BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 24, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 May 1965
Briefly Noted 000,
Bankrupt Fidel Castro Sel
Economy Heirlooms
Cuban refugee groups
are continuing their
efforts to prevent Fidel Castro
from selling art objects which he
confiscated when they fled their
homes to escape living tinder his
Communist dictatorship.
Reports from Milan (NYTimes
and Press Comment May 12) say that a
shipment of the paintings, silver,
bronzes, porcelain and other heir-
looms has arrived, is blocked in a
warehouse there, but has been paid
for by a Milan art dealer. This
represents about a quarter of the,
estimated total two million dollars
of the "Treasure of Fidel Castro"
sent to European countries for sale.
The Cuban Government has been
hard pressed to meet deficits accu-
mulated over the years from a dete-
riorating economy and from excessive
borrowing and spending for military
establishments and aggressive-sub-
version throughout Latin America.
Selling family heirlooms is the
last resort of the impoverished be-
fore bankruptcy is admitted. Sym-
pathy is also due the Cuban people
and future generations for the loss
of this part of their cultural heri-
tage which is being thrown away so
wantonly.
Communists Sino-Soviet Conflict
Expose Their Continues in Youth Front
Fronts in
Africa Chicom attacks on the
Soviets at youth meet-
ings increasingly reveal the extent
to which the World Federation of
Democratic Youth (WFDY) is subordi-
nate to Moscow. The latest series
of incidents occurred at the WFDY
Executive Committee meeting in Accra
(15-21 April) before an audience of
over 100 delegates from 56 countries.
Ironically' the Chicoms say what non-
Communists have always maintained,
that WFDY is an instrument of Soviet
foreign policy. Going one step fur-
ther, the Chicoms even described
WFDY's current designed-in-Moscow-
objectives as opposing China rather
than imperialism.
Using WFDY as a whipping boy,
the Chicoms took the Soviets to task
on several counts, especially Viet-
nam. A previously approved IUS (In-
ternational Union of Students)/WFDY
statement was condemned as a "peace-
ful political solution" that appeases
the U.S. when what the Vietnamese
want is American troop withdrawal.
The conference resolution on Vietnam
was branded a "trick" and its passage
rejected on grounds of Soviet voting
manipulation. Although TASS failed
to report a Sino-Soviet clash, the
Soviets retaliated by implying that
the Chicoms have been interfering
with shipments of Soviet military aid
to North Vietnam -- which the Chicoms
flatly denied.
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The Chicoms were equally vo-
ciferous on other issues, notably
an amendment condemning peaceful co-
existence and the United Nations,
but to no immediate avail. Although
the Chicoms drew their usual support
from delegations representing North
Korea, Indonesia, Japan, North Viet-
nam and the NLFSV, they gained Afri-
can backing only from Congo (Brazza-
ville) and the Federation des Etudi-
ants d'Afrique Noire en France. A
WFDY press release asserts that the
majority of the resolutions (not yet
published) were adopted unanimously;
it does not spell out the apparent
isolation of the Chicoms on key is-
sues.
The resolutions of the African
youth leadership seminar (20-23
April, sponsored by the Ghana Young
Pioneers) echoed the stance taken by
the WFDY executive committee session.
This sequel of events, billed to fo-
cus on Africa (i.e., the forthcoming
World Youth Festival, the first in
Africa, to be held in Algiers in Ju-
ly; future WFDY activities among Af-
rican youth struggling against colo-
nialism), offered both the Soviets
and the Chicoms an opportunity to
advance their aspirations in Africa.
To the Soviet chagrin, the Chicoms
were very active in corridor poli-
ticking among African delegations,
attacking Soviet direction of the
WFDY for hindering the anti-colo-
nial struggle of African youth, and
suggesting Afro-Asian solidarity to
resist the WFDY. On the conference
floor they reinforced their case by
denigrating Soviet suppression of
the 4 March anti-U.S. demonstration
by foreign students in Moscow.
Preparations for impending ma-
jor events in other front organiza-
tions indicate that the Sino-Soviet
conflict, as it appeared at this
WFDY gathering, will be epide
mid-summer.
Life in a Memoirs of a Soviet
Concentration General
Camp
In March, April, and
May of 1964, the so-
viet literary journal Novy Mir pub-
lished the memoirs of General Alek-
sandr Vasilyevich Gorbatov, a vet-
eran not only of two World Wars and
the Civil War, but also of Stalin's
prison camps of Kolyma and Magadan.
Gorbatov was one of those enlisted
veterans of the Czar's army whose
military experience and native abil-
ity enabled them to rise rapidly in
the new Red Army, which was then
fighting the Whites and the Poles.
His career continued to go well un-
til. 1938, when he was arrested
during Stalin's purge of the mili-
tary leadership. He tells us that
he refused to confess to crimes he
had not committed, and that he also
refused to implicate others. Un-
like most of his unfortunate com-
rades, he was released and rein-
stated in his old rank in March 1941,
thanks in large part to the inter-
vention of Marshal Budyenny on his
behalf. He made a good record for
himself in World War II, rising to
the post of Army Commander. His sto-
ry is very well told, with a stark
description of NKVD interrogations
and of conditions in the camps.
Gorbatov also tells many stories of
military skirmishes and command con-
flicts, as well as of his boyhood
experiences. There are two English
editions, entitled Black Years (Lon-
don: Flegon Press, 197) and Years
Off Icy Life (London: Constable, 1964);
there is also an American edition
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s25X1 C10b
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25X1C10b
issued by Norton, identical to the
Constable edition. The original
Soviet title was (in translation)
Years and Wars.
25X1C10b
Hospitals If You Disagree,
Replace You're Insane
Stalin's Camps
The ideal totalitar-
ian regime would not
use firing squads and rubber hoses;
it would use other methods which,
leaving their victims physically
unscarred, rob them of any feeling
of self-respect, any will to resist.
This ideal, described fictionally in
Orwell's 1984 and Koestler's Darkness
at Noon, and approached in Chinese
Communist brainwashing, inspires the
post-Stalin treatment of those Soviet
citizens who criticize the regime.
Instead of sending them to prison
camps as "politicals," the KGB now
puts them in a mental hospital. After
all, from the one-dimensional stand-
point of the blindly doctrinaire Com-
munist, a Soviet citizen who doesn't
like Communism must be insane.
On 2 May 1965, the London Observ-
er published the first of three in-
stallments of excerpts from a new au-
tobiographical novel by Valeriy Tarsis:
Ward 7. This sensational story de-
scribes the experiences of a political
prisoner, nominally a patient, con-
fined in a Soviet mental hospital. As
noted i in this issue, Tar-
sis and several others are known to
have been confined in mental hospitals
for political reasons. In 1960, Tar-
sis had smuggled out another manu-
script, The Bluebottle, sharply at-
tacking the Soviet regime, and this
led to his confinement for two years
in the hospital he describes. The
Bluebottle was carried out by an
Italian newspaper correspondent, pos-
sibly the inspiration for Signor Mario
Gozzi in The Fall of the Jesuit (see
attachment to 25X1 C10b
The Ward 7 manuscript has like-
wise been smuggled out. It is being
published in Russian in Grany, an ex-
ile publication in West Germany, and
Collins and Harvill of London pub-
lished the full translation in book
form on 10 May. The three Observer
installments appeared in Press Com-
ment on 13, 17 and 20 May.
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Countering the
SOVIET CAMPAIGN on WORLD WAR II
Twentieth anniversaries of events ending World War II
are being used by the USSR in a campaign to increase
its stature. The Soviets are claiming credit, inter
alia, for defeating the fascists while attempting to
grossly discredit the motives and actions of the
western allies and particularly the United States.
Rewriting history, an ingrained habit of the Communists
to make facts fit their constantly changing posture,
is one of the techniques being used in their campaign.
A pamphlet, Moscow Interprets World War Two: How the
Soviets Falsify History, illustrates how the Soviets
rewrite history for propaganda purposes. It analyzes
the methods used in Grigorii Deborin's THE SECOND WORLD
WAR, and also shows the ordinary reader how to recognize
distortions and questionable statements in such "history
books."
25X1C10b
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2 International Labor Conference (ILO), 49th session, Geneva, 2-24 June.
14 Treaty of Tientsin, second "Unequal Treaty," similar to 16 May Treaty
of Aigan. 1858
15 Magna Carta signed at Runnymede by King John. 1215. (750th anniversax .)
17 International Christian Democratic Youth Congress, West Berlin, June,
to end on 17 June, anniversary of East German revolt. 1953
17 USSR occupies Estonia and Latvia despite non-aggression treaties.
World War II, 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
17 Hungary announces trial and execution of Imre Nagy. 1958
18 Conference of Solidarity with Cuba, Montevideo, Uruguay 18-20 June.
19 Chinese Communists charged with Tibetan genocide by International
Commission of Jurists. 1960. Fifth anniversary.
19 Sixteen Polish leaders of Home Army and legitimate Govt-in-exile,
earlier invited to Soviet Occupation Headquarters under safe conduct,
tried in Moscow for "anti-Soviet activity" 19-21 June 1945. (Sentenced
22 July). 1945 Twentieth anniversary WW II.
22 Germany invades the USSR. 1941.
24 Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers Meeting, prelim to II Afro-Asian Confer-
ence, heads of state, opening 29 June, Algiers.
25 North Korean Army crosses 38th Parallel. 27 June, UN Security Council
(USSR boycotting) resolves aid to Republic of Korea; 7 July establishes
UN Command, 53 nations endorse assistance, 17 contribute units to UN
Force. 1950. Fifteenth annivers .
26 Conference of 46 nations, convened in San Francisco 25 April) adopts
UN Charter. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
28 Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia, Bucovina and Hertza
District. 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
28 Cominform condemns Tito and associates, expells Yugoslav Party from
"family of fraternal Communist Partieso"
29 Czechoslovakia cedes Ruthenia to USSR. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#53 Commentary 28 April-11 May 1965
Principal Developments:
1. Communist parties, states, and media during this period are heavily
concerned with the continuing warfare in Vietnam, the new crisis in the
Dominican Republic, the annual May Day celebrations, and the 20th anniver-
saries of the "great victory of the forces of socialism over fascism" and
the "liberation" of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, basking
in the glory of their almost-single-handed (according to Communist accounts)
triumph, calmly reiterate their adherence to the "general line" formulated
by the "20th, 21st, and 22nd Congresses and the Party Program."
2. The Chinese, however, use the anniversaries to strike hard at the
"Jirushchev revisionists" in.three major articles, in Rec! Flag Nos. 4 & 5
and in People's Daily on 9 May. They also revive the campaign against
"brutal Soviet suppression of anti-U.S. student demonstrators," publicizing:
(a an inflammatory Chinese Foreign Ministr note of 13 April to the SovGovt
referring back to the March Moscow affair, -- which the Soviets returned
without reply; (b) a "recent" letter to Pravda by 12 Vietnamese students in
Moscow denouncing an "eyewitness report" of the 4 March demonstration by
Soviet citizens which Pravda had published 13 March, -- with a demand that
Pravda "publish a correction of these falsehoods immediately"; and c) a
lurid account of an entirely new case of "savage" Soviet repression of an
attempted anti-U.S. demonstration on Apr I in Leningrad by a large number
of Vietnamese students. The Chinese also d ostentatiously publicize re-
ports of several anti-revisionist materials appearing several weeks ago in'
organs of the pro-Chinese dissident "CP of Australia (M-L)" and the Chinese-
aligned CP of New Zealand; (e) describe another fierce struggle with Soviet
manipulators at an April WFDY Executive meeting in Accra see also Briefly
Noted); and (f) accuse the Soviets of an "act of sabotage and split" in an
exhibit beginning 3 days before the opening of the AAPSO meeting scheduled
for 10 May in Accra (Winneba).
3. Analysts believe that the wording of the 1965 Sino-Soviet trade
protocol, signed in Moscow 29 April, indicates a further decline in total
trade levels, in contrast to increases in Chinese trade agreements with all
East European countries except Bulgaria.
4. North Vietnamese statements continue to show far more moderation
than the Chinese and an apparent desire to maintain good relations with the
Soviets.
5. The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation is reportedly receiving a
warm welcome in Hanoi, where Nan Dhan. publishes "warm and sincere thanks"
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for Italian "valuable support." In contrast, NCNA's report of the delega-
tion's 1-day stop-over in Peking indicates no warmth or agreement.
6. Beyond the 1 May NYTimes account included in our Chronology, there
have been several clandestine reports to the effect that Castro's regime is
shifting significantly away from a Chinese orientation toward the Soviets.
7. Diplomatic observers speculate on some evidence that the Czech
regime may be about to move toward Rumanian-style independence. Top-level
Rumanian representation in Prague for the `liberation' anniversary -- in
contrast to the CPSU and other parties which sent their senior delegations
to East Berlin -- seems to harmonize with Novotny's declaration of intent
to improve relations specifically with the Chinese and Albanians.
8. The brief published reports of a meeting of representatives of
West European CPs in Brussels to discuss preparations for a summit meeting
of all in accordance with French CP initiative (see Chrono, April 18-24)
are confirmed by clandestine reporting, which says that 13 parties were
represented in Brussels and the summit will probably be held early June.
A subsequent report cites "Stockholm sources" to the effect that represent-
atives of the 4 Scandinavian CPs meeting there around the 1st of May were
unable to agree on a joint attitude toward the French-sponsored meeting.
Significance :
While the Soviets, riding the crest of Communist 20th anniversary
celebrations of their great triumph over fascism, confine themselves to
calm, confident reiteration of their Khrushchevian line, the Chinese in-
tensify their anti-Soviet polemics in a series of strident, new attacks
hammering away at the "Khrushchev revisionists," Soviet falsification of
history, sham anti-imperialism, sham support of national liberation, and
real "Soviet-U.S. cooperation for domination of the world." In renewing
their old campaign against "brutal Soviet suppression of anti-U.S. student
demonstrators," they concentrate on the Vietnamese aspect, even reporting
an alleged new incident in Leningrad involving only Vietnamese victims.
However, the North Vietnamese leadership, presumably a chief target
of the Chinese polemics, continues to demonstrate a determined resistance
to being too closely identified with the Chinese. Particularly significant
is their reportedly warm welcome to the Pajetta-led delegation from the
Italian CP, in the face of past Chinese scathing denunciation of the PCI
and apparently cool treatment given the Italians in Peking en route in
contrast to the obvious Soviet favor demonstrated during tYeir Moscow stop-
over.
Bitter public Sino-Soviet battling may be anticipated at a number of
forthcoming international meetings. As reported herein, the Chinese have
already accused the Soviets of "an act of sabotage and split" before the
opening of the Accra AAPSO meeting due to get under way as this period
closes. Other major events will be the 2nd ("Bandung") Conference of
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Afro-Asian states in Algiers 29 June (where the controversial question of
Soviet participation is still to be decided), the World Peace Council con-
gress in Helsinki 14-17 July, and the 9th World Youth Festival in Algiers
28 July-7 August.
Two other developments bear watching: the possible Czech move toward
closer identification with the Rumanians and their independent stance; the
outcome of the French CP-sponsored regional conference of West European CP
scheduled for Brussels early in June. 25X1C1Ob
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CHRONOLOGY -- COiv 1UNIST DISSE'ITSIO S
#53
28 April-11 May 1965
Continuing from April 2: The Italian CP delegation headed by Pajetta
(see #51 & #52 for earlier reports arrives in Hanoi on the 30th, after
a 1-day stop in Peking is reported by INNCNA on the 29th. The NCNA report
indicates that the Italians did not meet any top-level CCP figures and
says only that "both sides elaborated their own vie-us on the Vietnam
question." However, PCI daily L'Unita on 1 May claims that the delega-
tion flew from Canton to Hanoi 'inn a Chinese plane made especially avail-
able" to them. The Italians are met at the Hanoi airport by "a large
North Vietnamese Party delegation headed by Secretary Le Duan," and are
received by Ho Chi Minh later the same day. They are feature guests at
Hanoi's May Day celebration and are reported as having "exchanged views
on questions which interest both parties" in "a cordial and friendly
atmosphere" with a Le Duan-led host delegation on the 3rd. They are
still reported as visiting museums and exhibitions on the 7th. Mean-
while, an editorial in daily Nhan Dan on the 3rd "extends the warm and
sincere thanks of the Vietnamese people for the valuable support given
them by the working class and other people of Italy in their national
salvation struggle against U.S. aggression."
April 18-24+: Finnish CP daily Kansan Uutiset on 18th announces that
Secretary Poikolainen will represent the Party at a meeting of West
European CPs in Brussels 20 April to discuss pre2arations for a summit
meeting of WE CPs. French CP daily L'Humanite on the 24th reports that
such a meeting had been held: no date or place mentioned, but the re-
port seems to confirm Brussels by quoting from a communique of the Belgian
CP on the meeting.
April 29: Signing in Moscow of the 1965 Sino-Soviet trade protocol is
announced: no figures are given, but observers think that the wording
suggests a further decline in total trade levels, -- in contrast to the
announcements of China's 1965 trade agreements with the East European
countries which (except for Bulgaria) explicitly mentioned plans for
higher trade.
April 29-30: Two successive Pravda editorials pegged to May Day reiterate
CPSU "unshakable" support of "the scientific nature of the Party's policy
and its general political line ... expressed in the decisions of the
20th, 21st, and 22nd Party Congresses and the CPSU Program."
May 1: May Day celebrations by the ruling CPs bring no surprises:
they are generally somewhat subdued in favor of the impending 20th an-
niversary of VE Day.
A NYTTIies dispatch from Havana by Paul Hofmann reports that "the
works of Mao Tse-tung have disappeared from the bookstore of the Cuban
State Publishing Department, but writings by Nikita S. Khrushchev are
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still on display. Referri.n3 to Castro's 13 March speech warning that
his government would not tolerate the introduction of "the apple of
discord" into the Eden of Cuban Communism, Hofmann writes "there are
indications that the withdrawal of Mr. Mao's works may be a consequence
of Cuban ideological vigilance."
May2 : NCNA reports on the 15-21 April Accra !,MY Ex. cutive; 33ceti , which
Mwas the scene of a fierce struggle between real and sham anti-imperialism,
between real and sham unity." The account bristles with Chinese charges
of Soviet manipulation, tricks, calumny, and "extremely undemocratic means
to force their capitulationist and splittist line upon others under the
pretext of 'stopping polemics."' It states that the Soviet delegation was
completely isolated in the voting for at least two items in the resolution:
one a condemnation of U.S. crimes in the Congo, and the other a Rumanian
demand that the draft resolution "firmly support the right of the peoples
of all countries to run their own affairs without interference by foreign
countries."
May 3: NCNA publicizes the text of an editorial on "The Great Victory
of Leninism in Red Flag No. 4, published in April. It recalls Chinese
publication in 19 0 in commemoration of Lenin's 90th anniversary, of
the three "Long Live Leninism" articles, in which, "although at that
time we did not yet openly criticize Khrushchev and the leadership of
the CPSU, the views expressed ... were the diametric opposite of the pack
of nonsense dispensed by the K. revisionists This aroused the livid
hatred of the K. revisionists and scared the living daylights out of them."
After reiterating their old line and their old charges on "the nature of
imperialism," "peaceful coexistence," and "the national liberation move-
ment," the Chinese say:
"Thus, the facts of the past five years have mercilessly
shattered the absuxd arguments of the modern revisionists. After
the fall of Khrushchev, which was a public proclamation of the
bankruptcy of modern revisionism, we hoped that the new CPSU leader-
ship would honestly and openly admit its mistakes and renounce the
revisionist line and policies pursued when K was in power, and we
advised them to do so. However, contrary to the aspirations of the
Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of the world, the new
CPSU leadership has taken over K revisionism as a priceless heritage
and has continued to brandish it. During the celebrations this year
of the 95th anniversary of Lenin's birth, they still had the effron-
tery to brag that 'the general line drafted in the 20th and 22nd
Congresses of our Party and embodied in the Program of the CPSU'
is a 'vivid indication' of a 'creative approach' to theory. It was
precisely in the name of a so-called 'creative approach' to Leninism
that K actually renounced every fundamental thesis of Leninism, became
the greatest revisionist in all history, and finally ended up in total
bankruptcy. Can his successors come to any better end?
Mays: NCNA Peking publicizes a CP of New Zealand statement, "released
22 March" ~, denouncing the 1 March 19-party meeting in j?ioscoz:7 as another
CPSU move "to compel the world parties to embrace a revisionist line"
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which "met with another se-':,back." (This wotLI.d seem to be the same as
the CPNZ statement on subject publicized by NCNA on 31 March, but the
passages quoted are entirely different.)
May 5-7: The Chinese publicize a series of new developments and charges
relating to Soviet s4 ression of anti-U.S., pro-Vietnam demonstrations.
On the 5th, NCNA reports on a Chinese Foreign Ministry note to the Soviet
Embassy dated 13 April protesting Soviet expulsion from the institutions
where they were enrolled of the four Chinese students who went back to
Peking "for medical treatment" after they had been "severely injured by
Soviet troops and police" in the 4 March deiaMstration at the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow. The tone of the Chinese note.-is reflected in the following
passage:
"It is precisely clear that the real reason for the expulsion
by the Soviet authorities ... is that the outrages committed by you
in cracking down on the anti-American demonstration and persecuting
the injured students were too ugly, that you are afraid that these
students would expose the true facts of the entire incident upon
their return to these institutions'fron their own country. So you
try to cover up your crime by expelling them from the institutions.
In addition, you try, by this act of repression, to intimidate other
students and prevent them from taking-part in anti-American activities
in the future. But all this is in.vnin.... The perverted actions
of the Soviet Government will only expose once again its own true
features of sham solidarity and sham anti-imperialism."
Not surprisingly, "the Soviet Embassy actually returned the memorandum"
to the Chinese FM on 20 April!
On the 6th, NCNA reports on a "recent" letter to Pravda, "which to
this day Pravda has not dared to publish, by 12 Vietnamese students at
the Institute of Geological Prospecting in Moscow "sternly refuting the
distortion made by that paper concerning the Soviet authorities' repres-
sion of the anti-U.S. demonstration staged by Asian, African, and Latin
American students in Moscow on 4 March, and its shameless, slanderous
attacks on these students." The Vietnamese letter tells how "the Soviet
Red Army surrounded ... (and) beat us" and claims that "75 Vietnamese
students were wounded, 4 girls seriously." It concludes: We demand that
you publish a correction of these falsehoods 5. ediately," -- and shows
codes sent to NCNA and VNA in addition to the original to Pravda.
Also on the 6th, NCNA publicizes an entirely new charge that on
3 April Soviet authorities "savagely suppressed Vietnamese students in
Leningrad for their demand to hold an anti-U.S. rally."
"In this incident, 82 Vietnamese students were arrested and
wounded, among them 3 seriously (including one girl). This was
another shameful atrocity committed by Soviet authorities...."
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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After describing Soviet "tricks" to try to prevent the Vietnamese
from holding a 3 April anti-U.S. demonstration, for which the authorities
on 1 April had granted peraission, NCNA describes how the Soviet authori-
ties "suddenly rushed some 300 police to the scene and brutally cracked
down on the Vietnamese students."
"The Soviet police seized and tore up the placards inscribed
with anti-U.S. slogans and the banners in the hands of the Vietnamese
students. They even went to such lengths as to trample under foot
the national flags of the DRV."
NCNA concludes with a paragraph sardonically asking the Soviet authorities
how they can reconcile their "sweet-sounding words" about "practical sup-
port" to the DRV with their "repeated suppression of foreign students who
call for the holding of meetings and demonstrations against the U.S. agres-
sors."
"A person's words have to be judged by his deeds. Obviously, the
outrage perpetrated by the Soviet authorities in Leningrad exposed
once against their sham anti-imperialism and sham support."
NCNA reports on the 7th that People's Daily and other Peking papers
devote a full page to the Vietnamese letter to Pravda and the above ac-
count of Soviet suppression of the Vietnamese students in Leningrad, to-
gether with pictures, including"a Soviet armyman seizing the national
flag of the DRV from the hands of a Vietnamese student and unscrupulously
trampling it under foot;' and another one"mercilessly manhandling a frail
Vietnamese girl:'
May 6 & 8: NCNA reports on two anti-Soviet items appearing In recent
issues of Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia
M-L . On the 6th, NCNA tells of a Vanguard report (date not given on
the Chinese 23 March People's Daily/Red Flag attack on the 1 March Moscow
"consultative meeting,' calling the Chinese comment "a splendid and in-
spiring call to all people of the world to be on guard against the tricks
of the modern revisionists." On the 8th, NCNA quotes from a denunciation
of the 1 March meeting by CPA (M-L) Chairman Hill as printed in the 23
April Vanguard..
May 7-10: The CPs of the world celebrate the 20th anniversary of VE Day
as a great triumph of the forces of socialism over fascism, with attacks
on "U.S. imperialism" s fascism's successor varying in directness and
vituperation in accordance with each Party's stand in the Sino-Soviet
conflict. In Europe, the victory anniversary is also merged with "libera-
tion" anniversaries in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The East German
celebration is favored by top-level delegations from the CPSU (headed by
Kosygin, vs. Podgorny to Czecho), Poland (Cyrankiewicz), Italy (Longo) and
a few others. The Rumanians, however, favor Prague with their top-level
delegation (headed by Maurer), the only party or state to do so. In
Prague, Novotny, while pledging fidelity to Moscow, says that the Czechs
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intend to work for closer relations with the Chinese and Albanians in the
interest of a "united rout ag is nst the imperialists whose aggression
is encouraged by Communist disunity."
Soviet speeches and statements, while hard in their condemnation
of "U.S. aggression," hold firm to the Khrushchevian "peaceful coexist-
ence" line. Limited positive mention of Stalin's contribution is made
and Marshals Voroshilov and Zhukov were accorded full recognition. The
Chinese, however, use the occasion to publish two major, 10,000-word
blasts, one in People's Daily on the 9th and one in Red Flag No. 5, ap-
pearing on the 10th. Both savagely attack the U.S. as trying to follow
in Hitler's footsteps, but the former is aimed even more sgainst the CPSU
leadership than against the U.S.
The People's Daily article, entitled "The Historical Experience of
the War Against Fascism," is a highly assertive CCP polemic on the "trhole
series of important differences of principle between Marxist-Leninists
and the modern revisionists on the question of how to assess the anti-
Fascist war and on the lessons to be drawn from it," necessary because
"the K. revisionists ... have been deliberately distorting history ever
since the 20th CPSU Congress, obscuring facts and concocting conclusions
that are extremely harmful." The victory of fascism was achieved pri-
marily by the Soviet people and army, but it is "indissolubly linked
with Stalin's leadership" and was made possible only by the socialist
system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The drawn-out Chinese
correction of the modern Soviet "falsifiers of history" builds up to
a parallel between the British-French-U.S. appeasement of fascism and
the present Soviet "betrayal of proletarian internationals i
"Instead of uniting with all possible forces against U.S. imperialism,
they are bent on aligning themselves with U.S. imperialism against
the people of the world and on realizing U.S.-Soviet world hegemony....
How can you expect 'concerted action' with the M-Ls and masses
of the people in all countries, who constitute over 90% of the world's
population, when you persist in the revisionist line laid down at
the 20th and 22nd Congresses and embodied in the program of the PCSU,
and when you persist in the line of 'Soviet-U.S. cooperation for
domination of the world?'..."
Indicatively, of the 16 footnoted references listed at the end of
the article, 12 are from the works of Mao, 3 from Stalin, and 1 from
Lenin!
The Red Flag article, entitled "Commemorate the Victory over German
Fascism" and signed by Lo Jui-ching, a senior general who is Vice Minister
of Defense, is an extremely bellicose exposition of the militant Chinese
views on war, "paper tigers," nuclear weapons, etc. "This decade is
witnessing atomic imperialism playing a superb farce." "U.S. imperialism
is like a large tree eaten hollow by worms." Etc.
5 {Chronology Cont.)
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In reviewing the less Drs of the "great victory," Lo loses no
opportunity to strike at Soviet distortion of history and taunts:
"Just imagine, if the Soviet people and army had not been led by
Stalin but by revisionists such as Khrushchev,... the outcome
could only have been disastrous defeat or capitulation...."
It... although a war imposed on us by imperialism will cause sacri-
fices, losses, and des-t,7 action, it will also educate the people,
and the people will win the war as well as peace and progress.
May 8: NCNA reports from Accra on a "so-called photo and books exhibi-
tion arranged by the Soviet delegation to the 4th Afro-Asian Peoples
Solidarity Conference" which opened the previous day in the hall where
the conference will begin on 10 May. "The exhibition has on display
anti-China pamphlets and thus challenges the conference even before its
opening by this Act of sabotage and split." NCNA says that the Ghanaians
expressed opposition and some removed the exhibit 10 minutes after the
Soviets had completed it. Next morning, however, the Soviets completely
renewed it.
6 (Chronology)
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903 AF,NE. STUDY IN AMBIVALENCE
Communist Front Organizations in India
25X1C10b
"India without Nehru needs strong and decisive government, and
all those who would lose if India crumbles have a right to look for
more of it than they see now. What anyone outside thinks is vastly
less important than what is thought in India. It is those who feel
about India with the perception and the blindness of being Indian
who will decide what happens to Mr. Shastri, and to his party."
(Economist - April 3, 1965)
India offers a uniquely favorable environment for Communist-front
organizations. Its cultural, linguistic, racial and religious hetero-
genity presents an ideal breeding-ground in which various dissident
groups prosper and agitate for a wide variety of general as well as
special political interests. A high degree of public interest - es-
pecially within the middle class -- in political and social matters, com-
bined with a considerable amount of emotionalism, a lack of sufficient
knowledge about general and political matters, and frequently an anti-
Western and vacillating bias have made it possible for the Communists
to organize some 50 active fronts in India, 10 of which are affiliated
to international communist front organizations They reflect not only
the Sinn-Soviet dissensions current in the World Communist Movement, but
have suffered from the consequences of the 196+ split of the Communist
Party of India into two parties. The principal groups which are most at-
tracted to Communist fronts have been students, educated working women,
artists and writers, and various other members of the educated middle
class. The educated unemployed and the minority linguistic groups (as
well as refugees from Pakistan) have also been particularly active in
front organizations.
The communist movement in India is not considered as a foreign-
dominated group by the great mass of the Indian electorate. The CPI,
prior to the split, has shared approximately the same slogans with
parties of the democratic left, overtly functioned as a conventional
political party, and tried to portray itself as a nationalistic party.
The fronts in India are apparently even more accepted by the general
public which is not alert to the dangers of the world communist move-
ment or the operations of front groups. They are now in the process of
being captured by either the Communist Party of India/Left (CPI/L) or
the Communist Party of India/Right (CPI/R), and have been relatively in-
active the past year or so.
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(903 Cont.)
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Although the present constitutional system of India is not subject
to widespread criticism (individuals in India are usually more a target
of attack than the system), there is a strong undercurrent of dis-
satisfaction among the public with the general condition of the Indian
economy and government. Communist front organization efforts to influence
government policy have been primarily various forms of agitation outside
the Parliament designed to discredit the government. Petitions and demon-
strations have been organized on issues such as Kashmir, nuclear testing,
the cost of living - and more recently, the Indo-Pakistan confrontation
over the Rann of Kutch. Indian fear of China, never far below the surface
especially since the Chinese aggression in 1962, has been intensified by
what India regards as the development of all too friendly relations be-
tween Pakistan and Communist China - the two implacable enemies of India.
The explosion of the second nuclear device by Communist China on May 14
(coinciding with the visit of Prime Minister Shastri to Moscow) will also
undoubtedly increase not only the fear of China but further exacerbate
the conflict between the CPI/R and the CPI/L and their front organizations,
most of which are turning more and more towards the pro-Soviet CPI/R.
Of the many front organizations in India, the six most active in
1962-63 (as reported by USIA) are briefly described below, and in more
detail in an unclassified attachment. Perhaps more than communist front
organizations in other countries, the Indian are closely intermeshed, marked
by dual leadership and simultaneous participation in several front groups
as well as in the communist parties. Particularly recently, communist
energies have been diverted and introverted by the left-right splits at
home, as well as by outside threats to India. Always vocal, and certainly
never to be underestimated, the front activities in India since 1962 ap-
pear to consist mostly of the "saved talking to the saved."
Peace and international friendship fronts, of which there are over
20 operating in India, were organized to discredit Western foreign policy
and to advocate support by India of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
These fronts oppose Indian cooperation with the West and Indian support to
the West in any v ay.
The largest peace front is the All India Peace Council - an affilate
of the World Peace Council - with approximately 5,000 active members and
about 35,000 sympathizers. It has branches in all major cities in India
and has been an effective channel for communist propaganda. However,
particularly since the Chinese invasion of 1962, its influence has been
declining, even though pro-Soviet elements are in firm control.
The Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the major Indian
communist international peace and friendship front, has played an important
role with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization as the chief sup-
port of the Soviets against the Chinese. It cooperates with the All India
Peace Council and appeals to the same groups, although it has never had
the popularity of the All India Peace Council.
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Most communist countries have a front organization within India
ostensibly organized to improve their reputation and influence. The
most prominent of this type is the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society which
is considered the most active front organization in India. It has di-
rectly supported Soviet foreign policy and has also supported and fostered
communism within India. It has sought, by low key propaganda, to establish
the image of the Soviet Union as a peaceful and progressive nation.
The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), an affiliate of the World Federation
of Trade Unions, is the largest labor front organization and one of the
oldest fronts in India. It is not now very active; the left-right split
in the communist movement (particularly concerning cooperation with the
Congress Party) is mirrored in the AIKS, and the CPI/L is dominant. Be-
cause of lack of unity, factionalism even among the dominant left wing,
and of thelongstanding strength of the Congress Party in the countryside,
the AIKS has been prevented from achieving major influence in rural India.
However, its emphasis on building support among the peasants makes it
potentially one of the most influential.
Much of the communist effective power for political agitation, sabo-
tage and espionage has come from its urban labor front, the All India Trade
Union Congress (AITUC), also a member of the WFTU. The AITUC cannot matchu
in size the 1.5 million member Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC),
the labor body of the Congress Party. However, not being under any obliga-
tion to the ruling party as is ITTTUC, it has greater tactical freedom --
particularly in its ability to call strikes in vital industries. Less than
one-half of Indian laborers belong to any union and the AITUC probably con-
trols only a fifth of these. But those under its control are strategically
placed and fairly well disciplined. Until 1964 when CPI factionalism be-
came rampant, the AITUC was the most effective trade union federation. It
has served as an important supporter of the Soviets' attempts to maintain
their influence within Asian trade unions over and against the Chinese
although it too is faced with a division of leadership between the CPI/R
and CPI/L.
The All India Youth Federation, affiliate of the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, appears to be fully controlled by the CPI/R, although
some left elements have split off. It is one of the most active Indian
fronts, and also active within the Soviet controlled mass youth organiza-
tion, the WFDY. In many ways, however, the youth and student groups can
hardly be called front organizations in the usual sense since their com-
munist affiliation and dominance are well known and they openly operate
as an official organ of the CPI. 25X1 C1 Ob
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25X1C10b
25X1C1Ob
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904. WHITEWASHING THE KGB
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
SITUATION: There has always been a respectable volume of fiction
and other material published in the Soviet Union, glorifying the "Chekist"
(the term for a secret policeman, derived from the name of the original
Bolshevik secret police organization, the Cheka). Recently, however, the
KGB, possibly with the collaboration of the Chief Intelligence Directorate
(GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, seems to
have launched a publicity campaign to "improve the image" of Soviet secret
police and espionage organizations. This campaign appeared to start just
prior to Khrushchev's fall with the disclosure of a highly colored version
of Richard Sorge's story and by February
1965 it had reached such a pitch that Literaturnaya Rossiya, a literary
weekly, published a cartoon showing a long line of writers eagerly waiting
outside an editorial office, carrying manuscripts with such titles as
"Operation Rose," "Operation X," and "Operation White Elephant."
One explanation would be that, in view of revelations of Stalinist
misdeeds in the last few years, not to mention the long-standing and well-
founded public fear and hatred of the secret police, the high command of
the KGB decided more effort was needed to make their organization popular;
popularity would make it easier to get tips, recruit informants, and pres-
sure suspects. There would also be political reasons for such a campaign.
Publicity campaigns on behalf of government departments are familiar phe-
nomena in many countries; even where the government is undemocratic, a
department which is not popular or at least respected finds it harder to
get money and a voice in major decisions. The 1953 denunciation and exe-
cution of Beria, the change of the Ministry of State Security to a Com-
mittee, and Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign were accompanied by person-
nel cuts, morale problems, and a loss of influence for the Chekists. None
of the leaders intended to allow another Beria to arise. Now, however,
when there is no single dictator, the secret police have a chance to try
to "sell" their organization. Coming at this juncture, the KGB's campaign
suggests both the achievement of a position of power, and also an effort to
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 Approved For Release P78-03061 A000300030004-3
expand that position by making the Chekists less vulnerable to criticism
and attack within ruling circles. Furthermore, when men or organizations
are powerful, they cannot hear their praises sung loudly enough.
There is plausible speculation (see attachments) that the KGB has
been virtually uncontrolled for the last few years, and that just prior
to Khrushchev's fall the KGB was actually sabotaging his foreign policy
and undermining his position. The KGB's power position was indicated by
an August 1964 article by Roger Hilsman showing that in the 1962 Cuban
crisis, it was a KGB officer in Washington, and not Ambassador Dobrynin,
who did the crucial negotiating with the Americans. (Hillman in 1962
was chief of the Department of State's intelligence and research organi-
zation, and in a position to know.) The KGB apparently served Khrushchev
faithfully in the Cuban affair. But signs soon appeared that suggested
KGB sabotage of Khrushchev's diplomacy.
In October 1963, the KGB staged the arrest of an American professor
and held him incommunicado for 16 days, at a time when a Soviet-American
cultural exchange agreement was pending. In March 1961, British and
American attaches were drugged in Odessa, as Western doctors proved by
clinical evidence and laboratory tests. Six months later, British and
American attaches were seized and searched in Khaborovsk, in violation
of diplomatic immunity, by what Pravda called the "glorious Chekists."
The most striking evidence that the KGB is uncontrolled appeared
in September 1961+. A West German technician, Horst Schwirkmann, came
to Moscow and cleared out many hidden KGB microphones in the West German
Embassy; his work accomplished,., he obtained the required Soviet Foreign
Ministry permission for a tourist trip to visit a historic monastery
building at Zagorsk, 70 km. from Moscow. While visiting the monastery
(on 6 September) he suddenly felt his left pant leg become damp; it turned
out that he had been attacked with mustard gas, a deadly gas used in World
War I which burns the skin. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials held up
Schwirkmann's evacuation to the West for two days, apparently because the
KGB hoped to get him into a Soviet hospital where he could be interrogated
(or "liquidated"?). Since this whole action was likely to upset arrange-
ments for a Khrushchev trip to Bonn, one must conclude that Soviet Foreign
Ministry officials are more influenced by the KGB than by considerations
of foreign policy.
Khrushchev can hardly have favored the Zagorsk operation; probably
he either knew nothing about it beforehand, or could not prevent it.
His own overthrow five weeks later (15 October) can only have taken place
with at least the acquiescence of the KGB, who at a minimum failed to in-
form him of what they knew was afoot. A. N. Shelepin and his protege
V. Ye. Semichastny, the past and present chiefs of the KGB, received
prompt recognition after the coup. On 16 November, Shelepin became a full
member of the CPSU Presidium and Semichastny became a full member of the
CPSU Central Committee. Aside from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Suslov, Shelepin
is the only party Secretary who is also a member of the Presidium, and of
2
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25X1C10b
25X1C10b
these four, Shelepin is the only man also to hold high state office, being
a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Since Khrushchev's fall,
Shelepin has been the most prominent of the younger leaders, carrying out
an important mission to restore and further exploit relations with the
United Arab Republic, and also making a special trip to Mongolia. (He
was with Nasser when the Egyptian leader in a speech told the US to "drink
up the sea," and shortly afterwards Nasser invited Ulbricht for a visit.)
Khrushchev occasionally tried to reassure the Soviet public that party
control would prevent a return to police terror; now, instead of such re-
assurances, we have the KGB propaganda campaign.
As part of the campaign, the popular magazine Ogonek is publishing
a serial biography of Sorge, written by Sergei Golyakov and Vladimir
Ponizovsky; perhaps the campaign's true sponsorship is shown by the fact
that Golyakov and Ponizovsky describe Sorge as a member of a special
branch of the NKVD (the KGB of the 1930's), rather than as an employee
of the GRU, as was actually the case. Sorge the hard-drinking libertine
is described as a dedicated man who performed a lofty duty. Several re-
cent novels have used the theme that Stalin and his cohorts overlooked
vital intelligence reports: The Last Two Weeks, by Alexandr Rosen (Zvezda,
1965, No. 1), June 1941, by Grigori Baklanov Znamya, 1965, Nos. 1 &2),
Not Born as Soldiers, by K. Simonov (Znamya, 1965, Nos. 1 & 2), and I am
Responsible for Everything, by Yuri German (Zvezda, 1964, No. 10). These
describe devoted and courageous secret agents, whose warnings were ignored.
Vadim Kozhevnikov, who has already contributed Stars on Earth about Soviet
agents in Germany, will have another espionage story serialized this spring,
The Shield and the Sword. Meanwhile, names of rehabilitated NKVD officers
purged b Stalin, frequently appear in the Soviet press
, and articles have memorialized the contributions of the
Chekists in rooting out Nazi spies during the war: on 3 and 2 April, both
Izvestiya and Sovetskaya Belorussiya carried such an article by a Lt. Gen.
Zheleznikov, who has signed a similar piece for Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)
as "Former chief of the Administration for Counterintelligence and 'Smersh'
on the Bryansk and Second Baltic Fronts." Pravda announced on 21 February
that Col Lev Yefimovich Manevich had been posthumously made a Hero of
Socialist Labor, and lauded his refusal, as the agent "Etienne," to give
in under interrogation by the police of a reactionary government.
It is easier to imagine that a KGB man might be courageous than that
he would be humane. Yet a recent serialized novel, The Fall of the Jesuit,
by Ya. Golovanov (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8-20 December 19 , tries to de-
pict today's Chekists as cultured, intelligent, sympathetic and compas-
sionate. They are soccer fans, discuss ballet, drink mineral water, and
think fondly of their children. The story describes a ne'er-do-well with
religious tendencies who serves the Germans, spends time in Paris brothels,
returns to the Soviet Union, and finally tries in a clumsy way to sell in-
formation to an American spy. In one episode, the Chekists discuss, before
making a house search, how they can do it without frightening the children
in the house. And the author comments that when he was a child he was
3
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(90I Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1 RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
always afraid to pass the NKVD headquarters, but now he realizes that
there has been a transformation since the days when a police agent was
judged by the number of persons he arrested; there has been an "irre-
versible" change in the psychology of the police.
Another story, Reverse Reading, adapted from a book by N. Tarianov
and published in Leninskoye Znamya (24+ November-2 December 196+), re-
lates that besides uncovering traitors and outwitting foreign agents,
the Chekists have to present Soviet courts with "irrefutable evidence
of criminal activities"; while in England the illegal possession of
"official secrets" is a crime in itself, the Soviet police must prove
that the information was in fact security information and that "it was
passed to a foreign power." According to these stories, the KGB gets
permission from a Procurator (district attorney) before searching a home
and before making an arrest. Sometimes, however, the true position of
the KGB in Soviet society shows through: at the end of The Fall of the
Jesuit, the villain is arrested by a KGB man who "tactfully gets him
out of a hospital ward by masquerading as a doctor, examining all the
patients, and telling the culprit he will have to go to Moscow for treat-
ment; it is hard to imagine a police official being allowed to do all
this in a non-Communist hospital. The Jesuit story also reveals that
the KGB's informants are omnipresent, and its files all-inclusive--they
still include "confessions" made in 1941, when suspects were often tor-
tured into making false accusations, and the KGB still considers these
"confessions" valid.
The fact is, that while the KGB does not serve a Stalin any longer,
there is still no effective protection against arbitrary arrest and im-
prisonment. A paper from a Procurator means little if the Procurator
himself is afraid of--or in league with--the police. If an American
professor like F. C. Barghoorn can be framed and held incommunicado,
what happens in the case of Soviet citizens, who have no Embassy to
look out for their interests, no President Kennedy to intervene for
their release? In the case of Schwirkmann, terrorism was apparently
a principal aim; the KGB hoped to intimidate foreign embassies to keep
them from trying to protect themselves against audio-surveillance.
Soviet citizens have of course no protection from such surveillance--
or intimidation.
In today's USSR, punishment is often carried out without reference
to courts and state prisons: poets and writers (e.g., Mikhail Naritsa,
Valeriy Tarsis, and Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin)are placed in mental hospi-
tals, or are banished for a time to factories and construction sites
(e.g., Andrei Voznesensky and Viktor Nekrasov). Rebellious youths are
sent to the Virgin Lands or other labor colonies (see Mihajlo Mihajlov's
first Delo article, in New Leader attached to 25X1 C1 Ob
indeed Shelepin himself, as chief of the Komsomol, is said to have super-
vised the sending of hundreds of thousands of young people to the Virgin
Lands in the middle-1950's, before he was officially connected with the
KGB. With the approval of easily influenced local Soviets, the police
may legally impose up to five years exile at forced labor for those they
charge with "parasitism," without any recourse to the courts.
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In the courts themselves, defense attorneys are intimidated and
guilt is presumed unless disproven. It is very easy for Soviet au-
thorities, including police authorities, to convey dire threats of
punishment to a people which still remembers the Stalin era. At the
22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, where he denounced Beria and Stalin, Shelepin
also advocated calling the "anti-Party group to strictest account," said
that the actions of "hooligans, thieves, loafers, bribe-takers and slan-
derers should be classed as grave crimes," and lashed out against certain
"unstable elements" among the cultural intelligentsia, accusing them of
"sabotage on the ideological front." Such statements, coming from a KGB
chief, were ominous to Soviet ears.
Today, Shelepin has become more powerful than he was in 1961; if
no longer the official head of the KGB, he is apparently still the supreme
authority in police and intelligence matters. (For example, a Pravda item
of 10 April 1965 stated that Shelepin had addressed a meeting of Party
administrative specialists and Republic Ministers of the Defense of Public
Order, held under Central Committee auspices; under Soviet conditions,
this indicates that Shelepin is the CPSU Central Committee Secretary su-
pervising the police organs.) His ruthlessness is shown by the fact that
in 1959 he personally awarded the Order of the Red Banner to Bogdan N.
Stashinsky, the assassin of Stefan Bandera, the Ukrainian exile leader.
Extracts from The Fall of the Jesuit are contained in an unclassified
attachment to this guidance. An unclassified biography of Shelepin and
reproductions of articles are also attached. See also Press Comment 5 May
1965, PP. 11-14. 25X1 C10b
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25X1C10b
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905. TIE PROSPECTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAM
25X1C10b
SITUATION: There has been much speculation that if the war in
Vietnam could only be brought to an end, Ho Chi Minh and his Communist
Lao Dong Party would--given Ho's international background and the tra-
ditional Vietnamese fear and hatred of China--become an Asian Tito. Even
should such a possibility deserve serious consideration in the total Viet-
namese problem, a close and realistic examination of the evidence shows
there is little reason to expect such a development.
In the first place, Tito's Yugoslavia was separated from the USSR
by some 200 miles and a ring of newly absorbed satellites whose depend-
ability in a crisis was at best untested. Vietnam has a common border
with China. Yugoslavia had common land borders with anti-Communist
states, which Vietnam does not have.
In the second place, and perhaps of greater importance, at the time
of Tito's demands for a voice in the Communist camp (and subsequent ex-
pulsion) he was a vigorous man of 55 in firm control of his Party and its
day-to-day operations. In contrast, Ho is 75 years old and his role in
the Communist Lao Dong Party is at the present moment questionable. It
is certain that he does not deal with day-to-day problems and some sources
even say that he is being used to take advantage of his immense prestige
as a veteran revolutionary in the world Communist movement.
Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party made their stand for independ-
ence and for the right to rule their own country. But ever since Vietnam
has been divided, the stated objective of Ho and his Communist Lao Dong
Party has been to take over South Vietnam. Nor are these expansionist
objectives limited to South Vietnam. There are indications that Ho and
the Lao Dong Party still have responsibility in the World Communist move-
ment for all of the areas of the former French Indochina. If this is
true it means that they will ultimately expect to extend their realm to
include Cambodia and Laos as well as South Vietnam.
The Yugoslav Communist Party in 1948 was intensively loyal to Tito
personally and to his programs. But there are factional rivalries at
the highest levels of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. The ex-
tremist, pro-Peking faction is led by the Party First Secretary Le Duan
and includes the following prominent members: Truong Chinh, former
Party Secretary General; Le Duc Tho, chief of the Party Organization
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(905 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1RDP78-03061 A000300030004-3
Department; Nguyen Chi Thanh, former top political Commissar in the North
Vietnamese Army; and Hoang Van Hoan, former ambassador to Peking. This
extremist faction is rigidly doctrinaire and espouses the harsh lines of
the Chinese Communists. The so-called pro-Soviet moderate element in the
Lao Dong Party has long been led by Premier Pham Van Dong. His primary
support comes from the hero of Dien Bien Phu, Defense Minister General Vo
Nguyen Giap, who is known to bear personal enmity toward both Truong Chinh
and Nguyen Chi Thanh. State Construction Commissioner Le Thanh Nghi,
North Vietnam's foremost industrial management and planning expert, is
also a member of the "moderate" faction. The existence of such high level
factions in the Party would make it impossible for Ho to eliminate foreign
influence in Vietnamese affairs even if he had the desire to do so.
The existence of these factions guarantees Chicom domination of all
parts of Vietnam that come under the control of Ho Chi Minh and the Lao
Dong Party. If the Soviet-oriented "moderate" faction took over and tried
to eliminate the pro-Peking extremist faction altogether, the extremist
faction would, in the final analysis, establish their own government some-
where along the Chinese-Vietnamese border and immediately call on Chinese
aid to thwart the plans of the "revisionist usurpers." The USSR could not
possibly sustain its adherents in Vietnam, in the face of determined Chicom
opposition, unless it resorted to the use of nuclear weapons against China
itself. This is exceedingly unlikely.
If, on the other hand, the pro-Peking extremists come to fully domi-
nate the North Vietnamese Party there is no doubt that they will look to-
ward Peking, both as a developmental model and supplier of material aid.
They will be as eager as Peking is to prove that all non-Communists (and
even some of the Communists) are paper tigers who do not have the deter-
mination to oppose the will of China.
Thus, so long as the Sino-Soviet split continues and that split is
reflected in the factions of the Communist Lao Dong Party, those portions
of Vietnam ruled by the Communists will inevitably come under Chinese Com-
munist domination. It is for this reason that Ho tried so hard to mediate
the Sino-Soviet split and to avoid making a definite and final choice be-
tween China and the Soviet Union. He realizes that for him there is no
choice; the act of choosing will make a Chinese province of however much
of Vietnam he controls. To think that he can declare himself and his
country free from the domination of Communist China is to ignore reality.
Other aspects of the Vietnamese question are important for the Free
World to consider. In the arrangements that took place at the end of
World War Two it was understood that all of Yugoslavia would come under
the Communist zone of influence. The Free World had no commitment to the
Yugoslav people to protect them from the ravages of a Communist takeover.
Such is not the case in South Vietnam. The 15 million people there have
rejected Communism as the form of government under which they wish to live,
and have made a long and valiant struggle against a foreign inspired and
2
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(905 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08 61 A000300030004-3
supported invasion; they deserve the protection of the Free World. In
view of the manner in which the North Vietnamese Communists have treated
their on people, it is not difficult to imagine the torture and terror
they would inflict on those who have fought so long and so hard against
them.
In 1948, there was good reason for the non-Communist world to risk
more on the possibility that Tito might throw off the shackles of Stalin-
ist domination. Until that time, the Marxists claimed that conflict be-
tween Communist states was impossible. They said that the competition
of monopoly capitalist states for raw materials and markets was the cause
of wars and that the same kind of national rivalries could not, by defi-
nition, take place between Communist states. The myth that the mere adop-
tion of Communism would eliminate conflict forever made it attractive to
naive, unthinking people. The thesis was an important aspect of the "sci-
ence" of Marxism, of the legend that Communism was the means for achieving
Utopia for mankind. Tito's rebellion caused that myth to collapse on the
heads of Communists everywhere and the Sino-Soviet split some ten years
later laid the ghost to rest forever. To exert any great effort on Ho's
defection or to gamble away the freedom of Southeast Asia on it is clearly
not worth the risk involved. Ho will find, as have all others who have
shown the desire to lessen their absolute dependence on their Communist
masters, that the Free World is more than willing to help them. But first
they must show the desire. 25X1 C1 Ob
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(905 Cont.)
 Approved For Release -03061 A000300030004-3
25X1C10b
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(905.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/ P78-03061A000300b~ 4 5
906 AF,FE,NE. MOSCOW'S FOREIGN "AID"
THE SOVIETS TAKE THEIR POUND OF FLESH
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
The materialism of the Soviet leaders is not merely theoretical. In
terms of worldly goods, they have shown themselves ready to take what they
can get, no_matter how damaging to unwary partners. Alone among the vic-
tors of World War II., the USSR seized and shipped out of the territory it
occupied as much machinery and equipment as it could haul away. This took
place not only in East Germany, but in all the areas through which Soviet
armies passed. In the "ex-enemy" countries, East Germany, Hungary, Bul-
garia, and Rumania, reparations were demanded, $300 million from Rumania
and $200 million from Hungary, while East German reparations deliveries
came to $4.3 billion before they were ended in 1953. It is estimated that
East Germany had delivered $15 billion worth of goods aside from repara-
tions by 1957. After reparations were reduced, the Soviets continued to
claim joint ownership of former German assets with Hungary and Rumania
(thanks to German investments and seizures of property during the war,
these assets comprised many key industries), and required Poland to de-
liver coal as "recompense" for a tiny share in East German deliveries.
"German" property in Czechoslovakia was shipped to the USSR. In Manchu-
ria too, which Soviet troops occupied at the end of World War II, the
Soviets stripped the steel mills of machinery with a capacity to produce
two million tons of steel. An American audit estimated that $2 billion
worth of equipment was taken from Manchuria by the Soviets.
Such policies could not be carried on indefinitely, as the Hungarian
and Polish revolts of 1956 showed, and the satellites do not pay tribute
any longer. But the Soviets continue to make a ruble whenever they can.
In the construction of the large-diameter pipeline from the USSR to Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, a Soviet-sponsored project which will
give Soviet oil a competitive advantage over Rumanian oil in the other
satellites, the Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans themselves pay the
costs of construction. Austrian reparations deliveries to the USSR con-
tinued until 1963. Egyptian cotton has been resold by the Soviets in the
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(906 cont.)
 Approved For Release 1 - DP78-03061A000300030004-3
:_iarkets where the Egyptians themselves normally sell their cotton; Polish
coal has been resold in East Germany; Ghanaian cocoa has been resold in
trlcstern Europe; Greek tobacco, cotton and other products have been resold
in Western markets. Where barter arrangements have been concluded, the
Soviets have later overpriced the goods they supplied hoping that the
overcharge would not be noticed; in Afghanistan, where this was done, the
prices were only brought into line after alert Afghan officials pointed
out the discrepancy with Western prices. When the UAR protested in such
a case, the Soviets coolly replied that the overcharge of 30 per cent was
to compensate them for the fact that the Egyptians could not pay hard cur-
rency. Soviet trade officials insist that any trade disputes be settled
by Soviet courts, which are hardly impartial. When the Soviets want to
break a contract for political or other reasons, as when they canceled a
contract to deliver $20 million worth of oil to Israel, Soviet courts
ensure that no damages fall on the USSR.
Soviet motives in their trade and aid program are mainly political,
but the so-called "aid" is a sound commercial proposition as well. Al-
though the term "aid" calls to mind grants or sales at minimum prices,
such as US aid programs have often made, Soviet "aid" is really only trade
on the barter principle, with an interest charge included. Aside from a
few "loss leader" projects, like the Bhilai steel mill in India, the Soviet
contribution in such arrangements consists of goods which are relatively
redundant from the Kremlin's point of view (if not always from that of the
Soviet consumer). This is particularly true of military equipment, which
forms an increasingly large proportion of Soviet "aid." The sale of obso-
lete arms is almost pure profit, and sometimes even current models can be
traded away without any hardship to the Soviet forces, thanks to the tre-
mendous scale of Soviet arms production, in 1962 estimated to be 23 per
cent greater than in 1955. (For a discussion of the Soviet political use
of arms deliveries, see BPG #833, 12 October 1961., and attachments.)
Even with other Communist governments, the Soviets expect to make
money on arms sales. The Chinese Communists have published their letter
of 29 February 1964 to the CPSU Central Committee Peki y
( n Review, 8 May
1961), charging that Soviet loans to China mainly served for the Chinese
purchase of war materiel, used largely in the Korean War. On 20 April
1965, the Albanian newspaper Zeri I Poopullit repeated the charge, compar-
ing the Soviet leaders with the famous merchant of death," Basil Zaharov.
Both the Chinese and the Albanians point out that Soviet experts serve as
a means of penetration and internal control in the countries to which they
are sent. The Soviets, from the Chinese-Albanian standpoint, not only let
others take the political risks and costs in bloodshed, they also make a
financial profit and place their own agents in key positions. (See attach-
ment for text of Chinese and Albanian statements.) The Chinese and Alba-
nians are of course trying to make an anti-Soviet case, but their charges
are quite credible. Moreover, the Soviets are now quite likely charging
North Vietnam for any arms delivered to that country. Other governments,
like Sukarno's and Nasser's, support "national liberation" and "anti-
imperialist" struggles, and pay the Soviets for the wherewithal for con-
ductint or aiding these campaigns, which assist the Soviets politically.
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(906 cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08 78-03061 A000300030004-3
The Albanian article also charged that the Soviets provide obsolete
weapons to North Vietnam. On April 29, President Jomo Kenyatta rejected
an arms shipment at Mombasa, partly because the arms were obsolete and
partly because he did not want to employ the 17-man team of Soviet "tech-
nicians" who had arrived in Nairobi a week earlier. Another aspect of
Soviet profit-taking trade policies is their failure to provide costly
service facilities or stocks of spare parts for their customers; their
usual rule is to unload and let the customer worry about operation. Thus
the UAR recently had to purchase $125,000 worth of spare parts from Gen-
eral Motors for Soviet-built trucks, copies of old GM designs. (Spare
parts are also a serious problem within the USSR itself.) 25X1 C 10b
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(906.)
 Approved For Release 1999/0 3061A000300036bO4 31965
25X1C10b
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(907 Cont.)
 Approved For Release -RDP78-03061A000300030004-
2
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er (907 Cont.)
5X1 C1 Ob
 Approved For Release 1999/081221 3061A00030003000429X1 Cl Ob
3
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1111 fl. pq~ (907 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1 !CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000300 C C1Qb
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(907 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/ 78-03061 A00030003000*1 C10b
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l`rnnr (907.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
Fact Sheet
24 May 1965
MM.jor Communist Front Organ ations in India
Brief descriptions of selected front-organizations indicate the
interplay of front group leadership, among CPI and other fronts. This
pattern is typical of Indian front organizations, all dependent upon an
elite few for direction and coordinated efforts:
All India Peace Council. Pro-Soviet elements are in firm control
of the AIPC. This was symbolized by the November 1963 replacement of
Pandit Sunderlal, a former president of the India-China Friendship Asso-
ciation, by the pro-Soviet Congress NIP Diwan Chaman Lal as its chairman
and dropping of CPI (left) leader A. K. Gopalan from the AIPC's Presi-
dential Committee. Though Chitta Biswas replaced the CIP (right) Sec-
retariat member Romesh Chandra as an AIPC joint secretary general at
this time, the latter was simultaneously chosen to replace the late
Saifuddin Kitchlew on the WPC's Presidential Committee. This is the
WPC's highest organ, and it -currently has both Sunderlal and Chaman
Lal as members, too. Biswas previously served at the Vienna Interna-
tional Institute for Peace, the WPC's headquarters. The AIPC has
thirty-two members on the WPC, within which it gives strong support
to the Soviet cause.
In or prior to March 1960, Divan Chaman Lal, not then prominent in
the AIPC, organized the Indian Parliamentarians for Peace. Numerically
speaking, this was primarily a Congress Party affair, and it contained
about one-third of all the members of India's national Parliament (both
houses). It continued to draw in a wider circle than just those formally
affiliated with the AIPC even after Lal's rise to prominence in the
latter organization. The Parliamentarians sponsored a "seminar" on
international relations in December 1963 and got Nehru to inaugurate
it. The main organizer and manipulator of this meeting was said to be
the Communist Romesh Chandra. A much larger international "peace con-
ference" was sponsored by the Parliamentarians in November 1964 on the
theme of carrying forward the program of the late prime minister. Once
again the prime minister (this time Lal Bahudur Shastri) was inveigled
into addressing the meeting. V. K. Krishna Menon, though India's most
famous leftist cabinet member prior to the Sino-Indian border war of
late 1962 and not formerly associated with the peace movement, was a
key showpiece at both meetings.
Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidari . This organization
has played an important role within AAPSO where it has been the chief
support of the Soviets against the Chinese. Two significant changes in
its personnel occurred in 1964 when Tara Chand* replaced Rameshwari
~i Tara Chan? (Con3ress) Y,a. vice Association at the ti~re Of its November 1962thissolvt on. Lii?:eeRasl~ip
11
meshwari Nehru, he is a WPC member.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
Nehru as president and Chataur Narayan Malaviya replaced Muhammad
Kallimullah as Indian representative on the Cairo AAPSO Secretariat.
Though ostensibly a joint front of the Congress party and the CP India
(right), the dominant personality in the organization appears to be
Romesh Chandra, a Secretariat member of the latter party. Until Novem-
ber 1963 Chandra and C. N. Malaviya were pro-Soviet joint secretaries
general of the All-India Peace Council.
All India Trade Union Congress. This organization, with a claimed
strength over a million and a government-certified one of about half
that amount, has been India's most effective trade union federation, at
least until it became the scene of CPI factionalism in 1964. in that
year the AITUC's "figurehead" president, S. S. Mirajkar, while still
formally a member of the CPI (right), took the lead in accusing AITUC
secretary general S. A. Dange of misappropriating AITUC funds and of
having offered his services to the British in 192+; Mirajkar then pro-
ceeding officially to join the CPI (left). The No. 2 AITUC leader,
Secretary K. G. Srivastava (Dange's 1962 deputy on the WFTU Executive
Committee), has been notably pro-Chinese in the past. Meanwhile, the
CPI (left) set up a committee in December 1964 under Politburo member
P. Ramamurthi, a 1962 AITUC vice president, to take control of state
trade union councils and individual affiliates from the CPI (right)
leadership of S. A. Dange. This leftist challenge has been partially
responsible for the AITUC's rightist leadership's engaging in the
price-rise/food shortage demonstrations of 1963-64.
Dange is one of the WFTU's twelve vice presidents, and the AITUC
maintains an official representative at Prague tiTU headquarters, one
Mahendra Sen. Another Indian resident in Prague, Satish Chatterjee,
served as secretary general of WkTU's Trade Union International of
Transport, Port, and Fishery Workers. In October 1963 Dange and Sriva-
stava (see above) attended the Moscow Congress of Soviet Trade Unions.
All Indian Kisan Sabha. This organization appears to be under the
effective control of the CPI (left). Its president, the CPI (left)
Politburo member A. K. Gopalan, appears to have used the organization's
facilities (offices, communications channels, etc.) to set up a left-
wing parallel to the right-wing-dominated CPI organization during 1962-
64, prior to the official formation of a second CPI. Its secretary
general, Jagit Singh Tyalpuri, another leader of the CPI (left), serves
as a vice president of the Agricultural and Forestry Workers TUI. Its
membership was estimated at a quarter of a million in August 1964.
All India Youth Federation. Though CPI (left) elements have split
off to form separate units in Andhra and Kerala, the CPI (right) appears
to be fully in control of the Federation's central organization. CPI
(right) Central Executive Committee member P. K. Vasudevan Nair, MP,
continues to serve as president; as of January 1963 he was also his
party's youth and student responsible. CPI (right] National Council
member Sharda (Sarrda) Mitra not only continues i serve as AIYF secre-
tary general, but he was made secretary of the Party Headquarters Branch
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(Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
in New Delhi in late 1964. Govinda Pillai, an ATYF secretary, suc-
ceeded Vasudevan Nair as a Wt'DY vice president in 1962, and he repre-
sents India, at the Budapest ?E717DY headquarters where he also serves as
an editor of World Youth. Pillai attended the Moscow World Youth
Forum of September 1_9677.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
24+ May 1965
Selected InCian Communist-Front Peace
and International Friendship Associations:
1.
All India Peace Council (affiliated to World Peace Council)
2.
Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (member of
Peoples Solidarity Organization)
3.
Institute for Afro-Asian and World Affairs
-.
Indian Writers Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (member Afro-
Asian Writers Bureau)
5.
Indo-Soviet Cultural Society
6.
Indo-Bulgarian Friendship Association
7.
Indo-Cuban Friendship Association
8.
Indo-Czechoslovakia Cultural Society
9.
Indo-German Democratic Republic Friendship
Society
10.
Indo-Hungaxian Cultural Society
11.
Indo-Korean Friendship Association
12.
India-Latin American Solidarity Committee
13-
Indo-Mongolian Cultural Society
14.
Indo Moroccan Friendship Association
15.
Indo-Polish Friendship and Cultural Society
16.
Indo-Rumanian Friendship Association
17.
Indo Vietnam Cultural Society
18.
Indian Association of Afro-Asian Youth
19.
India Committee of Support of Continental Congress Solidarity
with Cuba
Indian-Cuban Society
Indian Communist-Front Labor,
Agricultural and Professional Associations
1. All-India Kisan Sabha (affiliate of World Federation of Trade Unions)
2. A11-India Trade Union Congress (affiliate of World Federation of
Trade Unions)
3. A11-India Consultative Conference of Young Writers
4. Indian Federation of Working Journalists (affiliate of International
Organization of Journalists)
5. A11-India Association of Democratic Lawyers (affiliate of Interna-
tional Association of Democratic Lawyers)
6. Association of Scientific Workers of India (affiliate of World Fed-
eration of Scientific Workers)
Indian Communist-Front Cultural,
Women and Youth Associations
1. All-India Progressive Writers' Association
2. Indian People's Theatre Association
3. All-India Students' Federation (affiliate of International Union of
Students )
4. All-India Youth Federation (affiliate of World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth
5. National Federation of Indian Women (affiliate of Women's Interna-
tional Democratic Federation)
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 Approve or Ref a -1999 08124 : - - 30G 4-3
LONDON OBSERVER
22 November 19611
EDWARD CRANK$HAW..
CPYRGHT
zkz Ko
svalyl
re hnev
'e, in to loo
k shaky
THE features of the chief actors in the new power- party functionaries-the men in future appointed by
struggle in the Kremlin are already beginning to Podgorny,
e
merge through the smk lid d
oescreenaown by
Moscow after Mr Khrushchev's fall. As Messrs
Podgorny and Shelest, the two Ukrainians, on the
one hand, ,and Shclcpin and Semichastny, the two
political policemen, on the other. loom up through
the mists the ovcrlordship of Messrs Brezhnev and
Kosygin bgi t lk
ensooo very provisional indeed.
These two men are, in eficct,.bcing invited to preside
.c extensive party reforms, or shake-ups, the execu-
tion of which will be shared by Podgorny and Shele-
pin, each exploiting the situation to his own advantage.
A fortnight ago I suggested that Mr Semichastny,
the egregious youth leader turned head of Political
Police, must have played a critical part in neutralising
his own master, Mr Khrushchev bef #%..
There are other interesting promotions; but the
important. thing is the immense concentration of
power in the hands of both Podgorny and Shclcpin.
This in itself is sufficient to induce rivalry of the most
cut-throat kind. It seems inevitable that the men who
came together to get rid of Khrushchev will soon be
turning on each other. Mr Brezhnev's role is evidently
to hold the ring. It is the sort of employment that in
the Soviet, Union rarely lasts long.
For some time to come the sound and fury seem
likely to be limited to the domr.,ic front. In Soviet
foreign policy there will be no sharp change just yet.
China offensive
could sew himtip. What was not clear at ther This applies pplies to u Policy, too. After
es China
was whom Mr Semichastny was acting with and for. the very brief truce ce which followed the removal of
His
His prime mover might have been Mr Podgorny, Khrushchev, and which was highlighted by Chou
Mr Khrushchev an ex-party boss of the Ukraine Eh-tai's Moscow visit, China is once more resuming
who, surviving after the downfall of Khrushchev, with the offensive. Speaking through her obedient satellite,
whom he had been very intimately associated, had.' Albania, she has now formally declared that the new
evidently beer, playing for his own hand. Or it'might Soviet leadership has demonstrated its intention of
have been Mr Shelepin, Mr Semichastny's predecessor continuing on Khrushchev's revisionist and anti-
both as head of the Komsomol and of the K.G.B. Leninist path.
There was nothing to tell whether Semichastny was This. announcement should be taken together with
for or against his immediate senior. Now it is clear Friday's lurid attack on Khrushchev. in Red Flag,
that he was for him. which pointedly rejects the Kremlin's official explana-
tion of the reason for his fall. Earlier in the week
the Chinese had issued another warning of the return
Elevated to Presidium ' to the status quo ante, with a short, sharp statement I
Shclcpin has profited greatly from the other people, about Sinkiang.
Already a member of the party secretariat, he has now ' more It hatod rtK heSineSnkiang been quarrel here that there was than been elevated to the Presidium.' The only other men not contenting met the eye and
who belonged to both''; these august bodies'are Brezh- that Mr Khroubcheo, the contenting himself with
nev, Suslov and Podgorny. Since Brezhnev appears deeper operation trouble uble aiming th at raising a major plab lli a
lack the stuff of leadership, and since Sslvhas ? which al etachment of jor rebellion
always been a back-room figure, this means that proveinse could lead to the virtual dsame time wreck
Podgorny and Shelepin are now the two most power-' province from China and at the same time wreck
ful and challenging men in the Soviet Union. ChinAlthoug a s nuclear installations.
Podgorny, at 61, is now in charge of the party cadres China it is clear that the breach between Russia
? and China-is not to be bridged, although Chou En-tai
-i.e. the staffing of all party appointments-and has
also undertaken the job of went home with nothing to show for his visit, there
1 party reform: undoing is evidently) to be a certain attempt to paper over the
certain of Khrushchev's arrangements aimed, amongst cracks, at any rate as far as State relations are con
other things, at reducing the power of provincial party cerned. It is reliably reported that the Soviet Union
leaders. Podgorny is thus in a position to put his own is about to extend limited economic aid to China and
men where he wants them. that Mr Brezhnev has committed himself to visit
But Shclcpin, 46, , tight-lipped, cold-eyed, all Peking. At, the same time the most incendiary opera-
ambition, has the Political Police. still in his pocket, ? tion of all, the conference of 26 parties scheduled for
Semichastny has been rewarded by promotion to khg 1J
Ce11t~' ~99id~# d`e t n#i~'?bla~trt- MtaQi'Q~tt e
th rs! mast Party Control teeth of opposition from fraternal:parties everywhere,
h exercises'an inspectorate over all''. has now been quietly dropped.
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CPYRGHT
LONDON OBSERVER
29 November 19614
INSIDE RUSSIA
by our Diplomatic Staff
ALLKSANDR ELEPIN, one, of Khrushchevs fall is the lack of led to Kozlov's stroke in April,
of the two newly appointed, any information about the role of 1963 (he had already had probably
members of. the Soviet Party ? Podgorny, the one-time Ukrainian two heart attacks). Shortly after
Presidium, was the principal party leader who now controls
p pa this, Khrushchev's men, and
planner of Khrushchev's over- party administration and is the notabl his son-in-law Alcksci
throw, closely aided by the' State x maih'rival'to,Shclepin. Y '
Y Shelcpin was greatly helped in Adzhubei, dropped obvious hints
security (K.G.B.) chief Vladimir finding support for his plan, the that Kozlov?would in no circum-
Semichastny. This Is confirmed sources say, because of the way stances return to politics-though
b
informati
h
h
s
c
y
on t
at
a
rea
hed
Tae Oussgvert from reliable
Soviet and Communist sources.
Shclepin's coup Was 'originally
planned for Khrushchev's return
from Scandinavia in early July but
had to be postponed because
preparations were incomplete. ' ',
As for Khrushchev himself, he is
now under house arrestrin a block
of V.I.P. flats in Moscow's Gran-
ovsky street, .a bare five minutes'
walk from the Kremlin.'
Shelcpin, who is orlly, 46, was
already one of,the most powerful
men in the Soviet Union under
Khrushchev even though 'he was
not a niember of the Presidium. As
head of the party-State control
commission he was the party's
official watchdog over all aspects
which he controlled from 1958-61 - administration.. Into the bargain
and began the purge of the secre( He also attacked Khrushchev for he would make an' excellent prime
policemen responsible for the Stalin the failure of his'economic Policies. minister He has a re t t' f
u
o
power first via the Soviet. youth light industry, where the country
organisation and then the K.G.B., discontent badly needed first-class ideas and
a
n..or
terror. Kozlov cited instances" Of' active p
' discontent. which he Personal modest and an ascetic .
As a result of Shele ins and now public, per- y Way f life
Semichastny's work, the X.G.B. is sonally had had to cope with. He true to the Leninist it wideal of as felt
the
believed today to-be no longer they- mentioned the troubles. in Novoch. good leader.
independent organ of terror of crkassk in South Russia, in the Mr ider.
, the party thcoreti-
Stalin's'd, summer of 1962, when troops
l
_
lead pp m d For R61eas1fa4 tl ~ ; '8.0001, $~ r r3
T ggest gtEp` in the account was the strain of these evettts.which' abvtet enders, was also told late then p ;in 6 AS 1183 LiMll
offered a choice of ifninv:,l..t._
f
Police. char cd with detecting any rioting over poor living standards a ar easier without the
S rinci ally food erratic utterances of Mr K. Sonic
political threat to the regim c P P y shortages. He of the younger members of the
Little is known about Shclepin also mentioned the several dock Presidium, like Poliansky and
as a man but la. rgcly?because of his' strikes in Odessa., Voronov, could be oflcred more
:~.gc he should prove 1e s of an Kozlov said that'he for one did freedom in their parts of the
enigma to the West' than. men of not want to take responsibility foe economy, notably agriculture.
Khrus s vintage, though not .: such -,others- t hings
be unwilling that Certain anon were not brought
necessarily arily any more amenable,.' into the plan, or onl
The appointment of Mr'.Brczh- take the blame for the mistakes of y so laic they
could do nothing about it: one of
acv as party leader after,Khrush- one man.: these was Leonid llichcv the party
chev's fall was made on the under- Khrushche! replied with a brutal secretary, whose- job it 'had bee
standing that it be -temporary. Al-.,,,verbal counter-attack and full use to dress up Khrushchev's cultural
though Brezhnev will nqw have a of his large battery of swearwords, . policy in correct Marxist language.,
chance to prove himself, he. is not and managed to prevent the build-
considered to'be the, tuff hirh.
up en Mr Aliko an r t
otsI of a secret ogle clan, would appreciate that his job
to be called out to control people b
still have the functi
Khrushchev had handled a quarrel ut theory he remained a metinbct
with another Soviet leader. Kozlov, of thc:Prcent .
in early 1963. Kozlov was ? ?rhe incident provided Shelcpin
generally regarded as the man most with. powerful ammunition. If
likely to succeed Khrushchev and Khrushchev could get rid of Koz-
in-the?winter of 1962-3, after the lov like this,.what was to stop him
Cuban crisis, ' many observ ers removing any' other , of his col-
believed
thatf.Kozlov was leading leagues c In only guess challenge
how hirn.
and
something of. attack on.
Soviet leader.. ? the when ShclePin set about winning
,According to the latest informs, over the other' Soviet leaders.` But
lion differences of opinion culntin ' the sources indicate 'that" some of
atcd .in. a stand-lip row, in the the key figures were susceptible't
Presidium 'between the, two -men; certain, suggestions. . The. party
For the first time Kozlov raised leadership. even if only on a tern-
openly the charges of one-nian rule porary basis, could be offered t-
against Khrushchev, saying that. he Breihnev, a' man?o whom Khrdsh-
had ignored the principle of "col- chcv and others considered merely
er
lective'?leadership."" , ;,,r a political co
- r.?skilled; at
d
s.
carrying out orders.
Mr Kosygin could be offered a
instances of i:: ,",
free hand in his special field, of
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CPYRGHT
majority or against it. He cl-
thc majority and it wits his ttt%k
persuade Khrushchev to go t,,
Sochi for his Black Sea holiday in
October because the Soviet leader's
absence from the capital at this
time was a pre-requisite for the
coup's success.
Thanks to the. co-operation ? of
ficmichastny and the K.G.B.
Shelcpin was able to check that no
he arrived at Moscow's Vnukovo '_
airport he'was mat not b his ncual
Zil III car but by a different one.
with, a different driver and body-
guards. He was also met by
Scmichastny.
Any attempt by Khrushchev or
Kh
his aides to rally'last-minute Sup- Kh
port was rendered impossible by punctuated rurusshchev by reply to Suslov,
y - interventions of
the simple device of changing all varying length by the oilier
suspicious of the way Ad,;thubci
could sell Khrushchev his
by-passing them. Their suspicions
Were strengthened by -Adihubei's
occasional insolence toward, them
and the independent way.he rail
gone brought into the plan had phone system. The verIrishka was he ccnanger and comparative
pcndcd entirely on the full co-; sessed only by the most important
operation of the K.G.B., as already p op1c. It is now used to describe
'indicated in Tim OBSERVER. the secret telephone links between
Khrushchev's
top party and.State officials, both
at their work and homes. '
' Khrushchev was driveih 'straight
first indication aetivle Presidium memberse were
Khrushchev'S first indication waiting.for.him. The meeting was
'that something was up came when started at once. by Suslov, who
Brezhnev telephoned him. from. spoke from rough notes. The only
Moscow early on the morning of, documents he had with him were a
'Tuesday, October 13. Brezhnev Pravda- from .Stalins day and
said that the Presidium would like another of the Khrushchev era.
Khrushchev to attend ' an' impor-. He used these to show that Khrush-
tant meeting in the capital ast;soon. ch'cv was now getting his name in.
as possible. Khrushchev scolded the; Press.as. much as:Stalin ever-:
oscow, per
n
aps two
ays
c-
Brezhnev for taking such an drd' : ' fore Khrushchev himself. Once
His attack. stressed Khrushchevs
initiative
wh
B
h
,
ercu
rez
nev
suggested that if Khrousn hchev would personal behaviour and his mis they had been told why they had
takes' imt domestic policy before been called they were not allowed
not conic to Moscow, the Pre- foreign affairs.
out of the Kremlin again.
sichum would go to Sochi. 'His colleagues were therefore
The Soviet leader then agreed, able to lead Khrushchev at once
brought forward his meeting with a ,,Growing_ role. .. 3 into a nearby room for the Central
the French Science Minister, Committee meeting he had re-
Gaston Palewski, , to '9.30 a.m. of. f''idzhubel. ! qucsied. Khrushchev left the
'Ind then cut it short aftcr'lialf an Kremlin some time on the Wed-
!hour.. Khrushchev then drove to The growing role of the ex. nesday morning for his house on
the neighbouring' airport of Adler' tremely;-able Adzhubei was, par- the Lenin' .1- ills overlooking Mos-
where he,- found, not- his own 1 ticdlarly bitterly '. attacked., The 'cow, It Was'-there that-faithful
plane,- but one sent from Moscow, other -leaders Were ? '' already
flown by_._a differentcrew. When
inch aomtttco making ntttakcs.
and then' denied it. The oniv
moment of laughter came when he
asked to stay on as Minister of
Agriculture. Finally he said he
would like to call the Central
'Committee.
This was the moment of triumph
for the coup's organisers. Fore-
sceing this move by Khrushchev
(he had bcstcn Molotov and
Kaganovich in 1957 by calling up
the Central Committee) they h,,d
already called to Moscow a care-
fully chosen quorum of the com-
mittcc.
The chosen members were not
let into the secret until their arrival
M
i
h
d
b
'
tothc tradition of Russian political
recantation'-ha.-wrote :a- letter to
the Central Committee admitting
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
Aleksandr Nikolaevich SHELEPIN
Chairman of the Committee for
Party-State Control
Goaretury and. Mesmbvr of the
Presidium, CPSU Central Committee
Deputy Chairman of the Council of
Ministers
December 19621
AN. Shelepin, one of the youngest of the top officials
of the CPSU, is an outstanding example of,the ambitious party official
who makes a career out of his administrative and organizational talents.
In mid-November 1961+, he became a full member of the CPSU Presidium.
His most important administrative post had been that of chief of the
KGB (Committee for State Security) from 1958 to 1961; he was succeeded
in this post by Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny, who appears to be his
protege, and it is probable that Shelepin still has a role in making
major decisions involving the KGB, the Soviet secret police organization.
Shelepin was born in 1918 at Voronezh, the son of a rail-
wayman. From 1936 to 1939 he studied history at the Moscow Institute
of History, Philosophy, and Literature; his later career suggests that
he may have spent more time in Komsomol (Communist Youth) activities
then on his studies. He served during the Russo-Finnish War in 1939-
1940, and then (in 191+0) got into full-time Komsomol work in Moscow as
an instructor and later as head of the Agitprop Department of the Moscow
City Komsomol. In 19213 he became Secretary for Cadres in the All-Union
Komsomol and a member of the All-Union Committee for Physical Training
and Sport, an organ of the government. Between 192+7 and 1952 he was. also
Vice President of the International Union of Students (IUS), and he led
the Soviet delegation to the World Festival, of Youth and Students in
Prague in 1947. From 1952 to 1958, he served as First Secretary or Chief
of the All-Union Komsomol. In this capacity, he had over-all responsi-
bility (in 1952-1957) for sending hundreds' of thousands of Soviet youth
to the Virgin Lands as "volunteers." During this period he was also
Vice President of the Communist international youth front, the World
Federation of Democratic Youth (WFIJY), and he took part in youth festi-
vals, meetings and congresses in various Bloc cities as well as in London
and Helsinki.
In April 1958, at the age of 240, Shelepin put youth work
behind him and served a short term as Chief of the Central Committee
Party Organs Section. Then, in December of that year, he became Chair-
man of,the KGB, replacing General I. A. Serov, who was transferred to
the command of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. Shelepin was the
first chief of the secret police not to have spent years in "conspira-
torial work." It may be that he was intended to strengthen party con-
trol of the police, to improve the public image of the police, or to
sweep out some of the bureaucratic cobwebs' which had accumulated since
the days of Felix Dzherzhinsky. While in this position, he personally
conferred the Order of the Red Banner on Bogdan Stashinsky for Stashinsky's
murder of Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera.
In November 1961, Shelepin left the Imo, having become a
member`of the Central Committee Secretariat a'month before. Then at the
w-md 16e 13' $v ,9~QYre ke ~J71~ 0~ %4Q Qe~ 1
Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
Committee, with Shelepin as Chairman. The Committee's activities have
not received much publicity, but the Committee is able to take disci-
PlinarY action or launch legal proceeding3jagainst perrsonr who cause
"damage to the cause of building Communism." This usually means cor-
ruption or negligence in party or state work, especially in the economy,
but could mean any activity the party leaders consider undesirable.
Stalin used his control of a predecessor organization, the Workers' and
Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin), as one of his main instruments for
gaining control of the party and state bureaucracy by weeding out poten-
tial opponents.
Only three men besides Shelep n are both members of the
Secretariat and full members of the Presidium: Brezhnev, Podgorny, and
Suslov. Further, of those who are both Secretaries and Presidium members,
only Shelepin also holds high state office, being a Deputy Chairman of
the Council of Ministers. With his background in the Control Committee
and the KGB, Shelepin is evidently one of the most powerful men in the
Kremlin.
2
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24+ May 1965
THE FALL OF 'I'RE JESUIT
by Ya. Golovanov
(The events described in this story are true-to-life and
documented. The "Jesuit" is not an imaginary figure) and even this
autumn you could have encountered him on the streets of Moscow.
The leadership of State Security Committee under the USSR Council
of Ministers has allowed our special correspondent to become familiar
with all of the documents on the "Jesuit" case, and also to participate
directly in the day-to-day work of the co-workers of the KGB Administra-
tion, throughout Moscow and Moskovskaya Oblast long before the criminal
activity of the "Jesuit" was stopped, and then to attend the interroga-
tions, and talk with witnesses and accused.
In the story we have changed merely certain names of its heroes --
true heroes and "heroes" in quotes. The time and locality of the events
have been maintained.)
[Synopsis: Anatoliy Yakovievich Prokhorov in 1940 was a weak
schoolboy, teased by his classmates for his interest in religion.
He becomes involved with an illegal "Society for Training Jesuit
Clergy," which seeks to attract youth into the church, and other
members of this organization give his name to the secret police.
By the time his name is in the files, however, he is drafted into
an artillery regiment, and he is taken prisoner by the Germans soon
after their attack in June 1941. He escapes and becomes a novice
in the church in German-occupied Vil`no,then gives information to
the German SD, serves in a labor battalion, and comes to Paris to
spy on the White Russians for the Germans. After Liberation, he
falls into the Paris underworld and after a year in prison, de-
cides to request repatriation under the false name of Anatoliy
Yakovlevich Yershov. After his return to the USSR, he is soon
arrested, confesses, and is sent to the labor camp at Pechora in
February 1947. Released in the amnesty of 1956, he goes to Moscow.
In 1964, the secret police observe that one "Nikolay" is in contact
with an American, Howard Sciaton, and discover that "Nikolay" is
Prokhorov. Searching Selaton's room at the Hotel Ukraina, KGB in-
vestigator Aleksandr Roshchin finds that on the block calendar,
the sheet for 21 December has been torn out, and the sheet for
22 December shows a faint impression].
The results of the analysis were ready by evening. The sheet of
20 December was blank. On the sheet of 22 December, there was the
scarcely noticeable impression: "281618 L. D".
"The number is a 6-digit one, that is for sure," said the Captain,
in whose laboratory experts were working. "Evidently they were written
(Cont.)
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by a Japanese F1mmlaster -- a felt pencil with India ink. The impres-
sion was broad but very weak.
Thus, 6 digits. Perhaps this was a Moscow telephone number? But
L. D. -- were they initials? Two hours were required in order to es-
tablish that at the telephone number B8-16-18 there was no one with the
initials L.D. The telephone with this number was the apartment of
Aleksandr Il'ich Krasovskiy,, a doctor of physical-mathematical sciences,
who had lived here for many years with his wife Valentina Andryevna,
mother-in-law Antonina Dmitriyevna Vereshchagina and their son Vladimir,
a student.
Studying the Krasovskiy family did not give Roshchin even the
slightest basis to suspect these people of any improper acts or inten-
tions. A good warm Soviet family, but why would Sclaton have their
telephone number? Roshchin decided to visit the Krasovskiys, to have
a talk with them, and to try to find even the slightest shadow of a
story which could explain everything.
The three of them talked together: Roshchin, Aleksandr Il'ich and
Valentina Andreyevna. Roshchin said straight off: "your telephone
number was discovered in the possession of a foreigner who is of interest
to our organs of state security. Can't you help us to find out why this
telephone number would be in his possession? He got it very recently,
in the second half of December."
"I can't understand it," said Aleksandr Il'ich, shrugging his
shoulders. "I know many foreign scientists, but don't remember giving
them my home telephone. I make so secret of it, but I didn't have any
need to do so... I don't have any close friends among foreigners...
Actually, I don't know how to help you..."
"Do you recall any foreigners phoning you recently?" asked
Roshchin.
"I remember very well that no one called."
"Perhaps someone other than the members of your family uses the
phone?"
"No, no one does."
"What about people who visit you frequently?"
"We have many friends and acquaintances," said Aleksandr Ii'ich
spreading his hands, "but as far as I remember they all have their own
phones..."
"Well there is Lyuba...," said Valentina Andryevna.
"What about Aunt Lyuba?" Aleksandr Il'ich said to his wife.
2 (Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3
"Aunt Lyuba is the sister of my mother, and her last name is
Shabolina," explained Valentina Andryevna to Roshchin. She frequently
comes over to drink tea with mother, and they chat... You know, old
people have their own affairs... Aunt Lyuba lives with Valeriy her son
and they don't have a telephone, and recently she warned my mother that
she would be phoned, and asked her not to forget that they were to leave
the telephone number..."
"And how old is Lyubov'... What is her patronymic?" asked Roshchin.
"Lyubov' Dmitriyevna. She is 63. She is somewhat younger than
mother..."
"Yes..." said Roshchin with a smile. "Valentina Andryevna, I have
a request to make of you. As soon as your aunt is telephoned and gives
the telephone number, please tell me. We want to find out this tele-
phone number before Lyubov Dmitriyevna does. All right?"
"Yes, yes, of course," nodded Valentina Andryevna.
"Of course, if we must... We understand..." responded Aleksandr
Il'ich.
Roshchin left the Krasovskiys on foot. He wanted to stroll and
think a bit. He needed a glass of water. A 63 year old woman, Lyubov'
Dmitriyevna, L. D. Shabolina, was a foreign agent? Nonsense! What did
he know about her? She had lived all of her life in Moscow, she had
never worked, and 3 years ago had buried her husband. She lived with
her son an engineer. Imagine what a joke it will make when the fellows
find out that I have solved the mysterious initials L. D. Nonsense,
absolute nonsense. It means either that I must find another person
with the initals L. D., or ... Lyubov' is the "cover up" and someone is
using her as the "front." The apartment of the Krasovskiys was very
suitable for this. The old people are there drinking tea. This was
very plausible. Then the phone. One old lady is given a telephone num-
ber, and she relays it. To whom? Should I go to Lyubov' Dmitriyevna and
have a talk with her? That is dangerous. The person whose will she is
following blindly may be near by. That could spoil everything.
[Synopsis: The KGB soon discovers that Prokhorov has been corre-
sponding with one Bocharev in Riga, an orthodox priest, and one
Kuznetsov in Orsk, an old friend from the camp at Pechora; also,
Prokhorov is receiving mail at various addresses.
Looking back, the author ponders why Prokhorov should have become
a traitor to the Soviet Union, and recalls that after his release
in 1956, Prokhorov had shown cynicism about the sputniks, the dam
at Bratsk, and the Virgin Lands.]
There is a word -- ideals. Sometimes we use it without thinking,
and then this word dims. The problem is not in misuse, but in its very
essence. What are ideals? These ultimately, I think are your counting
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of right and wrong, justice and deceit, your evalutation to everything
that your people and you yourself are doing. Communist ideals are our
measuring stick by which we can check the world... I am always think-
ing about Prokhorov... What about his ideals? Perhaps, he was con-
vinced that the world of capitalism was freer and happier? Certainly
there are a number of people convinced of this. No, I do not think so.
This conviction could not be found either in his statements or in his
letters. He was not interested in economic indices, and he never looked
at statistical manuals.
It would seem that a person who is alien to our ideology should
be excited, for example, by the industry of the US which is ahead of
us for many of its indices. But he was excited by the poetry of the
cafe and romantic "free love." I had lived in Paris for a short period
of time but I know nevertheless that the owners of the cafe work hard
18 hours a day, and that in this beautiful city there is a gigantic
underground industry of prostitution, an industry, with its own chiefs
and bosses, borders and laws, supply and demand, and with terrible filth
and cynicism. How could he not see this during the years he lived in
Paris.
If in our nation he could have consumed continuously without giv-
ing anything in return, he would have chosen Soviet power. But since
it is impossible to live in this manner here, he could not stand Soviet
power.
[Synopsis: Expelled from the church because he had syphilis,
Prokhorov had gone to work in a bookstore, and dreamed of earning
large amounts of currency and escaping to the West. In June 1963
he persuades a tourist from France to mail a letter for him in
Paris, addressed to a war-time White Russian acquaintance, Prince
Nikolay Boryatinsky, who is now teaching at the Navy College in
Washington; a second letter is taken out by a Soviet geologist
teaching a course at Cambridge University. Then Prokhorov makes
the acquaintance of the son of the Krasovskys' Aunt Lyuba, Valeriy
Shabolin, who works in a sensitive defense center. While Shabolin
is in a drunken stupor, Prokhorov copies secret information from a
notebook he finds in Shabolin's jacket. Shabolin is furious when
he discovers this treachery, but is afraid to go to the KGB.
Prokhorov first tries to peddle the information to an American
journalist, who is too clever and cautious to accept written ma-
terial. He next offers the material to Sclaton, whom he meets at
an American cultural exhibition; Sclaton likewise refuses to take
anything, but tells Prokhorov to give him a telephone number; this
is the number which Roshchin found at the Hotel Ukraina. Thinking
over the case--and at this point not knowing exactly what Prokhorov
is trying to communicate--the police consider having a false "for-
eigner" use the number to contact Prokhorov.]
4 (Cont.:)
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"What do you propose?" asked the general.
"Petr Mikhaylovich," Roshchin said quietly but convincingly, "we
must find out what the intentions of Prokhorov are, and why does he need
this contact..."
"How?" asked the general quickly. Roshchin understood: every-
thing that they had said had been clear to the general from the very
first words of the report and all of this time he was thinking: how?
Kuprin moved his chair forward and the main conversation began.
"What if we would phone Krasovskiy and give Lyubov' Dmitriyevna
a telephone number for a contact, huh?" Kuprin had saved this varia-
tion until the meeting with the general. "Prokhorov will bite and make
contact. One of our men will be the 'foreigner.' And then we will see
how Prokhorov behaves. We have one thing to check: whether we should
tell the Krasovskiys about this call..."
The general thought for a second:
"This is not quite so, Boris Markovich. We have no reason not to
trust the Krasovskiys. We have asked for their assistance, and why
shouldn't we trust them? We cannot work without trust..." Once again
he was quiet. "And in the second place -- Prokhorov knows that the call
will be from Sclaton. This would tip him off. And we must find out
what he is thinking of. We must know. And we must do this so as to ex-
clude any pressure whatsoever upon Prokhorov, upon his will and psyche.
If he is intending to communicate something to transmit something, we
on our side must show not only that we are not interested in this, but
on the contrary, we want to do everything to support his attempt. Abso-
lute free will -- only in this case will we obtain reliable information...
Your idea about the 'foreigner,' the general turned to Kuprin, "is also
dubious. This is the extreme case. But I will allow that under the
given circumstances such a solution is possible. Just a minute." The
general pressed a button. The person on duty appeared silently at the
door.
"Please ask Aleksandr Nikolayevich to come in," said the general.
Aleksandr Nikolayevich Vorontsov having heard the request of the
general to be concerned with Prokhorov as an old police agent under-
stood that the work was delicate and difficult.
"Well, my friends," he said turning to Kuprin. Kozin and Roshchin,
"lets see what we can think up. Come around and see me and we'll have
a talk..."
5 (Cont.)
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[Synopsis: The KGB, instead of telephoning, sends a letter to
Prokhorov, supposedly from a "Catherine Cateway," saying she has
something for him. As "Cateway," a KGB agent meets Prokhorov,
tells him that she intended her letter for another Prokhorov, but
in the process confirms that he is desperately interested in selling
information to foreigners. This means that he is a spy. Then Mme.
Krasovskaya, the scientist's wife, informs the KGB that someone has
called their number and left another number for Aunt Lyuba. Within
20 minutes, Roshchin has found out that this is the telephone number
of the hotel room of a Signor Mario Gozzi, supposedly on an Inturist
tour from Milan. Meanwhile, Aunt Lyuba gives the number to Prokhorov,
who trustfully goes to meet Gozzi; Prokhorov and Gozzi arrange that
Prokhorov will leave his material in a railroad station locker and
telephone the locker number to Gozzi's hotel room. Prokhorov goes
to the airport and sees Gozzi board a non-stop ;?lane for Paris.
Actually, unbeknownst to Prokhorov, the KGB has simply had the tour-
ist from Milan shifted to another room and has substituted a KGB
agent for him; it is this fictitious Gozzi who meets Prokhorov, ar-
ranges to pick up his material, and boards the plane--"Gozzi" gets
off the plane when it stops for "technical reasons" at Riga. The
author attends a KGB viewing of a film of Prokhorov placing his ma-
terial in the locker, and jokes with the KGB officers.]
"How the devil did you take that?" I whispered in Roshchin's ear.
"Just like Yrusevskiy films at the Moscow Film Studio," whispered
Aleksandr Petrovich back.
"No, no Joking. Where did you hide the camera?" I said without
stopping.
"If you have to be at the station, how do you think it would be best
to hide a camera: in a stack of hay or in a tree stump?" asked Roshchin
not without some sarcasm.
"In a suitcase. Or somehow in a basket," I thought.
"Smart fellow," whispered Roshchin laughing, "a fine mind..."
I understand that all of this dialogue sounds like a typical con-
versation between Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson (incidentally, I
c-ould never understand why such an incisive person like Sherlock Holmes
would choose as a friend such a dunce as Watson).
And Prokhorov was now next to locker 242 on the screen. A small
boy with unmasked curiosity approached and was watching Anatoliy
Yakovlevich set the figures on the lock: 2122.
"One of your men?" I whispered to Roshchin. I wanted to get back
to the hay stack and stump.
6 (Cont.)
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"one of ours. Major Pronin made up as an 'October' member.* And
write it that way. So that everything is like a fast-moving detective
novel..."
Prokhorov opened the locker. And once again he looked about. One
could see that everything bothered him -- from the onlooking boy, to
the sweeper cleaning the floor and the passengers on the bench. People
were strange for him.
But people did not pay any attention to him. They were idling,
reading, talking and eating. Prokhorov put the letter in the hiding
place. But this time it was not in candy, but in a volume of "Eugene
Onegin."
Later, when I held this volume in my hands, I suddenly felt hate
for this person as never before. Let alone his contemporaries, he be-
trayed his ancestors, and besmirched Pushkin.
[Synopsis: Prokhorov is called up for army retraining at Yaroslavl,
and this interruption gives the KGB a chance to question his con-
tacts. Bocharov in Riga makes no attempt at concealment-]
He told everything in detail: when the interrogator requestioned him,
he nodded politely, willingly, attempting in every way to show his
readiness to be absolutely frank. And in fact he had nothing to hide
as he could not keep anything secret from the police as they had al-
ready discovered everything. He only had to substantiate this. And
he did...
Several days later we were in Orsk.
"Kuznetsov is a tougher nut to crack," said Roshchin. "He should
have letters from Prokhorov, and these letters are extremely incriminat-
ing. Therefore the prosecutor has given us permission to search the
apartment of Kuznetsov. This is little enough."
There were three of us in the hotel room: Roshchin, the prosecutor
Mikhail Sergeyevich Nakhimov and myself. We were eating sausage with
bread and drinking tea.
"Here is the problem," continued Roshchin, "Kuznetsov has a daughter,
a little girl in the second grade. How can we search the place when she
is there?" he turned to Nakhimov. "She would certainly remember this.
It is a joke, her father being searched! This would be a scar for all
of her life..."
*LOrganization for children aged 6 to 9.]
7 (Cont.)
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They were quiet.
"Misha, do you have any children?" asked Roshchin.
"Yes I do..."
"I have two. I also have a daughter... She is entering the insti-
tute. I don't know if she will make it... My wife and I have been
bothered..."
"And mine is still wetting the cradle," smiled Nakhimov.
"That is nonsense... If mine wet the bed, there would be no non-
sense..."
Once again they were quiet...
"Misha," once again Roshchin asked, "what can we do with the little
girl? We have to think of something..."
"We could ask the wife of Kuznetsov to take her somewhere for a
little," Nakhimov left the sausage. "Perhaps to her grandmother's...
For several hours..."
I do not like "shining" heroes. I do not want to idealize these
persons. But I did hear this conversation myself. It did exist!
Honestly, two officers of State Security on the eve of a difficult and
complex interrogation and search were talking about this girl.
I remember as a school child I use to walk along Dzerzhinskiy Square,
pass the grey granite large building, and I was always frightened when
looking at the barrier which surrounded it, with the sentries with frozen
faces, and their bayonets. They were protecting the security of my na-
tion and why then this great timidness and this desire to speak more
quietly and to go unnoticed? And here I was at this house. In three
months of working with the secret police, I had understood a great deal.
They had spoken long and frankly about the past and the present of our
organs, about the break with the past, outmoded conceptions and methods,
and about restoring the true police work norms put down by Dzerzhinskiy.
And the problem was not to merely renew the cadres of secret police,
and to attract new, young people, educated in school, higher institutions,
by the Komsomol, by the party and by all of our life; people for whom
the 22nd Party Congress has become the highest expression of our thoughts,
and an expression of the deeply personal and of one who has lived through
a great deal. It was not a matter of merely changing the personnel. There
was a change in the psychology of people which was very complicated and
refined, not always painless, but always irreversible.
8 (Cont.)
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One of the leaders of our state security organs told me: "There
was a time when we felt that the more persons a police agent arrested,
the better he was working... And now each arrest forces us to think--
have I looked everything over, have I stopped on time, and escaped
from the harmful influence..." But to say this, and to have this not
in words but in deeds, requires a great faith and the courage of the
communists, and a profound recognition of the necessity of an all-
purifying psychological change.
Kuznetsov denied everything; he didn't know anything, hadn't
heard about anything.
"I was in the camps," he said, "I don't want to go back... Yes,
I am afraid, very much afraid... I know you..."
Nakhimov had to do virtually the impossible, to convince a mature,
difficult and embittered person, to break the old and well established
principle that he was confronted with an enemy.
"Why do you speak about the camp?" said Nakhimov. "It is not a
question of the camp or of your fear. We are speaking about life,
understand this. You have your home, your favorite work, a wife and
daughter. Why do you feel that we want to put you behind bars? Who
or why does anyone want this? Why should we, all of us, our people
wish to multiply the number of enemies? Think about this. Understand
our interest. If you are an honest man and a patriot, these interests
cannot help but be yours..."
Three hours of a difficult and complex conversation. Three hours
and the years of a shadowy life ran together. Kuznetsov fell silent.
I saw his eyes and I saw how the wolfish persecution of his glance was
replaced by kind human thoughtfulness.
"All right," he said rapidly. "All right. I will trust you. For
the first time I will trust you. I know that I am a fool, but I will
trust you. Give me some paper, and I will write everything myself."
There is the slang word. "to be broken," that is to confess. But
Kuznetsov was not "broken." He was not pinned to the wall with facts
and evidence, he was not shown documents which showed his link with
Prokhorov. This was not so. We merely spoke with him. His confession
was not a f ced capitulation, as he understood that he could not live
any more like he had...
The search began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon when his daughter
was on her way to school. Incidentally, we found a letter from Prokhorov
in the belongings of his daughter, a doll with flaxen hair, her favorite
because it could close her eyes...
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[Synopsis: Shabolin Is interrogated, and is beside himself with
fear. He reveals that Prokhorov has hidden more secret material
at the home of Sof'ya Alekseyevna Tolehinskaya, a good-hearted old
woman who is an old friend of Prokhorov's.]
After talking with Sof'ya Alekseyevna at the investigators, we
went to her apartment. We had to find the last hiding place of the spy.
"I will tell everything! I will spill the whole thing: Yes, he
used to come to see me, he ate, drank and played the guitar... I have
nothing to hide, I have done nothing bad," Sof'ya Alekseyevna was un-
duly excited. Her face became red, and she looked at the investigator,
at me, at two neighbors in the apartment who had been invited to the
search as witnesses, and she sought our sympathy.
"Relax, Sof'ya Alekseyevna," said Roshchin softly, seating the old
woman in a chair, "we know that you have done nothing bad. But Anatoliy
Yakovlevich was at your place, according to our information, and could
have kept certain very interesting pieces of paper in your room.
"Yes: there are:;' Sof'ya Alekseyevna once again jumped up, "there
are! Here is a folder with his music..."
But there was only music in the folder. Romances. "You will soon
come in your officer's overcoat," I read and smiled in spite of myself:
in fact, they would soon come for him in an officers overcoat...
But only music and nothing more.
"Well," said Roshchin to Tolchinskaya, looking through the folder,
it must excuse us, but we must search."
"Please!" responded Sof'ya Alekseyevna readily. "If you want I
will help you."
"Thank you," smiled Roshchin, "we can do it ourselves..."
In the infinite variety of human dwellings, one can clearly note
a category of rooms which is strewn and hung with absolutely unnecessary
things. This was exactly the category of rooms to which the room of
Sof'ya Alekseyevna belonged. Here to find several sheets of paper was
truly a Herculean task.
Roshchin leafed through all books, stacks of old yellowed news-
papers and pencils. Everything. Roschin shook a briefcase, turned it
over and shook it again. Dust. Crumbs. He ran his hand inside and
felt a slit in the lining. Pressing his hand in further he pulled out
a small packet. Several sheets of paper with fine writing on them were
on the table.
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"Here it is. And this is no musical dictionary," smiled Roshchin
to Sof'ya Alekseyevna. He extended the papers to the witnesses.
"And all of the numbers!" said one of the women in terror. She
held the paper in the tips of her fingers as if it was a leaf of a
poisonous plant.
The search continued.
"Today 'Spartak' doesn't seem to be playing," said Vorontsov, "and
therefore I hope Boris Markovich will not be watching the clock, and we
can have a talk without hurrying. It is time to sum up..."
"'Spartak' is playing, but in Tbilisi," returned Kuprin, "and this
circumstance will play a fatal role for Anatoliy Yakovlevich."
"I feel that we should talk not so much about Prokhorov," said
Vorontsov, "as about Kuznetsov, Inozemtsev [a thick-headed friend of
Prokhorov's] and Shabolin. As long as they are involved with Prokhorov,
they will fall. Perhaps not fall but slide."
"Where is there farther to slide?" returned Kuprin. "A man has
worked at a defense enterprise and it is bad enough that he has violated
the elementary regulations of handling secret documents, but has con-
sciously turned them over to the enemy. Shabolin could not help but know
that Prokhorov wanted to sell the information received from him! No mat-
ter what you say, I will, never believe this!"
"And nevertheless," began Vorontsov, without hurrying, "and never-
theless, what sort of person is Shabolin? A fellow 26 years old. Raised
without a father. For a boy this is very important, a father... He
finished Soviet school and a Soviet institution of higher learning. How
could he be an enemy? Kuznetsov also, evidently, did a lot of thinking
in the camp. At present he is working... He has a wife and daughter...
You say 'I will never believe it.' These merely are emotions. The prob-
lem is not one of intuition. We must look into the soul of the man, and
see just how sick it is, this soul, and whether or not it can be cured.
So let us not hurry with our conclusions, there will be an investigation
and we will gain a complete picture of everything that happened. Let us
determine precisely the measure of their involvement in this case. And
then let the law decide to what degree shall Shabolin, Inozemtsev and
Kuznetsov are guilty. It would be no problem to slap them down... It
would be more difficult to keep them up."
"Correct," agreed Kozin, "I don't think that they are lost to us..."
"Remember," continued Vorontsov, "there have been a good number of
cases when persons at first glance were lost and then were literally re-
born. They were caught, talked to, they went to work, they got advice
from the family, from friends, from the Komsomol, from the party cells,
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and the person changed. Not immediately, initially with caution, but
they matured and understood that they were being helped and would not
be thrown into prison..."
[Synopsis: At Yaroslavl, Prokhorov claims he is ill and requests
a medical examination. The KGB has obtained a warrant for
Prokhorov's arrest, and three officers and the author drive to
Yaroslavl to pick Prokhorov up.]
We arrived at Yaroslavl' near evening. At the oblast administra-
tion of the KGB, we were Joined by two investigators. We discussed the
plan of arrest. Prokhorov was in a hospital ward with other patients.
To arrest him there was rather bad -- we would begin with chatter:
he would tell us where he was hurtinrg, and he would demand that he be
sent to Moscow to specialist professors. It was decided that Kuprin
would enter the ward as a physician and tell Prokhorov that he was to
be sent to Moscow, and could make sure that Prokhorov did not leave any-
thing in the night table -- it was very possible that he might keep cer-
tain records on himself at.al.l times, not trusting any hiding place.
Kuprin played the role of a physician like a professional actor.
He did not go up to Prokhorov directly, he chatted with the patients,
he felt the stomach of one, inspected the tongue of another, said some-
thing in Latin, and made notes in his pad.
"Prokhorov? so, so..." he stopped in front of a thin man with high
cheek-bones. He had black hair combed back. He had penetrating eyes.
He was completely quiet. "You will go to Moscow, Prokhorov. Your serv-
ice is finished. We have taken a routine analysis, routine," said Kup-
rin, "you must be cured..."
In fifteen minutes Prokhorov, hiding with difficulty his joy that
his deceit had suceeded so brilliantly, was already coming down the
stairs with a suitcase in his hand.
"Anatoliy Yakovlevich," Kuprin touched him on the sleeve. "Follow
me for a minute, please." Kuprin opened the door of the duty office.
Prokhorov went in. He looked at the blue edging on the shoulder straps
of the major-investigator.
"Are you Prokhorov, Anatoliy Yakovlevich?" asked the major.
"Yes, what is the matter?"
"Your documents please."
Prokhorov showed his passport.
"Prokhorov, Anatoliy Yakovlevich, born 1922," the major read out
loud. "That's it," he said to Roshchin.
12 (Cant.)
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Roshchin looked at Prokhorov. He had been thinking about this
man for a year night and day. For a year he had talked with him, argued,
changed his mind, studied, hoped and was deceived in his hopes, studied
his psychology, thought his thoughts and finally declared war on him.
This invisible duel had gone on for a year. Now he saw him for the
first time.
"According to a warrant from the deputy of the chief military pro-
secutor, you are arrested and accused under article 64 of the Penal Code
of the RSFSR," said the major.
"What? What did you say?" asked Prokhorov amazed. "What was the
article?"
"Treason to the motherland," said the major showing him the decree:
"read it and sign."
His face was completely quiet, and only his hands betrayed him.
The sheet of paper shook slightly like a man reading in the car of a
moving train.
"There has been a misunderstanding," said Prokhorov dryly, "there
has been some mistake..."
"We will see," said Roshchin quietly standing behind him.
Prokhorov turned around.
...It was completely dark. Prokhorov was sitting in the car be-
tween Roshchin and myself. He was quiet and looked ahead, beyond the
grey road, beyond the headlights into the night.
In the aims of conspiracy, the workers in counter-intelligence had
given Prokhorov the alias "Jesuit." This pseudonym was born by accident,
but it seemed to me amazingly accurate. During the night of 2 October
1964, the "Jesuit" ceased to be. And there appeared in his place Anatoliy
Prokhorov who was under investigation.
13
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yr
24 May 1965
Soviet "Aid"
"In recent years the leaders of the CPSU have habitually played the
benefactor and frequently boasted of their 'disinterested assistance.'
When commemorating the 14th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship.. Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February this
year, Pravda., Izvestia and other Soviet propaganda media again beat the
drum to the sametun We have not yet made a systematic reply in the
press, but we must point out that, so far from being gratis, Soviet aid
to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade and that it was cer-
tainly not a one-way affair. China has paid and is paying the Soviet
Union in goods, gold or convertible foreign exchange for all Soviet-
supplied complete sets of equipment and other goods, including those
made available on credit plus interest. It is necessary to add that the
prices of many of the goods we imported from the Soviet Union were much
higher than those on the world market....
"As for the Soviet loans to China, it must be pointed out that China
used them mostly for the purchase of war materiel from the Soviet Union,
the greater part of which was used up in the war to resist U.S. aggres-
sion and aid Korea. In the war against U.S. aggression the Korean people
carried by far the heaviest burden and sustained by far the greatest
losses. The Chinese people, too, made great sacrifices and incurred vast
military expenses. The Chinese Communist Party has always considered
that this was the Chinese people's bounden internationalist duty and that
it is nothing to boast of. For many years we have been paying the princi-
pal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable
part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union. Thus even the war mate-
riel supplied to China in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid
Korea has not been given gratis....
"Your action [the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China] fully
demonstrates that you violate the principle of mutual assistance between
socialist countries and use the sending of experts as an instrument for
exerting political pressure on fraternal countries, butting into their
internal affairs and impeding and sabotaging their socialist construction."
(Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of
February 29, 1961, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Peking Review, 8 May 1961+.
"Do you know, Soviet comrades, that the traitor Nikita Khrushchev
and his fellows have compelled the Chinese comrades to pay for the arma-
ments provided generously by the great Stalin for the Korean fight? Your
treacherous leadership is but an arms merchant, just as that notorious
adventurer, Zakharov. How can one trust these unscrupulous and dishonest
men? And now what does your treacherous leadership do in the Vietnam war?
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It blames China and alleges slanderously that she does not permit the
sending of old armaments which it has earmarked for Vietnam. In point
of fact these obsolete arms are insignificant and miserable....
"The Khrushchev revisionists are openly playing a dangerous game at
the expense of the Vietnamese people, socialism and peace. The diaboli-
cal aim of the Soviet renegades is to get the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam into their net by undertaking an operation to allegedly send arms
and volunteers to that country. This 'operation' is presently being car-
ried out through the hot war started by the Americans.
"This action by the Soviet revisionists, allegedly against U.S.
imperialism and providing 'aid' to the DRV, is accompanied by U.S. bomb-
ings, which will only stop in the culmination of the Soviet operation --
that is, when so-called Soviet 'volunteers,' as alleged experts, rocket
technicians, and so forth, have occupied key places in Vietnam."
(Editorial: "The Treacherous Group of Soviet Revisionists are Supporting
the U.S. Imperialists in their Aggression against Vietnam," Zeri-i-
Popullit (Tirana), 20 April 1965.)
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