BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 16, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : Cl 1A000300040004-2
SIgnifficant Dates
AUG.
30 II World Population Conference, Belgrade, 30 Aug-10 Sept.
SEPT.
1 Germany invades Poland: World War II begins. 1939.
8 10th Congress, Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe,
Brussels, 8-12 September (pro-west).
10 III annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra: postponed;
no date set.
10 Continental Congress for Self-Determination of Peoples and of Solidarity
with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Santiago, Chile 10-12 Sept. Gov-
ernment ban on foreign communist representatives.
13 III Arab Summit, Casablanca.
13 International Memorial Day for Victims of Fascism, annually celebrated
by communist Inter'l Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR).
14 UN GA calls for USSR "to desist from repressive measures" in Hungary
and adopts report of Special Committee. 1957.
17 USSR invades Poland. '1939-
19 Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist).
20 USSR grants sovereignty to East Germany. Tenth anniversary. 1955.
21 People's Republic of China proclaimed. 1949.
28 Friedrich Engels born (14-5 years ago) 1820. Dies 5 Aug 1895.
28 First International founded, London. 1864. Disintegrates by 1872.
28 USSR and Germany conclude "Friendship and Boundary" Treaty. 1939.
28 USSR and Estonia sign, 101-year pact which "shall not in any way infringe
sovereign rights of parties..." 1939. Infringed, June 1940.
1 First Soviet Five Year Plan begins. 1928.
1 Federation of Nigeria becomes independent. Fifth anniversary. 1960.
3 20th anniversa , adoption of statute of World Federation of Trade
Unions WFTU at founding congress, Paris, 3 Oct 1945. (Communist)
8 6th WFTU Congress, Warsaw, 8-22 Oct.
14 Russia signs treaty with Finland, recognizing Finnish independence and
sovereignty. 1920.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 ? I 78-03061A000300040004-2
25X1
GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#59
Principal Developments:
Commentary
21 July-3 August 1965
1. The Chinese heavily and repeatedly attack the Soviets on familar
themes (largely related to Vietnam) such as "the Khrushchev revisionist
line of capitulation, betrayal, and split," and "Soviet-U.S. collaboration
for domination of the world," -- in a 2-page Peking editorial, an authori-
tative People's Daily "Observer" commentary on the Helsinki WPC, remarkably
militant speeches by Chinese delegation chief to the "11th World Conference
against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs" in Tokyo, and an unprecedentedly criti-
cal speech by the Chinese Trade Union delegation chief to the Japanese
Sohyo convention in Tokyo. They publish the 7th volume of Khrushchev's
Statements without editorial comment. They also publicize another article
from Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese dissidents in Australia, parroting
not only the Chinese line on Soviet-U.S. collaboration to dominate the
world but also their charge that K revisionism in the USSR has its social
basis in the new privileged stratum. The Albanians continue their running
fusillade, including a new charge that "the K troika is prepared to sacri-
fice the GDR."
2. On the other side, the Soviets continue their one-sided moratorium
on polemics. They publish two restrained articles of note: a 27 July
Pravda article exhorting the Social Democrats of the Socialist International
to "discard anti-Communist prejudice" and join the Communists in joint ac-
tions opposing U.S. aggression; and a 30 July Red Star editorial affirming
the CPSU's resolute struggle against -- inter alia -- "manifestations of
nationalism in the countries of socialism, in the workers and Communist
movement.'
3. Belgrade's Borba on the 30th turns Peking's "privileged stratum"
charge back against the Chinese, describing the million "socialist capi-
talists" in China, "some who draw many thousands of yuan per month while
the national average of wages in China ranges between 50 and 60 ... live
in rich apartments, drive expensive automobiles .. (etc.)."
4. The annual "world conferences against A & H Bombs" in Japan are
again split along lines of the Sino-Soviet conflict, with the World Peace
Council, the Soviet Peace Committee, and other Soviet-aligned groups boy-
cotting the "11th World Conference" meeting from 27 July to 2 August under
sponsorship of the Chinese-line, JCP-controlled Gensuikyo. After the belli-
cose Chinese speech mentioned above, the. conference adopted resolutions
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
66*9*
(Commentary Cont.)
 Approved For Release 20 RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
fully supporting major Chinese -- and Indonesian -- policy positions,
including "crush Malaysia!" The rival Soviet-line, JSP-controlled
Gensuikin conference will meet 11 August, with WPC and Soviet repre-
sentation expected,...
5. The pro-Chinese dissidents supporting the semi-monthly Rote
Fahne (Red Flag) announce establishment of a preparatory committee -
for founding a new Marxist-Leninist CP in Austria: they appeal for
support to "workers" and socialists as well as Communists.
6. The pro-Chinese dissident Swiss CP launches an appeal "to all
revolutionaries, Marxist or not," to forma new "Revolutionary Inter-
national." Protesting against the",superiority complexes" of both
Moscow and Peking, the :P C.S' indicates that the new international
would create a third force between "the to hostile brothers" and pre-
dicts that it will be set up early in August "somewhere in Europe."
7. Italian Communists are engaged?in a new discussion of "the
crisis in Marxism" on the pages of PCI illustrated weekly Vie Nuove
(New Ways).
Significance:
The furious Chinese onslaughts against the Soviets in mass meetings
of international front organizations as well as in their own media con-
tinue to widen the gulf between the protagonists -- and, it seems likely,
to drive more and more sympathizers on both sides toward "third-force,"
neutral, or "plague on both your houses" positions. We will watch care-
fully for possible reactions to the reported initiative of the Chinese-
sympathizing dissident Swiss CP toward the formation of a new "Revolution-
ary International," which seems to be a manifestation of such a drift
toward middle ground between the egocentric "hostile brothers."
If there were ever any doubt about the purpose of the Soviet initia-
tive in urging a rapprochement between the Communists and the Social
Democrats in Western Europe, as signaled by the 1+ February 1965 Veber
article in Pravda, it has now been starkly revealed by the 27 July Pravda
article by the same author calling on these Social Democrats to join the
Communists in opposing U.S. "aggression."
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(Commentary Cont.)
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
#59 21 July-3 August 1965
May-June--July (delayed, and continuing): A fresh discussion of "the crisis
in Marxism' by Italian Communists, precipitated by a statement in the 3 May
issue, No. 22, of the PCT illustrated weekly Vie Nuove (New Ways), con-
tinues on through No. 29 of 22 July. Participants are the initiator, pro-
minent PCI writer Pier Paolo Pasolini who conducts a regular column in
the weekly under the heading Dialogue with Pasolini," and his correspond-
ents. Pasolini's most revealing statement to date is in No. 24+, 17 June,
as he replies to a rebuttal by Lamberto Guidotti. After cautiously acknow-
ledging the possibility that he is "projecting a personal internal crisis
and converting it into a non-existent crisis of Marxism" and affirming
that in any case he is still a good Marxist and writes "full of sincere
good intentions," Pasolini goes on:
"Having said this, I must persist in saying that a real crisis
of Marxism -- it would be better to say 'of the Marxist parties' --
does indeed exist. I shall confine myself to listing a number of
actual facts:
(a) The violent and sometimes profoundly alarming polemic be-
tween China and the USSR, which has split the traditional
"intercommunist nation" in two.
(b) The resultant break between the CPs of poor or underde-
veloped nations and the CPs of industrialized nations.
(c) The still partly mysterious deposition of Khrushchev....
(d) The evil triumph of Stalinism in all Marxist parties....
(e) The alarming political situation in many socialist countries,
where Communist governments faced by very serious, urgent prob-
lems have failed to 'continue' the revolution and have taken
strong, highly centralized positions.... The position of
writers and of intellectuals in general is very difficult and
.in some cases precarious. Furthermore, some middle-class at-
titudes that never quite died out have revived (for example,
minority nationalism such as Slovakian, Transylvanian, etc.,
which seem sadly ridiculous phenomena).
(f) The dramatic situation in the PCF [French CP], a party that
has clung to a politically archaic mentality, steeped in a kind
of rationalism borrowed from rigid and moralistic liberalism.
One symptom of its crisis is the demise of the intelligent pub-
lication of the French Communist youth (the pro-Italian) Clarte,
a demise decreed by Communist officialdom.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300QC4l0004;?iogy Cont . )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(h) The marginal position into which the PCI has been forced in
Italy in recent years, for the center of the stage has been oc-
cupied by a struggle between a potential labor group (the
center-left) and budding conservatism (the Milanese liberalism
of neo-capitalism). Symptoms of the PCI's involuntarily marginal
position are its efforts to regain a place at the center of the
political struggle: its dialogue with Catholicism (designed
to overcome the temporary Catholic-Socialist alliance) and the
project for a 'single party.'
As you see, I have simply listed harsh facts.... If you think
that this is a matter of the usual continuous crisis, like unending
evolution or the unceasing need to adaptto ever-changing historical
reality, etc., you are being dishonest with yourself. For in doing
this, you are ignoring the real situation....
I must say, furthermore, that your own letter confirms my be-
lief that the rank and file of the Party are only vaguely aware of
the real crisis through which the CPs are passing right now.... The
Communist elite and the intellectuals talk of nothing else.... Yet
the rank and file ... go on fooling themselves with their old opti-
mism about proto-Marxism, etc., etc...."
June 15 (delayed): Rote Fahne (Red Flag), semi-monthly organ of pro-
Chinese dissident Austrian Communists, announces that "a meeting of 42
activists of this magazine" in Vienna 12 June 1965, condemning the "re-
visionist degeneration" demonstrated by the 19th Congress of the Austrian
CP, "constituted itself as the preliminary 'Central Preparatory Committee'
for the founding of a new CP in Austria," -- "a revolutionary, con-
sistently M-L, really Communist Party." It lists 11 members of a "busi-
ness management office," with Franz Strobl designated as initiator.
"The success of the work of the preparatory committee will es-
sentially depend on the extent to which it manages to involve left-
wing socialists and revolutionary-minded unaffiliated individuals,
particularly young people, in addition to revolutionary and class-
conscious individuals.
The conference further decided to change the subtitle of Rote
Fahne to "Tribune of the Austrian Marxist-Leninists" (from "Tribune
of the M-Ls in the Austrian CP").
July 10 (delayed): Finnish CP daily Kansan Uutiset carries a forthright
discussion of peaceful transition" by George Paile.
"... I believe that the socialistic system will gain many new sup-
porters if we clearly acknowledge the boundaries of political con-
flict set by the present constitution and legislation. The fear
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300S40ZB$112gy Cont. )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
that the Communists would not play by the rules of our modern demo-
cracy is one of the reasons for our political alienation.
If we acknowledge peaceful transition to be morally binding,
then we also have to acknowledge that no single party in Finland
can bring about socialism. The only possibility is cooperation
with other socialists, and this in its turn would mean ... that we
accept the existence of several other parties. Also, the question
of a particular party's'leading position' has to be seen in an en-
tirely new light. Can one speak of cooperation if one simultane-
ously emphasizes one's own 'leading position". ... Peaceful and
democratic transition means also the rightful existence of a po-
litical opposition.... The peaceful return from socialism to the
old system must also be possible if the required majority so desires.
If these rights are acknowledged, then the talk about the dictator-
ship of the proletariat is useless...."
July 21 30: Paris independent daily Le Monde carries items concerning
a new initiative launched by the Chinese-sympathizing dissident Swiss CP.
First is an AFP dispatch datelined Geneva, 20 July, reporting the launch-
ing by the PCS of an appeal "to all revolutionaries, Marxist or not," for
the creation of a new Revolutionary International" uniting "all parties
or groups desiring to struggle against imperialism."
"At the same time, the PCS arises violently ainst the superi-
ority complexes of Moscow as well as Peking.'
This appeal, which especially noted the support of 'Belgian,
German, English, Spanish, French, Italian, and American comrades,'
affirms that the idea of a new pro-Chinese International is hence-
forth set aside.
'In effect,' declares the PCS Central Secretariat, 'it is not
fair that Moscow or Peking manifests such superiority complexes and
preempts, under various guises more or less biassed or egocentric,
the role of ruler of the Communist w,prld. The two hostile brothers
are too involved in maintaining and deepening their divergences to
have the right to dominate anybody and to give advice and orders
that they themselves do not follow....'"
In an article on the 30th, LM acknowledges a letter from the PCS,
rebutting criticism in a 27 July latter to the editor:
"As of 15r?July 1965, 311 cards have been delivered to members, and
our records indicate a larger number of cards delivered to sym athizers.
After all, we have never pretended to be thousands. It is true that as
long as our party defended only the theses of the Chinese comrades, re-
cruitment was difficult. Now that we have opted for a Communist path
adapted to Swiss realities and possibilities, it is much less difficult
for us to find new adherents."
3 (Chronology Cont.)
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
LM adds that in the remainder of the letter this new way is de-
fined as a "clear and independent line" showing that the signatories
"desire to e neither slaves nor robots." And finally, the PCS announces
that a new "revolutionary international" will be set up at a conference
"somewhere in Europe during the early part of Au ust.
r 22: Peking announces publication of Volume 7 of Statements by Khru
shchev, containing 98 of his speeches, reports, etc. from July to December
1957.
Jury 24: The Rumanian CP ends its Congress (see #58, July 18 and con-
tinuing) without an outbreak of polemical warfare among its mutually
hostile guests.
July 27; Peking daily Ta Kung Pao devotes two pages to a comprehensive
article on The Struggle Between the Two Lines over the Question of Deal-
ing with U.S. Imperialism," by Fan Hsiu-chu. After castigating the
"Johnson doctrine" as "neo-Hitlerism," the article turns on "the Khru-
shchev revisionists ... (who) have degenerated into the lowest flunkies
of U.S. imperialism."
"Both K and his successors who claim to be M-Ls are filled with
awe before U.S. imperialism. They have vociferously attacked Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that imperialism is a paper tiger and
distorted Lenin's famous saying that iriperialism is a colossus with
feet of clay....
The K revisionists are blind to the strength of the world's
revolutionary people and regard U.S. imperialism as almighty....
The counter-revolutionary black thread of Soviet-U.S. cooperation
for world domination runs through their whole set of revisionist
policies, be they peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, or
peaceful competition.
.... Their words and deeds are hardly different from those
of the U.S. imperialists....
They profess support for the national liberation movements in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but when it comes to deeds, they
undermine them....
... By repeatedly capitulating to U.S. imperialism, what the
K revisionists have received is humiliation and again humiliation.
'While the drooping flowers pine for love, the heartless brook
babbles on.' And so the joint domination will end in nothing else
than the K revisionists being dominated by U.S. imperialism...."
Pravda features an article by A. Veber (author of the noteworthy
4 February Pravda article urging collaboration of Communists with Social
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : 8IA-RDP78-03061A00030D848Q82 Cont. )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Democrats in the West, #47) and A. Chernyayev exhorting the Socialist
International to "discard anti-Communist prejudice, and, at all levels
where social democrats have influence, demand that the U.S. Government
stop interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam and also of other
peoples fighting for national independence and social progress, and that
it stop supporting rotten puppet regimes which are selling the interests
of their countries."
"The question ... is not one of discussing ideological differ-
ences, not of a political rapprochement, but of the elementary duty
of all democratic to join their efforts toward preserving peace, in
the face of the worsening international situation caused by U.S. ag-
gression. Joint actions of socialists and Communists in this field
could be a good example to all other democratic forces of the world."
July 27 and continuing: The annual "world conferences against atomic and
hydrogen bombs" in Japan are again split along lines of the Sino-Soviet
conflict. The ''11th World Conference" sponsored by the Chinese-line,JeP'=.iC-P_
controlled Gensuikyo meets in Tokyo 27 July-2 August, while the Soviet-
line, JSP-controlled Gensuikin conference is scheduled for 11 August.
Despite a 10 June Gensuikyo letter -- released on 26 July -- to the Soviet-
controlled World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee urging them
"not to attend any splittists' meeting but to attend the 11th World Con-
ference," there is no representation from the WPC, the SPC, or any other
Soviet-aligned group. (NCNA claims, however, attendance by the largest
number of foreign delegates in its history: 169 from 4+7 countries.)
KYodo reports from Moscow on 27 July that the Soviet Union will not at-
tend either of the meetings in Japan this year, according to "a Soviet
CP source." Tokyo Asahi on the 29th reports that the World Peace Council
will not send delegates to either meeting but will send messages to both
-- and that Gensuikyo responded with a statement that it will not accept
such a message from the WPC!
The 28 July speech of Chinese chief delegate Liu Ning-i was remark-
ably bellicose for a "peace assemblage":
"Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said that 'the atomic bomb is a
paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It
looks terrible, but in fact it isn't.'...
Scared out their wits by U.S. imperialist blackmail, the lead-
ing clique in another nuclear power ... did not hesitate to betray
the interests of the people of the whole world in order to concoct
the notorious Moscow tripartite treaty in partnership with U.S. and
British imperialism. This capitulationist line of yielding to the
nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism is the diametric opposite of
the correct line which this movement has persisted in all along....
5 (Chronology Cont.)
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Lately these greatest splitters have suddenly changed their
tune and have been calling out for 'unity.'...
Are we supposed to unite with them to promote the general line
of 'peaceful coexistence' for purposes of Soviet-U.S. cooperation
for the domination of the world?...."
The three resolutions adopted support all major Chinese--and Indonesian
--positions, including Conefo, "the world cj~nference for the liquidation of
foreign military bases to be held at th this year in Djakarta," and
"the peoples of Malaya--including Singapore and North Kalimantan -- in
their just struggles to crush Malaysia and for national liberation!"
(Japan Times on 4 August carries a Gens uikin announcement that a
Soviet delegation will participate in their conference.)
July 28: Two Albanian dailes carry anti-Soviet articles:
-- Zeri I Popullit: "The Helsinki Congress -- A Stern rebuff to the
Capitulationist Line of the K. Revisionists," by Thanas Nano, head
of the Albanian Peace Committee delegation to the Helsinki World Peace
Congress.
-- Zeri I Rinise: "Another Divisive Move by the Soviet Revisionists
in the International Youth Movement," unsigned, pegged to the
"thoroughly erroneous resolution imposed on" the IPC at Tampere to
postpone the World Youth Festival scheduled to open that day in Algiers
to an unspecified date and location in 1966 (see #58).
July 29: NCNA publicizes an article from the July issue of Vanguard, organ
of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), entitled he K Modern
Revisionists Are Going Further Down the Road of Revisionism."
"Some Australians did not believe Australian M-Ls when they said K
had deserted the cause of socialism and that K revisionism had its
social basis in a privileged stratum in the Soviet Union composed of
high-paid technicians,etc.
Since those days, just a few years ago, many facts have emerged
to demonstrate the truth of this.... These people do not want in any
way to disturb their peaceful life nor their positions of wealth,
power and privilege. They seek to collaborate with U.S. imperialism
because they fear that failure to collaborate ... will lead to war
and thus upset their positions of wealth and privelege. This reason-
ing is extended into direct U.S.-Soviet collaboration to dominate the
world....
July 30: A Moscow Red Star (Soviet Army daily] editorial "In the Spirit
of Proletarian Internationalism" includes the following passage:
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030QCA 8fl6I;gy Cont. )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
"The CPSU and other M-L parti.es are waging a resolute struggle
against the militant nationalism of monopolistic capital, great-power
chauvinism, and racism, as well as against manifestations of national-
ism in the countries of socialism, in the workers and Communist move-
ment...."
Belgrade Borba prints a Peking dispatch by Tanyug correspondent
Bogunovic headed 'One Million Socialist Capitalists:"
"...The Chinese road toward socialism differs from many others, al-
lotting to the national bourgeoisie even today a rather important
political and economic function in the socialist building of Chinese
society....
There are,among the 1 million of these 'socialist capitalists,'
some who draw many thousands of Yuan per month, while the national
average of wages in China ranges between 50 and 60 yuan per month.
They live in rich apartments, drive expensive automobiles, and
frequently receive Western journalists.... The reason for this
Chinese policy is that the CCP wanted to keep as many as possible
of the bourgeois intelligentsia in their leading posts in industry
and trade.... The sum of about 1 billion dollars alone, which the
Chinese working class has almost entirely paid to its bourgeoisie,
shows the true aspect of this phenomenon...."
French CP daily L'Humanite carries without comment an AFP report of
the remarks disparaging Soviet aid to Vietnam made by Chairman of the
Chinese A-A Solidarity Committee, Liao Che_ng_ chi, identifying him only
as "a high Chinese personality" (see #58, July 15 for details) and adding
that the story was "confirmed by an East European source." APP's report
added that the Soviets, "displeased by the obstacles Peking put in the way
of transit for its material to Vietnam," were told by the Chinese: "You
delivered your rockets to Cuba by sea, didn't you? All right, do the same
for Vietnam; L'Humanite followed this report with a Tokyo dispatch on
the "World Conference against Atomic Weapons," noting that it had refused
to accept messages from the WPC and the SPC and adding that it had con-
demned all nuclear tests "except those of China."
July 31: Peking People's Daily carries an authoritative Observer com-
ment on the "fierce and complicated struggle" against "the line of capitu-
lation,betrayal, and split" advocated by the K revisionists at the Helsinki
World Peace Congress. Again, the Chinese vividly describe the wide range
of unscrupulous tactics used by the Communist professionals at these front
meetings:
":.. For fear of revealing more of their ugliness, they (the K re-
visionists) concealed their bag of U.S. tricks and asked others to
peddle these tricks, while they themselves brandished the baton --
Approved For Release 2005/06/13: (TIA-RDP78-03061AOOd$`0UV4906W~2 Cont. )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
behind the scenes. They did their utmost to dominate the Congress,
suppress democracy, forbid consultations, restrict speeches, and
tamper with the documents of the Congress. They even went so far
as to try to interrupt the speeches not to their liking by pounding
the table, stamping their feet, yelling, booing, and singing...."
TASS, announcing the departure of the Indonesian CP delegation headed
by Chairman Aidit which had stayed in the USSR from 6 to 31 July, says only
that they "had an exchange of opinion on the major problems of the world
situation, the ICM, as well as relations between the CPSU and the PKI."
August 1: Speaking to the 28th convention of the Japanese General Council
of Trade Unions (So o) in Tokyo, Tang Chang of the A11--China Federation
of Trade Unions denounces "certain people (who)are working strenuously for
a conspiracy to bring about peace talks in serving the purposes of Lyndon
Johnson's fraud of unconditional discussions.
"While giving sham support to the Vietnamese people, they are
engaged in a real betrayal. We must relentlessly expose and condemn
their dirty work...."
Tang added: "I am shocked by and deplore the draft program of
action (of Sohyo) ... which attacked China by name for its nuclear
test...."
AsahiEvening News comments: "His speech marked the first time a
representative of a foreign country has criticized Sohyo's action policy
during the labor federation's national convention."
August 2: In an article on the 20th anniversary of the Potsdam conference,
Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit charges that "the Khrushchevite troika
is prepared to sacrifice the GDR, and to cause more serious harm to the
cause of socialism and peace."
Au ust 3? French CP daily L'Humanite features a "Proclamation" dated 28
July and signed by Hocine Zahouane, former member FLN Politburo, calling
on the Algerian people to resist the instigators of the 19 June coup.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004r2nology)
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/1 [ P78-03061A000300044QO ust 1965
936 WH. PROMOTING THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
25X1
SITUATION: The Comite Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso
(CIAP -- Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress) was created
by the Inter-American Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) at its meeting in Rio 29
October-16 November 1963. The CLAP was originally suggested by former
presidents Juscelino Kubitschek, of Brazil, and Alberto Lleras Camargo, of
Colombia, and in response to growing criticism of the lack of progress in
the Alliance. It is composed of a chairman, Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, of
Colombia, and representatives from seven member countries. The U.S. repre-
sentative is Walt Whitman Rostow, chairman of the State Department Policy
Planning Council.
Among the many functions of CLAP are: to examine Alliance problems;
evaluate annually the amount of financing required by Latin American de-
velopment, and survey the progress of the national and regional plans. The
fourth anniversary (17 August) of the signing of the Charter of Punta del
Este comes as CIAP has just begun an intensive country-by-country survey of
progress made during the year. The first country to come under review was
Argentina. Next on the Committee's agenda during the month of August are
Haiti, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. Progress and problems of all
other countries in the Alliance will be examined before the end of the year.
It will be recalled that the initial optimism generated by President
Kennedy's dramatic announcement of 13 March 1961 was followed by a period
of disillusionment. Alliance early accomplishments fell far short of the
high hopes generally held for it in Latin America. For one thing, most
people expected far too much far too soon; for another, per capita income,
as a meaningful indicator pf progress, actually began to show a slight de-
cline in the area as a whole and an alarming drop in certain countries.
Now, after four years, although none of the major goals has yet been
attained, progress in the last year has been encouraging. Most important,
perhaps, the per capita income rose from $300 for 1963 to $306 for 1964.
This represents a per capita growth rate of 2% -- less than the minimum
goal of 2.5% set by the Charter but more than the 15 year average of 1.7%.
All 19 countries under review have made efforts to adopt tax reforms and
improve the administration of tax collection. More than half have sub-
mitted national development plans -- still one of the bottlenecks in govern-
ment-to-government financing. Most of the countries have passed agrarian
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
0040"E- (936 cont.)
 Approved For Release 2 -RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
reform laws, although nowhere has the prescription been appropriate to
the problem, and agricultural production continues low in the area as a
whole.
But despite these few optimistic signs, the Alliance is still plagued
by the same fundamental ills that have inhibited its progress from the
beginning. It was originally contemplated in the Charter that the bulk of
the capital needed for development would come from the private sector; that
is, private firms would invest new capital in Latin America in the form of
new industry. Unfortunately, this most important aspect of the Alliance
has been the most conspicuous failure, and it is the least talked about
because the root causes are the political and social conditions for which
the Latin American people and their leaders are largely responsible. For
example, government instability, threats of nationalization, harassment of
private enterprise, discriminatory laws, corruption at all levels of govern-
ment, have combined to keep foreign capital out and cause domestic capital
to seek better investment conditions elsewhere. In one of his last speeches,
President Kennedy said in Miami on 18 November 1963:
"If encouraged, private investment, responsive to the needs, the
laws, and the interests of the nation, can cooperate with public activi-
ty to provide the vital margin of success; as it did in the development
of all the nations of the. West, including my own."
And he added, undoubtedly thinking of the Latin American capitalists who in-
vest their money abroad:
"There can be no progress if people have no faith in tomorrow."
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/19, -03061A000300Cj_,t0% -t? t 1965
937 AF, FE, NE.
25X1
SECOND AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
BANDUNG II
SITUATION: On the heels of the June coup in Algeria, the second
Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung II) was postponed until 5 November; the
Foreign Ministers' session until 28 October. The permanent preparatory
committee's decision defeated Algerian and Chicom-Indonesian efforts to
proceed according to schedule and accorded with the more or less univer-
sal interest in postponement, indefinite or otherwise. The disappearance
of Ben Bella and quick Chicom-Indonesian recognition of the Boumedienne
regime have caused adverse reactions, particularly among the Arabs and
Africans. As a result, not only Asian moderates, but also and more sur-
prisingly, radicals, notably Ghana and the UAR, may for different reasons
find excuses or take steps that could further delay the Conference.
The Radicals. For example, Ghana announced on 23 July that the
Organization for African Unity (OAU) Summit in Accra would not take place
in September but instead would begin on 21 October. This proximity of the
OAII gathering to the scheduled date of the Afro-Asian Conference coupled
with the concurrent session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
could pose, perhaps, insurmountable logistical and policy problems for the
Africans. The Algerians seem to regard the?Ghanaian move as an attempt to
have the Conference moved out of Algiers. In an apparent effort to marshal
continued support for the convening of the Conference in Algiers, the
Algerian foreign office on 24 July gave a briefing on the current status
of preparations to the Afro-Asian chiefs of mission in Algiers.
In their drive to get the Conference underway as soon as possible
the Chicoms have focused their efforts on the Arabs and Africans. Their
pre-emptive measure in June was successful. in postponing the meeting until
the fall: this initiative through the preparatory committee prevented
indefinite postponement by the foreign ministers' session which would have
meant the end for the committee and, perhaps, for the Conference itself.
The Chicom drive to ensure that there will be a Conference this fall began
before they left Algiers in June.
They will continue to take steps to redress Arab or African disaffec-
tion and counter closer moderate cooperation. Since the "Africa-is-ripe-
for-revolution" line and speedy recognition of Boumedienne have been some-
what counter-productive, they will probably be generally more cautious
and less blatant in their dealings with Arabs and Africans; even assigning
a good portion of the action roles to their Indonesian and Pakistani friends.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Sni?o i : -i- (937 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 20 RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio went to Africa in late July, but
even here discussion of the Conference appears to have been buried in
broader discussions. The Chicoms could be confronted by a conflict be-
tween their objectives and Indonesia's: The Chicoms are opposed to a
radical rump session, but the Indonesians would probably accept it since
they label the Conference a step on the road to a Conference of Newly
Emerging Forces (CONEFO), currently Sukarno's pet idea. Still another
postponement would jeopardize the current plan for CONEK dAiring the
summer of 1966.
The Moderates. Arab and radical African steps to delay the Confer-
ence would obviously be welcomed by the moderates. Some moderates feel
that the truly unprecedented cooperation' within their ranks was instru-
mental in achieving postponement, and they look to increased cooperation
between the Far Eastern group and the Indian-led South Asia bloc. Other
estimates point to Indian-Ceylonese supported actions at the abortive June
gathering as the only effective ones, although they were defensive in
character. Significantly, the Ethiopian draft, with some changes to suit
the radicals,. was the basis for the preparatory committee's communique on
postponement. Currently, Japan, India and Ethiopia are planning discus-
sions before the Conference but dissensions seem to exist between CENTO
moderates Iran and Turkey and between. these two and Pakistan. Moderate
Arab and African participation on the permanent preparatory committee is
generally regarded by the active moderates (on and outside the committee)
as ineffectual. To remedy this situation, it has been suggested that the
committee be revamped to bring about greater active moderate representa-
tion that could break the radical monopoly over preparations.
Some Issues. Moderates will also continue to be concerned. with the
issues of Malaysian, GVN, ROK and Soviet participation. The Algerian
threat to the Philippines that the dispatch of troops to Vietnam could
constitute grounds for exclusion suggests a premise-that the Chicom-
dominated group could use for keeping the ROK (which has troops An South
Vietnam) and 'GVN out and ad?hitting only the sVu Interestingly,
some moderates maintain that within the context of the Conference they
take confidence in a firm U.S. position in Vietnam, and even radical Arab
and African leader states are actively concerned that a negotiated peace
be obtained in Vietnam, whereas the Chicoms want the Second Afro-Asian
Conference to support their national liberation policy and. its specific
application to the Vietnam situation.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/13: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(931 Cont )
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 938.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13310 '11 1965
SOVIET ESPIONAGE CONTINUES
25X1
SITUATION: On 16 June 1965, a Norwegian court sentenced Captain
Kristen GjOen (pronounced 'GYOAN) to twelve years imprisonment for espi-
onage in what Norwegians consider their most serious spy case since World
War II; it is their eighthcas.e since that conflict. Gj$en was a security
officer in the Norwegian Air Force, stationed at Bod$ airfield in 1956-
1957, and at Rygge airfield after the fall of 1960. He had also attended
a Norwegian Defense Staff security course and, in 1957, a British Royal
Air Force security course in England. In his position, Gj$en had access
to highly secret information about Norwegian air bases, Norwegian air
force personnel, NATO papers, mobilization and defense plans.
Gj$en went to the Soviet embassy in Oslo at an undisclosed date in
1964, asked.to see the Soviet military attach', and offered to sell mili-
tary information to the Soviets. The Norwegian captain had gotten into
.debt due to his domestic expenses and his excessive'drinking, and his
alcoholism and financial worries had affected his work. He had been fined
for drunkenness, and had learned in December 1963 that he would be removed
from his security duties, but the removal was not immediately carried out,
and he continued to have access to highly secret information: Thus, with
his career under a cloud, with an urgent need for money, and with access
to secret information, Gj$en decided to betray his country.
During GjOen's first visit to the Soviet Embassy, the military attach,
Colonel A.A. Zhuk, a GRU officer, questioned Gj$en to establish his bona
fides, received documents from-him, and gave him 2000 kroner (approx. U.S.
$280), getting a receipt for the money. On 19 October, GjOen visited the
Soviet Embassy again, this time meeting with a member of Zhuk's staff, Lt.
Col. Sergei Yevdokimov, another GRU officer. (Zhuk was reportedly out of
Oslo at the time on other duties.) Gj~en was asked if he could obtain in-
formation on the NATO exercise Fallex, and he said he could, given time and
money.
In response to a question, Gj~en also told Yevdokimov that he could
travel, though not on short notice. Yevdokimov wanted him to go to either
Vienna or Bern for t r a n i n g, and it was arranged that if Gj$en
could go to Vienna he would send the Oslo embassy a postcard signed "Willy"
(W for Wien); if he could go to Bern, the card would be signed "Billy." On
arrival at one of these cities, he would go to the Soviet embassy, ask for
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(938 C ont . )
 Approved For Release 2005/06/ L3~_ CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300040004-2
the military attach4, deliver whatever documents he could bring with
him, and stay-for three or four days. G,j$en was not to call at the
Oslo embassy again, or sebk other contact with embassy personnel in
Oslo; he was shown photographs of a location outside Oslo and was told
that 1heft was a "mail box," nearby ( a hole in the side of a hill,
covered lay a stone) in which he could place documents. At the end of
the meeting, Gj$en received another 2000 kroner.
Then Gj$en had the idea of going to the American embassy as well,
telling them what he had done and offering to be a double agent. In
this way he would make more money and he hoped that working for the
Americans would "legitimize" his activities. But the American air at-
tache'to whom Gj$en talked refused to consider such an arrangement, and
told Gj$en that he would immediately inform the Norwegian authorities.
Very reluctantly, G,j~en then turned himself in to the Norwegian Security
Police.
Despite their domestic publicity regarding the past accomplishments
of Soviet espionage (see BPG #904, "Whitewashing the KGB," 24 May 1965),
the Soviets customarily deny current accusations of espionage in other
countries, no matter how well-founded. They have been particularly vehe-
ment in their denials in the G,joen case. On 18 December 1964, immediately
after the Oslo press had first revealed the arrest of Captain GjOen and
had linked Gj$en with the Soviets (the official Norwegian press release
had only said that G,j4en had spied for an "unnamed foreign power"), Soviet
Embassy Charge"A.S. Kaplin made an oral complaint to the Norwegian Foreign
Ministry. Kaplin was reminded that the official statement had not named
the USSR, and that the Norwegian government cannot muzzle the Norwegian
press. On 23 June 1965, after the trial, the'Norwegians made an official
protest to Soviet Ambassador Lunkov over Soviet activities revealed in the
Gj$en case. The Soviets brusquely rejected this protest on 21 July, main-
taining that Norwegian complaints over Soviet activities were groundless
and that Zhuk's activities violated neither international law nor diplo-
matic status; the Soviet note also expressed the hope that the Norwegian
government would try to end the "press campaign" on the case, which was
"damaging Norwegian-Soviet relations." To Norwegians, it seemed that the
Soviet note of 21 July was an insult to their system of justice, and a
demand that '.their press be muzzled. (See Press Comment, 5 August 1965)
The Soviets may have been encouraged in their brazen attitude by
the tactfulness of the Norwegian government. Norse authorities did not
officially name the USSR in their December 1964 announcement of Gj$en's
arrest, and later on, authorized accounts of the trial disclosed only
Col. Zhuk's involvement, and not that of Lt. Col. Yevdokimov. The pub-
lished record of the case (see Press Comment, Special Issue, July 1965)
released on 21 June 1965 made it appear that Gj$en's second conversation
at the Soviet Embassy (19 October 1964) was, like the first, with Col.
Zhuk. Yevdokimov's role emerged in public only after press leakages on
9 July.1965. (See Press Comment, 26 and 27 July 1965) Zhuk had returned
2
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/178-03061A000300040004-2
to the Soviet Union in early December 1964, ostensibly because his tour
of duty was over, while Yevdokimov remains in Oslo. (FYI only, the
Norwegian government may have wished to avoid a persona non grata action,
which would probably result in Soviet retaliation against a Norwegian
diplomat in Moscow. End FYI.) The Norwegian government tries its best
to avoid unnecessary friction with its big Eastern neighbor; as is the
way with totalitarians, the Kremlin only takes advantage of this policy
to try to throttle criticism.
25X1
3
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(938 Cont.)
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
 CPYRGH
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 T
COMMUNISM TODAY: A Refresher Course
U NDERGROUND and in open combat, by subversion,
terrorism, blackmail, riot and rhetoric, faithful Com-
munists the world over have for decades waged a holy war
against the rest of humanity. The tempo and techniques vary
from era to era, from continent to continent. And the nature
of Communism changes, Whereas Moscow now shuns the
perilous confrontations that so often brought the cold war
to boiling point, Peking grows ever more militant. For both
capitals of world Communism, the focal points of conflict
have shifted from Europe to Africa, Latin America and-
most notably-Southeast Asia, where the Johnson Admin-
istration last week solemnly committed the U.S. to what
could be a prolonged and painful war.
Thus the Marxist dream of world domination is palpably
no McCarthyist mirage. From Indonesia, where govern-
ment-sanctioned mobs howled for the ouster of a newly
arrived U.S. ambassador, to Cuba, where Fidel Castro pro-
claimed that "the imperialists" will not prevent Red regimes
from taking over throughout the hemisphere, it was also
becoming clear last week that the U.S. would have to stand
increasingly alone against the free world's enemies.
Nonetheless, to a world grown weary of cold-war ful-
mination, the thunder out of Hanoi or Havana often has a
curiously chimerical ring; the Iron Curtain itself seems less
an instrument of terror and repression than a gigantic cob-
web of cliche. Particularly to the generation that has reached
voting (or at least debating) age since the early coups and
crises of the postwar era, the sounds of struggle appear al-
most as irrelevant and unreal as fragments of a horror tale
recollected from childhood. Many of their elders see Com-
munism in the confused, self-doubting terms that have char-
acterized the. recent wave of academic protest over Viet
Nam and Santo Domingo. "Is it up to us to say who is
a Communist and who is not?" asks Anatol Rapoport, 54,
of the University of Michigan, a leading organizer of teach-
ins. Shrugging off the Red infiltrators in Santo Domingo, a
Stanford professor of Latin American history allows: "You
can find 58 Communists in New York, or San Francisco, or
anywhere." Political Scientist Stanley Millet, 48, formerly
of Briarcliff College, goes so far as to argue that "terror on
our side accounts for all that has happened in Viet Nam."
Since the U.S.-Soviet detente that developed after the
1962 Cuban missile crisis, more venerable and more qual-
ified commentators also have begun to sound as if Com-
munism had quietly buried itself. Not long ago, the Man-
chester Guardian pronounced: "The Russians and the Ameri-
cans no longer have any reason to quarrel." And there is
a widespread school of chop logic that maintains simul-
taneously: 1) Russia can no longer be seriously regarded as
a threat to the West, and 2) by its firm stand in Southeast
Asia, the U.S. is inviting Russian retaliation: Both premises
are debatable at best; together, they are not an argument
but a plea for passivity. The danger of such wishful think-
ing, as the State Department's Walt Rostow has warned, is
that "but of a false sense that the cold war is coming to an
end, out of boredom or domestic preoccupations, or a de-
sire to get on with purely national objectives, we will open
up new opportunities for the Communists to advance."
The Polycentric Era
Communism ? has itself made wrenching readjustments.
One of the more striking has been the post-Stalin push for
respectability. True; the spectacle of Khrushchev banging
a shoe at the U.N. did little to convince the world that
Kremlinologist Christian Duvael diagnoses as "the fatigue
of ideology" in the Soviet bloc. As Marxism proved less and
less relevant to the economic and social problems of con-
temporary society, Soviet ideologues came to realize that
they could no longer be solved in class-war terms. As the
old terror abates but never entirely vanishes, as the old
dogmas die but.never get burled, Intellectuals In Russia and
Eastern Europe increasingly feel as "alienated" from their
own societies as some of their Western counterparts. When
British Poet Stephen Spender recently told a gathering of
Polish writers that what he wanted to see most of all was
a Communist, a voice from the back of the hall called out:
"You have come too late for that." Soviet-bloc Commu-
nism has *become a weird conglomeration of Marxist rem-
nants, state socialism with tentative injections of free enter-
prise, and above all, nationalism. In today's polycentric
Eastern Europe, once tightly controlled satellites have devel-
oped what De Gaulle might call a Communisme des patries.
All this has only exacerbated Sino-Soviet antagonisms.
Red China's'rulers, fiercely determined to preserve ideologi-
cal': purity against Muscovite "revisionism," are bound to re-
main cruel and, spartan. Contemptuous of Soviet policies,
obdurate in its distrust of anything resembling capitalist
methods, insistent on violence, China is irreversibly commit-
ted to the notion of central direction for the whole Commu-
nist movement-as long as'Peking can do the directing.
The Fronts
Obviously, it would be foolish for the West to pretend that
Communism in 1965 is the same monolithic menace it once
was; but it is equally nonsensical to regard Communism as a
legitimate or benign form of government, or to suggest, as
the London Times did recently, that Marxism may have
"ceased to be an organized international movement."
Communism may no longer have a single line or direction,
but it remains highly organized, aggressively international,
and more intensely competitive than ever as a result of Sino-
Soviet rivalry. Though the Cominform (successor to the
Comintern) was dissolved in 1956, control over the world-
wide Communist movement is still vested in special depart-
ments of the Soviet and Chinese Central Committees. Of
the world's 105 Communist Parties, Moscow can count on
72, as against 21 for Peking. Twelve other Communist
Parties-mostly in Western Europe-are vaguely independ-
ent. In 1964, foreign aid by Communist countries. amounted
to $1.7 billion, of which Soviet funds accounted for half,
Eastern European funds for a quarter. Of 17,530 Commu-
nist technicians working in foreign countries-a skarp rise
from the preceding year-only 15% were Chinese.
One of the most effective instruments of Communist sub-
version remains the front organization. In McCarthy's hey-
day Communist terminology was tossed about too carelessly,
and in many quarters today words and realities such as
"infiltration" no longer seem entirely credible. Yet the lead-
ing fronts still reflect the reality and breadth of the Com-
munist subversive effort. They range from pacifist groups
such as the World Peace Council (headquartered in Prague)
and the International Institute of Peace (Vienna) to various
youth and professional outfits such as the International
Union of Students and the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers (Prague and Brussels). Most of these
organizations-many launched by non-Communists with the
best intentions and then taken over-are dominated by
Soviet-line Communism, although the Chinese are fighting
hard to capture them and are setting up rival fronts of their
ever, Soviet di~}31e1t R?D`~~ ~lA_R ~6f r the two Red giants, and
in which Soviet agents pushe oreign Minister Jan to some extent in rep y6'lo' it ommunist subversion pro-
Masaryk from a window of Prague's Czernin Palace. coeds apace, highly successful in some quarters, disastrously
A far more significant development is what Munich failing in others, but always at work.
 By all odds, the threat is most serious in Asia, where Coin-
munism-predominantly Chinese Communism--exploits the
vast turmoil of social disorder and political-economic dis-
content. Peking has chosen as its chief weapon "the war of
national liberation," an export version of the Chinese Com-
munist revolution, which is based on the theory that through
interminable guerrilla war a weaker force can wear out and
finally overcome a stronger one. The Chinese work through
nominally independent "nationalist" organizations such as
the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. It makes
no difference to Peking if such fronts contain many non-
Communists; as in North Viet Nam when the French were
forced out, Communists can always take over. As Yugo-
slavia's Tito has expressed it: "The Chinese will fight to the
last North Vietnamese."
Peking also uses the "united front" stratagem elsewhere.
Most effective example is in Indonesia, where the 2,000,000-
member Partai Kontuuis Indonesia, the third largest Com-
munist Party in the world (after China and Russia), domi-
nates the streets and, through the streets, President Sukarno.
Pro-Peking Communists also work hand in hand with Singa-
pore's Barisan Socialist Party, have long since captured
Japan's 10 million-member Gensuikyo, its Council Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (which nonetheless lost con-
siderable support with the advent of Red China as a nuclear
power). Though India's 160,000-member Communist Party
is split down the middle, the pro-Chinese wing holds the
psychological whip hand, having won 40 seats in this year's
Kerala state election to only three for the Muscovite wing.
The victory was doubly impressive, since there has been
virulent anti-Chinese feeling in India since the 1962 invasion.
The Chinese are currently laying the foundations of in-
surgency in northeast Thailand. Among primitive hill tribes
such as the Lahu, Peking has sent native cadres trained in
China to spread the word of a new messiah. One savior is
already at work among the Lahu, claiming to possess a
"magic hammer, magic rope and magic knife" with which
he can kill all enemies, even if they number "as many as
the sesame seeds in three baskets." Peking's most formidable
source of subversion is the 15 million "overseas" Chinese,
who dominate much of the trade and commerce of non-
Communist Asia. In Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, the Philip-
pines and Burma, their hsiao-tzu (literally, "little groups"),
of three to 22 members, perform subversive chores wher-
ever possible.
Everywhere, Red China cynically exploits racism to the
detriment not only of the Western powers, but also of the
Russians, who are. increasingly on the defensive in Asia.
But racial feeling also works against China, for many Asians
have a centuries-old fear of the Chinese and it is at ]east
as strong as their anti-white prejudice. The greatest threat
Peking holds over its Asian neighbors is its army-2,500,001)
infantrymen, a 12-million-man militia-which could inun-
date the continent if all its subversive stratagems should fail.
That is why Viet Nam is the ultimate test of Peking's poli-
cies: if the U.S. backed away from the threat of Chinese
intervention, it would lend powerful support to the untested
notion that China is invincible.
o
are rea t y avai a c o p <
Latin America Yet the myy country where an operational in time be locked in a bitter internecine contest to re estab-
subversive final iiQ Frl tllF@l giAeh~lQlOfifO&dsltteGlA-RD49718QO1 E644t F0 0(4(oO*~elligerent purity. In ap-
As a result, Communist activists in Latin America have peal and purpose, Communism today is unquestionably a
adopted new tactics. They are best exemplified by the failing creed. Yet it is precisely in decline and decay that
a . ;.inntnait.c like 'mnirec_ can nroye most dan?erous.
Latin America: Hiding Behind Ideologies
With the exception of Cuba, no Communist Party in
Central or South America holds power, but all are well
prepared to manipulate perpetual popular discontent. Cas-
tro's Cuba is the prototype, the precedent, and to a large
extent the preceptor of incipient Communist revolutions in
the hemisphere. Since 1960, Castro has trained guerrillas
from most Latin countries, including Colombia, Haiti, Vene-
zuela and the Dominican Republic. Propaganda and arms
tential revolutionaries throughout
d1 t bl t
~i~}S~r~ iYt r a scling into a Itgitimate
Ap~ye~]-egg 2005/06/13 :CIA-tY+S-C FlritfsY~tQ,H~~`+~'v3th hopes of duping its
idealistic leader, Juan Bosch. Much the same technique was
employed a year ago in Panama and in Goulart's Brazil
(1961-64), and in both countries it proved unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, in Panama and the Dominican Republic, the
Reds achieved a secondary objective, that of forcing the
U.S. to intervene in a conflict that to the gullible could be
made to resemble a valid internal revolution.
Africa: Money & Arms
"Revolution-the witch doctor in tiger skins," wrote a
Polish poet in praise of the Congo rebellion. In fact, Red
witchcraft is doing poorly in Africa. The only African coun-
try under outright Communist domination is the former
colony of Congo-Brazzaville. Through hamhanded diplo-
macy. and sloppy technology, the Russians alienated two of
their likeliest converts, Guinea's Sekou Toure and Ghana's
Kwame Nkrumah. China, usually more subtle in its subver-
sive techniques, has also managed to stomp on African toes.
Peking's men in Burundi were thrown out early this year
after a Chinese subversion campaign that was climaxed by
the assassination of Moderate Premier Pierre Ngendan-
dumwe. During a recent visit to Tanzania, Chou En-lai
ineptly pronounced Africa today was "exceedingly favor-
able" for revolution-which to incensed African leaders
suggested that Peking was plotting their own downfall.
Russia and China both had to write off major investments
in Algeria's Ahmed ben Bella, who managed to woo Mos-
cow and Peking simultaneously before his precipitate ouster
last June. Still; as the Russians proved when they sent arms
to the Congo rebels, both Moscow and Peking continually
attempt to influence students, intellectuals, officials.
Europe: A Problem of Prosperity
Except for the U.S., where Communism can claim only
10,000 party members, the Red cause has probably fared
worst in Western Europe. Nonetheless, with a quarter of a
million members, the French Communist Party pulls fully
20% of the vote, ranks as the second biggest political force
in the nation (only De Gaulle stands taller). Italy's 1,5 mil-
lion Communists have gradually increased their share of
the vote until it stands at 25%. Many such Communist votes
amount to a ritualistic protest by citizens who simply
oppose the existing order. Yet through sheer numbers, the
national parties today exercise a potent veto power on Mos-
cow's line.
The U.S. in the past decade has become far more sophis-
ticated about Communism, moving from frightened hostility
to eagerly sought contacts ranging from the test ban treaty
to trade. Washington has abandoned dreams of "rolling
back" the Reds-and has learned in the process that Com-
munists can fear coexistence more than the West.
For its party Soviet Communism in the 1960s has mel-
lowed considerably as its leaders have discovered that
goulash is more palatable than gunpowder. Under Khru-
shchev and his successors, Premier Aleksei Kosygin and
Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev, the old, unbending creed of
unconditional war against capitalism has yielded to the
cautious dialogue of coexistence. It has had to, for the
workers of the industrialized world today are not likely to
be inveigled into violent assault on social systems that have
given them so large a measure of prosperity.
As for hungry, underdeveloped Red China, the uncom-
promising letter and spirit of crusading Leninism dovetail
neatly with economic necessity and Peking's dreams of re-
asserting its ancient hegemony over Asia. The threat to
peace lies between the extremes, between Russia's evolu-
tionary progress and China's hard adherence to a fundamen-
talist philosophy. In the struggle for power and legitimacy
throughout the Communist world, Moscow and Peking could
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
25X1
16 August 1965
Abusers of Hospitality
(Note: The following is a list of Soviets who have been declared resoona
non grata or expelled for espionage, subversion or other undesirable
activity. This list only includes recent cases; moreover, this list
represents only some of the Soviets who have been obliged to return to
their own country, since it only includes cases which have appeared in
press reports. In other cases, governments have refrained from making
public announcements, usually for diplomatic reasons. Accompanying each
name is the nominal position, the date of departure and the place from
which the individual Soviet was obliged to leave.)
1. SAMOYLOV, Mikhail Kuzmich, First Secretary, Soviet Legation, Monte-
video, Uruguay, January 1961. Engaged in subversive activities.
2, YENAKIYEV,, Oleg Yakolevich, Izvest a correspondent, Bonn, Germany,
August 1961.
SHUT IY, Vladislav Stanislavovich, Tass correspondent, West Berlin,
September 1961.
li. METKIN, Mikhail Vasilyevich, Tass representative, Karachi, Pakistan,
November 1961. Subversive activities among students, As of the
summer of 1965, METKIN was in the Sudan.
5. SHIBAYEV, Sergey Vasilyevich, Trade Attache, Soviet Embassy, The
Hague, October 1961.
6. POPOV, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, The
Hague, October 1961.
7. PONOMARENKO, Panteleymon, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy, The Hague,
October 1961. SHIBAYEV, POPOV, and PONOMABENKO were expelled after
they had scuffled with Dutch police while trying to spirit the wife
of A. GOLUB, a defecting Soviet scientist, out of the country,
8, LOGINOV, Anatoly Fedorovich, Lt. Col., Assistant Military Attache,
Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, December 1961. Attempted to obtain secret
information from a Canadian government employee,
9. SOLOD, David, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy, Conakry, Guinea,, December
1961. Involved in p1gts against the Guinean government.
10, PRIPOLTSEV, Valerian, Employee, Soviet Trade Mission, Cologne, Ger-
many. Arrested for espionage in August 1961, convicted in February
1962,.and released and expelled,, July 1962.
U. ANDREYEV, Vladislav Sergeyevich, a Commercial. CCounsellor, $oviet
Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand., July .1962,,
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
(Cont.}
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
12. SHTYKOV, Nikolai Ivanovich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
Wellington, New Zealand, July 1962. SHTYKOV and ANDREYEV were
attempting to recruit agents.
13. MISHUKOV, Yuriy, Translator, United Nations Office of Conference
Services, New York, USA, September 1962.
14. ZAITSEV, Yuriy V., Political Affairs Officer, United Nations, New
York, USA, September 1962. MISHUKOV and ZAITSEV attempted to re-
cruit an American citizen for espionage.
15. VYRODOV, Ivan Y., Member of USSR UN Delegation, New York, USA,
October 1962.
16. PROKHOROV, Yevgeniy M., Member of USSR UN Delegation, New York, USA,
October 1962. VYRODOV and PROKHOROV sought to obtain US defense
documents from an American citizen.
17. BARANOVSKY, Georgiy, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 1963.
18. NIKOLSKIY, Vitally, Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 1963. BPtRANOVSKY and NIKOISKIY were involved in the
case of Co. Stig. WENNERSTROM.
19. KISELEV, Lev Sergeyevich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Reykja-
vik, Iceland, February 1963.
20. DMITRIYEV, Lev, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Reykjavik, February 1963.
Ragnar GUNHARSSON, an Icelander, told police of KISELEV's and
DMITRIYEV's efforts to recruit him for espionage.
21. PAVLOV, Gleb A., Attache, Soviet UN Mission, New York, USA, October,
1963.
22. ROMASHIN, Yuriy A., Third Secretary, Soviet UN Mission, New York,
USA, October 1963-
23* IVANOV, Igor A., Chauffeur, Soviet UN Mission, New York, USA,
October 1963. PAVLOV, ROMASHIN, and IVANOV met with a New Jersey
engineer who gave them US defense secrets.
24. TARASOV, Vasiliy, Izvestiya correspondent, Ottawa, Canada, April
1964. Attempted to buy classified information from a Canadian
government employee.
25. SKRIPOV, Ivan Fedorovich, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Canberra,
Australia, February 1963. Recruited an Australian government employee.
26. SOLOMATIN, Vladimir losifovich, Soviet Trade Representative, London,
UK, March 1964. Attempted to get information on strategic equip-
ment, also personal information on British businessmen for future
blackmail.
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-
2 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2
27. ABRASIIC N, Mikhail Y., Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Karachi,
Pakistan, June 1964,
28. UDAIAV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, Assistant Air Attache) Soviet
Embassy, Washington, USA, December 1964.
29. TKACHENKO, Vadim, Assistant Naval Attache, Soviet Embassy, London,
UK, December 1964.
30. ZADVINSKIY, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, Military Attache, Soviet Embassy,
Washington, USA, December 1964.
31. GRECHANIN, Vladimir Petrovich, Assistant Military Attache, Soviet
Embassy, Washington, USA, December 1964.
32. KOLESNIKOV, Mikhail Ivanovich, Soviet Delegate, Conference of Fed-
eration of-Colombian Trade Unions (CSTC), Bogota, Colombia, Decem-
ber 1964.
33. OPEKUNOV, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, Soviet Delegate, Conference of
Federation of Colombian Trade Unions (CSTC), Bogota, Colombia,
December 1964. KOIESNIKOV and OPEKUIIOV were charged with espionage
and overstaying their visas.
34. KARPOVICH, Boris Vladimirovich, Novo ti correspondent and Embassy
Counsellor, Washington, USA, December 1964.
35. PAVLOV, Serge) Sergeyevich, Aeroflot representative, Paris, France,
February 1965.
36. KHOKHLOV, Nikolai, Izvest a correspondent, Leopoldville, Congo,
March 1965.
37. SHAKHAROV, Khairula M., Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Colombo,
Ceylon, May 1965. SHAKIIAROV had already been obliged to leave
Thailand in 1958.
38.
KALASHNIKOV, Aleksandr F., Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Teheran, Iran,
March 1965-
39. BYCHKOV, Anatoliy Yef imovich, Commercial Attache, Soviet Embassy,
Ottawa, Canada, May 1965.
40. POLUSHKIN, Vladimir Nikolaevich, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa,
May 1965.
41. NYUNIN, Viktor Ivanovich, Assistant Military Attache, Teheran, Iran,
March 1965-
42. KIRSANOV, Stepan Mikhailovich, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
Washington, USA, June 1965.
43. BOYAR Vit iy Konstantinovich Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
Ap on{Re 25/06/13 : CIA-R1DP78-03061 A000300040004-2
o ?
3