BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 16, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Briefly Noted
Cuba's Sugar-Coated Economic Chaos
Although there have been complaints that the economic
boycott against Cuba is hurting the trade of some free coun-
tries, for others it is a blessing in disguise. The election
of prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies has been attributed in
part to the sudden increase in prosperity in the sugar-pro-
ducing territory of Queensland. With most of Cuba's sugar
going to Communist Bloc countries, and international quotas
no longer in force, queensland has increased the production
of sugar from 1,400,000 tons in 1931 to 1,950,000 in 1033,
with the prospect of raising this to 2,135,000 tons in 1964.
In fact, all sugar-producing countries of the free world
have profited by the present Cuban-created situation, sell-
ing more sugar and at higher prices -- up to 11 cents U.S.
per pound. Cuba, on the other hand, as a result of Castro's
wildly erratic economic policies, is producing less sugar
and selling it at lower prices. Under a bi-lateral barter
agreement, Cuba is exporting 1,000,000 tons of sugar to the
Soviet Union in 1933. Of this total, 100% will be exchanged
for other goods at the rate of C cents per pound, and 20%
will be sold for hard currency at 4 cents per pound. All
sugar that Cuba exports to other bloc countries is exchanged
for barter at a cents per pound.
Ile do not wish to present the above in such a way as
to ma?=_e it look as though the sugar-producing countries of
Latin America, for example, are profiting by the misfortune
of the Cuban people. However, Cuba's economic plight today
serves as a good case history of how Communist mismanagement
can bring economic ruin to the most prosperous country.
Further, in the market vacuum created by Cuba, other sugar-
producing countries of the world are building vested inter-
ests in increased production. Therefore, if Cuba continues
to pursue its present Communist-dictated economic policies --
which it undoubtedly will Co as long as Castro is in power it stands a good chance of losing its old sugar markets
permanently.
(Briefly Noted)
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DATES OF "I -rAGLIT!A INTEREST
January L.A. Trade Union Fed. Constituent Cong. (WiTU
sponsor:;) Rio d,:; Janoir o, Jan.
2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba 1959 (fifth
anniversary).
21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (40th anniversary) (born 22
Anril 1570) wee B?G item 709 of 4 November?
Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears
allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.
31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929 (35th anniv.)
21 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from
participation inter-American system by Foreign
Ministers at Punta del Este, 1962.
I Feb UIIGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communists
aggression in Korea, 1951.
14 Feb USSR. and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Dino--Soviet
oriendship Pact) repudiating Soviet Nationalist
Treaty (14 August 1045), 1950.
14 Feb I hrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at
C? SU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1S-16.
24 Feb Treaty of Ili (or St. Petersburg) returning most
of Sinkiang territory to China but granting por-
tion to ".ussia, 1581.
25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders' Party,
Bela Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-
Communist opposition, rung. 1947.
2 Feb International Conference of Youth and Students for
Disarmament, Peace and National Independence (RWyDY-
sponsored), Florence, Italy, 26 Feb-1 Mar 1963.
27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Eundred Flowers" speech, 1957.
March Latin American Youth Congress (Communist-sponsored)
Cantiago, Chile, 1964.
2 r:ar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore
capitalism by Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda et al,
{IC sentenced to death) 2-13 March 1935.
5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1079), 1953.
C Mar February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-2 Mar)
C--15 March 1917.
13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai
Lama, 1959.
14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1515), 1C03.
13 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1021.
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The Dictionary is a "must" for every
scholar and propagandist. Available
on request from Headquarters.
A reference of continuing interest treating the basic
issues of the vino-Soviet dispute. innate Communist
problems, as exposed by the principals themselves, are
presented in alphabetical order: a succinct explana-
tion of each issue is juxtaposed with the conflicting
stands of Moscow and Peking arranged in a parallel
column. This ?rimer of the Cino-Soviet Conflict (un-
classified) is an authoritative source for a concerI-
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 #13
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pROLLAGAND IST' S GUIDE TO COM1IIU1 TIST D ISS3NS IONS
23 November - 6 December 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The struggle in world Communism during this period
focused on Warsaw, where representatives of the major parties
fought a bitter mutually damaging 5-day battle before more than
400 delegates from O-some coup rtes assemo a or a meeting of
the World Peace Council: see detailed account in Chronology,
November-?ecem er The Soviets succeeded in marshaling an
overwhelming majority in support o eir pos on on peace, cap-
a a iz ng par cu arly on their popular initiative on the test-
ban treaty, -- with only the Chinese Albanians tThNorth Koreans,
forth Vietnamese ana Japanese in o position. e n onesjans
made speeches on the Chinese side bu ai a to follow through
with their votes.) however, the nature of the bitter recrimina-
tions, the refusal of the dissenters to accept the majority de-
claration and the absence of many delegates from the voting matte
the value of this Soviet "victory" rather doubtful.
2. Meanwhile, the official Rumanian acceptance of Yugo-
slavia slavia as a full-fledged socialist state, spelled out in ajo
communique which concerned economic agreements for the most part
(Chrono, Nov. 30), tended further to counter Chinese offorts to
stig:iatize "the Tito clique."
3. While the Chinese press continued to carry "routine"
polemical materials and press reports supporting their line, the
Soviet press continued to play down the dispute: in tact, the
first Soviet mention of Chinese obstructiveness and attacks at
the WPC meeting came in ?ravda and Izvestiya articles on Dec-
amber 3, alter its conclusion. A 9, wora' ?ravda article on
the 3rd anniversary of the 31-party Moscow con erence (Chrono,
Dec. 6) -- although it calls in calm language for discussion of
zontroversial questions in "the normal channel of inter-party
relations" and an end to open polemics "to ;neat more favorable
con;itions for the convocation of a new conference" -- seems
like a throw-bac?k to the 39 March CPSU letter to the CC'_?. It
iL1ies that it is up to the Chinese (without ever naming thee)
to restore unity by correcting their erroneous views and refrain-
ing frori their harmful activities
Z-. Reports (by NCNA) from Melbourne and Colombo indicate
that pro-Chinese dissidents in Australia and Caylon are moving
ciosar to the establishment of organized parties. (Chrono, Tlov-
eaber 23, December 3 and 4).
S. The highly heretical article by Landin in the Swedish
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013 Cont.)
Ny Dag of November 9,doscribed in our last installment, has been
=owed up by three further letters, one of which expresses
partial agreement, while the other two, including one by veteran
party boss Hagber, rebut without engaging in any personal attack.
(Appendix to Chronology and unclassified attachment. Note:
translations of these articles were carried in the following
numbers, of the series Translations on International Communist
Developments; the Nov. 9 article in No. 536, JPRS: 22,130 dtd
3 December 1963; and the three comments on it in No. 541, JPRS
22,262 dtd 13 December. The latter report also carries another
interesting article by klagberg from Ny Dag of 14 December, en-
titled "World Conference, But The Time $s of Yet Ripe.")
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Significance:
There has been no further reliable information regarding
prospects for Sino-Soviet bilateral talks or a world Communist
meeting, but the developments at the Warsaw WPC meeting might
be taken as a possible clue to the future. Here the Soviets
found the most favorable conditions they might ever expect for
an international conference (infact, the Chinese delegation
alone voted against the resolution for holding the Warsaw meet-
ing when the WPC Presidium not in Vienna, 27-29 Sept. according
to a report in the Indian Cn weekly New Age on 13 Oct.), i.e.:
a. Of all the issues in dispute, the Soviet
position is by far the strongest and most
popular on "peace," especially since the
opposition to the test-ban treaty and their
attack on the Indian border;
b. The UPC "apparat" has depended heavily on
Soviet financial support; and
c. The meeting was held in "friendly" (to the
Soviets) territory.
Nevertheless, the Soviets, torn between their desire to bring
the dissenters to heel and their need to maintain at least a
semblance of unity, were unable to maintain their absolute con-
trol over the W?C and had to be satisfied with a statement ac-
cepted only by a majority, while the Chinese divulged to the
world the texts of the two minority statements and the score of
the voting.
2
0131 Cont.)
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(5` 13' Cont.)
We can conclude frori the lossOnS of the Warsaw TIM meeting
and other recent developments (e.g. the resolution of the Italian
C'..-, COL ITTAt2W #15 and 3PG #717) that the chances for a new world
conference of all Communist parties are very dim indeed -- unless
the Soviets would capitulate, in fact, before the peremptory de-
mands of ?cuing. Apparently the two contestants cannot even
agree on the rules for the contest: the Chinese insist on una-
nimity for all decisions, the Soviets on majority votes. More-
over $ at sucLk a conference, the Chinese -- focusing their ar u-
ients on world ro ].ut?on, national liberation mover ents etc. -
-would be in a zuch better position than at the meeting where
their rejection of the test ban treaty cast them, into a :lost dif-
ficult role.
We, therefore, assn; a that i1oscow can restore any wor tin
unity of the '1CT on terms acceptable to the present Kremlin
leadership only if the Soviets either
a. return to Stalinist methods of discipline,
by using military force, I:idnappings, as-
sassinations etc. against Communist dis-
santers; or
b. abanc'on tie increasingly meaningless fetish
of "international proletarian solidarity,"
acknowledge that they pursue objectives
(both dozaestic and international) basically
different fro,:i those of the Chinese and
reorganize a new international alliance on
their terms, cli:ainating the Chinese and
their followers.
Since no tlier development is li%ely in the for seeable ft.turo, 11ve
do :lot expect a genuine restoration of unity in the W'TCIVI, at least
for the time being.
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#13 23 November-6 December 1963
November 23 - An Mongolian Party organ Unen editorial reiterates
full support of the J and denounces tM7adventurists and op-
portunists, crudely distorting truth...(and) attempting... to dis-
credit the great Marxist-Leninist doctrine." Every M-L party
must "give a crushing blow to the dogmatists, sectarians, and
other apostates."
November 24 - Peking gg-c .quotes extensively from the Albanian
..opulli Tovember denunciation of Tito, Khrushchev and
company.
November 25 - Peking papers give front-page prominence to a con-
ference of the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences -- under the self-explanatory
heading "Oppose Modern Revisionism, Study Contemporary Revolu-
tionary Questions." Poking press also features a resqlution of
the CP of New Zealand reiterating its stand that revision sm is
the main danger to the movement. The French and Belgian CPs
simultaneously publish a joint communique strongly denouncing
the Peking line and urging that s-"peps betaken to convene and
insure the success of a conference of world Communist parties
which would "reaffirm the general line of the International Com-
munist movement in the light of new developments." (AFP)
November 26 - Peking press prominently plays a press release of
t o n onesian s CC featuring Chairman tiidit s remarks in a
12 November speech in -Djakarta: he called for con inu na efforts
to "crush" revistetmism, "a poison which weakens the anti-imperial-
ist struggle," an pointed out that "armed struggle remains a
salient feature of the people's struggle in the southeast Asian
countries."
November 27 - All Chinese papers feature an article from the
December issue of the monthly literary journal Wen Yi Pao (The
Literary Gazette) (published the 26th) which criticized as re-
visionist three recent Soviet films and some statements made by
their director, G. Chunkhrai. "The smell of bourgeois humani-
tarianism and pacifism spread by the films shows, in the field
of art and ideology, precisely the political line of modern re-
visionism and the political demand for peaceful evolution from
socialism to capitalism."
November 23 - People's Daily (and other Peking press) publishes
an 11 November "Declaration of Australian Marxist-Leninists,"
with an editor's note explaining that it is'h reply of E.F. Sill
and other comrades to the attack and vilification by the open
letter of the CC/CPSU." The (Chinese) editor continues: "'It
can be clearly seen from this reply that it is none other than
the C?SU leaders who have actually violated the principles guid-
ing relations of the fraternal parties and adopted extremely
foul methods in imposing a revisionist line on a fraternal party,
interfering in its internal affairs, attacking the Marxist-
Leninists with the party, and creating an internal split in it."
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The Declaration itself gives a historical account of developments
in "the deep-seated plot" of the CP$U leaders "to subvert the CPA
to the line of the modern revisioniS s~ , in the course ox wfhic na
they "tried alternately to intimidate, bribe, and flatter the
leaders of the CPA." It con rasts a capitulation to e CPSU's
campaign by Sharkey and Dixon with "Hill's brilliant record of
almost 30 years service of the Australian working class."
November 23-December 2 - The Warsaw meeting of the World Peace
Council brought another round of er, cn clashe' ue weep
the Chinese challengers and the Soviet-aligned majority, -- be-
fore an assemblage reported (by Tass: sessions were barred to
the press) to consist of "close to 45011 delegates from more than
30 countries, and also representatives of 13 international organ-
izations. Trouble broke out early in the first session: here
is HCIIA's account --
Jadqued M .daule, a French Catholic.,.,lauded the
a'sSassinated President of the U.S., John F. Kennedy,
and paid "respects" to him for his "good will."...
He even proposed that all stand up to observe a
moment's silence in memory of Kennedy....The pro-
posal was dictated by a handful of people anm-
posed on the meeting as a suprise attack carefully
thought out and arranged in advance. It was an at-
tempt to glorify the bbsses of U.S. imperialism in
the same of the meeting....
A Chinese delegate, Tan Ming-chao, at once in-
dignantly voiced his opposition to the proposal and
asked for the floor to protest against this shameful
move. But the executive chairman of the session, Ostap
Dluski of Poland, turned down his legitimate request.
Thereupon, delegates from China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan,
Indonesia, the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam, Albania, and some European countries sat still
and refused to observe the silence. Some other dele-
gations who had learned of the move in advance left
the meeting hall before the proposal.
Alter prolonged consultations, the executive
chairman finally agreed that Tang Ming-chao speak
briefly at the session....T. said: 'file could not be
sincere to all the friends taking part in this meet-
in, nor would we be honest to ourselves, if vie do
not raise our voice in protest against the proposal
to pay td ibute suddenly imposed on us in a prepared
speech...."
The delegates in the hall listened quietly and
seriously to his statement. His suggestion that the
meeting pay tribute to the martyrs who fall in the
fight against U.S. imperialism drew loud applause.
Delegates from many countries walked up to the
Chinese delegate to praise and greet him. The U.S.
delegates, first of all, shook hands with him and
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other Chinese delegates with great warmth. They
exclaimed in one voice: "Your statement is excel-
lent."
NCNA further reported that the Japanese and N. Vietnamese
delegations protested the move in written statements to the
presidium the following day. On Dec. 1st, the N. Korean dele-
gation ebief in a speech denounced the move as "a, disgrace to
the WPC, and an indelible stain on the peace movement."
The Chinese speaker on the afternoon of the opening day,
Liao Chang-chih, delivered a hard 5,000-word exposition of the
Chinese line, including a denunciation of the "certain persons"
who viciously assail and libel all those who do not agree with-
their erroneous line and who have recently "gone so far as to
mat:a use of the name of the VIPC Secretariat, the VIPC Bulletin,
the ?C delegations, etc., and even of a forged letter allegedly
from the Chinese :.people's Committee for World Peace n an all-
out assault on the Chinese people's just stand on defending world
Peace. 11
Among other speakers on the 29th was Spano of Italy, who,
according to NCITA, "acted as an apologist for the T.S. imperial-
ist policy of aggression and war, while distorting and attac:ing
the stand tai.on by the Chinese delegation for world peace." He
cias followed by the Indian delegate, Lrora, who "actually used
the platform for work peace to make political provocations a-
gainst China over the Sino-Indian border issuo,;.,,.All those re-
were astonishingly similar to the themes of Moscow.
After group discussions on 29 and 30 November, the plenary
sessions resumed on 1 Deceraber, when, according to NCNA,
"the delegates of Korea, Albania, Vietnam and Indonesia
held aloft the banner of opposing; imperialism and de-
fending world peace, denounced as a fraud the tripartite
partial tost-ban treaty, and censured the modern re-
visionists for their ignoble actions of prettifying
and submitting to imperialism. The delegates of prance,
Bul :aria, Czechoslovalia and Zungar,, acting on ordors
of the baton, advanced lane excuses to defend the Mos-
cow tripa'titito treaty and justify the :modern revision-
ists' actions of bogging immporialisu for peace. By
na:ao or by insinuation, they attr_c':ed China and other
c:cfond ors of world peace."
The Bulgarian rtielegate ?irinsi y, according to 11CHA, "slandered
the position of China, Korea and Albania" on the Moscow treaty,
and "what was :::ost absurd, ...went so far as to say that the
treaty was 'signed by Chiang Ilai-shek' because China did not sign
it. ::ls statement aroused ina'igation and sneers a~ong the dele-
:"'-^tos.11
The stormy ci cussions and voting of the final session are
describes; by NC1TA as follows:
3 (11C Chronology Cont.)
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The VY?C meeting, closed... having witnessed a
bitter ceiaflict be den the line of s"-9c uarciiag
world peace by firmry opposing imperialism and the
line of submitting to imperialism and bogging it
for peace.
At the closing session, the Chinese delega-
tion declared that it did not approve the draft
general document of e anyway!
In view of the highly technical nature of modern warfare,
the purpose of this law is obviously not to add several hundred
thousand untrained draftees to the present armed effectives.
(We should not forget the enormous quantity of highly sophisti-
cated weapons that have been shipped to Cuba.) As summarized
and expounded by Raul Castro, it seems to have three purposes:
a) Primarily, to provide an abundance of
cheap labor.
b) Secondarily, to put additional thousands
under military discipline without at the
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off the street and put tnem to work.
Nowhere does the text of the now law refer to any but its
purely military, national defense purposes. However, as if
under some Freudian compulsion, Raul Castro returned frequently
to these hidden aims. The armed forces, he said, have an
obligation to help the economic production of the nation, there-
fore, . . . "vie ought to work, part of our service in sugarcane,
to which we can devote three or four months. . . We will have
other jobs to do. One of these will be coffee. Then we will
have to go and pick coffee beans, the socialized coffee beans
of the people, of the state, and at the same time help the
entire private sector of our peasants, setting an example by
our work on behalf of the consolidation of the worker-peasant
alliance of our socialist revolution."
Without the least compunction, Raul Castro gives examples
later in this speech of how the labor shortage in Cuba has
brought about the system of "volunteer" labor brigades. Now,
it seems, even this system makes the cost of coffee production
prohibitive. Although the volunteers are paid on an incentive
basis, at 55 centavos per tin of 28 lbs. of coffee beans gatherer.
plus room and board, efficiency is so low that the average wage
is less than one peso per day. Likewise, since rationing has
vastly reduced the real value of money, many coffee pickers go
along for the food and sometimes extra clothing they receive.
All this, as Raul Castro put it, has required a second look at
the costeabilidad of coffee growing in a socialist system. That
25X1C10bis, he is asirig: "Can we afford it?"
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724 FE,NE. The Formation of the Federation of Malaysia
BAC!'GROUND: On September 16, 1963 the Federation of
Malaysia came into being. This anti-Communist grouping is
comprised of four Southeast Asian territories: the former
Federation of Malaya, a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy;
Singapore, a semi-autonomous state; and Sarawak and North Borneo,
both former British Crown Colonies. The formation of Malaysia
has created new controversies in the already tense situation
in Southeast Asia. What is the history of the Malaysian con-
ception and why has it aroused such emotional controversy?
Tunku Rahman proposal: On 27 May 1961, Malayan Prime
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman met with the Foreign Correspondents
Association of Southeast Asia at a luncheon in Singapore and
in informal post-luncheon remarks he said:
"Sooner or later Malaya should have an understanding
with Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North
Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me
to say now how this closer understanding can be
brought about, but it is inevitable that we should
look ahead to this objective and think of a plan
whereby these territories can be brought closer to-
gether in political and economic cooperation."
"'his was not a completely new idea, but it was the first time
that it had been proposed publicly. In spite of the vagueness
of Tunku Rahmants proposal, concrete plans soon began to take
shape. Two months later (July 1931) the Malaysia Solidarity
Consultative Committee was formed and this group of leading
individuals from the five territories began to study the
feasibility of the suggestion and to develop plans to reconcile
conflicting local interests and requirements. Progress continued
at a rapid pace and in the Autumn of 1961 the Tunku went to
L.Dneon to consult with the British government. On 23 November,
agreement in principle was reached with prime Minister MacMillan
on the advisability of creating Malaysia. The agreement
included provision for appointing a commission to determine, on
the spot, the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak,
and to seen the views of the Sultan of Brunei.
The Cobbold Commission (so named after its chairman,
Lord Cobbold) went, to Saraw and North Borneo in February 1962
and interviewed several thousand private individuals, consulted
the Legislative Councils in the two Colonies, and reviewed
numerous memoranda from various groups and individuals in the
territories. The Commission also visited Brunei and consulted
the Sultan and his Ministers. In June 1962 the Cobbold Com-
mission's report was completed and signed. It summarized the
problems involved in setting up the federation, made a series
of unanimous recommendations and included separate recommendations
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by the British and the Malayan representatives. Subsequently,
there were e:.ten ive ncgetiattions on indi.vidr' I:?'herties,
religious freedom, : .ttsf~ of native peoples, o ucation, rural
improvement, financ.: and trade, immigration control and repre-
sentation in the Federation parliament. Meanvwhile, the Tunku
and wingapore's Prime Minister Lee Muan Yew had reached agree-
ment on the terms of a merger of Singapore and Malaya anad their
agreement was upheld by a referendum in Singapore in September
1002.
In July 19:3, four of the territories signed the formal
agreement providing for the inauguration of the Federation of
Malaysia on 31 August 1963. Brunei had backed out at the last
minute in a dispute over finances and issues related to the
precedence of the Sultan among the new leadership.
Foreign Opposition to Malaysia: As the members of the
proposed federation negotiated an it became increasingly
apparent that they would succeed in coming to terms, the govern-
ments of Indonesia and the Philippines showed increasing concern
and opposition. In December 1962 antagonisms and hostilities
reached a critical point. The Brunei People's Party (Partai
Ra'_yjat Brunei), led by A.M. Azahari, was vigorously opposed to
the formation of Malaysia. They favored the creation of a
unified state consisting of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
The Brunei People's Party under Azahari had been influential
in organizing a small rebel force called the "North Borneo
National Army" (TNKU). On December B these rebel forces
attacked several towns and oil fields in Brunei and Sarawak,
and attempted to seize control of the area. British troops were
flown in from Singapore and by December 12 the revolt had for
all effective purposes collapsed. Azahari fled to Manila and
thence to Indonesia. Indonesia denied involvement although it
had gone on record as supporting the objectives of the short-
lived rebellion and had oven covertly assisted in training some
of the rebel units. In January 1963 Indonesia announced its
policy of confrontation toward the formation of Malaysia.
President Sukarno, of course, was the architect of this policy of
menacing every aspect of the proposed federation and its
supporters. When Tunku Rahman refused to be intimidated and
Afro-Asian circles failed to give any meaningful support, he
abandoned that policy temporarily and on 31 May staged a recon-
ciliation with Tunku Rahman.
The Indonesian, Malayan, and Philippine foreign ministers
met in Manila in June to pave the way for a meeting of their
respective chiefs of state to seek a formula for agreement on
the disputed issues. President Sukarno, Prime Minister Abdul
Rahman, and ?resident Macapagal then conferred in Manila in
early )ugust. Sukarno immediately made a series of demands that
would have completely upset the Malaysia timetable; the Tunku
refused to meet them. Their differences were mediated by
President Macapagal and the stormy conference finally ended with
agreement that U.N. Secretary General U Thant would be requested
to make a quick assessment of whether the peoples of North Borneo
and Sarawak were really in favor of Malaysia.
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U Thant appointed a team of nine assessors (all of the
disputants approved U Thant's choices) which proceeded immediately
to the area, accompanied by two Indonesians, two Malayans, and
two =Filipinos who had been invited as observers. In accepting
the Manila Conference's request for assistance the Secretary
General made a strict condition that the findings of the U.N.
team were not subject to confirmation by any of the governments
concerned. On 14 September U Thant released the report of the
U.N. survey team which concluded that a clear majority of the
people in Sarawak and North Borneo were in favor of Malaysia.
Indonesia and the Philippines contended that the U.I.T. survey
had not been carried out in accordance with the Manila agreements
and refused to recognize the new federation.
The policy of confrontation was immediately renewed and
anti-Malaysian rioting -- encouraged, if not actually planned,
by the Indonesian government -- took place throughout Indonesia.
L mob sacked and burned the British bassy in Djakarta on
10 September and almost all other British and Malayan diplomatic
and privately owned property was systematically looted and
burned. Indonesia cut off commercial and communications links
with Malaysia and sent additional combat ready troops to the
borders of Sarawak and North Borneo. With the passage of time,
the more frantic and delirious aspects of Indonesia's confronta-
tion policy have subsided somewhat but the basic hostility
remains, primarily in the form of the economic boycott of
Malaysia and the support and training of anti-Malaysian guerrillas
in Borneo. The Philippine government has recently modified its
position considerably and has even shown signs that it may
recognize Malaysia if it can be done gracefully.
Reasons for Indonesian Hostility: Throughout the dispute
over the formation of the a aysian federation, Indonesia has
cited two main contentions for its opposition to the Federation:
First, it is an instrument of Great Britain and a tool for con-
tinuing British colonialism in Southeast Asia. Second, it is
too small and weak to withstand pressure and the threat of being
taken over by the Chinese Communists. A third factor in the
dispute is that Sukarno feels, and indeed has said, that the
forces behind the formation of Malaysia thin': they can settle
matters that concern Indonesia without even consulting Indonesia
and that they must be taught otherwise. It is generally conceded
that the latter factor is an important one, perhaps the important
one and that Sukarno has not been able to conceal his own
aspirations to see an Indonesian empire stretch from Malaya to
the northern tip of the Philippine Islands
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Attachment #1
CULTURAL EXC EATTGE
Almost immediately after the death of Joseph Stalin in
March 1253, his successors proclaimed that they favored the "free
development of contacts" between the Soviet Union and all other
countries. Partly in response to the Soviet "cultural offensive"
the term "cultural diplomacy," came into increasing use in the
West to describe exchanges of persons, particularly those of sci-
on;i.fic eminence, and of cultural materials, conducted with po-
? t e' ob4ectives or at least, with an awareness of their possible political
consequences.
In terms of human and financial resources involved, the
e. fort with which we are here concerned represents a new dimeu-
sio n of the : re :din's diplomacy and propaganda. In its ultimate
purposes, however, it is squarely in the revolutionary Lenin
tradition which Xhrushch?ev sought to revive after his discredit-
ing of Stalinism in 1953. It also bears many :marks of the heri -
tc:;e of Stalin, who himself, especially before the great purges
0f 1Z3e-33, was an energetic practitioner of cultural diplomacy.
Many of Stalin's actions reflected his belief that the dis-
play of Soviet achievements to foreign visitors in the USSR, or
to all who were interested abroad, was of ;great political siunifi-
ca.ace . EEe often interrupted his busy schedule to play host to
delegations of labor leaders, arti c and literary f gores, and
other foreign notables. !Sot infrequently he took the trouble to
receive individually such personages as R.G. Wells, George 3ez d.
Shaw, Emil Ludwig, Lion uFeuchtwanger, and many others. In a
statement to the 14th Congress of the Russian Communist ?arty in
Stalin revealed a, basic motive for this policy. hie told the
Congress that visits of groups from India, ypt, and China, as
well as of delegations of workers from the W , .. constituted "the
best, most forceful and active propaganda for the Soviet system
against the capitalist system." In a somewhat similar vein,
Z-hrushchev, during his visit to the United States in Sept. 13531
professed a desire for "the .;:oadest possible cultural and sci-
entific exchange" between Russia and America, and linked such ex-
change to peaceful competition between rival social systems.
In 102"7, V? KS, the A.ll-Union Society for Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries, was established. In Feb. 1053, VOI>S dis-
solved itself and was replaced by the Union of Soviet Societies
for Friendship and Cultural t`.elations with foreign Countries.
Although Soviet sources stated that the meth ds employed by VGL`s
had. become outmode~dd, there appears to be no essential d ffereace
between its activities and those of its successor organization
which, li'::e VC;KS , is officially described as a "voluntary, public
cganization" and is carefully distinguished in Sovietteriminolo;;y
from such state agencies as the 111instry of Foreign Affairs or the
t >~,e Committee for Cultural Relations with hood eign Countries,
ec abolished in l v.7. Like VOKS, the Union of Friendship Societies
operates mainly on a nominally nongovernmental level. It invites
sari: t: c, literary, and sometimes, scientific delegations to visit
the. USSR and arranges for formal meetings between such groups and
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Soviet colleagues. it also is active in the dissemination of
Soviet publications to forai n schclars and intellectuals.
The State Co--maittee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries, to the chairmanship of which Georgy A. Zhulov, former
Pravda foreign editor, was appointed upon its establishment,
played a major role in Xhrushchev's expansion of cultural di-
plomacy. The State Committee has negotiated a number of cul-
tural agreements and treaties with foreign countries, including
the United itingciom (1059). the German Federal Republic, India,
France, the United Arab Republic, and Afghanistan. Of pa rticula.r
interest to A;:ierica ns is the United States-Soviet Agreement on
educational, Scientific and Cultural Exchanges, signed in Jan.
/ 3, and extended for two years in Dec. x.95'::. In addition to
negotiating over-all agreements, the State Committee takes a
hang' in negotiation of i ipor tant individual cultural exchanges,
~~orhi~hg often with other Soviet agencies, such as the Ministry
of Culture.
Another organization which plays an important part in the
Soviet system of guided culture contact is Intourist, the offici:.2.
tourist agency. Founded in 1923,as one of several Soviet-style
"joint stow." companies, and still so organized, intourist had,
as of 1'57, some five thousand employees, according to an article
in the Soviet English language magazine for Americans, USSR. Its
staff has probably grown considerably since then, if one can as-
sume some proportionality between its size and the swelling di-
mensions of tourist travel to the USSR. In the case of the United
States, fox example, about 2,500 tourists visited the Soviet Union
in l0-55, while estimates for 1060 were in the neighborhood of
2 U, 000. With its netrwork of hotels and restaurants and its staffs
of interpreters, chauffeurs, and so forth, Intourist has shep-
herded and guided, served, helped, and sometimes obstructed.? thou-
sands of foreign tourists, teachers, students, businessmen, and
others who have over the years come to the "land of socialism"
to observe, to marvel, or to compare impressions based on printed
sources with whatever aspects of Soviet reality they were able to
see and appraise for themselves. Lost foreign visitors to Russia,
with the exception of such categories as diplomats and journalist:.
on long-term assignmments, gust use the facilities of intourist by
virtue of its :monopoly control over indispensable services. With
the recovery of the Soviet economy from the effects of World War
II and the partial xae pening of the USSR to foreign contact that
follovied Stalin's death, the services of Latour ist were e aYha:l, ed
and improved. l owever, it is fair to say that the Soviet system
of official tourism of which Intourist is a part still serves to
render travel in Russia highly restricted by free world standards
The consequences of this situation, in terms of concealing aspen
of Soviet life which the Kremlin doe: not wish to disclose, are
of course significant if, as is usually the case, foreign visi-
t-ors do not have a vor.ing l.nowles;e of the Russian language.
he main professed purpose of Soviet culture exchange policy
has always been the "struggle for peace." For example, TTi?kolr.y
T; i vhaylov, Soviet minister of culture, wrote in Pravda for
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April 2,1956,that"the development of cultural relations between
the Soviet Union and Great Britain will undoubtedly contribute
to the nobel aims, coririon to both peoples, of consolidating
peace." It is significant also that the posy-Stalin cultural
campaign was launched in June 1953, at the Budapest meeting of
the major international con.nmunist-front organization, the World
'3o--ce Council, which has continued to coordinate its activities
with those of the Soviet cultural apparatus. This aspect of
Soviet cultural diplomacy appears to be intended to strengthen
the desired i:maga of the USSR and the Soviet bloc in general as
champions of peace, while at the same time casting the United
States in the role of chief warmonger. Furtherance of Soviet
disarmament policy and hindrance of American defense efforts are
corollary themes of much of the Soviet propaganda disseminated
in connection v:ith major Communist cultural exchange projects,
suck, as the mai moth I:Ioscow Festival of Youth and Students (1057)
an t_e next in this series, held in Vienna in 1059....
Although Moscowbras devoted less of its cultural resources
to the underdeveloped countries than to W1 Europe and the United
States, it is perhaps in the less industrialized lands that
Soviet cultural diplomacy has the greatest potential for future
influence. Africa and Latin &aarica have not been neglected by
the Iat esmlin cultural strategists. Be-inning in 1055 the Soviet
authorities undertoo% a revival of Oriental studies which led
to development of a substantial, growing program of te.-ching
and research on the history, languages and literatures, and the
econoic and political conditions of the peoples of the non-
in:;ustrialized countries. At both the 20th Congress of the C 2,3,U
in 1053 an:1 the Extraordinary 21st Congress in 1953 such top-
ranking party Presidium members as, respectively, Anas:t. s LIii:oynn
and i:iiI hail Suslov demanded that Soviet scholars produce works
which viould be useful in carrying the Soviet message to these
areas .
The visit by Nikita S. Khrushchev and Nikolay Bul;anin to
Inc:in, Burma, and Afghanistan in 1955 and .hrushchevts visit
in 159 to Indonesia and other S. E. Asian countries, again
including India and Afghanistan, lent impetus to Soviet efforts
nt cultural penetration in these and neighboring countries.
I:.^.:oyc n t s visits and speech-na.iing in I+Iexico and Cuba in 150
renine:ed North Americans that the Soviet Union did not intend
to refrain from persuasion and subversion in the TH. hemisphere.
A significant move, which may for some time be difficult to
evaluate, was tas;en in 1053 when i~hrushchev announced in Indo-
nesia that the Soviet government had decided to open, in Moscow,
a special ?eoples' Friendship University...primar ily for stu-
dents frori Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to
covet `My' K'uitura (Soviet Culture), the newspaper of the Lain-
istry of Cultu:'e, for Feb. 23, 1030, the near university was to
be una'ar 't"_3 joint sponsorship o : the "Soviet 'Committee for Soll-
darity of the Countries of Asia and Africa," the already-mention?c,
Union of Friendship Societies, and the All-Union Council of Trade
Jason: .
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Attachment 0 3
Pitfalls of Cultural Exchange for the Soviets
The recent arrest of the American Professor Frederick C.
Barghoorn showed that, even today, visitors to the USSL, are not
immune from arbitrary arrest and detention. Clearly there was
no real case against3arehoorn, and it is profitable to specu-
late as to why he was arrested. One possible reason may have
been a desire by Soviet security and espionage authorities to
exchange him for a Soviet trading organization employee recently
caught in flagrante delicto at a hew Jersey railroad station.
Another, but a most Tom improbable, explanation might be
that there was an excess of zeal on the part of some very junior
secret police officer. But there is still another hypothesis,
which we find ouch more likely: Barghoorn may well have been
arrested to discourage both western visitors and Soviet citizens
from too much unsupervised personal contact with each other.
In recent years, the Soviets have engaged in a very active
program of cultural exchange, with stress on travel both to and
from the Soviet Union. Personal contacts can, under proper con-
ditions, be a very fruitful means of breaking down western sus-
2icion. We may be unable to bear the cliches of Radio Moscow,
but we will believe assurances of peaceful intentions from in-
dividual Soviet citizens, who doubtless offer them in allsincerity.
Many non-Communists return from the Soviet Union impressed by
Soviet accomplishments; if they are unsophisticated they may not
realize how carefully they have been guided and shepherded from
one nodal factory to another. As it happens, Professor Barghoorn
was perhaps the leading American expert on the organization and
methods used in the Soviet cultural exchange program. Fie knew
the techniques, and warned people against them. But he also knew
that, despite the Soviet intention, cuhiral exchange is bound to
work in two directions. Plants raised in an ideological hothouse
may be more sensitive than those which have grown wild in an open
environment.
The operators of the Soviet cultural exchange program have
groblems. If they keep all foreign tourists under strict sur-
veillance, and permit only hardened Communist "activists" to
travel abroad, they will convince the rest of the world that
things are just as they were under Stalin. On the other hand, if
they send Soviet intellectuals to meet foreigners, or allow for-
sign visitors to converse freely with Soviet citizens, there is
an exposure to non-Communist ideology. The most valuable Soviet
citizens for creating favorable impressions are precisely those
who can think for themselves, and who are ready--when they have
a chance--to voice independent thoughts. Many non-Communist
visitors to the USSR are by no means stupid, easily fooled, or
inarticulate. Ho doubt some Soviet officials are ready to "take
a chance" while others--for example, those who engineered Profas-
sor Barghoora's arrest--want to "play safe." Professor Barghoorn
seems to have underestimated the influence of the latter group;
on the other hand, his release shows the importance of the former
element. The Soviet Union has gone too far to turn back to un-
inhibited Stalinism, but if foreign contacts are permitted to
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continue, Soviet society itself is bound to be affected.
Soviet Visitors kb-road. In regard to Soviet visitors abToacd,
the problems are s ioun by tihe regime's experiences a year ago
with Va':tor I1e'crasov and Yev eny Yevtushenko. IJel.rasov is a
U::rainian writer who in ilovemb3r 13x2 publisha an article in the
Soviet, "liberal" literary journal Ilovy Mir (New Worl_'), describ-
ing his expexiences in Italy and t e U In 1 is ar -icle,
Ile_:rasov wrote relatively little about the superiority of Soviet
cow:~unism over capitalise, and many of his remarL:s acre likely tc
;;iva Soviet readers a favorabla impression of the countries visi-?
to . IIe.rasov ventureci to criticize the busybody activities oa
the secret police chaperon accompanying his group, and the EIritei
also seize: an opportunity to criticize the Soviet propaganda
fiLi cliche of the "old worker with the graying moustaches who
un:;:er stand, all and has a precise and clear answer or eve:ryth :'
In the Spr in; of 190-3. Vevtushenl.o, after conducting propaganda
tours through Europe, selling the idea of the "new" Soviet Union,
nublisha:2 his autobiography serially in a Paris weekly, L' xj ess;
in the process, he e,-.posed Soviet anti-se .iit i sn and confo ::?l s::l.
ii,:)7,rasov was the more serious transgressor, and having failed to
retract-, lie was (according to unconfirmed report:) expelled from
the "?3-J last su::^.mer. Ithrushchev and other worthies publicly
cri ticimad Aravtushe:e'.o who, uilli'ce Ile'r-^asov, exercised self -
criticism. The Soviets have had other unfortunate e~a,Jeriences,
as era th icdolf Ilureyev, the ballet dancer who defected in _~ trig,
or 3acdiriir A: h1canany, the pianist who hesitated for long to re-
turn hone.
Visitors.. r ? `ho ?.Soviet:,.13nion....".Jn. the case of foreign travel to
I_e J C R , the problems are exemplified by the case of the 3n ish
philosopher, A.J. Ayer. Western intellectual circles know .fyer
as the leading exponent of the skeptical tradition ste:ping from
David b}ume, and also as an extremely effective writer and speaker.
In his younger days, he was a forceful advocate of the Viennese
philosophy of logical positivism, which was hostile to vague
metaphysical formulas, and which only assigned value to those
st..tenents which coulc: be verified empirically. Thus, unlike
say Jeantaul Sartre, payer's phi'"osophica l sympathies pre poles
apart from the Eagalian-Marxist tradition. The Soviet philo-
sophical 4ournal Voprosy 'ilosofii (?roblems of Philosophy) brot.e
all precedents by solic9 ting an in January purl isil-I ng an
articia by Ayer. In d'yer's words, his article "contained a :.ii1
cL "t.ci ,ra of I.Iar:.ist dialectics. I argised that vih Lever other
purposes they night serve, thep rinciples of the dialectics were
not scientific laves. LIy suggestion was not that they were fu se,
but that since they were interpreter: in such a way that nothing
could conceivably refute then. they had no empirical content."
The artic1a was precoded by an editorial note, explaining that
f.';73r cdid not understand the dialectic, and was followed by a
j oine?er, defanzaia'.g Idarxisr~'s claim to be scientific. Jut
long re
it was surprisL:ng that dyer's article should be published at all.
"vidently, the explanation was that the Soviets hoped to enlist
Weyer (77ho stands to the Left in British politics, and who ha.- :ate
wth Soviet philosophers at a world congress) in the Soviet peace
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ca:7pa irn. After the article was accepted, but before it appeared,
Soviet phailosop,aers also invitad Ayer to the USSR, where he gave
lecture: on British and Ar erican philosophy at 1.1oscovj and Lenin-
grac . The bubble burst when layer publisl_ed an article in the
Lo:icon Observer (S April 10621), describing his experience, gently
rid-. cr.1Tn or oe ox i:Iarxis i IaJilo; ophy, mentioning the extreme
interest of Soviet students in h.is non-11urriict views, and con-
clui~inu that :: evisionicu was a growing force. It was now obvious
that, instead of ' nfluencing Ayer, Ayer vas influencing Soviet
youth. Zo .sunist, the official. ideological journal, published a
sc thzin ' a V~ c:.;, ai:iecl ::,.ore at the editors of Voorosy ?iosof ii
t:.u:, at Ayez^, and Voprosy Filoso:?ii tried to recover its iw eo-
1o logical stature with two further rC' but tats to Ayer.
Jil.enaaa Faces Soviets. Despite the pitfalls of foraiga contacts,
L13zpi v ale face Mat these contacts undermine Soviet ideology,
the Soviets cannot give up cultural and other exchang3s withor.?t.
Stultifying their oven political propaganda on "peaceful coex ct-
enca" and a "liberalized" Soviet Union. llotviithstanding t e
IIe'.ra ov, 1evtushen'.o, and Ash'.tanazy experiences, Novy Lair is to
plab1 isha new 113h:rasov wor',s next year; Eishlsana--y vas a11oviea? to
f a'1:e a concert tour to Iceland in June; and Ilya slazunov (a
Llo-lernist painter) and Ale?ksandr Tvardovsl:y (editor of ITovy 1.1ir)
mere per:bitten to go to Italy last spring. (The tour to e =an1
r:ay Lave bean intended to erase the i:apression left by the 1"~agfar
::nnab sson espionage case there last February; the visits to
Italy were probably designed to undercut Italian criticic.a--sortie
oat it Communist--of Soviet cultural repression.) Again, one of
the reasons for 3 r h:.oorn's release was probably the threat that
unwarrs rated retention would have posed to cultural ex-
chian a an f4, to taz) Soviet imc Ce abroau. In a related aria, the
general cultural repression which see:aecl i_arainent last spring
now see::ls to be partly reversed. Unfortunately, the is never
any ~,?uaraatee for Soviet cultural freedom, but slowly, yr t"iA oc-
casional setbac"..s, freedom seeras to be gaining group 1. The Soviet
leat:3rs are caught in a trap of their own :aa_sing.
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Soviet Subversion In The Congo
In iTove :" er 1- 3 Cora iunist leasers : rora eighty-one counties,
gathered in Lloscow, issue,.' a statem nt which said, inter a lia;
The socialist countries are true anc~ sincere
friends of tie Taeop13s fightin f' ":o li -3b ation Z nd
of those Ylbo h_av3 tiu ovrn ofS '9`.113 imperialist yoke.
While reject, a- on principle any interference in
the internal o f a irs of you a nat::ona1 states, they
consider it, their inte;;nat.o.ialist duty to help
the peonies in stran;;th3ninv1 their inc' ependence ....
The socialist systera has become a reliable shield
fey the independent national develop_.3 it of the
reo.:la who have on freedom .... Co_ iunists have al-
ways recognized the progressive, revolutionary s .c-
nificance of national liberation wars; they are the
most active cha:ai~aons o national independence.
These pious words vie--- a uttere.: two months a ftar Sov' et an.
yzeciaoslovah: diplomatic personnel hac: been e;:pellecl A.fron. Leopold-
villa for brazenly e efying General 1.1obutu's governs ent ::.gy sup-
?or tin;; Antoine Gizenga's efforts to ta?.,e over the prem ershhip,
I tad jtls '~ka'er3:l~'..ar.^s ~,,ef03^e ti~~a soviets vi era ^~ain to be ciecii:. 3.i
,D,ar iodic non gratae for conspiring to overthrow the lawful Congo-
:3c govern~aen~, o?remieT^ Cyrille Adoula.
''v
When they were : cacl_aitte:.'1 to the Republic of the Con;;o in
S(-itei ber 1202, Soviet Araaassador Serge S. Ne:ichlna said, in pa rt
The Soviet Union, faithful to the policy of
peace:Zul coexistence, desires to develop its relation-
ship with the is epublic of the Congo on the basis of
ecualityr of rights, Yautua l respect of sovereignty and
noninterference in internal affairs. The P.epublic
of the Congo can be assured that the Soviet Union is
its faithful friend who sloes not loo:; for special
privileges for itself, does not Yaal.e conditions !chichi
might preju;aice ;;he sovereignty of other states any:
does not pursue any inter estec1 aiYa in its relations
with other countries.
The hypocrisy of t:13sa easy words became clear just four-
teen __ionths later when two iae:ai~er , of A~l'cas2 ::tor P7e:nchin 's std
wise arrested and documentary evidence of subversive activities
was young on their persons after they .ad refused to prove p-
loma c iiinunity from saarcL. T'na two "diplomats , tt 3oris V on in,
e~_l'aassy counselor and Yuri TJlyah,o tnyi>h, press attache, were re-
`,urxL: by ferry frora Brazzaville, capital of neighbor in- Congo
re-At:Jl3.'^ (for:ier1y wrench Congo) and center for dis =Untla:i op--
,Dosiion Political elene nts from Lao po? viville who are plottin-
overthrow of -mitt Minister Cyrille LCoula' s govern ent.
~' ~ 321 d3.p?0blc..ts hic^.c ~.n bo..,?nn TT.y11r^..;:owv'.1 for
Congo said that ca::tae
^:c .o
rO_i3 t'a^ae and vdey a s~t_.,cp.n . ~t..c of", leading sz avcrsi`~ ~,, - t? s
.,_....~ r 1.0 3 ac t V :.
cover of di p1oraatic ii..iunity."
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Among the incriminating documents (subsequently released
by the Congolese lovednnent) were two which proved direct Soviet
encouragement and support of the Brazzaville plotters. One,
dated 10 November 1D63, was signed by Christophe Gbenye, a fol-
lower of the late Patrice Lu;:iuuba. It describes the organiza-
tion of the Nat tiona? Liberation Co:.xmfittee (IMC), of which Gbenye
is President, and the various political party components which
cow,2rise it and discu:sse$ cisagreer:-.eats among members over the
qu3stion ox wr,ether China or Russia will be most helpful to their
cause. The NLC goal, according to the report, is:
to take revolutionary and arr,'ed action in order to
liberate the Congo from the bands of the iinpar i.alists,
t e neo-colonialists and their agen s....It was .agreed
that Co-race Gbenye...would direct the action beyond
the borders while Comrades Lubaya and Assuman:i would
direct tlaa operations within the country.
E.yt ;Z further discussion of oxg-,A atioaa1 and personnel proolams,
tf~e document closes with P. it ^9
of "Measures to be Tallen" which
y:x~lt:clas "The Russian comrades should send us before 25 Noven,iber
1-3 two portub ;a radio transmitters for our activities"; "the
13Si to print money for us in order to better conduct the strug-
"la.,' It requests various items of espionage equipment, from
recorders ancy photo copying apparatus to silent pistols and
ouble- -ottori suitcases. Also included is a request that an NI:
fission to China be facilitated. Attached to the document,iype-
viritt-an in French, was C. handwritten note addressed to "Comrade
31e3," believer; to be Oleg I. lfazhest.ln, attache, who has been
ac .iva in support of the Com