BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 27, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

732 Bu, WE, d.
733 TIE, e.
734 A.F,g?
735 MINE.
736 UE, g.
737 EE,TWE.
Soviet Balance-of-Payment
Difficulties*
Specter of a New Popular
Front in France
Chou En-lai in Africa: China
in the U.N.?
Worth Vietnam: Economic Dif-
ficulties and party Dissonecra
PANAMA: The Riots and Their
Aftermath*
"Laster Marches"
? NUMBERING: Items with numbers alone are sent to all stations;
items with area letters and small letters are given selected distribution;
small letters indicate the following content-a. revisionism; b. agricul-
ture; c. religion; d. intelligentsia; e. labor; f. youth and students; g.
nationalism, neutralism; and h. black propaganda.
? COLORS: Items on blue paper are of basic, long-range interest; those
on pink paper are specifically for revisionist assets; the Central Propa-
ganda Directive is on buff paper; and green paper is used for the
Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions.
weekly
Pro aanda
uidance
REcop'o N Py
? Reasonable care should be taken to avoid reproducing the language or
style of the guidances, which would denote a common origin.
DATE: 27 January 1964
Central Propaganda Directive
Briefly Noted
Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions
#20, 3-17 January 1964 /unclassified Chronology
in English, French, an '"Spanish7
731. The Soviet Succession Problem
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27 January 1934
:3rief ly Noted
Soviets `'rofit from Cuban sugar Barter:
It was B213TY L' NOT D in Bi-t1eekly Guidance /12O, of IS
November 1963 that Cuba was exporting approximately one million
tons of sugar to nessia during 1033, of which 33% was exchanged
for other goods at 3 cents 'U.S. per pound and 207o sold for hard
currency at 4 cents per pound. The difference between those low
rates and the world price of close to 11 cents is the price Cuba
has to-pay for nussian arms and membership in the Communist fra-
ternity. This was the price exacted by Xhrushchev from Castro,
during his Sarin; 1933 visit, in return for a promise to,.extend
more Soviet credits to buy more Soviet goods.
Castro made another surprise visit to the soviet Union on
January 13, 1354. It has been reported ,47Y Times 13 January
10647 that Lhrushchev has now agreed to preempt less of the Cuban
sugar crop as payment for his aid, which would allow the Castro
regime to sell sugar elsewhere and pay for imports with the pro-
ceeds. Assuming this report to be true, it is not as magnanimous
as it might sound: according to experts, an analysis of the size
of sugar shipments to and from the Soviet Union shows that a pro-
fit of at least $73 million should already have been realized on
just a portion of the Cuban sugar committed to Ihrushchev. To
allow financially-strapped Cuba to earn a little hard currency
might reduce Cuban complaints and demands for greater economic
support from the Soviet Union -- and give the Soviet Union credit
for stealing a little less Cuban sugar than was originally ex-
actea.
Ue present this as an example, not only of the mismanage-
ment of Cuban economic affairs by the Castro regime, but also of
ghat it means to be a }ussian satellite.
Soviet Growth estimates
predictably, Soviet press and radio media have heavily at-
tac'.ed the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for itsesti late, re-
leased through the Idev ''orl Times of S January (`press Comment,
3 January), that the Soviet economic growth rate f`5 asx67
and 1:33 to 2.5 per cent. (Incidentally, Agency analysts in
their press release of 9 January only gave the 2.5 figure for
E M3; copies of this 4-page release are available if neoded.)
Vestern press comment has also been largely critioai. 25X1C1Ob
(Briefly noted
Cont . )
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(Briefly Noted)
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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
24 Feb Treaty of Ili (or St. Petersburg) returning most of
Sinkiang territory to China but granting portion to
.ussia, 1851.
25 Feb :rushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at
CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.
23 Feb Inter' l Cont. of Youth and students for Disarmmlont,
Peace, and National Independence (WFDY sponsored),
Florence, Italy, scheduled for 26 Feb-1 Mar, 1964.
27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1957.
2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore
(18""
capitalism by Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda et all
Omtenced to death) 2-13 March 193?.
5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1879), 1953.
8 Mar Russia -- February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-
2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917.
9 Mar Latin American Youth Congress (Communist sponsored)
Santiago, Chile, scheduled for 9-13 March.
13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai
Lama, 1953.
14 Mar Earl Marx dies (born 5 May 181C), 1883.
16 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921.
1 Ap Berlin Blockade begins, 1943.
4 Ap North Atlantic Treaty signed in response to Soviet
imperialism in Europe, 1949.
11 Ap "Day of Remembrance" - Libez-?5 ion. from Fascism,
celebrated annually by Comm?.: r?esistance fighters,FIR.
17 Ap Nikita Khrushchev born 70 years ago, 1894.
22 Ap Lenin born, 1870, Chicoms issue "Long Live Leninism"
statements, challenging Khrushchev, 1960.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#20 3-17 January 1964
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese continued to attack (on a somewhat lower
key) and to gain some ground against apparently mild Soviet-op-
position. The strongest Chinese polemics came during Chou's 9-
day visit to Albania, in denunciatory speeches by Chou and his
hosts and a joint statement by the two governments which brought
official Yugoslav notes of protest -- but no mention by the
Soviets. A Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow, noting on January
9 that the Soviets had abstained from replying to the continuing
Chinese assaults for two and a half months, said: "People in
Moscow think that this is an alarming situation." Khrushchev
did make several references to his differences with the Chinese
(not named) in his off-the-cuff speech with Castro in Kalinin on
the last day of this period, but of a purely defensive nature.
(Chrono, January 17.)
2. Back in Africa after Albania, Chou reverted to his role
of affable diplomat: most observers assessed his gains as greater
than anticipated, even though no spectacular achievements were
reported. (Chrono, entire period.)
3. The conflict was mirrored in further turbulent develop-
ments among parties in non-Communist Europe. Chinese gains could
be seen in the apparent advance of the pro-Chinese dissidents in
Belgium (Chrono, January 3) and the bolting of the extreme left
wing of Nenni's Italian Socialist Party to form a new Socialist
party of Proletarian Unity which seems to be ideologically closer
to Pelting than to the Italian CP. (Chrono, January 13). Pro-
Chinese elements in Sveden were thoroughly rebuffed at the C'?'s
20th Congress, but the ?arty seems also to have moved away from
the CPSU in the direction of an independent, right-leaning, na-
tional version of Communism. (Chrono, January 3-6) (The Italian
and French Parties announced plans for reorganizations to provide
more inner-party democracy, but this would seem to have no effect
on their alignment in the movement: Chrono, January 15/1v).
4. A clandestine report of plans for a meeting of Latin
American Communist youth leaders in Eavana January 20, to make
preparations for the Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC)
scheduled for March in Santiago, Chile, told of fear of disHu p-
tion through an outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It asserted
that no Soviet delegation would attend the 2nd LAYC in an effort
to avoid a confrontation with the Chinese and that the Soviets
are urging that the Chinese also be kept away.
5. Meanwhile, even the most dissident elements in world
Comunism reacted with the same stridently anti-imperialist out-
cries to the Communist-exploited anti-U.S. riots in Panama and
the Communist-led overthrow of the government in Zanzibar.
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Significance:
2 v e n t s were more important than words during this per-
iod: Chou En-lai's much publicized pied-piper circuit in Africa,
given additional encouragement by de Gaulle's intention to estab-
lish diplomatic ties with ?eking; Castro's surprise visit to Mos-
cow, whether caused by Cuba's economic woes or by welcome rioting
in Panama; apparent establishment of the first Communist foothold
in Africa, on Zanzibar; the shift in the Swedish CP and the left-
wing split away from Iienni's Italian Socialists.
Only the Chinese, with their Albanian supporters maintained
the battle of w o r d s, against persistent silence in Moscow.
We wonder whether this "turn-the-other cheek" attitude, not gen-
erally characteristic of tyhrushchev, reflects his conviction that
his domestic and foreign policy efforts hold more promise to re-
gain hegemony in the t.'orld Communist Movement for the CPSU than
"escalating"polemics, whether he is muted under pressure from
domestic opposition or whether Moscovw's odd reticence cloaks a
new round of behind-the-scenes negotiations with ?eking.
In any case, the events of this period appear to favor the
Chinese over the Soviets. At the sane time they might well mean
some Communist gain against the free world, underscoring our re-
peated warnings that dissensions in the Communist camp cannot be
relied upon to weaken the entire Communist cause automatically:
they will serve free-world interests only to the extent to which
vie are able and determined to utilize them for our own purposes.
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(Commentary Cont.)
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eferences (classified):
1. IITTI TITA'TIOITAL COI: L UITISII CIT';ii 1T gl~: r?C AIT ?A W` DS .
This is the cover title for a new series of briefs by Cl/l`OG.
ach brief will be classified according to content: the first
two, listed below, are unclassified. 1:04, The '7orld 7 ecleration
of Trade Unions and the o-So e$ Dispute Au us -idovem:)er _
.;?dry he or 4e erat~on oz ,,~ientific oi~era,
G January 19G4.
2. '_'einin? Justifies to its ?eo*~le the is*~ute with Moscow, ?Cl
iTo. 3G13/G~' dated G January 1964 (Secret). analysis
of t e Chou ? Tang speech described by our Chronology, Dece:~yroer 27.
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
3-17 January 1964
Throughout period - The Chicom delegation headed by Chou En-lai
continues its African tour see Chrono Dec. 14 and continuing).
During his 9-dayAlbanian interlude, Dec. 31-Jan. 9, Chou re-
verted easily from the mild manner of a reasonableciplomat to
his other role as a militant Communist, with a series of speeches
containing increasingly direct slams at the Tito clique and the
Soviet camp. Before a mass rally in Tirana on the Sth, he spoke
of the "brilliant successes" won by the Albanians "in a state
of encirclement b enemies and in spite of the perfidy of those
who originally styled themselves as comrades." After going on at
some length about "modern revisionism" which "has tampered with
the fundamental axioms of Marxism-Leninism and has been seeking
to paralyze the revolutionary will of the people of the world,
disorganize the revolutionary ranks from within, and help im-
perialism prolong its life," Chou declaims: "The Chinese people
will never forget that when the modern revisionists leveled
wanton slanders and attacks at the CCP9 the Albanian Workers Party
...0 courageously stepped forward, resisted this evil trend, and
mercilessly exposed and dealt blows at the modern revisionists'
anti-China scheme." The 5,000-word-plus joint statement issued by
both countries on the 9th strongly denounces the modern revision-
ists and "the modern dogmatists (who) always follow the baton of
the modern revisionists," "great nation chauvinism and national
egoism in relations between socialist countries," "any attempt to
reverse the verdict on the Tito clique (which) is a betrayal of
Marxism-Leninism," and "the splitting and disruptive schemes of
the modern revisionists (which) will surely meet with complete
failure."
The Yugoslavs counter-attacked, especially in articles in the
main Belgrade dailies Borba and Politika on the 12th which not
only denounced Chou's "hostile campaign against Yugoslavia" and
the "frontal Chinese destructive wrecking and harmful policy
toward the socialist world and international labor movement,"
but also objected to "that part of the Tirana resolution in which
the Chinese and Albanian leaders proclaim a major part of the coun-
tries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as an 'interzone' -- that
is to say, as a 'non-occupied, uncovered zone to which the direct-a
_y orientate themselves at the moment." oliika calls this "an
underestimation of the peoples of these countries, who have their
own ideas about development .... the Chinese leaders want to im-
pose themselves as inspirers, champions and patrons of the
national liberation movements, and of peoples who have freed them-
selves from foreign oppression and, moreover, are making attempts
to determine their policy." On the 14th, the Yugoslav Government
handed official notes of protest to the Chinese Ambassador and
the Albanian Charge d'Affaires, -- which the latter refused to
accept.
(#20 Chronology Cont.)
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Moscow, meanwhile, sald.nothiiigr about Chou's performances, beyond
brief reports of his MoVements. Merely indirectly, a Pravda
editorial board interview on the 6th with Ghana's Nkrumah stressed
Soviet-Ghanaian friendship and hailed the test-ban treaty as a
"great victory ."
Chou's two-day visit to Tunisia, 9-10, brings an agreement to
establish diplomatic relations -- an intent which Tunis had pro-
claimed since 1958. His five-day visit to Ghana brought nothing
more tangible than a joint statement with Nkrumah endorsing an
"anti-imperialist conference" of African, Asian and Latin American
peoples and a conference of the world's heads of government -- if
convened to sign an international agreement on total nuclear dis-
armament. In Bamako on the 16th, Chou was told by President Keita
that Mali supported the CPR's right to sit in the U.N. Security
Council.
Januar 3 - La Voix dui, organ of the pro-Chinese group
of dissi ent Be gian Communists headed by Jacques Grippa, announcec.
that it would henceforth appear weekly instead of fortnightly: it
also reported that at a "national congress" on December 22 a
Walloon Communist Party and a Flemish Communist Party were set up,
which, together with the Grippa-led Brussels Federation, would be
"the Belgian Communist Party, reconstituted on the national level
on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." Maurice Massoz, leading polit-
buro member of the dissident group, stated that La Voix is now
printed in 10,000 copies, of which 2,000 are fob __distribution in
northeast France. He also said that it is hoped to produce a
Flemish edition in early spring.
Le Drapeau Rouge, daily organ of the old, Soviet-aligned Party,
has not mentioned these developments, but a spokesman derided
the claims of the dissidents, saying that "a mere five percent of
malcontents will not shake out position."
January 3-6 -- The Swedish Communist Party (SKP) finally held its
20th congress, resulting in a "new look" for the Party, presum-
ably designed to give it greater appeal in modern Swedish society.
Over 300 SKP delegates and numerous foreign guests -- including a
5-man CPSU delegation led by Ponomarev but no Chinese-line repre-
sentatives -- attended, and, for the first time, the proceedings
were public, held in the Parliament Building. 64-year-old H.
Hagberg, who has been chairman since 1951 and had announced his
intention to retire, was replaced by 46-year-old C. Hermansson,
chief editor of the SKP organ Ny Bag, and 11 new, young members
were elected to the 45-man Party Executive (renamed from Central
Committee).
Hermansson had gained a reputation as a reformer, and correspon-
dents' reports (we have not yet seen a round-up of proceedings)
indicate at least an outward Party swing in the direction of
independent national Swedish Communism. A German reporter states
Frankfurter 1 gemeine Zeitung January) that the Party
2 (#20 Chronology Continued)
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"dropped the demand for poletarian dictatorship in favor of a
parliamentary system" and the old demand for Swedish disarmament
was replaced by a "people's defense project." Another (Die Welt,
Hanburg,same day) reports Hermanason as saying: "I consider the
wall an anomaly, an abnormal situation in Germany."
The dissident, pro-Chinese Swedish Communist Workers League had c:is-
ti'ibutod theopmkgoffliho c?r se 2-page leaflet calling on the SKP to
repudiate its leaders who have "deserted Marxism and chosen the
broad and comfortable road of reforms" and return to the revolutionar;~
struggle for Communism. In his opening speech, Hagberg accused the
Chinese of "spreading the poison of doubt and dissension" in the
WCM and of apparently "placing the national interests of China before
world peace," and no one spoke up in support of the Chinese line,
although E. Gustafsson objected to Hagberg's mention of China because
"our congress should not be a forum for criticism of any fraternal
party."
January 7 - Khrushchev returns to Moscow after his "hunting trip"
visit with Gomulka: the major purpose for the visit was presumably
discussion of the problems facing the international Communist move-
ment, though no conclusions or formal agreements were reported. In
Paris, the FCP organ L'Humanite published a joint declaration of
the French and Spanish CP's, agreed on at a meeting in December,
which declared their indignation at "the divisionist attempts fomenter
by the leaders of the CCP between and within fraternal parties of
various countries," condemned "the violent attacks directed by the
CCP against the CPSU, its leaders, and other Communist parties which
defend the line approved by the international Communist movement,"
and declared their support for an international conference to help
consolidate unity. And in Tokyo, the Asahi Evening News reports
that the Japanese Socialist Party will send a mission to the USSR in
March at the invitation of the CC The paper comments that
"the JSP has recently moved closer to Communist Chinese ideology,
but the Soviet talks are expected to bring it closer to Russian
policy, particularly with regard to the peace movement."
January 8 - Reuters i.; Moscow reports that the "latest issue avail-
le here" of Problems of Peace and Socialism carries an article
attacking the Chinese press for "recognizing as genuine Communist
revolutionaries" various weak splitter groups of dissidents who are
subverting the unity of a party, while at the same time they are
unilaterally and arbitrarily branding as revisionists, aides of im-
perialism, and even its direct agents, "such militant detachments
of the revolutionary movement as the Communist parties of the USA,
Italy, France, Spain, Chile, Iraq, India and many others." Whatever
revolutionary views are propagated by the splinter groups, the article
says, they in fact play only one role: "They serve as an instrument
of the bourgeoisie in the struggle against Communism. The article
calls on all parties to oppose such activity, repeats a call for an
end to polemics, and speaks of a conference of all CP's "after care-
ful preparation." It is signed jointly by Vaclav Slavi~b, member of
the Czech Party CC, Norman Freed, candidate member of the Canadian
CC, and Murad Kuwatly, a Syrian publicist. And a London Observer,
3 (#20 Chronology Continued)
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dispatch from Colombo carried by the Washinon Post this date
reported further on "the bitter ideological f i,9l~t between the
pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions in Ceylon" which "has come
to a head with the summary dismissal of five Ceylonese employees
from Soviet-bloc offices. " The men "allege that they were
sacked for their pro-China affiliations" and "charge their former
employers with victimization, a word generally reserved by Com-
munist trade unionists for capitalist bosses." "Their case is
sponsored by the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, over which pro-
China Communists ass assumed command after a pitched battle at the
recent annual meeting."
January 9 - Borba, Belgrade, carries an article by its Moscow
correspondent Bayalski who notes that two and a half months
have elapsed since Khrushchev proposed to Peking to stop public
polemics -- for the third time in recent years -- and "for as
long as 70 days so far" the Soviet side has been refraining from
writing or publishing replies to the Chinese, who "continue
launching assaults on the entire political line of the CPSU".
"People in Moscow think that this is an alarming situation and
one which demands an analysis of F_ further intentions."
January 10 - A UPI London dispatch (carried by Washington Post
Jan. 12 stated that North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh "was
reported today to have fallen out of favor with Red China's
rulers in an apparent split clouding relations between the Asian
neighbors." The article cited "informed Communist reports reach-
ing here" to the effect that Ho "had cooled to the political
and ideological strategy of the Peking regime" and that "the
Mao regime" has sought to isolate Ho in an effort to keep its
hold on the rest of the North Vietnamese Communist hierarchy.
January 12 -- A Peking People's Daily editorial denouncing the US 11 role in Panama jabs at the Soviets: "How strange, then, that
some who call themselves Marxist-Leninists actually applaud
Johnson's State of the Union message."
January 13 -- Castro unexpectedly arrives in Moscow at the
height of the Panama-USA crisis, but no connection between the
two events is admitted. A Cuban La Prensa article says that
Castro's talks with the Soviet boss will very likely deal with
the international Communist movement and the entire world sit-
uation. In Rome, a left-wing band of rebels bolted from Nenni's
Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and formed a new "Socialist Party
of Proletarian Unity" (PSIUP) with Tullio Vecchietti as General
Secretary. Although the break came primarily in protest against
Nenni's cooperation in the Moro government, it appeared that the
line of the new party would be more in harmony with the Chinese
than with the Italian or Soviet Communists.
January 15 -- NCNA international service first acknowledges
Khruschev's proposal for international agreemen renouncfnguse
0 once o se a errs oria ispu es: it is brief factual
report which does not elaborate on the contents of the proposal.,
4 (#20 Chronology Continued)
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and it has not been carried by any domestic media, as far as
we know. In a remarkably outspoken press conference in Rome, 4
top Italian CP National Executive members outline plans for a
far-reachi . rt reorganization to be adopted by a national
conference March 1 -15. The changes, which will give more
importance and power to regional committees, are admittedly in
response to a drop in Party membership over the last 10 years
from 2,145,000 to 1,615,000 and in Communist Youth Federation
membership from 431,000 to 172,000. The four also made a fresh
appeal for a broad alliance "among all the different political
organizations of the working class," including not only the
Socialist and Social Democrats but also the Christian Democrat
labor groups. On the same day, a PCI delegation led by Togliatti
arrives in Belgrade_ for an informal fraternal visit with Tito
and other Yugoslav Party officials in response to an invitation
extended a year ago.
eon
an L'Humanite publishes. a
org
The French
January 15-16 -- draft resolution (15th and pro osed ch na es of the Part statutes
(16th) approved by the CC for submission to the spring P con-
gress in Lille. The changes, apparently designed to further a
"united front" with the Socialists, and other leftists, advanced
the idea of peaceful change to socialism and provided for more
internal democracy in the Party.
January 16 -- The January issue of the Yugoslav theoretical
journal Komunistdedicates its lead editorial to the 40th anni-
versar of Lenin's death. It accuses the Chinese of 'U
total dogmatization and degradation of the rand teachings
of Marx and Lenin.' Although they proclaim themselves "the sole
d "keep quoting his works
"
an
deserving followers of Leninism, until exhaustion" they"do this outside the context of the entirety
of his thought and ryes ective of the situation in which that
thought was expressed, which is contradictory to all that Lenin
did and spoke of." Komunist adds: "Lenin in the Chinese fashion
is an irresponsible flood of sheer phraseology, senseless and
spiritless, and a vain effort to disguise a wrong political
orientation and veil it in a quasi_revolutionary garment."
January 17 -- In a rambling speech accompan ing Castro on a
visit to a Kalinin textile factory, Khrushchev made several
defensive references to his differences with the Chinese --
without naming them. Extolling Soviet material successes, he
said:
"Some people who call themselves Communists are
criticizing us because we want the country to be richer
and the people to live better. That sort of critic
has a strange logic. He reasons like this: the better
the Soviet people live, the greater the danger of their
becoming bourgeois-minded. But we say: if a man has one
suit, please god that he gets two, and then three. Let
the people have plenty to eat, let all the children study,
5 (#20 Chronology Continued)
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requirements -- this is our dream, which is now
coming true."
In doing everything to meet the material and spiritual
requirements of the people, he says, "we are following the
only correct Leninist path, and nobody will succeed in push-
ing us off that path." In a similar way, he refers to
"comrades abroad wr o say that Khrushchev is not managing
things in the right way, that he is afraid of war," and that
"there were people who began criticizing us for placing the
rockets (in baba) and then taking them away," but the
results have demonstrated the wisdom of our policy.
( M,O Chr xao logy )
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731. The Soviet Succession Problem
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BACKGROUND: The assassination of President Kennedy called
to mind'a universal problem -- that of providing for a smooth
transfer of power in the event that a national leader dies.
Dress discussion, particularly in the Near East and Latin America,
noted the smooth transition from John F. Kennedy to Lyndon
Johnson and privately, many heads of government (and their
possible successors) must have wondered what would happen in
the event of their own sudden death. There are a large number
of leaders who would be poor life insurance risks, and most of
them could not be so smoothly and easily replaced: e.g.,
de Gaulle, Nehru, Haile Selassie, Jomo Kenyatta, Sukarno, Mao,
Salazar, Tito, Franco, Gomulka, Ho Chi Minh, and rrushchev,
who will be 70 next April.
Nowhere is the succession problem more acute than in the
Soviet neon, the leading nation in e so-ca a "socialist
camp." Since the USSR is armed with advanced weapons and since
it exercises political influence throughout the world, the ques-
tion of who rules in the Kremlin concerns everyone. A highly
irrational individual (like Hitler, for example) could, as Soviet
dictator, destroy civilization. Yet the Soviet succession is
in no way assured.
Under present conditions, a succession crisis is practi-
cally a built-in feature of the Soviet system, There is y now
a certain more or less established way to win a Soviet succes-
sion struggle: as the system has worked thus far, the victor
is likely to be the man who is most successful in building a
personal machine within the CPSU. This was how Stalin managed
to 0 ow Lenin, an how . rus ev managed to fallow Stalin.
But no ruling dictator knowingly permits anyone else to build
up a personal machine during his lifetime -- they might not
wait for him to die naturally before seizing power. (If there
are favored heirs apparent, like Malen_kov under Stalin or
Erezhnev at present, it is a pretty safe bet that they are with-
out organized support.) Thus, unless as in Lenin's last years
the old dictator is physically or mentally unable to maintain
close control, possible successors have no opportunity to build
up a really strong group of vassals until the old man dies. At
that time, the personal factions have to be organized from
scratch. Hence there is likely to be a period of instability,
during which rivals maneuver for position.
The succession crisis following Lenin's death lasted
approximately seven years (1923-1930); that following Stalin's
death lasted approximately four years (1953-1957) -- at least
as it now appears. But Khrushchev finally won out only by
appealing to lower-ranking supporters over the heads of the
"anti-Party group," and he has never secured the unquestioned
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(731 Cont.) 27 January 1964
leadership which Stalin held. For one thing, Khrushchev has
failed to retain unchallenged leadership of the world Communist
movement. For another, signs continue to appear showing a
degree of domestic opposition to Khrushchev's wishes. For
examp e:
--Molotov tried to submit an article contrary
to Khrushchev's position in April 1960, and
in 1961 is said to have attacked the CPSU 20
Year grogram in a letter to the Central Com-
mittee. (See BPG #563, 27 August 1962)
--At the 22nd Congress in :L961, A.F. Kirilenko
(identified as a Khrushchev supporter) lost
candidate Presidium member status while I.J.
Spiridonov (believed to be allied with Frol
Kozlov) became a party Secretary; in April 1962,
however, Kirilenko was promoted to full member
of the CPSU Presidium and Spiridonov was
transferred to a purely ceremonial job. (BPG
#543, 16 July 1962)
--Although Khrushchev had lately described
Yugoslavia as "socialist," instead of
"revisionist," the original 1963 Soviet May
Day slogans, published on 0 April 1963, failed
to say that in Yugoslavia -- as in the case
of all the other Communist countries -- the
people were "building socialism"; the "error"
was corrected three days later.
--Just recently, at the December 1963 plenum,
the goal for fertilizer production for 1970
was announced as 70-80 million tons, instead
of the 100 million tons Khrushchev had advo-
cated a short time before.
Despite such signs of opposition, there is no strong
successor in sight, and it is difficult to pre ict what would
happen if 1thrushchev died. Frol Kozl.ov (age 55), the heir
apparent until last April, has repot ecTly suffered either a
stroke or a crippling heart attack, and apparently is out of
the running, although he is still officially Second Secretary
of the CPSU, and a member of the CPSU Presidium. Leonid Ilich
Brezhnev (57), the current "coming man," has in recent years
been mostly involved with his ceremonial duties as the Soviet
Chief of State (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet).
It is rumored that he has suffered two heart attacks; if true,
this would mean medically that a third, possibly fatal attack
was quite likely. Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin (59), perhaps
the next in line, has lately had the appearance of ill-health,
and Anastas Mikoyan (68), Mikhail Suslov (61), and Otto Kuusinen
(32) are all aand reportedly in -poor health. N.M. verni
is an old Stalinist hack of 75. The life of a top Soviet
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official, involving little exercise, an excess of food and drink,
long and irregular hours, and a constant atmosphere of anxiety,
is about as unhealthy as could be devised. If we note that the
average age of the twelve CPSU Presidium members is 62, this
scarcely gives an adequate idea of the effective age of these
men.
Nikolai V. Podgorny, an outspoken Irushchevite, seems to
be, after Brezhnev, a man to watch. Recently he has attended
functions relating to world Communist activities, perhaps in
order to gain the international experience and contacts he
sorely lacks. But at 60, he is hardly young; his past experi-
ence is in food industry and Ukrainian party affairs. L.P.
Ilyichev, who has cut a mediocre figure at recent party cultural
concaves, is 58. Beneath the older generation, there are few
young hopefuls in sight. Men like Dmitri Stepanovich Polyansky
(45: agricultural affairs), Petr Nikolaevich Demichev (45: Party
Secretary), and AN. Shele in (45: formerly in Komsomol activities
and former chief of the KGB) are exceptional, and play minor
roles, usually as specialists in some field.
The dearth in young talent may be partly explained by the
terrible Soviet population losses due to the Civil War, forcible
collectivization, Stalin's terrorism and slave labor camps, and
World War II. Had there been no Communism, no Stalin, and no
war, there would probably be about 20,000,000 more people on the
present territory of the Soviet Union. (Actual 1959 population:
203,226,650) Young active males were the group hardest hit in
the 1930's and 1940's, so that over the age of 35, there are
only three men to every five women. (Such younger CPSU leaders
as there are, like Shelepin, avoided extended front-line service
thanks to their party positions.) Perhaps, too, there would be
more young hopefuls if the non-Slavic quarter of the population
had opportunities equal to those of the Russians and Ukrainians.
The only full members of the CPSU Presidium who are not Slavs
are Mikoyan and the ancient Yuusinen, holdovers from Stalin's
day.
Thus the outlook for the Soviet Union, despite 7 and 20
Year plans, is far from clear. Xhrushchev is not as suspicious
as Stalin, but he does not give Brezhnev serious responsibilities.
i2irushchev apparently has a certain earthy appeal, but he has
never established himself as a Communist theorist or as a great
revolutionary, and his prospective successors will probably do
no better in this respect. Brezhnev's lack of Bolshevik renown
is likely, among other things, to make it still harder to retain
control of foreign Communist parties.
Perhaps Peking is the greatest problem facing the Kremlin.
Those Soviet leaders most likely to be able to patch up relations
with China are precisely those who are now out of the running:
Kozlov and Suslov (we need hardly mention Molotov). Compared
with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, or Chou En-lai, the potential
Soviet leaders are inferior in experience and personal prestige.
3
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What they will do is of course not now known. Quite possibly
these men will continue and develop Khrushchev's policies,
because none of them seems to have Stalin's or Mao's tendency
to ignore or flout realities. Economic, social, and military
realities dictate policies of increased investment in agricul-
ture, increased emphasis on chemicals, increased contacts with
the West, increased resort to the "peaceful coexistence" slogan,
and the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Peking, however, is unlikely to approve of these policies.
25X1C10b
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(731.)
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732 EE,FTB,d. Soviet Balance-of-Payment Difficulties 25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: As first reported in the New York Times of
S January 303 Press Comment, S January), economic analysts in
the Central Intelligence Agency conclude that growth in Soviet
gross national product amounted only to 2.5 per cent in 1362
and 1363, and that Soviet gold reserves have fallen to less than
$2 billion. According to a news story datelined London, appear-
ing in the 17ashington post on 19 January (Press Comment, 21 Janu-
ary), British officials estimate 1962 and 1933 Soviet d? growth
at 3 to 3.5 per cent and agree with the $2 billion gold reserve
estimate (though they draw different conclusions from these
figures). CIA*s estimates met with disbelief in certain quar-
ters, especially in those which are suspicious of CIA's motives,
those which wish to extend credits to the Soviet Union, or those
who (like Moscow) want to pretend that the USSR represents the
"wave of the future."
The CIA figure on GIP will not be discussed here (see
Briefly Noted). This guidance takes up instead the Soviet need
for loans and the dangers involved in any such loans. The de-
cline in Soviet gold reserves is significant mainly as a symptom
of more general economic problems, especially of a difficulty in
marking exports and services sold to foreigners match imports and
other expenses abroad. When a country cannot pay for its imports
or foreign expenses in some other way, and cannot defer payment
by borrowing, that country (if it does not default) must export
gold--hence gold exports serve as a signal of difficulties. The
US itself has had some difficulties in this field in recent
years, even though our merchandise exports exceed our imports,
largely because we have been spending heavily abroad on foreign
aid and in particular on free world defenses.
Soviet apologists counter-attack by stressing US payments
difficulties, and they may also claim to have an export surplus.
On paper, and according to Soviet figures, the USSR did have an
export surplus in 1962. Their trouble is that many Quiet ex-
ports went to "soft currency" countries (i.e., countries whose
currency is not acceptable everywhere at par) where payment is
sometimes slow and almost always in barter; an excess of exports
to these countries does not help the USSR to pay for imports from
industrially-advanced, hard currency countries. And it is these
imports of advanced equipment that Moscow needs if it is to over-
come its agricultural difficulties without serious sacrifices in
its military and other heavy industry programs. (See attachment)
It is not true that the USSR is unable to construct techni-
cally advanced equipment, although Soviet propagandists like to
pretend that this is the view of "US reactionary circles," so
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that they can ynocka down a straw man with references to cosmon-
auts, etc. The point is rather that the remlin would like to
borrow abroad so that it can buy abroad without sacrificing any
of its programs. Also, Soviet leaders do not want to admit that
their system is unable to solve its problems by itself, and for-
eign credits provide an inconspicuous way of getting foreign aid.
Large foreign credits would enable them simultaneously to make
needed expenditures on agriculture, to continue large-scale in-
vestment in industry, and to stay in the arms and space races.
Such credits will of course come due later, but Soviet officials
are inclined to let the future take care of itself.
Thus loans or credits give aid to the USSR in its competi-
tion with the West. Yet many western businessmen and some
western governments are ready to extend such credits. These
people are primarily interested in selling goods to the Soviets,
and in some cases (as for example in British shipbuilding) such
sales might help to solve local unemployment problems and make
governments more popular. Partly as rationalization, and partly
because they really gauge the situation differently, these ele-
ments question the seriousness of the Soviet predicament and
argue that trade will bring about better East-West relations.
A."fat Russian," they say, is apt to be peaceful. They are in-
clined to thin: that US efforts to bar long-term credits are
motivated either by rabid and outdated anti-Soviet mania, or by
a desire to reserve some of this market for the US itself.
Sometimes exponents of trade with the Soviets try to use US
grain sales as an argument: "If the US can sell the Russians
wheat, why can't we sell them machinery?"
The US has no desire to inflict suffering on the Soviet
citizen and does not consider cash wheat sales comparable with
sales on credit of advanced equipment--which help the Soviet
loaders stay in the arms race, and assist them in attempts to
"overtake and surpass" the West. Past experience indicates that
the Soviet leaders will resume their threats and aggressive
gambits as soon as they are able. It is hardly realistic to
believe that they would be grateful in the future for long-term
credits extended now, especially since they must compete in
revolutionary zeal with Peking.
25X1C10b
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(Note: At present, on a small volume of trade, Soviet
exports to several Western European countries, including the
U:C, France, and Italy, exceed imports from them. This condi-
tion is accentuated at the moment by a Soviet cut-back on
imports of machinery in order to concentrate on grain purchases
from non-European areas. But these export surpluses do not
represent a normal Soviet ability to pay for large volumes of
European industrial imports (or to repay large oans financing
such imports) by exports to Europe. Most of the Soviet exports
to Europe are in raw materials, fuel and (in good years) food,
and this trade cannot expand rapidly, both supply and demand
being inelastic. Machinery might seem more promising, but as
already noted there are difficulties in providing good quality
and service; out of total Soviet exports of machinery and equip-
ment in 1962 amounting to $1325 billion, only 2 per cent or
$25 million was sold to the industrial free world, the rest
going to less-developed and bloc countries. Exports of all
hinds to the industrial west were $1.1 billion. As noted in
attachment, the over-all Soviet deficit in hard currency that
year was $350 million, and may be double that figure for 1963.
If the USSR borrowed $500 million a year in five per cent ton
year credits, and did not default, they would after 1922 have to
pay bath. $612 million a year.just to keep their debt from
increasing.) 4
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733 WE,e. Specter of a New Popular Front in France
25X1C10b
The Making of the First Popular Front. In 1932,
before the emergence In ance of the opu ar ont, the PCF
was a hopelessly isolated minority having but 10 of some 500
seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
At the beginning of 1934 France was suffering the worst
phase of a great economic depression, while uncertainly ruled
by its fifth government in 18 months. Moreover, there was much
during the year 1034 which suggested to European Liberals and
Socialists that -- since Hitler had come to power -- in many
countries civil liberties and democratic institutions were
threatened. The Austrian Socialist Party was suppressed in
February 1034. Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered in
Vienna in July, just after the Nazis had revealed their ruth-
lessness, treachery and brutality by the murder of Roehin and
Schleicher. In October a rising of Socialist miners in the
Asturias was harshly put down by the new Spanish Republic. The
feeling that things were taking a rapid turn for the worse was
intensified by Germany's open rearmament and by the Italian
attack on Ethiopia the following year. Thus, for the two years
from 1034 to 1936, it looked as if the people of Europe were
taking sides for a great struggle between democracy and dictator-
ship. And when the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1036
(some four months after Hitler's remilitarization of the
Rhineland) it seemed to many people that the battle had already
begun.
The Paris riots of 6 Feb 1934 were one of a series of
events which led to the formation of the Popular Front, partial-
ly in reaction to the possibility of a Right-wing dictatorship.
The Communists were finally realizing that National Socialism
was not just a phase in the death-throes of capitalism and they
were gradually abandoning their refusal to ally themselves
openly with any other European party in opposing Fascism. In
France there seemed to be a need for a broadly-based coalition
to resist Fascism as well as to bring about long-overdue social
reforms. Thus, in the course of 1034 the French Socialist Party
(SFIO) and the PCF drew closer together and on 27 August 1934
they signed the United Actions Pact, which could be called the
formal beginning of what came to be known as the Front Commun.
(733. Continued)
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There followed lC months of tough, suspicious negotiations
between the C"10 and the Pte, interrupted more than once because
of continuing insults and polemics in the Communist press against
the SFIO. The SFIO had no clear program for relations with the
PC?; but the ?CF had clear instructions from Moscow: they were to
weaken the SFIO from below by attacks on its leaders, and they
were to make sure that any joint action was under Communist ti
leadership. In l'Fuumanite of 20 March 1934 Thorez declared, it
is under the direc bon ?i the Communist party, in spite of and
in the face of the SFIO, that fighting unity between Communist
and Socialist proletarians will be forged." Thorez was parti-
cularly bitter against those leaders on the left of the SFIO
who showed signs of taking the leading place in the movement for
working-class unity which the Communists had reserved for them-
selves. The SFIO sought continuously and vainly to achieve a
definite plan of joint action for specific ends, feeling that
only when agreement was reached on a detailed program of reforms
and their theoretical basis was there any sense in discussing
the creation of a united party to put them into action. The
Communists wanted nothing so specific. SFIO leader Leon alum
expressed the grave misgivings and suspicions of the Socialists
when he wrote that "the current towards unity might be trans-
formed into a current toward Communism." However, the SFIO was
under great popular pressure for progress toward some form of
working-class unity. For example, in September of 1935 the
national councils of the two trade union movements, the non-
Communist C.G.T. and the Communist C.G.T.U., reached agreement
on the terms under which they could fuse the two organizations,
after negotiations as long and as complicated as those between
the two political parties. Another notable evidence of the
success of Communist party tactics was their comparative gains
over the SIO in various local elections.
During this period Stalin decided to seek some diplomatic
agreement with the West in order to resist Hitler. Laval went
to Moscow and on 2 May 1935 signed a Franco-Russian alliance.
Whereas only two years earlier the Comintern Executive Committee
had rebuked the ?CF for flirting with the Socialists, the
Seventh World Congress of the Communist International (Comintern)
met in Moscow in July-August 1935 and reversed policy by putting
the official seal of approval on anti-Fascist united fronts in
France and elsewhere.
On 22 January 1936 the Laval Government fell, In ,larch
Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland; a fortnight later on 20
March 1936 the French Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and the
electoral campaign began in earnest along lines agreed to in
advance by the SFIO and 13C?. On the first ballot the voters had
a choice of fight-wing or popular Front candidates. In the end
the Communists gained 62 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thus
advancing to a strength of 72 seats as compared to their 1932
strength of 10. While the SFIO received almost the same number
of popular votes as they had in 1932 (some 1,900,003), the PC?
received 1,503,000 as compared with 794,000 in 1932.
2
(733. Continued)
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After the elections in 1936 a wave of industrial agitation
broke out at once. The PCF refused to participate in the new
cabinet, preferring to have the advantages of the electoral vic-
tory without its responsibilities. In mid-1936 two great waves
of "stay---in" strikes broke out in which the workers "occupied"
major factories. The first was a short one at the end of May,
and then came a much vaster one, which reached its climax on
June 7, but took weeks and months to subside. On June 3 over a
million people were on strike in France; the engineering indus-
try and building trades of the Paris region came almost com-
pletely to a standstill. Workers' demands varied from one
improvised strikers' committee to another. The new Blum govern-
ment promised to table Bills concerning working hours, collec-
tive contracts and holidays, while appealing to the workers to
observe discipline and to employers to treat the dispute in a
broad-minded spirit. The PCF leaders assumed the role of the
Great Victors. Thorez proclaimed the "new legality" and said
if the workers took good care of the plants during the stay-in
strikes, it was because "the factories would soon be the property
of the workers, anyway." France went up to her ears in debt;
interest rates were high; and the increased costs of production
only aggravated her already existing handicaps as an exporter.
In spring of 1937 new strikes and rioting broke out, and in June
the Bourse crashed to the lowest levels since the panic days of
1926. The Popular Front government of Leon Blum fell that month.
Orthodox economists and those who remember the climate of
the ::popular Front of 1936-37 agrco that its policies were catas-
trophic for France. In 1935 Paul Reynaud had the ugly task of
destroying the peaceful illusion of the Popular Front and pro-
claiming the end of the "two-Sunday week." The "national reac-
tion" of autumn, 1933 was directed in part at the PCF and its
submissiveness to Moscow, but was above all a pretext for taking
a ruthless revenge for the havoc that the Popular Front had done
in the social field.
Current Problems in France. Superficially there are certain
parallels between today's situation and the one which persuaded
the SF10 and other factions to join forces with the PCF thirty
years ago. Many are opposed to the increasingly autocratic
nature of the government; the desire for the defeat of do Gaulle
puts the SFIO on common ground with the PCF on this issue.
Internally there is a threat of increasing labor unrest caused
by mounting inflation. French government relations with totali-
tarian states (Peking and Moscow) are once more in a state of
flux and a cause for alarm to many Frenchmen. And again the
SFIO is seeking earnestly for a constructive modus vivendi with
the French Communists, apparently forgetting past lessons on the
absolute fallacy of such aspirations. Thus the press reveals
an SF10 leadership disagreeing among themselves and with other
Socialist parties; the SFIO leadership visiting iOirushchev in
Moscow at the request of the CPSU; the SFIO declaring that they
will not reject Communist assistance if it will contribute to
the defeat of do Gaulle, but that the only basis for any perma-
nent collaboration between the SFIO and PCF is the PCP's adoption
3
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and implementation of the democratic pre-conditions defined by
the SFIO; the SFI0 saying they reject the Communist tactic of
concealing from the electorate the issues which divide the
SFIO from the PCF and keeping before their respective followers
only the issues which tend to unite them; and the SFIC declar-
ing they will not support the establishment of another popular
Front. While not openly endorsing another Popular Front, the
PCF would of course, welcome a reenactment of the events of
1234-37 under any slogan or pretext. For example, in the party's
official organ, l'l-iumanite, on 16 January 1964, the PCT' made
public proposed changes in party statutes to be put before the
Central Committee at the party's congress in Lille next spring.
These changes are principally designed to further an anti-
do Gaulle alliance with the SFYO and are made to sound like a
major liberalization of doctrine. The pronouncements include
statements that the PCF rejects "the idea that the existence of
a single party is a necessary condition for the passage to
Socialism," that the PCF can now foresee a peaceful way to
Socialism, and that henceforth the election of (certain of) the 25X1C1Ob
party's committees would be carried out by secret ballot.
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73-1 AF.g.. Chou En-lai in Africa: China in the U.N.? 25X1C10b
B.ACsGROUND : Accompanied by Foreign Minister Chen Yi and
an entourage o 74 premier Chou En-tai's two-month African trip
is a high level effort to end Communist China's isolation and
increase its international influence. Chou's trip may be seen
to be inspired by the desire for gains in three fields, namely:
1. To enlarge China's position on the Communist world
map at the expense of the Soviet nion y: peal bng her own
uorc:er claims against Soviet-supported India; calling for
another Bandung-type conference of Afro-Asian governments (with-
out USSR and Yugoslavia) which China could dominate, as dis-
tinguished from the Belgrade-type non-aligned states conference
favored by many African statesmen; labelling as false Moscow's
claim to be opposed to the Afro-Asian proposal for enlarging
the U.N. Security Council because China haR not been admitted
to the U.N.
2. To obtain increased diplomatic recognition which could
also be turned in o vote or p s bid to the Of the 35
African countries now in the 113-member UN, 14* recognize Commu-
nist China; 20** recognize the Government of the Republic of
China, a permanent member of the Security Council. In October
1E63 $IOUI General Assembly voted 57 to 41 against admitting
Communist China and ousting Nationalist China.
3. To increase her influence in developing areas by per-
sonal diplomacy where her own domestic economic failures have
limited her ability to persuade by aid or trade.
African Reaction to the Trip. Chou En-lai has unquestion-
ably given an astute performance and has made a favorable
impression on his various hosts. He appears to have accont3lish-.
this much by careful attention to at least three cardinal points:
Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, United Arab Republic,
Sudan, Somali, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Tunisia, Burundi,
Kenya
**Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togo, Libya, Niger, Chad, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo
(Leo