BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 7, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1C10b
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Briefly iloted
Erosion of Czech Stalinisra
In a further effort to cope with internal pressures for
political liberalization and economic reform, Czechoslova louts
Stalinist President Novotny on 21 September dismissed or re-
assigned a number of leading official's who were identified with
political oppression and economic stagnation, replacing them
with representatives of a younger and more moderate generation
of Communists. :?remier Siroky, two hard-line deputy premiers
and four ministers were dropped. Two Slovaks were appointed
ministers without portfolio and four new central committee con-
-issions were created, three dealing with economics and one
with ideology. Josef Lenart, a 40-year-old Slovak who has been
a member of the party presidium since December 1962 and who is
untainted by Stalinism, was appointed premier. However, in
order to circumscribe the influence of his more liberal appointees
and safeguard his own position, Novotny has kept his own
lieutenants in Ley positions; viz. the appointment of Jiri
siendrych, long a Novotny supporter and heir apparent, as cha:r-
man of the new agricultural commission. Despite these maneuvers,
iTovotny is unlikely to placate Slovayt regional discontent,
popular dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions
or his political opposition within the Czechoslovakian C?, al-
though his actions may serve to defer slightly the agony of his 25X1C1Ob
own decline.
25X1C10b
WM& (Briefly Noted)
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DATES 25X1C10b
23 Oct 77un3arian revolution fails under force of Soviet
brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov
23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926.
7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power
from the Provisional Government, 1917.
13 Nov World Louth Day (Communist).
13 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GAN3O),
Djakarta 10-17 Nov 1963.
11 Nov International Student V)eek 11-17 November, concluding
with International Students Day on the 17th
(International Union of Students, Communist),
12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927.
14 Nov (China-Russia) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese
"Great Northeast" to Prussia, 1560.
15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of
the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of
self-determination to peoples of the former pire,
lsl7.
30 Nov USSR attacks Finland, 1939.
December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation,
4th AAOOC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963.
5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing
for universal sufferage, freedom of speech, press
and assembly, 1936.
239 Dec UIT issues second call for Tibetan freedom, 1953.
27 Dec Joseph cardinal Hinds,.enty arrested, Hungary,.1943.
2
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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#13 14-27 September 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The most important development in this period was the
Soviet government's statement of 21 September. This statement
replied to the inese official statement of 1 September (sea
Chronology #12), and argued that in their very denials, the
Chinese shooed both their indifference to the costs of nuclear
war and their ardent desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Another
part of the Soviet statement, apparently answering the 6 Septem-
ber People's Daily-Red Flag article's charge of subversion in
Sinkiang, e had been 5000 Chinese violations of
the Sino-Soviet border in 1962. The Soviets did not, however,
publish either the 1 September Chinese statement or the 6 Sept-
ember article; audiences in the USSR know of the 1 September
statement only in Soviet paraphrase, and are officially unaware
that the 6 September article (or the violently anti-Khrushchev
13 September article) even exists. (Peking's earlier statements
(31 July and 15 August) were published along with the Soviet
replies, on 3 and 21 August.)
2. The end of the above-mentioned 21 September Soviet state-
ment hinted at a possible resumption of the CCP-CPSU meetings
held in July, but made this dependent on"ernding open polemics."
On 16 September, a British CP statement, largely pro-CPSU an:.
anti-CCP, had ihaiuded a proposal for a world conference; Moscow
omitted this detail in early TASS reports, u Moscow Radio
reported it to domestic audiences two days later, and on
24 September Pravda published, in "trial balloon" fashion, an
appeal by the Portuguese CP for a world conference.
3. On 19 September, the Soviets published an editorial in
Pravda on the Sino-Indian dispute, clearly indicating that the
757 was the aggressor in the con lists of 1959 and 1962, and
stressing the bad impression Chinese aggression makes on Afro-
Asian countries. The editorial deplored frontier quarrels and
violations generally, including by implication the Sino-Soviet
border.
4. Among non-bloc CP's, a pro-Chinese faction of the Swiss
Party of Labor (Swiss CPT was disclosed on 16 September to have
split away, claiming contacts with similar splinter groups in
Belgium and Italy. (Switzerland houses an unusually large number
of Chinese diplomats, who apparently have been working to some
effect.) On the other hand, a leader of the Colombian CP (Jose
Cardona Hoyos) claimed (according to Pravda, 17 September) that
"the Chinese Communists have no influence in our rands," the
Chairman of the Swedish C? accused the Chinese of revisionism
(?xavda, 16 September , and the Finnish CP plenum (14-15 Septembeo)
passed-a resolution rejecting the inese position (TASS).
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(#13 Commentary Cont.)
A clandestine "Voice of Iraqi People" broadcast accused the
Chinese and Albanians of trying to divide the Iraqi Communist
movement. On 22 September, TABS reported that the Peruvianfg
Political Committee supported the Moscow Treaty, bu'tT the
did
Committee's statement condemned French atomic testing,
not condemn Peking.
5. At the UN, on 17 September, Albania submitted a proposal
for the "restoration of the lawful rig s o the people's Republic
of China," to admit the CPR to the UN. Such resolutions have
always been submitted y e in the past.
6. On 20 September, after missing a week, the series of
Chinese articles resumed with ,Is Yugoslavia a Socialist
Country?" In this article, the Chinese use quotations from
the Yugoslav press to support their own argument that Tito has
turned Yu slavia into a fascist dictatorship subordinate to
the United States. Khrushchev , w o -should repudiate Tito,
follows instead in Tito's footsteps. The Soviet statement of
21 September suggests in is no longer a
flatly that
"socialist" " country; ; this
3hrushchev has abandoned Marxism-Leninism.
Significance:
During the last period covered by this series, the Chinese
statement
took the propaganda initiative withf ththe eir d11 sSSeptember
be on Stalin
and their articles on the history
(6 and 13 September); the main Soviet effort was their agitation
on the Naushdi incident (first reported 9 September). But in
the two weeks now under review, the roles were reversed: the
Soviet leaders appeared to feel that they were getting the best
of the dispute -- their "peaceful coexistence" line had the
widest appeal, and had not been satisfactorily countered by the
latestvulnerability
Chinese was also
Co 1 yptrmstatement.
publBut ishSoviet
shhown n b by theiheir failure
Soviet treatment of the British and Portuguese CP state-
ments suggests that Moscow, in its present mood of confidence,
may be considering a call for a new intra-party meeting. I
little
the present state of the dispute, the Soviets probably have
interest in further private meetings with the Chinese alone, but
they might be interested in a new world conference of CP'sisolate
under their own control. Presumably they would expect
the Chinese if they attended, or else, if the Chinese refused to
outoccasion thto reaffirm e movement the pure
come, theo2~eo use the
Moscow line
Soviet criticism of Chinese policy in the Sino-Indian
border conflict (expressed in the 21 September statement as well
as in the 13 September Pravda article) may reflect a Soviet case,
expectation of further aggression in the Himalayas.
the Soviets on their own account are concerned over Chinese
irredentism. 2
(#13 Commentary Continued)
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(#13 commentary Cont.)
While the official party organizations are lining up with
the Soviets, it is becoming clearer than ever that the Chinessee
intend to create their own subsidiaries wherever they can.
must remember that the Sino-Soviet rivalry may often result in
a competition to see who can attack the United States most
sharply -- on the pattern of a 29 September Pravda, article con-
demning what is called "The Rampage of Racism n the United
States. 25X1C1Ob
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#13 14-27 September 1963
September 14-16 - Both Soviet and chicom propagandists continue
discussion of the Naushki incident. On 16 September, the Chinese
publish their governmen s note on the affair, along with Soviet
government's notes of 7 and 9 September. Other stories describe
the reception the and s passengers in
(NCNA) and deplore
September 14-15._ - National Conference of the Swiss Part of Labor
(Swiss UT) meets in Geneva. Wes ern readers earn on ep em er
that a pro-Chicom faction has s lit off from the main body of the
SPL, under the ea ers p of Lucien onnet, and Monnet claims
to be in touch with similar factions in Belgium and Italy, as
well as with the Chinese Communists. Although Tass covered the
conference, it makes no reference to the split un$-il 18 September,
when it circulates to Eastern Europe a report ridiculing the
faction. Also on 14-15 September, a Finnish CP plenum rejects
the Chinese position.
September 16 - The British CP publishes a statement (according to
Tass) saying that "British communists categorically reject the
objections of CCP and CPR government leaders to the Moscow partial
nuclear test-ban treaty." Pravda summarizes an article by the
Chairman of the Swedish CP, Hiic ng Hagberg, accusing the Chinese
leaders of rev s on ism, and complaining of attacks from Chinese
quarters on the eve of the Swedish CP's 20th Congress.
September 17 - Assuming a task previously shouldered by the USSR,
U e Albanian UN delegation subffiits a proposal for the "restoration
of the law l rights of the People's Republic of China," that is,
to give Peking the UN seat now held by the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
ment-.-X-clandestine a c broadcast of station Peyk-e Iran,
the "Voice of the Iraqi People," accuses the Chinese and Albanians
of trying o v e the Communist movement in Iraq "and to
create confusion in the ranks of the Communists and democrats."
naa publishes
Pravda
Hoyos, claiming bthat l"The rChinese dogmatists have no of the Colombian CP,
os e rdo rdo Y
influence in our ranks."
September 16 - A Pravda story indicates that the British CP state-
ment of September - see above) included a request a all CP s
study the question of calling a new international conference.
General -51 Tass also carries a Daily or er accoun o a spee Y
ecretary of the British , o n Gollan, denouncing the CCP
leaders, and saying: "We have never herd such language before
except from the Trotskyites." NCNA reports that 13 members of the
agency's Prague office have returned to Peking, rece v ng a
warm we come by more an 500 government officials. Chiang Lien-
chung, leader of the returnees, says: "The Czechoslovak Government
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(#13 Chronology Cont.)
tried by every means to blockade the correct views of the CCP and
government and of other fraternal parties persevering in Marxism-
Leninism, but it could not shut out th." One Embassy official
and one student returned with the/ . In Pyongyang, the
visiting Chairman of the CPR, Liu Shao-chi, delivers a militant
speech, denouncing the Soviet doctrine of division of labor:
"They are merely using this so-called international division
of labor as an attractive cloak to cover their own practice
of profiting themselves at the expense of others, a practice
characteristic of relations among the capitalist countries,
so as to obstruct the efforts of the economically under-
developed socialist countries to develop an independent
national economy and to make these countries economically
dependent on them and politically come under their control"
Liu charges that the "modern revisionists" are smearing the
revolutionary struggle as a "movement for piling up corpses"
and "promising the peoples freedom after death," while they
themselves blindly worship nuclear weapons:
"They recklessly brandish their nuclear weapons to blackmail
other countries. With the sure knowledge of meeting no oppo-
nent, they speculate in that situation and then ascribe the
achievements of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples
to the credit of their policy of nuclear blackmail. But once
confronted by an opponent, they capitulate, at the expense
of the interests of the revolutionary people, to the nuclear
blackmail of the opponent, sliding from adventumism to
capitulationism. When they engage in speculations, they
boast about their nuclear weapons in superlative terms;
when they capitulate, they allege that nuclear war is imminent
and that their capitulation is 'in obedience to the imperative
call of the time' and has 'saved world peace."
Liu claims that, while yielding to imperialist nuclear blackmail,
"the modern revisionists continue to practice nuclear blackmail
toward the people of the socialist countries and the revolutionary
people of the whole world," trying to frighten them with nuclear
horror stories. However, the Korean speaker who welcomes Liu,
a local official, makes only a cursory attack on "the modern
revisionists."
She tember 19 - A Pravda editorial, "Serious Hotbed of Tension
in Asia." scusses a Sino-Indian border question, indicating
that the CPR has looked for a quarrel, and has re used to accept
the proposals of the Colombo conference of non-aligned countries.
Chinese policies are causing great anxiety in Asia and Africa,
and are helping reactionary politicians in India. The Sino-
Indian conflict is used to disrupt conferences, as at Moshi and
the Moscow women's congress1showing the severity of the conflict:
2 (#13 Chronology Cont.)
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(#13 Chronology Cont.)
"Particularly alarming in this connection is not only the absence
of any real efforts to solve the conflict, but also increasing
evidence that the conflict may again be aggravated." The editorial
hints that there is concern for Soviet boundaries as well:
"On the question of frontier quarrels we hold Leninist views
and are convinced that there are no questions which cannot
be solved by peaceful means, by means of talks, without
bloodshed.... As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its
attitude to those countries which border on it is one of
respect,"
N C NA notes bitterly on 21 September that "India's official prop-
aganda machine" has given this editorial maximum publicity.
25 September, People's Daily reprints the editorial in full, and
promises to comment on ater, saying meanwhile: "The article
totally disregards facts, perverts the truth, slanders China as
wanting to settle its border dispute with India through war, and
maliciously attempts to poison the relations of Afro-Asian coup:.,
tries, the Colombo conference countries in particular, with China."
September 20 - iiomsomolskaya Pravda carries stories of Chinese
persecution ecution from our recent escapees from Sinkiang. In Pyongyang,
Nodong Sinmun publishes an article by three Korean scholars,
criticizing a Soviet World History for its treatment of Korean
history. The Soviet history tie eans claim, overlooks the
glorious ancient culture of Korea, fails to follow the Marxist
principles of artiynost and historicism, and mechanically Hcopies
from the works o Japanese and other imperialist writers. t
among the faults of the Soviet work (the Koreans say) are its
repetition of a legend that the first tribal confederacy was the
founded by an exile from China in the 12th century B.C.,
allegation that the Korean natives learned handicrafts and the
culture of sill: and of various grains from China.
September 21 - The Soviet government publishes an official state-
ment replying to the Chinese September statement; this statement
discusses the Chinese attitude on the nuclear test ban treaty,
er,
on the possession of nuclear weapons, on the no- ov a or,
on the ri-no-Ind an conflict, and on the eo e s communes. oscow
notes that-more than 90 countries have gned the test ban treaty,
and points out that recent Chinese disarmament proposals are
copied from two different Soviet proposals. Friedrich Engels is
quoted to show that, even in 14C;3, "broad sections of the popula-
tion /ere7 calling for disarmament," with Engels' full support.
As for the Chinese denial in their 1 September statement that they
are seeking their own nuclear weapon at any cost, the Chinese state-
ment "actually confirms the conclusion we have drawn and proves
once again that the negative position of the CPR Government toward
the nuclear test-ban treaty is explained precisely by their
desire to make their country a nuclear power." Alleging that
the Chinese say openly that they will have A-weapons if it takes
100 years, the Soviets point out that the Chinese are hardly in
a position, economically speaking, to divert resources to building
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(013 Chronology Cont.)
"It is well known that China does not have surplus resources,
and it takes enormous resources to produce nuclear weapons....
We do not consider ours a poor country, but even we have
much to do to put an end to those material difficulties
which still exist for the time being and about which we
speak openly."
Soviet weapons protect the whole camp, as Mao recognized in Septem-
ber 1958, when he said that, in view of the Soviet capability,
China "need not organize the production of such weapons, especially
considering that they are very expensive." The attempt now to
acquire an independent capability suggests that the Chinese "have
developed some sort of special aims and interests which cannot
be supported by the military force of the socialist camp":
"For it is impossible to accord plans of developing nuclear
weapons so as to increase, for instance, one's influence in
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or to create
for oneself 'a position of strength' in outstanding interna-
tional issues, or to increase international tensions, with
the peace-loving foreign policy course of the countries of
the socialist system."
The Soviet statement then adds, tongue in cheek: "We would not
(like?) to thing: that the CPR government is guided by such motives."
The Soviets turn against the Chinese their "full quotations"
from Mao and "Long Live Leninism:":
It... the Chinese leaders deliberate whether a half or 100
per cent of mankind would be destroyed in the flames of a new
war.... /this is shown bq7 the pronouncement of Mao Tse-tung
even in The altered form in which it is given in the statement
of the Chinese Government of 1 September: '/7 Tass ellipsis7...
if bad comes to worse half of humanity will perish, but hal'T
will remain. But imperialism will be razed off the face of
the earth and the whole world will go socialist.' No less
eloquent in this sense is a quotation from Redl , which
they are trying to deny, to the effect that n case of war
the victorious peoples 'most rapidly will create over the
ruins of destroyed imperialism a civilization a thousand
times higher. t11
In a powerful bid for support from the CP's of small countries,
the Soviets charge that, when a Czech journalist told Tao Chu,
a member of the CCP Central Committee, that all the Czechs might
be killed in a thermonuclear war, Tao replied:
V'fIn the case of a war of annihilation the small countries
belonging to the socialist camp would have to subordinate
their interests to the interests of the camp as a whole."'
It, (#13 Chronology Cont.)
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(#13 Chronology Cont.)
In Chinese eyes, "The war variant of the development of events is
regarded...as inevitable and even more desirable than the peaceful
variant." Every time a relaxation of tension has occurred in
recent years, the Chinese have deliberately stirred up trouble,
as in the case of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959. They even
stir up trouble on the Soviet border:
"Beginning with 1960, Chinese servicemen?-and civilians have
been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single
year of 1962, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border
from the Chinese side were registered. Attempts are also
being made to 'develop' some parts of Soviet territory with-
out permission.... Chinese propaganda is making definite
hints at the unjust demarcation of some of the sections of
the Soviet-Chinese border allegedly made in the past. How-
ever, the artificial creation today of any territorial
problems, especially between socialist countries, would
be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path."
Somewhat surprisingly, the Soviet statement ends with a call
to end polemics, and hints that the July CCP-CPSU talks might be
resumed, as it was then agreed to continue them later. The
Soviets state their readiness to take "all the steps we can to
achieve unity with China," but add that if the Chinese misinterpret
this good will and continue their slanderous and factional activ-
ities, "they must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff
from the CPSU and from the Soviet people awaits them on this road."
Also on 21 September, an award ceremony and a state banquet
were held in Ulan Bator on the occasion of the departure of 309
Chinese workers for na, Mongolian officials expresse gratitude
far the contribution of the Chinese workers, functionaries and
students, but it appears that the departure closed out Chinese
aid programs in Mongolia. The returnees were given the now--
customary welcoming reception when they arrived at the Chinese
border on 23 September.
September 22 - Tass reports that the political Committee of the
Peruvian Cr? endo sr es the "Moscos?r" test ban treaty, and condemns
the ench Government for its intention to persist in testing.
September 23 - A Moscow Radio broadcast in French to Africa
ridicules Chinese claims that they abstain from the Third World
Meeting of Journalists because is not held n Africa an ecause
Is to deal w professional and not political matters;
Algiers (where the journalists' ship is to touch) is in Africa,
and the struggle for peace, against reaction, and for national
independence and social justice will be broached at the meeting.
In Ulan Bator, the Mongolian Montsame news agency transmits an
"observers commentary, endorsing a 21 September Soviet statement.
5 (#13 Chronology Cont.)
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(#13 Chronology Cont.)
September 24 - Pravda publishes a statement by the Central Committee
of the oar uguese "co munist Party, saying that Chinese policies
are dangerous, and it coa en ons that the CPSU imposes a
"peace course" on parties in capitalist countries are deplorable;
no one is imposing a "peace course" on the Portuguese CP, which
must overthrow a fascist government by force. The statement
urges "the earliest convocation of a meeting of all communist and
workers parties which, in a on to discuss ng ideological
pro ens, wou work out the standards regulating relations between
fraternal parties." Tass and Moscow Radio circulate this story
to domestic and European audiences.
September 2.5- - Leninskaya Smena of Alma Ata carries a story by
r Vakhidov, a former member of the Chinese Komsomol Central
Committee and Secretary of the Sinkiang Komsomol, who has fled
from China. VaZzhidov, a Uip-hur by nationality, state; that
hundreds of his fellow-countrymen are languishing in "so-called
a or training camps, w ch are in fact concentration camps."
"We were branded as 'traitors,' 'cosmopolitans,' an oviet spies'
and dismissed from our jobs," Va!.hidov says; "People who for
any reason got in touch with the Soviet Consulate were submitted
to questioning," According to a Tan ug item of 26 September,
a similar story appears in the currLiteraturnaya Gazeta,
written by a Kazach writer, Bukhara Tis _an eyev, formerly living
in Sinkiang.
September 26 - After a pause of two weeks (the first two articles
appeared-a week apart), People's Daily and Red Fla publish the
third in their series of articles answering a Central
Committee's Open Letter of 14 July 1963: "Is Yugoslavia a
Socialist Country?" Not too surprisingly, the Chinese answer to
the titlews question is "No." They claim that capitalism and
usury flourish in Yugoslav cities, kulaks wax fat in the Yugoslav
countryside, and the dictatorship of the proletariat has been
turned into a "dictatorshi. of the bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie,
a category which sounds faintly reminiscent o as s
New Class. "U.S, aid has been the mainstay of Yugoslavia's
finances and economy"--thanks to Tito's having concluded a series
of traitorous treaties with the United States:
"Because of the conclusion of these treaties and agreements
and because the Tito clique has made Yugoslavia dependent
on U.S. imperialism, the United States enjoys the following
rights in Yugoslavia: 1) to control its military affairs;
2) to control its foreign affairs; 3) to interfere in its
internal affairs; 4) to manipulate and supervise its finance;
5) to control its foreign trade; 6) to plunder its strategic
resources; and 7) to collect military and economic intelli-
gence."
Under Tito, state power has degenerated from the dictatorship of
the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; "the
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dictatorship of the bourgeoisie not only exists, but is a brutal
fascist dictatorship at that. The Tito regime has set up many
fascist prisons and concentration camps where tens of thousands
of revolutionaries have been tortured to death by every kind of
inhuman punishment." On the other hand, counterrevolutionaries
are pardoned. 8hrushchev, however, fraternizes with the Tito
clique "not because it has corrected any of its errors but because
he is following in Tito's footsteps." Khrushchev and Tito "both
want to liquidate the socialist camp," and Khrushchev
"has abandoned Marxism-Leninism, scrapped the 1960 state-
ment, and wallowed in the mire with the renegade Tito clique,
in complete violation of the interests of the Soviet Union.,
the Soviet people, and the people of the whole world. This
will not be tolerated by the great Soviet people, the over-
whelming majority of the CpSU members, and cadres at various
levels, all of whom have a glorious revolutionary tradition."
The article contains numerous quotations from the Yugoslav press,
which cannot however be regarded as a guarantee of its factual
accuracy. Although the article contains at the end an incongruous
call to the Soviet leaders to turn back before it is too late,
its publication appears to constitute a resounding refusal to end
the open polemics.
Se tember 27 - Moscow Radio broadcasts domestically a Pravda
summary a the John Gollan 14 September speech (see under eptember
18 above), now including a passage appealing for a world conference
of CP's, on the basis of the 1957 declaration and the l960 state-
ment,
7 (#13 Chronology)
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CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENTIONS COMMUNISTES
No. 13 14-27 septembre 1963
14 - 16 septembre: Les propagandiates sovietiques at
ch iino con inuent a disouter de ].'incident de Naushki.
Le 16 septembre, lea Chinois publiaient?une note de leur
gouvernement concernant ].'incident an meme temps que des
notes du gouvernement sovietique datees du/7 at du 9 sep-
tembre. D'autres articles parlent de la reception a Pe-
kin du personnel at des passagers du train Chinois (Agen-
ce de presse do la Chine nouvelle) ou deplorent cette
reception (Izvestiya, 16 septembre) .
14 - 15 septembre: La Conference nationale du parts tra-
vailliste suisse (par communists su sse s est r unie a
Geneve. Les lecteurs des pays occidentaux apprenaient le
16 septembre qu'un groups pro-chinois sous la direction
de Lucien,Monnet weat separe du gros do 1'organisation;
Monnet pretend qu'il eat an contact avec des groupements
analogues an Belgique at an Italia, at qu'il hest egale-
ment avec lea communistes chinois. Bien que 1 agence
TASS sit ate representee a la conference, elle n'a
pas mentionne la separation jusqu'au 18 septembre, date 'a
la?cuelle ells a fait circular an Europe Orientale des ar-
ticles tournant au ridicule le groupement dissident. Ega-
lement le 14 - 15 septembre, un pl6num du parti communis-
te finlandais s'est e1eve contra la position chinbise.
16 se tembre: Le anti oommuniste britanni ue publie une
d claration (salon le TA qui dit qua: Lea communistes
britanniques rejettentcategoriquement lea objections du
parti communists chinoiB at du gouvernement de la Repu-
blique Populaire de Chine a 1'egard du traite de Moscou
interdisant lea essais nuoleaires.11 La Pravda donne une
resume d' un . article du president du arts communiste sue-
dois Hilding Hagberg, qui accuse lei leaders chinois de%
sionnisme et'se plaint d'attaques emanant de Chine a
la veille du 20e Congres du parts communiste suedois.
17 se}tembre: Assumant la tache precedemment d6volue a
l 'Union So ietique, la delegation albanalse aux Nations
unies soumet une proposition pour la restauration des
droits legitimes de la Republique Populaire chinoise" au-
trement dit, pour accorder a Pekin le sse a aux Nations
unies que detie nt heure actuelle le gouvernement do
Chiang Kai-shek. Une radio clandestine arabe, "La voix
du peuple de}1'Iraq", accuse les Chinois at lea lbanass
do chercher a provoquer des dissentions dans le mouve-
mont communiste on Iraq, "et de Greer la confusion parmi
les rangs des communistes et des deimocrates". La Pravda
public un article du leader du parts communiste de la
Colombie, Jose Cardona Hoyos, qui pretend que "les dogma..
tiates chinois n'exercent aucune influence parmi nos
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lgtembr?: Un article de Pravda fait savoir que la de-
clarat ion du parti communists britannique du 16 eeptembre
(voir plus haut) contenait une requite que toua lea par-
tis communiptes etudient la question de convoguorr uno nou-
velle conference Internationale. TASS rep odult egalemont
un comp a-rendu du Daill worker du scours du secr6taire-
genoral du parti commun ste ritannique, John aollan, qui
denonce les'leaders du parti comun18te chinois et ecla-
ro:"None n'avons jamais entendu de langage pareil, sauf
do la part des trotakistea". L'Agence de presse do la
Chine nouvelle fait savoir que 13 membres de son a ence a
Prague sont retourn(s a Pokin e t qu ils ont to chaleureu-
sement re9ua par plus de 500 fonetionnairesouvvernemon
taux. Chiang Lion-Chung, leader du groupe do P
d6clare:"Le ouvernement tchEcoslovaque a eesay6'par tour
los moyena d empecher 1'expreaaion des vises correctes du
parti communists chinois, du gouvernement chinois at des
autres partis fraternels qui perB6verent Jana le marxisme-
leninisme maisil n'est pas parvenu 'a empecher la ve`rita
do so rdpandre." Un fonctionnaire de l'ambassade et un y
etudiant sont rentr6s aver le groups. A Pyongyang, le pre
sident de la Republique Populaire chinoise, Liu Shao-chi,
fait un diecours agresaif dana lequel it dehonce la doctri-
ne soviotique de la division du travail:
"Ila ne font qu'utiliser la soi-disant division
Internationale du travail comme un voile attrayant
destine" a couvrir lour propre habitude de tirer
profit pour eux-memos aux d4pens des autres, une
habitude caracteriatique dana lea relations entre
pays capitaliates, qui eonaiste a empecher lea ef-
forts dos pays socialiates esonomiquement sous-
doveloppes et tendant a developper une economie
nationale rodep endante, pour rendre cea pays eco-
nomiquement ddpendants et places du point de vue
politique sous lour controle".
Liu pretend que lea "revisionnistea modernea" calomnient la
lutto ravolut ionna ire en pretendant que c' eat "un mouve-
ment pour entasser des eadavrea," et qu'ils"promettent aux
peuples la liberte apmes la mort", cependant qu'eux-memos
adorent aveugldment lea armes nucleaires:
Its brandiasent leurs armes nucleaires comme noyens
de chantage contre lea autres pays. Certains do no
trouver aucune opposition, ils apeeulent dens cetto
situation et ensuite pr(:ftendent quo lea resultats
obtenus dans la lutte revolutionnaire des peuplos
font dta grace a lour politique de chantage nue1o
airs. Mats une fois mis en pr6aence dun adversai-
re, ils capitulent, aux dens des interets du1pou-
ple ravolutionnaire, au chantage nucleaire de 1 ad-
versaire, glissant de l'aventurisme au capitulation-
nisne. Lorsqu'Ils s'engagent dans des sp6culations,
ils se vantent do leurs armes nucleaires on tenses
superlatifs; lorsqu'ils capitulent, Us pretendent
quo la guerre nuclea ire 6t a it inmpinIIent o et quo
ifleur
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1 ' a poque' et qu'elle a 'sauve la pa ix mond ial a' .
Liu protond qua tout an codant au ehantage nucleaire des
inp6rialistoa, "les reurisionnistes moderns continuant a
pratiquer le ehantage nueldaire'a 1'egard des pouplos dos
pays soc ialtates et des peuples revolutionnaires du monde
entier", cherchant a lea terroriser par des histoires do
boabos nueleaires. Cependant, l'oratour cordon qui a sou-
haite la bienvenue h Liu, un fonctionnaire locales n'a di-
rige qu'une attaque superf ieielle contra "les revisionnis-
tos moderns".
19 septembre: Un editorial do Pravda "Foyer de tension so
rieuse an Asie", discute do la cation do frontiere sino-
ind_ ie~, indlquant que la Repiub ique Popu sire c inoise
avast cherche quenelle, et qu e11e avast rejete' lea propo-
sitions de la conference des pays non-aligner do Colombo.
La politique chinoiso cause de granda soucis an Asie at an
Afrique, at aide lea politicians reactionnaires de 1'Indc.
Le conflit sino-indien eat utilise "a d6sagreger lea confer
rences, comma a Moshi ou au C,ongres mondial des ferns a
Moscou, co qui montre la severite du conflit;"Ce qui eat
particulierement allarmant sous cc rapport cc n'eat pas sou-
lomont, l'absonce de tout effort r3el de reaoudre le conflit,
ma is egal?ment la preuve croiasante qua cc eonflit risque
encore une foss do Be trouver a rave". Ldito vial fait
allusion au fait qu i n resse egalement lea frontiores
sovi6tiques:
"Au sujet do la question do querellea de fron-
tieros, noun partageons lea vues leninistes at
nous sommes convaincus qu'il n'y a pas do ques-
tions qui no puissant etre resolues par des moy-
ens pacifiques, par des entretions, sans faire
coulor le sang,.. En cc qu concerns 1'Union So-
vietique, son attitude a 11egard des pays avoc
lesquels elle a une frontiere commune eat une
attitude de respect".
L'Agence do presse de la Chine nouvello souligne aigrement
lo 21 septembre que "la machine off icielle do propaganda
do l' Inde" a donne a cat editorial une public its maximum.
Le 25 septembre, le Quotidian du Peu le reproduisait l'sdi-
torial on entier, et promettai de donnor plus tard des com-
mentaires, soulignant entretemps:"L'article Be raoque tota-
lonont des faits, alters la v6rite", calomnio la Chine on
prbtcndant qu'elle veut regler sa querelle do frontiers avec
1'Indc au moyen d'une guerre, of chercho avec malveillanco
d'eupoisonner lea relations entre la Chino of lea pays afro-
asiatiquos, on particulter ceux ayant participe' a la Confcr-
ronco do Colombo."
20 septembre: La KonsomolekaIa Pravda fait paraitre des
histoires de pers cum chi-noise contdes par quatre par-
sonnes echappdes recenment du Sinkiang. A Pyongyang, le
Nodong Sinmun public un article par trots savants careens
critiquant 1THistoiro nondiale publide par lea Soviets,
pour la fad on ont a trait5o 1'histoire do la Cor6c.
3
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L~histoire sovietique, protendont lea Coreens, oubliO'
1 ancienne culture glorieuso do la Cordes neglige do sui-
vro lea principes marxistes do arti post at d'historicis-
mo, of copio necaniquament lea travaux auteurs japonais
at autros impdrialistos. TMiais, d'aprbs les Cordes parni
los orrours do l'oeuvro sovi6tiqu~deratiou e une rWpatifonn
do la legende quo la premiere conf
doe par un exile' de Chine au coura du 120 siecle avant no-
tre 'bre, ainsi quo lea affirmations quo les indigbnes co-
roons avaient appria on Chine lea travaux d'artisans, la
culture do la sole et cello des diverses ce'reales.
21 sopte bro: Le ouvernenent sovieti ue public une decla-
ration offieielle on r pone a la declaration chinoise du^
preiaior septenbro; cette declaration discute do 1 attitude
chinoise a 11egard du traite nucleaire, de la possession
dos arms nucldairesi e a ron to sine-sov quo, u
con 1it i-no---Ind n ion, Iot des communes opu a res. ,1 con
sou gne quo p us a 90 pays an a ne a ra e nucleaire,
of quo les propositions rocentes des Chinois concernant le
dcsarmament sont lea copies de deux propositions sovicti-
ques differentes. Friedrich Engels est cite pour nontror
quo none on 1893, "de largea sections de la population do-
:.andaient le dasarnofient", avec un soutien sans roatrictions
do la part do Engels. En ce qui concern une den(gation
chinoise contenue dana lour den6gation du premier septeribre,
ils cherchent a tout prix df.avoir lours propres arr/es nu-
cloaires, la declaration chinoise "confirme actuellenent
la conclusion a laquelle nous somnes arrives at prouve unc
f ois de plus quo la position negative du gouvernenent do
la Republique Populaire chinoise a 1'egard du traite nucle
sire s'oxpliquo precisenent par leur de'sir de faire do
lour pays uno puissance nucleaire". Pretendant qua los
Chinois disent ouvertenent qu'ils auront la bombe atoniquc
uoae s'it lour fallait cent ans pour l'avoir, les Soviets
soulignent quo du point de vuc e'cononique lea Chinois sont
loin d'etro an position do detourner des ressources pour
la construction d'armes nucleaires:
"C'ost un fait bien connu quo la Chine ne pos-
sede pas de ressources exe dentaires, of ii fadt,
dos rossources enormes pour produire des arses
nucleaires... Nous no considerons pas notre pro-
pre pays comma itant un pays pauvro, main nous-
rienes avons de grands efforts a faire pour faire
cosser lea difficultes rlatdriellea qui existent
encore pour 1'instant, at dont nous parlons ouver-
tenent".
Los arses sovietiques protbgent le camp tout ontior, ainsi
quo Mao 1'a reconnu an soptonbre 1958, lorsqu it dit qu on
raison du potential sovi6tique la Chine "n'avait pas bosoin
do creer une production do cos armes, on raison particulib-
reront do cc qu'ellos content". Le desir do le faire 'nain-
tenant montre qua les,,Chinois "se sont cr66 quelques objoc-
tifs at quelques interets spdciaux qui no peuvent etro sou-
tenus par la force nilitaire du camp sooialiste":
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"Car 11 eat impossible d'harmoniser lea plans
do de'voloppenent d'arnes nucleaires pour augmen-
tor par example l'influence d'un pays daps lea
pays do 1'Asio, de 1'Afrique ou do 1 Amerique
Latino, ou do crier pour ce pays une position do
force dans lea problemes intornationauX, au
d'augmenter lea tensions intornationales, avec
la politique Arangbre pacifique des pays du sys-
teme socialiste".
Et lea Soviets ajoutent avec malice-."Noun n'aimorions pas
ponsor que lo gouvernement do la Chine Populaire snit guide
par dos motifa pareils".
Los Soviets tournent contre lea Chinois leurs "cita-
tions integrates"de Mao et do "Vivo le leninisme!".
"...lea leaders chinois deliberant pour savoir si la
moitie ou la totalit6 de 11humanite serait d6trui-
to dans lea flanmes dune nouvelle guerre...Los
declarations de Mao Tse-tuff rte iiontrent ] memo
dans la version modifies qu en donne la declara-
tion du gouvernement chinois du ler soytembro:
mais
'...au pare la moitie de 1'humanite perirait,
la moitie survivrait. Mais 1'imperialisme so trou-
vorait balaye de la face de la terre et to monde
entier deviendrait socialiste.' Non moins eloquent
on co sons eat un extrait du Drapeau rouge, decla-
ration qu'ils cherahent a renier, et qui veut qu'on
cas de guerre lea peuples victorieux aillont 'rapi-
dement sur lea ruiner de '.1'?impe'rialisme dStruit
crier une civilisation mille fois supe'rieure".
Dans un effort gigantesque pour le soutien du parti co:lnu-
nisto pour lea petits pays, lea Soviets pretendent que To
Chu, moiabre du eomite central du parti communists chinois,
aurait repondu ce qui suit a un journaliste tch6que qui
lui disait quo tour lea Tchbques risquaient d titre turfs
dans une guerre thereto-nucl6aire:
"'Dana le cas de guerre d'annihilation, lea pe-
tits pays appartenant au camp socialiste auront
'I subordonner lours interots aux intereta du
camp tout entier'."
Do Pavia des Chinois:"La variante do guerre dans le cours
dos eveneronts eat considerde... come (:rtant inevitable at
Chaquo
noMo plus souhaitable quo la variante pacifique.
fois qu'i1 y a eu un rolAchement do tension au tours do cos
dornibres annees, lea Chinois ont fait expres do crier dos
onr~!uis, come dans le cas du conflit sino-indien de 1959?
Its cre'ont Memo des ennuis sur la frontiore sovietiquo:
"Cori-iencant on 1960, lea militaires et lea ci-
vils chl.nois ont viola systematiquouent la fron-
tioro sovicstique. En la seule annee 1962, % i1 y
a ou plus do 5.000 violations do la frontiers so-
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ont ate faites egalonent do 'r:,ettro on valour'
corta inns parties du torritoire soviotique
sans obtonir do po ruisaion... La propaganda
chinoise fait dos allusions precises au fait
quo lea doiaarcations sot-disant faites dins
lo pas E dans ecrtaips soctours do la fontid-
ro sino-soviotique otaiont injustos. Copon-
dant, la creation artificielle aujourd'hui do
tout lo problene territorial, on particulier
antra pays socialist's, roviondrait a s'emb r-
quer sur une voce tros dangereuse."
Fait assoz surprenant, la declaration soviotique so tornino
par un appal a torninor lea polbEniques, et fait allusion
co quo lea entretiens do juillet entre le parti co raunisto
chinois of le parts conriuniste do 1'Union Sovietiquo pour-
raiont etre repris, ainsi quo cola fut entendu. Lee Sovicts
dcclarent qu'ils sent prrts ~a prendre "touter acs uosures
quo nous pouvons pour parvenir a une entente avoc la Chino,"
-2ais ils a joutent quo si lea Chinois donnaient a sotto
prcuve do bonne volontdune interpretation orroneo of con-
tinuaient lours calounies et lour attitude do discordo,
"ils doivont coiaprendre clairemont qu'.une rebuffade la
plus resolue de la part du parti communisto do 1'Union
Sovie'tique of du peuple soviotique lea attend le long do
la route".
Egalenent le 21 eeptenbre, uno corcrionio do distri-
bution do recompenses et un banquet d'Etat ourent lieu
Ulan Bator a 1'oecasion du de art a destination do la Chi-
no de 302 ouvriers chinois. Los officials mongols oxpri-
r nt lour gratitude pour la contribution faito par lea
ouvriers, lea fonctionnaires of lea 6tudiants chinois,
mass it somble quo co ddpart riot un terms au programme
d'aido chinoise la Mongolic. Los repatrie's furont ac-
cuoillis par uno rdception do bionvonue, bionvenue cou-
tu:icro, lorsqu'ils arriveront a la frontiers chinoise
lo 23 soptoubro.
22 septoimbre: TASS fait savoir quo lo Comite politiquc
du parts eomnuniste peruvien approuvo le traits "do Mos-
cou , intordisant lea essais nucloaires, et condaune lo
ouvornenont franj ass pour on intention do poursuivro
lea essais.
2 se ter_,bro: Uno radio do Moscou, en languc franjaise,
dostin6o a i'.ifriquo,tourno on ridicule lea affirmations
chinoises ue coux-ci s a a iennont do art ci er au
3 Congr s :rondia desJournalisto. parce qu it n 'a pas
lieu on Afrique et parce quo le congres allait traitor
do questions prof essinnnellos ct non pas do questions po-
litiques; Alger (ou lo navire des journalistos va faire
escale) se trouve on Afrique, at la lutte pour la paix,
contre la reaction, et pour l'indopondance nationals at
la Justice socials soront des questions trait6es la
reunion. A Ulan Bator, l'agenco do prosso .iongole .iont-
sau:c fait passor un cor:ientairc signd "Obsorvatour",app-
prouvant la declaration sovidtiquo du 21 soptcr_ibro.
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24 soptombro: La Pravda public unc declaration du Conito
central du parti conmunisto portugais, qui declare quo la
politique chinoise oat dangerouse, at qu'il at qu'i1 otait
deplorable do lour part do prdtendre que le parts connu-
nisto do 1'Union Sovi6tiquo imposalt aux partis des pays
capitalistos "uno politique de paix; Personne n'inpose
do politique do paix au parti connuniste portugais, qui
doit ronvorsor par la force un gouverneuent fasciate. La
declaration fait appal "d une convocation urgente do tons
los artis communistes et qui, on plus do
a discussion dos problenes eeononiques, etablirait dos
roglos pour les relations centre lea partis fraternele,"
TASS at Radio-Moscou font circular oette declaration a
1Tntontion dos audiences sovietique at europe'ennes,
25 $optenbrel Leninskaya Stena do Alua Ata public un ar-
ticle do Asir Vakhidov, aneien membre du Comite'central do
la Jeunesse eommuniste chinoise at secr6taire do la Jou-
nosso cor uniste de Sinkiang, qui s'est eehappe de Chino.
Vakhidov, qui ost do nationalite uigur, declare quo dos
container de sea con atriotes so trouvent dans "do soi-
disant carps do preparation au travail, qui an fait no
sont quo dos campa,?de concentration." "On nous qualif io
do traltros, de cosmopolites at d espions sovietiquos at
on nous licencie do nos eraplois, declare Vakhidov; lea
Bons qui pourquolque raison ont.et6 on rapport avoc lo
consulat sovietique sont sounis a des intorrogatoiros."
D'apres un article du Tan u du 26 septembre, une histoiro
analogue parait dans Literaturnaya Gazeta, sous la signa-
ture d'un eerivain kazakh, Bukhara Tishkanboyev, ancion
resident de Sinkiang.
26 septembro: Apres uno pause do deux senaines (lea deux
proriiors articles ont etd publics 'a une seraaino de dis-
tance l'un de l'autre), lo Quotidian du peu le of lo Dra-
poau rouge ant public le troisiene de lour s to d'arti-
clcs repondant a la lettre ouverte du 14 juillot 1963
adrossce par le Coriite central du parti corjn-unisto do
1'Union Sovietiquo:"La Yougoslavie est-elle un parti so
cialisto?" Il n'y a rion do tres surprenant quo la re-
ponse dos Chinois a eetto question eat "Non:" Its prow
tondont quo le capitalisre ot.l'usuro prosperent dans
los villas yougoslaves, lea koulaks s'ongraissont dans
la canpagne yougoslave, at quo la dictature du prol(fta-
riat a dtdr tranforuee on uno dictature do la bourgooi-
sic burcaucr, tc-conprador", catcdorie qui rappelle quol-
quc nou la Nouvelle classe de Djilas. "L'aido dconoui-
quo dos Etats-Unis a etc to soutien dos finances at do
1'econonio yougoslaves", grace a Tito qui a conclu uno
sorie do traitc(s porfides avec los Etats-Unis:
"Grwce a la conclusion do cos traitos at do cos
accords at parce quo la clique do Tito a fait quo
la Yougoslavee d6pendo de 1'i,:iporialismo dos
Etats-Unis, les Etats-Unis jouissent dos droits
suiv:nts on Yougoslavie: 1) le controle do sea
affaires uilitairos; 2) le controle de sea af-
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faires Qtrangaros; 3) le droit d'ingorence dana
sea affaires intorioures; 4) le droit do mani-
pulor,~at do diriger sea finances; 5) le droit do
controlor son commerce oxtorieur; 6) la possibi-
lite do pillor sea rossourcos atratdgiques, at
7) la faculta d'obtenir dos renseignenents d'or-
dro nilitaire at oconomique."
Sous Tito, le pouvoir d'Etat a dogene ro d'une dictaturo
de proletariat on uno dietaturo do la bourgeoisie; "la
dictaturo de la bourgeoisie non souloment exists, Lacs
cue oat par-dessus le marche uno dictaturo faseieto bru-
talo. Le r6gime Tito a or6e do nor~breuses prisons fascis-
to? at dose amps do concentration, ou des dizainos do mil-
liars do revolutionnaires ont 6td tortures a mort at sou-
mis e toutos sortes do punitions inhurnaines". D'un autro
cote, 1es contrerevolutionnaires aont pardonn6s. Khrouch-
tchof cop~ondant fraternise avec la clique de Tito "non pas
parse qu it a corrigo aucune do sea orreurs mais parco
qutil suit lea traces do Tito". Khrouchtchof at Tito
"voulent liquidor tous lea deux le camp socialists";
jthrouchtchof do son cat6:
"a abandonne to rnarxisne-lelinissmo, a mis au
lea dcsclarations do 1960, et il s a
dans la bouo avec la clique du traitre Tito, al-
lant a l'oncontre des int'r6ts de itUnion Sovie
tique, du peuple sovidtique at du peuple du mon-
do entier. Cots no sera pas tole're par le grand
pouplo sovietique, par la grande rnajoritd dos
mombres du parti comrwuniste do 1'Union Sovie'ti-
quo, par lea differonts cadres, qui tous posso-
dent uno tradition glorieuse do la revolution".
L' article contient des passages nornbreux certains es do lappnos-'atre se ougoslave sans quo 1 on puisse
dc.nt do lour cre'dibilitd'. Bion qu' a la fin l' article
contionno un appol incongru adresse aux leaders sovi6ti-
ques, qui lour dit de faire marehe arriere avant qutil no
soft trop tard, sa publication semble constituor un refus
rotontissant do mettre un torus a la polenique ouvorto.
21 septa oubre: Radio-Moscow transmot localement un r6surad
donne dana Pravda du diseours do John Gollan du 14 sep-
tenbro (voir- i-dessus le 18 septembre); co rdsuud con-
tiont un passage demandant la convocation d'uno confo-
ro ce nondiale des partis comuunistes, sur la base do la
declaration do 1957 at do cello do 1960.
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CROLOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES CCK)NISTAS
No 13 14-27 Septiembre 1963
14-16 Septiembre: Los propagandistas tanto sovi6ticos como chinocomu-
nistas prosiguen la discusi6n del incidents de Naushki. El 16 de sep?
tiembre los chinos publican la nota de su Gobierno sobre el asunto,
asi comp las notas del Gobierno sovi6tico de 7 y 9 de septiembre.
Otros relator describen el recibimiento en Pkin de la triplulaci6n y
los passajeros chinos (Agencia Nueva China) y deploran dicho recibi-
miento ("Izvestiya" 16 septiembre).
n5, 5a re: La Conferencia National del Partido Suizo del Tra-
o i. ?0 wlAo) se R;Ee- en Ginebra. Los lectores de la prensa
occidme.1 se enteran el 16 de septiembre que una facci6n pro chino-
comunista se ha escindido del cuerpo principal-&-l-M, bbajo la direc-
ci de Lucien Monaet, y Este declare estar en contacto con factions
semejantes en B6lgica e Italia asi como con los comunistas chinos.
Tass se ocupa de la conferencia pero se abstiene de mencionar la esci-
si6n hasta el 18 de septiembre, fecha en que envia a Europa Oriental
un informe poniendo en ridiculo dicha facci6n. El 14 y 15 de septiem-
bre tambi6n, un pleno del PC finlandds rechaza la posici6n china.
16 Septiembre: El PC britdnico publica, segdn informs Tass, una decla-
raci n en el sentido de qu ~"e~e los comunistas britdnicos categ6ricamente
rechazan las objeciones de los dirigentes del PC chino y del Gobierno
de la RP china al tratado de Moscd contra los ensayos nucleares."
"Pravda" resume un articulo de Hilding Hagberg, presidente del PC
sueco, acusahdo a los dirigentes chinos de revisionismo y quej dose
de ataques de origen_.chino en la vispera del ViOsimo.Congreso del
PC sueco.
17 Septiembre: Tomdndose ima tares que antes habia sido de Is. URSS,
la de agaclbn albanesa a la ONU somete una propuesta pare "la restau-
raci6n de los leg imps derechos de la Repdblica Popular China", o
sea dar a Pekin la banca en la ONU que ahora ocupa el Gobierno de
Chiang -shek. na emisi clandestina en firabe de la estaci6n
Peyk-e Iran, la "Voz del Pueblo Iraki", acusa a los chinos y albaneses
de intentar dividir a movimiento comunista en Irak y "crear la con-
fusi6n el las filas de los comunistas y dem6cratas". "Pravda" publica
un articulo de Josh Cardona Hoyos, dirigente del PC colombiano, decla-
rando que "los dogmiticos chinos no tienen influencia alguna en nues-
tras filas".
18 SSeptiembre: Un articulo de "Pravda" indica que la declaraci6n del
PC--brit node 16 de septiembre (vea mss arriba) incluy6 el pedido
de que todos los PC estudiaran la cuesti6n de convocar una nueva con-
ferencia international. Tars tambidn publics un relato del Daily
Worker"-
or er sobre un art culo de John Gollan, secretario general del PC
britainico, repudiendo a los dir gentes del PC chino y declarando:
"Nunca habiamos escuchado semejante lenguaje excepto de parte de los
trotakistas". La Agencia Nueva China informa que 13 miembros de la
oficina de Praga de la antis ban regreee a P , si ndoles pro-
digado un c ido recibimiento por mks de 500 funcionarios del Gobierno.
Chiang Lien-thong, lider de be regresados, declare: "El Gobierno
checoslovaco tratd por todos los medios de bloquear las correctas opi-
nions del PC y Gobierno chinos y de otros Partidos fraternos que
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verdad". Un t cicrario- "Oda y un estudiante regreseron con
el grgpO de is Ageaci&, China. En Pyongyang de visits, Liu
Shao-cbi, presidents t i~ thine, prcnuncia un discurso militante
rep*i$i.E do - le doctribs, iO4 ittict de la divisi6u del traba jo :
?Tia1b& peucil'Pmarate o leando ester dedicente divisi6n
in-reraacienal del tre a jo camp atray+ente caps para cubrir
su-propia prdtica de bejeficiaree a expenses do otros,
prdtica que caracteriza?lea relaciones entre loo pafses
capitalist8s, pare obot ix, los esruerzos de los passes so-
cialistas eeondmicamente subdioserrolladoa por desarroller
uaa economfa nacional indepeadiente y pacer que dichos passes
queden sujetos a ellos econdmicaeente y caigan poifticamente
bajo el control de ellos".
Liu denuncie que los "revisionistss conteeor&e0s" estdn desacrediten-
do la lucha revolucionaria como "movimiento pars emwtonar ceddveres"
y que "promete a los pueblos la libertad despuds de muertoe", mientras
que ellos ziamos adoran ciegamente las arenas nucleares:
"Bianden sin cautela alguna sue arms nucleares pera chantaiear.
a otros paises. Con el seguro conocimiento de no encontrar
oposici6n, especulan en dicha situaci6n y lvego atribuyen las
realizaciones de la lucha revolucionaria al crbdito de su polf-
tica de chantaje nuclear. Pero una vez se les encara un opo-
sitor, capitu].an, a expenses de los intereses del pueblo revo-
lucionario, al chantaje nuclear del opositor, deslizdndose del
aventurismo al capitulacionismo. Cuando se dedican a las es-
peculaciones, se jactan de sus arenas nucleares en t6rminos
superlativos; cuando capitulan, alegan que is guerre nuclear
estd inminente y que su capitulaci6n es 'en obediencia J.
llamado imperativo de la bpoca' y he 'salvado is Paz Ur'lndial'".
Liu declare que, en tanto que as rinden ante el chantaje n%zclear im-
perialists; ".os revisionietas cantempordneos continban practioando
le chantaje nuclear hacia-el -paebi.o 4e los passes socialistsa y el
pueblo revolucionario del mundo enterb", tratando de ei &*eberloa
con espeluznantes cuentos nucleares. Sin embargo, el..,orador coreano
que da a Liu is bienvenida, un funcionario local, hace un ataque
rutinario contra "los revisionistas contempordneos".
19 Se tiembre: Un editorial de "Pravda", titulado "Grave hervidero
de tensi6n en Asia", trata de la cuesti6n fronteriza entre India y
China, indicando que la RP china ha buscado querella S se ha negado
a acepter las propuestas de la conferencia de Colombo de naciones no
aliueadas. Las lineas de conducts, de China estdn causando grave
ansiedad en Asia y Africa y estdn ayudaado a los politicos reacciona-
rios de India. El conflicto chino-Indio se emplea pars desbaratareon-
fereacias, como la de Mosbi y el congreso femenil de Masco, demoetran-
do la dad del conflicto: "EspeciaimeuYe
Victrdar es so solamente lap.ansencie. de todo verdadercr esfuerzo .por der
eoluci6n a' onflicto lino la crec a de que el conflicto
puede volver a a sell EP
preoccapeeci por las froaberae-eovi6ticas:
"En materia de querellee Pronterizas~mentenemoe ideas leninis-
tas y eetamos conveneidoe de que no hay cuestionesque no puedan
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sin derramamiento de Sangre... Ppr,lo que concierne a 4.a Uni6n
Sovidtica, su actitud tespeetd & loi passes fronterizos a ella
es de respeto":
La Agencia Nueva China apunto con acritud el 21 de septiembre que
"la maquinaria oficial de propaganda de India" ha dado maxima publi-
cidad a d4.cho editorial. El 25 de septiembre el "Diario del Pueblo"
reproduce integramente el editorial, prowtiendo coinentar mks tarde,
y dice entretapto: "El articulo hate caso omiso totalmente de los
hechos, trastrpca is. verdad, ca].umnia a China en el sentido de querer
decidir su dispute fronteriza can India por la.ggerra, y r*Jiciosamen-
te trata de emponzo$ar las relations de los paises afroasidticos, en
particular los passes de la conferencia de Colombo, con China".
20 Septiembro: "Komsomolskaya Pravda" publics relatos de cuatro in-
divi uoa evacidos recientamente de Sinkiang sobre la persecuci6n china.
En Pyongyang, "Nodong Sini n" publics un articulo or tree estudiosos
chinos criticando la "Historic Mundial"-sovidtica por is. forma en que
trata la historia de Corea. La histori.a sovidtica, declaran los core-
anos, pass por alto la gioriosa culture antigua de Cores, deja de se-
guir los principios merxistas de partiyrnost e historicism y copia
mecdnicamente de las obras de escritores imperialistas tales como los
japoneses y otros. Pero entre los defectos de la obra sovidtica, di-
cen los coreanos, estdn is. repetici6n de una leyenda que dice que la
primera confederaci6n de tribes rue fundada por un exiliado de China
en el siglo 12 a.J., y is. pretensi6n de que los naturales de Cores
aprendieron de China el cultivo de is seda y de varios cereales.
21 Septiembre: El Gobierno sovidtico blica una declaraci6n oficial
en contestaci6n a la de los chinos de 1 de septiembro; dacha decla-
raci6n comenta la actitud china sobre el tratado contra los ens M8
nucleares, sobre la posesi6n de arenas nucleares, sobre is. ontera
chino-sovidtica, sobre el onflicto chino-indio y sobre las co win
pow es. Moses apunta que mAs de 90 seas an suscrito ci tra ado
contra los ensayos nucleares y sefiala que las propuestas chinas reci-
entes sobre el desarme estdn copiadas de dos propuestas sovidticas
diferentes. Cita a Friedrich Engels para demostrar que ya pars, el
1893 "atnplios sectores de la poblaci6n reclamaban el desarme", con
of eompleto apoyo de Engels. En cuanto a is negativa china en su
declaraci6n de 1? de septiembre de ester procurando su propia arms nu-
clear a cualquier precio, is. declaraci6n china "realmente confirms, la
conclusi6n a que hemos llegado y comprueba una vez ends que is. posi-
ci6n negativa del Gobierno de is. RP china sobre el tratado contra los
ensayos nucleares se explica precisamente por su desec de pacer de su
Pais una potencies nuclear". Alegando que los chinos dicen abiertamen-
te que van a tener arenas nucleases aunque les tome cien egos, los so-
vi6ticos seffalan que los chinos dificilmente estdn en condiciones de
desviar recursos pars, la fabricaci6n de arenas nucleares:
"Es bien sabido que China carece de un superdvit de recursos,
y se requieren enormes recursos pare fabricar arenas nucleares...
Nosotros no consideramos e]r nuestro un pass pobre, pero noso-
tros mismos tenemos mucho que hater pare poner fin a las difi-
cultades materiales que atn existen por ahora y de las cual.es
hablamos abiertamente".
Las arenas sovi6ticas protegen 3 todo el campo socialists, como Mao
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capacidad sovidtica, China "no necesita organizer la producci6n de
tales arenas, especialmcnte viendo que son muy costosas". La tenta-
tiva actual de adquirir une capacidad independiente sugiere que los
chinos "han desarrollado alguna, clase de prop6sitos e intereses es-
peciales que no pueden ser apoyados por is fuerza militar del cameo
socialists".
"Ta que es imposible emparejar planes de desenvolvimiento de
arenas nucleares pare aumentar, por ejenplo, is influencia
propia en passes de Asia, Africa y America Latina o pare
crearse una 'posici6n de fuerza' en cuestiones internaciona-
lea sobre salientes con el derrotero pacifico de is politica
exterior de los passes del sistema socialists".
Made la declaraci6n sovidtica, burlonamente: "No quisidramos pensar
que al Gobierno de is RP china lo animsn semejantes m6viles".
Los sovieticos vuelven contra los chinos sus "citas integras"
de Mao y "Viva el Leninismo":
" .. los dirigentes chinos debaten si el 50 6 el ciento por
ciento de is humanidad quedaria destruido en las 11 ss de
una nueva guerra ... [Esto to demuestral el pronunciamiento
de Mao Tse-tung sun en is forma alterada en que to presents
is declaraci6n del Gobierno chino de 1? de septiembre:
'[elipsis de Tass] ... en el peor de los casos media humanidad
perecerd, pero quedard is mitad. Pero el imperialismo serd
barrido de is faz de is tierra y el mundo entero pasard a ser
socialists'. No menos elocuente en este sentido es una cita
de 'Benders Ro,ja', que tratan de desmentir, en el sentido de
que en caso de guerra los pueblos victoriosos 'con is mayor
rapidez creardn sobre las ruins del imperialismo derruido
una civilizaci6n mil veces superior''.
Solicitando poderosamente el apoyo de los PC de passes pequeffos, los
sovidticos denuncian que, cuando un periodista checo le dijo a Tao
Chu, miembro del CC del PC chino, que en caso de guerre nuclear todos
los checos podrian morir, Tao replic6:
"'En caso de una guerra de aniquilaci6n los passes pequeffos
que pertenecen al campo socialists tendrian que subordinar
sus intereses a los intereses del campo en general`".
En opini6n de los chinos, "La variante bdlica del desarrollo de los
acontecimientos se considers ... inevitable y hasta mds de desear que
la variante pacifica". Cads vez que en afos recientes se ha producido
una distensi6n los chinos intencionalmente han provocado el malesta
comp en el conflicto chino-indio de 1959. Rasta en is frontera sovi-
dtica crean dificultades:
"Comenzando en 1960, militares y civiles chinos han estado
sistemdticamente violando is frontera sovietica. Tan solo
en 1962 se registraron mds de 5 mil violaciones de is frontera
sovidtica desde el lado chino. Tambidn se hicieron tentativas
de 'desarroliar' algunas pastes del territorio sovidtico sin
permiso ... La propaganda china estd baciendo claras alusiones
a is demarcaci6n injusta de algunos sectores de la frontera
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Sin embargo, la creaci6n artificial boy de problemaa ter-
ritoriales, especialmente entre paiaes socialistas, equi-
vaidria a lanzarse a un cemino pelogrosisimo".
Un poco sorprendentemente, la declareci6n sovidtica terming can
un llen do a poner fin a las pot eas y deja entrever que lee conver-
saciones de Julio entre el PC chino y el PCtS podrian ser reanudadas,
ya que se convino entonces que serian centinuadas mis tarde. Los so-
vigticos manifiestan su disposici&n a der "to4oa los pesos que pods-
moe por conseguir is unidad con China", pero :Haden que si los chinos
malinterpretan eats buena voluntad y persisten en sus actividades ea-
lumniosas y facciosas "deberda comprender claramente que ea ese camino
lea aguards el as resuelto recbazo del PCUS y del pueblo sovidtico".
Tambi6n el 21 de septiembre se celebraron el Ulan Bator una cere-
monia de premio y un banquete de estedo en ocasi6n de 1is partida de
309 trabajadores chinos pare China. Puncianarios mongoles expresaron
an gratitud por la contribuci6n de los trabajadores, funcionarios y
estudiantes chinos, pero parece que is partida de 6stos clausur6 los
programas chinos de ayuda en Mongolia. Los regresados recibieron la
ya acostumbrada manifestaci6n de recibo cuando liegaron a la frontera
china el 23 de septiembre.
22 Septiembre: Informs Tass que la comisi6n politics, del PC 21ruano
se suscribe el tratado "de Moscd" contra los ensayos nucleares y de-
nuncia al Gobierno Frances por su intenci6n de proseguir sue ensayos.
23 Septiembre: Una emisi6n de la Radio de Nosed en frances pare
Africa ridiculiza los asertos chinos de a se abstienen de tomar par-
te en la rcera Reunidd dial de eriodistas porque no se celebt'a
en Africa y porque tratar de asuntos de la profesi6n y no politicos;
Argel (donde tocard el barco de los periodistas) estd en Africa, y
is lucha per is paz, contra la reaccidn y per is independencia nacio-
nal y la justicia social serd tratada en is reunion. En Ulen Bator,
is agencia noticiers mongols Monteame transmite un comeatari de ob-
servador" apoyando la declaracitn sovietica de 21 de septiembre.
24 Se tiembre: "Pravda" publica una declaraci6n del Comit6 Central
del PC ortuguCs que declare que las linens de conducta de los chinos
son peligrosaa y sus argumentos de que el PCJS impone un "rumbo de
paz" a los partidos en los paises capitalistas son deplorables; nadie
le estA imponiendo un "rumbo de paz" al PC portugu6s, que tiene que
derrocar a un Gobierno fascists por la fuerza. La declaraci6n sugiere
"la me.s pronta convocatoria de una reun-i6nde todos los tidos comu-
nistas obreros que,-ademfis de discutir probiemas ideal icon, elabo-
rar a las normas que gobernaran lea:relaciones entre los.partidos fra-
ternos". Taos y la Radio de MoscdTdif n el relato a sus au$itorios
del interior y de Europa.
25 Se tiembre: "Leninskaya Smena" de Alma Ate, publica un articulo de
Asir V idov, ex miembro del comit? central del Komsomol chino y
secretario del Komsomol de Sinkiang, evadido de China. Vakbidov, de
nacionalidad uigur, declare que centensres de sus compatriot" langui-
decen en "los ilamados campos de entrenamiento obrero, que eon en rea-
lidad cameos de concentracidn". "Be nos march como 'traidores',
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tros empleos", express, Vakhidov. "Las personas qua por cual) ier n-
tivo se pusieran an contacto can el consuiatIo savietico eran inter-
rogadas". De acuerdo con un articulo de is Agenda Tanyug de 26 de
septiembre, un articulo parecido aparece en is edici6n actual de is
"Literaturnaya Gazeta", escrito por Bukhara Tishkanbeyev, escritor
kazaj que anteriormente vivi6 en Sinkiang.
26 Septiembre: Despuds de ups pause de dos sem.. nas (los primeros
dos art~os aparecieron con una semana de separaci6n), el "Diario
del Pueblo" y "Benders Roja" publican el tercero de su aerie de ar-
ticulos en contestaci6n a la Carta Abierta del Comite Central del
PCUS de 14-de Julio de 1963: "&Ea Yuou~os__1avia a socialists?" La
resppesta china, que no sorprende macho, es que no. Dicen ellos que
el apitalismo y is usury florecen en is ciudades yugoslavas, los
kulaks se engordan en los campos yugoalavos y is dictadura del prole-
tariado se ha convertido en una "dictadura de.ia burguesia burocrdti-
co-compradora", una categoria que suena un poco coma Is, Nueva Clase
de Milovan Djilas. "La ayuda de los Estados Unidos ha aido el soaten
de las finanzas y is economia de Yugoslavia" -- gracias a hater Tito
concertado una aerie de tratados traicioneros con los Estados Unidos:
"Debido a is concertaci6n de dichos tratados y acuerdos y por
hater is camarilla de Tito puesto a Yugoslavia en sujeci6n al
Imperialism norteamercano, los Estados Unidos gozan de los
siguientes derechos en Yugoslavia: 1) a controlar sue asuntos
militares; 2) a controlar sus relaciones exteriores; 3) a
inmiscuirse en sus asuntos interns; 4) a manipular y super-
visar sus finanzas; 5) a controlar au comercio exterior;
6) al despojo de sus recursos estrat6gicos; y 7) a recoger
inteiigencia militar y econ6mica".
Bajo el gobierno de Tito, el poder del estada ha degenerado de is
dictadura del proletariado a is dictadura de is burguesia; "la die-
tacura de ].A burguesia no solo waste sino que pasta es una brutal
dictadura fascista. El regimen de Tito ha establecido mucbps cameos
de concentration y prisiones fascistas donde--decenas'de millares de
revolucionarios pan sido torturados a muerte con toda clase de casti-
gos inhussnos". Al mfsmo tiempo se parlous a los contrarrevolucionarios.
No obstante, Kruscbev fraternize con is caciarilla de Tito "no porque
hays. corregido alguno de sue errores sino porque e1 estd siguiendo los
pesos de Tito". Kruschev y Tito "ambos quieren liquidar el cameo so-
cialista" y Kruschev
"%a abandonado el marxismo-leninismo, descartado is declaration
de 1960 y hozado an el lodo con is camarilla de Tito, en compie-
ta violaci6t de los intereses de la Uni6n Sovietica, el pueblo
sovt tico y el pueblo de two el mundo. Esto no nerd tolerado
por el- gran pueblo sovietico, Is, aptaat me ice miem-
broa~lel PCUS y cuadros a varios ntveI s, todos cuslea
tienen una gioriosa tradici6n revolucionaria".
El articulo contiene numerosas cites de is prensa yugoslava, lo que
no obstante no puede considerarse garantia de su exactitud de hecho.
Aunque el articulo contiene al final una incongrea invitation a. los
dirigentes sovieticos a der marcha atrds antes que sea demasiado tarde,
su publicaci6a parece constituir una resonante negativa a poner fin a
-6 -
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Se' iembre : Ls Redo de Mosca aaxuwa +.? ??o. - -
de Jots Wu. de 1 de septie~"e(cout&se
pids
iun
a
diacvr'so trozo que
de uu
18 Se tieznbre), em inclusi a
de
Y 1
1957
c ia7, tie PCs a b"e de las JW declaraciones ?
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731. Crisis in Communist Agriculture
25X1C10b
BACKGRO flD: The gravity of the Communist agricultural fail-
ure in 1363 became known in September when the Soviet Union pur-
chased tremendous quantities of grain -- upward of 8 million
metric tons -- from free world countries to feed itself and its
satellites, including Cuba. The full extent of the failure is
not yet known: the Soviets may dip into their presumably large
grain reserves (mown to be kept in event of war) or may attempt
to fulfill all of its needs and commitments through purchases.
xperts_ at Ws time estimate the crop failure to be a minimum of
13% loss with the possibility that it could be more than 33%.
?YI. The crop now appears to be about the level of the 13 and
1363 crops -- an 13% decrease from 1362 when the program called
for a 21% increase.?
In spite of failure to increase its overall agricultural
production in recent years, the Soviet Union has been a net ex-
porter of grain: in 1962 it imported only 45 thousand tons while
exporting 4.3 million metric tons (hereafter referred to si:iply
as tons), three-fifths of it" to 3astern Zurope. The USSR
claimed a production of 70 million tons in 1962, but it was prob-
ably closer to 55 million tons. Current purchases suggest that
this year's crop is well under 53 million tons. That the Soviets
reach exceeds their grasp is notable in the fact that their over-
all farm pros -ction has not yet reached its 195? level while
their wand 7-year plan (1959-1935) called for a 73% increase.
In the meantime, the Soviet population has steadily increased,
which means less food per capita year by year.
The devastating 1963 failures in the USSR and the Bloc,
largely brought on by drought, demonstrate more dramatically than
ever their basically unrealistic agricultural policies, farm
systems and planning /See BIG #123, item #693 "Belated .elp for
Soviet Agriculture" and unclassified attachment "Agriculture in
the Soviet Bloc."7 In his speeches, Khrushchev has railed at farm
officials for their inefficient management, and talked about
bureaucratic administrators who did not 'snow good farm procedures.
Lt the same time he has stressed the need for using greater quan-
tities of fertilizer, and the need for irrigation. These latest
remedies are largely unavailable to the managers and bureaucrats
Who have to make do with what they have. Typical of Khrushchev's
off-the-cuff interference was a hint (13 September) that he would
force V.D. 3eliayev, Chairman of the lower Volga Lconomic Council,
to replace outmoded machinery in spite of Beliayev's expressed
opinion that production loss during a changeover would ;name it
unprofitable.
(701. Continued)
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Speeches made by Khrushchev earlier this year criticizing
agricultural officials might have suggested that the Soviet Union
as aware tb_are would be a serious crop setback. For example, in
response to a March 12, 1963 proposal he made in a speech, five
of the largest Soviet Republics -- the RSFSR, the U'.traina, the
Kazakh the and the Tadzhila (as well as the Moldavian and
Byelo-Russian) -- passed laws reducing the number of cows which
could be privately owned and placing a penalty of up to three
years of corrective labor for any owner feeding bread to coves.
It is the practice in many parts of the USSR, where grain is not
available to private households, for farmers to buy bread for
their cows. Bread, a staple supplying about one-half of the
Russian diet, Is heavily subsidized by the state, its sale is con-
trolled by the state, and prices are very low-7 But sthrushchev's
speeches evidently were concerned only with continuing low
production (four successive years of mediocre crops before 13S3)
and with serious reductions in the winter wheat output. The
devastatyng -fail-,ire of the summer-fall crops in the satellites and
the USS: were evidently not foreseen, nor was there any provision
for such emergencies in Communist planning: only six months ago
the USSL had sold 4::~3 million bus a3]a of grain to Brazil; only eight
onths ago they negotiated a tremendous sale to Japan; and just
before the massive purchase of wheat,from Canada, the Soviet -
purehased nearly 4 million bushels from 3uropean countries an-VA
were negotiating to buy back what they had sold to Great Britain.
Soviet purchases of grain in September were made in several
steps. In the early part of the week of September S the Soviets
:,)ought 11million bushels from Canada; on September 16th they
made the history-rdar~ ng purchase of 227.5 million bushels (103 of
wheat and 23.5 of wheat flour or a.2 million tons) rob an =da;
on September 13th another agreement was signed,-'This time with
kustralia, for 53.5 million bushels (or 1 million tons) all in
wheat flour, with an option for another or 6 mil =ion bushels.
T La Canadian sale, it is reportedt would have been even larger if
Canada's transporation facilities had been sufficient to Feet
the deadline delivery date set by the USSR. It was reported in
Ceptember that Soviet officials were negotiating; with private
U.S. producers for the purchase of some 100 to 203 million bushels
of wheat; with Italy and West Germany for something around 3)
thousand tons; and had cancelled sale of grain to Finland* The
purchase off large quantities of wheat flour suggests that the
Soviets waiter! so long to recognize the critical nature of their
need that their milling plants were Inadequate to make grain
available for use.
In spite of its own calamity, the USSR is fulfilling its
comaitment to Cuba, whose needs have increased from 292 thousand
to 465 thousand tons as a result of drastic failures in all of
its own crops. the Canadian sale ~astcontingent
ntnuupon
rthelwillingban,
ness of that Country to ship the 4Part of t7--e lame Soviet purchases are intended to fulfill
commitfaents to satellites, but: Poland has already asked to buy
2
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a million tons from the U.S.; it is reported that a Bulgarian
mission is in Cana ;a; and the Czechoslovakian goveraraent has
inquired into purchases in the U.S.
China. At the time the Soviet purchases were announced,
negotiations by Comtuaunist China for 107 million bushels (or
533,333 tons)of wheat from Canada for delivery before the ens, of
1963 were cisclosed -- six months before the expiration of their
earlier 3-year contract. Their full agreement calls for a maxi-
mum of 5 million tons and a minimum of 3 million tons during the
3-year period 1 August 1963 to 31 Jul, 1966. Approximately three
;,tears ago the CCP had largely phased out its Commune program on
the heels of countrywide chaos resulting from this half-conceived,
misdirected and poorly administered monstrous effort. In 1359-
i33, Chinese officials discovered that, over the years, agrcul-
tural production figures had consistently been inflated by
regional and local officials. Unrealistic production goals,
wherefore, were in part caused by the inaccurate base throughout
the country provided by officials intent on protecting themselves
by claiming successes they had not achieved. But disclosure of
these facts (a.e. failure of the Communes and the practice of
inflating production figures) and the promise to institute
realistic agricultural programs, have apparently not produced
better results. The population continues to suffer and the CPR
is forced to purchase food in some attempt to maintain its
massive population at a subsistence level.
Recent economic decisions of the CC? involve further depriva-
tion for the Chinese people. In their anger at the Soviet Union,
the CPR is engaged in a strenuous effort to repay, at an unnec-
essarily fast rate, the earlier loans made by the USSR. Further,
they have launched a campaign for self-sufficiency in an effort
to enhance their political prestige. Advocating "self-reliance" in
socialist economic development, they are attacking the USS#.
,-enuncation of this principle, primarily with respect to CPSU
policies toward the Satellites in Comecon (CEMA). In its "go-it-
alone" policy, the CC? is attempting, in competition with the
CPSU, to create an image of its own strength as the (Co m ni st)
nation to be imitated and followed.
Xhrush.chev has admitted, in a parenthetical reference in a
speech published on 33 September, that "a difficult situation
has arisen in 1953 and we shall not be able to harvest the a.aount
of bread grain we had reckoned upon"; he also disclosed the
USSR's purchases from Canada and Australia (8.8 million tons,
according to hfs statement), and the allocation of 43,033 tons
from Rumania, Informal restrictions have been placed on the
purchase of bread in Moscow stores, and bread and flour are some-
times simply unobtainable. The Xremlin is clearly trying to
take the shod, out of the hard facts of the situation, to lesson
the food deficit by spending hard cash for foreign grains, and
to control the reactions of the ;,people to this latest failure in
the production of consumption goods.
3
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For six on seven years Khrus1Schev has been telling toe nussian
people that his agricultural policies would lead to immense increases
in all types of food production. In addition to concentration on
expanding grain and corn acreage (especially in the new lands
program), meat and dairy products were promised in the near future.
One of these promises was made as follows:
"The leading collective farms and state farms, ... have
made a pledge ... to catch up with the United States in
the next few Years in the production of meat, milk, and
butter per capita of the population." (Khrushchov in
Moscow radio broadcast November S. 1957 on the 40th
25X1 C10b anniversary of the BolsheviL::revolution. )
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702. Games of the New Emerging Forces
25X1C10b
BACTGB,OUND: Games of the New Emerging Forces (GAT FO) will
be he=in Indonesia from 10 to 22 November 1063. The
decision eras announced by Indonesian Sports Minister Maladi on
13 February 1`363 and has been reaffirmed inter alia in resolutions
adopted at subsequent "fro-Asian conferences.
In February 1963, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
suspended Indonesia for an indefinite period as a disciplinary
measure following Indonesia's failure to allow athletic teams
from Taiwan and Israel to participate in the Asian Games held
in the late summer of 1962 in Djakarta under IOC auspices. This
action was taken in accordance with IOC rules that all eligible
participants must be allowed to participate.
On 9 February 1963 the Department of Sports of the Republic
of Indonesia denounced the action of the IOC as having been
prompted by arrogance and lust for power by elements in the IOC
who were a:com-olices of Taiwan and Israel, the imperialists,
capitalists and colonialists. Their statement said that, far from
being isolated by the IOC's action, Indonesia would be freer to
realize its ideals of organizing new games free from imperialist
and colonialist elements.
Claims of the sponsors. Indonesian officials, including
Sukarno, portray UANEFO as eiag inspired by Olympic ideals
merged with the Bandung spirit (which is attributed to the first
governmental-level Afro-Asian conference of 1955). They say
GANEFO is the logical growth of the present world order, a world
of the aviaLening of the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, preceded -- as stated in an Indonesian ANTMA broadcast
by the birth of the socialist countries.
The sponsors of GANEFO say that the political changes of the
world are not sufficiently reflected in the present structure of
international sports, because reactionary elements and those with
vested interests have deliberately sought to maintain the status
quo. The sponsors say that just as the freedom of Asia, Arica,
an Latin America and the establishment of the socialist countries
were the result of hard struggles, so will the transformation of
the world of international sports require relentless struggle to
conform with the new world order. In the words of Sukarno "sports
cannot be separated from politics . . . (indeed) sports must be
based on politics." Political, religious and all types of
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fraternal societies have long organized sport groups as organi-
zational adjuncts to encourage a mass following; and countries
have encouraged participation in international sports events to
improve their image and cultural contacts throughout the world.
Communist countries, however, have at times sponsored inter-
national events excluding committed. free countries in an attempt
to capture prestige for themselves as the center of world sports.
Sukarno is following this tactic in an a emp o destroy any true
international sports organization which encourages world-wide
participation in the spirit of free competition and is, in this
sense, apolitical.
GANEFO sponsors claim that they are not against the Ales of the existing international sports movement as represented
by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This claim is con-
tradicted, however, by the implication that IOC's principles do
not really apply to the new family of nations, i.e. ICC has not
taken proper cognizance of the "breakdown of the old order." Some
sponsoring elements make this explicit, saying that GANEFO is
fully in accord with the struggle against imperialism and
colonialism.
Position of International Olympic Committee. In an ICC
circular, dated August, to members of the , National Olympic
Committees, and International fEmateur Athletic? Federations
(IA&Fs), ICC President Avery Brundage stated inter alia that IOC
has no information about GANEFO and "no conned o with them."
The circular says that if the games
"are not sanctioned by the International Federations /TAAFs7,
participants will be liable to suspension, since most inter-
national federations have rules that prohibit members from
participating in unsanctioned events. If they are sanctioned
by the international federations, only members of those
federations will be eligible to participate, since most inter-
national federations have regulations against the participa-
tion of non-members. (Obviously there is no reason for being
a member of a federation if participation in its event is
open to non-members)."
Participants. According to available reports 52 nations
have been invited to the Games. In August, Indonesia announced
that with the New Emerging Forces alone GANEFO would not be com-
plete and the sponsors have agreed to include all progressive
forces in other countries. Just which nations are cons ere
eligible for GAP?CFO has never been made clear. Since the nations
of the emerging areas and the Communist countries add up to con-
siderably more than 52, and there is conflicting and only partial
information on the invitees, an accurate list of the participants
cannot be given at this time. Presumably South Vietnam, South
Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Union of South Africa and areas still under
colonial rule will not be invited.
2
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(702. Cont.) 7 October 13663
According to 4 .report of last April the Soviet Union advised
Indonesia that it will not participate in the Games, because IOC
members are not allowed to take part in games organized by non-
members. Eowever, a recent report states that the Soviet Union
is planning to send 300 athletes and the Chicoms a 350-man team.
Reportedly, several African countries as well as Burma are re-
luctant to participate in the Games since they have learned that
the Chicoms have agreed to defray expenses for all countries which
cannot pay their own way. The Chicom subsidization presumably is
to be channeled through the Indonesian government. The Burmese,
it is reported, do not want to put themselves in the position of
"being dominated by Peking."
NCNA reported on 13 September the Indonesian Minister of
Sports' statement that 20 countries had accepted invitations to
the Games and that those countries opposed to GANEFO will leave
no stone unturned in their attempts to undermine the Games. In
an apparent reference to the IOC circular, Maladi is reported
also to have stated that some international sports associations
have warned their member nations not to take part in W013373,
and to have added: "Do not take notice of them, we need not ask
25X1 C1 Jeir permission."
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703 WK,a. Dissensions Among Latin American Communists
BACKGROUND: New evidence of Sino-Soviet competition in Latin
America an a effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute upon Latin Ameri-.
can Communist Parties (as discussed in Bi-Weekly Pro agenda
Guidance No. 633, Wli,a, "Communism in Latin America," 6 August)
appears daily.
Among the recent developments:
1. Four prominent Soviet Communist Party officials
arrived in Montevideo (ideological and propaganda expert s nclud-
ing the chief editors of the official CP journal, Konimunist, and
the CP propaganda journal, Agitator, and the deputy iea of the
International Department of the antral Committee) to attend the
celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the Uruguayan Communist
?arty (?CU). The celebrations were originally planned for
21 September, the day the PCU was founded, but were postponed
until 5 October.
A secret meeting of Latin American Communist Part
2
.
officials in Montevideo in early October con Hues to be reported
from a variety of sources. The arrival of Soviet Party officials
and the postponement of the PCU celebrations lend credence to
these reports. The agenda reportedly will feature discussions
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, plans to create political and eco-
nomic chaos in Latin America, general sabotage strategy including
specific programs for Brazil and Argentina, and an analysis of
communism on the continent.
3. The Chinese Communists plan to create a "new Communist
International" according to a report in Rome s pro- ek- ng ommu-
nis newspaper Ritorniamo a Lenin (Let Us Return to Lenin).
Among the Communis Parties supporting the Chinese, according to
the paper, are those in Venezuela and Puerto Rico. (See Washington
Post and Press Comment, 4 September.)
41. Peking is stepping up attempts to win supporters
nese communist trade officials repor e told
Lain er ca
.
a recent meet ing of Uruguayan pro-Chinese leftists that similar
splinter groups were springing up everywhere and that Peking was
ready to help them in every way possible. One element of the
Ecuadorean Party is reported to be receiving funds from both the
Chinese and the Cubans. In Peru young pro-Chinese leaders are
reported to constitute a serious challenge to the old guard of
their OP and sharp dissension. has forced postponement of the CP
plenum. Latin America's best organized pro-Chinese group -- the
Communist Party of Brazil which broke away from the pro-Soviet
(703. Continued)
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,703 Con
-Brazilian Communist Party -- -reportedly has formed an alliance
with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues and other extreme leftists
and established combined political and military directorships to
consolidate "all Brazilian revolutionary forces."
Cuba continues its !Sgressive attempts to foment
rebellion. President ermo n Valencia o om a
charged on 26 September that "today the fight is with Fidel
Castro." Ee declared that he had documentary proof of open
Castro intervention in Colombia and called Castro-supported
terrorists and guerrillas "wolves in sheep's clothing" which pose
"the greatest danger ever to threaten the country."
There is reason to believe that the Cubans see in the Sino-
Soviet dispute new opportunities to re-assert their claim to
lead the Latin American revolution and for Castro to regain lost
stature. After considerable silence on the subject, they have
renewed their exhortations for rebellion and violence in Latin
America. "Violence," declared Cuba's Minister of Industries
Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the September issue of the Cuban Commu-
nist theoretical journal, Cuba Socialista, is "the midwife of
new societies." He said:
"We had predicted that the war would be continental...
Will its vortex be in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia,
Peru, or icuador? /Note the designation of countries
where violence, pro-Chinese factions and/or Cuban-
supported guerrillas exist? . . . . Will these present
skirmishes be only manifestations of an unrest that
does not bear fruit? It does not matter . . . . What
counts is the decision to struggle that ripens day by
day; the awareness of the need for revolutionary
change, the certainty of its possibility."
Cuba's support of dissident elements in Latin America and
its encouragement of rebellion have aroused not only legally-
constituted governments, but also local Communist Parties. The
latter object to Cuba's financial and material aid to dissidents
without the prior knowledge and approval of the local Parties.
More than one old-guard leader has been upset to find his
opposition within the CP financed by Cuba.
6. Yugoslavia President Tito has acted as a catalyst to
precipitate or exacerbate-dissension on his -four of n America.
Catholics in Brazil, for example,, launched a campaign protesting
his visit, publicizing the fact he had been excommunicated by Rome
and calling him the "torturer" of Archbishop Stepinac. They were
joined by Brazil's far left. Classe Operaria, the weekly news-
paper of the pro-Chinese CPB, denounced he visit of "the temporary
president of Yugoslavia" as an imperialist plot (with the notation
that his request to join President Goulart on a big game hunt
revealed his "aristocratic tendencies"). "Tito and his gang," the
paper concluded, "call themselves socialists but in reality they
yield to North American monopolies in exchange for dollars and
weapons."
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Conservative political leaders in Brazil restricted his
itinerary, reduced the length of his stay and limited his con-
tacts. His reception in Chile was indifferent and threats on his
life severely limited his contact with the public. The conserva-
tive press had a field day. Manama pabers called him a "slippery
neutralist" with "zig-zagging politics" and suggested: "Paint
him as a classic acrobat who walks the edge of a razor."
But the most significant effect of Tito's visit was among
the leftists. Comments ranged from effusive welcoming editorials
to scathing attacks on the so-called leader of "independent"
communism. The Communist Party of Bolivia reportedly resolved to
adopt a neutral position using the Party paper to a:irnowledge his
presence but omitting any praise. Bolivian CP leaders felt it was
impossible to ignore his visit and designed his strategy to
prevent stimulating ideological disputes within the Party.
It is reasonable to expect that the Sino-Soviet dispute will
increase tensions within the Communist Parties of Latin America
and coupled with the developments described above will contribute
to more fractionation of the Communist movement in this area.
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704 EE,WE,a. Stalinist and Pro-Chinese Dissidence in the
25X1 C 1 Ob 3uropean Communist : ar es
BACKGROUIND :
Italy. In January 1963 a splinter group from the ?CI
established -the "Associazione d'Amicizia tra Italia e Cif,"
(Italo-Chinese Friendship Association), dedicated to the vio-
lent overthrow of the bourgeois state and the establishment of
the dictatorship of the proletariat, The group has its head-
quarters in Padua and branches in a number of Italian cities.
It is composed for the most part of Trotskyites and militants
expelled from the PCI, i.e. of dispvate extremist groups work-
ing outside of or on the fringes of the Italian Communist and
Socialist parties. It publishes a monthly magazine entitled
Italia-Cron, The Association is recognized, officially endorsed
and presumably funded by the Chinese, although it may receive
additional funds from a variety of sources which see in it an
instrument to weaken the PCI. At present, the Italia-Cina or-
ganization is going through a period of disagreement and dis-
orientation,,a phenomenon usually experienced by Communist groups
which break with the party organization and then attempt to
reconcile divergent interests and ideas and to agree on some
form of organized protest. The Association -- which is without
a leadership of national stature and whose cadre is formed basi-
cally from dissident sections of the Padua provincial Communist
Federation -- has succeeded in publishing a number of booklets
attacking the embour eoisement of Togliatti, Nenni, et.al.,
accusing the leadership o the by-now-familiar heresies of
"reformism," "constitutionalism," "demobilizing the working
class" etc., while advocating a return to Marxist-Leninist
purity and revolutionary action. The PCI, while publicly ignor-
ing the group or insisting that the hard-line trend is negligible,
is disciplining party members in contact with the factionalists.
For the present, Togliatti, fresh from successes in the Italian
elections won on a program of moderate parliamentary reform
(i.e. the opposite tactic to that advocated by Italia-Cina) is
in a very good position to maintain party discipline and isolate
the left-winZ factionalists. In fact, the PCI appears -- in a
sense -- to be exploiting the Italia-Cina Association by con-
trasting the radical program of the latter with its own "peaceful"
and "democratic" efforts. Nonetheless, the appearance of a
rival group of dedicated militants, supported and funded by
Communist China, is a phenomenon which he cannot afford to
ignore. In addition to Italia-Cina, which at the moment is the
chosen instrument of Peking, there are other independent mani-
festations of Chicom activity in Italy which reflect radical,
abstract or anarchist currents and appeal largely to an
extremist fringe.
(704. Continued)
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Belgium. Factionalism in the Belgian Communist ?arty, on
the other hand, is capable of posing a significant challenge
to party leaders. When Jacques Grippa, Secretary of the Brussels
Federation, politburo and central committee member, was expelled
from the Party at the XIVth BCP Congress in April 1963, together
with three other prominent members of the Brussels Federation,
for "engaging in factional activities incompatible with the
party constitution...," he took with him an estimated 25-4 per-
cent of the Brussels Federation. Grippa's dissident "Brussels
Federation" held its own Congress 23 June, "dissolved" the regu-
lar party organization and demanded an extraordinary national
congress. The dissidents receive funds and polemical propaganda
from the Chinese who recognize in Grippa an important tactical
asset in their campaign to develop pro-Chinese support anon the
3uropean CPs. Grippa, long an advocate of greater militancy, has
steadfastly attacked Khrushchev's "moderate" policies and opposed
the Belgian CPs endorsement of them since the 22nd CPS1J Congress
in 1961. At the XIVth BC? Congress, he and his followers
culated to al the delegates a document reiterating their dissi-
dent views. In August Grippa, who had already spent most of
July in Albania, made a visit to Communist China. In late August
the dissidents attacked Moscow and the Belgian C:o in a statement
characterizing the Moscow group as revisionists and scissionists.
On 27 September, five members of tZe party's youth association in
3russels were expelled for "deliberately attempting to create a
split within the Brussels Federation of the young Communist
organization." The Belgian CP is the first in Europe in which a
significant splinter party has been formed.
France. While there are a number of left-wing Communist
groups otscyite, dissident Trotskyite etc.) in France which
oppose the French Communist Party and favor greater militancy
(some of which have helped spread Chinese propaganda), an organ-
ized, Chinese-backed opposition group is still only in the
formative stage. Indications exist, however, that the Chinese
have selected certain individuals to engage in extensive propa-
ganda activities on their behalf in the hope of creating factions
and gaining support in the traditionally conservative but docile
and Moscow-oriented French CP.
United Kin dom. While there appears to have been little
?eft-w ng opposition at the British CP Congress in April 1563,
where a dozen or so delegates criticized the party's refusal to
publish the Sino-Soviet exchanges and called for public debate
of the issues (they also criticized Yugoslav revisionism), in
August and September 1963 the correspondence columns of the
gaily Worker indicate that pro-Chinese sentiment exists even in
the ranks of the British CP. The fact that these letters, many
of which are strongly militant and sympathetic to the Chinese
stand, were allowed to be published in the official party organ,
is an indication both of party reluctance to take sides in the
quarrel and of the difficulty in convincing the conservative
and orthodox British Communist rank and file of the wisdom of
Khrushchev's policies. For the present, the Chinese Communists
e%
C. (704. Continued)
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seem to be v:or!zing largely through the Britain-China Friendship
Association which is responsive to Chinese direction and supports
China on major points of difference with the Soviet Union.
Switzerland. In mid-September 1963, dissident members of
the Parte der rbeit, the Workers (Communist) Party, formed a
new "Communist Party of Switzerland" in opposition to the auto-
cratic and unrepresentative methods of the present Partie der
Arbeit leaders in suppressing the Chinese point of view and
ordering party members to follow the Moscow line. The new party
is in contact with the Chinese and is receiving and disseminating
Chinese propaganda. It is in contact also with Italian and
Belgian dissidents. The Swiss dissidents are mostly from Vevey
in the Canton of Vaud. The new party is led by GArard Buillard,
"Secretary General;"formerly Secretary of the Vevey Section of
the Worker's ?arty, recently expelled for distributiong Chinese
propaganda pamphlets. The public emergence of a dissident
faction in Switzerland is basically a reaction against the
uninsp king policies of Secretary General Edgar Woog who has
maintained traditional Swiss CP subservience to Moscow and to
the Italian Communist Party. In regard to Chinese activities in
Switzerland, the NCNA office in Geneva is expanding to accommo-
date the NCNA officials recently expelled from Prague.
General. There have been recurrent rumors throughout the
summer of 033 that the Chinese Communists intend to establish
a new Communist international which would promote revolutionary
Marxism-Leninism and be responsive to Chinese direction. Evi-
dence indicates that the Chinese are attempting -- at the least
- to coordinate activities of the revolutionary factions of
the various European Communist Part as. Jacques Grippa, and
three other Belgian dissident leaders were in Tirana between 14
July and 5 August 1963, together with a{ranco Molfese, and other
Italian leaders of the Italia-Cina Friendship Association.
G yard Buillard, leader of the Swiss dissidents,appears also to
have been to Albania in August. Subsequently, the Belgian leaders
visited Peking. A militant Communist publication entitled
E.evolution has recently appeared in Paris in Spanish, English
and Prencfi. The publication may be intended as a link among the
25XlC10brevolutionary Communist factions in Europe.
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CPYRGHT
.. September 9, 191:3 1
G 1 'Zed Farms
Soviet. A(riculture
F: u s Fifth Straight
1eImv-Par Harvest
Wearer Woes Shrink Grain
Output; Scarcity of Feed
Spurs Slaughter of Animals
Bosses Score Inefficiency
By JOE WESTERN
Staff Rrrortcr of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-With harvest time at hand,
U. .,L
fifth straight year of embarrassing below-par
farm production.
U.S. ana'?,?sts are now convinced of that
prospect. By sifting Russian agricultural sta-
tistics, weather reports and Communist con-
cessions of error, they're piercing some of the
fog veiling the current facts about life down
on the soviet farm. The findings include
these:
This year's crops of badly needed livestock
feed grains, vital wheat for bread making and
all-important potatoes promise to sag below
last year's none too great results. By the
Communists' own admission, plantings of these
crops actually shrank from 1962 acreages,
some of them by over 10r. Since planting
time, they've suffered from extreme cold and
heat and from drought. In one major grain-
raising region, rainfall this year has been less
than half of normal.
Shortages of feed are forcing Russian farm
bosses to trim their herds of cattle, hogs,
sheep and goats and send to slaughter hun-
dreds of t'touaands of skinny, often underage
a n ma'is. R;.'13 scanty Soviet meat supplies
may thus be swelled temporarily, the longer-
range effect will be to prolong or worsen Rus-
sia's chronic meat scarcities. For lack of
cattle fee`, too, Soviet milk production prom-
ises to slip below last year. Even before this
year's ba~i news came in, the Moscow daily
Pravda surveyed the feed situation and com-
plained: "Hooves and tails increase, but pro-
duction remains almost on the same level."
Less Food Per Capita?
Though output of cotton and some lesser
crops may top i962, these increases may not
be enough to offset "other shortcomings. At
best, by Free World reckonings, the USSR's
total farm output this year probably won't
rise significantly above last year's showing;
that was about 5% short of record 1955. More-
over, because the Soviet Union's population
may rise by about 1.5% to an estimated 226
million in 1963, per-capita food and fiber pro-
duction may we!; fall to alu;iit S7cJ of 1958's
levels from 88% in 1962.
No one expects anythin; approaching
famine to result, of course. But the lack of
more meat and milk alone indicates Premier
Khrushchev's regime is faliin', dow,vn on a
promise to better the lot of liis pcoplo and
to catch up to U.S. farm r.hui:-., r ee. The
US:;A's current sv ii-v,,., ia.. ,:r! dy en-
visioned a total lt;i't-tin rough-11,r,,, ..i pro-
duction increase of 76";, ~iti: e~pec ly steep
ga.in., in ?,:.at and mii'c. T..i vcu?y year so far, Russ ::in farmers have failed even to match
record 195.3. What's more, total Soviet farm
output continues to lag more than 30 %o behind
the U.S. even though Rta:,ia'. 1583 planted
acreage of 5,',9 .million acre:. is n rly 7,%
larger than this country's. This uni:;s;)iring ex-
an.l,le, compared to griculturaI
abt:n,dd rce, threatens to hamper export of the
Red r , ith to developing nations.
Ag .in this year as last, the Russians are
blamin;, bad weather for most of their agri-
cult,:rs: woes. i,1ut officials continue also to
excor.a_e irnver.cchclon bureaucrats and
farmers I 1 r inefficiency, ignorance and ir-ortia.
In fact Western analysts find, the Commu-
nist syste 1 of tight state control, with limited
incentive or producers, is heavily to blame..
Even spe iai production bonuses and 1963's in-
creases i prices for farmers have not been
enough, it's believed, to spur them to dawn-
to-dusk 1 ors. Still another brake has been
Russia's ost-1058 slowup in growth of invest-
ment in griculture, affecting spending on
farm mac inery, fertilizer and other essentials.
Freeman Detoured
Admittedly, separating Communist farm
fact from fancy continues to defy precise anal-
ysis; any conclusive on-the-spot investigation
is impossi Ie. Indeed, Russian reluctance to let
prying V'c=tetn eyes see serious crop damage
may liavc been behind an unexpected and still
unpubliciz d switch made in the travel plans
of Agricu Lure Secretary Freeman and his
party oft chnicians touring Iron Curtain lands
this sumo er.
On Jul 15 in Moscow, Russian Agriculture
Minister I P. Volovchenko handed the Amer-
icans a sc edule conspicuously lacking a long-
scheduled trip: A two-day trek through the
heart of the famed wheat-growing "New
Lands" ar and Tselindgrad, some 1,400 miles
east of M (scow; the region, formerly prairie,
was plow (d up for crops beginning only in
l9$4.
Instead the Soviets had substituted a short-
er jaunt Orenburg, 750 miles east of the
Russian c pita.l. After listening to Mr. Volov-
chenko's M convincing explanations, Mr. Free-
man abre d to the change because Orenburg
is at least n the fringe of the New Lands, and
because h was reluctant to make trouble just
as the nuc ar test ban negotiators had reached
agreement a few blocks away in the Kremlin.
Adding to Free World suspicions of Red
farm fail es this year is that both Pravda
and Izves a, Russia's leading dailies, have
fallen sile t of late about agricultural pros-
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CPYRGHT
space in m,).-c- promising past years. "If things
were tur_Zi::y out well in the current harvest,"
says a WLc tern specialist, "they'd be bragging
about it."
Annly~, Ciirs Potential
\onc;aclcss, many U.S. farm specialists are
to warn against any Western h?nd-
n,
. ,agn;tt.?d suwt, 19Sti, says a
11 analyst, "and we flank a major rea-
son is _-,at they cut bac1 in capital investment
growth." But if the test ban accord and any
s!;bsequcnt tt mziorrea iiq should lead Russia's
rulers to c vert big money from armaments
to farm machinery, fertilizer and other pro-
duction aids, this analyst contends, a jump in
fan:: output would surely result.
But at least until Russian plant breeders
develop plants more resistant to frost, heat
and drought, it's agreed the Soviet Union's
generafv inhospitable weather will continue to
plague Moscow's farm planners most years.
As compared with American weather, Russia's
climate tends to be dry and subject to tem-
per Lure extremes; it is not moderated by l
warm, moisture-laden winds blowing off oceans
or large lakes. Because the USSR lies much
farther north than the U,S., the average grow-
ing season is short, much like that of Canada's
prairie provinces.
For 1963 crops, U.S. onlookers agree, ex-
tremes of cold and heat. plus lack of moisture
have stunted. per-acre yields of key Soviet farm
cornmofi,~tes,
se. (-re Winter Hurt Crops
The past winter was unusually long and
cold. In the Ukraine, long-time bread basket
of the USSR, fall-planted crops, mostly wheat
and barley, were badly hurt. Then spring
1 came late, and it was dry and hot. So was
ne summer that followed, damaging spring-
planted corn.
Eastward in the "New Lands," wheat and
other grains have suffered lately from scanty
rainfall and extra-high temperatures. So far
in 1963, precipitation in this semi-arid area,
which has sometimes produced as much as
25'0 of Russia's wheat crop, has been less than
half of normal and average thermometer read-
ings have run sev'ral degrees above even the
region's scaring norms.
Coming on top of reduced plantings of some
basic crops, this buffeting by nature assures
punier output of certain vital farm products.
The Communists themselves admit this
year's plnntin;;s of major livestock feeds, in-
clndin, corn, oats, hay and sugar h,cis grown
for forage, are down to around 136 million,
acres this year from over ::):!lion in 1962.
With feed scarcer, Soviet milk output is ex-
pected to shrink somewhat below last year's
U.S.-estimated 116 billion pounds, a showing
roughly 10 billion short of the 1962 U.S. total
and even farther behind in per-capita terms.
Even with a temporary bulge in livestock
slaughter, Soviet farms are expected to pro-
vide no more than 70 pounds of meat per
citizen this year, only slightly above last year's
67 pounds, and far less than the expected rec-
ord 167 pounds per capita going to American
dining tables this year.
Not only has the Soviet wheat crop suf-
fered weather damage, but planted acreage
of this basic bread grain admittedly slipped
below 166 million acres this year, down 2 mil-
lion from 1962. Outlook: Production some-
what lower than last year's, which was reck-
oned by Free World analysts at about 2 billion
bushels.
Potato Pl:uttin;;. I)ec.linc
Plantings of potatoes, a staple in Russian
diets, at only 21 million acres are off by 500,-
000 acres from the 1962 total. The USSR . al-
ready is suffering acute spud shortage, stem-
ming from last year's shrunken output; U.S.
experts estimated it at only about 68,200 tons,
far below ]961's more normal crop of about
83,600 tons.
It's true that Russia reports i163 plant-
ings of protein-rich field peas and beans used
mostly for livestock feed jumped to 31.6 mil-
:ion acres from 20,5 million in 1962, that cot-
ton moved up to 6 million acres from 5.7 mil-
lion and that oilseeds, mostly from sunflowers,
at 15.6 million acres were up from 14.8 mil-
lion. Oil pressed from the seeds is used mostly
in cooking.
But because of this year's siege of rough
weather, actual harvests of these crops may
not climb in step with planted acreage, And
increases could be overshadowed by setbacks
elsewhere on the farm front.
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