BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 26, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 April 1965
Briefly Noted
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inally, FISE Teachers Protest
Too Polemics
The Fourth World Con-
ference of the Soviet
nominated World Federation of Teachers'
Unions (FISE) met in Algiers from 10
Lo 15 April (which is in turn a divi-
sion of the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions based in
Prague). It was marked, and its de-
liberations pushed _a full day behind
schedule, by Albanian and Chinese
Communist polemics against and clashes
with the Soviet Union. The Chicoms
also attacked the procedures of the
conference as undemocratic--for allow-
ing majority votes and following the
"UN system" of giving each country
one vote regardless of its size--and
charged the Soviets with responsibil-
ity for these "procedural injustices."
The Algerian President at one
point resigned from his position in
an effort to bring the conference
back to "a serene atmosphere" and to
its announced schedule.
The'Chicoms carried on their
feud not only in an attempt. to prove
the Soviets could. not lead the anti-
imperialist forces of the third
world generally, but through attacks
on a Soviet report on teacher train-
ing. Delegates and observers became
so irritated at one point that they
attempted to drown out an Albanian
speaker by banging on table tops for
three minutes.
Communist tactics in their in-
ternal struggle for power over re-
gignal and world organizations have
been further displayed at the FISE
meeting. This should serve as a
warning to all future gatherings in
which Communists have substantial in-
fluence or control, that legitimate
business will be pushed aside, that
non-Communist delegates (and even
non-S-S Communists) will have to
give their attention to problems,
issues and disputes which in no way
pertain to their interests and which
in fact are likely to involve them
to the detriment of their own devel-
opment.
Remnant of Art Theft in Moscow
Bourgeois
Ideology? News reports of 3 'April
stated that a Franz Hals
painting of St. Luke,
worth $140,000, had been cut from its
frame in the Pushkin Museum and sto-
len, after the drugging of a woman
attendant. It seems that two other
paintings were stolen from the Hermi-
tage Museum in Leningrad last.Decem-
ber. [NYTimes 1 and 4 April in Press
Comment 1 and 5 April respective
In ironical treatment, we point out
that as in other fields of endeavor,
the Soviets are now striving to over-
take and surpass the West in the
realm of art theft--though they have
yet to achieve the heights reached in
the London theft of Goya's "Duke of
Wellington." Also, the procedure of
cutting a canvas from its frame seems
a little crude, possibly "uncultured,"
and likely to diminish the value of
the painting. One might speculate
that there must be some monstrous con-
spiracy behind all the thefts, East
and West--and ask, Auspiciously, why
it is that no one yet has reported
any art thefts from Peking.
A serious note could be added,
to the effect that many treasures of
modern art are kept in the basements
of Soviet museums and are never ex-
hibited because they are ideologically
"unsuitable ."
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(Briefly Noted.)
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MAY
Significant Dates
8 VE-Day. Armistice ends World War II in Europe - 191+5. (20th
anniversary.)
9 IV Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference,
Accra, Ghana.
11 (Soviet Bloc) Warsaw Pact for military cooperation and mutual aid
concluded (i1-14 May). Tenth anniversary. 1955
15 COMINTERN (third international) dissolved, declaring autonomy of
Communist Parties outside USSR. 191+3 Austrian State Treaty 1955
(Tenth Anniversary)
16 Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties" ceding part of Chinese
"Great Northeast" west of Amur River to Russia. 1858
22 Organization of African Unity (OAU) signed at Addis Ababa, 22-25 May,
1963.
23 Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) founded. 115th anniversary. 1920
23 Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed (made fully independent 5 May
same year, as Western Powers lifted remaining controls). Tenth anni-
versary. 1955
Khrushchev speech in Belgrade blaming Soviet side for errors and
Beria for break. Tenth anniversary. 1955
1 International Children's Day, celebrated by the Communist Women's
International Democratic Federation (WIDF).
14 Treaty of Tientsin, second "Unequal Treaty," similar to Treaty of
Aigan. 1858
15 Magna Carta signed at Runnymede by King John. 1215 (750th anni-
versary)
17 International Christian Democratic Youth Congress, West Berlin,
June, to end on 17 June, anniversary of East German revolt. 1953.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#51 Commentary 31 Mareb- :3 April 1965
Principal Develo ntsw:
,. 9 WIP P??epgwr~
14 Communist dissensions during this period are focused in all media
primarily on comments on the warfare in Vietnam and President Johnson's
Baltimore speech. All condemn U.S. aggression, and vary in their criticism
of the Johnson proposals in accordance with their own position in the Com-
munist spectrum. The CPSU with top leadership away a'full week on a
party-state visit to Poland continues to accent unity and solidarity
against imperialism and to refrain from open intra-Communist polemics. The
Chinese, while prominently publishing a strong Malayan CP attack on the mod-
exn revistoulsts, likewise add no new polemics. The Albanians continue in
their role as spearhead of the "anti-revisionist" camp, hammering away at
"collabbrati.on'of the Khrushchevite revisionists with U.S. imperialism,"
which now causes the "grave situation" in Vietnam.
2. The Polish-Soviet talks, despite a great show of fraternal solidar-
ity, apparently brought no noteworthy new developments.
3. French and Norwegian CP'resolutions call for and approve, respec
tively, a conference of West European CPsYon the problems of CPs in capital-
ist nations.
4. The Italian CP announces it will, send in the near future a top-level
delegation to Hanoi, invited by Ho Chi Minh to seek "more effective collabor-
ation between the .two parties in the struggle for independence and peace."
The PCI daily L'u e i a greets ets the Johnson speech as the first cracks in the
truculent U.S." which sho.ld be appreciated by all people
interested in peace and freedom. This recalls the 31 January 1965 NCNA re-
port that Kang Sheng, a CCP Politburo alternate member, held talks in Peking
with Qalo Vicenzo, one of the leaders of the Italian pro-Chinese renegade
"Fong Live Leninism" group.
5. It is belatedly reported that in February the pro-Soviet group of
dissident Japanese Communists headed by 1?64 expellee Shiga adopted the name
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Commentary Cont.)
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMYJNIST DISSENSIONS
#51
31 March-13 April 1965
Febru 2 (delayed): Issue No. 29 of Nihon-no Koe (The Voice of Japan),
published by the pro-Soviet Ja ese dis ident Communist "Voice of Japan
Comrades Society, headed by 1964 JCP expellee Shiga, announces a double
change in designation:
a. Beginning with No. 29, Nihon-no Koe becomes the "official publica-
Lion of the central organ of the Japanese Communist Pay;
b. Simultaneously, the publisher is now "The Japanese Communist Party
(Voice of Japan.")
March 30 (delayed): Norwegian CP daily Friheten publishes "Resolution
on the Situation in theICM adopted unanimously at MCP Congress over
previous week-end. It briefly "noted" that the 1-5 March 19-party con-
ference "was carried out as a consultative meeting at which they sought
new ways and new initiatives to strengthen cooperation and restore unity,"
expressed the "viewpoint" that a new international conference "can restore
unity only if all parties are willing to take part," and approved "the
roposai raised by several fraternal parties for a conference of all CPs
in the capitalist countries in Europe...."
March 3 : NCNA reports text of a statement by the Political Committee
of the CP of New Zealand denouncing the 1-5 March Moscow "consultative
meeting" and rejecting the proposal in its con manique to call an 81-
party "consultative meeting" to prepare for a world conference.
"In the absence of real conditions to make such a 'consultative
meeting' productive, such a gathering would have virtually the same
results as the conference. planned by Khrushchev -- the open split-
ting of the world movement through attempts to impose on all parties
the anti-M-L revisionist line of the?CPSU leadership."
The Political Committee "calls instead for bilateral talks in which the
modern revisionists can start a thoroughgoing self-criticism of their
mistakes and an abandonment of attempts to impose their capituulationist
practice and theory on the WCM." It says in passing, that
"neither during the meeting nor since have the leaderships of the
CPSU and the other seven participating socialist countries taken
concrete steps in Practice to repulse the aggression (in Vietnam).
This fact exposes the words of the cQmmuxiique calling for unity to
fight imperialism as being no more t1an hollow deception."
i
The 4%l an Monitor carries a statement by the Malayan CP/CC de-
nouncing the sectarian and divisive activities perpetrated by the modern
revisionists under the guise of unity." All Peking papers prominently
publish the statement 2 April.
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Aril 1: The French CF/CC approves a resolution calling on other Western
European CPs to join it in organizing a conference on the problems of GPs
in capitalist nations. It also "unreservedly shares the opinion that the
holding of a new international conference of parties would be fully in
the interests of the ICM."
April 2: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit article -- "The Interna-
tional Imperialist-Revisionist Policemen -- denounces1oviet collabora-
tion with the U.S. imperialists in U.N. peace-keeping activities.
"The present Khrushchev revisionistq are most perfidious, but their
tricks deceive nobody. The whole w?rld is aware that the hypocriti-
cal clamor and noisy anti-imperialist declarations made by the K.
revisionists are a poor mask indeed,to distract the attention of the
people from the bargainings and plots which the former are carrying
out behind the scenes with American, imperialism."
April : A top-level Soviet Party-State delegation headed by Brezhnev
and including Kosygin visits Warsaw amid a great show of fraternal soli-
darity, signing on the 8th a new 20-year treaty of friendship and mutual
assistance to replace the treaty of 21 April 1945. Despite flowery lan-
guage and treaty mention for first time of the Oder-Neisse frontier, the
meeting seems to have brought no noteworthy new developments.
Aril 6: An Albanian Zen. I Po lit editorial saluting "the DRV people
and army for downing 61 American aircra 't.., and sinking an American
Ranger ship" adds that "this grave situation is the inevitable result of
the rfidious attitude of the Khrushchevite revisionists," who "are even
more inclined than N.K. himself to engage in bargaining with imperialism."
April : TABS reports from Cairo that Algiers bound Indian leftist former
Defense Minister Krishna Merlon "told a correspondent of the newspaper Al
Musavar that he demanded participation of the Soviet Union in the forth-
coming conference of Afro-Asian countrieA in A giers, since the Soviet
Union is a major country including a large part of Asian territory inhab-
ited by Asian nationalities."
A ril 10: The Italian CP announces in Rome that a top-level PCI delega-
tion headed by Giancarlo Pajetta would visit Hanoi at the invitation of
North Vietnamese boss Ho Chi Minh, to seek
"ways and forms of an ever more effective collaboration between
the two parties in the struggle for independence and peace." 7As
Venezuelan Interior Minister Barrios announces that three Italian
Communist Party members were arrested in Caracas for having carried
daily L'Unita reporting the case on the 12th after all other Italian
press hid- i ,ven it heavy play), cal]e d it "the affair trumped up by the
Minister of the Interior of the reactionary Venezuelan Government."
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April 12: TASS reports that No. 5 of CPSU theoretical journal Koimnunist
features an editorial on "Solidarity: A Formidable Weapon of Communism."
It admits that "the restitution of unity of the WCM under present condi-
tions is a complicated matter," but emphasizes that "pltical actions in
the process of joint struggle against the common foe would be the easiest
way to rid oneself of the encumbrances that have gathered during the
polemics."
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896 EE; b.
COMMUNIST AGRICULTURE
STILL AILING IN EASTERN EUROPE
OBJECTIVES: Add to the growing pressures on
European Communist regimes to drop excessive
state control of agriculture; turn new nations
away from Communist models.
SITUATION: BPG Item No. 886 and its unclassified attachment, 29 Mar
65, dealt with the various internal reforms which Bloc regimes are being
forced to permit as a consequence of decades of Communist failure in the
economic sector. These reforms, however, have scarcely touched the agri-
cultural sector, which still suffers fully (except in Poland.) the admin-
istrative stranglehold and mismanagement of Communist bureaucracy. The
encouraging upturn which ensued from and prevailed for some time after
Poland's abandonment in 1956 of forced farm collectivization, should have
convinced leaders of other Communist regimes that agriculture prospers
everywhere in direct proportion to the absence of state coercion and
state interference with individual initiative. But the other regimes
could not or would not see the implications of this working example in
their midst. For state ownership and control of the land is at least as
important to Marxism as is control of industry. So their agricultures
continue to languish, unable generally even to.supply their own popula-
tions adequately, while regime apologists (as in the economic sector) try
to rationalize the endless failures or to blame them on the occasional nat-
ural adversities which are the lot of farmers everywhere, and which are
taken largely in stride by the non-Communist countries.
In the economic sphere, the Bloc regimes are talking of substantial
administrative and ideological concessions to private initiative. Not
so in the case of agriculture. While there is undoubted recognition of
the superior effectiveness of private agriculture, steps are not being
taken to actually revert to private ownership or relax state control to
any extent. The regimes certainly want the land and farmers to produce
as successfully as possible, i.e., to feed the population and to have
surpluses for export (including aid to developing areas). But they seek
to achieve this end with so-called "incentives" or ideological subterfuges,
rather than grant the farmers any bona fide proprietary interest.
See the unclassified attachments for a summary of the agricultural
situation in Communist Central Europe. The one titled "A New Look at Bloc
Agricultural Growth" was produced by RFE (Radio Free Europe).
TREATMENT: There are few subjects of such basic and universal human
interest, and none on which the Communist countries are more vulnerable,
than the business of producing enough to eat. The manifest difficulties
of Communist regimes to properly feed their populations -- e.g., witness
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food lines, grumbling and sporadic demonstrations against price increases
and short supplies, hasty government moves to purchase enough from abroad
to feed their people, meanwhile reassuring them that bread would arrive --
is a telling propaganda theme for all audiences, if properly presented.
Much publicity has been given recently to trends away from command
economics and to plans for economic (industrial) reforms among the Com-
munist states of Eastern Europe and even the USSR. Very little has been
heard of relaxation of timeworn Communist agricultural policies. The
available record of facts and statistics makes clear that agriculture,
least of all, can be excluded from liberalization programs or left at the
mercies of CP functionaries. To counter the Communist smokescreen of ex-
cuses, promises, and ideological gibberish, we should keep the pertinent
facts of Communist agricultural bankruptcy in the foreground and in per-
spective for Bloc audiences in general.
Potential Western creditors and Communist trading partners in the
Free World should be reminded of a basic fact, i.e,, that so long as Com-
munist countries cannot even keep up with the food requirements of their
own population growths, long-term commercial deals with those countries
may rest on an equally shaky base and be subject to the risk of inadequate
economic performance in trade goods.
Government officials, planners and opinion molders in developing
countries should be kept aware of the rapid decline of agriculture in
every country where communism has taken over. The acid test for Com-
munism has been agriculture, the field in which political maneuvers and
propaganda slogans were no substitute for success, and we should show
that Communism has failed conclusively in this test. We should point
out, in this light, the incongruity of agricultural advice or aid from
Communist sources -- the cynicism of food-deficit Bloc countries buying
Western foodstuffs and re-exporting same to buy influence in Cuba or
other areas of political unrest.
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~d (896.)
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Fact Sheet
26 April 1965
The Situation of Soviet Labor
To judge by official titles, the slogans on the walls, and the
symbolic hammer and sickle, the workers and peasants--and especially
the workers--rule the Soviet Union. All the industry, all the capital
plant of the country officially belong to the people. The state is now
"the state of the whole people." Paradoxically, all these trappings
only weaken the real power of the workers, and strengthen that of the
managerial elite, the "New Class." Strikes are illegal, since (so the
official reasoning goes) the economy belongs to the people and any
strike is a strike against the people. The ruling Communist Party,
dominated by Nev Class elements, issues continuous propaganda represent-
ing itself as the "vanguard of the working class," and pretending that
its interests and those of the workers are identical. Whenever the
managers and party officials want to organize a speed-up, or force
workers to do unpaid overtime work, they stage "voluntary" and "spon-
taneous" resolutions by "the workers." The Stakhanovites have been
largely replaced by competitions between groups or labor brigades, but
this is only another technique for forcing individuals to work harder,
and for breaking dawn any solidarity among workers.
No independent newspapers exist to expose these tactics, no soap-
box speakers are allowed to attack them. And of course it is the New
Class that reaps the benefits of the system: higher pay, better apart-
ments, official automobiles, vacations on the Black Sea, special privi-
leges of every kind. The present situation contrasts with Lenin's
insistence in 1917 that officials must be elected, subject to recall,
and paid no more than a competent workman. There is no ruling class
anywhere that exploits the workers more effectively than the Soviet
New Class. If Karl Marx were alive today, he could easily write a
critique of Soviet society; the examples he gives in Capital of early
Victorian capitalist exploitation could readily be matched with cases
from the present-day Soviet Union, with an added element of chicanery
and coercion. What would the capitalists Marx described have given for
such levers as the Soviet worker's labor book, in which an unfavorable
entry can bar future employment, or for the practice of "voluntarily"
surpassing the plan, under which each Soviet worker made an average con-
tribution of 108 rubles worth of production to the state in the first
four-and-a-half years of the Seven Year Plan!
It is true that conditions have improved since Stalin's day. It
is no longer a criminal offense to be late to work, or to seek a new
job without being ordered to do so. The Soviets have finally recognized
what Marx saw clearly, that slave labor is uneconomic, and the slave
labor camps have been replaced by much smaller prison camps, mostly
occupied by real criminals. Working hours have been reduced and
pensions have been increased and extended. Soviet propaganda claims
that unemployment is non-existent, and boasts of such services as free
medical care. But Soviet workers depend on the crumbs which the system
chooses to give them; they cannot strike for better working conditions,
or even complain about them without danger of punishment.
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(Cont.)
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The crucial weakness of Soviet labor is that it cannot form genuine
unions and bargain collectively. In Chapter 28 of Capital, Marx described
the legislation which, from the end of the 15th century, had attempted to
fix maximum wages and prevent workers from organizing. He ended with a
scathing account of the Loi Chapelier of 1791, by which the French bour-
geoisie tried to forbid any coalition of workers, although he admitted
that for the most part British anti-union laws had been repealed in 1825
"before the threatening bearing of the proletariat." But as far as
genuine union organization goes, it is forbidden today in the USSR; wages
in the USSR are also fixed by the state, as under Edward III of England.
True, bodies exist in the Soviet Union which call themselves trade unions;
controlled by the party, they in fact serve as "yellow unions" or "company
unions." Their aim is to induce the ?corkers to increase production, not
to fight for better wages or working conditions. In 1963, an official
union publication called on Soviet unions.to concentrate on the following:
"An early fulfillment of the production plan for 1963, further growth
of labor productivity, lowering the cost price, improving the quality
of output, eliminating losses due to breakdowns and other non-
productive expenditures, and implementing a strict economy regime;
wide introduction of new equipment, perfecting technological proc-
esses, and raising of the level of mechanization and automation of
production."
As for wages, a compilation of Soviet labor legislation states flatly:
"The amounts of wages and the application of different systems of
wage payments to workers and employees are established by the govern-
ment..."
Soviet apologists say of course that there is no conflict of interest
between state and worker. We shall see later how true this is.
As a result of the absence of effective union organization or of
an effective labor lobby in the USSR:
1. Real wages fail to rise and even decline as the cost of living
rises faster than wage payments. The average number of hours of
work required to earn weekly food for one person (i.e., a fixed
quantity of bread, flour, potatoes, sugar, beef, milk, eggs, butter,
and other fats) was 7.9 hours in 1958 and 9.11. hours in 1962, almost
as many hours as in 1953. Actual food budgets would run substantially
higher. In 1963 and 1961+ there were food shortages, and free market
prices went up 30 per cent in the fall of 1963. Like the unscrupu-
lous London bankers described in Capital, though with somewhat dif-
ferent motives, the Soviet government degraded the quality of flour
and bread. In many localities, breadlines formed in 1963-19611., and
fruit, vegetables, sugar, and milk were often unavailable. In the
USSR more than 50 per cent of the family budget goes for food, as
2 (Cont.)
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compared pith about 30 per cent in Great Britain. In regard to
other consumer goods, an inexpensive suit costs 75 rubles and a
cheap pair of shoes 25 rubles, while the average worker's full
monthly earnings (according to Soviet officials) were 80 to 90
rubles in 1964. Some do much better; foremen make 200 rubles a
month. Unskilled laborers barely achieve the monthly minimum wage
of 40-45 rubles, and often do not earn that much. In the early
1960s, reductions in the work week and upward revisions of labor
norms led to serious cuts in the wages paid to many workers.
2. Workers are paid largely on the piece-work system, usually con-
sidered unacceptable by organized bor. In the early 1950's 75
per cent of Soviet workers were on piece-work. This proportion has
now fallen, since with mechanized and automated production processes
it is often not feasible to pay on a piece-work basis. But over half
of Soviet workers are still on piece-work.
3. There is no unemployment compensation, and very little in the
way of an employment service. Officially, unemployment--like worker
discontent--does not exist. Actually, the problem is simply pushed
out of sight. There are various jobs which amount in practice to
work relief, such as unnecessary positions as porters and sweepers,
and there are many persons who cannot find jobs in the specialties
they are trained in, and who are forced to take jobs which do not
pay a living wage. There are also those whose labor books are lost
or contain adverse comments, who cannot legally find a job at all.
Beggars and others spend the night in railroad stations. Western
countries might reduce unemployment too if they denied all unemploy-
ment assistance, forced people to take whatever job was available,
and above all, kept no unemployment records.
4. Penalties for work stoppages and unacceptable products fall on
the worker even when management is at fault. In cases of work
stoppage or spoilage due to bad management, workers on time scales
are paid from one-half to two-thirds the wages they would other-
wise have been paid. If the workers are responsible themselves,
they receive nothing.
5. Effective safety programs and measures are lacking. Safety
campaigns are common, with posters, edicts, resolutions, and the
like, but these have little effect on accident rates. Measures
which would be effective, such as the provision of safety devices,
the improvement of overcrowded factory conditions, a relaxation of
pressures to exceed the norm, or the elimination of excessive over-
time work, all seem to be regarded as too expensive by the Soviet
hierarchy. The situation is typified by the fact that in early
1964 there was no production of safety goggles for farm machine
operators or of asbestos hoods and gloves for metallurgical workers.
3 (Cant.)
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As a result, the Soviet Union has an annual accident rate of 1+5
per thousand persons employed, as compared with a US rate of 211.11
per thousand. (Even this understates the difference, since the
Soviet rate only includes those incapacitated for at least three
days, while the US rate is based on those absent for one day or
more.) An American visitor to a Leningrad plant stated:
"The rooms are dark, dirty, and crowded with machines. Not
even primitive safety equipment is to be seen. Graphite is
used as a lubricant, and it covers everything with its charac-
teristic black and slippery coating: stairs, walls, railings,
and workers--generally black from head to toe.... This plant
looked like something out of the nineteenth century...."
Paul Metzger, a Swiss engineer employed in installing a chemical
plant at Balakovo, fell victim (as did his Soviet co-workers) to
mercury poisoning, due to conditions arising from carelessness and
haste in trying to meet a deadline.
"Not only I, but also the Russians who worked in the same area
began to suffer severe headaches, attacks of dizziness, bleed-
ing of the nose, and fatigue, which finally led to interrup-
tions in the work.... Mercury vapor even in slight concentra-
tions, causes severe damage to the liver, kidneys, and nerves.
Headaches commence, the hands begin to shake, memory fails,
and the teeth become loose."
The local hospital identified the illness, but the management took
no preventive measures and permitted no delay. There was also
danger of explosion and poisoning from carbonic disulphide. Metzger
finally had to return to Switzerland for a period to recover.
6. Women are widely employed in unhealthy and dangerous work. Until
1957, Soviet women were employed in mines as miners; they are still
employed there as engineers, supervisors, cleaners, ventilation
operators, etc. (In England, all employment of women in mines was
prohibited in 1812.) Occupations with serious occupational hazards
--especially under Soviet conditions--are largely filled by women:
Percentage of
Occupation female workers
Electric welders 73 per cent
Pressers and stampers 64 "
Grinders and polishers 53 "
Galvanizers 60
Chemical industry 57 "
Production of building materials, 51+ "
glass, and chinaware
Printers 70 " it
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4 (Cont.)
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One woman reportedly lifted up to 33 tons of weight a day in the
course of her work. Izvestia noted (24 October 1964) that women
were laying crossties on the railroad "while able-bodied men stand-
ing nearby are writing down in their notebooks that the norms are
being fulfilled." These women also do a days' housework when they
get home. As a result of such conditions, there are reports of
increasing ill-health among working women, and the birth rate fell
from 31.3 per thousand in 1940 to 23.8 per thousand in 1961.
7. The Soviet worker is unable to emigrate. Although industrial
workers are now able (as they were not in Stalin's day) to travel
without permission within the USSR, collective farm workers are not,
not having internal passports. Various pressures and regulations
are used to compel people to settle in Siberia, and to prevent them
from returning to Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev. Only very exception-
ally can a worker get permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union,
even if only to go to another Bloc country. This state of affairs
contrasts with the ability of European workers in the 19th century,
including workers in Czarist Russia, to escape an oppressive system
by emigrating to South America, Canada, Australia, or the United
States. It also contrasts with the present-day freedom of movement
in Western European countries,. which has permitted thousands of
Italian and Spanish workers to find better wages in West Germany
and elsewhere.
8. The supposed benefits often have gaps. In practice, medicines,
bandages and dentures must be paid for -- if they can be obtained.
The collective farmers only began to receive old-age pensions in
1964, and then at very low rates, averaging under 17 rubles a month;
such a pensioner would have to spend more than four months' pension
to get that inexpensive 75 ruble suit. The minimum monthly wage
was supposed to be raised in 1960 to 40 rubles in rural areas and
45 in urban areas, and public statements gave the impression that
this was already in effect; then in the summer of 1964, Khrushchev
admitted that it was not in effect, and promised that the new minimum
would be applied everywhere by the end of 1965. Whether this will
happen remains to be seen. Persons who are involuntarily unemployed
are ineligible for sickness benefits. Rents are low, but no bargain
for those who lack influence and must make do with the average hous-
ing area for urban dwellers of 6.5 square meters--or less, since
some of course have less than the average amount of space; the real
beneficiaries of low rentals are the New Class, since they pay the
same rates per square meter and obtain large, modern apartments.
Similarly, the tax system, based mainly on a turnover or sales tax
on necessities, favors the well-to-do; previously promised income
tax alleviations for the lowest brackets have been postponed. The
sanatoria and rest homes, widely advertised in propaganda, only
have facilities to accommodate about 10 per cent of the working
population each year, and the cost for a Moscow worker, including
5 (Cont.)
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transportation, of a two-week Black Sea vacation amounts to about
five or six weeks' wages; the rest facilities are thus enjoyed
mainly by the New Class, who at the same time have the influence
or status necessary to get reduced fare or free tickets from the
trade union organizations. A change from a six-day, 1+1 hour week
to a five-day, 1+0 hour week, first promised for 1962, has been
postponed; the average actual working week is probably at least
54 hours, with overtime frequently unpaid. One hour can hardly
be a serious difficulty -- it is rather that a five 8-hour day
week would not have room for the extra hours that can be worked
into six days, five of which are supposedly seven hours.
It would be surprising if Soviet workers suffered all these
hardships without resentment and complaint, and in fact it is clear
that they are full of resentment and that they occasionally complain,
despite all the dangers. Accounts have leaked to the West of civil
disturbances in Karaganda in 1959 and in Novocherkassk in 1962, the
Novocherkassk riots apparently being set off by an increase in meat
and butter prices of 30 and 25 per cent, following reductions in
pay. Dozens, possibly hundreds, of people were killed. In
Karaganda, the trouble reportedly started when young people brought
in to the Virgin Lands found lodgings unhealthy and food both in-
edible and insufficient; they sought to complain, and the authori-
ties refused to listen to them, so the demonstrators siezed the
food in a kolkhoz market. The first troops sent against them
fraternized, instead of dispersing the demonstrators, and outside
forces had to be used, killing over a hundred persons. No one
knows how many other riots and strikes have gone unreported. In
their open letter of 14 July 1961+, the Chinese Communists claimed
that "the broad masses of the Soviet workers, collective farmers,
and intellectuals are seething with discontent," and stated that
"on more than one occasion (the Soviet government) bloodily sup-
pressed striking workers and the masses who put up resistance."
Sometimes discontent arises from compulsory overtime, from the
denial of vacation time, or from the arrogant behavior of officials;
the director of a kolkhoz was described as follows in 1963:
"He does not need people, but a labor force: he doesn't look
after anyone, speaks with no one politely, always screams at
everyone. The people have complained more than once that he
is likely to bait, maltreat, or insult anyone. He lives like
a petty bourgeois, acknowledges no one and submits to no one.
Young people do not run away to Nefekumsk for no reason."
This internal unrest helps to explain why the Soviet government has
purchased grain abroad for the past two years, despite the cost in
gold and the damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union abroad.
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 ''- Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : A- P78-03061A0003000366ft-rv 1 1965
25X1C10b
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(899 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 19 -RDP78-03061A000300030002-5 - 41b .
25X1C10b
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err DrT (899 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A00030003000,25k1 C10b
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(899 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 19 A-RDP78-03061A00030003000 1 C10b
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(899 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 61A0003000300022X1C10b
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(899 Cont.)
 Approved For Relea / CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300030002-5
25X1C10b
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w 5. %P it pqh~ (899.)
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26 April 1965
Ailing Agriculture in Communist East Europe
Up until the time of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Russia herself
was a substantial exporter of grain, averaging 10.5 million tons yearly
from 1909 to 1911+. Her grain exports were negligible for 37 years fol-
lowing the revolution.
Prior to WW II, Eastern Europe too was a food surplus area; between
1931+ and 1938, Hungarian wheat exports averaged 430,000 tons yearly;
Rumanian, 51+9,, oo tons; and Bulgarian, 99,000 tons. Following Communist
subjugation of Eastern European countries, the agricultural situation
there went steadily from bad to worse. Khrushchev at one point was able
to stem temporarily the USSR's food production decline by plundering the
soil of the Virgin Lands. Thus the USSR was able to export some wheat
to its European satellites: 548,000 tons in 1956, 4.6 million tons in
1957, 2.8 million tons in 1958, 4.4 million tons in 1959, 1i.2 million
tons in 1960, and 3 million tons in 1961. The late 1950's were the post-
war production peak years for Bloc agriculture. However, production
stopped rising or went into decline as the exhausted soil of the Virgin
Lands began turning into a dust bowl in the 1960's. Presently, sugar
is the only food in surplus supply in the USSR and Communist East Europe.
The diet of the average Satellite worker has remained at the level of
that of 1959/60. Communist imports of grain from the Free World are run-
ning at a high level; only Rumania was able to export substantial quan-
tities of grain (mostly corn) from the 1964 crop, and the Soviets, while
themselves net importers, are expected to export some grain to the Satel-
lites in 1961+/65.
According to recent announcements by CPSU First Party Secretary
Brezhnev, Soviet farm output, which was slated to rise by 70 per cent
during the current Seven Year Plan (1959-65), rose by only 10 per cent
in the first six of the seven years. The figure of 10 per cent is not
only 0.1+ per cent less than USSR population increase during the same
period, but is probably 10 to 15 per cent above the actual net, since
official Soviet crop figures include chaff, dirt and moisture. The in-
vestment needs of Soviet and Satellite agriculture are great. For years,
the regime leaderships have transferred large sums from agriculture into
industry. Much of the burden of a hasty and unwieldy industrial program
has been carried by the peasants. As a result, agriculture has been
deprived of the investment critical to its development. Even a massive
program of agricultural investment will only replace the vast sums which
have been drained out of agriculture. It is significant that the 71
billion rubles which Brezhnev proposes to spend on agriculture in the
next five years, a sum equal to that spent on Soviet agriculture during
the last nineteen years, is estimated by Western experts to be only one
quarter the amount needed to put Soviet agriculture on its feet.
(Cont.)
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Planned increases in Satellite gross agricultural production for
1965 range from a modest two per cent for Hungary to an unrealistically
high 8 per cent for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. It is obvious from
these planned increases, however, that none of the Satellites has any
illusions that they will fulfill original five-year plan (1961-65)
goals. Such figures qs are available would indicate that in Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland and Rumania, net agricultural production declined in 1964.
Preliminary estimates of the important grain crop indicate a total out-
put for the Satellites as a whole in 1964, slightly below the mediocre
yields of 1963 and also below the normal average for 1957-61 (when the
number of mouths to feed was considerably smaller than it is now). Total
Satellite imports of grain reached a record level of 8 million tons in
the consumption year 1963/64 and are expected to be no less during 1964/
65. As in 1963/64, more of this 8 million tons is expected to come from
the Free World than from the Soviet Union.
Soviet and Satellite production figures wherever farming is col-
lectivized (in other words, all Bloc countries expect Poland) show that
the private plots of the collective farmers account for a share of yields
that is all out of proportion to their relative size -- and precisely in
the case of some of the staples that are of vital importance in feeding
the populations. For example, tiny peasant plots produce about of
Soviet meat and milk, 6 I of the potatoes, and of the eggs. The re-
gimes of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have been particularly conscious
of this production factor and anxious not to lose it.
Because Rumania has naturally rich and plentiful farmlands - more
than 27 million acres under cultivation - the Communists could afford
in the early years to simply exploit the agricultural sector while de-
voting their prime attention to industrialization. The year 1956 marked
the beginning of a period of intensified pressure and persecution of the
peasants by the Rumanian regime. In 1961 the regime launched an all-out
drive for collectivization, aiming at establishing a form of collective
farming in which the peasants would no longer have any right of land
ownership. This was brought to a temporary halt by peasant demonstra-
tions in the countryside, but in April 1962 the government claimed that
the collectivization of all arable areas bad been achieved three years
earlier than planned. As of 1963, State and collective farms reportedly
accounted for 93% of arable land, with private agriculture restricted
to "private plots" on State-owned land or small "Free Farms" in the un-
collectivized 7% or so of land. Despite this, privately owned livestock
still accounts for over of the total of cattle, sheep and pigs in
Rumania. of the milk, egg and vegetable production of Rumania is
accounted for by private ownership, as is 6% of poultry production.
For private initiative to feed a major part of the populace from a tiny
percentage of the land and against great odds is a living refutation of
regime agricultural doctrine, but it is a factor which the regime cannot
ignore and dare not disrupt. The best the Bucharest regime has been able
to do is to refer to the private plots as "auxiliary" parts of collective
farms.
2
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The Hungarian CP's pragmatism where certain bread and butter
questions are concerned was illustrated by the regime's public en-
couragement of "household" plot cultivation by collective families.
The farm journal Szabad Fold carried a reminder of this in its 21 March
issue in the form of a warning to local authorities that household plots
must not be neglected nor regarded as "an anomaly hostile to the col-
lectives." The journal reminded the authorities that the household plots
must receive full consideration in the drawing up of annual plans by the
collectives. However, the farmers recognize this for what it is - share-
cropping - with the regime making sure that the state gets a cut of all
the fruits of private initiative; the farmers do not mistake this for
any generosity or good will on the part of the regime. The upward trend
in livestock numbers, which began in Hungary in 1961+, is now being threat-
ened by the most serious outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease in years,
which has spread into 15 of the 19 counties since last autumn. The Hun-
garians have not controlled the disease and have not reported it, leaving
it to the Czechoslovak government to do so in the form of an order closing
the Czech-Hungarian border to tourist travel. Meanwhile, outbreaks have
cropped up in adjoining Bloc areas of southern Slovakia, Bohemia, Rumania
and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. Adjoining non-Communist Austria
has not experienced any outbreaks. Along with the hoof-and-mouth disease,
Hungarian agriculture has been damaged by the unchecked spread of field
mice, which caused damage valued at several hundred million forints to
green fodders in 1964. The Ministry of Agriculture has ordered a nation-
wide campaign to kill off the mice in March and April, during which the
whole population, including school children, will be pressed into field
work.
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Fact Sheet
26 April 1965
ANew Look at Bloc Agricultural Growth
The measurement of agricultural progress by countries is generally
given in terms of gross production figures or by indices of output using
selected years as a base for comparison. In surplus producing countries
as well as those industrial nations with a productive agriculture these
accounting procedures are adequate. It is with the developing countries,
however, and those nations faced with a continued underproduction of
food products that a more sensitive yardstick to measure agricultural
development seems imperative. The concept of per capita output in terms
of net agricultural production provides a meaningful addition to the ex-
isting methodology of measurement. This is particularly true In the
East European communist bloc countries with unresolved problem of chronic
underproduction of foodstuffs in relation to their grandiose plans of
agricultural development.
The United States Department of Agriculture has worked out an index
of net agricultural production based on the value of crop production less
feed, seed, and waste; the value of livestock products are also included.
The base period selected was the span from 1953/54 to 1955/56 for the
USSR, a period of unfavorable conditions in agriculture. For the bloc
countries the base is as given. The split year system is used which in-
cludes the harvests of the second half of a calendar year and the value
of livestock products for the first half of the succeeding year.
In the European communist countries as a whole net farm output re-
covered this year from the serious setback suffered during 1963/61+ but
was still below the levels reached in 1961/62. Thus with the steady
population increase, net productivity per capita continued to deteri-
orate from the moderate high of four years ago. The weight of the Soviet
Union's agriculture in the composite total is clearly felt: about half
the output comes from the USSR, so the ups and downs of the Soviet har-
vests appreciably affect the index figure. Nor is the continued regres-
sion a credit to communist central planning. Each country sets its farm
production plan in accordance with the projected population growth. The
record for the bloc in the aggregate is cumulative failure to reach not
only their target goals but even to maintain previous levels of produc-
tivity. This is solid regression in any economic order.
Only two bloc countries were able to improve net productivity per
capita, Bulgaria and the GDR. Bulgaria improved its position during the
last two years but failed by two points to reach its 1962 level. This
performance was mainly the result of an expansion of the irrigation
system, greater use of fertilizers, and a shift in the cropping struc-
ture toward the high value crops: tobacco, sugar beets, vegetables.
Substantial price rises in recent years contributed to the moderate
growth. Nonetheless, agricultural plans were only partially fulfilled.
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Eastern Europe: Indices of Net Agricultural
Production, Per Capita by Countries
1961/62 to 1964/651
(1952/53--1954/55 = 100)2
Country 1961/62
1962/63
1963/61+
1964/653
USSR 122
121
112
120
Other Eastern
Europe:
Poland 123
117
111
112
East Germany 107
107
110
113
Czechoslovakia 120
118
115
113
Hungary 117
118
115
117
Rumania 117
109
113
117
Bulgaria 133
11+0
134
138
Yugoslavia 124
120
122
121
Total 120
117
115
117
Total Eastern
Europe & USSR 122
120
113
! 119
1) The 1965 Eastern Europe Agricultural Situation, U.S. Dept of
Agriculture, Economic Ruse .rch Service: , March 1965.
2) Base period for the USSR is 1953/51+ -- 1955/56.
3) Forecast.
2 (Cont.)
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The GDR performance is attributable to a recovery from the pre-
cipitous drop in production following collectivization in 1960. Present
output levels correspond with the average of 1955-59, however.
Czechoslovakia continued its steady decline for the third straight
year in net growth per capita. The output of all major grain crops, as
well as sugar beets, dropped during 1964 Meat output fell off as did
the number of livestock. The migration of farm labor to cities has made
additional inputs a precondition to normal yields. It is apparent that
the levels of investment for machinery and fertilizer allocations have
been inadequate, which along with the inefficiency of the collectivized
farm system, account for the stagnation in farm output.
Hungarian net output has remained virtually on an even keel during
the last four years with no improvement registered however. This stabi-
lization, no doubt, was partially due to liberal state investments. For
the third successive year, government investments were greater than
planned. These relatively large investments have raised production
costs at a faster rate than gross production value. But the experience
of Hungary is not unique -- it applies to all the bloc countries. The
hard lesson is that investment returns in a collectivized farm system
come slowly and with declining marginal returns. The record shows that
sustained and accelerated rates of investment are necessary to a steady
expansion in agricultural growth.
Poland has been unable to match its record harvest performance
reached in 1961, and what with the annual population increment, the net
output per capita is 11 points below that base year. Gross farm output
grew by 2 percent during 1964 which accounted for a 1 point rise in net
output per capita. Here too, investment inputs have been inadequate to
insure a modest acceleration in net agricultural output. This recogni-
tion no doubt influenced the regime in its decision to raise agri-
cultural investment 60 percent during the 1966-70 plan period.
For Rumania, a near record corn crop pulled the net output back to
the 1961 level. Two successively good corn crops were decisive and in-
dicate an improvement in livestock output. Tobacco and sugar beets,
both high value crops, improved substantially. However, no progress
in per capita output was recorded. In national planning, moreover, the
record in plan fulfillment is one of near failure. The only major agri-
cultural targets that will be attained in the 1960-65 plan are the land
collectivization goal and state investments in agriculture. The fact
that collectivization was accomplished more rapidly than planned led to
overfulfillment of the agricultural investment plan. On the other hand,
no major production goals have been, or will be, fulfilled. The big gap
between 1964 performance and 1965 goals is due to failures other than
shortfalls in the irrigation and chemical fertilizer plans. Inadequate
capital outlays and the built-in restraints of the collectivization
system are primarily responsible for failure to improve the net output
of farm products per capita
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Fact Sheet ON=
26 April 1965
Confrontation: Can It Crush Malaysia?
Last year President Sukarno vowed that "before the cock crows on
l January 1965, Malaysia will be crushed." His talent as a prophet has
to date proved to be on a level with his talent for mustering the vast
natural resources of his country for the benefit of his people.
Since the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, the new Federa-
tion has not only refused to succumb to Sukarno's bullying, it has: with-
stood the most bloody racial riots in Chinese-Malay history in July and
September 1964; continued to enjoy a favorable balance of trade and in-
creased foreign capital investment; raised what is already the
highest standard of living in Southeast Asia, and begun to develop new
industries to absorb labor that was dislocated as a result of the cut-
off of trade with Indonesia.
Indonesian subversion, infiltration, sabotage and military aggres-
sion forced the Federal Parliament to pass new internal security laws
giving the Government wide powers to detain persons alleged to constitute
a threat to peace and public order. There is no evidence or complaint
that the Government has abused its emergency powers or used them to quell
opposition criticism. Even after Indonesian invasion attempts against
the Mainland began, minority parties were not gagged even on the most
sensitive policy issues. In October, for example, an opposition party
(Socialist Front) proposed U.N. supervision over the Borneo territories,
and in November the leftist Sarawak United People's Party boycotted the
Government's Malaysian Solidarity campaign. In neither case did the
Government attempt to invoke its emergency powers or harass the opposi-
tion in any unusual way. In Sukarno's Indonesia, any such attempt to
resist or even oppose Government fiat would have found the individuals
concerned in jail and the parties banned from any further activity.
Malaysia's future is by no means assured and the forces that drive
it apart can still exert influence on those that hold it together. Never-
theless, a new Five Year Plan is being drafted on the basis of sound eco-
nomic development of the entire territory of the Federation and a number
of other forward-looking activities are being undertaken to build a better
life for all the peoples of Malaysia while simultaneously guaranteeing
them basic freedoms within a democratic framework.
Sukarno's confrontation results in a vastly different situation for
Indonesia. The confrontation has taken place within the framework of
constantly increasing influence and power for the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI). The consequences include a gradual transition toward a Com-
munist form of government domestically and, as the junior partner of the
Peking-Djakarta axis, increasing isolation for Indonesia internationally.
Sukarno'sprecipitate withdrawal from the United Nations, applauded only
by Communist China and her Satellites, is the ultimate symbol of that
isolation.
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Even Sukarno's myth of national solidarity was shattered when he
was forced to suppress even those enemies of the PKI who expressed devo-
tion and loyalty to Sukarno personally. That is what happened in January
1965 when he banned the Murba Party, a party of Indonesian nationalists
of Marxist persuasion who organized a "Body for the Protection of Sukarno-
ism." That group set itself the task of protecting Sukarno and Sukarnoism
from manipulation by the PKI and immediately incurred the violent opposi-
tion of the latter. In Indonesia today, however, no one can do that and
survive. D.N. Aidit, the powerful chief of the PKI, welcomed Sukarno's
decision to ban the Murba Party and called it "a nice New Year's present
for us from Bung Karno."
Economically Indonesia continued toward fiscal bankruptcy. Her
debts to the Soviet Union and the West are now over $2.5 billion and her
future is mortgaged for at least 20 years.
Additional credits are apparently unobtainable from both sources
and the Indonesians have turned to the only remaining source left to
them, the Chinese Communists. In mid-November 1964 more than 500 billion
Rupiahs were in circulation, more than twice the amount on December 31,
1963. Gold and foreign exchange deficits approached $300 million. The
best single indication of the dilapidated state of the Indonesian economy
is the official rate of exchange is 1i5 Rupiah to one dollar in contrast
to the black market rate of 9000 to one!
This economic deterioration is particularly distressing because
Indonesia is the largest nation in southeast Asia and potentially the
wealthiest. There are abundant natural resources in the form of rubber,
oil and tin. Crude oil production in 1960 was 20.6 million tons and
proven petroleum reserves exceed nine billion barrels. The prospects
for expansion of the oil industry on both Sumatra and Borneo are good.
Tin production has fallen in recent times, from a high of 36,00 tons
in 1954 to 23,000 tons in 1960, but reserves are certainly large enough
to rehabilitate production to earlier levels. Rubber production in 1960
was 620,000 metric tons, down from a high of 805,000 metric tons in 1954.
Yet ever since Indonesia became independent her people have endured a
subsistence level of living.
The PKI is not opposed to the economic deterioration for the simple
reason that the wcr se it is should they finally take over the Government,
the easier it will be for them to institute a few minor reforms and take
credit for considerable improvement in the people's living standards.
The PKI-inspired confrontation policy has been primarily responsible
for the increasing ruin of the Indonesian economy and the PKI can be ex-
pected to continue to take advantage of Sukarno's preference for swash-
buckling imperial adventurism over the less romatic, but more vital tasks
of economic development.
2 (Cont.)
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The first full year of Sukarno's confrontation policy makes two
points crystal clear: First, if the Malaysians fail to find suitable
solutions to their problems, it will be because of their own short-
comings and inability to put first things first, not from Indonesia's
confrontation. Second, so long as Indonesia continues her confronta-
tion, her economic decline can never in fact be reversed; the PKI will
grab more and more power, and Indonesia will become an increasingly
Junior partner in the Peking-Djakarta axis.
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Fact Sheet .26 April 1965
Collection of Controversial Statements from
Moscow Broadcasts Concerning African Leadership
(Note: Underlining in following statements has been added for emphasis.)
Moscow Gives the OAU Its Marching Orders
Moscow in English to Africa, 26 February
"The Agenda of foreign ministers meeting of independent African
states in Nairobi contains a large number of important questions.
They concern the strengthening of African unity, the national libera-
tion movement, and the struggle against racial discrimination. Obvi-
ously, however, the Congolese problem will have greatest attention...
Ministers will discuss the report of a special OAU Commission on
the Congo - and not only discuss, but will take concrete constructive
measures for speedy normalization of the situation... which is a
result of domination of the foreign monopolies in the Congo, and
Tshombe's reactionary regime which they have imposed upon the Congo-
lese people. The committee of liberation of the OAU which met in
Tanzania condemned the imperialist interference in the Congo and the
bombing of Uganda by Tshombcs US-made aircraft. Most important, the
committee recommended that the African states reconsider their at-
titude to the present Leopoldville regime. Great responsibility
rests with the participants in the session for the maintenance of
peace, in all of Africa. We should like to express the hope that
the resolutions adopted in Nairobi this time will go beyond the frame-
work of simple recommendations."
Moscow TASS International Service in English, 27 February
"The Soviet Union sides with the government and people of the Congo
Republic (Brazzaville) in face of an imperialist conspiracy.
Attempts to Make the Best of Things
Moscow TASS International Service in English, 6 March
Commenting on results of the Nouakchott conference, the commentator
notes that "despite pressure brought to bear on the conference by
the anti-communist-minded leaders, the concluding communique did not
include an article condemning the development of normal diplomatic
and other relations between the African and socialist states. This
is because 8 countries out of the 13 who met at Nouakchott have al-
ready established diplomatic relations with the USSR and other
socialists states and are now expanding economic and cultural co-
operation with them." Touching on the conference decisions to set
up a new so-called Afro-Malagasy general organization, the commenta-
tor says this decision is regarded "as an attempt to re-establish
(Cont.
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the political Afro-Malagasy Union which discredited itself by
openly pro-imperialist leanings. The concluding communique of the
conference is worded rather nazi . However, if studied, it sheds
1_ fight on the ptuoses pursued by the new organizations. First, the
communique distorts the true reasons of the present aggravation of
the political situation in Africa, caused by the growing interfer-
ence of imperialist powers in the internal affairs of African
states. Secondly, it attacks the OAU. Third, the conference makes
groundless charges against several African states which abide by a
consistent anti-imperialist stand, particularly against Ghana.
Fourth, the authors of the communique come out in support of the
Tshombepuppet regime."
Soviet Excuses for Nairobi OAU Meetigg "Failure"
Moscow in English to Africa, 12 March.
"The session (Nairobi meeting) did not pass any new resolutions on
the Congo.... The Congolese patriot, Thomas Kanza, assessing the
results of the session, declared that 20 of the 35 governments rep-
resented refused to rccognize the Tshombe regime as
Yet the imperialist powers did everything they could to frustrate
the opposition of independent Africa to the Tshombe regime....
Under the direct influence of outside forces, a group of African
leaders spoke at Nouakchott in support of the Leopoldville regime.
This line was continued at the session of the OAU in Nairobi. The
imperialist politicians, however, failed to neutralize independent
Africa on the Congolese issue.
"How events will develop is still too early to say. The imperialist
powers, using their agents, have apparently launched a wide offensive
against independent African countries which are supporting the Congo-
lese People. Tshombe's blunt statement that the commission of the
OAU on the Congo allegedly no longer exists puts one on guard....
The absence of new resolutions on the Congo is explained by the New
York Times as practically the abandonment of the old positions of
the OAU. It goes as far as to say that after the Nairobi session,
Tshombe is not under obligation to disband his mercenaries.... The
actions of the colonialists and their henchmen are complicating
what is alreadv an extreme difficult situation in the Co o; but
despite all this, events in that country are developing in favor
of the patriots."
Moscow Reassurance to French Africa
Moscow in French to Africa, 13 March
"The Western press has been vociferous about the failure at the
conference of the countries which fight for the elimination of
colonialism on the African continent, and about the worsening of
differences among African countries. When one reads the comments
of Western papers, one may have the impression that African unity
has disappeared. ~rrr~~,
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"It is a fact that the hesitating attitude of several African
countries at Nairobi did not make it ssible to pass a construc-
tive resolution on the Co o such as would contain concrete recom-
mendations to solve the Congo crisis.
"Since the closure of the session, several African countries have
confirmed their decision to lend assistance to the Congo insurgents
who are fighting against the colonialists. Formerly, the insurrec-
tion movement of Congolese patriots was often of a spontaneous
nature. At present, it is a we11-organized struggle with its
alitical and militarcenters its government and administration.
At the "--^'
moment Preparations are successfRI& underwa, for the final
rally of all forces fighting in the Congo and of all Patrice
Lurmunba's disciples into a unified national anti-imperialist front.
One should not be surprised that the (US and other Western coun-
tries try to represent the Nairobi session as a failure of African
tulityy "
Soviet Criticisms of African Leaders
Moscow Domestic Service, 17 March.
The lack of the Congolese rebels' success could be attributed to
"disunity and estrangement within their leadership" and "frequent
personal quarrels between political and military leaders.y
Moscow Warns Africa of Danger to Unity
Moscow in English to Africa, 20 March
"Africa is living through another difficult period. Grave danger
to cause of its freedom is caused by imperialist maneuvers spear-
headed against Africa's unity, the maneuvers with Tshombe-type
puppets. Imperialism is tryin to set up warring clans to Congo-
lize the whole of Africa. An example is the resurgence of the po-
litical bloc of 13 nations from among the former French Colonies,
the bloc which has lately been known as the Africa-Malagasy Union.
It is indicative that as soon as the organization was set up, its
Western inspirers began to predict the restoration of another, a
broader bloc, the so-called Monrovia group, which is also known for
its close collaboration with imperialist powers. It is not diffi-
cult to understand that these maneuvers, aimed at restoring groups
and organizations, strike at the unity of Africa, the forging of
which began as the OAU merged two years ago.
"Ben Bella said, 'Obviously taken aback by the success of the
African Unity Organization, imperialism and colonialism have de-
veloped a strategy geared to wreck its activities.' The meeting of
the four presidents (Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali,
Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana at Bamako on
14+ March) will be followed by more meetings to offset the maneuvers,
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expose their actual meanies, and offset the danger they spell
to the cause of African unity. Ben Bella noted the viciousness
of the theory of dividing Africa into white and black, stressing
that all Africa has common interests as it struggles against reac-
tion. Me statements (of the four presidents) have swept aside the
slander of the imperialists and their agents who claim that the
revolutionary countries were set i u their own grouping."
Soviet Explanations to Arab Africa and East Africa
Moscow in Arabic, 1 April
"The maneuvers by Washington and Brussels are embodied in the
results of the OAU foreign ministers conference in Nairobi. The
adoption of a number of useful decisions there, such as intensifi-
cation of the boycott against Portugal and the Republic of South
Africa, the special decision on the OAU budget and others, but the
ministers did not reach an agreement on the most important question
- the Congo... The situation which developed in Nairobi on the
Congolese question was not unexpected. On the eve of the meeting,
some of the African states announced that they recognized the Tshombe
government and demanded that the other African countries halt their
aid to the Congolese rebels. From the start, this was expressed by
Nigeria and it was also adopted by the bloc called the moderate
states... in Nouakchott."
Moscow in Swahili to East Africa, 3 April.
"The US realized that African unity is a chief obstacle to its
imperialist policy in Africa. As a weapon in the struggle against
this powerful obstacle, the US chose the Afro-Malagasy organization,
which unites old colonies. The plan adopted by the Afro-Malagasy
group has little to do with the task of the African Unity Organi-
zation. The resolution adopted in February by the heads of state of
the Afro-Malagasy organization in Nouakchott called for full soli-
darity with Tshombe administration.
"The divisionist activities of the leaders of the Afro-Malagasy
organization affect the work of the OAU. The recent meeting of the
OAU foreign ministers in Nairobi could not adopt a single resolution
on the Congolese problem.... The imperialist plots in the Congo will
not succeed because today the destiny of Africa is in the hands of
the African people themselves who by jointly confronting the common
enemy were able to create a very important and strong weapon - unity."
Continued Attacks on the OCAM and Support of the OAU
Moscow Domestic Service, 6 April.
"Without renouncing attempts at direct suppression of the liberation
struggle of the peoples, the imperialists are attempting to place in
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the paths of the national liberation revolutions covering detach-
ments from reactionary regimes and from the unification of pro-
imperialist puppet governments. Thus in Africa the Tshombe clique
is used not only to control the riches of the Congo {Leopoldville)-,
but also for repression and pressure on neighboring states....
Attempts have been made to create, using the so-called Afro-Malagsy
Union, a political bloc of states aimed at splintering the OAU.
Leaders of independent African states have called upon people of
their continent to take measures against imperialist intrigues.
Ten liberated states openly support the movement against the Tshombe
regime and for true independence of the Congo."
Moscow TASS, 7 April
"Most of the Africans have begun to realize clearly that the basic
prerequisite for their independent development is unity. It is
becoming clear why the OAU, which has proven its strength, is being
subjected to such vehement attacks. The recent meeting in Nouakchott,
where the leaders of the former Afro-Malagasy Union tried to white-
wash the actions of the imperialist in Africa, actually came out
against the foundations of the OAU."
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