BI-WEEKLY ROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 6, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1C10b
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Women and WIDF Peace Formula
"Democracy"
in Action... Reporting of the late
October session of
the Council of the
25X1 C10b Women's International
25X1 C10b Democratic Federation (WIDF)
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
highlights
the increasingly vitriolic polemics
of the Sino-Soviet dispute reflected
in recent international communist
front meetings. WIDF congresses and
conferences demonstrate equally, if
not more than other front meetings,
the violence and intensity of emotion-
charged, divergent views among commu-
nist delegations. This conduct is
particularly ironic for WIDF which is
perhaps the most overtly guileless of
all communist international fronts
with its appeals to "women of the
whole world" for peace, and its claim
of stewardship for the welfare of
mothers and children.
Although the more moderate pro-
Soviet forces prevailed in the final
resolutions of the Council meeting,
the militancy of the Chicom delega-
tion and its followers (DPRK, DRV,
NFLSV, Japan and Albania) seriously
challenged the WIDF leadership of the
Soviet women, even more than at the
WIDF Fifth World Congress in Moscow
in June 1963.
Many observers of the political
scene tend to cross off gatherings
of the WIDF as "Just another women's
meeting"; but the speeches of the
Soviet and Chicom 'hard core' leaders
-- clearly reveal the respective
lines and policies of the world move-
ment and the dissensions which cur-
rently infest it.
BrIefly Noted 0000'
In becoming embroiled in Sino-
Soviet polemics, WIDF leaders offer
assets excellent ammunition to ex-
pose its true nature -- especially
to women's audiences. WIDF sarcasm
and destructive denunciation has
heretofore been reserved for the
"capitalist" world. Their extreme
outbursts in support of Chicom mili-
tancy or Soviet tactical "peaceful
coexistence" may be used to expose
their pretense of speaking for the
peace, security and live-and-let
live hopes of the women of the world.
Liberalization, Czechoslovaks Still
Communist style Harass Intellectuals
X1C
a letter from a Dr. Ivan Svitak, 25X1 C10b
printed by Fg um, an independent,
liberal monthly in Vienna. The let-
ter is self-explanatory.
Until 14.months ago Dr. Svitak,
a man in his early 40's, was a mem-
ber of the Philosophical Institute
of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ences. Since then he has been ex-
pelled from the Institute and from
the Party, his lectures banned, his
personal papers confiscated, and
suitable employment has been closed
to him. Where he is now and whether
or not he has been arrested is un-
known.
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His total transgressions con-
sisted of having critical opinions
on the regime's attitude toward
philosophy and culture, and writing
one letter to a liberal publication,
which, although it was not published,
came to the attention of the regime.
Continuing incidents of this
kind make it clear that despite West-
ern wishfulness as to Czechoslovak
"liberalization" and "relaxation,"
the Prague regime still retains ap-
palling features of repression and
"thought-control."
Independence: British Guiana
under
Communists Not very long ago,
Only when Cheddi Jagan's
People's Progressive
Party (PPP) formed
the Government, he demanded immedi-
ate independence from Great Britain
for British Guiana. But the PPP
does not control the government now,
and Cheddi Jagan is opposing prepar-
ations to make the country fully in-
dependent in 1966.
Jagan's activities over the past
several years present a clear pattern
of Communists tactics with regard to
independence for colonial territories:
they agitate loudest for independence,
and for severing relations with the
mother country, imperialism and colo-
nialism -- when they control a coun-
try; they are in the vanguard of
those who would postpone independence
when the government is not firmly in
the hands of communist-oriented par-
ties.
Jagan's PPP has thrived on the
ethnic split in the population in
the past. East Indians supported him
in opposition to the largely African
supported People's National Congress
and Jagan created ethnic-racial strife
in labor relations to insure this sup-
port. He is using the same techniques
now that his Party is in the minority,
even to the point of intimidating his
own East Indian followers. But East
Indians did not support him in his
call to strike against the sugar
estates in November 1965. His at-
tempts to excite racial antagonisms
while playing down his Communist
sympathies have been so extreme as to
sow discord among his Communist col-
leagues. Nonetheless, his hope is to
ride to power on the racial issue in
a takeover for communism.
Premier Forbes Burnham's accom-
plishment in negotiating for inde-
pendence should be contrasted with
Jagan's abdication of responsibility
in refusing to participate in the
conference. Similarly, Burnham's
success in bringing order to the
Guiana economy and administration
should be placed against the back-
ground of mismanagement left by
Marxist Jagan.
The communist's double policy:
for independence should be noted
wherever possible and especially
among African audiences. In addi-
tion, where appropriate, Marxist
Jagan's anti-Africanism, and his
inciting to racial violence (even
though other Communists in British
Guiana are viewing his extremism
with alarm) should be used to portray
Communists as outright opportunists
and not as protectors of all working-
men, as they pretend.
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IgnIficant Dates 1
20 International Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People, to begin
20 December -- 5th Anniversary, Founding of the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam; sponsor, World Peace Council (international
Communist front organization).
21 Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879. (Dies 5 March 1953.)
26 Mao Tse-tung born. 1893.
27 Netherlands transfers sovereignty to interim Republic of United Provinces
of Indonesia. 1949.
29 15th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, 29 December - 4 January.
I Conference (heads of state), African and Malagasy Common Organization
(OCAM), mid-January, Tananarive, Malagasy Republic.
2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959.
2 7th Anniversary, the Castro regime (note: the Afro-Asian-Latin American
Peoples Solidarity [Tri-Continent] Conference sponsored by the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization [Communist] begins on 3 January; the
timing is not accidental.)
3 Afro-Asian Latin American Conference (Tri-Continent Conference), Havana,
3-10 January, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organiza-
tion (Communist controlled).
6 President Roosevelt states Four Freedoms: of speech and expression, of
worship; from want and from fear. 1941.
17 (Yugoslavia) Plenum of CP Central Committee expels Vice Premier Milovan
Djilas. [See Calendar of Significant Political Events for similar sub-
sequent actions against Djilas. If you do not have a Calendar, you may
request one.]
21 (Tibet) Chinese People's Republic orders government representatives to
Peking to negotiate "peaceful solution Tibet's status." (See Calendar
for subsequent events). 15th anniversary.
30 3rd anniversary, Founding of Organization of African States (OAU) by
20 nations; Lagos, Nigeria, 1962.
I UN General Assembly charges Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. 1951.
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25X1 C
#67 Commentary 10-23 Nov 1965
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese again "declare war" to the finish against the CPSU leader-
ship -- naming Brezhnev and Kosygin. An 11 November joint People's Daily/
Red Flag editorial savagely condemns and rejects the post-Khrushchev Soviet
appeal -- "what unites us is stronger than what divides" -- for unity in
common action against the imperialist aggressors. It declares that "nothing
unites us" and there is only an irreconcilable "class antagonism" between
M-Leninism and K revisionism. It repeats many old Chinese charges and adds
% some new grist, mostly in connection with Vietnam: e.g., revealing an ex-
change of communications earlier this year in which the Soviets proposed a
Soviet-Vietnamese-Chinese summit, the Chinese say the CPSU leaders "have
no other purpose in mind than to deceive the world, to tie the fraternal
countries to the chariot of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination,
to use the Vietnam question as an important counter in bargaining with the
U.S., and to isolate and attack the CCP and all other fraternal parties up-
holding M-L." Peking calls on "all M-L parties to draw a clear line of
demarcation, both politically and organizationally, between themselves and
25X1X6 the revisionists, and again blatantly appeals to the Soviet people to ex-
ercise their "ever stronger dissatisfaction and opposition." Without
specifically identifying them, the article clearly confirms the secret ex-
change of letters described by 25X1X6
- Crankshaw in the London Observer
on 14 November, stating that they were just received "fron an East European
source" (see attached Chrono).
~~.- 2. Peking paved the way for the above blast by publishing in People's Daily
almost 3 pages of texts of "anti-Chinese comments" by Soviet and Soviet-
aligned parties with a harshly denunciatory "editor's note" -- the same ma-
terial which had been scheduled for publication on the 2nd (see #66), with
the addition of a few more texts, including the Polyansky October Revolution
speech. The Chinese continue to fan the flames with a sardonic People's
Daily Commentator article on the 18th pegged to two TASS deletions in re-
porting the Polyansky speech and a tauntingly derisive PD editor's note
prefacing the full text of the 16 November Pravda commentary on the joint
article (see below). And they go back to publicize a long, anti-CPSU, 7
November editorial from Japanese CP organ Akahata.
3. Soviet media react almost a week after the Chinese joint editorial:
Pravda and Izvestiya feature identical commentaries attributed to Pravda's
Peking correspondent -- essentially defensive but sharply critical abandon-
ing the "moratorium" on anti-Chicom polemics, maintained since Khrushchev's
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0*$" (Commentary Cont.)
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ouster]; they reveal the nature and extent of Chinese warfare more than
any other Soviet source in recent times, perhaps since the CPSU open
letter of l4 July 1963.
4. Czech and East German press rally to Soviet support, Neues Deutschland
specifically endorsing a Soviet-Vietnamese-Chinese meeting as urgently
necessary." Moscow correspondent for Belgrade Borba says that the Chinese
attack is believed in Moscow to have been timed for the 23rd CPSU Congress
(29 March 1966) and that "political quarters" in Moscow think that "it is
incomparably more important to make good preparations for the Congress than
to engage in futile polemics with China."
5. Reporting indicates that a WPC Presidium meeting in Sofia was not at-
tended by the Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese members.
Significance:
The new Chinese joint article is a bellicose reaffirmation -- if any
were needed -- of Peking's total rejection of the "soft" approach to prob-
lems of the WCM attempted by the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership, of
their appeal to build a working unity in action of Communists against im-
perialists of the basis of their greater common ties -- "what unites us
is stronger than what divides."
The Chinese demand for all M-Ls to "draw a clear line of demarcation,
both politically and organizationally," is clearly intended to push the
splitting process further, and could even foreshadow a concrete initiative
to form a competing international alignment. The apparent boycott of a
WPC Presidium meeting by the Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese members could
be a harbinger.
We note the Yugoslav report from Moscow, speculating that the new
Chicom attack is "timed for the 23rd 'CPSU Congress": could it be that the
Chinese really entertain hopes that their appeal to the "90% of the Soviet
population" who are "in a position of antagonism" to the new CPSU leader-
ship could contribute to an anti-revisionist, pro-Chinese reversal at that
Congress next March?
The CPSU leaders, in giving their people a more sober and realistic
view of the lines of Chinese attack than allowed since Khrushchev's
ouster, could be paving the way for a strong counter-offensive. However,
we believe it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders, encouraged by their
clear gains vis-a-vis the Chinese during the past year and still preoc-
cupied with domestic woes, will make any radical departures from the 25X1X6
policies and conduct under which these gains were realized. 25X1X6
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 5X1 C1 Ob
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#67
10-?23 November 1965
November 10-11: Peking People's Daily (10th) devotes almost 3 pages to
anti-Chinese statements made by leaders of the CPs and press of the
Soviet Union and some other countries since the divisive meeting in
Moscow last March." An introductory editorial note denounces the new
leadership of the CPSU, "pursuing Khrushchevism without K':
`... While talking about unity,... (they) are engaged in splitting
activity; while talking about the improvement of Soviet-Chinese
relations, they are engaged in anti-Chinese activity; while talk-
ing about a halt to public polemics, they are engaged in spreading
rumors and slanders to malign the CCP and other M-L parties....
(They) have sent their people abroad on secret anti-Chinese mis-
sions in all parts of the world....
... This material further exposes the new leadership of the CPSU
in their true colors as revisionists and splitters."
72 "anti-Chinese statements" are printed, including 13 Soviet, 22
Czech, 11 Hungarian, 8 Bulgarian, 3 East German, 2 Polish, 7 Italian
and 6 French.
Next day, a People's Daily and Red Flag joint 11,000-word editorial
"Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on United Action," harshly
rebuffs the Soviet "what unites us is stronger than what divides" appeal
of the past year. It is divided into 7 (unnumbered) sections as follows:
-- The Unity of the International Proletariat Must Be Based on Principle
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao are cited on the need for genuine, revolu-
tionary unity, which "demands resolute and unequivocal struggle against
all brands of opportunists and splitters." It lists the various measures
taken by the CCP to defend M-L, the unity of the ICM based on M-L" (the
major Chinese polemical statements from 1956 to 1965 are named, -- plus
warnings in "numerous talks and exchanges of letters ... that it [the K
clique] must rein in on the edge of the precipice"). But the new leaders
of the CPSU, although "vociferously advocating 'united action'" and "in-
cessantly spouting such fine words as 'unity,"' are "protagonists of sham
unity and real hostility toward China." This opening section concludes:
"Let us expose their fraudulence by citing their misdeeds both inter-
nationally and at home in the course of the past year."
-- The Khrushchev Revisionists Have Undermined the Common Basis of Unit
The editors reject the CPSU "argument" that all CPs have "a common
ideold" and "a common program." After a brief outline of the old Chinese
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charges of CPSU betrayal of the common ideology and program by emphasis
on peaceful coexistence and "shamelessly emasculating Lenin's theory on
the dictatorship of the proletariat," the article asserts:
'Between the M-Ls and the K revisionjsts there is a difference
of fundamental line, a major difference between what is right and
what is wrong. In the circumstances, how can there be a 'common
ideology' and a 'common program' between the M-Ls and the K re-
visionists? How can there be a cor 'non, basis for unity?... In all
fundamental issues of the present epoch the relation is one of s
0 ositio there are things that divide us and nothing that unites
use, things that are antagonistic and nothing that is common.... ( They
are) striving for Soviet-U.S. collaboratior,!:Ttoo dominate the worlds
and opposing the people's revolutions in various countries....
"The antagonism between M-L and K revisionism is a class
antagonism between the proletariat and the hour jeoisie: it is the
antagonism between the socialist and the capita List roads and be-
tween the line of opposing imperialism and that of surrendering to
it. It is an irreconcilabZe antagonism...."
-- Tinited Action is Impossible with Those Who Transpose Enemies and Friends.
"The new leaders of the CPSU argue that even if there are dif-
ferences of theory and line, these can be put aside and that 'united
action' should be taken and 'unity against the enemy' achieved in
practical struggle against imperialism.... The reactionary nature
of K revisionism is expressed in concentrated form in the line of
Soviet-U.S. collaboration for domination of the world. The K. clique
completely transposed enemies and friends...."
The editors then discuss four "facts" demonstrating their charge:
1. Even though at times they find it necessary to talk about a tendency
toward a 'freeze' in Soviet-U.S. relations, 4' the Soviet leaders "behind
the scenes are step ipng up their secret diplomacy and their deals with
the U.S."
2. The new CPSU leaders have not only accepted the legacy of the partial
nuclear test-ban treaty, but they are "actively plotting new deals with
the U.S." to prevent proliferation and thus maintain the "monopoles of
the two nuclear overlords" against China and all other independent coun-
tries.
3. "... Together with the U.S. imperialists, they are using the United
Nations to attack, weaken, and divide the forces opposing imperialism,
colonialism and neocolonialism...."
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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4, They have carried on their role in the K.ennedy-'Nehru--TC.hrushchev alliance
against China.
~~ ~~-
--. The New Leaders of the CPSU are Pakin United Action with the U.S. on
the question of Vietna .gyn.
The editors again "consider" a series of (unnumbered) `'facts,
eluding:
1. New CPSU leaders "have been busy rennin errands for the U.S. a res-
sors.... When Kosy in ...passed through Pekin on his visit to Vietnam
in February 1965..., he stressed the need to help the U.S. 'find a way out
of Vietnam."
2. "On 16 February this year, the day after Kosygin's return to Moscow,
the Soviet Government officially put before Vietnam and China a proposal
to convene a new internaticnal conference on Indochina without prior con-
ditions.... On 23 February, disregarding the stand which the Vietnamese
Government had taken against this proposal and without waiting for a reply
from China,... (they) discussed the question ... with the President of
France through the Soviet Ambassador to France."
3. "After these plots of 'unconditional negotiations' and of 'stopping
the bombing and holding negotiations' were foiled,... (they) began to col-
laborate with the Indian reactionaries and the Tito clique -- both lackeys
of U.S. imperialism -- as brokers on the question of Vietnam...."
4. "China is helping the Vietnamese people to the best of its ability,"
but "whether in quantity or quality, their [i.e., the Soviet Union's] aid
to Vietnam is far from commensurate with the strength of the Soviet Union.
They have ulterior motives in giving a certain amount of aid -- they are
trying to hoodwink the people at home and abroad, to keep the situation
in Vietnam under control, to gain a say on the Vietnam cuestion, and to
strike a bargain with U.S. imperialism on it."
5. The U.S. imperialists "appreciate the trick''`: far from objecting to
Soviet "aid" to Vietnam, they welcome it. "In fact, the new leaders of
the CPSU have disclosed the details of their so-called "aid" to Vietnam
to the Americans through various channels."
6. "Furthermore, the new CPSU leaders have been using their 'aid' to
Vietnam as a pretext for wantonly vilifying'China, and have been assiduously
spreading the lie that 'China obstructed the transit of Soviet military
equipment for Vietnam.'"
The editors reach the conclusion that the new leaders of the CPSU
have no other purpose in mind than to deceive the world, to tie the fra-
ternal countries to the chariot of Soviet-U,S. collaboration for world
domination, to use the question of Vietnam as an important counter in
their bargaining with the U.S., and to isolate and attack the CCP and all
other fraternal parties which uphold M-L.
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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Old Chinese charges are repeated, sometimes more luridly, such as:
"... (They) have conducted a feverish campaign against the CCP
throughout their , party and among the entire Soviet people.,..
"While continuing the practice of subjectZ otker CPs and
socialist countries to pressure, sabotage, and subversion, the new
lea ers of the CPSU are also employing the more insidious strategema
of trying to woo them, buy them over, deceive them, and sow dissen-
sion among them....
''... They repeat K's despicable stock tricks at the meetings
of these international organizations, rely on behind-the-scenes
manipulation as well as open trout e-making and even resort to such
ludicrous tactics as banging tables and stamping their feet.
"In the name of 'united action,' the revisionist leadership of
the CPSU is vainly trying to recover its position as the 'father
party,'... Actually, however, its former power and prestige are
gone beyond recall....
"Facts have shown that if the Communists of a particular coun-
ty; accept the hodgepodge of revisionism, great-power chauvinism,
and splittism of the CPSU leaders, the country's revolutionary
cause is impaired and undermined, its CP becomes corrupted, goes down-
hill, and degenerates....
In many countries, the M-Ls have broken with the revisionist
cliques and either rebuilt M-L parties and organizations or founded
new ones.... Beyond all doubt, it is perfectly right to (do so)....`'
--"United Action," So-called, Is a Slogan to Deceive the Soviet People
Rebutting the CPSU claim that the socialist countries have "a socio-
economic system of the same type" and share the "common goal of building
socialism and communism," the article brings up old Chinese charges that
14rr "the new CPSU leaders are bringing about the further degeneration of the
Soviet Union toward capitalism in the name of realizing 'Communism.'
It goes on to assert that "they are in a position of antagonism to the
Soviet people, who constitute more than 90% of the Soviet population,
and they are encountering ever stronger dissatisfaction and opposition
on the part of the Soviet people. It adds:
"In our view, when a revisionist clique emerges and a capitalist
comeback occurs in a socialist country, all the M-Ls in the world are
duty-bound to expose and struggle against these things.... Comrade
Mao Tse-tung has often said ... that if China's leadership is usurped
by revisionists in the future, the M-La of all countries should like-
wise resolutely expose and fight them; and help the working class and
the masses of China to combat such revisionism...."
(Chronology Cont.)
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-- Persevere in the Strizle . Against Khrushchev Revisionism
"... The people's revolutionary struggles in all countries will
certainly triumph, while imperialism, reaction, and modern revision-
ism will step by step descend to their doom.... But imperialism
and reaction will not fall down unless you strike them down, and
modern revisionism, too, will not collapse unless you fight it....
"At present, the task facing all the M-L parties is to draw a
clear line of d.em cation, both politically and organizationally,
between themselves and the revisionists, who are serving U.S. im-
perialism, and to liquidate K revisionism....
"In the final analysis, in all parts of the world, including
the Soviet Union, the masses of the people who constitute the over-
whelming majority of the population, and the overwhelming majority
of Communists and cadres want revolution and are upholding or will
uphold M-L.... The M-Ls and all the other revolutionary people of
the world must continue their victorious pursuit and carry the
struggle against K revisionism through to the end!"
November 11; Reporting from Peking on the appearance of the above arti-
cle, Yugoslav Tanyug's correspondent says "What strikes the eye in this
terrific text is the effort to discredit Soviet foreign and domestic
policy in every country in the world."
Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit carries its own denunciation
of Soviet-American collusion in Vietnam, entitled: "Imperialist-
Revisionist Maneuvers and Plots Cannot Crush the Vietnamese People."
November 14: Commenting on the new Chinese attack, Edward Crankshaw of
the London Observer adds that he has just received, "from an East
European Communist source," copies of two secret letters exchanged be-
tween Moscow and Peking which cast "the most revealing light on the head-
'to on collision between the two great Communist powers." Crankshaw does not
describe the Soviet letter but quotes the Chinese reply as saying:
"The CCP/CC and the Chinese Government disagreed with your pro-
posal of April 3 for a summit meeting of Vietnam, China, and the
Soviet Union. This is quite a normal thing in relations between
fraternal parties, yet your letter of April 17 arbitrarily abuses
is, and even goes so far as to slander us as 'encouraging the ag-
gressors.'...
"Frankly speaking, we do not trust you. We and other fraternal
countries have learned bitter lessons in the past from K's evil
practice of control under the cover of aid. The same old tricks
you are now playing on the Vietnam question are even less likely
to work."
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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In addition to leveling the same charges as contained in the above
joint editorial, the Chinese in this letter detail and denounce alleged
Soviet plans for military infiltration of the Vietnam area under the
cover of military aid:
"It should also be pointed out that you wanted to send via
China a regular army formation of 1,000 men to be stationed in
Vietnam, without first obtaining her consent.
"Under the pretext of defending the territorial air of Vietnam,
you wanted to occupy and use one or two airfields in southwestern
China and to station a Soviet armed force of 500 men there.
"You also wanted to open an air corridor in China and obtain
for Soviet airplanes the privilege of free traffic in her air space.
"In view of these moves of yours and your collusion with U.S.
imperialism, we have every reason to think that you have ulterior
motives in offering such assistance."
November 15: Belgrade Borba's Moscow correspondent reports that the new
Chinese attacks are "being described as another attempt at harsh inter-
ference by Peking in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union" and "are
believed in Moscow to have been timed for the 23rd CPSU Congress." Borba
says that although "political quarters in Moscow are considering a pos-
sible reaction" to the new attack, "two reasons are put forward against
reacting: first of all, public polemics cannot settle anything in the
Sino-Soviet conflict, and secondly, it is now incomparably more important
to make good preparations for the 23rd CPStJ Congress than to engage in
futile polemics with China."
November 16: Identical articles in Pravda and Izvestiya, credited to
Pravda's Peking correspondent and dated November 13, report and denounce
the Chinese joint editorial:
"With regard to the bitterness of the attacks and the crude
tone, the article stands out even against the background of other
materials of this sort regularly published by the Chinese press.
The article bears evidence to the fact that the CCP leadership is
openly rejecting unity of action with the CPSU and the other M-L
parties....
"The struggle of the Soviet Union for the preservation of peace
and against the threat of a new world war is libelously represented
in the article as revisionism. The article alleges that the Soviet
Union has entered into a plot with American imperialism in the name
of joint rule of the world. As a 'proof' of this, the signing by
the Soviet Union of the treaty banning nuclear tests in three environ-
ments is cited. It is known, however, that over 100 countries
throughout the world have acceded to this treaty.
6 (Chronology Cont.)
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"Another 'proof' of a plot ... is stated ... to be the proposal
made by the SU on the need for a treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which would prevent the handing over of nuclear
weapons to the West German revanchists. All the aid and support
which the SU has been giving in strict accordance with the request
of an ..,agreements with the DRV to the struggle of the Vietnamese
is presented in the article as 'a plot with American im-
perialis
"The CPSU course toward building a Communist society ... is
declared to be a course for the 'bourgeois renaissance' of the Soviet
people."
Pravda goes on to say that the latest Soviet agricultural measures,
particularly the decisions of the March plenum, are presented as "ac-
celerating the development of capitalism in the countryside" and the de-
cisions of the September plenum as "the restoration of capitalism in the
Soviet Union."
It quotes the Chinese article as declaring that between the CCP and
the CPSU "there is what disunites and there is nothing that unites them...
Moreover, the Chinese proclaim the need for "drawing political and organ-
izational boundaries" between the CCP and its supporters on one hand and
the rest of the"Communist and workers parties on the other!
"The entire article from beginning to end is saturated with
impermissible, utterly groundless, slanderous, and provocative
fabrications and is pervaded with the spirit of hostility toward
the Soviet people and the CPSU.... Such a pronouncement without
question greatly damages the common cause of struggle against im-
perialism and for peace...."
November 17: The Czech press republishes the above Pravda comment,
Rude Pravo adding that by its efforts to renew unity with the Chinese
the CPSU has "proved that it is sincerely carrying out the resolution"
of the March consultative meeting: "nevertheless, the Chinese continue
their attacks and calumniations."
November 18: People's Daily carries a bitterly sardonic "Commentator"
article exploiting two TASS deletions in reporting Polyansky's October
Revolution speech (one simply "deleted" the eye-catching phrase 'Soviet-
American cooperation'" and the other a longer passage emphasizing peace-
ful economic competition) as "remarkable and significant":
"The fact is that the successors to K have learned to be a
bit wiser than K himself.... They talk little but do a lot; they
speak in evasive terms, uttering falsehoods and withholding the
truth as best they can.. However, Polyansky blundered in his report
and let the cat out of the bag.... That is why ... the new CPSU
leader ... hurriedly got TASS to make the corrections....
7 (Chronology Cont.)
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"K's successors, it seems, are having a really tough time....
They persist in pursuing K revisionism, yet they want to mask their
true features.... They want to realize 'Soviet-American cooperation'
at a faster pace, yet they want to avoid= being exposed and condemned
by the M-Ls and revolutionary people. Their doublefaced tactics
inevitably land them in a mess of contradictions, from which they
can never extricate themselves."
A Pravda report by Rome correspondent Yermakov on the 36th Italian
Socialist Party Congress deplores the "sharply negative position on such
major questions as unity of the labor movement and relations with the
CP." It concludes that "the Congress resolutions are bound to damage
seriously the cause of the unity of the working class and people and the
cooperation of all democratic forces in Italy."
November 18-19: Albanian Party daily Zen I Popullit attacks Soviet
policies in two successive editorials, the first denouncing the economic
reforms announced.,by Kosygin at the September plenum and the second
reiterating-the'charge of "Soviet-American collaboration to achieve
hegemony of the two big powers" in a blast against continued exclusion
of China from the U.N.
November 19: NCNA publicizes a long 7 November Japanese CP Akahata
editorial on the October Revolution anniversary which repeatedly refers
to the betrayal of the path of Lenin and the Revolution by K and the new
leadership of the CPSU.
November 20: People's Daily publishes the full text of the 16 Nov.
Pravda comment on the Chinese 11 Nov. joint editorial, prefaced with a
scathingly derisive editor's note which concludes:
"As Pravda would have it, our article is simply bad all the way
through. Such being the case, dear comrades, why are you afraid to
publish it and let the great Soviet people judge for themselves
what is right and wrong? Why are you afraid to come right out and
carry on the public polemics with us by presenting facts and reason-
ing things out?
"It seems that, like K, the new leadership of the CPSU are
afraid of: (1) U.S. imperialism; (2) M-L; and (3) the Soviet people
and the revolutionary people of the whole world. This, fundamentally,
is the reason why they are afraid to publish our article."
An editorial on "solidarity with Vietnam" in the East German Party
daily Neues Deutschland denounces the slanderous Chinese attacks on the
USSR -- tantamount to putting differences of views above the struggle
against imperialism" -- and declares that "our party considers talks
by the Communist and workers parties -- especially of the CPSU, the Vietnam
Workers Party, and the CCP -- on joint measures against the U.S. aggressors,
on the coordination of aid for Vietnam, as urgently necessary." TASS
publicizes a summary of the editorial.
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November20-21: Radio Moscow on the 20th announces that Brezhnev, Suslov,
and Ponomarev met that daj_'in a friendly and warm atmosphere" with a
visiting Greek CP (KKE) delegation of Koliyannis and Partsalidhis. TASS
on the 21st reports that it is "officially announced" that Suslov,
Ponomarev, and Korionov QPa few days ago" held talks "in a friendly
atmosphere" with an Israeli CP delegation headed by Mikunis and Sneh.
November 20-22: The World Peace Council Presidium meets in Sofia to
discuss the situation in Vietnam and questions of European security":
reports indicate that it is not attended by the Chinese or the rP o-
Chinese Japanese members of the Presidium.
November 22: A Pravda commentary on the ban imposed on the Sudanese
CP says that it was precipitated by "an anti-religious statement by an
agent-provocateur at the Omdurman Teachers College." Washington Post
Moscow correspondent Rosenfeld writes that on the same day Soviet agency
Novosti quietly distributed a review of the situation in Sudan which
said that the Sudanese CP on the 20th identified this statement as made
by a member of the "revolutionary leadership of the CP," "agents of the
CCP" who were expelled from the Party in mid-196+. Rosenfeld writes
that diplomats see this as indicating Moscow preparations to "ready the
onus of disaster -- if Sudan's Communists come to that -- for Peking."
9 (Chronology.)
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966. COMPARING SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
IN THE US AND THE USSR
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The evidence is that both the US and USSR decided around
the middle of 1955 to attempt the launching of artificial earth satellites.
Owing at least partially to their postwar development work on large rocket
boosters for intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviets were able to
orbit the first earth satellite - Sputnik I - on 4 Oct 57.
That Moscow made good use of the propaganda potential in this feat
is well known. However, even the Kremlin leaders appeared to be somewhat
surprised at how effective an instrument Sputnik I proved to be in influ-
encing world opinion, and the extent to which the loud cries of surprise
and consternation from the Free World helped their cause along. A 1960
evaluation by George Allen concluded that whereas before Sputnik I, few
people of the non-Communist world believed that the Soviets were capable
of challenging the US in the broad fields of science, technology and pro-
duction, the early Soviet space feats were widely accepted as evidence of
world leadership in all these fields.
The economic value (with its political consequences) of such a
change in world opinion should not.b.e underestimated and, indeed, all the
evidence is that it was not underestimated by the Soviets. Joseph Guilfoyle,
writing from Montevideo in the 20 Nov 58 issue of the Wall Street Journal,
quoted a "disturbed" foreign diplomat as saying, "The South American people,
who previously were always suspicious of the Reds, now seem willing to
accept their goods and offers of aid without question." Guilfoyle noted
significant increases in trade between Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile
and Peru and the Soviet Bloc in early 1958, along with a slump in trade
with traditional customers. "Increased respect for Russia's technical and
scientific achievements," he said, "has given them a degree of respectabil-
ity they've seldom enjoyed here."
These initial propaganda windfalls have been followed up by Soviet
propagandists to the end that quite a few audiences have been persuaded
that Moscow's much-ballyhooed bombs and space spectaculars prove "social-
ist superiority" in all branches of science and technology.
This guidance is designed to provide a broad and updated appreciation
of the fact that, since the Sputnik I era, the Soviets have been falling
ever further behind the US and its Western partners, scientifically and
technologically. This is truest, moreover, in the very field where Soviet
prestige got its greatest boost, namely, space exploration.
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P@*"T (966 Cont.)
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Several guidances issued since Sputnik I have dealt in detail with
certain specific aspects of Soviet propaganda claims for their science
and technology. Salient points of those guidances are reviewed in an
unclassified attachment, which gives item titles and dates, but omits
numbers and other classified nomenclature. A collective review of these
points gives an impression of the pace at which the Free World has drawn
ahead in the past decade. The attachment concludes with an updated sum-
mation of comparative attainments. 25X1C10b
(966 Cont.)
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967 AF,e. AATUF: AFRICAN LABOR ORGANIZATION
DOMINATED BY THE WFTU
25X1C1Oc
SITUATION: In typical communist fashion, African workers are being
subjected through the abuses of the AATUF to an attempt to achieve commu-
nist colonialism. Communists have recognized that open affiliation with
the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) is a liability for African
labor organizations at this time. Therefore, they are attempting to cap-
italize on the nationalistic and Pan-African sentiments in the newly
emerged African states by advocating national and regional unions, inde-
pendent from any world body. AATUF poses as such an independent, eschew-
ing international affiliation; but WFTU, in advocating non-affiliation
with international organizations, cites only free world groups -- i.e,
the ICFTU*and the IFCTU-- when giving examples.
While WFTU works largely behind the scenes in its efforts to increase
AATUF membership and strength, evidence exists to demonstrate its direct
ties to the African organization. For example, ideological lines and tac-
tics are identical; and WFTU officials attend AATUF meetings and maintain
close relations with its officials.
AATUF, posing as an independent nationalist organization, is pursuing
two tactics in an effort to dominate or eliminate its major rival, the
ATUC (African Trade Union Congress). It proposes "unity of action" pro-
grams -- the step toward a popular front in which the intent is to destroy
the identity of and absorb the rival (or rivals). Simultaneously, AATUF
officials have petitioned the heads-of-state OAU to become its official
labor arm.
[See two unclassified attachments for Communist tactics and
WFTU-AATUF relationship.]
Biweekly Propaganda Guidances
#166, Item 907, May 1965, "World Federation of Trade Unions"
#168, Item 914, June 1965, "ICFTU"
#178, Item 961, Nov 1965, "New Cracks in the World Communist
Labor Front"
*International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
**International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
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The Quality and Quantity of Her Self Defense
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The military role of the U.S. in Vietnam is receiving
such extensive world-wide coverage that the impression is rapidly grow-
ing that this is a U.S. war. With over 200 correspondents from the U.S.
alone accredited to Vietnam, readers and viewers around the globe are
constantly reminded that the U.S. is fighting on the Asian continent.
This concentration on U.S. military activities in Vietnam has also suc-
ceeded in furnishing Communist propaganda mills with more grist for
their theme of U.S. "imperialist aggression."
The very considerable role being played by the South Vietnamese
is receiving minimal coverage: this is harmful to the image of a viable
South Vietnamese Government and her people gallantly fighting aggression
and subversion. Actually the conflict in Vietnam is a Vietnamese war:
the South Vietnamese armed forces are doing most of the fighting and have
sustained most of the casualties; the civilian population has suffered
hunger, devastation, kidnappings, torture and assassination at the hands
of the Viet Cong. Despite great odds, the Vietnamese people are still
battling courageously and the military assistance they are now receiving
from friendly nations they requested only after they had defended them-
selves for almost a decade.
17 Sept 1965 speech of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, John T. McNaughton.
II Nov 65 Daily News item on US Airlift Evacuation of Wounded
SVN Soldiers.
II July 1965 New York Times article by Dr. Howard Rusk on Tech-
nical Assistance in Vietnam.
Excerpts from October-November 1965 Press Coverage of non-military
role of U.S. in Vietnam.
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(968 Cont.)
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969 AF,NE,WE,WH. VENEZUELAN COMMUNISTS LOSING
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The Venezuelan government, since the election of Romulo
Betancourt in 1958, and continuing under current President Raul Leoni, has
been both democratic and progressive in fostering social and economic de-
velopment programs. It has gained and kept the loyalty of the campesinos,
organized labor, and the military. Recently it has mounted a resolute
counter-insurgency program to combat Communist-authored violence and ter-
rorism in the countryside and in the cities.
The counter-insurgency program is now beginning to pay off in rather
spectacular fashion. In September alone 100 guerrillas (out of a force
of approximately 1800) were captured and in October several top leaders
were apprehended. At the end of October an underground Communist arms
and munitions factory was discovered, which was undoubtedly a serious blow
to the rebel movement.
There is solid evidence that the leadership of the Venezuelan Commu-
nist Party (PCV) now favors a shift in emphasis, playing up participation
in a popular front, concomitantly playing down guerrilla violence. This
shift is producing dissension within the guerrilla movement, although it
is too early to forecast its ultimate significance.
Enclosed as an unclassified attachment to this Guidance is a report
on the Communist movement in Venezuela and on the Government's anti-Commu-
nist campaign; a Spanish translation is included for the appropriate sta-
tions. 25X1C10b
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(969 Cont.)
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970 AF,NE,WH.
DEMOCRATIC ACTION IN TURKEY:
1965 General Elections
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Many prophets were confounded by the landslide victory of
the centrist Justice Party (JP) in the general elections in Turkey on
10 October 1965. Although it was predicted that the JP, successor to
the banned Democratic Party of former Premier Adnan Menderes, would
win a plurality over its chief rival, the Republican People's Party
(RPP), most public opinion anticipated another coalition government.
However, the political heirs of Menderes won a decisive victory
in a free election in Turkey just five years after the overthrow of
the Menderes government by a military coup and four years after his
execution, winning about 54% of the vote and some 240 out of 450
seats in the National Assembly.
This political development is viewed as at least a partial repu-
diation of the Turkish left and the 1960 revolution; neither of two
new and more extreme parties made much of an impact on the voters.
The Turkish Labor Party (TLP), first genuine left-wing party allowed
to contest an election in 35 years, and the somewhat shadowy Republi-
can Peasants' Nation Party (RPNP) demonstrated only marginal appeal.
In spite of campaign claims and Monday-morning quarterbacks, the
strength of the JP vote cannot be credited entirely to party platforms
.or' an election fought on the basis of principles and not personalities.
The overwhelming JP victory is seen as due primarily to four fac-
tors basically independent of party principles: the effective use by
the JP of the "party machinery" inherited from the old Democratic Party;
the extensive campaigning of the JP, led by Suleyman Demirel, which
carried its white (iron gray) horse symbol into the most remote villages,
and attracted the peasants, workers and the growing middle class; the ap-
parent accommodation between the JP and the military; and the emotional
loyalty of the Turkish masses, particularly the peasants, to the "mar-
tyred" Menderes.
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But the campaign issues, if not the election result, represent the
real beginning of the left-right debate that is part and parcel of po-
litics in most western democracies. This is the first political cam-
paign in Turkey in which key foreign policy issues have become contro-
versial , largely because of the emergence of a vocal political left.
Turkish politics may be beginning to divide along ideological lines
but the process is curiously confused, the structure and membership of
the main parties contrast oddly with what the parties preach.
Justice Party. The JP draws its strength mainly from business,
peasants and industrial workers; it is a middle-of-the-road party which
accommodates a range of beliefs and which holds that Turkey's economic
future lies in giving full freedom to private enterprise whether Turkish
or foreign. It's victory brought comfort to businessmen, industrialists,
investors and foreign oil companies.
The JP believes that Turkish nationalism is served by a pro-Western
stand. It declared that it is in Turkey's national interest to rein-
force its security by close relations with Western friends and allies,
and by regional defense organizations such as NATO and CENTO. The JP
favors a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations
with Greece. It also advocates friendly ties with the countries of the
Middle East, the Balkans, and the Afro-Asian countries - but its pre-
election pronouncements ignored the Soviet Union. On domestic issues,
the JP is moderate, emphasizing that only a strong and stable government
can solve Turkey's problems. It advocates a mixed economic system, but
wisely avoided the hotly contested issue of foreign investment in the
petroleum industry, although promising to encourage "productive invest-
ment."
Republican People's Party. The RPP, on the other hand, has always
been mildly progressive, and basically rooted in the bureaucracy, the
military, bourgeoisie and the landowners. Although it contains some
energetic reformers and made some progress in social reform while in
office since 1961, it failed to sell itself as a serious reforming party.
Primarily because of internal dissension, it lacked the organization and
leadership necessary to carry on a campaign. In a belated effort, aimed
primarily at attracting votes from the left, it became stridently inde-
pendent and ultranationalistic, with anti-US overtones. Its leader,
former Premier and elder statesman Inonu, spoke out in favor of improved
relations with countries outside the Western alliance "in defense of our
high interests in the international field." The RPP took a belligerent
stand on the Cyprus issue, largely in order to embarrass the then incum-
bent coalition and especially the JP. Finally, this summer Inonu an-
nounced the party's position as "left of center." This cost it support
2
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(970 Cont.)
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from two groups; those who feared it was moving too far to the left;
and those left-wingers who doubted its sincerity and decided to take
a chance on the Turkish Labor Party. The RPP won only about 134 seats.
How far Turkey's traditional fear of Russia lost votes for the RPP can
only be guessed. But the JP freely hurled the charge of "communist" at
both the Labor Party and the RPP, which aroused strong feelings among
the peasants.
Turkish Labor Party. The TLP draws its strength not from indus-
trial workers - most trade unions regard it with considerable suspicion
- but predominantly from intellectuals and white-collar workers. It
attacked all political parties, especially the JP, and its election
theme was that the "TLP will give land to the villages." It proposed
nationalization of the oil industry, banking, insurance, and foreign
trade, called for planned economic development, and employed the "Ameri-
can exploitation" theme lavishly against all comers. It strongly de-
nounced Turkey's membership in both NATO and CENTO as incompatible with
national sovereignty. The TLP had no real hope of making any immediate
strong impression on the political life of Turkey, (it won about 15
seats) but it is working for the future when conditions may be more
favorable for the development of the political left,
Republic Peasant Nation Party. RPNP is the product of the merger
of the late 1950s of two small conservative parties, both organized by
groups of dissidents from the old Democratic Party. When radical Col.
Alparslan Turkes and his followers took over the party in July 1965,
after being rejected by the JP, the RPNP became what has been called
a "potentially semifascistic organization which is essentially the per-
sonal vehicle of a single dominating leader." The election dealt a
major blow to Turkes whose party received only 11 seats.
The military play a watchdog role in Turkey. The Army is unique
in the Moslem world for its earnest attachment to democracy, and its
paternalistic supervision of the "democratic processes" as guardian of
the Constitution.
The coup of 1960 ended nearly 40 years of reasonably stable govern-
ment which followed the founding of the first republic by Ataturk in
1923. During this time, power had transferred peacefully from Inonu and
other Ataturk associates to Menderes' Democratic Party in the elections
of 1950. The attempt to foster democracy, complete with a two-party
system, gave way to traditionally Turkish authoritarian pressures during
the last years of the Menderes regime.
After a year of direct rule, the military authorities returned the
government to civilians under arrangements designed to preclude the re-
surgence of followers of the executed Menderes. His old Democratic Party
was banned, most of its top figures imprisoned, and an electoral law im-
posed that set up a system of proportional representation, which resulted
in a series of weak coalition governments that did little to inspire public
3
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ESEEWE~ (970 Cont.)
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confidence. Until last February, the Army remained in the background
while trusting only aged Inonu to be premier. Despite his party's
having polled less than 37% of the vote in the 1963 election (as
against 46% for'the JP), Inonu stayed on as head of a coalition gov-
ernment, but resigned in February when parliament rejected his budget.
A caretaker four-party coalition headed by Urguplu, an independent,
then held office until the October election freed the voters to pick
whatever democratic government they pleased.
The Army, having become accustomed to and gained confidence in
the JP, apparently concluded that a single-party government can be a
good thing for Turkey if it does not abuse its power. But it will un-
doubtedly exert whatever pressure is needed to keep the new government
in line. On the whole, the military seem generally satisfied with the
election results and now see the JP as the main defense against the
left.
The cabinet announced by Demirel, on 27 Oct, appears to be gen-
erally competent, is acceptable to the military, and includes most
of the moderate leaders of the dominant Justice party. Some of the
ministers - including the defense minister - were Jailed briefly after
the 1960 coup, but nearly all are from the JP's moderate wing, which
has advocated accommodation with the army and has disavowed any vengeance
for the coup.
The program of the new government was presented to the National
Assembly by Premier Demirel on 3 November 1965. It presents no drastic
new proposals and follows the reasonable and constructive policies pro-
mised during the campaign. In external relations it emphasizes Turkey's
pro-Western links without abandoning the cautious normalization of
relations with the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Russia. In its internal
economic policies the government promises help and encouragement to
private enterprise, within the framework of its constitution-based 25X1C10c
planning organization. (See unclassified attachment)
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25X1C10b
6 December 19 5
WIDF
The "illusion of peace" and the "spirit of hatred."
Albanian radio November 1965
TASS reports of the October 1965 meeting in Salzburg do not mention
the disruptive activities of the Chinese and their allies at the WIDF
Council session; PRAVDA avoided the issue by briefly reporting only the
opening of the session. Prague's RUDE PRAVO, on the other hand, reported
that discussion of the meeting's "Message to Women throughout the World"
was distributed by "The Chinese, Albanian, and Japanese delegates, par-
ticularly the utterances of the Chinese delegates culminating in gross
personal attacks against the representatives of the Federation."
Pertinent excerpts of reports, illustrating the Sino-Soviet dissen-
sion among the delegations, follow.
Prague Domestic Service, 29 October 1965; Commentary by Jirina Brejchova,
member of the Czechoslovak delegation:
The federation was born from the women's longing for peace and
for this reason was also a cofounder of the World Peace Council ....
It is regrettable that the federation must counter many attacks,
which in their substance, are directed against the unity of the inter-
national democratic women's movement such as are again being witnessed
here in Salzburg. Many matters can be discussed but discussion stops
when women who fought, arms in hand against the fascist enemy, are
being slandered, abused, and accused of having betrayed the common
struggle.
Discussion stops when the federation's program, which was enthu-
siastically adopted in 1963 at the Moscow congress, is being described
as a chapter of shame in the history of the federation. It was in
this spirit that the Chinese and some other delegations took the floor
in Salzburg.
Tirana Domestic Service, 2 November 1965:
WIDF Session Scene of Anti-imperialist Fight.
At this meeting a sharp clash developed between the representa-
tives of women's organizations, members of the WIDF, who stand on
strong positions and defend the militant traditions of the federation,
and representatives of women's organizations who have fallen under the
influence of the modern revisionists and who want to deprive the fed-
eration of its militant spirit and turn it into an instrument for im-
posing on the masses of women their revisionist policy of submission
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and capitulation to imperialism. ...Vito Kapo, Albanian delegation
head, stated in part: "Since its founding, the federation has adopted
a revolutionary antifascist and anti-imperialist policy of a widely
democratic character whose program and (?aim) included the hundred-
million-strong working masses."
"However," she sai;i, "certain elements of the federation wanted
to create the illusion of peace in women's minds, to disarm them mor-
ally, and to erase the spirit of hatred and revolution against the
imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist(s) ... thus recommending
peaceful coexistence, economic competition, general and complete dis-
armament, and the United Nations as the only means; and personalities
-- especially those of the two great powers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, which have also the Pope's blessing -- as the only force
which can handle the destiny of mankind and settle everything and not
the people themselves.
"These elements began to say that imperialism and its leaders
were popular and reasonable, that they would widely employ a strategy
of peace and therefore are angels of peace, and so forth. Is this
not a completely capitulationist policy? The facts are known. Yet we
discover with regret that even here certain elements continue to toe
this wrong, dangerous, and unacceptable line before the masses of
women. They do not denounce imperialism as the main enemy of the
people and decline to point out the source of war and hunger... It
is an indisputable fact that all these incorrect views and attitudes
have been imposed on the WIDF by representatives of a great power
who occupy leading posts in the WIDF, by representatives of the Soviet
Women's Committee to be precise. They are constantly and by all pos-
sible means trying to remove the federation from the democratic and
revolutionary traditions upon which it was founded and turn it into a
supporter of the policy of their party and government whose aim is
rapprochement and cooperation with the enemies of peace -- chiefly
rapprochement and cooperation with imperialism. ...
At the final session ... three documents were presented for
approval: I) a message directed to the women of the world, II) a
resolution supporting the struggle of the people of Vietnam, and III)
a document on WIDF activities in the coming year. The representative
of the Albanian Women's Union ... exposed the capitulationist course
of this document and also the demagogy of the representatives of the
Soviet Women's Committee.
".., the document presented for approval is completely permeated
by a wrong concept not based on the militant, democratic, and anti-
imperialist principle by which the WIDF was characterized in its found-
ing. The document fails to consider the crucial aspirations and de-
mands of the masses of women, intentionally deviates from the substance
of the question, and makes erroneous evalutations of many problems which
do not correspond to reality.
2 (Cont.)
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"The Albanian Women's Union delegation, ... taking the essential
measures to turn the WIDF back on to its original path, made, just as
did a series of other delegations, many important remarks and concrete
proposals. ... these just requests were not considered because of the
machinations of certain elements who hold leading posts in the WIDF.
They tried to appear here not only as defenders of the democratic rules
but also as resolute fighters against imperialism, headed by American
imperialism, and against colonialism and neocolonialism. ...
"The Albanian Women's Union delegation cannot reconcile itself
with a document permeated wth a capitulationist nature dictated by
those who support the policy of sabotaging the national liberation
struggle of the people and conciliating and compromising with American
imperialism to share the spheres of influence."
The Albanian Women's Union delegation took the rostrum again to
make its remarks on the document concerning WIDF future activities.
On this occasion, the Albanian delegate wanted to answer Jeanette
Vermeersch who, in her speeches, accused the Albanian People's Repub-
lic, the CPR, and other countries which oppose the Moscow treaty of
standing on the imperialist side. But the chairman of the session
did not let her speak, switched off the microphones, and a great tumult
ensued in the hall. Some of the representatives of the contemporary
revisionists left the room.
Peking NCNA, 8 November 1965:
Revisionism Exposed at WIDF Council Meeting.
At the meeting, the maneuvers of the Soviet delegation and some
leaders of the federation in pursuance of Khrushchev revisionism and
their capitulationist line were exposed and staunchly opposed by the
delegations of China and a number of other countries.
From its very beginning, the meeting plunged into a sharp battle
of words over the issues of whether or not the women of all countries
should be brought together to oppose U.S. imperialism's policy of
aggression and war and whether or not support should be given to the
national liberation movement.
Rosa Jasovich, general secretary of the WIDF, delivered ... the
report "Women's participation in the struggle for peace and national
independence." She zealously preached "universal disarmament" and
"a world without wars." She declared that "every step taken toward
the consolidation of world peace, on the road to disarmament, was a
new guarantee for the success of liberation movements." Playing up
the nuclear horror, she lauded the infamous Moscow tripartite treaty
and boosted the United Nations -- a tool in the hands of U.S. imper-
ialism.
3 (Cont.)
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... Nina Popova, chairman of the committee of Soviet women,
strenuously played up the policy of "peaceful coexistence" which actu-
ally means capitulation to U.S. imperialism. This policy, she said,
"corresponds to the most ardent desire" of every woman. She called
for "a world conference for general, complete disarmament" and "a
more intense struggle for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."
... The Chinese delegation pointed out that U.S. imperialism was
now engaged in ever more rabid aggression and intervention throughout
the world and was brutally cracking down on the independence struggles
of the peoples, thereby gravely endangering world peace. Therefore in
order to find out whether an international women's organization truly
represented the fundamental interests of the masses of women, one had
only to see whether it mobilized the women of all countries to wage a
relentless struggle against U.S. imperialism -- enemy number one of
women and all other people of the world, or capitulated to it., ..
These leaders ... extolled the United Nations .... They arbitrar-
ily declared that the overriding task of the international women's
movement was to strive for "general complete disarmament" and "peace-
ful coexistence." They discriminated against and attacked the women's
organizations which stood firmly opposed to imperialism, and carried
on anti-China activities.
These WIDF leaders with unusual zest helped U.S. imperialism and
modern revisionism in pursuing the policy of nuclear blackmail by play-
ing up the nuclear horror, Kuo Chien continued. They vilified those
who opposed imperialism unswervingly as "bellicose elements" and
"adventurists." ... Unmasking the features of these leaders who were
for real capitulation and sham anti-imperialism, she said they still
refused to abandon their erroneous line. ... they then spread ener-
getically the fallacies about "general complete disarmament" and
"peaceful coexistence" which was what they really wanted -- their
heartfelt desire.
The Albanian delegation roundly repudiated the Khrushchev revi-
sionists' preposterous ideas of "peaceful coexistence," "general com-
plete disarmament" and "a world without wars, arms, and armed forces,"
accused the representative of the committee of Soviet women of press-
ing the WIDF to betray its revolutionary, democratic tradition ....
In defiance of the opposition of many delegations, the manipu-
lators of the meeting outrageously forced upon the meeting a "message
to the women of the whole world," which, proceeding from a capitula-
tionist line, describes "general and controlled disarmament and peace-
ful coexistence" as "the great demands of the peoples" and echoes the
call for prohibition "nuclear proliferation" and "nuclear tests." It
neither points to U.S. imperialism as the source of aggression and war
and as the most ferocious enemy of all peoples and to world peace, nor
does it mobilize the women all over the world to struggle against U.S.
imperialism. This reveals most clearly the hideous features of certain
4 (Cont.)
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WIDF leaders who are following the baton of the Khrushchevite revi-
sionists to push the line of sham anti-imperialism but real capitula-
tion, sham support but real betrayal, sham unity but a real split.
When the manipulators of the meeting operated the voting machine
and put to vote paragraph by paragraph this document which has mistakes
on principle, the delegations of China, Albania, and Japan refused to
take part. When the document was put to final vote, the three delega-
tions voted against it and the delegation of Korea, the DRV, and the
South Vietnam Women's Liberation Union abstained.
Jeanette Vermeersch, vice chairman of the Union of French Women,
tried to justify the call for the "prohibition of nuclear prolifera-
tion," which is designed for the United States and the Soviet Union to
maintain their monopoly of nuclear weapons. She went so far as to
slanderously compare China to imperialism. The head of the Chinese
delegation immediately challenged her with the questions "Do you or do
you not regard the People's Republic of China as imperialism?" and "Do
you have the courage to tell the women and other people of France that
China is imperialism?" In face of these stern questions, Vermeersch
was at a loss to answer. Her slanders against China had enraged many
of the delegates. ...
Some leaders of the committee of Soviet women once again acted
blatantly to split the international women's movement. Behind the back
of the Federation of Japanese Women's Organizations -- a member organ-
ization of the WIDF, they brought to the meeting the splitters of the
Japanese women's movement. ..
During the meeting the presiding chairmen arbitrarily manipulated
it and suppressed democracy. To restrict others from expressing differ-
ing views, they imposed on the meeting a rule of procedure which contra-
vened the democratic spirit. Under this rule, each delegation could
only speak for 10 minutes during discussions at the meeting. They cut
short the speech of the head of the Albanian delegation on the pretext
of "exceeding the time limit." But many other speakers, including the
head of the Soviet delegation, could go on speaking despite their ex-
ceeding the time limit. When the Albanian delegate commented on a pro-
posal advanced by the general secretary of the WIDF, the executive
chairman repeatedly rang the bell and shouted fiercely, "You are not
allowed to continue speaking!" She then switched off the loudspeaker.
A farce was enacted as the meeting hall resounded with boos.
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Copy of article in Forum(Vienna)
also reprinted in Ceske Slovo(Munich)
The reader will understand why we cannot reveal the
method through which we received this letter. The
addressee is a high-ranking official in Prague.
CPYRGHT
Dear Comrade,
I am addressing myself to you, as a Czech philosopher and scientist
who during the past twenty years has studied and taught Marxist philos-
ophy in Czechoslovakia. Only a year ago I was still a member of the
Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Based
on a decision of the Central Committee and the Academy Presidium, I was
fired a year ago. This decision represented a repressive, administra-
tive answer to certain critical opinions which I hold regarding Czech
philosophy and culture. This decision was taken in spite of the fact
that my co-workers on three occasions protested my dismissal and labeled
the accusations as unfounded. The decision was taken only after a spe-
cial measure was passed by the former chairman of the Ideological Com-
mission, Koucky. My dismissal was followed by an order to dissolve the
Party organization at the Institute, by the installation of an investi-
gative commission and by an atmosphere of fear under the threat of dis-
solution of the entire Institute.
These stringent administrative methods in philosophical discussion
are quite unusual even in Czechoslovakia. Publishers confiscated all my
manuscripts, editorial offices of cultural publications confiscated ten
of my articles, all my university lectures were banned, my passport was
withdrawn, and I myself was attacked for seven sentences in an unpub-
lished letter. At this point, I am without employment, since all my
efforts to find work have failed. The reason is an order which states
that I cannot be employed in any Czech cultural institution. The only --
and really offensive -- offer I have had from the Academy Presidium was
some vaguely-defined work in Charita, a Catholic organization which man-
ufactures religious (cult) objects and has nothing whatever to do with
philosophy.
You will be better able to understand these absurd measures against
a scientist, if you recall that in the spring of .1964 -- for the first
time in the history of socialist countries -- police dogs were used
against the working youth during a May Day celebration. For the first
time, peaceful citizens were chased out of public parks with police night-
sticks. During the same period, a cartoonist was sentenced to a year in
prison for a drawing which had been approved by the censor. It was dur-
ing the time when the question of the unpunished political murders of the
(Cont.)
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1950-52 era, was still unresolved. My dismissal thus coincides with a
wave of repression against the intelligentsia which repeats itself in a
regular four-year cycle in Czechoslovak cultural life.
In 1948, members of the intelligentsia were sent to coal mines, in
1952 to the gallows, in 1960 many lost their positions, today they are
only publicly denigrated. This unquestionably represents liberalization,
for which however as a Marxist and humanist socialist, I find little ad-
miration.
The reasons for my arrest were contrary to justice, to the norms of
scientist life, and served purely as an administrative measure within the
theoretical controversy regarding the orientation of Czech philosophy.
Any scientific defense became impossible. Through various mechanisms,
threats and pressures, those who spoke out in my behalf were quickly
silenced. The fact that I was released was to serve as a case of "exem-
plary" punishment of "revisionist orientation" but was in reality an ex-
pression of pure Stalinism and unreconstructed dogmatism on the part of
certain leading officials, headed by Vladimir Koucky. The fact that this
theoretical dispute among Marxists culminated in this manner, well illus-
trates the tensions in current political life in Czechoslovakia. I re-
spected the existing situation and stated openly that I have no intention
of using my case against the Party, and that I don't want to exchange my
citizenship for a good job abroad. In spite_of my expectations, pressure
against my person continues and therefore I have decided to ask you for
assistance.
A week ago, the new chairman of the Ideological Commission and mem-
ber of the Politburo, Jiri Hendrych, declared that he will have me prose-
cuted for parasitism, even though I am an independent scientific worker,
a translator and member of the World Federation of Scientific Workers.
I therefore face arrest again. I put all pertinent documents at your
disposal so that you will realize what methods are still employed by cul-
tural dogmatics in 1965, and in Central Europe; what's more, in a social-
ist state which had formally rejected the methods of the personality cult.
I would be very grateful if you would intervene on my behalf in my request
for a passport, so that I can continue my studies abroad. I cannot do so
here since all scientific and publication activity is denied me. I do
not intend to remain abroad permanently however because I am convinced
the practical application of socialist humanism is much more important
than mere philosophical theory.
With sincere greetings Yours
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Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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6 December 1965
"Communist Labor Tactics in the Colonial and
Former Colonial Countries" by
George Lichtblau
NOTE: The material below is taken from chapter 3 of
Everett Kassalow's (ed.) National Labor Movements in the
Postwar World, published and copyrighted by Northwestern
University Press in 1963. Since that year, communist
popular front tactics in Africa have largely shifted from
attempts to gain open affiliates for the WFTU (the commu-
nist international labor front) to encouragement of popu-
lar fronts with purportedly independent regional African
trade unions, i.e., the All-African Trade Union Federation
(AATUF).
CPYRGHT
Movement toward Unity
In the prevailing favorable climate the WFTU sought to make its
contribution to anti-Western solidarity by emphasizing the common interest
of the Communist and nationalist unions in fighting imperialist exploita-
tion and aggression. It even suggested that tactical unity of action
should lead to the unification of the nationalist and Communist organiza-
tions. Unity of action and unification on the national level, in turn,
were presented as paving the way for eventual unification of the WFTU
and the ICFTU, or failing this, to bring about the dissociation of the
Afro-Asian neutralist unions from the ICFTU. Furthermore, it was claimed
that the economies of the former colonial countries were evolving, if not
directly toward "socialism as we scientifically understand it" at least
toward something akin to it, i.e., "State capitalism." Therefore, this
process must be supported through unity as a right step toward national
emancipation from Western influence.
As part of the new "unity" campaign, the class struggle, by being
equated with the anti-imperialist struggle, was to become "outer directed"
toward the international scene about which the masses in effect can do
nothing. This meant its elimination from the party and trade-union pro-
grams -- and in some cases even of the trade-unions themselves -- as a
threat to the nationalist governments and the reduction of Communist trade-
union activities to what might be called "sound business unionism."
Accordingly in 1956 the Communist campaign for national and inter-
national trade-union unity assumed a new dimension. The hitherto spurious
appeals to the non-Communist unions and the ICFTU gave way in several
African and Asian countries to actual mergers of Communist unions with
their nationalist rivals, thus creating new pressures from below for more
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international cooperation on all levels. Surprisingly enough such mergers
were promoted regardless of whether the Communists stood to gain organiza-
tional control of non-Communist unions or not. In several cases the mergers
had to be sternly imposed with backing from abroad against heavy opposition
of local party and trade-union cadres who saw their cause undermined by
such a sacrifice to the remote interests of the Soviet Union. The WFTU con-
tributed to these pressures by giving publicity to such "achievements of
unity" and through publishing articles by the local leaders who conducted
these unity moves, strongly criticizing those elements who tried to hold
out against the liquidation of their organization. No doubt such articles
reflected also behind the scene pressures for compliance.
Communist Labor Tactics in Africa
To turn to specific cases, between 1956 and 1958, Communist unions
in Tunisia, French West Africa, and Algeria have merged with or have been
absorbed by non-Communist trade-union centers. The most striking case
was that of the Tunisian WFTU-affiliated USTT which in September, 1956
after a special congress, following a Communist party resolution on trade-
union unity, dissolved to merge its rank-and-file with the Neo-Destour
controlled, ICFTU-affiliated UGTT, from which the Communist USTT leaders
remained excluded. At the time when the USTT disbanded it had about 6,000
members or about 15-20 per cent of the organized workers in the country.
This act of local Communist self-negation was justified on "anti-imperi-
alist" grounds, i.e., that working class unity would strengthen the deter-
mination of the Tunisian nationalists to transform "formal" independence
from France into "real" independence -- i.e., neutralism.
In the case of Algeria, the Communist Union Generale des Syndicats
Algeriens (UGSA) dissolved itself at the end of 1957, following the par-
ticipation of the Union Generale du Travail Algerienne (UGTA), an organ-
ization aligned with the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and affili-
ated with the ICFTU, at the Leipzig WFTU Congress. The Algerian Communist
party announced this decision in a declaration calling for trade-union
unity and urging UGSA members to join their rival nationalist movement.
The UGTA, in turn, despite its continued affiliation with the ICFTU, has
since then closely collaborated with the WFTU, particularly in the pro-
motion of the International Trade-Union Committee for Solidarity with the
Algerian Workers and People. It also has accepted money and training for
its cadres from both the WFTU and individual Soviet bloc unions, especi-
ally from the East German Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB).
Perhaps the most effective Communist unity maneuvers took place in
former French West Africa. Here the Communist Confederation Generale du
Travail (CGT) joined with autonomous non-Communist unions at Cotonou,
Dahomey, to form in January, 1957 the neutralist and unaffiliated Union
Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). The new movement in-
cluded the CGT, the Confederation Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique
(CGTA), a nationalist labor movement aligned with the Reassemblement
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W
Democratique Africain (RDA); and several other autonomous unions, mostly
of railways workers and teachers. As the price of unity -- approved and
acknowledged by the French CGT and the WFTU -- the West African CGT leader,:
despite resistance from their own cadres yielded control of their segment
of the new labor movement to the CGTA. The CGT broke its affiliation with
the WFTU in deference to Sekou Tour6, who as General Secretary of the CGTA
became also General Secretary of the UGTAN, and surrendered to his drive
to bring the entire nationalist and labor movement under his control.
Toure is a dedicated but eclectic Marxist who, both as leader of the
RDA and of a dissident section of the French West African CGT, had severed
earlier associations with the Communists. Although he has increasingly
aligned himself with the Soviet bloc since 1957, it is unlikely that at
the time he would have, or could have, given the Communists any assurances
that in return for their support he would detach Guinea from France and
the Western political system, and instead look to the Soviet bloc for his
main support and inspiration in restructuring the political and eccnomic
system of his country.
Abdoulay Diallo, ex-CGT chief in the Suday, former chairman of the
CGT-Coordinating Committee for French West Africa, and ex-vice president
of the WFTU, was virtually eliminated from the international activities
of UGTAN. Although he was given a vice presidency of UGTAN, he no longer
seems to have any real influence on the Guinean labor movement. A similar
case was that of Cisse Alioune, another ex-CGT man, who at the UGTAN Unity
Congress at Conakry in January, 1959 was nominally entrusted with UGTAN
international relations. In effect, however, these were conducted by
Diallo Seydou, a Tours man who became General Secretary for Organization,
Press and Education.
To justify this tactical self-negation, Communist propaganda declared
that the unification of the French West African movement would lead to a
Pan-African trade-union movement spreading from the French to the British
areas of the continent. Furthermore, such unification would undercut the
efforts of the ICFTU to establish an effective regional organization and
would help speed up the process of detaching colonial Africa from the
metropolitan powers through the strengthening of the nationalist movements.
The effectiveness of this move in strengthening Communist influence on the
growing African labor movement was soon proven. Despite the fact that the
international policy of the UGTAN does not appear to be under the control
of the ex-CGT leaders, the movement has become increasingly committed to
the WFTU. Not only has the UGTAN attended the Fourth World Trade-Union
Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig in October 1957, but subsequently has be-
come a regular participant in all major WFTU affairs, including the meet-
ings of the functional trade departments of that organization. By 1958
it joined, as a provisional member, the Technical Profession Forestry
Section of the Trade-Union International of Agricultural and Forestry
Workers.
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In July, 1960 the UGTAN played host to the Third World Teachers'
Conference in Conakry, arranged by the Federation Internationale Syndicale
de 1'Enseigment (FISE), the teachers' trade department of the WFTU, for
which the Guinean teachers' union, a UGTAN affiliate, acted as co-sponsor
and host. Toure personally welcomed the congress. Perhaps even more
important for the Soviet drive toward influencing labor developments in
Africa was the establishment of a UGTAN trade-union training school in
Conakry with the financial and technical assistance of the WFTU and the.
East German FDGB, both of whom provide instructors.
With Guinea having become a base for the spreading of Soviet influence
in Africa, the UGTAN was turned into an instrument for purveying this in-
fluence among trade-unions. This was well-illustrated at the January,
1959 UGTAN Unity Congress at Conakry, when that organization proclaimed
its intent of becoming a Pan-African labor movement. To emphasize this
point the Ghana Trade-Union Congress, then one of the key ICFTU organiz-
ations in Africa, declared itself affiliated with the UGTAN. Despite the
stress on non-commitment and the attendance of both ICFTU and WFTU fra-
ternal delegates, Toure in his report to the Congress on orientation and
doctrine stated that the unique character of the African labor movement
did not prevent the UGTAN from aligning its sympathy with the forces
represented by the WFTU.
Since their association at Conakry the Ghana TUC and the UGTAN have
welcomed every support, not the least of which came from the WFTU, for
their efforts of establishing an all-African trade-union movement associ-
ated with the Ghana-controlled All-African Peoples' Movement and designed
to crowd the ICFTU and Western trade-union influence from the continent.
To dramatize this objective the Ghana TUC disaffiliated from the ICFTU
in October, 1959 just prior to the establishment of the ICFTU's African
Regional Organization (AFRO). At the same time it promoted jointly with
the UGTAN and the WFTU, a split of the Trade-Union Congress of Nigeria
over the issue of international alignment when that organization was
about to affiliate with the ICFTU. This made it more difficult for the
ICFTU to find in the Nigerian labor movement an effective alternate base
to the Ghana TUC for its operations in Africa below the Sahara. Not only
was the labor movement now divided, but the Pan-African neutralists to
whom the so-called "unaligned" wing -- the Nigerian Trade Union Congress --
looked for guidance, could charge the ICFTU with the "responsibility" for
the split.
The impact of the Congo crisis in summer, 1960 on Pan-African nation-
alism further strengthened the sentiment for a new all-African labor move-
ment at the expense of the ICFTU. As a result this movement, with the
backing of the Ghana TUC, the UGTAN, the U.A.R.-controlled Pan Arab ICATU,
the Algerian UGTA, and the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), as well as
the WFTU, became so attractive to African nationalists that, earlier dif-
ficulties and rivalries notwithstanding, no leader of an African ICFTU
4 (Cont.)
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affiliate dared to oppose it outright. Even the most prominently identi-
fied African ICFTU leader Tom Mboya, the General Secretary of the Kenya
Federation of Labor, who had been one of the main targets of the African
neutralists, felt compelled to associate himself with this movement at the
expense of his ties with the ICFTU.
While, of course, this trend within the African labor and political
movement cannot be directly attributed to the WFTU and other Communist
efforts in the field of labor, the African nationalists and neutralists
themselves freely admit that under the influence of Soviet bloc foreign
policy these activities and tactics have considerably affected not only
the political attitudes but also the focus of trade-unionism developing
in Africa. By providing training for trade-union cadres both in Africa
and Europe, fraternal exchanges, roving representatives, money, propa-
ganda, and various other forms of aid, the WFTU together with its Soviet
affiliates and the Italian and French Communist unions seek to transform
not only the African labor movements but also the social and political
institutions in which they operate so that they will resemble those of
the Peoples' Democracies. Developments in Guinea, Ghana, and elsewhere
already indicate that such changes may make the restoration of normal
relations -- be they commercial, political, or labor -- between these
countries and the Western nations increasingly difficult.
This trend toward the detachment of African labor from Western con-
tacts and influence was further reinforced by the ability of the WFTU
and its affiliates to promote ever-increasing international contacts and
associations of the neutralists both with other Communist fronts, such
as the World Peace, Youth, and Student movements, and with the regional
neutralist movements which have emerged in recent years often with Com-
munist help. Among these are the Afro-Asians, the Pan Arabs, the Pan-
Africans, and the Pro-Castro Latin American, who are induced to collab-
orate with the Communists over such issues as the Algerian independence
struggle, the Suez or Congo crisis, the South African race riots, the
Angola rebellion, etc.
Thus, despite the fact that the number of WFTU affiliates in Africa
remains insignificant, the association with and participation in the
nationalist turmoil of Africa makes it an important instrument for under-
mining the regional status quo. Consequently, the disintegration of the
UGTAN outside Guinea as a result of the breaking up of French West Africa
into separate states aligned in a pro-French and a pro-Guinean power bloc,
has, if anything, strengthened the ability of the WFTU as an outside force
to intensify the appeal for a Pan-African labor movement. Even though the
pro-French "Entente" states remain suspicious of the Ghana-Guinea front
against them and try to keep their trade-unions independent of the UGTAN,
both official and unofficial contacts between their unions and the UGTAN
continue.
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Fact Sheet 25X1 C10b
December 1965
VIET CONG TERROR
FORCES THOUSANDS FROM HOMES
CPYRGHT
by John T. McNaughton
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
The greatest cruelty of war and the greatest crime of aggression
is the suffering inflicted on the innocents. Innocents are felled and
injured; innocents -- young and old, the healthy and infirm -- are up-
rooted from their homes and set to wander in the ravaged countryside.
In the struggles the world has known this century, perhaps no ele-
ment has evoked more sympathy than the plight of those seeking refuge
from conflict.
Even more than the spectacle of physical pain, the spectacle of
families separated, of homes destroyed, of hopes shattered -- has dis-
turbed all men of good faith and all men who set about "to deal with
the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish."
The policy of the United States in Southeast Asia is the same as
it is for the rest of the world: to render assistance to those nations
requesting aid to repel aggression, to promote peace, to build stability,
and to protect the right of free people to choose their own destiny..
The assistance rendered is sometimes economic, sometimes military
-- and sometimes, as in the case of Vietnam, both.
This aid the United States gives out of humanitarian concern for
others and for the protection of its own national security, which de-
pends in no small part on the security and stability of the whole free
world.
For 11 years, the United States has been rendering the Republic of
(South) Vietnam both economic and military assistance. This aid has
increased in recent years as aggression against the free people of Viet-
nam has increased.
When the Geneva Accords of 195+ partitioned Vietnam into the free
Republic in the South and the Communist-led state in the north, nearly
seven percent of the population in North Vietnam sought refuge from Com-
munism. By foot and by oxcart, carrying their former happiness and
future hopes on their backs, they made the long, hot trek to freedom.
(Cont.)
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Even after the deadline for overt movement had passed, they risked
grave dangers to board U.S. vessels waiting offshore.
They voted with their feet.
By 1957 -- just two and one-half years after the exodus -- the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam, with assistance from the United States, had largely
completed the important task of integrating these one million refugees
into a free society. An important fact of this exodus was the direction
of the mass refugee flow -- away from Communist domination.
But while the Government of South Vietnam was undertaking its monu-
mental task of relocating and caring for the million refugees from the
North, that same North was beginning its aggression within South Vietnam.
This aggression has since caused innocent civilians again to flee the
inhumanity that man often inflicts on his fellow man.
The mass emigration from the North to the South was "Phase I" of
the refugee situation in Vietnam: seeking refuge for political reasons.
The completion of Phase I of the refugee problem also marked the begin-
ning of Phase I of the Communists' plan to subjugate the South. This was
the creation of a basis for insurgency through political organization and
subversion.
Phase II of the Communists' plan to conquer South Vietnam -- terror
and guerrilla warfare -- commenced in earnest in 1959. Because the new
nation of South Vietnam was proving to be a success, North Vietnam trig-
gered a reign of terror against local officials and civilians in the
villages.
As this blatant aggression, called by the Communists "national lib-
eration," began to gnaw at South Vietnam's village structure, Phase II
of the refugee problem began: exodus from the horrors of guerrilla war.
This is the constant flux of refugees -- for the most part ethnic
South Vietnamese -- who flee from insecure areas to seek safety near or
in district and provincial capitals.
In 1962 and 1963, about 100,000 refugees fled Viet Cong terror in
Vietnam's rugged Central Highlands.
Since late 1964, more than 600,000 refugees have left insecure
areas.
In September of 1965, the Government of Vietnam reported that there
were about 400,000 Vietnamese in refugee status, with 300,000 of these
being in the Coastal Plains and Central Highlands area.
2 (Cont.)
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Why do these people flee?
The first, and perhaps the most important basic reason for the
present refugee flow is the terror campaign conducted in the villages
by the Viet Cong.
Since the beginning of the Viet Cong's terror-and-guerrilla Phase
II, fleeing and hiding have become a way of life for much of the popu-
lation at one time or other. The more the terrorism and the hit-and-
run attacks, the greater the number of refugees. The alternative to
fleeing is joining the Viet Cong -- submission.
In 1964, 1,728 civic officials were killed, kidnapped or wounded
by the Viet Cong. There were 11,746 plain civilians killed, wounded,
or kidnapped.
In the first eight months of 1965, casualties of officials through
Viet Cong terrorism numbered more than 600, and other civilian casualties
exceeded 6,000.
Why do the Viet Cong pursue terroristic methods against the people
whose minds they hope to win -- especially since the Viet Cong must de-
pend on the farmers in the villages for funds, food, shelter, intelligence,
and conscripts?
When the Viet Cong enter a village, they immediately try to win the
local inhabitants to their cause. Sometimes, however, to insure Com-
pliance, terror is liberally used against all potential opposition.
If the local teacher is teaching the children of his village to be
loyal to their government, the Viet Cong sternly warn him to stop it.
If the teacher continues, he is likely to be shot and his corpse may be
mutilated. If the village chief does not cooperate with the Viet Cong,
he too may be shot.
In addition to enforcing compliance, terrorism serves the equally
important function of disrupting the process of government and causing
the villagers to lose faith in the ability of the central government
to protect them.
Partly out of disenchantment with the Viet Cong and partly from
pure fear, many Vietnamese flee to areas where they hope to be safe --
sometimes only to have to take refuge again.
In mid-1965, the Viet Cong studiously avoided large-scale contacts
with U.S. and government forces because of their well-founded apprehen-
sion of superior firepower and mobility.
3 (Cont.)
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But while avoiding large-ecale attacks, the Viet Cong, reinforced
by infiltrators from the North, have maintained their terror attacks
on individuals and whole villages. They have continued their inter-
diction of roads and highways and have continued to prosecute the pro-
tracted warfare of the guerrilla.
There is, however, evidence of growing disenchantment among vil-
lagers who have heretofore complied with Viet Cong demands. There are
two reasons for this disenchantment: first, the Viet Cong have failed
to make good their promises to the people, and second, the horrors of
war are likely to follow wherever the Viet Cong intrude.
Another major cause of the increased refugee flow is nature her-
self. Natural disasters like floods often leave thousands homeless
and swell the refugee rolls. With the heavy monsoon rains swelling
Vietnam's rivers and swamps, there is a possibility of heavy flooding
again in late 1965, and a subsequent large increase in the number of
refugees.
Current emergency needs created by the refugee movement have been
met by assistance through relief centers of the Government of Vietnam,
by U.S. voluntary agencies, and through a wide variety of regular gov-
ernment provincial welfare and counterinsurgency programs supported by
the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The refugees assist the counterinsurgency effort by giving badly
needed information. The refugees are questioned, one at a time, as
they enter safe areas or camps, and information is obtained.
In the interior of Vietnam, the refugee problem has been made more
difficult by the harassment and interdiction by the Viet Cong of supply
routes and lines of communication. This blocks the movement of sup-
plies and causes the price of food to rise, creating further hardships
for both refugees and villagers who choose to remain.
If an area is under Viet Cong control temporarily, the government
urges people to move out. But if only small numbers of Viet Cong are
present, the government prefers that the people stay in the area. Re-
lief supplies are available for the refugees in the provincial capitals.
The refugee movement has had very little effect on the total war
effort in Vietnam.
Supplies generally have been adequate to handle the situation both
for the civilian and military personnel. Most of the people have been
fed, sheltered, and some medical care has been available.
The U.S. Government is currently expanding its efforts to help solve
the refugee problem.
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CPYRGHT
DAILY NEWS, TII;JRSD. Y \TOVE)IBgt 11, 1965
t
(New York)
25X1C10b
Staff Correspondent of Two ;claws
Half a world from Communist mortar burst and machine gun bullets that wracked
their bodies, 56 paraplegic Viet Namese soldiers found hope Tuesday at Castle Point
Veterans Hospital in the rolling hills overlooking,the Hudson River near Beacon, N.Y.
Within minutes after their huge 4` - - -- +
C-141 jet plane touched down at "I hope I can walk again, before
0 A.M. at Stewart Air Force Base, I go home,"
after a 26-hour flight from Viet Another soldier waved to news-
Nam, the soldiers and 14 Viet men and said: "U.S. okay." A
Namese medical corps personnel pretty Viet \amese nurse said
were driven to the white brick the men were all se "
hos ital. "happy" to be
matches of gray fog swept the here.
runway and a chill breeze cut, Dr. Rusk, director of the In-
through the clothing of dignitaries stitute of Physical ;Medicine and
waiting for the flying hospital. Rehabilitation of New York Uni-
The Viet Namese ambassador to versity, watched closely. It was
the U.S., Gen. Tien Thien Khiein, Rusk who had started the whole
former U.S. Ambassador to Viet project during a trip to Viet
Nam Maxwell Taylor and Dr. Nam.
Howard Rusk, who initiated the Before, There Was No Hope
new program, greeted the s' Idlers. He told how it was then,
A crowd of 300 stood silent as "There was no hope. The men
Air Force personnel lifted the were getting treatment in a small
litt
f
h
ers
rom t
e plane, brown hospital. The only piece of mod-
blankets strapped over each man. ern equipment I saw was a niece
They're Nervous at First
Shy, confused and extremely
boyish looking, the soldiers
glanced nervously around as their
litters were hoisted aboard buses
for the 30-minute trip to the hos-
pital.
"I hope I can be cured," said 2d 1 at which they can lead a produc-
Lt. Huynh Quang Nhuong softly. five life back home. Rusk will be
L. I., president of the PVA's east-
ern division.
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in charge of their retraining and
treatment here.
After his trip, Rusk told Presi-
dent Johnson of the soldiers'
plight, and Johnson provided
federal cooperation. The doctor
said he knew of no plans to bring
more here for treatment, though
he estimated there were 600 more
paraplegics in Viet Nast.
Person-toPeraon Support
Among the greeters, national
officers of the Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America, from their
wheelchairs, promised person-to-
person support. Vice President
Robert T. Rohrer promised to
take the Viet Namese 'Into our
z
+yau
e attached to a ., a.. a ioo4
which he manipulated for exer- With him were Harry A.
cise. The men were doomed unless , Schweikert Jr, of Washington,
they got proper treatment." D. C., executive secretary; Robert
If all goes well, he said, it will Classon of New York past na-
take. 120 days to get the least tional president, an' Sanford
injured of the men to the point Weinaimer of Valley Stream,
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Fact Sheet
December 1965
Non-Military Role of U.S. in Vietnam
[Excerpts from press coverage]
CPYRGHT
Beginning 4 November the U.S. began a massive air drop of 108,000 pounds
of food to 5,000 people, mostly refugees, at Tanh Linh in Binh Tuy Pro-
vince. The supplies originated with U.S. voluntary agencies including
CARE, Catholic Relief, the Mennonites and the U.S. AID Mission.
In the next few days this drop was followed by 9 A -123 drops into an
area swarming with Viet Cong units. (First drop witnessed by numerous
members of foreign and U.S. press.)
The drop included over 49,000 blankets, 60,000 pounds of clothing, 665
tons of Bulgar wheat, 175,000 aluminum roofing sheets, 28 half tons of
powdered milk, 132 tons of cooking oil, 650 tons of surplus corn in ad-
dition to tools, fertilizer and other supplies.
(The first drop was witnessed by numerous members of the foreign and
U.S. press and details of the contents were given by US AID spokesman
at a briefing on 4 November.)
A total of four air shipments were completed on 30 October to families
of FULRO trainees (organization of Montagnard tribesmen in SVN Y,igh-_
lands) in Banmethuot. The last shipment contained 2,250 blankets, and
25 metric tons of food.
On 31 October three U.S. manufactured (GE) generators each producing
1,500-KW, arrived in Saigon for the South Vietnamese people.
On 30 October Operation Friendship clothing arrived in Saigon. The
clothing, an unspecified amount, will be distributed by U.S. Special
Forces in the central coastal and highland provinces of Vietnam.
SPECIAL NOTE: as of the end of October 1965 refugees in South Vietnam
totalled 700,000.
See BPG #875 of 15 February 1965 on"Free World Support for South Vietnam"
and BPG #942 of 13 September 1965 on "The Refugee Problem in South Vietnam"
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Fact Sheet
December 1965
The Venezuelan Communists are Losing
The dramatic discovery on October 28, 1965 of an underground
Communist arms factory near Caracas, Venezuela served to highlight two
seemingly contradictory points: that the Venezuelan Government's anti-
Communist campaign is highly successful, and that the Communists are
far from beaten. The underground factory was used to manufacture weap-
ons, explosives, and other armaments for the Communist guerrilla forces.
Quantities of rifles, machine guns, grenades, bazookas, and explosives
were found in the underground installation. The galleries containing
the plant were three meters underground, lined with steel walls and
roofs, and secured by an electrically controlled sliding door of rein-
forced concrete. In the factory were expensive lathes, drill presses,
and other machines imported from Europe, the total value of which was
estimated at US $100,000. The entire installation was cleverly hidden
under a peasant hut. In the surrounding village, classrooms decorated
with flags bearing the Communist hammer and sickle were used for guer-
rilla training classes.
The discovery and capture of the underground plant constituted a
further step in the government's increasingly effective anti-Communist
campaign which has recently been marked by the capture of many of the
guerrillas, including major leaders, and the surrender of one of the
top rebels. But these successes also serve as reminders that the Com-
munists are not out of business and still represent a major threat.
The discovery of the underground factory probably did more than the
capture of a hundred guerrillas to emphasize the danger--because it was
the concrete proof of foreign support on a very large scale. No dis-
contented peasants, much less the poverty-plagued Venezuelan Communist
Party, ever built a $100,000 underground factory. This was clearly the
work of a rich, large, and well-organized international operation.
Venezuela is a country of some 8.7 million people, largely mestizos.
Its economy is growing rapidly -- 7% in 196+ -- and thus keeping ahead
of its burgeoning population, growing at 3% per annum. A notable problem
of Venezuela is the enormous migration of people from the rural districts
to the cities; today 71% of the people live in town and urban communities
compared to 28% just 29 years ago. The oil industry is the nation's
major source of income, contributing about 30% of the Gross National
Product, 90% of the total export earnings, and 66% of the government rev-
enues. This largely "unearned" income (the industry employs only 2% of
the labor force) is being wisely invested by the government in measures
for economic advancement. An impressive 25% of the national income has
been invested during recent years in three major sectors: agrarian re-
form to give land to the landless peasants; education -- to build schools
(Cont.)
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in city and countryside; and industrialization -- to decentralize wealth
and population outside Caracas and the Maracaibo oil center. An entire
new industrial complex is being built in the Orinoco River valleytsouth-
east of Caracas where a large steel works, utilizing remarkably pure ore
from an adjacent "iron mountain," and a large dam for hydroelectric power,
which will eventually surpass in power output the Aswan Dam, are the key
enterprises.
Despite the progressive and democratic nature of the Venezuelan
Government, and despite its solid achievements in bettering the lot of
the people, it is bitterly opposed by a determined band of Communists
intent on seizing power in order to rule the country according to their
narrow, doctrinaire precepts.
The Venezuelan Communist Party, which was founded in 1931, has spent
most of its existence underground. It flourished legally for a period
after helping in the overthrow of Marcos Perez Jimenez in January 1958.
But it began losing ground to the aggressive left-wing (though strongly
anti-Communist) government of Romulo Betancourt, leader of the Democratic
Action (Accion Democratica -- AD) Party. The PCV became more and more in-
volved in subversive and terrorist acts, to the point of attempting to
overthrow the government in late 1961, early 1962. The PCV established
a separate front for its more violent activities: the Armed Forces of
National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional -- FALN),
which in turn collaborated very closely with the Leftist Revolutionary
Movement (Movimiento de la Ezquierda Revolucionaria -- MIR), an extremist
group of outcasts from the AD.
A brutal terrorist assault on an excursion train in September 1963,
caused a full governmental crackdown on the PCV and MIR, resulting in
the arrest of many of its leaders. In retaliation the subversives
launched a campaign of intense violence which lasted during the entire
period of the election campaign from 4 October to 1 December 1963. They
used every means at their disposal to create disorder, sabotage the elec-
tions, and cause the military overthrow of the government. In the middle
of this period a cache of 3 1/2 tons of arms was found on a beach in
northwestern Venezuela and it was subsequently traced to Cuba. The arms
were intended for use in a planned terrorist assault on the central sec-
tion of Caracas and their discovery further embittered the campaign.
The chief Communist demand during the campaign was for boycott of the
election, hoping thereby to demonstrate their strength and the illegiti-
macy of the election. The turnout of'9O% of the eligible voters, despite
an active intimidation campaign by the Communists, and the clearcut elec-
tion of the AD candidate Raul Leoni as Betancourt's successor were severe
defeats for the Communists. Further, their concentration on violence led
to the loss of their residual popularity among the Venezuelan people and
the depletion of their leadership and material resources. The violence
has continued since the election, though never approaching the same
scale.
2 (Cont.)
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The FALN has a current estimated strength of 1800 men, of whom
approximately 500 constitute the rural guerrilla forces, 500 to 600
urban terrorist groups, and the remainder intelligence, support, smug-
gling and study groups. Surprisingly, the Communists receive almost
negligible support from the campesinos, and the rural guerrillas are
dependent on the urban groups for support of every kind. Perhaps equally
surprising is the fact that the urban Communist elements receive very
little support from organized labor. Out of a labor force of 2.5 million,
the Communist-dominated Single Central of Workers of Venezuela (Central
Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela -- CUTV) represents only about
100,000 workers.
The single most important source of strength for the Venezuelan
Communists is the student population. One-third of the membership of
the PCV consists of members of the Communist Youth of Venezuela (Juventud
Communista de Venezuela -- JCV), and it has been estimated that 70% of
the FALN's strength is composed of JCV members. Key FALN positions are
held by JCV leaders and many FALN units are made up exclusively of JCV
members. The common Latin American tradition of university autonomy
exists in Venezuela, whereby no authorities may enter the campus without
the approval of the university authorities, even to apprehend known crimi-
nals, and those other than students may seek refuge on the campus and be
immune from the police. This has made universities an ideal base for
leftist subversive operations. The Communists have taken full advantage
of this situation to use the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas
for holding party meetings and caucuses, printing and distributing propa-
ganda, manufacturing and storing arms, conducting para-military training
and terrorist operations, and hiding extremist refugees from the police.
Of the 18,000 students at Central University, between 30% and 40% sup-
port the PCV and MIR. Of the university's 2400 teachers, approximately
half are Communist and extreme leftists. The key Communist figure at
the university, and until 1964 head of the Department of Journalism, has
been Hector Mujica, a member of the Central Committee of the PCV. Com-
munist influence is accomplished chiefly through its control of the senior
administrative organization for student affairs and through its domination
of most of the university faculties.
Certainly the major element preventing Communist growth in Venezuela
has been the progressive and effective government of the country under
Betancourt and Leoni. Venezuela has not had a long tradition of demo-
cratic government. The election of Betancourt to the presidency was only
the second free presidential election ever held in Venezuela. The in-
auguration of Leoni as President in March 1964 marked the first success-
ful transfer of power from one freely elected government to another in
the nation's history. The Democratic Action Party of Betancourt and
Leoni finds its main support among the peasants and workers and its "re-
volutionary" programs have met with their continued approval. One of the
major programs of the government during recent years has been agrarian
3 (Cont.)
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reform, which has achieved the settlement of 78,000 families on an
estimated 1.8 million hectares of land since its inception in 1960.
In addition, in every Venezuelan state the government has embarked
on programs of farm-to-market roads, rural aqueducts, new schools,
and rural electrification. The campesino labor federation is one
of the nation's largest and most effective and the main political
parties vie with one another for campesino support. Up to now the
ruling Democratic Action Party has found, and has maintained, its
greatest strength among the campesinos.
The government's successful program to invest profits from
the oil industry to stimulate other economic development programs
has been widely approved by labor groups and their support has been
essential to the AD. There has also been an active slum clearance
program, although the flood of migrants to the cities has limited its
effectiveness. The government sponsored community improvement pro-
jects, and the army's civic action program have all contributed to
organized labor's confidence in the government.
Concomitantly with these progressive economic and social pro-
grams, Venezuela has initiated a large scale counter-insurgency cam-
paign. The anti-guerrilla effort in the countryside has been chiefly
carried out by the Army. After early mistakes in implementing this
program, which often served to irritate and alienate the peasants,
the Army has now developed an effective "neutralization" campaign de-
signed to assert, and then continuously maintain, governmental authority
over progressively larger areas in the key northwestern and northeastern
states. The guerrillas have been systematically forced farther back in-
to the hills and jungles and isolated from their urban support bases by
highly effective mobile roadblock operations.
The entire national police force was fired after the ouster of
dictator Jimenez in 1958 and has since been replaced with a new, more
honest, and reasonably efficient force which, with training and more
modern equipment is becoming a highly professional organization. Its
surveillance of the Communists has been a major factor in the Govern-
ment's success in dealing with the rebels. It received credit for the
arrest of several Communist couriers who were apprehended in April 1965
while trying to smuggle $300,000 into the country for the Communist
underground.
Thanks to the combined activities of the army and the police, over
100 guerrillas were captured in September alone and a number of their
leaders were apprehended in Caracas and elsewhere. On 16 October six
important leaders of the FALN from the states of Anzoategui and Bolivar
were captured and large quantities of documents and equipment, includ-
ing personnel records were seized.
(Cont.)
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That the government's counter-insurgency program is having its
effect is evident from the Communist-front press. The August 31,
1965
edition of the Communist-controlled weekly Que features an article
by
PCV Secretary General Pompeyo Marquez (using the pen name Carlos
Valencia) which provides the most authoritative call for a popular
front which has been recorded so far. Marquez insists that the drive
for what he calls "Democratic Peace" is a revolutionary line and de-
nounces the dogmatists for lacking perspective and as guilty of "in-
fantilism" in insisting on single-minded violence. He also acknowledges
that the people reject civil war and are tired of armed struggle. In a
later edition of Que (September 19), Marquez decries the critical situa-
tion which exists within the revolutionary movement and admits that it
has become "necessary to redirect the revolutionary cause to a zigzag
course, instead of following a straight line." In plainer terms this
means that the leadership of the PCV is coming to the conclusion that
violence is not working, recognizes it is out of step with the people,
and is about to change its emphasis by attempting to play up its non-
violent facet, temporarily playing down the guerrilla effort. The Com-
munist objective in the popular front policy obviously would be to lull
the Government and populace back into complacency and expand Communist
influence within the legal political party system until conditions are
deemed favorable for a resumption of armed struggle.
It is not certain to what degree the membership of the PCV and
MIR will agree to diminish the guerrilla struggle. Early in November
a band of seven armed guerrillas kidnapped and slew a locally prominent
AD member who was first vice president of a municipal council of the
district; an AD campesino leader was similarly assassinated on the same
date. President Leoni decried these acts as "treacherous, monstrous,
cowardly crimes." The Campesino Federation also denounced them and of-
fered to provide campesino manpower to bolster police and military forces
if needed. On balance it seems that the FALN actions more likely damaged
their cause than bolstered it -- particularly with the important campesino
population.
There is good reason to believe that the Venezuelan government will
not be deceived by this temporary shift in tactics. The very success of
the counter-insurgency program seems to have whetted the government's
appetite for winding up the Communist threat. The problems which remain,
however, are impressive. A band of only a few guerrillas can gun down a
traffic policeman or blow up an isolated pipeline with relative immunity.
And the essential source of Communism, the universities and liceos, re-
mains as acute a problem as ever, especially since 50% of the nation's
population is now under the age of 20.
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CPYRGHT
[Summary of Government program presented to the
National Assembly on 3 November by Premier Demirel]
25X1C10b
We heartily believe that a transition period has been concluded and a new
era, filled with light and hope, has opened in Turkey. This era will be
created and survive as the joint work of all citizens, without regard to
parties and factions. The main effort of our government in the political
field will be directed at achieving this end.
We rely on the Turkish nation and its faith in us to discharge these re-
sponsibilities. We are also confident that we shall derive strength from
the constructive criticism and timely warnings of other parties with whom
we have entered the service of the nation under this roof at the same time
as ourselves.
It is our inalterable aim to implement our constitution in the letter and
in the spirit. We consider it a leading duty to preserve the Ataturk re-
forms in every way. A dignified and secure life can only be accomplished
under a democratic regime and we consider the smooth operation of a regime
of freedom in our country as the crux of the whole problem.
Security and Freedom of Individual. We believe that the chief duty of the
state lies in safeguarding the security of life and property of the citizen,
and his freedom to work and to travel, and in preserving the security and
peace of the country. It is necessary to bolster the authority of the po-
lice and the gendarmerie, to promote reciprocal respect and trust in their
relations with the people, and to strengthen the inadequately staffed ranks
of the security forces in city centers and remote areas of the country. We
shall always dwell sensitively on the question of rendering beyond suspicion
the impartiality of the administration.
Current expenditures of the public sector amount to an important slice of
our budget and national income. We shall bring security of service to the
mass of civil servants. One of our leading goals lies in the reorganization
of the administration and, to develop independent rural administrations --
within the bounds of existing laws -- so as to provide speedy and effective
services to the population.
"It will be our most important duty to apply our laws in a manner befitting
their aims and spirit to save our regime and security from being hurt by
any kind of harmful tendencies -- particularly procommunist activities --
that were long known to operate by stealth but which recently were observed
to have taken to open action, and never to allow freedoms deriving from the
constitution to be used to annihilate freedom itself."
(Cont.)
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Freedom of Religion. Our government regards the freedom of religion
and the freedom of worship as a natural right of the citizen and be-
lieves that this right, like other natural rights, comes under the
protection of our constitution. "Our government holds the belief that
freedom of worship -- closely tied with the freedom of religion -- is
among the most natural rights of citizens. It is not possible to in-
terpret the principle of secularism of the constitution as aimed at
suppressing the religious needs of the citizens and as restricting the
freedom of religion and worship as well as of religious instruction."
Freedom of Press. "In the past 29 years there have been important changes
and developments in the Turkish press, and the Turkish press has come face
to face with tough problems. We believe that the state must help out in
solving these problems, without casting a shadow on the freedom of the
press. It will be the greatest privilege for us to be a supporter of our
press -- the greatest guarantee of a free society and of the democratic
system -- in every way. We shall include in our legislation measures be-
fitting the social security needs -- including unemployment insurance --
of the members of the press. The state will give the necessary support to
render the distribution of newspapers more speedy, consistent, and rational.
We are convinced of the necessity of an amnesty in offences connected with
the press.
Election Procedures. "While preserving the proportional representation
system in the election of National Assembly deputies, we intend to submit
to this great assembly a draft to prevent the defects clearly observed at
the recent application of the electoral law and to return the Senate elec-
tions to the majority system.
"At the same time we shall improve legislation to regulate the present
status which in practice subjects our country to the throes of elections
every year in such a manner as to enable elections to be held once every
two years at least." We shall change the basis of the implementation of
our penal code from punishment to reform and education.
Fiscal Policy. Our fiscal policy aims at increasing national savings to
help in a speedy economic reconstruction, to prevent imbalances such as
inflation and deflation in the economy, and to insure the distribution of
increased national income among citizens in accordance with the principles
of social justice.
We shall subject to a detailed review our direct and indirect taxation
systems and dwell on eliminating any aspects of taxation that have a nega-
tive influence on production in general. We believe that we should improve
the method of carrying out the provision of taxation laws.
"We are determined to stop the rise of public spending, both in volume and
in percentage of national income, and to put an end to a budget policy of
high expenditures and costs."
(Cont.)
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We shall operate state economic establishments in a more efficient manner
and insure their working toward creating greater economic resources for
our reconstruction. We shall insure that those of the state economic es-
tablishments that no longer need to be under state control may be gradually
passed to the control of the population and become their property as hold-
ings companies.
"We shall take in hand our foreign exchange legislation and the machinery
for the preservation of Turkish currency -- the principles of which were
laid down 25 years ago, but which remain essentially unchanged today. We
shall attenuate and liberalize -- to the extent that we may improve our
balance of payments -- the controls and restrictions in current transac-
tions and capital movements."
We shall make the necessary contributions from the state budget to meet
the needs of local administrations and municipalities which have insuf-
ficient sources of income to meet the services they have undertaken to
perform. "In the matter of monetary and credit policy, we shall follow
the road of holding ready for placing at the service of the economy pay-
ment media in sufficient volume to meet the needs of the reconstruction
and to preserve the internal fiscal stability of the country. We shall
rearrange and reinforce -- in the light of past experience -- the credit
control media of our central bank."
Economic Reconstruction. We believe that our economic reconstruction can
only be achieved in freedom. Our efforts in economic reconstruction aim
at a speedy increase in per capita income, at a balance between regions
and groups, and at the preservation of the stability of our economic and
social order.
"We strongly oppose the authoritarian mentality that turns individuals
into slaves of the political authority under the pretext of economic re-
construction and considers individuals a raw material that can be used
without regard to sentiment." The path of the modern Turkish state will
be entirely different from the methods of 19th Century capitalism. At
the same time, this path also is quite different from the hardened be-
liefs and systems of dogmatic socialism and communism that have been
proven as ineffective in the solution of complex problems. Therefore, we
believe in a system which does not pit the individual and the state against
each other but insures their cooperation.
"We oppose the view that a mixed economy is a transition period toward a
system of full statism, or into full collectivism. All economies in the
world are mixed economies. In our concept of the mixed economy, the eco-
nomic activities of the state and the public sector are obliged to help
and support the citizen in his efforts to achieve happiness and prosperity."
3 (Cont.)
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CPYRGHT
We believe that planned reconstruction is a constitutional institution
and that the democratic planning technology is a very effective method
in economic reconstruction. "We do not believe that there is any con-
nection -- either in application or in mentality or theory -- between
planning in democratic countries and statism.
"We do not share the outlook that considers the plan as a pretext for
irresponsibility, inactivity, and for turning one's back to the needs
of the citizen." We consider the plan as a national document to be
voluntarily accepted by the people as their own. Under a democratic
regime and in an economic structure based on the machinery of the mar-
ket, planning should be a guide, an illumination, and a spur to the
private sector. "A plan that dictates is incompatible with democratic
principles and the rule of the constitution."
Industrialization. The speedy industrialization of Turkey will be one
of the chief goals of our economic policy. We shall establish industrial
regions and provide low cost land and buildings to investors in these re-
gions. We shall work for the establishment and development of capital
markets to assist in the financing of large investments.
Cottage Industries. Attending to the difficulties and problems of cot-
tage industries and minor industries which play an extremely important
role in our country will be one of our main duties. The basis of our
policy toward this duty: to facilitate the acquisition of machinery
and tools by craftsnic.n, to assist in the acquisition of raw materials
at a lower price, to assist in marketing and exports, to establish pro-
totypes so as to control quality of products, to give every assistance
for small businessmen and craftsmen to acquire their own homes and busi-
ness premises, and finally to bring this community of workers within the
provisions of the social security system.
We shall continue expanding our factories for the production of cement,
sugar, paper and fertilizer and we shall establish new ones where neces-
sary.
We shall take necessary measures designed to assist in supplementing im-
ports and saving foreign exchange by making greater investments in vari-
ous fields such as liquid fuels, iron and steel, motorized transportation,
the oil industry, the aluminum industry, and the paper industry, and the
chemical industry. We shall begin work immediately for the establishment
of a third iron and steel works."
Social Security and Unemployment. To save the citizens from worrying
about the future is the basis of our social security ideal. "An unemploy-
ment insurance system will be established."
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CPYRGHT
"In our view social justice does not mean citizens enjoying or being
made to enjoy -- equal status in poverty and misery. It means insuring
that everybody receives a fair share of the increasing income and rising
prosperity, commensurate with his ability and the service he performs.
Government efforts to secure social justice through the abolition of
private ownership and by conducting a policy of enmity toward wealth
and the distribution of accumulating income and capital among individu-
als today have been relinquished even in the most doctrinaire countries.
To implement social justice the modern state has under its disposition
a number of tools, such as expanding social services in the service of
the people, free trade unionism, the establishment of wages and profit
sharing through collective bargaining, and so forth.
"The greatest injustice and inequality today is that of unemployment,
without a doubt. Therefore, we believe that a policy that creates a
large volume of work and opens up employment opportunities for the masses
is a policy that will stop unemployment -- the greatest source of misery
and the greatest instance of inequality in our community."
There are great differences in living and working conditions between many
parts of the country, particularly in the eastern and southeastern regions.
n increase in the prosperity of our people in poor regions will be pos-
sible by increasing industrial investments in these areas.
Transportation. Our government will attach great importance to the im-
provement and expansion of our highways, railroads, ports, and airports.
"The implementation of the project of the Istanbul Straits bridge, which
will serve the important duty of securing a highway link between Asia and
Europe, will be taken into consideration. The construction of the ferry-
oat service installations on both sides of Lake Van and the railroad line
etween Van and the Iranian border will be rapidly continued."
oreign Capital Investment. The historic experiences of other nations and
our very own experience clearly show the role and benefit of foreign capi-
tal in economic reconstruction. No nation in history has been able to
achieve a speedy reconstruction on the basis of the principle of autarky.
"Today, almost all the underdeveloped countries are engaged in speeding
p their development through foreign aid and foreign capital from one bloc
or another. Recently we witnessed the sight of certain collectivist eastern
European countries joining this movement in trying to secure capital from
western countries. In the present phase of our economic reconstruction we
ieed to supplement our internal resources by foreign capital in the form of
foreign exchange, in the proportion of one part of foreign capital to four
to five parts internal resources.
"Turkey is obliged to continue to make use of foreign capital for some
ime to come. Actually, there is no case of an autarkic policy based on
economic chauvinism and a closing of borders to foreign trade and to the
5 (Cont.)
A
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flow of foreign capital being followed anywhere in the world today. The
main goals of such organizations and institutions as GATT, the Interna-
tional Trade and Tariff agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the
European Economic Reconstruction Organization, and the Common Market --
in which Turkey currently participates as a member -- envisage the eco-
nomic cooperation of our nation with the other countries on the widest
possible scale.
"As economic development speeds up so do foreign capital movements take
place across the borders. Therefore, the movement of opposing foreign
capital that certain circles in our country are trying to instigate is
compatible neither with our short term reconstruction projects nor with
the foundation-'goals of economic units such as the Common Market which
we are preparing to join as a long-term aim. To speed up its economic
reconstruction, Turkey is obliged to develop its foreign trade quickly
and to strengthen its foreign exchange reserves by balancing its foreign
payment deficits.
We consider opposition to foreign capital as opposition to the speedy re-
construction of the country and to the establishment of closer economic,
commercial, and technical ties between Turkey and the Western World.
National Resources: Oil. "The basis of our oil policy is this: To meet
the country's complete needs for oil and oil products from our own na-
tional resources as soon as possible; to save the great sums paid abroad
for the importation of oil; and to turn Turkey, in a short time, into a
exporter of crude and refined oil and oil products. Our oil resources
will be developed -- taking all measures dictated by national interests.
The investment of adequate and productive investments in areas of activity
-- such as the determination of oil reserves, prospecting, production,
transport, processing, and distribution of oil -- will be encouraged.
"A new national refinery will be established to enable us to stop import-
ing refined oil and to import crude oil from the most advantageous sources.
"The oil we shall be obliged to import until national output reaches a
level sufficient to meet national needs will be purchased at the most
suitable prices possible. Priority will be given to investments in the
petrochemical and artificial fertilizer industries to enable us to make
use of oil industry byproducts. The construction of the oil pipeline will
be quickly completed and our domestic oil production, which has been re-
stricted by road transport, will be rapidly increased."
Mining A new mining law will be prepared and brought to the assembly in
the shortest possible time to encourage the development of mining in our
country. A mining bank will be established. Unsatisfactory production
will be replaced by high-productivity and high-capacity modern production.
A long-term and comprehensive program will be drawn up to prevent the ob-
jectionable use of wood and organic fertilizer for fuel and to use coal
and oil products.
6 (Cont.)
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CPYRGHT
"We consider it the most hallowed of all national duties to assist and
support our armed forces to perform their noble duty in tranquillity
-- removed from all kinds of political influence and currents and with-
in their own order and command setup -- to defend the security of the
country and of democracy. We shall take every measure to enable our
armed forces to develop in accordance with modern practices and needs
and to enable them to reach a satisfactory level of efficiency.
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