'revisionist' line pursued by the CPSU
leadership' and other fraternal parties. `Such an approach damages the
interests of the movement and arouses justified fears of causing irrep-
arable damage if the CCP wants to continue this line." Referring to
Chinese and Albanian charges that the fraternal parties are attempting
to isolate the CCP, it says that "it is the CCP leadership that is
stepping out of ranks if it refuses any cooperation or any joint
action."
The article says that "the holding of a wide international con-
sultative meeting of Communist and workers parties is possible and
desirable, after careful preparations."
2 (Chronology Cont.'
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January 29-1 February: The Finnish Ct' holds its l4th Congress in
Helsinki: limited reporting available as of 1 February rrimarily TASS
bulletins) indicates that less than a dozen Soviet-aligned European CPs
sent delegations, including; the Rumanians. GenSecy Ville Pessi and
Politburo foreign policy speaker iertta Kuusinen criticize the Chinese:
CPSU chief delegate Grishin avoids mention of problems with Chinese.
January 30: Peking People's Daily editorial, pegged to the 27 January
resumption of the 17-nation disarmament commission talks in Geneva,
denounces the Soviet Government for "preparing the ground to strike a
new deal with U.S. imperialism." The U.S. sings and the S.U. chimes
in;, how very harmonious and how very intimate! ... This clearly shows
to what depth the Soviet leaders have sunk in their quest of American-
Soviet cooperation.`' It concludes that the Soviet leaders "must be
told with frankness that so long as they take united action with U.S.
imperialism, no M-L, no revolutionary people of the world will take
united action with them."
januar_ 31: NCNA Peking; comirents that a collection of the late Indian
PM Nehru's writings and speeches has just been "turned out" by the
Soviet "Progress"publishing house, under the title: Indian Foreign
Policy "This Soviet publication found it convenient to use Nehru's
words freely to vilify the struggle of the Vietnamese people to resist
U.S. aggression and save their country, and maliciously slander China."
February 1: Western corrpesondents in Moscow describe "a detailed
indictment of Communist China's policies" which the Kremlin leaders
are reported -- according to "reliable Communist sources" -- to be
circulating among the CPSU membership. The main thrust is said to be
that China "has now abandoned its 5-year ideological offensive and gone
over to direct attack in spheres affecting the Soviet Union as a nation."
They acknowledge that there has been no official mention of such a let-
ter. (On Feb. 3 Reuters reports from Moscow that the CPSU has distrib-
uted a similar letter to foreign CPs.)
3 (Chronology)
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SITUATION: Although the CPSU is now less than two months away from
the 29 March starting date for its 23rd Congress and has published a num-
ber of articles (totaling about 100 pages) pegged to the Congress in its
foremost theoretical journal Kommunist, there is still little firm indi-
cation of its plans. An unclassified review of these Kommunist articles
is attached: in general, they seem to confirm our original impression
that the CPSU leadership will attempt to limit the proceedings (at least
those open to the public) to a general endorsement of the Brezhnev-
Kosygin policies demonstrated in the post-Khrushchev era, with emphasis
on basic economic reforms and on "democratization" of Party life.
Soviet plans and prospects for dealing with the Chinese challenge
at the Congress - whether within the Congress sessions or using the as-
semblage of world CP delegations as a major event in the ICM -- are still
obscure. We have noted new evidence (especially the Soviet-Mongolian
communique, Propagandist's Guide #70) of Soviet intent to proceed with
the long-delayed project for a world Communist meeting, but at the same
time we speculated that the N. Vietnamese agreement to send a delegation
must mean a Soviet promise not to use the Congress gathering for any pur-
pose which would give the Chinese grounds for criticizing N. Vietnamese
party. However, several clandestine reports indicate that some parties
do expect the CPSU to use the assemblage for some such purpose, and a
Soviet TASS correspondent is reported as saying -- without further ex-
planation -- that the Congress would mark a "turning point" in the ICM.
In the first days of February Western correspondents reported from
Moscow that the Kremlin leadership was circulating throughout the CPSU
membership a detailed indictment of Chinese policies, the principal thrust
of which is that Peking has abandoned its 5-year ideological war against
Moscow and gone over to direct attack on the Soviet Union in various
spheres of national interest. 25X1 C10b
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rR (985 Cont.)
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986 AF,FE,NE,WH. CUBA VS COMMUNIST CHINA
Political Determinants of Communist Trade
25X1C10b
SITUATION: In the last few years the People's Republic of China
(CPR) has charged the USSR with ulterior motives in first extending eco-
nomic aid and then cutting it off. Cuba has now in effect charged the
CPR with backing out of a long term sugar-rice trade agreement. The de-
crease in trade exchanges for 1966 comes at a time when Castro has, in
spite of certain calls for revolutionary action in recent speeches,
placed himself again on the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and
obligated himself for continued Soviet support.
Cuban CPR charges. In three official statements the Cuban and CPR
governments have differed in their explanations of trade agreements and
exchanges in the past and over current negotiations for 1966. Each has
implied that the other lied and questioned the motives of the other for
publicly discussing their differences. Prime Minister Castro started the
open debate on 2 January 1966 in a speech celebrating the 7th anniversary
of the Cuban revolution on the eve of the Tri-Continent Conference in
Havana, to explain to the people "the reasons for which we will have less
rice" in 1966. The CPR's Foreign Trade Ministry countered the charges in
an interview on 9 January, which the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry rejected
in a detailed rebuttal on 12 January 1966. [See unclassified attachment
for excerpts from these statements.]
Some four major areas of dispute appear in the official texts, as
follows: 1) Castro says there was a long term agreement to increase
trade, which the CPR categorically denies; 2) Cuba says that the CPR
will not allow the use of credits to cover a trade deficit for 1966 while
the CPR says the request has not been made to the correct official; 3) Cuba
contends that 1966 trade will be below any previous year, again denied by
the CPR; 1) Cuba states that the prices for rice and sugar were favorable
to the CPR while the Chicoms say the reverse is true,
If the figures presented for 1966 remain unchanged, as would appear
to be the case (the Cuban trade delegation arrived in Peking 10 Nov 1965
to start negotiations; were reported leaving on 7 Feb 1966), the CPR will
not accept the quantity of sugar Castro wants to sell and will provide only
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(986 Cont.)
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135,000 metric tons of rice instead of the 285,000 so badly needed by
the Cuban people. The CPR statement says that while China has enough
rice, they must sell it to obtain currency to buy other grains which
they are lacking. It was reported (NYTimes, Jan.) that rice exports
to Japan will rise above 1965 by some 140,000 metric tons.
Chicom Aid Grants. While some two-thirds of the CPR's aid still
goes to communist countries (Asian with the exception of Albania and
Cuba) it started an aid program to selected non-communist underdevel-
oped countries in 1960. In a political drive to establish bonds of
common interest with the non-European world to the exclusion of western
ideologies and interests (in which it is now including the USSR) the
CPR has also condemned the Soviet Union for the nature of its economic
assistance. Responding to Moscow's abrupt withdrawal of aid, after the
outbreak of Sino-Soviet hostilities, with villifying remarks that it
had never received aid as such, Chou En-lai said
"Speaking quite generally, the Soviet Union did
not give China any aid without getting something
in return." (Interview in Look magazine, reprint-
ed in Die Welt, Hamburg 16 Jan 1961.)
At a later date, the CC of the CCP in a memo to the CPSU of 29 February
1964 (published in Jen-min Jih-pao 9 May 1964) said
"We must point out that Soviet aid to China was by
no means free; it took place mostly in the form of
trade and it was not a one-sided affair. China
paid and is stiZZ paying the Soviet Union for all
equipment and ... other merchandise, as well as
gold and other foreign currency."
The Chicoms also charged the Soviets with extending aid as "a means of
making a profit." (Jen-min Jih-pao 31 May 1964). For their part the
Soviets have claimed that they gave the Chicoms "charity," and have
given detailed accounts of the actual aid extended to the CPR.
The Chicoms have stressed the point that Soviet aid is interest
bearing (i.e., profit-making). Significantly Chicom aid to developing
countries is purported to be largely interest-free -- that is, after
its open conflict with the USSR and its entrance into the field of aid
to non-communist countries. According to an analysis by a German scholar,
D.E. Gross, a comparison of the nature of CPR aid to communist countries
(started in the 1950's) with that to non-communist developing nations
shows the following*:
*See Propaganda Note #113 with unclassified translation "Development Policy
and Development Aid of CPR" by D.E. Gross, from The East Bloc and the De-
veloping Nations June 1965.
2
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(986 Cont.)
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Communist Non-communist
countries countries
I) without
interest insignificant 75%
2) with
interest over 50%
3) non- a little
repayable under 50%
25%
In effect, Communist China mounted its economic offensive in the develop-
ing world by saying: we too are a developing country, but we will share
with you -- without asking you to pay for our help (i.e., making a profit).
Actually, the Chicoms do have advantages, probably hidden in many in-
stances, in their trade agreements which are about 90% barter. In the
Cuban-CPR exchange, for example, the CPR said that they were giving 1.12
tons of rice for every ton of sugar while the Cubans insisted they were
giving more sugar for less rice. Communist countries have often been
charged with setting a high value on their export barter goods and a low
market price on their import barter goods. 25X1 C1 Ob
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rRMITOr (986 Cont.)
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987 WH. MEXICAN PRESIDENT VISITS CENTRAL AMERICA
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz toured the
capitals of the six Central American republics in January 1966. This
was the first visit ever made to these countries by a Mexican chief of
state. The trip was inspired by mixed motives, including a clear com-
mercial interest in building a bridge to the very successful Central
American Common Market. The President also desired, however, to de-
velop a new "Good Neighbor" policy consonant with Mexico's rapidly
developing economic and political stature.
Mexico's GNP growth rate has been one of the highest of any Latin
American country and compares favorably with those of the European Eco-
nomic Community and the United States. Mexican foreign trade has also
grown impressively, and her aggressiveness in this field has created
concern in some quarters. Diaz Ordaz undertook his tour partly also
in order to allay such suspicions.
Mexico's president was warmly greeted by the peoples of the coun-
tries he visited; he was almost mobbed by a cheering throng in El Sal-
vador. Cultural, economic and/or technical assistance agreements were
concluded in each country. The cultural agreements centered around the
study and restoration of the Mayan heritage of the region, included ex-
changes of students and professors and provided for reciprocal recogni-
tion of scholastic accreditations. The economic and technical agreements
included a $5,000,000 credit granted to Honduras and a Mexican subscrip-
tion to $10,000,000 of bonds in the Central American Common Market bank.
These were the first direct foreign loans ever granted by Mexico. Other
agreements included various provisions for improving the trade balance
between Mexico and several Central American countries.
Diaz Ordaz ran into considerable criticism from the local press
for Mexico's Cuban policy, specifically its position relative to the
free travel access through Mexico to and from Cuba, thus opening the
doors for subversive agent traffic.
However, this was of relatively minor importance compared to the
over-all significance of Diaz Ordaz' trip: an important and largely
successful first step in expanding and improving social and economic
relationships with the Central American states. The fact that Mexico
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(987 Coat.)
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has now developed to the point of being able to offer economic and technical
assistance to other Latin American nations augurs well for the future. Per-
haps most important of all is Mexico's evident determination to foster co-
operative and friendly relations, specifically promising no economic or polit-
ical interference. 25X1 C1 Ob
2
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L&&&" (987.)
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NYTimes
1 Feb 1966
Bonn Ransoms 2,600
From East Germany
e New York Times
P$ , Jan. 31-West Ger-
dom from East Germany for
2,600 political prisoners, it was
learned today.
The operation, which was pri-
vately arranged through law-
yers in East and West Berlin,
was said to have involved the
payment of ransoms equivalent
to as much as $10,000 a prison-
er. In all, East Germany was re-
ported? to have obtained the
equivalent of more than $24-mil-
lion.
The East Germans did not,
receive the payments in cash,
however. Through the East-
West German trade office, they
were enabled instead to Import
Vital consumer goods, largely
coffee, citrus fruit,, butter and
fertilizer.
The transaction began in 1964,
when release was obtained for
800 prisoners. The rest were
freed last year and this month.
Officials said the West had
called a temporary halt in the
operation, not because there
were no prisoners left, but be-
cause it was felt there was a
danger that the Communists
might titlempt to nrrevt W'erit-
erners deliberately in the hopes
of obtaining payments for their
release.
While the majority of prison-
ers were West Germans and
West Berliners, most of them
were arrested in connection
with escape operations Others
came from East Germany and
East Berlin.
Under the arrangement, pris-
oners were released to the
places where they had lived be-
fore their arrest.
The Westerners were taken in
buses across the East-West Ger-
man ' border to a clandestine
'camp in the state of Hesse;
West Germany.
eturn to their home towns.
They were told not to speak
about their experience so as not
to endanger the release of
others.
Details of the transaction
came to light Oct. 8, 196.4,, when
the West German Government
nounced that it had bought
t e release of 800 politicaipris-
o ers. The extent of the opera-
t' n was later shrouded in
s Crecy by officials who feared
t at the Communists would
Action on Funds Expected
ice Chancellor and Minister of
11-Germany Affairs, was in
untry and were unable to take
eir children along. Some, of
ese youngsters were placed In
Freeing of Cubans Recalled
In December, 1962, the Cuban
overnment of Fidel Castro re
eased 1,113 prisoners in ex
hange for $53 million in food,
edical supplies and drugs gath
red by a group of Govern-
lent officials and private oiti
ens in the United States,
enator Robert F. Kennedy, then
ttorney General, and James B.
onovan, a New York lawyer
ho later became president of
he city's Board of Education,
ere instrumental In the trans-
ction.
The prisoners had been seized
during the ill-fated Bay of Pigs
Invasion of April, 1981.
CPYRGHT
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25X1C10b
14 February 1966
Twentieth session
Agenda item 107
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly
[on the report of the First Committee (A/6220))
2131 (XX). Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty
The General Assembly,
Deeply concerned at the gravity of the international situation and
the increasing threat to universal peace due to armed intervention and
other direct or indirect forms of interference threatening the sover-
eign personality and the political independence of States,
Considering that the United Nations, in accordance with their aim
to eliminate war, threats to the peace and acts of aggression, created
an Organization, based on the sovereign equality of States, whose
friendly relations would be based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples and on the obligation of its
Members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State,
Recognizing that, in fulfillment of the principle of self-
determination, the General Assembly, in the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in
resolution 1514 (IV) of 14 December 1960, stated its conviction that
all peoples have an inalieneble right to complete freedom, the exer-
cise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national terri-
tory, and that, by virtue of that right, they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development,
Recalling that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the
General Assembly proclaimed that recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
without distinction of any kind,
Reaffirming the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed in the
charters of the Organization of American States, the League of Arab
States and the Organization of African Unity and affirmed at the con-
ferences held at Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Chapultepec and Bogota, as
well as in the decisions of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung,
the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
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Countries at Belgrade, in the Programme for Peace and International Co-
operation a..o-t ,ed at the and of the Seco"d Conference of Heads of State
or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo, and in the declaration
on subversion adopted at Accra by the Heads of State and Government of
the African States,
Recognizing that full observance of the principle of the non-
intervention of States in the internal and external affairs of other
States is essential to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles
of the United Nations,
Considering that armed intervention is synonymous with aggression
and, as such, is contrary to the basic principles on which peaceful
international co-operation between States should be built,
Considering further that direct intervention, subversion and all
forms of indirect intervention are contrary to these principles and,
consequently, constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,
Mindful that violation of the principle of non-intervention poses
a threat to the independence, freedom and normal political, economic,
social and cultural development of countries, particularly those which
have freed themselves from colonialism, and can pose a serious threat
to the maintenance of peace,
Fully aware of the imperative need to create appropriate conditions
which would enable all States, and in particular the developing coun-
tries, to choose without duress or coercion their own political, eco-
nomic and social institutions,
In the light of the foregoing considerations, solemnly declares:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of
its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.
Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite
or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State,
or interfere in civil strife in another State.
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national
identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and
of the principle of non-intervention.
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4. The str'.ct observance of these obligations is an essen-
tial condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with
one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not
only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United
Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten
international peace and security.
5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its
political, economic, social and cultural systems, without inter-
ference in any form by another State.
6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination
and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised
without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect to human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall
contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination
and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
7. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term
"State" covers both individual States and groups of States.
8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as
affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security, in particular those contained in Chapters VI,
VII and VIII.
1408th plenary meeting,
21 December 1965.
3
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e r uar
Kommunist On The 23rd CPSU Congress
Following is a brief review of a series of articles pegged to the
23rd CPSU Congress appearing in the CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist,
Nos. 17 and 18, December 1965, and No. 1, January 1966.
Kommunist No. 17, signed to the press 2 December 1965, featured
an unsigned 5,000-word lead editorial on the Congress which discusses
a number of internal questions in line with the sober, reform-minded
approach of the Brezhnev-Kosygiri leadership. It still bows to the
20th and 22nd Congresses and the new Program but now points to the
October. 1961+ plenum (which ousted Khrushchev) as "of great importance
to the life of the party and the country," following which "serious
work was done for improving the methods of party and state leadership."
(In a later passage, it mentions "all types of subjectism," "tendency
toward 'arbitrary' methods," and "switches from one direction to an-
other" as faults eliminated by the post-K plenums.)
Stating flatly that "the time for a serious reorganization of
our economy has come," Kommunist indicates that major attention w:i.l_l.
be focused on the party's efforts at "resolving the basic economic prob-
lems on a scientific basis." After it defends "economic concepts such
as profits, market, price, efficiency in returns on capital investment,
etc., which were extensively covered in the resolutions of the September.
Plenum," against both "bourgeois interpreters" and "those vulgarizers and
dogmatists who base their theories not upon life or objective reality,
but upon sterile schemes" (i.e., the Chinese), Kommunist emphasizes that
"material incentive is a powerful and irreplaceable factor in production
growth, the mobilization of people's talents for the common good."
Toward the end, the editorial interestingly turns the party's at-
tention to the social sciences, which "are given prerequisites such as
to turn them into a real theoretical basis for the solution of economic,
social, and political problems, so that they become an efficient tool in
social changes and the education of the people."
It also declares that "the CPSU statutes ... must be strictly ob-
served." This is followed by a paragraph endorsing "the growth in CPSU
ranks" (by over two million since the 22nd Congress), thus touching on
another very controversial issue among the rank and file, that of "quan-
tity vs. quality" of membership.
Two subsequent issues of Kommunist have reached us since No. 17.
No. 18 of 1965 contains 5 articles (47 pages) under the general heading
"The Party Goes to Its 23rd Congress," and No. 1 of 1966 includes 3 arti-
cles and a collection of notes from local organizations (total 37 pages)
under the same heading. Although there was an unexplained shift of chief
editors between Nos. 17 and 18 (A. G. Yegorov moved up to the chief post,
while V. P. Stepanov again became just a staff editor), these articles in
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Nos. 18 of 1965 and 1 of 1966 follow the same general line of the No.
17 editorial described above. The unsigned lead in 18 is devoted en-
tirely to "the Party's Economic Policy and the Economic Plan for
1966." It assigns "first-place iaortance" in the building of "social-
ism, Communism" (sic to-the working out of a "scientifically based
economic policy, effective means and methods of managerial leadership
which would correspond to the character and level of productive forces
and the peculiarities of production relationships at every stage of
their development." The other (signed) articles in No. 18 are concerned
with Soviet nationality relationships; central planning and local initia-
tive; principles of party democracy; and the factory collective, party
organization, and director. That on party democracy, by F. Petrenko,
seems to be an earnest endeavor to encourage all individual party members
to play an active role in the nomination and election of officers, parti-
cularly at the local level.
The unsigned lead in No. 1, "The Force of Example," declares that
"Today, (for the individual Communist) to be an example means:
-- Raise the effectiveness of the production of society, increase
the output of production....
-- By all means develop technology, create new types of machines
and equipment....
-- Strengthen and develop managerial accountability....
-- Manage economically...."
The other two (signed) articles in No. 1 are "On the economic bases of
the alliance of the working class and collective farmers"; and "Under
the Sign of High Responsibility." There are four short signed items
under the heading "Affairs and Plans of the Party Organizations."
(CPSU.)
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
.HE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1966.
excerpts From Castro Text on Communist prim
SpecI I to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 6-yo
lowing are excerpts from' a
their home addresses.
On occasion Chinese rep-
resentatives tried to make
direct contact with Cuban
officers and went . so far
sometimes as to approach of-
ficers in an apparent effort
to influence them personally,
ther socking to proselytize
o sometimes to obtain in-
f rmation.
A type of massive distribu-
t on of propaganda, similar to
le one mentioned in this re-
p rt, was carried out among
r Any civil functionaries of the
s ate, although to a less in-
t nse degree. This was a really
s nselessthing that no sover-
e n state, no government
t at respects itself, will ever
t erate, a flagrant violation
o the norms of the most ele-
n ntal respect that should
c, ist between Socialist and
e en non-Socialist countries.
O r revolutionary state could
n (t allow such an attempt to
in luence military and admin-
is rative cadres by acts that
After extensively express-
ing those points, we expressed
our protest against the slan-
der campaign against the
Cuban revolution that was
being carried out In some
parts of the world by ele-
ments closely linked to the
Chinese Government, which,
from our point of view, made
more serious the Chinese rep-
resentatives' lack of com-
pliance with the.rcquirements
made regarding; the massive
distribution of propaganda
dealing with typically politi-
cal matters.
Despite that warning, made
in the most precise and con-
clusive manners, the Chinese
Government and its represen-
tatives, with the insolence of
the omnipotent and complete
scorn for our country, sent
more than 800 bags contain.
ing .bulletins with political
propaganda material for dis-
tribution In Cuba.
The total of these bulletins
delivered to Cuba from
very clearly when our trade
delegation arrived in China to
discuss trade for 1966. It gave
,of Cuba published iii the Cuba
press today:
will not be made of underes-
timating, of failing to realize
the idiosyncrasy of our peo-
ple; because heaps of mis-
takes of this kind have been
committed by Yankee impe-
rialism, one of whose charac-
teristics is contempt for
others, contempt for and un-
derestimation of small peo-
ples.
This imperialism has com-
mitted great, huge mistakes
in underestimating our revo-
lutionary people; it would be
deplorable if others should
commit similar mistakes. Our
sincere policy has been and is
to unite because we are not
and never shall be satellites
of anyone.
The imperialist enemy can-
not be fought effectively in
any part of the world with
the revolutionists divided, with
the revolutionaries insulting
one another, with the revolu-
tionaries attacking one an-..
other. There must be unity
and cohesion in the revolu:,
tionary ranks,
Despite this absolutely clear
position, the unmistakable ex-
pression of the will of our
people and of the policy we
propose to follow, the Chi-
nese Government has in-
creased the shipment and
mass distribution of propa-
ganda material to our coun-
try, both directly from China
and through its diplomatic
representatives.
On Sept. 12 the Ministry
of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces reported that a mass
distribution of this material
was being systematically con-
ducted by representatives of
the Chinese Government
among the officers of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Cuba. This propaganda
..was being sent to the general
staffs of the armies, to the
staffs of the army corps, to
division. staffs, to the staffs
of the various arms admin-
istrations, to the heads of
political sections, and in
many cases directly to offi-,
c stitute a betrayal of the
t st, friendship and brother-
h d with which our country
re cives the representatives of
all socialist state.
his was the reason that
a Sept. 14 we expressed our
pr test in the most energetic
to ins to the Chinese charge
d' ffaires - the ambassador
w s absent-and our demand
tlh t such activities cease.
We very clearly told the
re resentative of the Chinese
G ernment that those me-
th ds and procedures were
ex ctly the same as the ones
us (d by the United States
E bassy In our country when
it ttempted to meddle in the
in rnal affairs of Cuba and
im ose its will on the nation
in one way or another, that
out country had liber,ted it-
sel from that imperialism 90
mi es from our shores and it
w not willing to permit
an her powerful state to
co o 20,000 kilometers to im-
po similar practices on its;
th we considered the ac-
tin s of the representatives
be in frank violation of the
so reignty of our country
an harmful to the preroga-
tiv s that pertain exclusively
to our Government within
our borders; and that no mat-
ter what the cost, our Gov-
its answer in the farm of a
brutal economic reprisal for
purely political reasons,
How could the Chinese Gov-
ernment expect that the Cu-
ban Government would hum-
bly go higher up to beg, to
implore, that they glev us a
credit, that they accept the
800,000 tons of sugar, that
they restore the 115,000 tons
of rice, that they allow its a
trade imbalance as in previ-
oils years, when from the first
moment we understood the
obvious extortionist position
taken by China in the trade
negotiations?
This exception on the part
of the Chinese Government 1
can be explained only as a
display of absolute contempt
toward our country; of total
ignorance of the character
and sense of dignity of our
people. It was not simply a
matter of more or less tons
of rice, or more or less square
sonal warning from the Pres- meters of cloth, which were
Ident of the Republic and the also involved, but of a much
Premier of the l evolutionary more important and funda-
Government is 58.041. Also, mental question for the poo-
since that date tens of thou- pies: whether in the world of
ands of other bulletins and tomorrow the powerful na-
material of a political nature,
printed or accumulated by the
Chinese representatives in
Cuba, have been distributed.
This has happened despite
the fact that the Chinese
charge daffaires informed us
on Sept. 4 that he would in-
form the governmeit of his
country and it would answer
the objections raised. Not the
slightest explanation from the
Chinese Government has ar-
rived. It has continued to con-
duct Its activities and it gave
its answer.verv obviously and
blackmail, extort, pressure,
attach, and strangle small
peoples; whether in the world
of tomorrow, which the revo-
lutionaries are struggling to
establish, there are to con-
tinue to prevail the worst
methods of piracy, oppres-
sion, and fllibusterism that
have been established in the
world since a class society
slavery, feudal regimes, ab-
solute monarchs, the bour-
geois states, and, in'the con-
temporary world, the impe-
rialist states.
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CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TRADE WITH CUBA
I. Castro Explains the CPR's decision to Decrease Trade
[Excerpts from Prime Minister Fidel Castro's speech 2 January 1966
for the 7th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution and on the eve of
the opening of the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana]
"... there is a product with which there will be difficulties, because
of reasons beyond our control, this year. That product is rice. I am
going to explain the reasons for which we will have less rice, basing
my conclusions on a report from our Foreign Trade Ministry in relation
to the trade exchange with the People's Republic of China. It reads:
Our commercial policy with China was oriented for 1966 toward continuing
to increase the volume of exchange, thus following the trend of the last
few years. The planned exports for 1966 amounted to 110 million pesos
and the imports amounted to 140 million. These amounts, compared to
prior years, provided for bigger deliveries of sugar on our part and
bigger deliveries of rice on their part. During mid-November our dele-
gation arrived in Peking to discuss the commercial protocol for 1966
which is to be signed in Havana. The delegation was headed by the di-
rector of our ministry, Comrade Ismael Bello. After several interviews
with the Chinese officials, the following was officially proposed:
Sugar. The Chinese will not be able to accept the 800,000 tons of sugar
which had been offered, for the following reasons: a) This year China
had a big harvest; b) In 1961 the USSR made them a loan of 500,000 tons
of sugar, payable in the same product. This year the USSR sugar loan
was payed by using part of the sugar which was bought from Cuba; and
c) The Chinese people do not at present require coupons for purchases
of sugar because stocks are sufficient to meet the demand.
The quantities of rice supplied to Cuba in 1965 constituted an exception,
due to the request made to the Chinese Ambassador by Prime Minister Fidel
Castro. For 1966, even though they (the Chinese authorities -- ed.) have
had a good crop, they see no possibility of greater quantities than in
1964, which amounted to 135,000 metric tons, for the following reasons:
a) A need to build up a reserve in case of an attack by the Yankee im-
perialists, b) The aid they must provide to Vietnam, and c) Deficits in
the yield of other grains, which necessitate imports from the capitalist
area. As a result, certain quantities of rice have to be used to obtain
foreign currency for that purpose.
Our ministry's report goes on saying that China had granted us two state
credits, one in 1960 amounting to 60 million, for complete plants, another
in 1963 amounting to 40 million, because of trade imbalances. Of the 60-
million-credit, 30 million has been used already in various contracts on
plants, and 20 million to cover the remainder of the unfavorable balance
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in 1965. The 40-million-credit, of a commercial nature, has already
been completely used up.
When our delegation brought up the question of using the remaining 10
million of the 1960 credit for partial financing of the unfavorable
balance that would occur in 1966, according to our standard of exports
and imports, the Chinese delegation replied as follows: Utilization of
the credit, as an economic matter, was not within its. competence and
must be taken up at government level, but, as for products and quantities
they could furnish us, their offers were the (maximum) and hence final.
They said that in this way the volume of trade would attain more or less
the 1964 level, since it would be a balanced trade.
Trade implications of these proposals. The foreign trade report says:
Although the Chinese speak of bringing our trade to the 1964 level, by
not allowing an imbalance as in previous years, what is in truth brought
to the 1964 level are our exports, but the value of our imports will fall
to a level below that of any year of trade from 1961 to 1965--since 1961,
when our trade was established. As.is customary between socialist coun-
tries, by means of annual commercial protocols, the value of our exports,
600,000 metric tons of sugar at six (?centavos) a pound and quantities of
nickel and copper similar to preceding years, will come to some 85 million
in 1966. The Chinese are adjusting their offers to that sum; this cor-
responds to their position on balanced trade.
Comparing our purchasing capacity of 85 million with the value of present
needs of 140 million, the Chinese proposal means decreases in that market
of something around 55 million. This means the reduction of 150,000 metric
tons of rice with a value of 22 million pesos at 145 pesos to the metric
ton. To understand this well, I must refer to a precedent which took place
at the end of 1964 on the occasion of a trade proposition made personally
by me to the diplomatic representatives of the Chinese People's Republic
in our country.
.... I thought it would be mutually beneficial to effect a greater ex-
change of sugar for rice. As a result of this I made them the proposition,
which in my opinion was highly beneficial to that country and also to ours,
that we were prepared to deliver two tons of sugar for every ton or rice
they sent us from China.
I made that proposal considering a number of circumstances, as I said
before, among them the principle of international division of labor. The
fact that we are a country which by tradition has raised sugarcane and
produced sugar, and that we are capable of achieving a very high yield of
sugar per hectare from sugarcane and considering the fact that such is not
the case with rice because we do not have the same experience with it nor
the large quantities of water, great rivers and large areas for the optimum
cultivation of rice, nor do we know the best techniques, nor do we have the
best varieties of seed as we have in sugarcane, that is why we made that
proposal.
2 (Trade Cont.)
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I must say that on this occasion the reply was more than we expected.
They accepted the proposal, they even proposed that the exchange not be
made in the manner in which we said. They would continue to pay us the
same price for sugar and we would continue to pay the same price for
rice. It was on that occasion, sincerely, when I proposed this, and
based precisely on the principle of mutual benefit, it was not my idea:
that it was for one year. I sincerely believed that this was a proposal
for the future at long range. That is why I saw nothing naive, although
it has turned out to be in a certain manner naive, in proposing that we
follow that line.
However, by what is seen, the other party did not understand it thus and
understood that this was some exception and was for one year. As a re-
sult, we have already at the end of 1965 been faced with the reality
that we will have practically one-half of the rice we received last year.
We have no resources to buy this rice in other markets because this would
be to the great detriment of other vital parts of the economy. It could
effect medical items, textiles, and raw materials essential for industry
because we are not in 1963 or 1964 when prices of sugar in other markets
reached the level of 10 centavos. This means that we do not have the
resources.
However,... we are not telling the Chinese to change. We accept the
reasons of economic order they have given us and of strategic order they
have given us. We could never object to that....
To be self-sufficient in rice, we would have to completely revise our
agricultural plans for the coming years, the sugar plan for 10 million
tons, our cattle-raisir}g plans, our fruit production plans, and our
vegetable production plans. We would have to allocate to it some 10,000
more irrigated caballerias and to invest in it the little amount of water
we have for other crops of greater economic and nutritional value, as well
as the machinery, the human resources and the economic resources in gen-
eral. Therefore, in the long run, it would be harmful to our economy.
Doubtless, it would not be good for our country to stop producing 1.5 mil-
lion tons of sugar, which is what 10,000 irrigated caballerias of sugar-
cane could produce and which would increase the purchasing power of our
country by more than 150 million pesos, to produce on that same land and
with the same effort rice that would be worth 25 million pesos.
Therefore, the other alternative, or the other alternatives are: the
reduction of our consumption of rice....
3 (Trade Cont.)
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II. CPR Ministry of Foreign Trade Answers Castro's Charges
[Excerpts from NCNA 9 January 1966 interview on trade between
China and Cuba, People's Daily]
On 2 January Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro spoke at great length on
the question of trade between China and Cuba at the mass meeting in
Havana celebrating the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Cuba.
To clarify the facts, our correspondent obtained-a special interview
with a responsible official of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade on the
question concerned. The full text of the questions and answers is as
follows:
Question: In his speech at the mass meeting on 2 January Prime Minister
Fidel Castro said that the 1966 volume of trade between China and Cuba
would fall below that of 1965 and that China's export to Cuba would fall
to "a level below that of any of the trade years between 1961 and 1965."
Would you please give an account of the negotiations between China and
Cuba for trade in 1966?
Answer: The delegation of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade led by
Comrade Ismael Bello, director of the ministry's Department of Trade with
Asian Socialist Countries, arrived in Peking on 10 November 1965 for pre-
liminary discussions on trade in 1966 between the two countries with its
counterpart delegation from China's Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the
discussions are still going on.
According to reports from the delegation of our ministry, the volume of
trade for 1966 between China and Cuba now tentatively agreed upon by the
two delegations is lower than that of 1965. But it is still higher than
that of 1962 or 1963 and is roughly the same as that of 1964. Prime
Minister Castro said that China's export to Cuba would fall to a "level
below that of any of the trade years between 1961 and 1965." This is at
variance with the fact....
.... In the current discussions, the Cuban side asked us to supply it
with 285,400 tons of rice in 1966, which was double the annual amount
we used to supply to Cuba in the past few years, namely, between 120,000
and 135,000 tons. Although our grain harvest in 1965 is relatively good,
it is still not enough to meet our country's needs in various fields, in-
cluding those in aid to other countries. While frankly explaining our
difficulties in the negotiations with the delegation of the Cuban Ministry
of Foreign Trade, our side has made very great efforts and proposed to
supply Cuba with 135,000 tons of rice in 1966 in thus maintaining the
level of 1964. The Cuban comrades are fully aware of these facts.
Question: Prime Minister Castro said that he had suggested to exchange
two tons of Cuban sugar for one ton of Chinese rice and had thought that
the exchange was to be a "long-term" one. Could you give an account of
this matter?
4 (Trade Cont.)
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Answer: On 1 October 1964 Prime Minister Castro made a suggestion to
our ambassador to Cuba, Comrade Wang Yu-ping, saying that Cuba hoped to
exchange 370,000 tons of sugar for 250,000 tons of rice from China each
year. And the rate of exchange proposed by him was one and a half tons
of sugar for one ton of rice and not two tons of Cuban sugar for one ton
of Chinese rice as stated by Prime Minister Castro in his speech on 2
January. At the time, the Chinese Government carefully considered Prime
Minister Castro's suggestion and agreed to supply Cuba with 250,000 tons
of rice within the one year of 1965, but did not promise to supply the
same amount each year or accept his proposed rate of exchange between
sugar and rice. The value of the 250,000 tons of rice supplied by China
in 1965 was calculated according to the actual contract price, while the
price of sugar remained the same as that agreed upon by the two sides in
the contract. Hence, one ton of Cuba sugar was exchanged for 1.12 tons
of Chinese rice.
No long-term agreement for the annual supply of 250,000 tons of rice by
China to Cuba has ever been signed between the Chinese and Cuban govern-
ments. And no request for long-term annual supply of 250,000 tons of
rice by China to Cuba was made by the Cuban ministries of foreign affairs
and foreign trade during their contacts with the Chinese Embassy in Cuba
after the Chinese side replied to Prime Minister Castro's suggestion.
Nor was the matter raised in December 1964 when the Cuban Government
trade delegation headed by Comrade Raul Maldonado, vice minister of for-
eign trade of Cuba, came to Peking to discuss and sign with our govern-
ment the long-term trade agreement of 1965-1970,and the 1965 trade proto-
col between the two governments. Obviously, Prime Minister Castro's idea
that China was going to supply Cuba with 250,000 tons of rice yearly on a
long-term! basis was groundless.
Question: In his speech Prime Minister Castro also referred to the ques-
tion of China's loan for economic cooperation and trade loan to Cuba. He
said that when the Cuban side suggested to use the economic cooperation
loan to make up for its deficit in trade with China in the trade negotia-
tions for 1966 between the two countries, "the Chinese side replied that
the use of the economic loan was not within their power to decide, and
should be brought up at the governmental level." What were the facts?
Answer: On 30 November 1960 the Chinese and Cuban governments signed
the agreement on economic cooperation for 1960-1965, under which the
Chinese Government granted the Government of the Cuban Republic a loan
of 240 million old rubles--60 million U.S. dollars--free of interest and
without any strings or privileges attached to it. As stipulated in the
agreement, the loan was to be provided in the form of complete sets of
equipment and technological assistance to help with Cuba's economic con-
struction. It was quite different from the trade loan. If the Cuban
5 (Trade Cont.)
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side wanted to use their loan for other purposes, the matter should be
discussed and settled between the governments. In 1965, for example,
after consultations between the Chinese and Cuban governments part of
the economic cooperation loan -- to the value of 15 million U.S. dollars
-- was used to make up for Cuba's deficit in its trade with China in the
year.
During the preliminary trade negotiations for 1966, the Cuban side pro-
posed to use part of the remaining sum of the economic cooperation loan
to make up for the deficit in its 1966 trade with China. The proposal
could be discussed, but as it concerned the implementation of the agree-
ment on economic cooperation between the two countries, and as, accord-
ing to the division of labor among our governmental departments, it fell
within the competence of the Commission for Economic Relations with For-
eign Countries, our delegation expressed the hope that the Cuban authori-
ties concerned would consult the Chinese Commission for Economic Relations
with Foreign Countries. This was a very reasonable reply. However, up
to now Cuba has not contacted our Commission for Economic Relations with
Foreign Countries on this matter. Yet Prime Minister Castro raised this
matter in his speech as if China had refused to discuss the proposal.
This is at variance with the fact.
Question: What do you think of Prime Minister Castro's remarks in which
he made public contents of the preliminary trade negotiations for _966
between China and Cuba?
Answer: According to the usual practice of trade negotiations between
China and Cuba, preliminary discussions on trade between the two countries
for 1966 are first held in Peking, and then the Chinese Government will
send a delegation to Havana for the formal signing of the annual protocol.
At the moment, the delegation of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade is
still in Peking, the preliminary trade negotiations between the two sides
are going on, and the annual protocol has not yet been finally signed.
If the Cuban Government has different ideas or demands, it can very well
raise them for discussion with the Chinese Government. But instead of
doing so, Prime Minister Castro has taken a step which is extraordinary
in normal state relations.
At the Havana mass meeting celebrating the seventh anniversary of the
liberation of Cuba, he unilaterally and untruthfully made public contents
of the preliminary trade negotiations now going on between the govern-
mental departments concerned of the two countries. We cannot but feel
regret at this.
Each year there have been trade negotiations between China and Cuba, and
each year differing views of one kind or another have cropped up in the
course of the negotiations. But in the past Prime Minister Castro never
acted as he had done now. Why then has he suddenly taken such an extra-
ordinary step on the eve of the Three Continents Peoples Solidarity Con-
ference in Havana? This offers food for thought.
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III. Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry Replies to CPR
[Excerpts from text in Granma, organ of the Central Commmittee of
the Communist party of Cuba 12 January 1966 -- also over Prensa
Latina in Spanish.]
The Chinese News Agency NCNA, in a bulletin dated 10 January published
some statements made to a correspondent by a "responsible official of
the Foreign Trade Ministry" of that country in which, speaking of the
statements of our Premier in his 2 January speech concerning the 1966
trade negotiations between Cuba and China, certain statements are made
to which we consider it necessary to respond with complete exactness,
and clarity so there can be no room for the slightest doubt about the
strict truth of the statement of our Premier. .
The official of the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry says that "the volume
of trade for 1966 between China and Cuba will be below that of 1965 but,
nevertheless, greater than that of 1962 and 1963, but more or less the
same as 1964. That official adds that "the statement by Premier Fidel
Castro that the value of Chinese exports to Cuba would fall to a level
below any of the years of exchange between 1961 and 1965 does not con-
form to the facts."
-- Cuba to China, 72.7; China to Cuba, 90.8;
total
trade,
163.5
million
pesos; 1964 -- Cuba to China, 81.4; China to
Cuba,
109.3;
total
trade,
190.7; 1965 -- Cuba to China, 97.3; China to
Cuba,
128.9;
total
trade
volume, 226.2 million pesos; 1966 -- Cuba to
85.0; total trade, 170 million pesos.
China,
85.0;
China
to Cuba,
According to General Juceplan headquarters and the statistics department
of the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry, trade exchange between both countries
has been as follows: 1961 -- Cuban exports to China 91.6; Chinese exports
to Cuba, 98.6 million pesos; total trade, 190.2; 1962 -- Cuba to China,
89.0; China to Cuba, 89.8 million pesos; total trade volume, 178.8; 1963
The statistical figures for 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964 were arrived at on
the basis of the goods received in or shipped from the country....
The figures for 1965, the statistics for which have not yet been com-
pleted, including 250,000 tons of rice and 700,000 tons of sugar; the
figures for 1966 represent approximately the value of the goods that
could be included in the protocol in accordance with the restrictions
established by the Chinese party.
The premier did not speak of the volume of the trade between the two coun-
tries, but of the value of our imports from China, that is, the total
value of the goods that Cuba will receive from that country, which is
what matters with regard to the needs of our population. The figures in
the above statistical outline demonstrate, however, that with regard to
the volume of trade, which is the sum total of what the country exports
to another country plus what it imports from that same country each year,
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only 1963 would be below 1966 with regard to imports from Cuba, which
was what was stated by our Premier -- that its value would be below any
year since 1961.
In effect, imports from China under the 1966 protocol will reach, ac-
cording to what will be able to be purchased in that country in view of
the limitations imposed on our sugar exports and in view of the quantity
of goods offered Cuba and the implantation of a policy of balanced trade,
85 million pesos -- that is, 13.6 million pesos below 1961, when they
were 98.6 million; 4.8 million less than in 1962, when they were 89.9
million; 5.8 million less than in 1963, when they were 90.8 million;
24.3 million less than in 1964, when they were 109.3 million; and 43.9
million less than in 1965, when it reached 12.9 million.
Therefore, what Premier Comrade Fidel Castro said in his speech of 2
January is strictly true-- that "the value of our imports from China will
fall to a level below that of any of the trade years between 1961 and
1965." The revolutionary government; never makes statements that do not
stick strictly to the facts, and I would never hesitate to correct any
error into which it might fall.
In October 1964, preliminary talks were initiated in Havana to be followed
in Peking later by those dealing with the trade protocol for 1965. The
Chinese Party had already agreed to send us that year 150,000 tons os rice,
which constituted a slight increase over the figure of 1964, 135,000 tons.
Therefore, Cuba would receive in 1965 150,000 tons of rice which, at a
fluctuating price between 145 and 150 pesos per ton depending on the varie-
ty of the rice, would be exchanged for an equivalent of 165,000 tons (of
sugar--ed), approximately, according to the stipulated price of 6.11
centavos per pound.
It was on that occasion that the Premier of the Cuban Revolutionary Gov-
ernment proposed increasing the trade of rice for sugar. Exchanging
annually -- as the Chinese foreign trade official admitted according to
the NCNA text -- 370,000 tons of sugar for 250,000 tons of rice, that is,
instead of 150,000 tons, China would deliver 250,000 tons of rice, and,
instead of 165,000 tons of sugar, Cuba would deliver 370,000 tons. Ar-
ithmetically speaking, Cuba would deliver approximately 205,000 more tons
of sugar, and, if the arithmatic is not mistaken, this represents a ratio
of almost exactly two for one. Therefore, the statement by the premier
that the Cuban proposal involved an increase of the exchange of sugar for
rice, at the rate of two tons of sugar for each ton of rice is strictly
correct.
In another part of his statement; the Chinese official note that "Premier
Fidel Castro had no grounds to believe that China was going to supply
250,000 tons of rice annually on a long-term basis." The reverse of this
is much more logical.
8 (Trade Cont.)
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When the Chinese Government agreed to the delivery of the 250,000 tons
of rice requested and when it made a reply with regard to the price
that was even more favorable than the one proposed by the Cuban party,
in what appeared to be a gesture of special consideration for our eco-
nomic needs, absolutely no one had the slightest reason to suppose that
the Chinese Government was contemplating the possibility of reducing
drastically and without the slightest warning the level of exchange in
the following year. Otherwise, the Chinese reply to the Cuban proposal,
which was made -- as the Chinese foreign trade official admits -- for
the purpose of increasing the exchange annually, would have been mean-
ingless. It was that confidence, which, if you like, was ingenuous but
explainable, that led to believe that we could count similar quantities
in years to come.
The Chinese statements admit the fact that when the Cuban party proposed
the use of the economic cooperation loan, in 1960, to partially cover
the deficit that would be created in the exchange with China in 1966,
the Chinese side replied that this should be proposed on the government
level - to the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. But what was
not mentioned is the fact that at the same time as making that gesture
the Chinese delegation clearly said that its offers were maximum and
final regarding the products and quantities they could deliver to us.
Moreover, the Chinese delegation noted that trade for 1965 must be bal-
anced, limiting the purchases of Cuban products to some 185 million pesos
and, therefore, limiting the sales of the rice products to the same value.
Given this background, it is not understood how the Chinese side can ex-
press surprise that "up to the present time Cuba has not established any
contact with our Committee on Foreign Economic Relations with regard to
this.problem."
Why request a credit if the Chinese offers are maximum? Moreover, why
seek a credit if we were clearly and conclusively informed that the trade
had to be balanced? It is true that Cuban foreign trade officials remain
in that country, but since the Chinese side conclusively established the
conditions and the volume of the trade it was prepared to accept, the work
of those officials has been reduced to the routine of contracting for the
product offered.
It is not unusual for the Cuban Revolutionary Government to explain to
the people the consequences that would result from the brisk reduction
of more than 40 million pesos in the import from the CPR as compared to
the previous year, which under the present circumstances constitutes a
hard and unexpected blow to our economy and a problem, without immediate
solution, concerning the supplies of a product which is a traditional
party of our people's diet and distribution of which had to be reduced
to three pounds per capita per month as of January of this year.
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... The event forced the Cuban Revolutionary Government to make this
public explanation ... not only on the eve of the first Tricontinental
Solidarity Conference, but at the time when Yankee imperialism has
tightened the economic blockade against Cuba, the sugar prices on the
world market have declined to the lowest levels in the past 20 years,
and the country has suffered the worst drought since 1900.
(Signed--ed) The Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry.
10 (Trade)
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25X1C10b
14 February 1966
Mexican President Visits Central America
Despite its geographic proximity, its shared Mayan and Spanish
heritage, its cultural kinship, and its extensive economic ties, it is
a startling fact that no President of Mexico has ever officially vis-
ited its neighboring countries in Central America. None, that is,
until President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz' trip this year. From 10 to 22
January, Diaz Ordaz toured the capitals of all the Central American
republics: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Panama.
Diaz Ordaz' trip was undoubtedly inspired by mixed motives, in-
cluding a clear commercial interest in expanding Mexico's contacts
with the remarkably successful Central American Common Market (CACAO.
Of even greater importance, however, was his desire to develop a new
Good Neighbor policy consonant with Mexico's rapidly developing
political and economic stature. No Latin American nation has made as
much economic progress in the past 15 years as has Mexico. Its gross
national product has grown by 90.75% during that period, as compared
with 95.4% for the European Common Market, 57.6% for the U.S.A., 60.7%
for Brazil and 9.1% for Argentina.
Because of Mexico's explosive population expansion, its growth in
per capita gross national product has lagged behind that of the Euro-
pean Common Market, though keeping up with the U.S.A. Based on the
1950 level, the changes are as follows: European Common Market coun-
tries, 59.3%; U.S.A., 25.2%; Mexico 24.0%; Brazil, 20.6%; and Argentina,
-4.7%.
Mexico's prosperity has resulted in an aggressive interest in ex-
panding its foreign commerce. Its trade with the countries of the Latin
American Free Trade Association grew by 547% from 1960 to 1965; trade
with the Central American Common Market grew 62% during this same period.
And Mexican businessmen have been moving into the Central American coun-
tries with an aggressiveness formerly attributed only to the "Yanquis.
Indeed the North American magazines Time and Newsweek chortled over the
fact that in Central America Mexico is now being called the "Colossus
of the North" and the "New Octopus,'' a mirth caused by decades
of use of the same sobriquet by the Mexicans against the United States.
Newsweek also pointed out the pertinent comparison that ''Mexico stands
in almost precisely the same relationship to the six small countries of
Central America as the U.a.A. does to Mexico.'' Both in population and
in size -- about 41,000,000 people to 14,000,000 and 762,000 square
miles to 208,000 .. Mexico overshadows Central America.
(Cont.)
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Although Mexico's trade with the CACM has grown r.apidlSr -- 62%
since 1960 -- it has been one-sided. Mexico has little interest in
buying the coffee, bananas, sugar and cotton which are the CACM's chief
exports. As a consequence, Mexico last year sold $12 million of goods
in Central America, but bought only $500,000 worth there.
Thus it was partly to offset the Central American impression that
this is economic exploitation, that Diaz Ordaz set out on his tour.
The reception at his first stop, Guatemala, was perhaps best described
as reserved, which was not surprising in view of the turbulent history
of Mexican-Guatemalan relations. However, Diaz Ordaz' personal charm,
warm personality and carefully worded public statements did much to
dispel suspicions that his intentions were anything other than to lay
the groundwork for closer and more friendly future relations between
the two countries.
The popular reception accorded Mexico's president in subsequent
stops left little to be desired. In El Salvador he was almost mobbed
by a cheering crowd of some 100,000 Salvadorans. The exuberant people
of the Honduran capital, Tegucigalpa, gave him an emotional and gener-
ous welcome, and the press played up the visit to the exclusion of
practically everything else. Similar receptions in Managua, San Jose,
and Panama City all attested to the success of the tour.
The cultural, economic, and technical assistance agreements which
were concluded in the various capitals showed a definite pattern. Cul-
tural agreements revolved largely around the development of the nations'
common Mayan heritage: restoration of Mayan sites, creation of an
Institute of Pre-Colombian studies, and. establishment of libraries in
Costa Rica and Mexico. Also covered were such matters as: reciprocal
recognition of scholastic diplomas, course content, academic grades;
development of tourism in the area; and exchanges of students, pro-
fessors and professional people.
The economic and technical assistance agreements included a $5
million credit granted to Honduras and a Mexican subscription to $10
million worth of bonds in the Central American Common Market bank --
the first direct foreign loans ever granted by Mexico. Other agree-
ments included: various provisions for improving the trade balance
between Mexico and the various CACM countries; Mexican purchase of
Panama's 1965 rice surplus; improvement of roads and telephone connec-
tions between Mexico and Guatemala; barter of Mexican grain for Costa
Rican butter; offers to train CACM investment technicians-, etc. Mexi-
co's concessions in the economic agreements were manifestly generous
and several government ministers subsequently voiced their pleasure
over the terms and over the absence of demands for reciprocal conces-
sions.
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The one sour note which emerged from the tour was the reaction of
President Diaz Ordaz to persistent and pointed questioning by the press
of Mexico's policy vis a vis Cuba. Apparently Mexico's president had
underestimated the strength of the antagonism of the Central American
countries toward Castro's Cuba. One point which constantly arose in
press conferences was the fact that Central Americans obtain passports
to travel to Mexico, but once there they are able secretly to fly to
Cuba and return without their own government being the wiser. The fre-
quency with which this question arose indicated a great awareness of
the danger of subversion by such travelers who visit Cuba to obtain
training, funds and instructions for the Communist subversion of the
continent. Persistent questioning on this subject caused Diaz Ordaz
to lose his temper several times, which resulted in numerous critical
comments in local newspapers.
While it is not likely that this criticism will in itself change
Mexico's policies toward Cuba, President Diaz Ordaz will have to take
his neighbors' strong views more carefully into account in future
issues involving Cuba.
However, this was a relatively minor aspect of the trip which
should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental importance of Mexico's
initiative. It is of great significance that Mexico has attained a
stage of economic and political maturity which now permits it to begin
to help its neighbors. It is even more significant that Mexico's help
is to be directed toward the development of healthy social and trade
relations in a spirit of cooperation and mutual advancement. Recogniz-
ing Central American fears of possible Mexican ``expansionist" policies,
Diaz Ordaz specifically promised no economic or political interference:
"Mexico does not seek for other nations what it is not disposed to
accept for itself."
The real danger is that the auspicious beginning of a new era in
Central American economic and political relations which was inaugurated
by Diaz Ordaz may founder for lack of follow-through. Essentially the
burden is on Mexico to prove its constancy of purpose since it originated
the various proposals tendered by the Mexican chief of state. Wisely,
the offers of Mexican assistance did not exceed its realistic capabili-
ties. All eyes, therefore, are on Mexico to see whether it will capi-
talize on --- or dissipate -- the goodwill generated by its president's
trip.
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110,
988. LAOS
Stepping Stone
for Chinese Communist Subversion in Southeast Asia
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Since 19+9 the newly independent nation of Laos has
been struggling to unify itself. Laotian domestic ills - economic
under-development, corruption, poverty and governmental problems -
have been additionally complicated by external military and political
pressures from its neighbors -- Communist China and North Vietnam.
The most serious internal deterrent to stability in Laos -- and
thereby to peace for its Southeast Asian neighbors, is the Pathet Lao,
organized by Prince Souphanouvong and the Viet Minh in 1950. The
Pathet Lao, as a creature of the Viet Minh, has been supported by Com-
munist China and North Vietnam. It has been a front for foreign com-
munist subversion and infiltration, has kept the country in turmoil
and seriously jeopardized the independence of Laos. Royal Lao Govern-
ment forces (with some foreign economic assistance) have almost con-
tinually been forced to battle Pathet Lao forces which have been
bolstered not only by foreign communist military and economic assist-
ance but by foreign communist troops.
Communist elements in Laos suffered a setback in 1958 when they
formed a "popular front" for the purpose of taking over the Lao cabinet
following the supplementary elections. This move had two results: it
rallied non-communist groups loyal to the Royal Lao Government to win
the election and a majority in the Lao Cabinet; however, the other
result had sinister significance, for Hanoi and Peking -- ever concerned
with communist expansion in Asia -- immediately began vicious radio cam-
paigns demanding the dissolution of the newly constituted non-communist
Royal Lao Government. It was at this juncture that Ho Chi Minh's mili-
tary men began their incursions into northeastern Laos and began encour-
aging the Pathet Lao to intensify its guerrilla activity.
In view of the attacks from the neighboring North Vietnamese
border and Pathet Lao violence, the Lao Government asked for help from
the United Nations. The presence of the UN fact-finding commission
helped for a while in dampening Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese activity,
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(988 Cont.)
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4 6
The 11-nation Geneva Conference of 1962 guaranteed the independence
and neutrality of Laos but did not succeed in precluding Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese attempts to destroy that independence and neutrality.
And the newly established coalition government of right, left and neu-
tral elements was unable to function properly because of the intransi.-
geance of the Pathet Lao in refusing to cooperate with the other factions
The hopes of the Geneva Conference of 1962 have not materialized.
Today Laos is subject to Pathet Lao violence and subversion and aggres-
sion by North Vietnamese military forces. There would be little or no
Pathet Lao insurgency in Laos without Chinese and North Vietnamese sup-
port and direction. The Pathet Lao has recently changed its name to the
Peoples' Liberation Army -- the name for Communist China's army!
In mid-1965 there were perhaps 10,000 North Vietnamese troops in
Laos not including the North Vietnamese units which travel through Laos
to enter South Vietnam; there are also reports that some North Vietnamese
agents have crossed Laos to infiltrate Thailand's northeast border. The
Pathet Lao forces are supplied with Chinese, Soviet, and North Vietnamese
weapons, ammunition and military-related equipment. There have been 31
North Vietnamese soldiers captured during military engagements in Laos.
The International Control Commission in Laos (,with Indian and
Canadian representation) has been compiling evidence that the Pathet Lao
forces have violated the ceasefire and that North Vietnamese troops and
equipment have entered Laos. Despite the world's preoccupation with the
conflict in Vietnam it is obvious that the situation in Laos also signals
a serious menace to peace among its neighbors as well as a growing menace 25X1C10 b
to the independence and stability of Southeast Asia.
2
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(988 Cont.)
 25X1C1Ob
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 . 03061A00030006OOG -1966
989. THAILAND:
Next Move in the Chinese Communist Blueprint
for World Conquest
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Communist China's plans for Southeast Asia in 1966 do
not stop with Vietnam, In fact, precisely as blueprinted early in 1965
by Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, the nation of Thailand
appears to be the next target on the Chinese Communist agenda for ag-
gression.
It has been almost a year since Chen predicted the possibility of
a guerrilla war in Thailand; it has been more than a year since the
Chinese Communists presided over the setting up of a front organization
in Peking avowedly dedicated to directing subversive activities in the
northeast and southern reaches of Thailand. That organization, the
Thailand Patriotic Front, was modeled after the NLFSV (National Front
for the. Liberation of South Vietnam), the Hanoi-manipulated group that
runs the Viet Cong.
With the first anniversary of Chen's prediction about guerrilla
war in Thailand, an assessment of how successful Mao's men have been
in Thailand is in order -- for what is happening in Thailand reveals the
pattern for Chinese Communist moves throughout Southeast Asia. China's
overweening arrogance has just been illustrated again with the 13 January
1966 announcement that Peking is giving assistance to a new clandestine
organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government of Malaysia
and the dismemberment of Malaysia by Chinese Communist tactics.
Intelligence reports received in 1965 clearly indicated that the
communists have been preparing for a significant increase in terroristic
activities in Thailand in the next few months. The two most troubled
regions in Thailand in the past, and predictably the seats of increasing
violence, are those where foreign communist influence is at work.
The first is in northeast Thailand where a somewhat isolated section
of the population consists of approximately 1+0,000 Vietnamese who took re-
fuge there as a result of French military operations starting in Laos in
191+6. These Vietnamese are 90% pro-Hanoi and are controlled by communist
cadres. It is highly possible that these cadres in the northeast receive
guidance from the North Vietnamese Embassy in Laos.
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(989 Cont.)
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The second serious trouble spot in Thailand is in southern Thailand
in the northern portion of the Malay Peninsula; The southern group has
a hard core of 500 Chinese Communist led by Chin Peng, who with his in-
surrectionist group was driven from northern Malaya into Thailand by the
combined British and Malayan forces in 1948. For the past 17 years, Chin
and his men have lived and battled in classic guerrilla style (see unclas-
sified attachment). They are supported, at least vocally, by Communist
China, and it is believed possible that they actually receive instructions
and remittances from Malaya and/or Communist China.
Thus it is that two communist groups, cooperating with the Thai com-
munists, probably controlled and supported directly or indirectly by
Communist China, are operating within Thailand's borders - in effect com-
prising a pair of Trojan Horses at the opposite reaches of the country
where they provide staging areas for more elaborate incursions into the
center of Thailand and two ever increasing areas of infection - both re-
sponsive to Chinese Communist direction in the subversion of a country in
the very heart of Southeast Asia.
The Chinese Communist timetable for Thailand has obviously been
speeded up. During the past year it has been reported that the Thai Com-
munist Party has switched from defensive to offensive action and there is
evidence that communist cadres have been organizing cells and recruiting
supporters. There has also been a marked increase in the production and
circulation of subversive literature. More dramatic manifestations of the
timetable during the past year: 14 front groups aimed at insurgency in
Thailand have been subsidized by the Chinese; local officials including
teachers have been assassinated or have been the objects of assassination
attempts; in the northeast, terrorists incidents have risen from a total
of seven in 1964 to over 30 in 1965 with 21 occurring in the last half
of the year. Police patrols have been fired upon in!.clashes with subversive
bands, training camps and firing ranges have been discovered and underground
arms caches have been unearthed in increasing numbers. The communists are
reportedly planning to attempt to increase their terroristic activity in the
next few months.
Chronology of increasing Subversion and Violence in Thailand in 1965
and Chinese Communist Involvement [attached]
15 December 1965, New York Times article by Seymour Topping: "As"'aan
Communists Step Up Infiltration in Thailand." [attached]
December 1965 American Universities Field Staff article by Dr.Wilyard
Hanna: "Peninsular Thailand" [attached]
BPG #912, 7 June 1965: Chicoms Choose Thailand as Next Target
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i (989 Copt,:
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CPYRGHT
NE''d YORK TIMES
15 December 1965
CPYRGHT
Asian Communists Step Up Infiltration in Thailand
By SEYMOUR TOPPING
Special to The New York Times
BANGKOK, Thailand, Dec
n uommumsts have ac.
celerated their infiltration o
Thailand, apparently in a di
versionary action to support
their wa.r, effort In Vietnam.
Thai and United States of-
ficial sources report a substan-
tial increase In Communist
guerrilla activity, both in the
northeast provinces near Laos
and in the south on the Malayan
border. The police have seized
training areas and Communist
literature that indicate a con-
certed drive to recruit villagers
for an Insurgency movement:
In the northeast, which is ex-
posed to the influence of the
pro-Communist Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese units oper-
ating in Laos, the number of
political assassinations of vil-
,lage officials and teachers has
risen sharply in the last six
months. Most of the murdered
men were marked as police in-
formers.
that three new battalions of
guerrillas are being trained.
Peasants are recruited for a
period of ilitary schooling and
political I dootrination and then
are sent ack to their villages
For the first time, a link has
been eta lished between Com-
munist activity in the northeast
and that ' the south. The same
Communi t literature has been
found in abandoned camps In
both regi is, and the movement
of liaison gents between guer-
rilla ban has been reported.
Hara, sing Action Seen
The Th i Patriotic Front, a
movement .supported by Pe-
king, is ying to rally broad
popular s pport, charging that
the Gover mcnt is corrupt and
that it is oiling the country to
the Unite States. Its propa-
ganda ap als are broadcast by
Peliing an the clandestine Free
hai fadi.
In the south, the Communists
re recru ting Malayan Mos-
The terror tactics of jungle
bands are similar to those em-
ployed by the Vietcong in South
Vietnam In 1958.
In the south, where a hard
core of 300 Chinese Communists
driven out of Malaya has been
operating for years, the police
recently found base camps and
firing ranges, which suggests
rviaiaya at would embrace
our sou hern provinces of
hailand.
United States officials In
angkok clicve that the Pa-
riotic Fr nt has gone over to
4litant action in advance of its
riginal ti etable. The guerril-
a bands p sumably would have
referred have built a more
before going over to offensive rilla movement would soon be
armed tactics. started against the Bangkok
It is believed that the organ- Government.
ization was persuaded by Pe- Thailand has not been de-
king and Hanoi to move out terred from her alliance with
boldly in a diversionary harass- the .United States. From air-
ing action because of the fields in Thailand, United
broadening conflict in Viet- States fighter bombers are
nam. striking at the so-Called Ho
A communiques issued Nov. 1 Chi Minh trail in L.los, which is
by the Thailand Independence a corridor used by Hanoi to
Movement, calling for action send reinforcements and sup-
against the United States' pres- plies to the Vietcong.
once in Thailand, asserted: Bangkok recently agreed to,
"Support received from inside the construction of a large lo-
and outside the country helps gistical complex that would al.'
increase our confidence that we low United States divisions to
will achieve a great victory." land quickly in Thailand in this
Earlier this year, Peking event of a war emergency. The
warned Thailand . aga]fist mill- complex would make United
tary cooperation with the States forces capable
of a majot'?
it the Com.
d or,.
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 25X1 FM
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Fact Sheet
14 February 196
Details of Communist Non-military Support
and Direction to Pathet Lao 1964-65
Communist interference and potential aggression in Laos has not
been confined to supply of armed forces, arms and military direction
to Pathet Lao forces:
1. Laotian civilians have been impressed into road gangs repair-
ing roads along the Vietnamese border.
2. During the rainy season in mid-1965 Communist soldiers and
civilians built new roads leading from North Vietnam into South
Vietnam.
3. Laotian civilians have been forced to haul supplies for Com-
munist troops.
4. Laotian farmers have had part or all of their rice harvests
stolen or commandeered by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops.
5. Hanoi has sent political cadres and propagandists into Laos
to encourage continued rebellion against the Royal Government of
Laos.
6. Using Laotian trails and roads, hianoi military personnel have
infiltrated into South Vietnam at a rate of about 4,500 per month.
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Fact Sheet
Compilation of Communist Breaches
of the Geneva Accords on Laos
14 February 1966
In the 1962 Accords (the US was NOT a signatory to the 1954
accords) it was agreed that all foreign military personnel and equip-
ment not specifically needed for defense or requested by the Lao Gov-
ernment should be withdrawn from Laos.
Western military advisors and technicians completed their orderly
withdrawal from Laos in advance of the conference-established deadline.
HOWEVER,
1. less than 50 of several thousand North Vietnamese left Laos
through the official checkpoint;
2. some North Vietnamese fighting units were reportedly dispersed
to different locations in Laos and not back to Vietnam;
3. an estimated 6 - 7,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were still
in Pathet Lao-controlled areas three years later;
4. supported by Communist China and North Vietnam, the Pathet
Lao broke the cease-fire agreement in March 1963 and attacked
government defense forces in the Plaine des Jarres in north
central Laos;
5. The International Control Commission (set up under the 1962
Accords and composed of a Pole, a Canadian and an Indian repre-
sentative) documented charges in 1965 that Hanoi had violated the
Geneva Accords by sending military personnel and equipment into
Laos to join with their Pathet Lao comrades in aggression against
the nation's legally constituted government;
6. at least 24,000 North Vietnamese regulars were estimated to
be in Laos in mid-1965;
7. captured North Vietnamese soldiers have admitted entering
Laos between February and September 1964 in units varying in size
from 50 - 650 men each; the captured soldiers also admitted carry-
ing Communist-made weapons and ammunition and of fighting on
Laotian Government defense forces;
8. a cave, located northeast of the Plaine des Jarres, was
captured by Laotion Government Forces on 24 October 1965. The
cave contained 10 tons of ammunition, a number of Soviet-made
machine guns, a radio made in Communist China and 50 North
Vietnamese army uniforms.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300060003-1CPYRGHT
CPYRGH I November 1965
Diary of North Vietnam Soldier
Is a' Story of Suffering in ,' Laos
By Richard. Halloran
wnnhfngton Pont Staff Writer
Nguyen Khanh was a Sol.
dier Class II in the 168th
Mortar Regiment of the
North Vietnamese army un-
til he was captured in a
battle near Paksane, Laos, in
September, 1964.
His diary is part of the
record compiled by the
International Control Com-
mission to document the
presence of North Viet-
namese troops in Laos in
violation of the 1962 Geneva
agreements. The report was
made available by the Cana-
dian Embassy here yester-
d ay.
Nguyen Khanh's notebook,
simply written, tells what it
is like to be a 19-year-old
farm 'kid away from home
and fighting a war' he does
not understand,
Nguyen comes 'from Phu
Tho Province, up the Red
River from Hanoi, where he
dived with his father and
younger sister. His mother
is dead and three other sis-
ters are married.
Nguyen, who has a sev-
enth grade education, was
conscripted on Feb. 29, 1964.,
But, he was only partly
trained before he and 100
soldiers, were sent to Laos.
He told an ICC interrogator
that he'had not been given
an army serial number be-
cause "I was ordered to
move out quickly without
completion of training and
allotment of army number."
The army sent Nguyen
and the others to the Lao-
tian border in. Russian-built
trucks early In July, 1964..
There, they changed into
Pathet Lao uniforms and
climbed into. Pathet Lao
trucks for the bumpy ride to
'Khang Ichay, a Pathet Lao
stronghold. . . .
in Khang lay, the 100 the family. Heart trouble.
on were split into three ' A-- -i u nlrnirlx
groups and sent as units to Aug. 15-A m b u s h the
join Pathet Lao units in whole day, raining continu-
battle. Nguyen's group ously--c o 1 d-everything is
moved toward the village of , damp-mosquitoes are bit-
'Phou Song Noi.
Excerpts ing, very unhappy-sur?
from his note- covered by cloud
book,as he wrote it, tell his roundings waves resembling the ice of
St
ory:
July 7-Spent the night in
forest; Collection of arms at
11 o'clock, as well as gre-
nades and ammunition
the North Pole. Heart very
much disturbed because
thinking too much of the
nice native village.
Raining heavily-very diffi- Late in August, Nguyen
cult to prepare rice-eating moved again and in early
uncooked rice. Continuous September the battle in
rain day and night-highly which he was captured be-
flooded road - everywhere gan to take shape. He wrote:
there is water-traffic diffi. Sept. 9-The whole day it
cult. Plane :.. rained, fighters arrive,
July 11-Departure in the many planes. Enemy has in
morning, through bombed tention to launch attack' on,
place - difficult-toilsome- us. Whole day d i g g i n g
tired ... trenches, hunger, tired,
July 12 - Arrived at the thirst-. Had to swallow salt
river. Rest. Took bath- to forget hunger, thirst.
washing of clothing. Eating Bay (another soldier) has.,
rice with hand-unboiled got ?ome rice, a small ball,:
water and dry fish are the rice cooked for a long time,
main food of the fighting stinking like,, cat's excre-
man in Laos. ment.
July 13 -Twenty days Sept. 2-Very much hun-.
have passed without having gry, legs and hands shaky.,
a little vegetable or soup, Enemy attacks in four di
always eating tinned food rections, no way to with-
and dry fish, draw. Our troops subjected
July 16-Evening surprise to continuous hunger with-
attack-pushing back the - out possibility of sleeping,
enemy, friend without loss sick,,body shaking. Where is
July 18-Return to defen-
sive position. Very tired-
pain in leg-impossible to
m m
t th k' f f ' 1
ea
my fate before this danger,
what will be my destiny. .
Sept. 14-Today 16th day
of the fight on Moung Soul ?
tured by Royal Lao Forces!
about 11 o'clock that night. -
In the back of his note.
book were a few military
training notes and a poem:
"At last, young girl, be
away from me, I am,-still
-
young - girls are not lack-
ing in the world. I am a
fighter, I have a strong
heart'."' -
-
g o ami Y. front. We have already suf.
July 25-A r r i v a I in vil- fered from hunger for five -
lage. Rest, cooking rice. ' days. Nobody can get up,'
Completely tired-the Loa- ' move. The whole - day, we
tian girl is having consider- had to eat and guzzle enemy
ation for Vietnamese troops artillery shells. Encircling
-they are sentimental. from all directions. M o s?
By the first week in Aug-
tist, Nguyen had moved to quitoes bite and drink blood,
a new position. He wrote: Sept. 15-Enemy encir-
cling continues. Friend fell
Aug. 9-In camp, on 'de- back but our plan of with-'
fensive peak B, sitting the drawal discovered by en'
whole day-sad while think- emy. Enemy pursues us at
ing of the native village, of time of withdrawal.
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