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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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r ~ , i ?M ?
?bM?M~ ianificant Dates
FEB
1 UN General Assembly condemns Chicom aggression in Korea. 1951
7 Yalta Conference begins (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin). 1945
(20th anniversary)
10 Soviet Govt. repudiates all debts incurred by Tsarist regime. 1918
13 Soviet Army occupies Budapest. 1945 (20th anniversary)
13 Czechoslovakia, last East European nation governed by traditional
parliamentary methods, falls by coup to Communist control. 1948
14 USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact),
repudiating Soviet-Nationalist Treaty of 1945 authorized by Yalta
Agreement. 1950
20 Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Djakarta, Indonesia.
21 Day of Solidarity with Youth and Students Fighting Against Colonialism.
Created by Communists and celebrated by their youth (WFDY) and Student
(IUS) fronts.
23 Kronstadt Uprising begins. Soldiers, sailors and workers--supporters
of October 1917 Revolution--unsuccessfully rise against "three-year-
old autocracy of Communist Commissars." 1921
24 Treaty of Ili (or St. Petersburg) returns to China most of Sinkiang
territory occupied (1871) by Russia during Moslem Rebellion (1864-77)
but grants portion to Russia. 1881
27 Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech. 1957
2 First Congress of Third International, Comintern, Moscow, dedicated
to Communism and world revolution. 1919
4 President Roosevelt states "Good Neighbor Policy" in first inaugural
address. 1933
5 Joseph Stalin dies. 1953 (Born 21 December 1879)
6 Soviet's Vyshinsky delivers ultimatum demanding Rumania's Coalition
Government be dissolved. A Communist cabinet is placed in power.
1945 (20th anniversary)
8 International Women's Day. Originally (1910) Social Democratic cele-
bration furthering emancipation of women; appropriated since 1945 by
Communist women's front (WIDF).
10 Afro-Asian Conference cII Bandung) Algiers. Chicom-Indonesian backed
--likely to be postponed to April or May.
12 -Sun Yat-sen dies. 1925 (40th anniversary) (Born 12 Nov 1866)
12 Finland, after brief war with USSR, yields Karelian Isthmus, Viipuri,
Hangoe Naval Base. 1940 (25th anniversary)
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CHRONOLOGY -- COM[ TIST DISSENSIONS
9 Dec 1964-5 Jan 1965
December 10: The IUS Congress in Sofia described in Chronology #43
closes after adopting a resolution which "contains an erroneous line,"
according to NCNA, which asserts that only 39 of the delegations with
voting rights, including the Soviet, voted for the resolution, the
Chinese and Albanians against it, with the remainder abstaining or not
taking part. NCNA also claims that "frenzied attacks on China were
mounted by the Soviet and Indian delegates and a handful of their fol-
lovers" and that delegates from Nigeria, the Japanese Zengakuren, and
Canada "vilified China's nuclear testing." The NCNA round-up con-
cludes with the following description of the atmosphere during the
Congru s s :
"During the meeting, some people resorted to points of
procedure, interrupted speeches or made trouble when others
spoke, deprived some delegates of their opportunity to take the
floor, created obstacles of translation, booed and hooted and
set the voting machine into motion, thus making normal discus-
sion impossible at the meeting. These tricks aroused the indig-
nation of many delegates who condemned them time and again."
December 11: On a visit to Japan, Izvestiya editor Stepakov answers
several questions about the Khrushchev ouster in an interview with
Tokyo Asahi foreign news editor Hata.. Adhering to the standard Soviet
line, he denies that Khrushchev's published works have been withdrawn
from Soviet bookstores. Asahi published on 12th: neither Izvestiya
nor any other Soviet outlet mentions it.
December 12: Pravda front-pages a brief announcement that, "on the
basis of mutual snco ultations carried out between the fraternal parties,
and for the purpose of thorough preparation for a meeting of the edi-
torial commission and for an international conference of Communist
and workers parties, the first meeting of the editorial commission
has been designated for 1 March 1965." The European Communist states
report it without comment on the same day, except for the Rumanians,
who wait until the following day, and, the Albanians, who ignore it.
On the eve of the 7th Congress of the old-line, Moscow-aligned
Ind CP (ICP/R), Pravda prints a long article by Executive Commit-
tee member Sardesai who, in addition to discussing the Party's new
draft program, denounces "the actions of the splitters who left the
national council of the ICP in April 1964 and who then formed a
separate party under the name "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of
India." He does not name the CCP but asserts that the splitters
"would not dare to break completely with the party if they were not'
instigated to do so from the outside."
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(See December 20-25 for treatment of Indian 7th Congress resolution.)
December 14: Italian CP daily L'Unita carries CPI resolution approv-
ing of postponement of Moscow preparator commission meeting to 1 March
15 and adds that the interim period should be used to "create more
favorable conditions for collaboration between all the CPs and for
deep study of the problems which face our i-Thole movement." Indonesian
CP daily Harian Rakjat publishes a joint statement of the PKI with the
pro-Chinese dissident Communist Part of Australia M-L) on 6 December,
concluding talks with a visiting CPA M- delegation led by E.F. Hill.
Both see K's downfall as "a victory for the constantly expanding M-L
forces throughout the world" but warn: "With or without K, modern
revisionism must be vigorously opposed!" Both hold that a world con-
ference "can only be justified if it is preceded by adequate prepara-
tions in which the... parties of all socialist countries participate."
December 15: In Djakarta, Indonesian CP Chairman Aidit hands Soviet
Ambassador Mikhaylov a PKI letter replying to a 1 December. CPSU letter
inviting the PKI to participate in the 1 March preparatory meeting in
Moscow: it says that the PKI can not and will not attend any inter-
national conference unless it is preceded by the best preparations and
unless the Communist and workers parties of all the socialist countries
will participate in it." The PKI accepted a Soviet invitation to visit
the Soviet Union, the date to be determined later, depending on the
development of the ICM:
December 16: Moscow releases the text of a joint communique signed
by the CPSU with a delegation of the old-line Communist Party of
Australia on the 14th: both "expressed themselves in favor of the
convocation of a new international conference... and of an editorial
commission, the beginning of whose work is envisaged for 1 March 1995."
December 16-18: Yoshichika Tokugawa, a leader of the Japan-Soviet
Society in Tokyo, told a press conference on the 16th that he, sup-
ported by 18 other veteran members, planned to break away from the
society and set u pa new Soviet friendship or ization by the middle
of February. The present society, he said, is 'too dominated by the
JCP" and could even be called an "anti-Soviet society" because all
pro-Soviet propositions are stifled by the JCP majority. He claimed
that the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo approved his plains. JCP daily Akahata
on the 18th printed a statement by the Society's standing director,
Muraichi Horie, denouncing these "schismatic maneuvers." The same
issue also carried a story of clashes between personnel of the (JCP-
supported) Nauka Bookstore and those of the "renegade-supported Japan-
Soviet Book Center."
December 18: NCNA announces that Radio Peking is beginning to broad-
cast twice-weekly programs in Esperanto.
Correspondents report from Bucharest on the enthusiastic reception
and immediate sell-out of a new Rumanian book, entitled Notes on
Rumanians,, containing four obscure Marx documents which a leading
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2 (Chronology Cont.)
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Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. The "notes" are generally
anti-Russian, and charge that the Russians use political power to
enforce economic exDloitati.on. More ecifically, they ctaestion the
legitimac1 of Russia's claim to sovereignty over Bessarabia. They
also criticize the Magyaxs' treatment of the Rumanians in 'Transylvania.
December 20: East German ADN service reports a communique of the KPD
West Ge rman CP) approving of the 1 March meeting of the editorial com-
mission and of the directives for the KPD delegation to the commission.
December 20-22: New Delhi and Belgrade Radio report that the 7th Con-
gress of-the old-line Indian CP in Bombay concluded with a resolution
which sharply condemned the C inese leadership for splitting and weak-
ening the ICM. (See also Dec.12.) Tass reporting on the Congress
(attended by a large Soviet delegation headed by Ponomarev) fails to
mention any critici3m of the Chinese, and Pravda, publishing on the
25' =Ehe contents of the documents adopted, omits the parts which
directly refer to the CCP. Pravda does, however, include its de-
nunciation of the left factionatists as well as all support of CPSU
positions, including endorsement of an international conference.
December 21: The only major article in the ICM on the 85th anniversary
of Stalin's birth to come to our attention was a 2500-word, unreserved
tribute in the North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun.
December 21-22: Chou En-lai's 2-day report to the National People's
Congress in Peking was a hard-line reaffirmation of CCP anti-revisionist
policies. Although he made pro forma reference to China's desire for
better relations with the USSR, he also referred to the "perfidious"
withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 and to the Soviet role in the i6
disorders on the Sinkiang border. His remarks on the "great signifi-
cance" of Mao's statements on international questions amounted to a
sweeping claim to Chinese leadership of world revolutionary forces.
December 26: The Moscoa?r correspondent of the Belgrade Borba, "analyzing
numerous speeches ljy soviet leaders anc'_ articles in Soviet Party papers,"
sees the current Soviet attitude toward problems of the ICM as follows:
"Avoid activities and open polemics that might deepen the
present misunderstandings even more; make an effort to suggest
to Peking, through the position (sic; - posture?) of the CPSU,
to refrain from anti-Soviet activities so as to produce normal
conditions for tails on the present disputes; continue the effort
to call an international consultation of Communist and workers
parties."
However, he notes, "the Chinese leadership gives no sign of willing-
ness to accept this line," and that if they "launch a fresh open
political battle against the CPSU," it will be "compelled to under-
take political steps from which it has hitherto... refrained."
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December 28: Japanese 155~ daily Akahata publishes an article respond-
ing to a 30 October Trud report by V. I. Prokhorov, Secretary of the
Soviet Trade Unions Central Council, who had attended a Sohyo con-
gress in Tokyo last J , which the JC? considers "an open attack on
us." It declares that the whole matter could be "concrete testimony"
to the fact that the new Soviet leadership is "continuing the subver-
sive attacks of the K era against the JCP.
A Kosygin message to Chou En-lai responds to the Chinese 17
October proposal to world governments, following their first nuclear
explosion, for an international conference of heads of states on the
prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Noting that the pro-
posal reflects the Soviet line, the USSR accepts and supports it.
December 2: Japanese CP daily Akahata reports SecyGen Miyamoto as-
serting at a Kyoto rally welcoming an Indonesian CP delegation on
18 December -- that postponement by the CPSU of the 26-party prepar-
atory meeting to 1 March 1965 will not change the JCP's previous
negative attitude: a new international meeting requires unanimity
and must include "all the parties of the 13 socialist countries."
December 20: A Pravda editorial on the successes of the socialist
comity, "Confident tride of Brother Peoples," mentions in turn all
of the "countries of socialism," including Cuba, -- but omits Albania
and Yugoslavia:
January 1: A London UPI dispatch says that the new issue of World
Marxist Review (English edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism)
carries an article declaring that it would be folly to minimize the
sharp and serious differences between Russia and China and that an
early international conference is esseptial, even if China refuses to
gIrticipate.
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Highlights of the Conflicts in World Communism
May 1963-December 196+
We summarized the highlights of the Sino-Soviet conflict from its
earliest manifestations in 1956 through the massive public polemics of
early 1963 on 22 April 1963, supplementing the first of the biweekly
"Chronologies" which have since continued to document in detail how
this conflict intensified and spread throughout the Communist world.
The end of 1964 is a particularly appropriate point to summarize
the most important developments of the ensuing 20-month period: the
new CPSU leaders, after re-evaluating the'situation in the WCM in the
wake of the repercussions of the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev -- who had
precipitated, led, and even symbolized the conflict, have recommitted
themselves to push preparations for a world party conference to restore
"unity" (Soviet style), setting 1 March 1965 for the Moscow meeting of
the 26-party preparatory commission (formerly scheduled for 15 December),
in the face of probable boycott by the Chinese and their most ardent
followers.
The following review is a selective index to the most important
entries in the 44 numbered installments of our Chronology over this
period: comments are brief, and the referenced entries should be con-
sulted for details.
May-December 1963
Our first summary ended by describing a published CPSU-CCP exchange
of letters: CPSU dated 21 February proposing a bilateral meeting to
restore unity; CCP reply dated 9 March counterposing conditions sure to
be unacceptable to Khrushchev; and a 10,000-word CPSU "reply" which re-
stated the CPSU's Khrushchevian line as true Marxism-Leninism, fully
confirmed by "the entire course of world development in recent years,"
and avoided debate on any of the issues raised by the Chinese on the
grounds of not aiding the imperialist enemy.
May 9: Chinese propose to send delegation to Moscow for bilateral
talks mid-June: add that a reply to 30 March CPSU letter would come
later. (#L3)
May 14+: Chinese announce acceptance of Soviet proposal to begin talks
5 July: CPSU announces postponement to 18 June of plenum scheduled
for 28 May. (#,4)
June 1A: CCP 18,000-word, 25-section "letter" ostensibly replying to
CPSU 30 March letter. Published immediately, together with previous
exchange (Feb 21, March 9, March 30), in 115-page pamphlet under the
title A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the ICM -- in many
languages. Chinese Embassy Moscow tries to distribute Russian-language
copies to CPSU/CC members on eve of plenum. This remains the most com-
prehensive statement of the Chinese line on all points at issue with
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the Soviets, despite subsequent voluminous Chinese polemics expanding
on various aspects of the conflict. (#6)
June 27: Soviets expel 5 Chinese nationals for distributing June 14
pamphlets in USSR: Chinese protest, warning that this is a step towards
"manufacturing a split in the ICM," and give the 5 a herb's welcome in
Peking. (#7)
June : Pravda publishes Khrushchev 21 June speech to CPSU plenum, in-
cluding direct attacks on Chinese leaders. (#7)
July Pravda prints "CPSU/CC statement in connection with forthcoming
talks which denounces Chinese "aggravation of polemics" with i4+ June
letter and announces decision to reply in the press. (#7)
Julys-20: CPSU-CCP talks held in complete secrecy, with a day of re-
cess following each day of talks, apparently for the Chinese to confer
with Peking. Final communique indicates no agreements reached and de-
cision to adjourn indefinitely taken on Chinese initiative, with re-
sumption to be mutually agreed upon. (+7'&
#8)
J y iii: CPSU replies to 14 June CCP letter by publishing 22,000-word
open letter," which likewise remains to date the most comprehensive
statement of the Soviet case vis-a-vis the Chinese. Publication signal-
led. a wave of "me too attacks on Chinese positions by Soviet European
sa^:ellites . (#8)
July 2, 10, 13: In further exchange on 5 Chinese expelled from USSR,
CPSU statement on 9th warns of "dangerous-consequences of this policy";
CCP statement on 10th asks "how far are the comrades of the CPSU pre-
pared to extend Sino-Soviet differences?"; and People's Daily on 13th
wonders "whether the CC/CPSU wants to push Sino-Soviet relations to the
point of rupture." (#8)
July 12: Peking press reports rally of 10,000 to welcome Chinese delega-
tion back from WIDF (women's front) congress in Moscow, where they suc-
cessfully struggled "against the end" (the Soviet delegation). (8)
July 19: Chinese announce that "the Czech Govt has precipitated a
serious incident" by demanding (on 8 Ju37,) the recall of 3 Chinese NCNA
correspondents from Prague for publishing polemics. (#8)
July 20: Chinese publish 14 July CPSU letter, together with a re-run
of their own 14 June letter, plus a scorching People's Daiiy editorial
accusing Soviets of ".no less than 70 to 80 reversals of the truth" --
such as on the withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians -- and promising
to "provide tt,e necessary material to clear up these matters in future
issues."
'Ind July and August: While Communist media around the world are still
reacting to the direct polemical clash of the CCP-CPSU letter exchange,
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2 (Cont.)
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the conflict suddenly spreads to international power politics with
Khrushchev's hasty conclusion of negotiations for the nuclear test-ban
treaty with the U.S. and U.K. (initialed 25 July and signed 5 August).
A Chinese Govt statement of 31st and a People's Daily editorial of
2 August denounce the treaty as a "dirty Traud and accuse the Sov-
Govt of allying itself with the U.S. against China. The USSR pours
out a barrage of material capitalizing on its popular "ban-the-bomb
[tests]" position, most authoritatively in Govt statements on 3 and 21
August. A 7500-word CPR Govt statement of 15 August in reply reveals
that in June 1959 the USSR had unilaterally abrogated an October 1957
agreement to help Chins produce atomic weapons: it also concludes bf
accusing the Soviet leaders of betraying the interests of their own
people. Most CPs support treaty (or maintain discreet silence): only
the Albanians echo the Chinese denunciation, while the North Korean,
North Vietnamese, Japanese and Indonesians limit themselves to the line
that it does not go far enough (i.e., a total ban on nuclear weapons)
and criticize US imperialism for perpetrating it. (#9, #10, & #11)
August: Chinese begin Japanese edition of Peking Review, as North
Koreans withdraw from pro-Moscow, Prague-based Problems of Peace and
Socialism (joining the Chinese, who had withdrawn at end of 1962).
)
Aust 2-7: "Ninth World Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs"
in Hiroshima breaks up over attitude toward test-ban treaty and JCP
domination.
August 20 & 22: The Chinese seize on border tensions with India to
accuse Soviet leaders of collaborating with U.S. imperialism to ally
with India against China, in a Govt statement of the 20th and People's
Daily editorial of 22nd. (#rll)
August 20 & 27: Pravda articles identify Chinese chauvinism with "the
spirit of Genghis Khan," a theme to be replayed frequently in coming
months. 11)
September 2: Czech Govt demands recall of 2 more Chinese for disseminat-
ing polemics. (#12)
Sel2tember 6: The Chinese publish the first of a series of long, joint
articles by the editors of People's Daily and Red Flag labeled as
Comment on the Open Letter of the CC CPSU." This 15,000-word tract
sets forth in full the Chinese version of The Origin and Development of
the Differences Between the Leadership of, the CPSU and Ourselves, includ-
ing as appendices three heretofore unpublished documents: an outline of
Chinese views opposing the Soviets on "peaceful transition" dated
November 10, 1957 (prepared for the Moscow conference of ruling parties);
statement of the CCP delegation at the Bucharest meeting of CPs, dated
June 26, 1960; and five proposals to settle differences and to attain
unity dated September 10, 1960 (in preparation for the 81-party confer-
ence in Moscow). Among the new disclosures were the claims that the
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Soviets in 1956 intended to abandon Hungary to the "counter-revolution"
but the Chinese insisted on smashing it; that in 1958 the Soviet leaders
"put forth unjust demands designed to bring China under Soviet military
control"; and that in 1962 they "used their organs and personnel in
Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities," etc.
(#12)
September 8: A Radio Moscow roundtable implies that there will be
no attempt to reply to this Chinese attack.; "it would be undignified...."
September l : Chinese joint "Comment on the Open Letter of the CC/CPSU
TI , entitled On the Question of Stalin, expands to 7,000 words the
Chinese views on this issue, to which they return again and again in
subsequent polemics. (#12)
September 17: At the UN, Albania submits a proposal to admit the CPR;
the USSR had always submitted such resolutions in the past.(-#13)
September 19: A Pravda editorial on the Sino-Indian border dispute,
"Serious Hotbed of Tension in Asia," notes the negative results of this
conflict and implies that the Chinese are largely to blame for it.
People's Dail reprints and denunces this on 21st, promising full comment
later. X13
September 21: A USSR Govt statement pegged to 1 September CPR statement
on test-ban treaty also discusses Sino-Soviet border dispute (charges
more than 5,000 Chinese violations of Soviet border in 1962 alone).
Surprisingly, it ends with a call to end polemics and hints readiness
to resume bilateral talks. (#13)
September 26: Chinese publish joint "Comment (III)": Is Yugoslavia a
Socialist County? After more than 13,000 words describing the degenera-
tion of socialism in Tito's Yugoslavia, the Chinese conclude that "Khru-
shchev really regards Tito as his teacher and is sliding down the path
of revisionism hard on Tito's heels." There follows the first
implied appeal to the Soviet Party rank-and-file to oust K.
Late September and October: Observers note various indications that
the CPSU had decided to convene a world conference of CPs to confirm
its views as "the general line" and to reject the Chinese. A flood of
Soviet anti-Chinese articles is spearheaded by a 38-page article in the
issue of Kommunist appearing 3 October, "The General Line of the WCM
and the Schismatic Platform of the Chinese Leadership." (#14) A French
CP plenum, convened 6 October, shortly after SecyGen Thorez returned
from Moscow, strongly denounces the Chinese and take up the call for a
conference: Pravda publishes Thorez on 13th. PeM;ing adds to the furor
by publishing its 10,000-word "Comment (Iv)," Apologists of Neo-
Colonialism, on the 21st. (#15)
4 (Cont.)
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On 25 October, however, the ltalian CPCC unexpectedly meets in
plenum and adopts a 12,000-word statement which, while still critical
of Chinese positions, expresses firm opposition to a world conference
at this time. (#15) Almost simultaneously the North Korean Party
opens fire against it in a 16,000-word editorial in Nodong Si.nmun on
28 October e.:horting all Communists to shun any Soviet move to isolate
the Chinese. (7ri6)
The Soviet campaign suddenly grinds to a halt: at the 7 November
Soviet Revolution anniversary, not only is the dispute muted but key-
note speaker Podgorny bids publicly for cessation of polemics -- and
Soviet media begin to observe a unilateral moratorium. On 29 November
( we ;.earn half a year later when the Chinese publish the exchange:
see 8 May 1964), Khrushchev sent a long, conciliatory letter to Mao pro-
posing a number of "concrete steps for setting things right in Soviet-
Chinese cooperation." A major 6 December Pravda editorial on the 3rd
anniversary of the 81-party conference renews the public bid for an
r.r end to polemics, and Izvestln on the 17th repeats the plea. The mora-
torium remains unilateral, however, as shown below. (#18)
October: First issue of pro-Chinese Belgian dissident Communist La Voix
du Peuple. (#16)
November 2: Peking People's Daily 10,000-word editorial, "The Truth
about How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India
against China," replying to 19 September Pravda, includes a 16-point
resume of Sino-Soviet exchanges over the Sino-Indian border conflict.
(7,16)
November 7: Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial lauding Stalin and
denouncing the Khrushchev group is only polemical attack in the WCM on
the anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. (Another ZIP tirade follows
on 9 Nov.: The Albanians attack so continuously that only those with
special significance are noted.) (#16 & #17)
November 10: Japanese CP organ Akahata expresses opposition to world
conference now. 7-17
November 16: Cautiously pro-Chinese article in North Vietnamese Hoc Tap
fails to mention conference). (717)
November 19: Chinese publish 10,000-word "Comment (V)": Two Different
Lines on the Question of War and Peace, employing some of the most ex-
treme formulations and insulting derision to date. {717)
November 28: Chinese challenges precipitate bitter public battle with
Soviet-aligned majority at 5-day Warsaw meeting of the World Peace
Council. (#18)
December: New theoretical journal, The Australian Communist, published
by pro-Chinese dissident Australian Communi s headed by E.F. Hill. (7118)
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At the same time, pro-Chinese dissident Austrian Communists begin
publication of Die Rote Fahne (Red Flag) ,F19
December 12: Chinese publish 13,000-word "Comment (VI)": Peaceful Co-
existence -- Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, which goes so far as
to quote approvingly the famous Lenin prediction that "a series of
frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states
will be inevitable." (#19)
December Iii: Chou En-lai,tirith large party, sets out on long round trip
through Africa -- interrupted by a 9-day sojourn, December-31 January
9 in Albania which produced a number of diatribes at the CPSU (unnamed).
(419,ff.)
December 23: Indonesian OP Chairman Aidit's opening report to CC plenum
defines PKI policies attuned with Peking, acknowledges "differences of
opinion" with the CPSU, and promises to establish relations with dis-
sident factions split from "parties under the control of revisionists."
(#19)
December 27: Peking People's Daily publishes 18,000-word 26 October
speech., "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the
Social Sciences," by Chou Yang espousing the splitting process which
prgduces strong M-L revolutionary parties. (#19)
December 31: Khrushchev message to all heads of states proposes treaty
renouncing use of force in territorial disputes. (#19)
1964
The Soviet side begins to resume polemics in a restrained manner.
Prague-based Problems of Peace and Socialism prints articles (by non-
Soviet Communists critical of CCP in December, January, and succeeding
issues. (:,r21-22) A book attacking Chinese "anti-Marxist doctrines)"
signed to press in October but apparently held up, is published in
Russian mid-January. Tass on the 20th brands an NCNA report as misin-
formation, and on the 30th Pravda, "Why Mislead?" condemns the Chinese
for distorting Soviet peace initiatives. (#21)
January: Chinese step up publication of French and Spanish editions
of Peking Review from bi-weekly to weekly, matching the English, and add
an Indonesian version, making a total of five, with the Japanese. (#22)
Pro-Chinese dissident Swiss Communists begin publication of a monthly,
L'Etincelle (The Spark). (?#21+)
January 18 & 19: Pro-Chinese dissidents meeting in Peru on the 18th
and in Ceylon on the 19th proclaim themselves the rightful CPs of their
respective countries . (721)
February 4: Chinese publish 18,000-word "Comment (VII)": The Leaders
of the CPSU Are the Greatest Slitters of Our Times, the sharpest point
of no return' challenge to the CPSU yet. (#21-221
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February 14: The CPSU "agricultural plenum," which convened on the 10th,
meets in an expanded secret session on the ideological situation (see
April 3 for publication of results). (#22)
February: New pro-Chinese dissident publications are reported in Denmark,
Great Britain, Spain/exiles, and Chile. (#23)
March 1-31: Top-level Rumanian delegation leaves for Peking on hastily
scheduled 10-day visit to mediate Sino-Soviet clash. Flies on for 2 days
in N. Korea, and spends 2 days with Khrushchev in Gagry on way home.
Lack of any achievement shown as Chinese, who had refrained from polemics
during visit, resume ostentatiously the day after their departure with a
daily series of delayed materials from Chinese-aligned parties or dissi-
dent groups through 30 March, climaxed on the 31st with their own 15,000-
word "Comment (VIII)": The Proletarian Revolution and Khrush.chev 's Re-
visionism. Here they not only call directly on all Communists, inside
the CPSU as well as in other parties, to "repudiate and liquidate Khru-
shchev's revisionism," but also declare it necessary to ammend the docu-
ments of the 1957 and 1960 conferences "to conform to the revolutionary
principles of Marxism-Leninism." (#24-25)
March 10: London Observer's Crankshaw reports receipt of a copy of Khru-
shchev's November letter to Mao (see May 8 for publication of same). (#24)
March 18-21: WFTU Executive session in Sofia brings new public clash.
25
March 20: First issue of Nuova Unita reported, pro-Chinese Italian Com-
munist monthly. (#25)
March 22-28: Bitter Sino-Soviet battling at AAPSO Council session in
Algiers brings Algerian protest. (#25)
March 31-April 5: Budapest Congress of IADL (lawyers) brings another
erce struggle." (#26)
April 3: The CPSU launches its counter-attack against the Chinese, pub-
lishing Suslov's 35,000-word report to the February plenum, the plenum
decision, and an editorial briefly distilling the Suslov report and
bringing it up to date. Suslov describes, condemns, and rebuts the
Chinese onslaught which made the counter-offensive necessary and proposes
a conference of all fraternal parties to overcome difficulties and restore
unity.
This time, however, the public reaction among the pro-Soviet parties
indicates more hesitation and disagreement than whole-hearted support:
the Hungarians fail to endorse the conference: the Poles hesitate almost
a week and then decry "excommunication"; the Rumanians maintain silence;
and the Italians, joined by the Norwegians and Swedes, reiterate their
opposition to a conference. (#26)
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Over the coming weeks and months, Soviet media pour out voluminous
materials supporting their course, ranging from their own statements
and articles to statements by the most obscure parties in distant lands.
The first reaction from the Chinese camp comes in a harsh editorial
in N. Korean Nodong Sinmun on 19 April, reprinted on the 26th by the
Chinese, who on the 27th publish the 3 April Pravda materials with their
own short but savagely derisive note. (x'27)
Meanwhile, the Rumanian Party holds a secret plenum 15-22 April and
on the 26th publishes its statement: a 12,000-word "declaration of in-
dependence" -- from domination or exploitation by any other party, from
any suprastate or extrastate bodies, etc. .(#27-28
Aril 29: Hanoi publicizes 21 April letter it sent to all parties pro-
posing 2-step preparations for world conference: (1) resumption CPSU-
CCP bilateral talks; (2) a preparatory meeting by selected parties. (#28)
May 4: Soviets react vigorously to Chinese conduct at the Djakarta pre-
paratory meeting for the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference, sending a 2,000-word
Govt. statement denouncing Chinese to all A-A govts. (#28)
MaL8: Chinese publish texts of exchange of letters beginning with 29 Nov.
1963 Khrush. to, Mao and ending with CCP 7 May. Letters, obviously not
intended for publication, at least by the CPSU, provide remarkable in-
sight into depth and bitterness of conflict. K's gambit is conciliatory,
suggests putting aside disputes "until the heat of passion has cooled"
and proposes "concrete measures" such as expansion of trade, "broadening"
of technical assistance, settlement of boundary questions, and cessation
of polemics. There was no acknowledgement from the Chinese until 20
February 1964, almost 3 months later, when they sent a brief letter com-
plaining that the CPSU had, secretly and behind the back of the CCP, sent
a 12 February letter to other parties which "instigates struggle" against
the CCP on the pretext that the CCP had not answered the 29 Nov. letter:
the latter, they said, will be answered in due course. The CPSU immedi-
ately replies in a 22 Feb. letter protesting CCP "aggravation" but re-
maining conciliatory. On the 27th, the CCP sends a brief but extremely
arrogant.reply to the latter, and follows on the 29th with a long reply
to the original 29 Nov. K letter, scorning the Soviet overtures as "an
utterly false and demagogic trick." However, it ends by proposing re-
sumption of CPSU-CCP talks in Peking in October and a preparatory committee
of 17 parties to meet at an unspecified later date to make preparations
for a world conference. The CPSU replies on 7 March) resolutely repudiat-
ing the CCP's "libelous attacks," questioning the CCP's motives in pro-
posing such delayed preparations for a world meeting, and counter-
proposing an accelerated schedule leading to a world meeting in autumn
1964. The CCP waits 2 more months to reply: its taunting 7 May letter
now says 4 or 5 years or longer may be necessary to prepare for a world
conference! (##28-29)
8 (Cont.)
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MaZ 10-12: An authoritative 3-part series of Pravda articles grapples
with the apparent contradictions in the "new look' -approach to relations
within the movement -- the dilemma between "cohesion" and "unity" vs.
"equality" and "independence" -- while spelling out their case against
the CCP. (#29)
May 21: Prominent pro-Soviet Japanese CP members Shiga and Suzuki ex-
pelled for opposing JCP line.
May 30: Chinese Govt. statement strikes back at 4 May Soviet Govt state-
ment on Djakarta preparatory meeting for 2nd A-A Conference: attempts
to demonstrate that Soviet Union is a' European power and cannot have it
both ways, and questions motives in trying to "squeeze into the 2nd A-A
Conference." (#30)
June-July: Soviet media give increasing evidence that the CPSU is about
to initiate formal preparations for a world conference, such as articles
in two successive issues of Kommunist which name 53 and then 69 parties
as supporting them. On 15 July they publish a 7,000-word CPSU letter
sent 15 June in reply to the CCP's 7 May letter, last of the series pub-
lished by the Chinese on 8 May: it asserts its right and intent to call
a conference on its terms. (#30-33)
During this period the Rumanians demonstrate their new independence
by publishing at least 3 polemical attacks on Soviet policies and abruptly
sending Maurer to Moscow on 6 July in what is seen as another attempt to
head off Soviet "excommunication" action.(#31-32)
The Chinese on l4+ July publish "Comment (IX)," On Khrushchev's Phony
Communism and. Its iHistori-ca't Lessons for the World, a 20,000-word harangue
on the degeneration of socialism in the USSR. On the 28th, they reply to
the 15 June CPSU letter with an 8,000-word letter containing the most
brutally arrogant reiteration yet of CCP intent to "bury" the CPSU leaders
unless they surrender. (#33-34)
Meanwhile, an open conflict between the CPSU and the Japanese CP
erupts in connection with Soviet support for the expelled Shiga and his
efforts to form a new pro-Soviet group in Japan (#32-3k). The Indonesian
and North Vietnamese parties move perceptibly further toward the Chinese.
August: The CPSU finally launches its concrete plan for convening a world
conference, announcing on 10 August that it had proposed to the 26
parties of the 1960 editorial commission that they send representatives
to meet in Moscow 15 December as a preparatory commission for an inter-
national conference to convene mid-1965. (#35) By the end of the month,
the CPSU names 9 of the invitees as having agreed to take part. The CCP,
in a belligerent letter of 30 August, declines and warns that the day
"you convene your drafting committee will go down in history as the day
of the great split in the ICM." On the following day, the North Koreans
call on all parties to stop this CPSU move.
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By mid-September, the CPSU can still name only 12 parties, less
than half, as agreed to participate. The Chinese and 5 allies had de-
clared or indicated their refusal, while the remainder were apparently
still reluctant to commit themselves. (06-39) Moreover, the Italians
publicly declare that they will attend to discuss measures for improving
unity and not to plan a conference which would result in excommunication,
and it was indicated that some of the other parties close to the CPSU
were inclining more and more toward this posture.
September 5: Italian CP organs publicize a strongly "independentist"
memorandum composed by Togliatti in Yalta just before his death: it
frankly cri.iticizes Soviet plans for a meeting to condemn Peking, re-
cords pessimistic views of Communism's international and Italian situa-
tion, and is somewhat critical of the USSR. Surprisingly, Pravda pub-
J isahr-s full text on 10th. (#37)
September 22: First number of German-language edition of Peking Review
appears -- thus making a total of 6 editions (see Jan. 1964 for list).
October 15: An era in the history of the WCM ends with the ouster of
Khrushchev in a secret, poorly explained coup which dumbfounds even
those party leaders closest to Moscow. Many openly express their con-
cern and at least 5 send delegates to Moscow to seek an explanation.
On the other hand, the Chinese and their allies welcome it as a victory
for their line and a defeat for revisionism -- while warning against a
continuation of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."
The new Soviet leadership, however, soon reaffirms their commitment
to all basic positions in question, including the necessity for an early
world conference -- but without mentioning the scheduled 15 December
preparatory meeting. In a surprise move, Chou En-lai heads a strong
Chinese delegation to Moscow for the annual Soviet Revolution celebra--
tion on 7 November: however, a week of secret talks with the CPSU
leaders reportedly are stalemated as neither side showed any inclina-
tion to yield from its previous positions. In a 21 November Red Flag
editorial, "Why Khrushchev Fell," the CCP declares unequivocally that
the new CPSU leaders can avoid conflict with the CCP only by reversing
all basic CPSU policy developments of the past 11 years. (7LI0-l+3)
December 12: Just 3 days before the scheduled Moscow meeting of the 26-
party preparatory commission, the CPSU announces (with no reference to
the old date) that, "on the basis of mutual consultations" between fra-
ternal parties, the "first meeting" of the commission has been set for
1 March. Four non-ruling parties publicly affirm approval within a few
days. All European Communist states promptly report the invitation
without comment, except Albania, which remains silent along with the
Asian Communist states. Thu Indon and Jap,Ci's publicly refuse to attend--
unless "all socialist countries" participate. The year ends with both
protagonists observing a sort of truce -- and the Rumanians making another
independence gesture by publishing a book of little-known Marx documents,
generally anti-Russian in tone and specifically questioning Russia's
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861 MILITARY FORCES IN THE WORLD TODAY
25X1 C10c
SITUATION: In mid-November 1964, the Institute for Str=ategic Studies,
18 Adam Street, London, WC2,, issued the sixth in its series of annual esti-
mates of the size and breakdown of the major military forces of the world:
The Military Balance, 1964-65. In a field where there is little authori-
tative information published, this booklet stands out as an excellent source
of data. Some other publications also contain information, among them Jane's
All the World's Ships and All the World's Aircraft, and the official publi-
cations of parliamentary governments provide data on their own national
forces. The Military Balance, however, is probably the best available un-
classified source, particularly as regards the strength of the forces of
Communist countries.
(FYI only: Figures on the Soviet forces given in The Military Balance
are slightly on the high side, as compared with the latest classified US
intelligence estimates. Thus, current official estimates of total Soviet
personnel, strength are 2.8 to 2.9 million and not 3.3 million; Soviet di-
visions are believed to nun ber between 120 and 140, and not simply 140;
tactical aircraft are thought to add up to 3250 and not 4000. The higher
figures are more useful. for most propaganda purposes, however, than the
official figures would be--if the official figures could be used, which
they cannot be. End FYI.)
The following are some aspects of The Military Balance's figures which
are relevant to current political and diplomatic problems:
1. The Soviet strength in operational ICBM's is estimated at about
200, although The Milit~ar Balance states that this figure may in-
crease substantially in.. 1965; US strength in this type of weapon (late
19611.) came to over 800, Moreover, only one-third of the Soviet ICBM's
are storable liquid fuel missiles (an advance over Soviet liquid fuel
missiles which must be drained if they are not fired, and which re-
quire a fueling up period before they can be fired) and none are known
to be solid fuel. missiles; the chief protection of Soviet missiles con-
sists of concealment and active defense. On the other hand, three-
quarters of US ICBM's are solid fuel (ready for instantaneous use)
Minutemen, protected in "hardened" underground silos. By his aggres.
sive behavior,, especially in the 1901 Berlin crisis, Khrushchev pro-
voked the US into a rapid ICBM buildup. The result showed that the
Soviet economy was still far from a match for that of the US; while
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(861 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 19 ?CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
the USSR will have twice as many ICBM's in early 1965 as a year
earlier, the US will retain a four-to-one lead by increasing its
ICBM's from 475 to 925. This lesson in the inferiority of Soviet
power helps to explain the waverings of Soviet economic policy
over the past two years, and presumably contributed also to the
fall of K .rushc a v .
2. While the Soviet defense budget was reduced by 600 million
rubles in 1961 (subsequent to the publication of The Military BalBal-
ance Kosygin has announced that a further 500 million ruble re
duction willbe made in 1965). Soviet defense budget figiLres "do
not include space research costs or the development of advanced
weapons systems... It is thought that in real terms total Soviet
military expenditure represents something between 30 and 35 thou-
sand million dollars a year. (Emphasis supplied) This would consti-
tute a ilitaryexpenditure of over 30 per cent of the Soviet budget.
(Or e might think this small compared with the 55 per cent of US fed-
eral expenditure which goes to US defense; such comparisons would
be misleading, since the non-defense part of the Soviet budget in-
cludes elements of the national economy, e.g., investment, which
have no counterpart in the US budget?) This represents a tremen-
dous burden for a country which is still lagging behind in the pro-
duction of food and other consumer goods.
3. Equally serious is the burden of arms expenditures on certain
developing countries. In comparison with earlier estimates, Indo-
nesian defense expenditures may have more than doubled to almost
1 billion dollars per annum. As a result, Malaysia must spend 4.1
per cent of its national income on defense costs, as compared with
1,9 per cent for the Philippines. Israeli-Arab rivalries result
in Israel and the UAR spending respectively 9 and 8.2 per cent of
their national incomes on military forcese In general, the military
burden of non-aligned nations tends to be somewhat higher than that
of the smaller West European countries. Any comparison should take
into account the ability of different national economies to support
unproductive expenses; Indonesia, for example, has a large popula-
tion and an abundance of certain resources, but _?- since much of
these natural riche; is still inadequately utilized -- it is not a
wealthy country, and the extravagance of its government has put the
Indonesian economy in dire jeopardy. Also, when the percentages of
budgets devoted to defense are compared, distinctions should be made
between budgets which contain large amounts for state investment
(see also para. 2 above) and those which do not, also between fed-
eral budgets (where non-defense costs are largely a local or state
concern) and the budgets of centralized countries.
4. While the US is preponderant in ICBM's, to which should be
added 1100 strategic bombers and 656 submarine-carried Polaris mis-
siles, there is no US or NATO force corresponding to the 700-750
2
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(861 Cont.)
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Soviet MRBM?s, largely targetted against Western Europe. This fact
tends to cause some concern in European circles, especially in West
Germany, and it was partly to meet this feeling that the US pro-
posed the Multilateral Force (M12) concept. If the Soviets do not
like'the MIF idea, they should consider what they have done to pro.-
yoke it. And if Europe is not sufficiently concerned to agree to
some form of MLF, then it is not the-intent of the US--which is
amply defended., and which in any case intends to defend Europe--to
impose the MLF concept on unwilling allies.
5. If some smaller European countries have low defense budgets,
one major reason is the disproportionate share of Free World arms
expenditures borne by the US. While-the other NATO countries are
now beginning to make more of an effort, slightly relieving the US,
Americ&n defense expenditure in 1963. was 9.8 per cent of the gross
national. product; among the NATO countries, the UK came next with
7.2 per cent, followed by Portugal at 6.8 per cent, by France at
6.4 per cent, and by Germany at 6.1 per cent. Of the other NATO
countries., only Turkey spent over 5 per cent of its GNP (5.9 per
cent) on defense. The US does not simply say it will defend Europe
or its Far Eastern allies; it shows it will do so by paying the
heavy bills.
The Military Balance contains an abundance of other useful informa-
tion, such as on the breakdown of forces and principal arms and ships of
various nations. The handbook states that the Chicom nuclear explosion
of October 196+ shows that Chinese nuclear technology is more advanced
than had been supposed. But it is thought that the Chinese will not
have any advanced indigenous capability in delivery systems in the fore-
seeable future. Meanwhile, the Chinese amy suffers from inadequate
logistic support and obsolescent equipment; China is the only country
which is "totally deprived of access to the sophisticated equipment and
expertise which the world's leading military nations continue to make
available to . host of lesser countries." 25X1 C10b
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f (861 Cont0)
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I Tr L" I
862 AF,FE,NE.'.-' ECONOMIC SYSTEMS COMPARED:
CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN
25X1C10b
SITUATION: For years, the People's Republic of China (CPR) and the
Soviet Union boasted of their communist economic system as the wave of the
future. The CPR, and to an even greater extent the Soviet Union, drama-
tized huge programs, projects and plans, publicized tremendous raw figures
of production and cultivated acreage attendant on their large territories
and populations, and in addition, distorted their substantial economic
advances to make them appear greater than they were.
What they did not talk about was the cost of production (human and
material) which would have exposed startling inefficiencies, and the
failure to meet quotas and achieve plans -- keeping the spotlight rather
on ever larger plans for the future, repeating mammoth figures of previous
plans and ignoring the fact that they had not always been achieved. And
what they did not divulge, until forced (by their own rising difficulties)
was the padding, distortion and falsification of production figures (the
extent of which was not known for some time even to their highest authori-
ties). It was no accident that for years Westerners had no opportunity
to examine Communist economic statistics in detail, particularly agri-
cultural (granted that these statistics were not too adequate even for
their own officials).
Only by the end of 1963, in spite of previous critical failures (e.g.
CPR communes and backyard furnaces in the late 1950's, the shutdown of
numerous factories on the heels of departing Soviet technicians about
1959; Soviet collectivization in the 1930's and the Virgin lands in the
late 1950's) was it possible to demonstrate the falsity of Communist eco-
nomic growth claims and to puncture the inflated image of sustained spec-
tacular economic performance. Authoritative analyses of Communist eco-
nomic data accumulated over a span of years and released in January 1964
coincided with public exposure of the crisis in the Soviet economy, brought
on by successive years of failure after 1958, and the collapse of the
Chicom economy.
Analyses of Communist economic performance have usually compared the
USSR with the US -- largely because Soviet leaders announced their intent
to meet and surpass US production figures. This comparison gave Soviet
propagandists a certain advantage in claiming, among other things to have
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 Approved For Release 199 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7-..
started from an agricultural base (industrialization was underway before
the revolution of 1917), and to be competing with the world's most eco-
nomically developed and prosperous country.
However, for developing countries, the most applicable bases for
comparison ought to be found outside the U.S. and Western Europe. For
this purpose, comparison of the CPR's communist economy with Japan's
and particularly India's mixed economies is particularly appropriate.
Japan demonstrates what a developed mixed economy can accomplish as con-
trasted with a Communist system. India, on the other hand, starting from
similar economic conditions, demonstrates a mixed economy in a developing
country. [Japanese and Indian economies are not comparable for several
reasons, namely: Japan was a sovereign country while India was a depend-
ent British colony, until 1947; Japan has long had an industrial economy
while India became independent as a predominantly agricultural country.
Further, India chose to build a mixed economic system along with democratic
political institutions, to assure the maintenance of free institutions in
the long run, rather than to take what some believe to be the shorter road
to economic development through a state controlled economy in an authori-
tarian system.)
Industrial Production in India and Communist China, 1959 - 1963.
China has fallen behind India in industrial development during the last
5 years. When the Soviet Union cut off its aid program to China and with-
drew its technical advisers, a large portion of the Chinese economy pro-
grams collapsed. In 1963 Chinese industrial production was only about
two-thirds of the level achieved in 1959. For example, only 8 to 10 mil-
lion metric tons of crude steel were produced in 1963 compared to 13.4
million metric tons in 1959, and only 190 to 200 million metric tons of
coal were produced in 1963 compared to 347.8 million metric tons in 1959.
Refined petroleum products, which was one of the few industrial commodities
to show an increase in production, was only 37 percent above the level of
1959.
During this period of collapse and stagnation in China, industrial
production in India increased by about 40 percent. Between 1959 and 1963,
the production of crude steel grew by 142 percent, the production of elec-
tric power grew by 64 percent, and by 1963 the production of refined
petroleum products in India reached 7.6 million metric tons in contrast
to only 5.4 million metric tons in China.
The prospects are that India will continue to develop its industry
rapidly, whereas China will take many years to regain the level of produc-
tion achieved in 1959.
Industrial Production in an and Communist China, 1959 - 1963.
Communist China's record contrasts unfavorably also with Japan's indus-
trial production. In two commodities (cement and refined petroleum prod-
ucts), Japan's 1959-1963 production increased at an even greater rate than
2
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O"O"OTO (862 Cont.)
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did India's, while the CPR's cement production decreased and its refined
petroleum products increased only 37% to Japan's 102%. [Japan's 1963
cement production was almost 30 million metric tons; the CPR's, only some
9 million.] In another two commodities (crude steel and coal), Japanese
production increased but at a lesser rate than India's, while the CPR's
decreased in both cases. [Japan's crude steel production is approximately
three times greater than the CPR's but the latter still produces sub-
stantially more coal despite its decrease to some 200 million metric tons
and Japan's increase to 52 million.] In the fifth commodity, electric
power, Japan and India increased their production at an almost identical
rate (63% and 64% respectively), contrasted with the CPR's decrease to
only 72% of its 1959 production. The CPR's 30 billion kilowatt-hours con-
trasted to Japan's almost 162 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, is
more significant when the importance of electric power for a developing
economy is considered and the size and populations of the two countries 25X1C1O b
are compared.
 25X1C10b
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863 FE,f CHINESE YOUTH LACKS REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL
25X1ClOb
SITUATION: The Chicom leaders have become increasingly alarmed by
the sag in revolutionary zeal among their young people and have started
intensive indoctrination to remedy the situation. This campaign itself
provides mounting evidence that dissatisfaction among Chinese youths
has become even more widespread and increasingly serious. The primary
causes appear to be the lack of adequate educational opportunities,
scarce job opportunities, and the discrepancy between the ideals long
proclaimed by the regime and the bleak realities of the general situ-
ation facing the young people.
Lack of Educational Opportunities: For the fourth consecutive
year, fewer new students were accepted by universities than were grad-
uated in June and total university enrollments have fallen steadily
from 900,000 in the peak academic year of 1960-61 to something less
than 500,000 in the current year. This reduction in educational oppor-
tunities has in turn increased the competition for available jobs.
China's stagnant economy is unable to absorb the large number of youths
who enter the job market each year and unemployment continues to rise.
The large numbers of unemployed youths in the cities cause what the
Chicom authorities call "social problems," and they have attempted to
alleviate the situation by sending young people to the countryside and
remote frontier areas. The young people are soon dismayed by the poor
living conditions and the lack of any prospects for improving their
situation.
Disillusionment is said to be particularly high among the latest
graduating class of university students who had been led to believe
that they were being trained to play a vital role in building a new
China, but are now unable to find posts of responsibility or positions
in which they can use their new skills and training. The new graduates
were bluntly told that because of "readjustments in the economy," not
enough jobs existed in their specialities and that graduates who could
not be placed in appropriate jobs immediately would be assigned to rural
or frontier areas or to "basic levels" where they would perform appren-
tice-type work at low rates of pay.
There is also increasing discontent among the undergraduates who
resent the heavy doses of political indoctrination as well as their duty
to spend at least a month each year doing manual labor. According to a
student from the Hunan Medical College, only two months were spent in
genuine class work during the past year and the remainder of the time
was spent either in political indoctrination meetings or in rural clinics.
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These Chicom indoctrination efforts confirm the alienation of
Chinese students that became apparent in 1962 when some 15,000 students,
most of whom had relatives in Hong Kong, left the mainland with permits
to visit their relatives and almost none of them went back. There were
other similar instances of this exodus in 1963, but after that time,
stricter controls over visitor permits brought an end to such cases.
Impact of Sino-Soviet Split: The fact that the Chicom youth indoc-
trination campaign is still being intensified after nearly two years in-
dicates that the program to date has had little impact on the 130 million
Chinese between the ages of 16 and 25. The current intensification of
the campaign can also be attributed in part to the Sino-Soviet split, and
the Chicom view that what has happened in the USSR proves that even an
old well-established Communist society can be "corrupted" and "subverted"
by bourgeois attractions. The indoctrination campaign--through the press,
radio, speeches, movies, songs, plays, "study groups," etc.--includes at
least as many warnings against "revisionist influences" as against the
traditional evil of "bourgeois influence."
This campaign is not tied directly to the shorter range problem of
an immediate successor to Mao. This will be settled in deepest secrecy
by a small clique of only the highest leaders. The successors of Mao
and of other leading officials of his generation--most of whom are now
in their 60's and 70's--and hence their selection, is deeply affected by
the problem of dissatisfied Chinese youth. The aging Chicom leaders
have only belatedly come to realize that while they can dictate what
happens to the Chinese people today, they cannot dictate in advance the
future path and direction of Chinese Communism. It is entirely in keep-
ing with their frequently demonstrated arrogance that it should have
taken them so long to reach this obvious conclusion. It is also in
keeping with their long-held, unrealistic dogmatism that t#ey seek to
solve the problem by an uncompromising adherence to harsh communist
ideals, by demanding increasing sacrifices from their people without
offering any real inducements in the form of material improvements or 25X1C10b
opportunities in the people's lives,
2
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(863 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
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 Approved For Release 1999/08~RDP78-03061A0XH%0
864 EE,WE,a. CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC REFORM PROMISED
25X1C10b
Background References:
BPG No. 131+, 10 Feb 6]+, "Made in Czechoslovakia: New Meaning for an Old
Trademark," with unclassified attachments, "Controversy Among Communists
Over Economic Practices," and "Outline of Communist Steps Toward Sub-
version."
BPG No. 138, 6 April 61-, "Czechoslovakia's Lagging Economy," with unclas-
sified attachment, "Czechoslovakia Falters: 1956-1963."
BPG No. 141, 18 May 61., "The Czechoslovak Economy Declines Further," with
unclassified attachment, "Kafka's Nightmare Comes True."
BPG No. 149, 14 Sept 61., "The Czechoslovak Situation," with unclassified
attachment, "A Look Behind the Iron Curtain Shows Dollar:'.s Surprising
Stature."
SITUATION: The above-cited guidances have'troated in detail how
badly Czechoslovakia's oboe-flourishing economy has declined under a
Communist regime. Moscow's exploitation of Czechoslovakia as a facade
and financier for Soviet "aid and trade" penetration of emerging areas
has, of course, been a serious drain on the economy. However, the main
culprit is clearly the rigid central planning system that has studiously
ignored consumer interests and needs, and has produced a vast backlog of
unwanted, inferior and unsalable products.
The deterioration in the quality of Czechoslovak goods is reflected
even in the Czech-Rumanian, trade agreement of 19 October 63, which con-
tains a pledge that both parties will export only products "on a par with
the best products available on the world market" -- plainly a warning by
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~~~ ~ (861- cont.)
 Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300020001-7
the Rumanians that they will buy in the West if the Czech product does
not improve. Seventeen years after the great experiment in Communist
economic planning in Czechoslovakia began, even the Czech CP leadership
has been forced to acknowledge that it has resulted in an almost un-
qualified failure.
The debacle in Czechoslovakia is not just another Communist eco-
nomic failure. In Czechoslovakia, Communist economic doctrine was put
to a laboratory test under ideal or nearly ideal conditions: in 1948 the
party took over an industrial society with one of the most highly skilled
labor forces in the world, a plant in generally good condition (virtually
undamaged by the war), and an unsurpassed reputation for quality products.
This 6ftde_'.. bithd State, with its tradition of high industrialization and
mechanical skill, has been brought close to ruin. "How could we," a prom-
inent Czech economist recently asked rhetorically, "the most highly in-
dustrialized nation in Eastern Europe, have taken the Stalinist system
of highly (cei'itralized, non-specialized planning which sets the same
broad quantitative norms for all fields of production -- a system devised
to increase radically the basic, heavy industrial plant of a backward
nation (Russia) -- how could we have been so stupid as to take such a
system and impose it lock, stock, and barrel on our economy? It's incred-
ible:"
Bright, New Vistas Pictured. For the past several months, the Czech-
oslovak press has carried on an intensive debate over plans for a radical
overhaul of the entire economic system -- a total assault upon the plan-
ning and management techniques imposed by Moscow, which have long been
held to be synonymous with Marxism-Leninism itself. The author of the
original proposal for change was Prof. Ota Sik, director of the Economic
Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and a member of:, the
Party's Central Committee. Under the basic proposal, central planning,
after a period of transition, would be reduced to little more than pre-
dicting market and production opportunities and choosing among major
trends of possible development. The change in course toward "Progressive
Market Socialism" was approved tentatively by the Party's Presidium in
October 1964.
These steps represented an apparently firm intention to put into
practice the recommendations of some of the country's top economic and
legal experts, manor of whom appear agreed that traditional Marxist-Leninist
concepts have been to blame for the wreckage of their national econo '
(For example, the volume of industrial production in 1963 fell below the
poor 1962 level, and labor productivity and national income during 1964 re-
mained static. Net agricultural production has shown a downward trend since
the late 1950s, and President (and Party First Secretary)Novotny announced
in November 1964 that Czechoslovakia would have to seek abroad for yet an-
other 2.2 million tons of grain, the harvest having been down by one mil-
lion tons as a consequence of drought. He also admitted that none of the
1964 agricultural goals had been reached except in production of potatoes.)
2
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(864 Cont.)
 Approved For Release I 999/08 P78-03061 A000300020001-7
Three months before the new draft economic reform plan was tentatively
approved by the Presidium, the conclusions of a symposium of 35 economic
authorities appeared in the June and July 1964 issues of 'Pravnik, the
-journal of the Institute for Government and Law of the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences.
Of these 35 participants, not one defended traditional Communist
planning and management methods -- in which economic plan targets are
arbitrarily assigned to individual enterprises. The chronic handicaps
imposed by such a practice were recognized by all, Pravnik said. More-
over, a leading spokesman for fundamental economic change, Radoslav
Selucky, reportedly asserted that not one of the Czechoslovak five-year
plans had survived a period of two or three years in its original form,
nor was there a single enterprise in Czechoslovakia whose plan had not
been changed several times in any given year. Most of the symposium ex-
perts agreed, Pravnik said, that the continual interference by CP bu-
reaucrats in the daily operations of enterprises was keeping the economy
in a state of ineffectiveness and confusion.
Eugen Loebl, another well-known critic, supported Selucky by point-
ing out that the system of directed management had been wrong from the
very beginning, and that it had caused more damage in Czechoslovakia than
anywhere else in the Soviet Bloc. Pravnik also reported that the sym-
posium participants were practically unanimous in favoring a broader ap-
plication of the laws of supply and demand. Selucky stated that it was
possible to combine the classical Communist system of administrative
planning with one based on the laws of supply and demand. "They are two
incompatible methods," he said. Since it was impossible to salvage the
present centralized Communist economy, he added, the only solution was
to replace it with a system of management fully based on a free market
economy.
Mirage or Reality? Despite the hopeful words, there is no assurance
as yet that Prague's new plans will be approved in their original form,
or if approved without substantial change, that they will bear better
fruit than the administrative panaceas of the past 17 years. Whatever
liberalization the regime may institute in theory, effective control may
remain in the hands of party bureaucrats who were among the last and most
reluctant de-Stalinizers in the Bico. Not until seven years after IC ru-
shchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress did the Prague regime,
under pressure from its own intellectuals and the Soviets, jettison Karol
Bacilek, First Secretary of the Slovak CP, and then Premier Viliam Siroky.
President Novotny, himself the chief Stalinist holdover, while having
moved in recent months to identify himself with popular pressures for po-
litical and economic reform, may lose his appetite for drastic economic
reform when faced with the task of forcing it down the throats of the
Stalinist party bureaucrats who administer economic affairs.
3
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JA*VTT (864+ cont.)
 Approved For Release 1 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
Novotny has been steeped in the tradition that rigid, monolithic
politico-economic management is the sine qua non of Marxism-Leninism.
He is, as in the words of Prof.. Sik, one of the "many comrades who look
with distrust at all unusual non-Stalinist theories" and are "accustomed
to a single, absolute form of Stalinist society, including its economy
and management." (Kulturni Tvorba, 19 Nov 64). While Novotny has sought
to identify himself with the economic reform, in his 3 December speech in
Moscow he took care to emphasize the continued importance of central con-
trol, promised a strengthening of Party control over the economy, and
denied that the law of supply and demand would be allowed free play.
All this could have been for the benefit of his Soviet hosts or it
might have presaged a watering down of the new economic principles by
the Central Committee (CC) at this December meeting. On 18 and 19
December the enlarged presidium of the CC met to discuss the introduction
of the new model economy. This was followed by a meeting of the Economic
Commission of the CC on 21 December. Both meetings were apparently sub-
stitutes for a plenum of the CC itself, which Rude Pravo had announced
in October would assemble in December to give final approval to the pro-
posed reform. (in a year-end report to the nation, Novotny, in an ap-
parent attempt to satisfy both the party bureaucrats and the economists/
technocrats, asserted that the proposed reform would not negate past
principles of management and organization of the economy, while elsewhere
asserting the need to eradicate conservatism in order to open the door to
ability, elasticity and skill.)
The switch in forums suggests that the Prague leadership has either
run into opposition to the reform, or is divided on how far-reaching it
should be or both. If there is opposition, it probably is concentrated
in the CC itself, where a large number of members and candidate members
are also economic functionaries notorious both for their incompetence
and for their close identification with middle level cadres of Stalinist
leanings. Certainly there is recognition by all. involved that full im-
plementation of the proposed economic changes would strongly curtail the
political power of the Party bureaucracy and greatly enhance the political
influence of the ablest managers of industry, many of whom are not CP
members. The power to determine the actual operations of the nation's
economy on both a daily and long-range basis would pass out of the hands
of Party bureaucrats, at least in part. This could be intolerable to the
many Party officials and managers who have a vested interest in retaining 25X1C10 b
the maximum of control for the central authorities.
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(86&. Cont.)
 25X1C10b
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
CHINA AND INDIA: COMPARISON OF OUIrPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, 1959 and 1963
13.4
6.0
1959 1963
CRUDE STEEL
(million tons)
347.8
1959 1963
COAL
(million tons)
1959 1963
CEMENT
(million tons)
7.6
4.0
1959 1963
REFINED
PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS
(millic i tons)
41.5
1959 1963
ELECTRIC POSTER
(billiom KWH.)
NOTE: Bars depict true comparisons within each commodity on o Different scales
are used to show cc nodities wi a wide production range on a single chart
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
CHINA AND INDIA; INDEXES OF OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, 1959 and 1963
140
158
242
164
20 40 6o 80
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
China and India: Comparison of Selected Industrial Commodities
1959 and 1963
India
1963 - 1963
as percent of as percent of
1959 a/ 1963 b/ 1959 1959 c/ 1963 d 1959
Crude Steel Thousand metric tons 13,350 8,000 to 10,000 6o to 75 2,473 5,976 242
Coal Thousand metric tons 347,800 190,000 to 200,000 55 to 58 47,800 66,912 140
Cement Thousand metric tons 12,270 8,970 2/ 73 6,936 9,360 135
Refined Petroleum Products Thousand metric tons 3,960 1 5,430 / 137 4,801 7,600 J 158
Electric Power Million kilowatt-hours 41,500 30,000 72 17,794 29,100 164
a. New China News Agency, Press Communique on the Growth of China's National Economy in 195 , Peking, January 22, 1960, except as noted.
b. Colina MacDougall, "Filling the Gap," The Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 68, Hong Kong, April 16, 1964.
c. Statistical Office of the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963 , New York, 1964.
d. Statistical Office of the United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. XVIII, No. 11, New York, November 1964, except as noted.
e. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Trade Notes, Vol. 59, No. 3, Washington, D.C., September 1964.
f. Estimated to be 92 percent of the total amount of crude oil available. Domestic production is reported in New China News Agency, Press Communique
on the Growth of China's National Economy in 1959, Peking, January 22, 1960; and imports are reported in The Foreign Trade of the USSR for 1959,
Moscow, 1960.
g. Estimated to be 92 percent of the domestic production of crude oil reported in Colina MacDougall, "Filling the Gap," The Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. XLIV, No. 68, Hong Kong, April 16, 1964.
h. The Eastern Economist, New Delhi, October 30, 1964.
i. For the fiscal year April 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960.
j. Estimated. Production by enterprises generating primarily for public use is reported in Statistical Office of the United Nations, Monthly Bulletin
of Statistics, Vol. XVIII, No. 11, New York, November 1964; and the production by industrial establishments generating primarily for their own use
is estimated.
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
18 January 1965
Chinese Communist Officials Harangue Youth
on Need for Revolutionary Zeal
The following quotations from the Chinese Communists
press and radio are selected at random from the vast
amount of material stressing the need to instill re-
volutionary zeal in the young people. 'They indicate
the intensity with which these Communist leaders view
their problems.
Hu Yao-pang speech at Congress of Chinese Young Communist League in
July 1961x:
"The 'peaceful evolution' from Socialism to capitalism has long
been realized in Yugoslavia. Today Khrushchev is the greatest re-
visionist. Under his leadership the fruit of socialism gained
through the sweat and bloodshed of the great Soviet people is being
frittered away and bourgeois influence is becoming rampant. Broad
groups of young people are being corrupted by capitalism to a grave
extent. This cannot but rouse our vigilance."
Peoples' Daily editorial of 3 August 1964:
"The lessons to be drawn from the damage that the modern revisionists
have done to the Soviet Union and the living facts of the class strug-
gle in our country are a warning to us. In the long, involved class
struggle, we must constantly increase the strength of the nucleus
of party leadership at all levels to resist corrosion by the class
enemy. We must pay greater attention to the choosing, cultivating
and training of the successors to the nucleus of the leadership at
all levels."
Red Flag article of 22 September, by An Tzu-wen:
"If the proletariat is to pursue the revolution to the end, it must
be skilled at distinguishing the genuine from the fake Marxist-
Leninists, and must choose and train successors to the revolution
carefully so that the responsibility for leading the revolution will
be handed over to the genuine Marxist-Leninists and the usurpation
of the leadership by the fake Marxist-Leninists will be prevented."
Fed Flag (14 July 1964) article:
"Viewing the development of revisionism in the Soviet Union, our
class enemies at home have decided that the day 'will soon come for
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
(Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
18 January 1965
Chinese Communist Officials Harangue Youth
on Need for Revolutionary Zeal
The following quotations from the Chinese Communists
press and radio are selected at random from the vast
amount of material stressing the need to instill re-
volutionary zeal in the young people. They indicate
the intensity with which these Communist leaders view
their problems.
Hu Yao-pang speech at Congress of Chinese Young Communist League in
July 196+:
"The 'peaceful evolution' from Socialism to capitalism has long
been realized in Yugoslavia. Today Khrushchev is the greatest re-
visionist. Under his leadership the fruit of socialism gained
through the sweat and bloodshed of the great Soviet people is being
frittered away and bourgeois influence is becoming rampant. Broad
groups of young people are being corrupted by capitalism to a grave
extent. This cannot but rouse our vigilance."
Peoples' Daily editorial of 3 August 196+:
"The lessons to be drawn from the damage that the modern revisionists
have done to the Soviet Union and the living facts of the class strug-
gle in our country are a warning to us. In the long, involved class
struggle, we must constantly increase the strength of the nucleus
of party leadership at all levels to resist corrosion by the class
enemy. We must pay greater attention to the choosing, cultivating
and training of the successors to the nucleus of the leadership at
all levels."
Red Flag article of 22 September, by An Tzu-wen:
"If the proletariat is to pursue the revolution to the end, it must
be skilled at distinguishing the genuine from the fake Marxist-
Leninists, and must choose and train successors to the revolution
carefully so that the responsibility for leading the revolution will
be handed over to the genuine Marxist-Leninists and the usurpation
of the leadership by the fake Marxist-Leninists will be prevented."
Fed Flag (14 July 1964-) article:
"Viewing the development of revisionism in the Soviet Union, our
class enemies at home have decided that the day will soon come for
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
(Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
25X1C10b
Fact Sheet
18 January 1965
Chechoslovakia's Burden
During late 1963 and 1964 Czechoslovakia announced multi-million-
dollar aid and trade agreements with Ghana, Guinea and India, lesser
activities in Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Mali and. Zanzibar, and there were
even reports of an arms deal with Haiti. Czech penetration has been
heavy in Latin America, where the CSSR has full diplomatic relations
with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay; a consulate
general in Colombia; and trade representation in Chile and Venezuela.
In 1964 the Czechs are believed to have had more personnel in Latin
America than the Soviet Union and other Satellites combined; the demon-
strable Czech2er capita contribution to political activities abroad was
more than twice that of the Soviet Union. Paralleling widespread com-
plaints of shoddy Czechoslovak exports there have been public exposures
of Czech-directed espionage and subversion in West Germany, Switzerland,
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and even Iceland. Following the Communist
subversion of Cuba, the Czechs in Latin America needed no longer go to
Prague for personnel, supplies and directives. The Latin American of-
fensive could be run directly from their major base in Cuba, where the
Czechs built up to an estimated 4,000 personnel. Many Czechs have been
grumbling because they feel that the more than $430 million that Prague
has poured down the Cuban drain could have been better utilized to boost
their own faltering economy.
The Czechoslovakian people have carried the burden of economic pene-
tration ordered by Communist leaders. Free countries which Soviet of-
ficials have singled out for subverting and influencing are indicated in
the stories carried in Czechoslovak media September-December 1964, as
follows:
Technicky Tyd.enik,, Prague, 16 Sept 64:
he 'Kovo' Foreign Trade Enterprise constructed in Mali at the beginning
of 1964, two large transmission centers. Now there have been put into
operation additional Tesla SRV 30 transmitters."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 12 Oct 64:
'K. Rucka, a representative of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Dar es Salaam,
presented a gift of a hundred tons of sugar from the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment and people to the inhabitants of Zanzibar on 10 Oct 64. The island
had rid itself of a pro-British regime in January of this year."
Handelsblatt, Duesseldorf, 22 Sept 64:
Ups 1967, over 1,000 Czechoslovak experts and specialists will be
sent to India to work on the planning and assembly of industrial enter-
prises which India is constructing in cooperation with Czechoslovakia."
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 - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020001-7
Rude Pravo, Prague, 14 Oct 64:
"A Czechoslovak government delegation headed by Prof. Dr. K. Boda, left
for the People's Republic of Mon`o_ lia on 13 Oct 64."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 4 Oct 64:
"The 'Motokov' Foreign Trade Enterprise of Czechoslovakia has given as
a gift to the government of Kenya, a 50 Super Zetor tractor, it having
been on exhibit with other Czechoslovak machines at the Kenya Agricul-
tural Exhibit in Nairobi."
Techniciy Tydenik, Prague, 21 Oct 64:
"The Kralovo Pole Machine Building Plant in Brno has delivered the last
parts of two sewage purification plants for the eastern and western parts
of the city of Alexandria in the UAR."
Pravda, Bratislava, 24 Oct 64:
mongolian Youth Delegation in Czechoslovakia."
Novr Zahranichtho Obchodu, Prague, 21 Oct 64:
"Czechoslovak-Indonesian Economic Co-operation."
Kridla Vlasti, Prague, 14 Oct 64:
Cc echoslovak Planes for Indonesia and Rhodesia."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 25 Oct 64:
Czechoslovakia and India Sign Five Year Economic Agreement."
Pravda, Bratislava, 25 Oct 64:
"Somali delegation arrives in Czechoslovakia-at.the invitation of the
Czechoslovak Society for International Relations to study the possibil-
ities for expanding cultural contacts between the two countries."
Ceskoslovensky Svet, Prague, 15 Oct 64:
fCzeehoslovak-Bolivian Economic Co-operation."
1 Za raniczne, Warsaw, 27 Oct 64:
Czechoslovakia will supply Pakistan with complete equipment for a cement
plant, as well as other investment goods valued at 10 million dollars."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 31 Oct 64:
"By 1970 Czechoslovakia will construct for the UAR two of the largest
sugar refineries in the world."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 31 Oct 64:
'Czechoslovak Party and Government Delegation Visits eria."
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Rude Pravo, Prague, 4 Nov 64:
'In the next few days a 25-member group of young construction workers and
other technicians will leave Czechoslovakia for a 3-month stay in Algeria.
They will participate in the International Youth Construction involving
the renewal of villages destroyed by the French colonists."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 3 Nov 64:
"Czechoslovakia will aid in the construction of plants in the Kashmir.
Dr. Ivan Rohal-Ilkiv has announced that Czechoslovakia will present a
completely equipped laboratory as a gift to the intermediate schools in
Jammu and KashrrJ.r. "
Pravda, Bratislava, 12 Nov 64:
'A oc mpletely equipped field surgical dressing station and an ambulance
for the transportation of wounded was presented yesterday as a gift from
the Czechoslovak workers to the National Front for the Liberation of
Sout': Viet cam."
Rude Prevo, Prague, 14 Nov 64:
C D Blansko is devoting attention to the fulfillment of the order of a
second vertical Kaplan turbine for the hydroelectric plant in Cachoeira
Dourada in Brazil. Our water turbines will also be put into operation
for the first time in Ceylon."
Markt Informationen, Berlin, 2 Nov 64:
About 200 industrial enterprises have been constructed in developing
countries up to now, with assistance of Czechoslovakia. In the last few
years, Czechoslovakia has been one of the major suppliers of complete
industrial equipment for the developing countries. -- All the orders ful-
filled by Czechoslovakia involve long-term credits at low interest rates."
Rude Pravo, Prague, 17 Nov 64:
"A plant for the production of analine, constructed with the aid of
Czechoslovak specialists, was put into operation in Mexico on 14 Nov 64."
Technicky Tydenik, Prague, 11 Nov 64:
Czechoslovak Sugar Refinery for Syria."
Techniclg Tydenik, Prague, 11 Nov 64:
"In the third quarter of 1964, a plant (including smelting furnace) for
the production of aluminum tableware, constructed with Czechoslovak as-
sistance, began operation in Ghana."
Ceskoslovensky Svet, Prague, 12 Nov 64:
Over 3,000 foreign students from more than 80 countries of Latin America,
Asia and Africa are studying in Czechoslovakia."
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Novi Zahranichiho Obchodu, Prague, 2 Dec 64:
"The Czechoslovak State Bank is systematically offering technical banking
aid to the developing cotntries. One form of this aid are the regular
6-month courses for employees of banking and financial organs from the
developing countries."
Lidova Demokracie, Prague, 28 Nov 64:
Czechoslovak Catholic Delegation Leaves for 38th Eucharistic Congress
in India. They were seen off at Ruzyne Airport by leading functionaries,
including the Deputy Central Secretary of the Czechoslovak Peoples Party.
Our reporter was told that the Eucharistic Congress is being held in
India, a country rich with religious tradition, for the first time. The
Congress can, therefore, have a great influence on strengthening religious
toleration and understanding among nations."
Novixr Zahranichiho Obchodu, Prague, 16 Dec 64:
Foreign students who have been studying for 5 and 6 years at schools in
Czechoslovakia and have mastered the Czech language well, recently re-
ceived their engineering diplomas. At the start of January most of the
graduates will return home to the developing countries. In the day prior
to graduation, the students were invited by the employees of 'Strojimport'
(Foreign Trade Enterprise). This was not a one-shot affair, because after
these young engineers return to their respective countries, 'Stroiimport'
will continue to keep in contact with them regularly."
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