BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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1 July 1963
Briefly Noted
Soviet Officials Fabricate Slave Stories to Prevent Fraternization.
The New York Times carried on 4 June (Press Comment, 4 June)
an article describing a controversy which has arisen between
African students in Moscow and the Soviet authorities. On 27 Oct-
ober last year, Koisomolska a Pravda, the official paper of the
Young Communist e~ gue,pubed a -story on the alleged adven-
tures of a Soviet girl who married a Moslem student, left the
Soviet Union with him, and later was sold by him to a friend, who'
wanted a sixth wife in his harem, The Soviet press being rather
deficient in spicy stories of this kind, the tale attracted wide-
spread interest, Actually it appears that the story was com-
pletely fictitious, and that it was published in order to dis-
courage Soviet girls from fraternizing with foreign students.
The purpose was accomplished, in that symptoms of hostility to
foreign students increased. A group of Arab students obtained
an assurance that the abduction had not been to any Arab country,
but a group of African students was unable to gain satisfaction.
According to the African students, they were told that the story
was invented and they were promised that a retraction would be
published, But such a retraction has not appeared. (See also
New York Times, 9 June 1963, in Press Comment, 10 June 1963.
overage n non-American media is expected, and will be reproduced
in Press Comment.)
This incident should be given maximum play in all non-white
areas sending students to the Soviet bloc. Comment should point
out (1) the attempt of the Soviet authorities to discourage
fraternization, and (2) their admitted lying and their failure to
carry out the promise of a retraction. (Note: Separate guidance
has been dispatched to selected stations on this subject.)
Chinese People's Congress Postponed.
Chou En-lai announced on June 7th that the 1963 session of
the National People's Congress (the fourth session of the 2nd
NPC), Communist China's rubber-stamp legislature, has been
rescheduled from the second to the last quarter of this year.
The Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to begin July 5 probably affected
the decision. However, since the chief purpose of these con-
claves has been to publicize regime policies and accomplishments,
the worsening crop outlook and continued retrenchment in industry
are the more likely causes of its postponement. The sessions
have been held annually since 1954, with the exception of 1961
which was also a year of exceptional economic difficulties.
Whatever the reasons, the postponement of the Congress is
evidence that the body, which strives to create the appearance
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(Briefly Noted Cont..) 1 July 1963
of being a democratic institution, exists only for the conven-
ience of the regime and this year it would be a distinct incon-
venience even to such a totalitarian regime as the CCP. In
commenting on the postponement, we note that it would not be
possible to eliminate the convening of a legislative body if it
had any real functions to perform in governing a society. We also
point out that the election of deputies for the third NPC Con-
gress will have to be postponed into 1964, so that even the
pretence of having a legislative body will be suspended.
Soviet Concern over African Developments
An article by IzvestiY a "observer" V. Kudryavtsev in the May
issue of the Soviet Publication International Affairs (see Attach-
ment), the English version of the monthly ourna ez dunarodnnaya
zhizn',reveals a considerable Soviet concern over Afri an develop-
me
n s.
Kudryavtsev attended all three conferences of the Afro-Asian
Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Writing after the most
recent AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, he
finds that AAPSO's work is of diminishing value for two main
reasons: (1) power in Africa has gradually shifted from popular
(liberation) movements to the growing number of independent
governments which are preoccupied with local problems and are not
adequately represented at the non-governmental AAPSO conferences;
and (2) while not stating so specifically but strongly implying,
because AAPSO is increasingly dominated by the Chicoms.
The article is of particular interest because it fails
generally to take an optimistic view of African developments and,
indeed, rather critically views those African trends which are
potentially inimical to Soviet Interests. It may be inferred
from the article that the Soviet Union will at appropriate
occasions point to trends in Africa which in its opinion are
wrong. The author contemptuously refers to unnamed antagonists
as simpletons who have forgotten their own origin and fail to
realize that African liberation would be impossible were it not
for the Soviet revolution, the defeat of Fascism, and the work of
"progressive forces" in the West. In the same context the
author notes that some of the intensely nationalistically inclined
figures are using the solidarity movement not only against
imperialism and colonialism but also against "white people in
general."
In unattributable outlets we use this article as a basis for
editorial treatment following the same line as in previous AAPSO
guidances, generally as follows: The Soviet Union, and other
Communist regimes, look with favor on newly independent countries
o n 1 y when these countries permit the local CPs to work freely
its (Brief 1 gt ~t s~
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) 1 July 1963
towards gaining control of the country. When developing
countries search for their own policies or adopt policies which
are opposed to Communism, national aspirations are decried or
labelled as being more expressions of bourgeois ideology. We
explain that Communists have only scorn for attempts to carry
out social, economic and other reforms, unless these reforms are
carried out completely along Communist lines and lead to social
revolution within the country. On appropriate occasions, we
also throw light on the Soviet concern over the growing Chinese
influence in front organizations such as AAPSO, and we comment
that the Chinese-led ,_viit along racial lines may well cripple
Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world areas.
Sixtieth CPSU Anniver:: try 17 July -10 August.
The CPSU dates its birthday from the second Congress of the
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) held in Brussels
and London in 1903. Factional disputes over the type of party
organization to be developed dominated the sessions. Lenin
rejected the view of the majority and stuck to his concept that
the party should be a small revolutionary conspiratorial group,
centralized and tightly controlled. Several delegates opposing
his views walked out of the meetings in disgust at Lenin's
intransigeance, leaving him at the end of the Congress with a
small majority of 4 in the remaining 44 representatives. Lenin
used this temporary situation to namo his faction the Bolsheviki
(majority) and his opponents the Mensheviki (minority) and
utilized the opportunity to pack the controlling organs of the
RSDLP and the party newspaper Iskra in Switzerland. There was
a final break between the two dons in 1912 although they
continued to work together before and during the 1917 Revo-
lution. The Mensheviki were liquidated as a political force
after the Lenin-Trotsky coup d'etat in which similar dictatorial,
conspiratorial maneuvers were used by the CPSU minority to
eliminate the provisional government and all opposition.
Wherever comments on the CPSU's anniversary celebration are
appropriate, we q u e s t i o n the political and historic
right of Khrushchev's organization of the ruling managerial
class to take credit for the revolutionary endeavours of the
RSDLP 60 years ago. Commenting to non-Stalinists.and Cortraurlist
sympathizers we seek to counter the forthcoming eulogies of Lenin
by concentrating on his dictatorial ru a an his use of con-
spiracy to out-maneuver and ultimately liquidate opponents.
We characterize the developments in and the present state of
the Soviet Union in historical terms: to all European or other
audiences (mainly intellectual) who understand the French
Thermidor we compare Khrushchev's "collective" leadership, policies
3
(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) 1 July 1963
and practices with the Directorate which followed Robespierre's
execution (this was treated fully more than a year ago in BPG
#87 item 503 "The Thermidorean Reaction" 26 March 1962); to
other audiences, particularly Communists and their sympathizers,
we stress that the loss of revolutionary leadership in the present
CPSU, the failure to solve conflicting demands, the effort to
suppress both the right and the left, and the increasing appearance
of popular demands and pressures against restraints of the regime,
are all part of a historical process, the running out of the
limited Communist plan to organize society in its image and
dominate mankind.
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(Briefly Noted)
DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
I July 1963
20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement
I54 =ambodia, Laos, Vietnam)
22 July OAS Panama Declaration of principles signed by 19
Western Hemisphere countries in 1956. (US
invited first International Conference of American
States to Washington in 1899, the first step
toward creating the Pan American Union.)
31 July Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against
Communist guerrillas, 1960.
August Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco State
scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist Governor
Miguel Arraes.
6 Aug. 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, still scheduled
for Santiago, Chile, 6 - 11 August but likely to
be postponed or cancelled.
13 Aug. Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin
border by building a wall in 1961 (more than
30,000 refugees had registered in West Berlin in
the preceding month).
14 Aug Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the
Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic (Chiang Kai
Shek) signed in 1945.
17 Aug. Soviet-Polish Treaty went into effect. Poland
received German territory as compensation for
territory annexed by the Soviet Union, 1945.
9.0 Aug. Leon Trotsky assassinated in 1940 in Mexico City.
24 Aug. Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
24 Aug. North Atlantic Treaty entered into force 1949 (NATO).
17 Sept. International Committee for Cooperation of
Journalists (ICCJ) Conference on board Soviet ship
in the Medeterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct.
29 Sept. International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh
Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be
followed by UIA General Assembly and International
Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.
(Briefly Noted)
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#6 11-24 June 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese Communists delivered and published
their long-delayed response to the CPSU letter of 30
March (see Chronology, 15 June). It was a long, un-
yielding, arrogant, even insulting rc-statement of
their most militant interpretation of Marxist-Leninist
theory, plus harsh denunciation of recent Soviet inter-
nal developments and of Soviet conduct in relations
with other fraternal socialist parties and countries,
topped off by another taunting challenge to the CPSU
to publish the materials on both sides. (NCNA announced
that the new message had already been published in book-
let form, together with the CPSU letter to which it
replied.) On the same day, the Peking Peo lees Daily
and the Albanian Zeri I Popullit feature nasty ttackts
on Tito and Yugoslavia, Albanians coupling Tito
directly with Khrushchev.
2. Moscow observers report that Soviet officials
were obviously shocked by the tone and timing of the
CCP message, just three days before the opening of the
CC plenum of the CPSU, convened to discuss ideological
problems. The CPSU reacted with a statement released
on the first day of the plenum which regretted the
"arbitrary interpretation" and "unwarranted attacks,"
and which stated that they would not publish it because
publication would call for a public reply which would
further aggravate polemics, contrary to "the understand-
ing reached." Speakers at the plenum were compelled to
address themselves to the Chinese dispute and the plenum
adopted a resolution on the subject, all rejecting the
attacks and supporting the Khrushchev line. The Soviet
press joined in the chorus.
3. Meanwhile, the North Koreans again demonstrated
their support of the Chinese in a joint statement at
the conclusion of President Choe's visit to China and
with the North Vietnamese during a visit of a North
Korean delegation to North Vietnam.
4. On the other side, the Yugoslavs have taken ad-
vantage of several opportunities to reassert their
firmness, and the East Germans officially protested
to the Chinese against their dissemination of their
polemical materials.
5. The Rumanian party further demonstrated its
"independence" by publishing a lengthy review of the
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contrary. (Commentary Continued)
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6. The resignation of a CC member from the
Australian CP and the ousting of five from their
Central Executive positions was interpreted locally
as portending the formation of a dissident, pro-
Chinese party there. Somewhat the same situation
seems to be developing in the Ecuadoran CP (accord-
ing to the OCI Weekly Summary dated 21 June), though
we are not able to furnish any published reports in
the Chronology. FBIS has furnished an unpublished (7)
OUO report of a 3-day plenum of the Chilean CP, at
whfch the Secretary General violently attacked the
ChiComs and condemned visiting Chinese writers in
Chile for making anti-Soviet propaganda. The plenum
repeated its support of the Soviet line, but it is
believed that a purge of the ranks will be forthcoming.
Significance: In their conduct during this period, the
Chinese cou a.rdly have been more provocative, insolent,
challenging, and downright hostile toward the C'SU and still
remain within the outermost limits of nominally "fraternal"
relations. It is not only that their polemic directly con-
tradicts the Soviet line on many vital questions and labels
Soviet positions as "absolutely impermissible," but they
directly impugn Soviet sincerity (see the two uses of "under
the pretext" sections 20 and 23, and the "CPSU should match
their deeds with their words" in section 22) and spew out such
nasty insults as great.-.power chauvinism, sectarianism,
splittism, subversion, crudely interfering, imposing their
own wrong line, advocating one thing today and another to-
morrow, -- and, horror of horrors,-- tantamount to helping
restore capitalise! And finally, their repeated challenge
to the Soviets to publish both sides was so worded as to
make it a matter of deciding between truth and falsehood
rather than honest differences of opinion; Moreover, their
maneuvers were no less provocative than the content of their
message. After deliberately refraining from replying to the
CPSU letter for ten long weeks, the Chinese launched this
massive attack just 3 days before the important CPSU plenum
and about two weeks before the bilateral talks are to begin,
-- and simultaneously announced that it had already been pub-
lished in booklet form.
Only the outcome of the Sino-Soviet talks, still scheduled
to open on 5 July, will conclusively show how to interpret
the perplexing submissiveness of the Soviets who, despite
their protests, appear to be "turning the other cheek" towards
their Chinese tormentors. For the time being, several differ-
ent, mutually exclusive interpretations are conceivable:
a. the Soviets want to give the Chinese sufficient
rope to hang themselves, e.g. they refrain from re-
paying the CCP in kind until the negotiations, in
order to demonstrate Peking's guilt before the entire
World Communist Movement (relatively the most likely
explanation).
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b. Or the Soviets are primarily playing for time,
willing to swallow some more ideological insults
(especially since Khrushchev apparently -- and mis-
takenly, seen from his place -- underestimates the
importance of "doctrinal squabbles," putting first
priority on military, especially nuclear strength,
second on scientific and industrial achievements) ---
hoping that time is working for them, e.g. by way
of seeing Mao depart from the scene.
c. Or the Presidium has inside information to the
effect that the Chinese dragon's bark is far worse
than its bite, i.e. that the CCP is really willing
to make concessions behind closed doors but tries
to save face and improve its bargaining position
until then (an admittedly unlikely, but not im-
possible alternative).
d. Or the pressure on Khrushchev inside the CPSU
to come to terms with Peking is so strong that K.
cannot aggressively deal with the increasingly
deadly insults compiled in that latest letter (no
evidence to support this possibility, either --
but the "inferiority complexes," caused among
Soviets and other European Communists by the bar-
rage of devastating ChiCom accusations, may have
led to a crisis between revolutionary emotions
and more conservative practices which characterize
the Khrushchev line).
The foregoing is intended mainly as "food for thought" for
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CERO LOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSI NS
#6 11-24 June 1963
June 7 - In a speech at Ljubljana, reported in Politika, Sel-
grado of 8 June, Yugoslav Deputy Premier Kardeltto China
that relations between socialist countries must be based on
equality and mutual respect. "What would the relations. . .
become if every socialist country ascribed to itself the right
to declare another socialist country to be capitalistic,
imperialist, agent of imperialism, etc. . . . China must
realize that it cannot subordinate the whole of international
socialism to its momentary interests and aiabitions."
June 12 - The North Korean organ Nodon Sinmun in a lengthy,
reps ive article stressed the necessx ytoo build "a self-
supporting economy under the banner of self-reliance."
June 15 - NCNA announced that the ChiCom Ambassador in Moscow
had ivered to CPSU Presidium member Suslov a reply dated
14 June to the CPSU letter of 33 March to the CCP (Due to its
length, we are appending our analysis of this highly important
document at the end of this Chronology.) The full text was
published by all Peking papers on 17 June under the heading
"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International
Communist Movement," and NCNA announced on the same day that
it had already been Published in booklet form together with
the ex s o a 5111 arc letter to W-Hich it replied and
o the earlier exchange between the two, 21 February from
CPSU and 9 March from CCA.
June 15 - On the same day, both the Chinese People's Daily
an a Albanian Zeri I Popuilit carried harsFi'a tacks on
Tito and the Yugos av rev s onists. The relatively short
Chinese article, accusing the Titoites of "trying to worm
their way into the ranks of the international Communist move-
ment to carry out unscrupulous sabotage," is distinguished
only by its scurrilous language: "The Tito group's attacks
and slanders are no novelty; they are mere spittle collected
from the cuspidors of the imperialists and other revisionists."
The Albanian, however, picks up the underlined implication
of Soviet collusion and spells it out unequivocally. Tito,
it says, "expounded their /T and K7 identical profoundly anti-
Marxist and anti-revolutionary views on questions of war and
peace, peaceful coexistence, the paths and forms of the transi-
tion to socialism, etc. What is characteristic is that in
dealing with all these questions, Tito used N. Khrushchev's
language." And later:
"The renegade Tito in a string of slanders, in
particular against the CCP, has qualified the firm
struggle of principle being waged by the CCP to.de-
fend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and to oppose
the counter-revolutionary views and hostile attacks
of the modern revisionists, }as 'a 'struggle for
hege
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judges others' from his chauvinistic angle. Be-
cause it is precisely they who claim to have the
monopoly on the 'creative development of Marxisn'
-- and all others must join in step -- they have
not shrunk from anything to impose their own
views: from plots -- even organizing counter-
revolutionary insurrections as'ar , from the liquidation o eading cares in frater-
nal parties who oppose eir rev s orast course,
dispatching for their purpose special envoys to
convince the leading circles of these fraternal
parties, -- and even economic and military pres-
sures and use of flattery and means of corruption."
And later, this aggrieved indictment: "The modern revi-
sionists manipulate Lenin in a cynical way and they distort
him without shame."
June 17-20 - On the 17th, the Havana Revolucion (formerly
official organ of Castro's 26th of July movement; still re-
garded as reflecting Fidel's personal line) published a 5-
column Prensa Latina dispatch from Peking on the CCP letter.
Hoy, (recently designated as the official organ of United
)arty of the Socialist Revolution as well as the CP) carried a
similar piece on the 10th, credited to Hsinhua, Peking.
However, this reportage craftily avoided any description of
the harshly controversial polemics: for example, each of the
25 sections was listed, but only in a single title-like
sentence or phrase denoting the "problem" discussed, such
as "11 - The transition from capitalism to socialism!' The
Cuban articles were published before the CPSU had issued its
statement (see next item in Chro- nology) vetoing any publiciz-
ing of the CCP letter, but on the 20th, the Rumanian :Party
organ Scinteia published a report almost identical with the
Cuban, credited to the Rumanian agency Agerpress, Peking.
June 10 - TASS released a statement which, after recalling
the earlier CPSU-CCP exchanges proposing the halting of
polemics and holding of a bilateral meeting, acknowledged
receipt of the CCP letter of 14 June. However, the CPSU
stated:
"This letter gives an arbitrary interpretation
to the declaration and statement of the Moscow
conferences of Marxist-Leninist parties, distorts
the major theses of these historic documents, and
contains unwarranted attacks on the CPSU and other
fraternal parties. All this gives rise to deep
regret.
The CPSU CC believes that the publication at pre-
sent in the Soviet press of the letter of the CC CCP
dated 14 June 1963 would call for a public reply
which would lead to a further aggravation of the
polemics, would not ac d t
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reached, and would run counter to the opinion
of the fraternal parties on this question.
This should not be done, all the more in view
of the coming meeting between representatives
of the CPSU and the CCP on 5 July this year."
June 18-21 - Although the large "ideological plenum" of the
aiad been scheduled to discuss internal problems, most
of the speakers in the closed session and resolution reacted
to the Chinese attack by rejecting as "groundless and slander-
our" the Chinese attacks on Soviet policy, supporting the
Khrushchev line, and approving Khrushchev's action "in rallying
further the forces of the world Communist movement" and his
"concrete actions and measures" taken in the USSR's relations
with Peking. The resolution on China and the appointments of
Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat were generally re-
garded as evidence of enhanced support for Khrushchev in his
foreign as well as domestic policies.
June 19 and continuin - A visit to North Vietnam by a dele-
gation o the oxorean Supreme People's Assembly, led by
Vice President Pak Kum-chol, is being used to propagate the
Chinese-oriented North Korean line, with repeated attacks on
modern revisionism in a Nodon Sinmun editorial on the 19th
and in Pak's speeches in ano . f-rs host, Truong Chinh
(Chairman of the Standing Committee of the DRV National
Assembly), in his reception speech on the 20th, gave restrained
concurrence: "Together with the fraternal parties, we
resolutely defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, oppose
revisionism and dogmatism and other wrong tendencies, especially
revisionism." On the 19th NCNA also reported that the latest
issues of two North Vietnam organs, Party theoretical journal
Eyoc Tap and the Labor Youth Union's Tien Phones, had carried
a ac;s on Yugoslavia and its new constitution.
June 19 - The Yugoslav agency TANYUG described an article in
the grade Komunist responding to the ChiCom attacks on the
Yugoslav party following her Fifth Plenum. In answering the
questions as to what is the direct aim of theChinese attacks,
Komunist said: "They are, in fact, efforts to impose their
own v ews on the international labor movement on the pretext
of protecting Marxism-Leninism and taking the role o- arbiter
over the policy of all the socialist countries and parties.
The Chinese leadership thus only aggravates the actual dilemma
in the international labor movement -- the need of deciding
between blind dogmatism and arbitrary adventurism, and the
active and persistent struggle for peace and socialism based
on a creative application of Marxism, a policy which springs
from, a genuine sense of responsibility for the fate of the
world in which we live."
June 20 - News dispatches from Moscow reported that the ChiCom
Em'?'bas`sy, in defiance of stated Soviet desires, was distributing
copies of "the 67-page CCP letter" to Soviet organizations,
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difficulties in passing beyond the front door of the Chinese
Embassy have been cordially handed as many copies of the
letter as they wanted, UPI reported.
June 20-24 - The Australian Overseas Service reported that
the A u t lian CP has split over the issues of the CPSU--CCP
dispute. It cited the AC? weekly Guardian, which reported
the dismissal of five members of t We Party's Central Execu-
tive in Victoria for "fractionalism, breeches of the Party's
constitution and rejection of democratic centralism." Radio
Australia's reporter said that all named have shown strong
Peking leanings. One Victoria CC member veteran of 22 years,
resigned from the Party. On the 24th, Radio Australia reported
that another 25-year CP member had resigned "because he
opposed the revisionist policy (of) its CC," thus feeding
speculation that Australia may soon have two Communist Parties.
June 21 - The East German news agency ADN announced that First
Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer had protested to the Chinese
Ambassador over Chinese dissemination of printed matter in
violation of the existing order and legal regulations. ADN
added: "It is to be regretted that the Embassy of the CPR
in the GDR by such steps has acted against the wish enter-
tained by the Marxist-Leninist parties that public polemics
among fraternal parties should be ended and that differences
of opinion should be ironed out by means of negotiations."
June 21 - The Pelting People's Daily published a commentary
on ohn F. Kennedy's Great onsp racy" which interprets the
American President's 10 June American University speech as
"a cunning and vicious move in his 'peace strategy,"' aimed
to influence the outcome of tlx3Sino-Soviet debate and "to
divide the Red bloc." "As a special detachment of US impe-
rialism, the Yugoslav modern revisionists are beside them-
selves with joy at Kennedy's speech and have lauded it to the
skies." "However, all who firmly uphold the unity of the
socialist camp and that of the international Communist move-
ment will never allow themselves to be taken in."
June 23 - The extensive visit of North Korean President Choe
Yon -kon to China (see our last Chronology,-June 5) ended
with a 12-page joint statement signed by Liu Shao-chi and
Chos, which (to nobody's surprise, after Choe's earlier
speeches) followed a tough Chinese line, denouncing modern
revisionism and declaring that "it is absolutely impermissible
one-sidedly to reduce the foreign policy of the socialist
countries to peaceful coexistence."
June 23 - The Rumanian Scinteia, again alone of all the
."as .~uropean bloc, publis e lengthy report of the CPSU
plenum's resolution on China, including its rejection of
the CCP charges and its charging of the Soviet representa-
tives to "promote undeviatingly" the Khrushchev line in their
talks with the Chinese,
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.Tune 24 - Editorials in Pravda and Izvestiya reviewing the
wort o the CC plenum rdIterated tha? et ins oof the plenum
resolution which "categorically rejected" as "groundless and
slanderous the attacks by the CC CCP on our party and other
Communist parties," and authorized the delegation to the
July talks to follow Khrushchev's policies "unswervingly.'"
Reporting this from Moscow, New York Times correspondent
Topping added that Soviet officials, who had not expected
that the July talks would result in any ideological recon-
ciliation but had hoped for an agreement that would limit
the dimensions of the dispute and maintain some facade of
unity, were obviously shocked by the delivery of the harsh
Chinese letter only three days before the opening of the
plenum.
June 24 -- NCNA quoted "a spokesman of the CPR Embassy in the
G as.expressing "utter amazement at the ADN statement of
21 June which attacked the Chinese Embassy for distributing
printed matter." The spokesman said that the printing and
distributing of "this important Marxist-Leninist document"
was "fully justified and in accordance with international
practice," and it "undoubtedly will help increase the fra-
ternal German people's correct understanding of the CCP's
position and viewpoints and thus will be beneficial to
strengthen unity." After complaining that ADN "hurriedly
published the statement," even before the Embassy could com-
municate with its government, the spokesman said: "such
practice can only be regarded as a deliberate attempt to
incite an uproar, attack the CCP, widen differences in the
international Communist movement, and undermine the unity
among fraternal parties." He concluded with a reminder that
the Sixth SED Congress had "resorted to non-Marxist-Leninist
tactics in launching preposterous attacks on the CCP."
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APPENDIX to CHiROMOLOOY
Analysis of CCP letter to the CPSU dated 14 June 1963
After a few introductory remarks about the "common and
sacred duty" of all parties to uphold and strengthen unity, the
ChiCon message stated that, inasmuch as the CPSU letter "raises
the question of the general line of the international Communist
movement," "we, too, would like to express our view, which con-
stitutes our proposal on the general line . . . and on some
related questions of principle." (The CPSU letter had not
"raised the question of the general line," but it had damned
the CPSU's views as "the line of the Communist movement," the
correctness of which has been fully confirmed by "the entire
course of world development in recent years," and had flatly
stated that "we are deeply convinced that there are no grounds
for a re-examination of this line.")
The Chinese position is set forth in 25 numbered sections
(about 13,030 words), the first 17 of which re-hash previously
expressed ChiCom views on the theoretical issues in the dis-
pute, especially the questions of revolution and war. "In the
last analysis, it is a question of . . . whether or not to
accept the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, whether or not
to recognize the universal significance of the road of the
October Revolution, whether or not to accept the fact that the
people still living under the imperialist and capitalist system,
who comprise two-thirds of the world's population, need to
make revolution." The ChiCom answer: "the transition from
capitalism to socialism can only (our underlining here and
throughout) be brought about-trough proletarian revolution,"
and those who try to "predict peaceful transition" on the basis
of "absurd parallels" are repudiating Marxism. Continuing in
this vein, they repeatedly emphasized that Asia, Africa and
Latin America "are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist
rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct
blows at imperialism." On war: those "certain persons /ho7
now actually hold that it is possible to bring about 'a world
without weapons, without armed forces and without wars' through
'general and complete disarmament"' are perpetrating "sheer
illusion." "Peaceful coexistence" (a "Lenin thesis," and not a
"great discovery" by certain persons a few years ago) is a valid
concept within a narrow, strict interpretation, but it cannot
be made "the general line of foreign policy of the socialist
countries." "If the general line . . . is one-sidedly reduced
to 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition,' and 'peace-
ful transition,' this is to violate the revolutionary principles
of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement, to discard the
historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to
depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism."
"If anybody, following in the footsteps of others, defends the
erroneous opportunist line and policies pursued by a certain
socialist country . . . , then he is departing from Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
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6 (#6 Chronology Continued)
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With section i8, the Chinese begin attacking specific
Soviet internal developments and Soviet conduct in relations
with other fraternal parties and states, and the tone grows
increasingly arrogant and nasty. A novel feature of the CPSU
3rd Program, adopted by the 22nd Party Congress in 1931, was
the statement that, "having brought about a complete and final
victory of socialism -- the first phase of communism -- and
the transition of society to the full-scale construction of
communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled
its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the
US&.. from the point of view of the tasks of internal develop-
ment." Until the achievement of full communism -- with the
disappearance of classes and the withering away of the state,
-- Soviet society will be governed by a "state of the entire
people" (an ill-defined and nebulous concept). In sections
13 and 19 the Chinese roundly denouce "the announcement, half-
way through, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no
o~ nger necessary." "This, too, is not a question about the
internal affairs of any particular party but a fundamental
problem involving the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism."
"Does this not disarm the proletariat and all the working people,
organizationally and ideologically, and is it not tantamount to
helping restore capitalism?"
In section 20, the Chinese turn to "the issue of "combating
the cult of the individual" which they brand as "erroneous and
harmful," because raising this question "is actually to counter-
pose the leaders to the masses, undermine the party's unified
leadership which is based on democratic centralism, dissipate
its fighting strength and disintegrate its ranks." Furthermore,
"what is more serious is that, under the pretext of 'combating
the cult of the individual,' certain p re sons are crudely inter-
fering in the internal affairs of other fraternal parties and
fraternal countries and forcing other fraternal parties to
change their leadership n or er to impose their own wrong-line
on these parties,is all this If it is no ea -power MHat chauvinism, sectarianism and splittism? What is all this if
it i s not subversion?"
In 22, the Chinese attack Soviet conduct in its economic
relations with the socialist camp: "Economic cooperation must
be based on the principles of complete equality, mutual benefit,
and comradely mutual assistance. It would be great-power chau-
vinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name of
'in ernational division of labor' or 'specialization,' to impose
one's own will on others, infringe on the independence and
sovereignty of fraternal countries, or harm the interests of
their people. . . . It would be preposterous to follow the
practice of gaining profit for oneself at the expense of others."
The attack is shifted to the field of political relations
between fraternal parties in section 22. The CPSU should match
their deeds with the fine words of their 30 March letter: "it
is impermissible for any party to place itself above others,
to interfere in their internal affairs and to a o al
W MVd* 'Re1*as t9g8~6124 : o-
lu in
d
'
s an
line of one
s own party on -other fraternal parties
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as the "common program of the international Communist movement."
How to treat the "Marxist-Leninist fraternal Albanian Workers
Party" and the "Yugoslav revisionist clique of trat,tors to
Marxism-Leninism" are "two essentially different questions" and
"must on no account be placed on a par."
"Who is it that has taken splitting actions in Soviet-
Albanian relations? Who is it that has bxtonded the
ideological differences between the Soviet and Albanian
parties to state relations? Who is it that has brought
the divergence between the two countries into the open
before the enemy? Who is it that has openly called
for a change in the Albanian party and state leadership?
All this is plain and clear to the whole world. Is it
possible that the leading comrades of the CPSU do not
really feel their responsibility. . .?"
"The series of distressindevelopments which have
occurred in a soc.a camp in the past period have
harmed the interests not only of the fraternal parties
concerned, but also of the masses of the people in their
countries. This convincingly demonstrates that the
larger countries and parties need to keep in mind
Lenin's behest never to commit the error of great-Rower
chauvinism. The comrades of the CPSU state _][n t r
letter tat 'the CPSU has never taken and will never
take a single step that could sow hostility among the
peoples of our country toward the fraternal Chinese
people or other peoples.' Here we do not desire to go
back and enumerate the many unpleasant events that have
occurred in the past, and we only wish at the comrades
of the CPSU will strictly abide by this statement in
their future -fictions. During the past few years, our
party members and our people have exercised the rea$est
restraint In the face of a series of grave inc en s
w e were In violation of the principles guiding e
relations among fraternal parties and countries, despite
the many difficulties and losses which have been mppoosed
on us,"
Concentrating in section 23 on the Yugoslav problem, the
Chinese note that "certain persons are attempting to introduce
the Yugoslav revisionist clique into the socialist community,"
and assert that "this is openly to tear up the agreement
unanimously reached at the 1960 meeting. . . and is absolutely
impermissible." N)w "certain persons are openly saying that dogmatism not revisionism is the main danger, or that
doEsnatism is no less dangerous than revisionism, etc. . . .
They must not barter away principles, . . . advocating one
thing today and another tomorrow, . . . . On a pre ex of
'creatively developing Marxism,' . . . they describe as
'universal Marxist-Leninist truths' their own prescriptions
which are based on nothing but subjective conjecture an are
divorced from reality and rom the masses, an ey force others
to accept these prescriptions unconditionally. That is 1
wh
,r~, Q In 1 AaB/ 8? d ( - 7&3Q3 1 At ' st
Communist movement.""
?3 06 Chronology Continued)
 t
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In the brief section 24, the Chinese scornfully
contrast to their ideal of a self-reliant, Marxist -Leninist,
pro t etar an revolutionary party such despicable types as a
"bourgeois reformist par';y, " a "re v'isionist party.," and "a
party that parrots the cr'. rds of others, copies foreign ex-
perience withouUana- . , rulis farier and thither in response
to the baton of certain persons abroad, and has become a
hodgepodge o rev is n ism, ogmatimn, and everything but
Marxist-Lenin is t principles."
Finally, in section 25 the Chinese tauntingly repeat their
challenges to the CPSU to follow their example and publish
the articles on both sides of the dispute, because "it is the
duty of Marxist-Leninists to distinguish between truth and
falsehood with respect to the differences that have arisen in
the ICM.."
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CBRONOLOGIE - DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES
No 6 11-24 juin 1963
7 uin: Dane un discours d Liubliana, relatd dans "Politika". Belgrade, le 8
Ou n, 1'adjoint du premier ministre Kardelj a dit , la Chine que lea relations
entre pays socialistes doivent &tre basdes sur 1'dgalitd et sur le respect mu-
tuel. "Que deviendraient lee relations... si chaque pays socialists s'arro-
geait le droit de qualifier un autre pays socialiste de capitaliste, d'impdria-
liste, d'agent de l'impdrialisme, etc... La Chine doit comprendre qu'elle ne
peut subordonner le socialisme international tout entier A sea intdr9ts et sea
ambitions du moment."
12 .ruin: "Nodong Sinmun", Journal paraissant en Core du Nord, a soulignd en
un long article plein de rdpdtitions is ndcessitd de construire "une dconomie
qui se supporterait elle-mine sous la banniere de la confiance en soim?me".
15 uin: L"Agenee de presse de la Chine nouvelle annonce que l'ambassadeur de
is Chine communiste . Moscow a remis , Souslov, membre du Prdsidium du Parti
communists de 1'Union sovidtique, une rdponse datde du 14 Juin a is lettre des
partis communistes de I'Union sovidtique du 30 mars adressde au Parti communis-
te chinois, (en raison de is longueur de ce document important, nous en donnons
une analyse 6, is fin de cette chronologie). Le texte fut publid en entier
dens tous lea journaux de Pekin le 17 juin sous le titre "Une proposition con-
cernant Is, ligne gdndrale du mouvement communiste international", et 1'Agence
de presse chinoise annoncait le m?me jour que sa_publication existait ddA
sous forme de livre contenant d alement le texts de is lettre du 0 mars du
Parti, communiste de 1'Union sovi ti ue & laquelle elle r pondait, ainsi que
]'dchange de lettres pr4e dentes entre lee deux partis, lettre du 21 fdvrier
dmanant du Parti sovidtique, et celle du 19 mars adressde par le Parti chinois.
1,5 juin: Le m.e jour, le "Quotidien du peuple", journal chinois, et le "Zeta
i! opullit , Journal albanais, attaquerent violemment Tito et lea rdvisionnis-
tes yougoslaves. L'article relativement court, publid par lee Chinois qua ac-
cusaient lea partisans de Tito "d'essayer d'infiltrer lea range du mouvement
communiste international pour y pratiquer leur sabotage sans scrupule", ne se
distingue que par son langage grossier:"Lea attaques et lea diffamations du
ghroupe de Tito ne constituent pas une nouveautd; ce ne sont que crachats re-
ceuillis dans lea craehoirs des impdrialistes et autres rdvisionnistes". Les
Albanais de leur c8td reprennent l'implication soulignde de complicit sovid-
tique et is prdcisent sans dquivoque possible. Tito, ddclarent-ils, "a ex-
posd leur opinion identique et profonddment anti-marxiste et anti-rdvolution-
Haire sur lea questions de is guerre et de is paix, sur celles de la coexis-
tence pacifique, sur celles des chemins et des formes que prend la transition
vers le communiste, etc... (c'est-d,-dire lea opinions de Tito et de Khrouch-
tchef). Ce qu'il y a de caractdristique c'est qu'en traitant de touter ces
questions Tito a employd is language de Khrouchtchef. Et, plus loin:
"Le rendgat Tito en une sdrie de calumnies, profdrdes notamment
coutre le Parti communists chinois, a traitd de lutte pour l'hd-
gdmonie is lutte de Principe que le Parti communiste chinois mene
fermement Bans le but de ddfendre is puretd du marxisme-ldninisme
et de s'opposer aux opinions contre-rdvolutionnaires et aux atta-
ques hostiles des rdvisionnistes modernes. Il l'a fait comme Mon-
sieur Khrouchtchef lui-mgne a essayd de le faire. 11 eat clair que
Tito aussi bien que Khrouchtchef uge e s Wj~j%g%Q6004
Yo rCR~O&fl
4>dl t
XQ-5
1
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monopole sur le d v loppement crdateur du marxisme, et que tour
lea autres n'ont qu'& se mettre au pas, que rien ne les a arr--
td's pour imposer leurs vues: ni les complots, com ris 1'or ani-
sation d'insurrections contre-rdvolutionnaires comme en Hongrie,
ni la liquidation des cadres dirigeants dans des parts fraternels
qui s opposaient leur cours r visionniste' ni l'envoie avec mis-
sions spdciales de ddldguds chargds de convaincre lea cercies diri-
geants de ces partis fraternels, ni me'me les pressions dconomiques
et militaires et le recours d la flatterie et aux moyens de corrup-
tion."
Et plus tard, cette accusation:"Les rdvisionnistes moderns manipulent
Ldnine dune faron cynique et le ddforment sans honte."
17-20 juin: "Revolucion", journal publid d La Havane (qui fat 1'organe officiel
du Mouvement du 26 juillet de Castro, et que Von considere toujours comme ex-
primant lea ides personnelles de Castro) a reproduit un communiqud sur cinq co-
lonnes de "La Prensa Latina" adressd de Pdkin au sujet de la lettre du Parti com-
muniste chinois. "Hoy" (qui rdcemment a dtd ddsignd 11organe officiel du Parti
unifid de la rdvolution socialiste aussi bien que celui du parti communiste) pu-
bliait un article analogue le 18 qu'il attribuait A "Sinhua", Pdkin. Cependant,
ce reportage a dvitd adroitement de mentionner les poldmiques violentes: par
example, les 25 sections n'dtaient mentionndes que par une simple phrase sous
forme de titre, ou de phrases indiquant le "probinaie discutd, comme par exemple:
"11 - Transition du capitalisme au socialisme". Les articles cubains furent pu-
blids avant que le Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'ait fait parattre sa
ddclaration (voir l'article suivant de la Chronologie) par lequel it interdisait
toute publication de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois, mais le 20 "Scin-
teia", organe du Parti roumain, publiait un rapport presque identique & celui des
Cubains attribud a l'agence roumaine "Agerpress", Pdkin.
18 juin: L'agence Tass publiait une ddclaration qui, apres avoir rappeld les
dchanges prdcddents entre Ie Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique et le Parti
communiste chinois qui proposait de cesser la poldmique et de fixer une reunion
bilatdrale, accusait rdception de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois datde du
14 juin. Le Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique Mclarait cependant:
"Cette lettre donne une interprdtation arbitraire des ddclarations
faites aux confdrences de Moscou des partis marxistes-16ninistes,
ddforme lea theses principales de ces documents historiques, et
contient des attaques injustifides contre le Parti communiste de
1'Union sovidtique et d'autres partis fraternels. Tout cela est
profonddment regrettable.
"Le Comitd central du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique es-
time que publier d, prdsent dans la presse sovidtique une lettre
du Parti central du Parti communiste chinois datde du 14 join 1963
exigerait qu'il soit rdpondu publiquement ce qui entratnerait une
aggravation de la politique, ne serAit pas dans l'esprit de l'accord
obtenu, et irait a, l'encontre de 1'opinion de partis fraternels sur
cette question. Cela devrait Otre fait d'autant moires que les reprd-
sentants du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique et du Parti commu-
niste chinois doivent se rdunir le 5 juillet de cette annde."
18-21 juin: Bien qu'un "pldnum iddologique" important du Comitd central du Parti
communiste de l'Union sovidtique ait dtd prdvu pour discuter des problemes in-
ternationaux, la plupart des orateurs d'une rdunion privde ainsi que is rdsolu-
tion A ve4 P4RLSteftas i q A-RDR$eU8S'pAO OO a8O4 5itchev
 et enAfA9n+~~"~~_~~~ ~eCC~ ci-i7esQ61~~g~n~-uses
contre is. politique sovidtique. La rdsolution a approuvd Khrouchtchef d'avoir
"continud d relier les forces du mouvement communiste mondial," et elle a approu-
vd"les actions et les mesures concrbtes" prises A 1'4gard des relations entre
1'U.R.S.S. et Pdkin. La rdsolution sur is Chine et la nomination de Brezhnev et
de Podgorny au Secretariat sont considdrdes en gdndral comme dtant une preuve de
soutien accordde d sa politique dtrangere aussi bien que de sa politique intd-
rieure.
19 juin et les fours suivants: Une visite dans le Vietnam du Nord par une ddldga-
tion de lAssembide pQpulaire suprine de la Core du Nord, sous la direction du
vice-president Phak Kum-chol, sert.t propager la ligne nord-kordenne d'orienta-
tion chinoise, d l'aide d'attaques rdpdtdes contre le rdvisionnisme modern ex-
primdes dans un dditorial du "Nodong Sinmum" pare le 19, et dans lee discours que
Phak fit d Hanoi. L'h6te de Phak, Truong Chinh, (president du Comitd permanent
de l'Assemblde nationale de la Rdpublique ddmocratique du Vietnam) approuva en
termes mesurds dans son discours de rdception du 20:"De concert avec les partis
fraternels, nous ddfendons rdsolument is. puretd du marxisme-idninisme, nous nous
opposons an rdvisionnisme et au dogmatisme ainsi qu'ft d'autres tendances erro-
ndes, 1e rdvisionnisme en particulier." L'Agence de pre see de is. Chine nouvelle
a dgalemeut communiqud le 19 que les derniers numdros des publications vietna-
miennes, le "Hoc Tap", journal thdorique du parti et le "Tien Phong", jkurnal du
syndicat professionnel de is jeunesse, se sont dgalement attaques d la Yougosla-
vie et d sa nouvelle constitution.
19 juin: L'Agence yougoslave "Tanyug" parle d'un article pare ft Belgrade dans
le omunist", qui rdpond aux attaques des communistes chinois contre le parti
yougoslave ft is. suite de son cinquieme plenum. De savoir quel dtait le but des
attaques chinoises, le "Kommunist" ddclare:"Ce sont en effet des efforts pour im-
poser leurs propres vues sur le mouvement travailliste international, sous prd-
texte de protdger is marxisme-ldninisme et de prendre un rele d'arbitre au sujet
de is politique de tous les pays et de tour les partis socialistes. Les diri-
geants chinois ne font qu'aggraver ainsi le dilemme vdritable qui se pose au mou-
vement travailliste international - le besoin de ddcider entre un dogmatisme a-
veugle et une politique aventuridre arbitraire, et la lutte active et persis-
tante pour is paix et le socialisme basde sur une application crdatrice du mar-
xisme, politique qui jaiilit d'un Sens vdritable des responsabilitds pour l'ave-
ni.r du monde dans lequel nous vivons."
20 muin: Des communiques de Moscou font savoir que l'ambassade de is Chine commu-
niste, en ddpit du ddsir exprimd par les Soviets, distribuait des copies "d'une
lettre de 67 pages adressde par le Parts communiste chinois" aux organisations so-
vidtiques, aux journaux et aux correspondants dtrangers dont ceux des partis com-
munistes. Les journalistes occidentaux qui d'habitude dprouvent des difficuitds
de ddpasser is porte d'entrde de l'ambassade chinoise furent recus cordialement
et obtinrent autant de copies de is lettre qu'ils en ddsiraient, rapporte la Uni-
ted Press International.
20 u',n: La radio de is Aastralian Overseas Service annonce que le Parti commu-
niste australien s'est trouve divisd our la question du diffdrend iddologique en-
tre he Parti communists de l'Union sovidtique et le Parti communiste chinois.
Ces radios citent 1'hebdomadaire du Particcomministe australien, he "Guardian",
qui annonce que cinq membres du comitd exdcutif central du parti dans 1'Etat
Victoria out dtd relevds de leurs fonctions pour raison de "fractionalisme, en-
freinte ft is. constitution du Parti et opposition au centralisme ddmocratique."
Le speaker de Radio Australia a ddclaarrd que tous les membres relevds de leurs
fonct,gr8 L Ail
4U -e$ a ooh
1i ~1" 3a 'q Fg jMW
du Com central t e dtor a onn as admission au parts apr8s en
 avoir
bent
aeux part s nrnunlsee f JRvPgo33 s1 #a9*ew 4a6t
21 uin:L'A.D.N., agence de presse de l'Allemague Orientale, anaonce que le pre-
mier adjoint du minis tre des affaires dtrangbres Winzer a protests auprbs de
1'anbassadeur chinois contre la dissemination d'iunprimds pratiquds par lea Chinois
en ddpit des instructions et des rdglements en vigueur. L'A.D.N..ajoute:"Il est
regrettable que l'ambassade de la Republique populaire de la Chine dans is Rd-pu-
blique democratique allemande ait, en ce faisant, agi contre le desir des partis
marxistes-ldninistes de faire censer lea disputes en public entre lea partis :2ra-
ternels et de faire rdgler lea differences d'opinion au moyen de negotiations."
21 juin: Le "Quotidien du people" de Min a publid un cozimentaire sur "la grande
consp tion de John F. Kennedy", dans lequel ii declare que le discours du pre-
uident fait le 10 juin A: 1'American University dtait "une manoeuvre habile et mal-
:Caisante dans sa stratdgie de paix, tendant A influencer lea rdsultats des debats
sovidtiques prochains et '& diviser le bloc rouge'." "En leur qualitd de ddtache-
ment special de l'lmpdrialiame amdricain, lea rdvisionnistes modernes yougoslaves
no peuvent coutenir leur joie en presence du discours de Kennedy et en font lea
louanges jusqu'au ciel." "Cependant, tous ceux qui maintiennent fermement l'uni-
td du camp socialiste et celui du mouvement international communiste ne permettront
jamais A sly laisser prendre."
23 uin: La visite prolongde du president de is Corse du Nord Choe Yong-kon en
Chine voir notre derriere Chronologie du 5 juin) a prix fin par une declaration
commune de 12 pages signees par Liu Shao-chi et Choe, qui, pour ne surprendre per-
sonae spree lea discours prononcds par Choe, a suivi la ligne rigide des Chinois,
denoncant le rdvisionnisme modern, et declarant qu'il dtait "absolument impossi-
ble de pemettre une reduction unilatdrale de la politique dtrangere des pays
socialistes A I'dtat d'une eoexistence pacifique."
24+ uin: Les dditoriaux de "Pravda" et d'"Izvestiya " passent en revue le travail
du omits central du plenum et reproduisent lea termer de la rdsolution de ce ple-
num qui "rejeta catdgoriquemenfcomme calomnieuses et non fondles lea attaques
du Comite central du Parti communiste chinois dirigees contre notre parti et d'au-
teres partis eommunistes; Bette rdsolution autorisa dgalement la delegation pour
lea entretiens de juillet de suivre is politique de Khrouchtchef "sans devier".
Dans sa deAche de I4oscou, le correspondent du "New York Times" Topping ajoute
que lea officiels sovidtiques qui, s'ils ne s'attendaient pas b. ce que lea entre-
tiens de juillet aboutissent A une reconciliation ideologique espdraient toutefois
qu'un accord surviendrait limitant la dispute et maintenant une certain facade
.'unite, furent manifestement choquds par la violence de is lettre chinoise dis-
tribute trois .fours A peine avant 1'ouverture du plenum.
24+ uin: L'Agence de presse de is Chine nouvelle cite "un porte paroles de l'am-
baseade de is Rdpublique populaire chinoise aupres de la Republique democratique
allemande" qui s'est declare "profondement etonne par is declaration de 1'A.D.N.
du 21 juin, attaquant l'ambassade chinoise pour avoir distribud des imprimCs". Le
porte paroles a declare que l'impression et is distribution de "ce document mar-
xiste-ldninisteimportant" etait "pleinement justifie et en accord avec is pratique
internationale," et qu'i1 allait "certainement aider le peuple fraternal al.lemand
A mieux comprendre is position du parti communiste chinois ainsi que son point de
vue, et qu'il contribuera de cette fawn A renforcer i'unitd." Aprbs s'$tre plaint
que 1'A.D.N. "avait publid sa declaration en h?te" m?me avant que l'ambassade
Wait pu comrauniquer avec son gouvernement, le.porte.paroles ddclara?"une fa on
pareille d'agir doit *tre consideree comme n'etant qu'une tentative concertee A.
provoquer une explosion, une attaque dirigee contre he Parti communiste chinois,
petisiYs~Iautef~ffit en rappe anf
que le scongr5s de n~dlab SSE Dees
 Approved For Relea ZIM29 019 4A:1jI $ 306WO0200020004-5
Analyse de la lettre datde du 14 juin 1963, adressde par le Parti commu-
niste chinois au Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique.
Aprbs une introduction sur "le devoir est sacrd" de tous les partis de
maintenir et de renforcer 1'unitd, le message des communistes chinois ddclare
que daps la mesure off. la lettre du Parti communiste sino-sovidtique "souldve
la question de la ligne gdndrale du mouvement international communiste",.. nous
aussi, nous voudrions exprimer notre point de vue qui reprdsente notre proposi-
tion concernant la ligne gdndrale... et sur certaines questions de principe qui
sly rattachent," (La lettre du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'a pas
'"soulev6 la question de la ligne gdn&rale; mail elle a qualifid les vues du
Parti communists de 1'Union sovidtique de "ligne du mouvement communiste," dont
la justesse a dtd entibrement confirmde par "le tours entier des dvdnements
rnondiaux de ces dernbbres anndes," et elle a ddclard carrdment que "nous sommes
pronfonddment convaincus qu'il n'existe aucun foademen pour examiner de nouveau
cette ligne.")
La position chinoise est ddfinie dans 25 articles numdrotds (comprenant
environ 18.000 mots), dont lee premiers 17 reprennent les vues ddjh exprimdes
des communistes chinois sur les questions thdmriques soulevdes au tours de dis-
putes, particuli6rement celles de la rdvolution et de la guerre. "En derniere
analyse, c'est une question... d'accepter ou de ne pas accepter la vdritd uni-
verseile du marxisme-ldninisme, de reconnattre ou non la signification univer-
selle de la route tracde par la rdvolution_d'octobre, d'accepter ou de rejeter
le fait que des gens qui vivent encore sous des rdgimes impdrialistes et capi-
talistes et qui composent lee deux tiers de la population mondiale ont besoin
de faire la rdvolution." Les communistes chinois rdpondent:"La transition du
capitalisme an socialisme ne peut Otre accomplie qu'& 11aide d'une rdvolution
proldtarienne," et ceux qui essaient de "prddire Me transition pacifique" sur
.a base as "parall&les absurder," rdpudient le marxisme (le passage soulignd
Bans cette phrase et ceux jusqu'& la fin de ce texte font dtd par nous). Pour-
suivant Bans cet dtat d'esprit, ils soulignbrent constamment que l'Asie, l'Afri-
que et i'Amdrique Latine constituaient "lee zones les plus vulndrables parmi
celles placdes sous la domination impdrialiste, et ddchoyaient de rdvolutions
mondiales d'od partaient des coups directs adressds A 1'impdrialisme." Sur la
guerre: ces "certaines personnes" qui, & i'heure actuelle, prdtendent "qu'il
est vraiment possible de crder un monde sans arses, sans forces armdes et sans
guerre au moyen d'un ddsarmement g6ndral et complet ne font que crder "une il-
lusion pure et simple." "La coexistence pacifique (qui est une these de Ldnine
et non pas une grande ddcouverte faite it y a quelques anodes par certaines per-
sonnel) reprdsente un concept valide dans le cadre d'une interprdtation dtroite
et stricte, mail on peut en faire "une ligne gdndrale de politique dtrangbre
pour les pays socialistes." "Si la ligne gdndraie.,. se trouvait 9tre rdduite
unilatdralement a. une coexistence pacifique, une competition pacifique et une
transition pacifique, cela enfreindrait les principes rdvolutionnaires de la de-
claration de 1957 et de celle de 1960, ferait abandonner la mission historique
de la revolution proldtarienne mondiale, et ferait ddvier des enseignements re-
volutionnaires du marxisme-leninisme." "Celui qui, sur les traces de certains
autres, defend la ligne opportuniste et erronde ainsi que la politique poursui-
vie par un certain pays socialiste... s'dcarte du marxisme-leninisme et de 1'in-
ternationalisme proletaire."
Avec l'article 18 debute l'attaque chinoise contre certains dvdnements
precis de la vie intdrieure de 1'Union sovidtique et contre la conduite par les
sovietApor 2lf ?$P FkR8aQ:1'r /d8PN9 81MR '-8 63 WAD02ft 0 5
 chiaaiA #ddFOT3 Rol UNIM
M 13k&dMR 78 # G*WQWO u
Parti c piste de 1'Union sovidtique, adopte par le 226me congrts du parti en
1961, comportait une ncuveautd dons is d6clexation suivante:"Avant abouti a is.
victoire complete at finale du sccialisme, premiere phase du communisme, et au
passage de is socidtd A. la construction dtendue du communisme, is dictature du
proletariat a rempli as. mission historique et a cessd d'Otre indispensable en
Union sovidtique en ce qui concerne lea tItches de ddveloppement intdrieur."
Jusqu't ce qu'un arrive au communisme integral, avec is disparition des classes
at l'atrophie de 1'Etat, is socidtd sovidtique sera gouvernde "par un stat du
peuple tout entier" (conception mal ddfinie et ndbuleuse). Les articles 18 et
19 des Chinois exponent avec vigueur "1'annonce, Ao mi-chemin, que is dictature du
px?oldtariat n'dtait plus ndcessaire." "LA, non plus it nest pas question d'af-
faires interns d'un Etat particulier, main d'un problAme fondamental qui im-
p.ique is vdritd universelle du marxisme-1eninisme." "Est-ce que cela ne ddsar-
ne pas le proletariat et tous lea travailleurs dans leur organisation at leur
iddologie, et est-ce que vela n'dquivaut pas A, contribuer A, is restauration du
apitalisme?" -'~-
Dana l'article 20, lea Chinois se portent sur "la question de combattre
le culte de l'individu", qu'ils qualifient "d'erronde et de malfaisante" car sou-
lever cette question dquivaut A? dresser lea leaders et lea masses lea uns contre
les autres, A, saper la direction unie du parti basde sur le centralisme ddmocra-
tique, A, dissiper sa force combative at A, ddsintdgrer sea Tangs". D'autre part,
"bien plus sdrieux est le fait que sous dtexte de combattre le culte de 1'indi-
;rdu certaines personnel font preuve ding rence sans scrupule dans lea affaires
irftdrieures des autres partis et pays fraternels, at obligent d'autres partis
fx'atex'nels A changer leers chefs afro d'im poser a ces partis leer gore lime
:rronde. Quest-ce que tout eels. reprdsente s non un chauvinisme, un sectarisme
Bt un esprit de diffusion de grande puissance? Quest-ce quetout vela sinon de
La subversion?
Dana l'articie 22, lea Chinois attaquent la conduite par lea Soviets de
'curs relations dconomiquesavec le camp socialiste:"La cooperation dconomique
bit etre basde sur des principes d'dgalitd complete, d'avantages mutuels, at
.'assistance mutuelle fraternelle. Ce serait du chauvinisme de grande puissance
jue de nier ces principes fondamentaux at, au nom de is division internationale
3u travail ou de is specialisation, que d'imposer sa propre volontd aux autres,
lue d empieter sur 1 inddpendance et la souverainetd des pays fraternels, ou que
le heurter lea intdrgts de leurs peuples... I1 serait absurde de suivre is pra-
bque de se mdnager des avantages aux depends des autres."
Dana l'article 22, i'attaque est transferee dans le domain des relations
?g1itiques entre partis; fraternels. Le Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique
Levrait mettre sea actions d'accord avec lea belles paroles de as lettre du 30
oars:"On ne peut permettre qu'un parti prenne le pas sur les autres, qu'il inter-
:?ienne daps leurs affaires internes, at qu'il adopte une attitude patriercale A
'_eur egard... qu'il impose en tant que programme commun du mouvement communiste
;.nternational le programme, lee resolutions at la ligne de son propre parti aux
autres partis fraternels. Les questions d'attitude envers "le parti fraternel
iarxiste-ldniniste des travailleurs albanais" et "la clique rdvisionniste des
;raftres du marxisme -ldninisme yougoslave" sont "deux questions essentieliement
iiffdrentes" que l'on ne doit A, aucun prix "placer sur le mine niveau."
"Qui est-ce qui par sea actions tend A, aemer le desaccord.dams
lea relations entre Soviets et Albarais? Qui est-ce qui a in-
troduit dans lea relations d'Etat lea differences iddologiques
qui existent entre lea partis sovidtique: et Albanais? Qui est?
CA o9d#F r- 9@I "tl A2*ur(UA-RDPM&d fc~e~k0 2@9020004-5
 A&P? 3 g en eu parrs es groupes a rigeants
04-5
du parti et de i'Etat albanais? Cela est simple et clair pour le
monde entier. Ii est possible que lee camarades dirigeants du
parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique ne se rendent pas compte
de ce que reprdsentent leurs responsabilitds...?" "La sdrie
d'dvdnements an issants qui West produite dans le passe au sein
du camp socialiste a portd prejudice nor.seulement aux partis fra-
ternels intd'resses, macs encore aux masses populaires de leurs
pays. Cela prouve dune manure convaincante qu'il est du devoir
des pays lea plus grands et de leurs partis de garder presents d
1'esprit is commandement de Ldnine de ne jamais commettre 1'erreur
de pratiquer un chauvinisme de ranee puissance, Les camarades du
parti communiste de l'Ur on sovi tique d,c rent data leur lettre
que le Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'a jamais rien en-
trepris et n'entreprendra jamais quoique ce soit de nature d semer
1'hostilitd parmi lea peuples de leurs pays envers is peuple fra-
ternel chinois et lea autres peuples. Nous n'avons pas 1'intention
de retourner en arribre et d'dnumdrer le grand nombre d'dvdnements
ddplaisants qui se sont produ is daps le passe, et nous esp runs
simplement que lea camarades du Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidti-
que adhdreront strictement d cette declaration data leurs actions fu-
tures. Au cours des quelques anndes rdcentes, lea membres de notre
_rti et notre eu le ant fait preuve de is plus gran r serve en
prdnce d e seried'incidents graves aux principes directeurs des
relations entre partis et pays fraternels, et eels malgrd lea diffi-
cultds nombreuses et lea pertes qui nous out dtd im.os es.
Dans Particle 23, se concentrant sur le probleme yougoslave, lea Chinois
aoulignent que "certaines personnel cherchent A introduire la clique rdvisionniste
yougoslave dans la communautd socialiste," et affirment que "cela dquivaut ouverte -
:aent A ddchirer l'accord pris A l'unanimite au cours de la reunion de 1960... et
vela ii est absolument impossible de le permettre. Maintenant, "certaines person-
'ies declarent ouvertement que c'est le dogmatisme et non pas le rdvisionnisme qui
constitue le danger principal ou que Is dogmatisme est aussi dangereux que le re-
visionnisme, etc... Its ne doivent pas marchander sur lee principes... prdconisant
une chose aujourd'hui et une autre demain... sous le prdtexte de ddvelopper le
marxisme dune faron cr atrice... its qualifient de veritd marxiste-ldniniste uni-
verselle leurs propres ordonnances qui ne sont basdes que sur des conjectures sub-
jectives et qui n ont rien t voir avec is realitd ou avec lea masses, et ils obii-
gent lea autres d accepter ces ordonnances sans poser de conditions. C'est pour
cette raison que bien des phdnomenes graves se sont produits au sein du mouvement
international communists.
Dans un article bizare et court, larticle 24, lea Chinois comparent avec
addain l'idde qu'ils se font d'un parti rdvolutionnaire qui soit inddpendant du
.narxisme-ldninisme et proldtaire d ces genres de partis mdprisables qui sont "le
parti rdformiste bourgeois..., le parts rdvisionniste..., et le parti qui comae un
perro uet re ate lea mots des autres invite tout ce qui est dtranger sans chercher
,] analyser, court de tous lea c t s sous la direction de certaines personnes d
1'6tranger, et qui eat devenu une sorte de mac oine de r visionnisme, de dogma-
t;isme et de tout ce que Von veut ~, 1'exception des principes marxistes-ldninistes."
Enfin, dans Particle 25, lea Chinois rdpbtent avec sarcasme leur ddfi au
Parts communiste de l'Union sovidtique de prendre leur exemple et de publier lea ar-
ticles reprdsentant lea deux c'8tds de la dispute, parce que "i1 est du devoir des
:narxistes-ldninistes de distinguer entre la veritd et le mensonge en ce qui concer-
ns lea pprov f g Fe g'it1 WWO 1 $e1 q EjQ n"O69 0G0MC*tional.'
7
 Approved For Rel ?1 /08/245M3 EDP 4900200020004-5
No 6 11-24 Junio 1963
7 Junio: El vicepremier yugoslavo Kardelj, en un discurso en Ljubljana
informado el 8 de junco en el 6rgano "Politika" de Belgrado, manifest6
a China que las relaciones entre los passes socialistas deberian basarse
en la igualdad y el respeto mutuo. "LQu6 seria de las relaciones ... si
cada pals socialista es capitalista, imperialista, agente del imperialisme,
etc. ...T China deberh comprender que no puede subordinar a sus momentaa-
neos intereses y ambiciones todo el socialismo internacional."
12 Junio: El 6rgano norcoreano "Nodong Sinmun" en un extenso y repeticio-
so art culo destac6 la necesidad de construir "una economic que se manten-
ga a si misma, bajo la bandera de is autodependencia."
15 Junio: Sinjua (la agenda noticiera china) inform6 que el embajador-
de China comunista en Mosc-d habla entregado a Suslov, miembro del presi-
dium del PCUS una contestaci6n fechada el 14 de junco a is carta del
PCUS del 30 de marzo al PC chino (importantisimo documento cuyo andlisis
ofrecemos como ap6ndice a esta Cronologia debido a su longitud). El texto
integro fue publicado en todos los diarios de Pekin del 17 de junco bajo
el titular de "Una Propuesta concerniente a la lines general del Movimien-
to Comnunista Internacional." Sinjua anunc16 el mismo dia que el texte ya
habla sido publicado en forma de follete junto con los textes de la carts
del CUS de 29 de marzo a la cual contestaba y del intercambio anterior
entre los dos, del PCUS el 21 de febrero y del PC chino el 9 de marzo.
15 Junio: El mismo dia el "Diario del Pueblo" chino y el "Zeri i Popullit"
alb n s publicaron fuertes ataques contra Tito y los revisionistas yugos-
lavos. El articulo chino, relativamente breve, acusando a los particarios
de Tito de "tratar de insinuarse en las filas del movimiento comunista in-
ternacional pare ilevar a cabo sabotaje sin escr.pulo," se distingue solo
por los improperios que contiene: "Los ataques y calumnias del grupo de
Tito no son novedad; son mere saliva recogida de los escupidores de los
imperialistas y otros revisionistas." El articulo albands, por otra parte,
recoge is implicacl6n que subrayamos sobre colusi6n sovidtica y is pone en
tantas palabras. Tito, manifiesta, "expuso sus opiniones id6nticas (de
Tito y Kruschev], profundamente antimarxistas y antirrevolucionarias, so-
bre cuestiones de guerra y paz, coexistencia pacifica, las vias y formal
de la transici6n al socialismo, etc. Lo que es caracteristico es que al
tratar todas estas cuestiones Tito emple6 el lenguaje de N. Kruschev."
Y mks adelante:
"El renegado Tito en una sarta de calumnias, especialmente contra
el PC de China, ha calificado la firme lucha de principio que man-
tiene el PC de China en defense de is pureza del marxismo-leninismo
y em contra de is opini6n contrarrevolucionaria y los ataques hos-
tiles de los revisionistas modernos, como 'lucha por la hegemonia,'
precisamente Como el mismo N. Kruschev pretendi6 calificarla.
Este claro que T., como K., juzga a los demas desde su dngulo cho-
vinista. Como son epos precisamente los que reclaman para si el
monopolio del 'deaarrollo creader del marxismo' -- todos los demas
tienen que marchar al mismo comps -- no se han abstenido de nada
pare imponer sue propias oponiones: de complete -- hasta organi-
zando contrar revoluciones como en Hungria -- de la lii uidaci6n de
cuadros diri enter en los partidos fraternos ue se on
Approved For R 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0301A000O0HO%04-5
- 1 -
 Approve gcttuaM e lonista~2despach~ n3oPp a sue xibes 2en~ 22os Des
peciales que convenzan a los circulos dirigentes de dichos par-
tidos fraternos -- ni aun de presiones econ6micas y militares
y el empleo de la lisonja y los medios de corrupci6n."
Y mds adelente, eats denuncia quejumbrosa: "Los revisionistas
modernos manipulan a Lenin cinicamente y to deforman decvergonzadamente."
17-20 Junio: El 17, el diario "Revoluci6n" de la Habana (6rgano oficial
que fue del Movimiento 26 de Julio de Castro, y considerado aun como re-
flejo de la opini6n personal de Fidel) public6 a cinco columnas un despa-
eho de Prensa Latina desde Pekin describiendo la carta del PC chino.
El diario "Hoy" (designado recientemente 6rgano oficial del Partido
Unido de la Revoluci6n Socialista asi como del PC), public6 el 18 un ar-
ticulo, atribuido a Sinjua, Pekin. Este reportaje, sin embargo, astuta-
mente evadi6 la descripcibn de las amargas pol6micas: anotando, por
ejemplo, cada una de las 25 sections pero solo con una oraci6n o frase a
estilo de titular denotando el "problema" discutido, como "ll - La tran-
sici6n del capitalisme al socialismo." Los articulos cubanos fueron pu-
blicados antes de haber el PCUS emitido su declaraci6n (v6ase a continu-
aci6n) ve:ando toda publicidad para is. carts del PC chino, pero el dia
20 el 6rgano del PC rumano "Scinteia" public6 un informe casi iddntico
al cubano, atribuido a is. agencia rumana Agerpress desde Pekin.
18 Junio: TASS emiti6 una declaration que despu6s de recordar los ante-
riores intercambios entre el PCUS y el PC chino proponiendo la suspen-
sion de las pol6micas y la celebraci6n de una reuni6n bilateral, acus6
recibo de is. carta del PC chino de fecha de 11+ de junco. Sin embargo,
el PCUS declar6:
"Esta carta da una arbitraria interpretation a las dos decla-
raciones de las conferencias en Moseld de Partidos marxistas-le-
ninistas, deforms las tesis principales de dichos hist6ricos do-
cumentos y contiene injustificados ataques contra el PLUS y otros
Partidos fraternos. Todo esto ocasiona gran pesar.
"El CC del PCUS estima que la publicaci6n en la prensa sovidtica
actualmente de la carts del CC del PC chino de 14 de junco de
1963 demandaria una respuesta pifblica que conduciria a una mayor
agravac16n de la poldmicas, no concordaria con el acuerdo a que
se ha llegado y serfa contraria al parecer de los Partidos fra-
ternos sobre esta cuesti6n. Esto no deberd hacerse, mds aun en
vista de la pr6xima reunion entre representantes del PCUS y el
PC chino el 5 de julio de este affo."
18-21 Junio: Aunque el "pleno ideol6gico" ampliado del CC del PCUS
hab a sido Para discutir problemas internos, la mayoria de los oradores
en las sesiones secretas y is. resoluci6n f.nal reaccionaron ante el ata-
que chino apoyando la linea de Kruschev y rechazando como "sin fundamen-
ts y calumniosos" los ataques chinos contra la politica sovi6tica. La
resoluci6n aprob6 is. actuaci6n de Kruschev al "reunir mds estrechamente
las fuerzas del movimiento comunista mundial" y se suscribi6 a las "me-
didas y acciones concretes" llevadas a cabo en las relations de la
URSS con Pekin. La resoluci6n sobre China y el nombramiento de Brezhnev
y Podgorny al secretariado fueron generalmente considerado$ como indicio
de acrecido apoyo para Kruschev en sus actuacion'es en materia internacio-
A rrwkMar oope 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5
 M An ro ed F r Release.1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061 00200020004-5
uniVo y s?g.: La visita a Vietnam del Norte de una elegaci6n de la
Asamblea Suprema del Pueblo de Cores del Norte, encabezada por el vice-
presidente Phak Kum-chol, estd siendo utilizada para propagar la Linea
norcoreana pro China, con repetidos ataques contra el revisionismo modern
en un editorial de "Nodong Sinmun" del 19 y en los discursos de Phak en
Hanoi. El anfitri6n de Phak, Truong Chinh (presidente de la comisi6n per-
manente de la Asamblea Nacional de la Rep1.blica Democrdtica de Vietnam),
en su discurso de recepci6n el dia 20 expres6 su acuerdo restringido;
"Junto a los Partidos fraternos, resueltamente defendemos la pureza del
marxismo-leninismo, nos oponemos al revisionismo y el dogmatismo y otras
malas tendencias, especialmente el revisionismo." El 19, Sinjua tambi6n
inform6 que los uitimos ndmeros de dos 6rganos de Vietaiam del Norte, la
revista te6rica del Partido, "Hoc Tap," y el 6rgano "Tien Phong" de la
Uni6n Juvenil Obrera, hablan publicado ataques contra Yugoslavia y su
nueva constituci6n.
19 Junio: La agencia yugoslava Tanyug inform6 sobre un articulo en el 6n
gan "o"o Kamunist" de Belgrado respondiendo a los ataques del PC chino contra
el Partido yugoslavo a raiz de su Quinto Pleno. En cotstestaci6n a la pre-
gunta sobre el prop6sito directo de los ataques chinos, "Komunist" expres6:
"Son de hecho esfuerzos por imponer sus propias opiniones en el movimiento
sindical internacional so retexto de proteger el marxisme-leninismo.y to-
mar el papel de drbitro de la politics de todos los passes y partidos so-
cialistas. De esa manera los lideres chinos solamente agravan el dilema
mismo del movimiento sindical internacional -- la necesidad de decidir en-
tre el dogmatismo ciego y el aventurismo arbitrario, y la activa y persis-
tente lucha por la paz y el socialismo a base de una creadora aplicaci6n
del marxismo, politica que nace de un genuino sentido de responsabilidad
por la suerte del mundo en que vivimos."
20 Junio: Despachos de prensa de Moscd informaron que la embajada de
China comunista, a despecho de los deseos sovidticos declarados, estaba
distribuyendo ejemplares de la "carts de 67 pdginas del PC chino" a or-
ganizaciones sovi6ticas y per16dicos y corresponsales extrajeros, incluso
los de passes comunistas. La agencia UPI inform6 que a los redactores
occidentales, que normalmente tienen dificultad pars, it mds alld del
portal de entrada de la embajada china, les fueron cordialmente entregados
todos los ejemplares de la carta que quisieran.
20 Junio: La Australian Overseas Service i.nform6 por radio que el PC
australiano se ha dividido por las causal de la disputa ideol6gica del
PCUS y el PC chino. Bas6 su informaci6n en el semanario "Guardian" del
PCA; que dio a conocer el despido de cinco miembros del ejecutivo central
del Partido en el Estado de Victoria por "fraccionismo, infracciones de
la Constituci6n del Partido y rechazo del centralismo democrdtico." El
periodista radial de Radio Australia expres6 que todos los hombres menci-
onados han demostrado fuerte tendencia pro Pekin. Un miembro del comit6
central en Victoria, con historial de 22 a1os, se dio de baja del Partido,
dando lugar a pensar que Australia puede pronto tener dos Partidos comu-
nistas.
21 Junio: La agencia ADN de Alemania oriental anunci6 que el primer vice-
canciller Vinzer habla protestado ante el embajador chino por la distri-
buci6n de impresos en contravenci6n del orden existente y las reglas legs-
les. Afiadi6 la ADN: "Es de sentirse que la Embajada de la RPCh en la
RDA con tales pasos haya actuado contra el deseo clue anima a los Partid s
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 M yn e'sue~. a `p' orri neego0cia-
ci6n.
21 Junio: El "diario del Pueblo" de Pekin public6 un comentario sabre
"La Gran Conspiraci6n de John F. Kennedy," interpretando el discurso
del Presidente en American University el 10 de junco como "jugada astu-
te y maligna de su 'estrategia de paz'" con intenci6n de influir en el
resultado del debate chino-sovi6tico y "dividir el Bloque Rojo." "Como
destacamento especial del imperialismo norteamericano, los revisionistas
modernos yugoslavos estdn fuera de si de regocijo con el discurso de
Kennedy y lo han alabado hasta los cielos." "No obstante, todos los que
firmemente sustentan la unidad del campo socialista y la del movimiento
comunista internacional jamds se dejar6n engaklar."
23 Junio: La extensa visits del Presidente Choe Yong-ton a China (v6ase
nuestra dltima Cronologia, 5 Junco) concluy6 con una declaraci6n conjunta
de 12 pdginas suscrita por Liu Shao-chi y Choe, siguiendo (Para sorpresa
de nadie, en vista de los discursos anteriores de Choe), la dura Linea :
china, denunciando el revisionismo moderno y declarando que "es absolute-
mente impermisible reducir unilateralmente la politica exterior de los
passes socielistas a la coexistencia Pacifica."
24 Junco: "Pravda" e "Izvestiya" publicaron editoriales repasando el tray
bajo del plena del CC y reiterando los t6rminos de la resoluci6n del mismo
que "categ6ricamente rechaz6" como "infundados y calumniosos los ataques
del CC del PC chino contra nuestro Partido y otros Partidos comunistas"
y autoriz6 a la delegaci6n a las conversaciones de Julio a seguir la po-
litics de Kruschev "invariablemente." Informand.o esto desde Moscu, el
corresponsal Topping del "New York Times" a!fadi6 que los funcionarios so-
vi6ticos, que no hablan contado con que las conversaciones de Julio re -
s ultaran en reconciliaci6n ideol6gica alguna Pero si que hubiera un acuen-
do que limitara las dimensions de la disputa y mantuviera alguna aparien-
cia de unidad, dieron muestras inequivocas de sobresalto por la entrega
de la rude carte china solo tres dins antes de la fecha del pleno.
24+ Junco: Sinjua cit6 las palabras de "un portavoz de la embajada de la
RPCh en la RDA" expresivas de "completo estupor por la declaraci6n de la
ADN del 21 de junco atacando a;la embajada china por distribuir materia
impresa." El portavoz manifest6 que la impresi6n y distribuci6n del "im-
portante documento marxista-leninista" era "completamente justificada y
de acuerdo con la practica internacional." e "indudablemente ayudar6 a
incrementar la corrects comprensi6n por parte del fraterno pueblo alemdn
de la posici6n y opiniones del PC de China y asi serd beneficiosa en el
fortalecimiento de la unidad." Despu6s de quejarse de que la ADN "apre-
suradamente public6 la declaraci6n" aun antes de que is. embajada pudiera
comunicarse con su gobierno, el portavoz declar6: "Semejante practice
solo puede considerarse como tentative intentional de incitar a escdndalo,
atacar al PC de China, ensanchar las divergencias en el movimiento comu-
nista internacional y socavar la unidad entre los Partidos fraternos."
Concluy6 con un recordatorio de que el VI Congreso del SED habia "echado
mario de tdcticas no marxista-leninistas al lanzar ataques descabellados
contra el PC de China."
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 Approved For ReleaSg'12`4LtFA?03061A000200020004-5
Andlisis de la Carta del Pc Chino al PCUS el 14 de Junio de 1963
Despu4s de unas palabras de introducci6n referentes al "deber
sagrado y coma" de todos los Partidos de mantener y reforzar la unidad,
el mensaje del PC chino declar6 que Como la carts del PCUS "trae a cuento
la cuesti6n de la lines general del movimiento comunista internacional,"
"nosotros tambi6n quisi&ramos expresar nuestra opini6n, que constituye
nuestra propuesta sabre la Linea general ... y sobre algunas cuestiones
relacionadas de principio." (La carts del PLUS no habia "traido a cuenta
is cuesti6n de la linea general," pero si habia definido las opiniones
del PCUS como "la Linea del movimiento comunista internacional" cuya cor-
recci6n ha sido completamente confirmada por "el curso entero del desar-
rollo mundial en aflos recientes," y habia declarado lisa y llanamente que
"estamos profundamente convencidos de que no existen fundamentos pars un
reexamen de dicha lines.")
La posici6n china estd expresada en 25 secciones numeradas (unas
18.000 palabras), entre las cuales las primeras 17 recalientan opiniones
chinocomunistas expresadas anteriormente sobre las cuestiones te6recas en
disputes, especialmente las cuestiones de la revoluci6n y is guerra. "En
ultimo andlisis se trata de .'.. aceptar o no la verdad universal del mar-
xismo-leninismo, reconocer o no is significaci6n universal de la via de
is Revoiuci6n de Octubre, de scepter o no el hecho de que la gente vive
aun bajo el sistema imperialists y capitalista, y que comprende las dos
terceras pastes de is poblaci6n mundial, necesita hacer la revoluci6n.."
La respuesta chinocomunista: "La transici6n del capitalismo al socialis-
mo se puede producir solamente (el subrayado aqui y en adelante es nues-
tro) por media de la revoluci n proletaria," y aquello que tratan de
"predecir is transici6n pacffica" a base de "paralelos absurdos" estdn
repudiando el marxismo. Continuando con este tenor, repetidamente se de-
clara que Asia, Africa y America Latina son "las zonas mds vulnerables
bajo el dominio imperialista y los centros de torments que asestan golpes
directos al imperialismo." Acerca de is guerra: las "ciertas personas
(que] ahora liegan a mantener que es posible producir 'un mundo sin ar-
enas, sin fuerzas armadas y sin guerras' por medio del 'desarme completo
y general'" estdn perpetrando una "pura ilusi6n." La "coexistencia pacf-
fica" ("tesis de Lenin" y no "gran descubrimiento de ciertas personas
hace unos amos) es un concepto vdlido dentro de una estrecha y estricta
interpretaci6n, pero no se puede hater "la linea general de is poiitica
exterior de los passes socialistas." "Si is lfnea general ... es unila-
teralmente reducida a is 'coexistencia pacffica', ' competencia pacffica'
y 'transici6n pacifies,' eso es violar los principios de la declaraci6n
de 1957 y la de 1960, desechar is misi6n hist6rica de is revoluci6n pro-
letaria mondial y apartarse de las enseflanzas del marxismo-leninismo."
"Si cualquiera, siguiendo las pisadas de otro, defiende is err6nea lines
oportunista y las polfticas proseguidas por cierto pals socialists ...,
se estar6 apartendo del marxismo-leninismo y el internacionalismo prole-
tario."
Con la secci6n 18 los chinos comienzan a atacar asuntos internos
sovi6ticos especificos y is conducta sovidtica en sus relaciones con es-
tados y Partidos fraternos, haci6ndose su tono mda y mds arrogante y ofen-
sivo. Una caracteristica novedosa del III Programs del PCUS, adoptada
par el XXII Congreso del Partido en 1961, foe is declaraci6n de que, "ha-
biendo producido una victoria completa y definitiva del socialismo--- pri-
m~p8doi:@ 1999/(/2A~7$8069~'i4+~(~2~0?r
5
 Ap sbxed "rr lpw J a4 zaCi`c RUa$zRlO&Wp .qqg O@&-?
plido su histbrica misibn y ha cesado de ser indispensable en is URSS
desde el punto de vista de las tareas del desarrollo interno." Hasta
la consecuci6n del comunismo compieto -- con la desaparici6n de las
clases y el desvanecimiento del estado -- is sociedad serb, gobernada por
un "estado del pueblo entero" (concepto mal definido y nebuloso). En
las secciones 18 y 19 los chinos denuncian fuertemente "el anuncio, a me-
dio camino, que ya no es necesaria is dictadura del proletariado."
Esto tambi6n no es cuesti6n de los asuntos internos de un Partido deter-
minado sino un problems fundamental que envuelve is verdad universal del
marxismo-leninismo." No desarma esto al proletariado y a todo el pueblo
trabajador, organizativa e ideol6gicamente, y no eguivale a coa4yuvar a
restaurar el capitalismo?"
En is seccibn 20 los chinos se dirigen a "la cuesti6n de 'combatir
el culto al individuo'" que ellos denuncian como "err6nea y nociva," ya
que traer al tapete esta cuesti6n "es realmente contraponer los lideres
a las masas, minar el liderato unificado del Partido que se bass en el
centralismo democrbtico, disipar su fuerza combativa y desintegrar sus
filas." Ademds, "la que es mds grave es que so pretexto de 'combatir el
culto al individuo,' ciertas personas estbn burdemente interviniendo en
los asuntos internos de otros Partidos fraternos y palses fraternos y
forzando a otros Partidos fraternos a cambiar su liderato para imponer su
propia Linea errada a dichos Partidos. LQu es todo esto si no esc sio-
nismo sectarismo y chovinismo a estilo de gran potencia? 4Qu6 es todo
si no subversi n?
En Is seccibn 22 los chinos atacan la conducts sovi6tica en sus
relaciones econ6micas con el cameo socialists: "La cooperaci6n econ6mi-
ca deberd basarse en los principios de igualdad completa, beneficio mutuo,
y asistencia mutua en compa?lerismo. Serfs chovinismo propio de gran po-
tencia negar dichos principios bd,sicos y, a nombre de la 'division inter-
nacional del trabajo' o 'especializacibn,' imponer is voluntad propia
sobre otros, eonculcar is independencia y soberania de passes fraternos
o perjudicar los intereses de sus pueblos. ... Berta descabellado seguir
la prdctica de sacar partido para at mismo a expensas de otros."
En le seccibn 22 el ataque vira hacia el campo de las relaciones
politicas entre los Partidos fraternos. El PCUS deberia emparejar sus
hechos con las Buenas razones de su carts del 30 de marzo: "Es impermi-
sible que ningdn Partido se coloque por encima de otros, intervenga en
sus asuntos internos y adopte modales patriarcales en sus relaciones
con ellos, ... [y es impermisible] imponer el programs, las resolutions
y is lines del propio Partido sobre otros Partidos fraternos como 'el
programs comdn del movimiento comunista international.", La manera de
tratar al "fraterno Partido marxista-leninista de los Trabajadores Alba-
neses" y is de tratar la camarilla revisionista yugoslava de traidores al
marxismo-leninismo" son dos "asuntos esencialmente diferentes" y "de nin-
guna manera deber?in ser puestos a la par."
"'LQuibn es el que ha realizado actos de escisionismo en las
relaciones entre sovi6ticos y albaneses? LQuibn es el que
ha extendido las divergencias ideol6gicas entre los Partidos
sovi6tico y albands al terreno de las relaciones entre estados?
Quin es el que ha puesto las divergencias entre ambos passes
al descubierto ante el enemigo? LQuibn es el que ha demandado
roaeF ` e `e b*OV2 -~ FA-R 9P* ( 6icXOB0L2b66 04-5
App
 Approved ft ,etea ,8 $ , a RgMtQ3 QA,0a 20004-5
entero. ZSer, posible que los camaradas dirigentes del
PCUS realmente no recuerdan an responsabilidad...?
"La serie de acontecimientos apenantes que ban tenido luger
en el cameo socialista en el pasado per odo ha perjudicado
los intereses no solo de los Partidos fraternos en cuestibn
sino tambidn las masas populares en sus passes. Esto com-
prueba convincentemente que los mayores passes y Partidos ne-
cesitan tener en mente el encargo de Lenin de nunca cometer el
error chovinismo propio de gran potencia. Los camaradas del
PCUS manifiestan en an carta que 'el PCUS jemds ha dado ni dard
ni un solo paso que siembre la hostilidad entre Jos pueblos de
nuestro pals hacia el fraterno pueblo chino u otros pueblos.'
No deseamos aqui volver atrds y enumerar los muchos aconteci-
miientos desagradables que ban ocurrido en el pasado, y solo de-
seamos que los camaradas del PCUS se ajusten estrictamente a
dicha declaraci6n en sus actuaciones futures. En los <imos
altos, los miembros de nuestro Partido y nuestro pueblo ban ejer-
cido el ma or dominio des mismos ante una serie de graves in-
cidentes v olatorios de los principios que gu an las relaciones
entre passes y Partidos fraternos, no obstante las muchas difi-
cultades y pdrdidas que nos ban lido impuestas.
Concentrando en is. seccibn 23 en el problema yugoslavo, los chinos
apuntan que "ciertas personas estdn tratando de introducir a la camarilla
revisionista yugoslava en la comunistd socialista," y afirman que "esto
es destrozar abiertamente el acuerdo adoptado undnimemente en la reuni6n
de 1960 ... y es absolutamente impermisible." Ahora "ciertas personas
estdn declarando abiertamente que el dogmatismo y no el revisionismo es
el mayor peligro, o que el dogmatismo no es menos peligroso que el revi-
sionismo, etc. ... No deberdn canbalachear los principios ... abogando
boy por una coca y maftana por otra... So pretexto de 'desarrollar el mar-
xismo creativamente, ...describer como 'verdades marxistas-leninistas
universales' sus propios preceptos basados unicamente en la conjetura sub-
`e~ tiva y divorciados de la realidad y de las masas, y obligan a otros a
aceptar dichos preceptor incondicionalmente. Por eso es que muchos fen6-
menos graves se ban producido en el movimiento comunista international.
En la breve y extraPfa seccibn 24 los chinos desdeffosamente contras-
tan a su ideal de un Partido revolucionario proletario marxista-leninista
confiado en sf mismo tipos despreciables tales como un "partido burgu6s
reformista," un "partido revisionists" y "un partido que parlotea como el
lord las palabras de otro, copia la experiencia extranjera sin analizarla,
corre de un lado a otro obedeciendo a is. batuta de ciertas personas en el
extranjero y se ha convertido en una mescolanza de revisionismo, dogmatis-
mo y de todo menos los principios del marxismo-leninismo."
Finalmente, en la seccibn 25 los chinos repiten con chufletas sus
retos al PCUS a seguir su ejemplo y publicar los artfculos de ambos lados
de la disputa, porque "es deber de los marxistas-leninistas distinguir en-
tre is verdad y is. falsedad con respecto a las divergencies surgidas en
el seno del movimiento comunista international
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673. Constitutional and Structural Stability: Fundamental
25X1 C10b Factors in the o ar
The Supreme Test of the Cold War. it is safe to predict
that the o War -- i.e. the free wor 's continuous effort to
reduce Communist expansion, subversion and aggression at least
to a "safe" level where it no longer involves the threat of gen-
oral war, if only by miscalculation -- will last quite a few
more years and will require, for its successful conclusion, con-
tinued maximum exertions by all free nations. Even if its
course does not lead to actual nuclear conflict, there is a
pressing need to overcome a succession of political.and socio-
economic crises, local and regional insurrections, and diplomatic,
propagandistic and mass-organizational pressures by the World
Communist Movement. For this purpose, Cold War allies will
continue to require the very highest degree of loyalty, moral
fiber, endurance and far-sightedness among all free people: if
nuclear war should be added to all Cold War strains and stresses,
these demands will be obviously still far higher, if the free
world is to win the war and rebuild its civilization afterwards.
Consequexntly, the free world's efforts through the years ahead
must be spearheaded by those nations which offer mankind the best
possible hope for passing this supreme test: nobody can predict
the future with a high degree of certainty, but we can unques-
tionably derive important lessons from the past performances and
the present conditions of the nations involved.
Criteria of Stability and National Cohesion.. The following
factors are essential in evaluating a nation's ability to pass
the above described tests:
1. Constitutional Continuity. The better a nation
has succeeded in adapting its institutions and govern-
ment policies to internal and external changes without a
violent break of constitutional order, the more probable
that it will master future crises, too, and that its
citizenry will remain loyal. All other circumstances
being equal, a constitution which has functioned for
several generations will command far higher and more
reliable allegiance than a regime set up relatively
recently after one or more violent and/or fundamental
changes in the constitutional order.
2. Military Record. A nation's role in past wars
Appfb~' De4' ~.n~eg Ins
tw ind
rac y~an oyty of asorces an
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Population in war emergencies --, while no automatic
guarantee of future victories (the character of
enemies, as well as its own warlike qualities may
change quickly), is as significant as its continued
maintenance of both nuclear and conventional arma-
ments and present psychological preparedness for
all types of military conflicts.
3. National Cohesion Vs. Internal Subversion.
No nation is today entirely immune to possible sub-
version since the Communist Bloc will stimulate sub-
version even in countries where it does not arise
spontaneously. However, there is a fundamental
difference between small-scale, isolated subversive
efforts which can be controlled by the country's
security services and large-scale subversion
bol-
,
stered by tangible popular sympathies, which serious-
ly threatQ the nation's fabric in peace or in war.
The seriousness of subversion in any given country
can be measured not so much in absolute terms, but
in comparison, with the cohesion loyalty and the
constructive, patriotic socio-political efforts of
the majority of the population. (Subversion, in
this context, denotes not only Communists, but
includes also any other elements endangering the
stability of a nation, whether Fascists, separatists
or the like.)
4. Flexibility and Adaptation to Internal and
External anges. The manner in which a nation as
dealt with inajor changes in its domestic situation
or in its international relations, the relative ease
of transition to new positions and the acceptance of
necessary changes by population and government, are
also highly indicative of a nation's ability to pass
new tests. Such shifts may include transition from
rural to urban economy and society, technological
revolutions (e.g. automation), immigration and
emigration, minority problems, relations between
motherland and colonies, and so forth.
(The following paragraphs apply the foregoing criteria to the
principal nations of the free world.)
United States. Has maintained the same constitutional
system since 1799, adjusted to changing conditions by amend-
ments: even the Civil War, 1861 -- 1865, did not break the
continuity of the constitution or of the institutions based
on it. The US has won all wars in which she became involved:
her participation in World Wars One and Two was decisive for
the outcome of these global conflicts. Neither Nazis nor
Communists gained dangerously strong influence. Whatever
sympathies local Nazi groups may have enjoyed among the mil-
lions of German-Americans evaporated quickly when Hitler
` eA a opRelb9sUS1 fte*M*PCIA ? 03061 AGMMM004-5
(623. Continued)
 (61pp99,pd)For Release 199 DP78-03061 000 099R024
unions and certain intellectual circles was reduced, largely
through the initiative of the groups concerned (e.g. CIO's
investigation and subsequent expulsion of Communist-controlled
unions), below the danger point. US settled relations with
her former possessions amicably, granting independence to the
Philippines, raising Hawaii and Alaska to statehood and estab-
lishing the commonwealth of Puerto Rico according to the vote
of its population.
Britain. Has continued her unwritten constitution with-
out break, adapting to changing conditions -- for instance, by
reducing the role of the House of Lords and increasingly shift-
ing towards a "welfare state." Britain participated in winning
World War one and Two -- though she could not have won either
war without massive US intervention. Her latest military ven-
ture, Suez 1956, was a failure. Fascist and Communist groups
are small, though defeatist trends -- "unilateral disarmament"
-- have spread far beyond the insigAificant CP. Britain has
divested herself of her once farflung empire with only rela-
tively minor conflicts and maintains, on the whole, close
relations with most of her former colonies -- many of which are
now voluntary members of the British Commonwealth. On the
whole, Britain has adjusted to her reduced world position in
good grace and has taken realistic measures to rearrange her
diplomacy, defense and economy accordingly.
France. Has experience) four violent breaks in her con-
stitutional order within the last 100 years: the end of the
2nd empire and the establishment of the 3rd republic in the
awake of her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, 1379/71; the
3rd republic was replaced by the Pertain regime as a result of
France's defeat in the first year of World War Two, 1940; the
Petain regime (Vichy) was followed by the 4th republic at the
end of World War T4wo; the 4th republic was overthrown by the
present de Gaulle regime in 1958.
France lost the war with Germany, 1870/71; fought on
the winning side -- bearing the main burden among
the Western powers -- in World War One (even though
her armies were severely shaken by the great mutiny
of April, 1917) ; her forces collapsed after a few
weeks of fighting in the first stage of World War
Two, a crushing defeat repaired only by US interven-
tion later in the war; lost the colonial wars in
Indochina and Algeria and the intervention against
Suez (jointly with Britain and Israel), 1956.
The French CP, though radically reduced in her parliamentary
representation through de Gaulle's sweeping electoral reforms,
still polls more than one fifth of the popular vote and con-
trols the strongest labor union federation. Right-wing
extremists, too, have played significant roles in recent years,
from the Cagoulards of 1934 through the groups which collaborated
with the Nazis during World War Two to the "Secret Army" in
A 1AM*bv d~R'e MeMM&M* 3RDPq8tD064LAO?0200020004-5
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 "AvpirdVc1 For Releases 199 P78-03061 Q0002~0(04
France lost her richest colonies, Indochina and Algeria,
after costly a _d protracted wars, leaving especially in
Indochina (Vietnam Laos, Cambodia) many critical, un-
solved problems. Settlement with most of her other
colonies in Africa was amicable and France retained con-
siderable influence there. (France still owns some
minor overseas territories, such as Martinique and French
Guiana. in the Caribbean and New Caledonia in the Pacific.
While France has recovered remarkably well from the destruction
suffered in World War Two and from the loss of her colonies, a--_,y
realistic adjustment to her changed (i.e. reduced) role in world
affairs is still impeded by strong and emotional wishful think-
ing about her past grandeur -- delusions by no means limited to
de Gaulle and his close associates.
Germany. Her constitutional regime was changed violently
four tth"an the last 100 years: 1671, the Second Empire was
established by Bismarck as result of the victory over France;
1910, the Kaiser was replaced by the Weimar Republic in the
wake of the defeat in World War one; 1933, Hitler seized power;
following military occupation in 1945, after Germany's defeat
in World War Two (during which the Allied powers established a
4-Zone regime over all of Germany), two separate governments
were established in West and East Germany in 1949.
Germany was the principal loser in both World Wars.
Her split into a Communist and a free part (likely to
last until the Soviet Union should retreat) provides
an element of basic instability. In West Germany, the
CP is outlawed and was numerically weak even while
legal; but West Germany is a prime target of Soviet
(and East German) subversion efforts. Right-wing
extremism hardly appears on the West German political
scene today -- but this may be temporary and due to
the present prosperity and to the moral condemnation
of Nazi crimes rather than to a genuine disappearance
of anti-democratic tendencies.
Other Nations. The free world includes many other countries
besides those discussed above, including big and important nations
such as India, Japan, Italy, Argentina, and so forth. None of
these is a real candidate for leadership in the Cold War since
all are lacking either the military or industrial potential, or
occupy too peripheral a position in the community of the free
world -- quite apart from any shortcomings in their constitutional
stability. The general criteria outlined above, however, apply
25X1 C1 ob to any nation, large or small.
 25X1C10b
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 1 July 1V 33
6261 Op d Fao ReI' 9e 0Is24EcoCIAo- is Di8f03i0u1A0002?f0020004-5
-25X1 C10b 15ov e oc
KO :
CEMA's Failure to Progress. The Council for Mutual
Economic 21ssistv'nee kCZAA) is e economic Planning and trad-
ing organization of the USSR and the East European satellites.
C)MA was founded in 1349, partly as an answer to the American
Marshall Plan, and partly as a move to discourago other satel-
lites from following the example of Yugoslavian heresy. Eco=
nomically, it was intended to coordinate the plans and
economies of the bloc countries and to direct the satellite
economies into specialized types of production. Such special-
ization would be much more rational economically than the
prevalent attempts to make each country self-sufficient, but
specialization was apparently also designed to make the satel-
lites obedient and subservient; with thorough specialization,
it would become impossible for these countries to imitate Tito.
But it was easier to establish the CEMA organization than
to bring the coordination and specialization program into
effect, and in fact almost nothing happened. Following the
Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1256, which revealed the
persistence of nationalist feelings in the satellites, and
following the related failure of the over-ambitious five year
Plans of that period, the Kremlin decided to make a new,
second effort to turn the bloc into a closely knit economic
group. In succeeclinZ years CEM[ planned inter-satellite
electricity networks and pipelines and work was begun on them.
But progress in trade volume was still slight, in embarrassing
contrast to the success of the West European Common Market,
while specialization was virtually non-existent.
Therefore in June 1962, the Soviets began a third campaign
to get CEMA off the ground. Judging by some of Khrushchev's
remarks, he may have been anxious to enable CEMA to trade on
equal terms with the Common Market and the capitalist world
generally; his interest in East-West trade has often been shown,
as in the recent reception accorded to the manager of Krupp's
of Essen, Berthold ?1eitz. At all events the party secretaries
assembled in Moscow, a document entitled "Basic Principles of
International Socialist Division of Labor" was issued, the
Communist press circulated a long article by Khrushchev, and
the construction of a new CEMA headquarters building began in
a Moscow suburb. The CEMA Executive Committee, whose members
are all deputy premiers in their countries, now meets every two
raonths, and CEiRA's bureaucracy, including a permanent secre-
tariat and an increasing number of permanent commissions, has
expanded rapidly. At the Executive Committee's December 1962
meeting, the non-Soviet members agreed to establish a joint
P?? ~ 6&o Fb sei1 $1 8t 4Q IA R6JF O3 6I 0 -5
poo rrans;-remont _
(674. Continued)
 (674 Cont.) 1 July 1963
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The most notable sign of its built-in difficulties has been
the resistance of Rumania to a central planning system, ex-
pressed at many committee meetings, and especially at the
April Executive Committee meeting in Moscow (Economist Foreign
Report, 2 May 1963; London Times, 9 May 1963). a Rumanian,
Bulgarian and Hungarian press bias also made implicit criticisms
of CEMA's plans to dismantle factories in certain satellites
and transfer them elsewhere. While the Czech radio denied on
29 March that Czech plants were as yet being dismantled and
moved, it admitted that they would be moved in the future, and
a part of the Hungarian radio industry was packed up and
shipped to Bulgaria; later, the Hungarians refused to buy
Bulgarian radios.
All the smaller CEMA states have some doubts about special-
ization, and Rumania, more vocal than the others, is said to be
especially aroused over the opposition of the CEMA planners to
a large-scale expansion of the Rumanian steel industry. (On
Rumania, see also Guidance #657a, 6 May 1963.) With the USSR
beginning preparations for its next five year plan, and with
the satellites exposed to the rival attractions of ?eking, the
West, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets badly need to get CEMA into
operation. Yet they face two tremendous problems: conomic
nationalism and the lack of economic prices.
Economic Nationalism. The leaders of Eastern Europe are
determined to mate esr countries technically comparable with
the Soviet Union and with Western European nations. It was
probably this goal that led many of these men to become Commu-
nists,. and in their party training, often in the USSR, they
absorbed Soviet lore on giant dams and steel mills. In the
postwar years, even while Soviet troops were removing equip-
ment to rebuild the USSR, and even while Stalin was using so-
called "joint stock companies" to operate choice satellite
industries for Soviet profit, local Communists were planning
and starting to implement grandiose plans for miniature Soviet
Unions, complete with steel mills, tractor plants, and all the
other typically Soviet industries. Stalin, who was much more
a Machiavellian politician than an economist, seems to have
feared that if the satellites specialized, they would tend to
cooperate with each other, perhaps eventually forming a
political union against the USSR. On the other hand, he did
not take them seriously as individual countries, and he cal-
culated that with each satellite a weak, non-specialized
economy, they would compete with each other for Soviet favor;
Moscow would hold the reins.
But economically, and especially from the standpoint of
Soviet economic interests, this multiplication of small, all-
around economies made little sense. More than half the ore
needed by satellite steel plants is imported from the USSR,
and substantial amounts of other raw materials are drawn from
the same source. Not only are these materials diverted from
Soviet use, but the overburdened Soviet and satellite transport
facilities must haul them over long distances. From being
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e 'Vcv.Pg Fo4kr ga 0 qW r RjAiz DP7 n-Q30o 00 002 0 000s -
el::ites have changed into importers, and they draw on the none-
too-ample food supplies of the Soviet Union. Although most of
the relief for Poland and Hungary after the 1956 uprisings was
squeezed out of past Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets
have discovered on that and other occasions that satellite
economic difficulties may entail Soviet economic contributions.
The predominately Soviet officials in CEMA have logic on
their side in demanding that Rumania abandon her Stalinesrue
plans and concentrate on oil and grain production. But for
Rumanians, industrialization is all-important, an expression
of inherited nationalism and, at the same time, the only way
of emerging from Balkan backwardness. The choice between
economic nationalism and specialization is ultimately a choice
between political independence and lasting vassal status.
Other CEMA members are less defiant at the moment, but they
too are likely to. resist any sacrifice of their "national
sovereignty." Most Communists are also nationalists, and if
forced to choose between national interests and loyalty to
Khrushchev -- who in any case is no longer an unquestioned
authority -- many will follow the line of national interests.
The Lack of Economic Prices. The question of economic
nations sm would e much less acute if the bloc had a normal
market economy. Among western cou"tries, industries are usually
located in the most economic places. Steel plants, for example,
have usually been placed where coking coal and iron ore were
readily available, since steel plants in other locations will
have higher costs and make less profit. One reason why
Switzerland and Sweden prosper is that, instead of running
large-scale, unprofitable steel complexes, they concentrate on
the products (such as cutlery and watches) they are best able
to make and sell. But (paradoxically for economic materialists)
the economic policies of Communist countries are settled on
political, not economic grounds, and these policies are
influenced by quasi-aesthetic factors, such as reverence for
tall smokestacks and massive masonry walls. Economic activities
are pursued by plan -- that is, by order -- and supply and
demand are deliberately ignored; according to Marx, economic
values are based on labor cost, and not on supply and demand.
Therefore prices in each Communist country are established by
the state, allegedly on a cost basis, actually with the intention
of favoring plan execution, but in any case arbitrarily.
This means that prices reflect the whims of the adminis-
trator, that they constitute no reliable index to the scarcity
of delivery cost of a commodity, and that they provide no true
reflection of the costs of capital depreciation and stockpiling.
Factories have been built in Siberia which received their
materials from and delivered their products to the Ukraine;
managers amass vast stores of unused machines and equipment
against the possibility of shortages; and machines once produced
have sometimes proved unneeded or unsuitable, and have been
left to rust in the open. Not only is there no price indicator
of demand and overhead costs, but the absence of a market makes
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 (674 Cent,) 1 July 1963
JA m o aFelti gy'I $ "AAI: } P dOaq~ AORR JQOOa20 04-5 er
cause of hoarding and waste. Lip service is rendered to
"accountability," but in the last analysis, production and use
are determined by order.
'Price problems become more acute in Soviet foreign trade,
and most acute of all in trade with other bloc countries. All
Soviet foreign trade is conducted by corporations of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. In trading with capitalist coun-
tries, the planners first decide what imports are needed and
what exports may be disposed of, and then the Ministry strikes
the best bargain it can; often the transaction amounts to a
quantitative barter. The Soviet domestic cost plays no role
in deciding the amount to be traded, and indeed the arbitrary
Soviet prices, insulated from the influence of world markets,
would be practically useless for making such a decision.
As. to Soviet trade with other bloc countries, these
countries have Price structures which are like the Soviet
structure in being arbitrary, but which differ from the Soviet
structure in all their particular prices, being the product of
different sets of planners working with different economies.
Between these economies and the Soviet economy, there is no
objective standard of cost, and In order to find such a
standard, the bloc countries have had to use world market
prices as a point of departure in their negotiations with each
other. At present, 1957-50 world prices are used, and begin-
ning in 1964, these Will be replaced by a new average world
Price, based on the five year period 1957-61. This should be
an improvement, but obviously the standard is somewhat out of
date.
At all events, even with such a capitalist yardstick,
Ck114A trade is a two-way barter, base! on the particular quantity
of goods needed for each country's plan. Foreign exchange
(i.e., funds available for use in any foreign free market) Plays
virtually no role in intra-bloc trade. Without foreign ex-
change, barter is necessary, and simultaneous multilateral
barters are difficult to work out. Various expedients have been
tried, but the right to obtain as-yet-unspecified goods at an
unspecified future data (essential if trade is not arranged in
a single quid pro quo agreement) is hard to reconcile with a
planned, controlled economy. Some third or fourth country
might suddenly appear and demand goods earmarked for domestic
purposes.
In short, the bloc is unwilling to adopt a real market
economy, with real money which can be spent as the owner of the
money wishes. Adoption of a market economy would of course
mean abandoning a major part of Communism. But without markets,
trade relations remain primitive and cumbersome. One result
of the no-market, play-money system is that, for the mcs t part,
the bloc countries do not know what commodities are in short
supply. Another result is that it is difficult for them to
tell who produces a given commodity most cheaply. Most impor-
tant of all (and most characteristic of Communism), trade tends
to become a contest o ,?
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Lue oorrowed yardstick of worltii prices ; ?ves as a point
of departure for *pis contest, but the final*eerms must be
hammered out in c y1o -at1c-type negotiations. It is no wonder
that departures from the yardstick usually favor the politically
and economically superior country, the USSR A survey of 1960
statistics has shown that, in that year, the Sovietsovercharged
their partners (relative to western prices) in 41 cases, and
undercharged them in 10. The total of overcharges was 23 times
the total of undercharges. Thus, while official figures made it
appear that the USSR exported more to its partners than it im-
ported from them, this appearance was due to Soviet over-pricing,
and trade in terms of western prices made the USSR a net importer,
exploiting the bloc. The variation from market prices may not
be due entirely to plan, but had the advantage been to the
smaller countries, we may imagine that it would have been
quickly corrected.
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675. Cuba's "New Look" Economy is Soviet Colonialism
BACKGROUND: Cuba's new emphasis upon developing its
sugar products?n constitutes a basic policy change. During
the first years of Castro's regime, the objective was agri-
cultural diversification and industrialization, Intended to
reduce Cuba's dependence on a single crop and to make it
"economically independent." The problems this policy created
have been detailed in earlier Guidance items on Cuba (see
below). Cuba's sugar production has deteriorated and the
leaders of the Castro regime have become more strident and
critical as they exhort the Cubans to greater efforts. The
decision to increase the production of sugar now emerges as
part of the Communist pattern of Soviet economic control
and imperialism as it limits Cuba to the role of a producer
of raw materials within the Soviet realm.
Castro himself revealed the plot in his long 4 June
"meet-the-press" report on his trip to the Soviet Union (see
Guidance #668, "Castro's Mission to Moscow"). He said his
talks about Cuba's sugar and economy were "of the highest
import to Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet Government" and
declared:
"For us, it means that we must seriously get to
work on all this, in order to prepare the position
that we are going to occupy in the world of produc-
tion in which we are going to specialize. What are
we going to do? We are going to build an economy
based on international division of labor."
That Cuba's "specialization" would be agriculture and
specifically sugar was emphasized by Cuban agricultural chief
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on 8 June as he urged radical improve-
ment in sugar production which he described as the "basic
factor" of the economy, and on 15 June when he told the Cubans
"to produce much more sugar and also much more corn, rice,
more and better tobacco, more vegetables, more products of all
kinds, and more cattle. That is our duty and that is your
obligation. . ."
The Communist Pattern. The Soviet Union established the
basic pa ern for a Communist economy, namely a totally con-
trolled state plan centered on the development of capital goods
and heavy industry. The Soviets have maintained a rigid doc-
trine of industrialization first, particularly vital industries,
at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods industries.
But the USSR has now decided that its satellites should
not follow this Communist pattern, and it assigns to other
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economy of the Soviet Union. In particular, countries like
Rumania, with her oil (and now Cuba, with her sugar) are to
specialize on their traditional primary products. None of
the satellites is to develop a balanced economy, none is to
be able to provide for its own economic needs in independent
trade throughout the world. This specialization is aimed
generally to strengthen Soviet political control by keeping
the satellites dependent on the USSR.
Aside from the general control technique, control and
dependency have been developed by the Soviet Union through
a variety of specific methods, such as:
1. Trade treaties -- especially supplying arma-
ments in exq ange for goods at prices favorable to
the Soviet Union;
2. Binational "joint stock companies" -- which
gave the Soviets control of key industries (these
were largely dropped in the 1950's, but recent Soviet
proposals for "joint investment" suggest that the
concept is being revived and refined);
3. Loans -- which insure long-term indebtedness
to the ov ts;
4. Technicians, managers, advisers experts
extending ov e influence and control at key points
in the planning and execution stages of every major
economic enterprise.
The Soviet Union strives to control the trade of the Bloc
and is the main buyer, seller, broker and clearing house.
While there are signs of "independence" movements within the
Bloc, these only strengthen the Soviet interest in extending
its economic exploitation of new areas, for prestige as well
as economic reasons. In this context, Latin America offers
an appealing prize and Cuba represents the Soviet "foot in the
door."
The Cuban Experience. Soviet "trade imperialism" con-
stitutes an a ort to -.y- developing countries loose from
trade relations with the Western world and to bind them to
the USSR. Latin America offers an example of how this works --
the Soviets buy surplus goods and materials without regard to
the world market; then "dump" the goods on the world market at
prices to suit their own propaganda purposes regardless of the
economic crisis this might create.
Soviet handling of Cuba's sugar illustrates the pattern --
a long-term purchase contract at prices favorable to the USSR,
a "generous" adjustment in the purchase price when the world
market price. goes up (but a price which at the time was only
half the world price), evidence of re-selling on the open
market at a profit,etc. (See Guidance #663, "Castro's Mission
tA-maO'6@11s For"1"$'/2 QIP7 ROP?8646' OOOa9OO2@?04-5
(675. Continued)
 (675 Cont.) " " " " a mw iv #63
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#6 1WHb, "Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings.")
When Castro came to power, the United States was Cuba's
most important source of capital and its chief trading partner.
In 1959, the last year of normal trade, 75% was with the US --
453 million dollars in each direction, 350 million dollars of
Cuba's exports being sugar. Trade with the Soviet Union was
negligible -- about 1S million dollars a year.
Using the propaganda slogan, "economic independence,"
Castro prepared the way for Soviet economic imperialism and
colonialism. Foreign private capital was confiscated without
compensation; aid from the West was refused; trade with the
West was rejected as a form of "imperialist exploitation." As
a substitute, he accepted Soviet offers of marvelous prospects
of trade -- "generous help" as the propaganda describes it.
By 1961, Cuba's trade with the US had all but stopped
while trade with the Soviets had jumped -- the dollar ex-
change Probably was more than Soviet trade with Hungary,
Rumania or Bulgaria. At the same time, Cuba's trade with the
Communist countries of Europe also increased -- Poland-Cuba
trade tripled between 1960 and 1961.
But this did not mean that the Bloc trade compensated for
Cuba's losses from severing trade with the US. Cuba-US trade
was nearly in balance but there was a deficit -- a growing one
in Cuba-Bloc trade -- 40 million dollars in 1961, 225
in 1962. Also, there was a loss of at least 100 million
dollars from the transfer of sugar from the preferential US
market to Communist markets which pay a lower price. This
sugar loss has increased as the market price went up while
the Soviets continued to pay the pegged low price and Cuba's
production has decreased.
In addition, more than 76% of Cuba's export income is only
a credit on the books of the central banks of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc countries. This means that Cuba must accept the products
the Bloc countries offer in trade without regard to normal
price and quality considerations. Cuba's economy must be
geared to the Bloc in order to utilize the Bloc's exports.
Realistic economic considerations are minimized; political
considerations are emphasized. As Cuba's Minister of Industries
Ernesto "Cho" Guevara acknowledged 6 January 1961 when dis-
cussing the Soviet purchase of Cuba's sugar, "it happened
simply as a political proposal." From another aspect, there
is no information to indicate the extent to which Cuba's sugar
exports to the Soviet Union are considered as payment for the
excessive amount of military hardware which has been sent to
the island.
How have these developments affected Cuba? In explaining
"the maguttudeFoT the g e s signed the socialist
countries," Guevara declared in 1961 that Cuba would have to
change -- "the socialist countries use the decimal system, we
3
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 (675 Cont.)
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use the . . . system of pounds and so forth. The socialist
countries measure electricity at 50 cycles per second, ours
is 60 cycles per second. We will have to change all of this."
The "change" has meant the deterioration of Cuba's economy
and the Cuban's living standards. Wages have been lowered;
rationing has been imposed; there are shortages of imported
foodstuffs and consumer durables; raw materials, fuels and
capital goods are limited; long haulage from Communist coun-
tries has increased freight charges and added drains on the
limited foreign exchange; quality as well as quantity has
deteriorated.
25X1C10b
The departure of Cuba's managerial class and its trained
and experienced workers has caused problems in every sector
of the economy. Coupled with shortages of raw materials and
spare parts, it closed plants and slowed down production.
Lack of spare parts for the American machinery has led to
conversion to Bloc equipment and there is evidence that this
switch has been less than satisfactory (see attached
unclassified press comments).
Castro's revelation that henceforth Cuba will be an
agricultural specialist and a supplier of raw materials for
the Soviet Union completes the colonization of Cuba and
fixes its role as a satellite of the Soviet Union. The
attendant propaganda promising a brighter future cannot hide
the fact that the average Cuban, who had more than the
average Soviet to begin with, is getting less and less.
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676 AF,FH,WH.' Chinese Influence in International Communist
25X1 C 10b ron ; Orrg s zat ions
BACKGROUND: In attempts to counter Soviet influence in
Asia, Africa and to a 1-sser degree in Latin America, the Chicoms
apparently seek to form a competing set of front organizations
to the older, established international fronts. The most con-
crete example of this trend is the Afro-Asian Journalists' Con-
ference (AAJC) in Djaka to Indonesia (24-30 Ap it 'o; see
EMIR= I where the International
Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and the Soviet delegation had
only observer status. The new Afro-Asian Journalists' Organiza-
tions (AAJO) set up in Djakarta will undoubtedly be dominated
by the Chicoms and enjoy the strong support of the Indonesians,
who did much of the organizational work prior to and at the
Conference, and did the Chinese bidding during the Conference
proceedings, In line with general LAPSO policy, the Chicom
representatives called for a tri-continent journalists' meeting
to include Latin Americans as well as Afro-Asians.
The International Union of Students (IUS) may also have to
cope with a rival organization in ae fro-Asian-Latin American
area. The Now Delhi daily Patriot /recently created to support
Krishna ME-NON and thus not suspect ecf of anti-Communist propaganda7
reported on 25 April 1963 in an item datelined Hong Kong, April'24,
that the Chinese Students Union has strongly backed the proposal
of the Indonesian Federation of University Students to convene
a tri-continent conference of students which is expected to
found a new international organization. According to the news
item, the Soviet Asian student organization is to be kept out
of the planned conference, following the pattern established at
the AAJC in Djakarta. Also, according to an NCNA broadcast of
11 May, the chairman of the Union of Indonesian Student Organiza-
tions called on the all-China Youth Federation and All-China
Students' Federation to convey a March resolution concerning the
convocation of a tri-continent student conference.
However, a Chicom/Indonesian CP-backed Afro-Asian lorkerst
Conference, which was planned for Djakarta in May has been
postponed, probably because of the conditional response of many
Afro-Asian trade unions which called for prior consultation
among WFTU affiliates.
The work of the World Peace Council (WPC) is also severely
hampered by tensions caused in its ra ~s by clashes of pro-Soviet
and pro-Chicom forces -- with Soviet-oriented elements, however,
still having the upper hand. At council meetings last winter,
the WPC was faced for the first time with difficulties in passing
resolutions on vital questions and was forced to delay and re-
( 676. Continued)
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a spring meeting of the WPC council, Warsaw was finally desig-
nated as the site and the date fixod for C-12 June. The meeting
was to concern itself with the key problems of international
policy, including the problems of :uropean security and Germany,
the formation of atom-free zones and the development of national
liberation movements. While some participants already were
an route to Warsaw, the meeting was indefinitely postponed,
presumably because the UPC's spring disarmament campaign through-
out the world had been so successful as to call for a full
assessment of its impact prior to a council meeting. This
explanation was, of course, a cover for whatever serious inter-
nal conflict must have been the true reason for the last-minute,
embarrassing postponement of the meeting. A basic difference
in tactics between th Soviets and Chicoms is that the latter
seek to advance the "liberation" of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America without the participation of "peace organizations."
The Chicoms make little-veiled attempts to exclude the WPC
from AAPSO!s mission and they have been fairly outspoken on
the matter of excluding the WPC (as well as women's and youth
international organizations) from a tri-continent "liberation"
alignment.
In the meantime, the established Soviet-controlled inter-
national front organizations seek to increase their own activi,
ties in the underdeveloped world areas to the degree that they
are able to do so.
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CPYRGHT
From the English edition, International Affairs, of the May 1963 issue
of the monthly journal MMzhdu::-. -rya zhLzr,.. , Moscow, pp. 51-56
PROBLEMS OF AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY
Thoughts at the Foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro
V. Kudryavtsev #
I have attended all the All-African Peoples' Conferences (in Accra,
Tunis and Cairo) and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conferences (in
Cairo, Conakry and Moshi) held in Africa in recent years. The latest
solidarity conference met., early in February at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro,
in the Mawenzi School on the outskirts of Moshi in northern Tanganyika.
As I sat in the hail of the School (named after Kilimanjaro's second
tallest peak), I involuntarily compared all these forums. The importance
of these meetings for the struggle of the African and Asian peoples can
hardly be overestimated. At the first All-African Peoples' Conference
in Accra, for example, one of the issues was whether the word "imperialism"
should be mentioned in the resolutions. This time no delegate had the
slightest doubt that imperialism is Enemy No. 1 of the peoples-of.both
continents. The resolutions of the Moshi conference are sufficient to
show how much'more politically mature the participants are.,
These conferences have rallied progressive public opinion in the
African countries, mapped out common tasks in the national-liberation
struggle, exposed, the latest, cunning methods of the colonialists and
have clearly shown that American imperialism is the chief mainstay of
colonialism. The Afro'-Asian forums have helped the African peoples.
realise that they are not alone, that their fight is-part of the general
struggle of progressive mankind against imperialism and its disgraceful
system of colonialism, and that peoples fighting for their freedom and
independence enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and all the other
Socialist countries and of all progressive mankind. This has greatly
increased the strength of the African freedom fighters and has inspired
them to work even more persistently for the complete abolition of
colonialism ontheir continent.
And yet against the background of all these indisputable successes,
there have been changes in'the atmosphere at these conferences. since the
first one held in Cairo in 1957 and what is more, not all these changes
have been for the better.
A great number of national flags -- over 60 altogether -_ fluttered
outside the school building. in Moshi; miniature national flags decorated
the delegates' tables, many more than in the Cairo University Hall in
1957; and naturally the envoys of the Afro-Asian peoples were-given a
hearty welcome by the host country. Nevertheless in Moshi I noticed many
things which have changed over the last five years.
To begin with, the familiar faces of many well-known leaders of the
African peoples' struggle for national liberation were conspicuous by
their absence. Many who hold governmental posts in the newly independent
countries now attend inter-governmental meetings and not public.forums
like the conference in Moshi. Others thought it necessary to stay away
for reasons of inter-party rivalry or because of unwillingness to impair,
now or perhaps in future, their relations with: the former metropolitan
country by co-operating with "Communist" circles which, they claim, have
initiated such conferences.
To bring home this point I need only compare the list of those ex-
pected at Moshi and those who actually came. For example, Dr. Hastings
Banda, the national-liberation movement'leader who now heads the Govern-
ment of Nyasaland, was invited but did not come. Judging by his quite,
frank statements, narrow party considerations outweighed any. consideration
of the need for solidarity in the struggle for Africa's freedom. Nor
did I see any relegates from the Afro-Malagasy countries (formerly French
colonies) with the exception of representatives of the Union of the Peoples
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of Cameroon, the opposition party, and one delegate from the progressive
organisations of Malagasy Republic. Former French Africa was virtually
unrepresented at the Moshi conference owing to opposition from the
Governments and ruling parties. This naturally has harmed the cause of
solidarity and brought grist to the mill of the colonialists.
These remarks do not only apply to existing independent states.
As regards Kenya which is still fighting for independence and is certainly
in need of solidarity, there were no representatives from the Kenya African
Democratic Union (KADU),'the rival of the Kenya African National Union
(KANU) particularly on the question of the future constitution (whether
Kenya. is to be a'federal or unitary state). The two parties are contesting
which will be_in power after the proclamation of independence. Moreover,
Ronald Ngala, leader of KADU, evidently prompted by purely party politics,
persisted in slinging mud at the organisers of the Moshi conference, try-
ing hard to represent it as a "Communist conspiracy".
Friction between certain countries was. felt more keenly than before
at the recent conference and on several occasions it nearly precipitated
a crisis. I am not speaking of the Indochinese border conflict which
some enemies of,Afro-Asian. solidarity strove to exploit for their own
ends. A cloud was also cast by the conflict between Somalis and. Kenyans
over the part'-6f Kenya in the north inhabited by:Somalis. The British
colonialists, aware of the Kenyans' negative attitude to the possible
secession of the northern territory, had arranged something in the nature
of a referendum shortly before the Moshi conference which showed that
Somalis favouredjoining the Somalia Republic. This added fuel to the
flames, which was also apparent at the conference.
There are a ,number of border disputes of this kind due to the
arbitrary frontiers fixed by the colonialists at the Berlin Conference
at the end of last century. The colonialists, directly or through their
agents, keep rubbing salt into these unhealed wounds.
The recent upsurge of extreme nationalist, feeling in different parts
of Asia and Africa, particularly in the Middle East, laid its imprint
on the Moshi conference. Some of the more chauvinistically-inclined
leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement not against imperi-
alism, colonialism and its agents, but against all white people. They
are ready to sacrifice the truth, as they did, so far cautiously, in
Moshi, and to shrug their shoulders at the participation (even though
only partial) of international organisations such as the World Council
of Peace, international women's and youth organisations, etc. They
sacrifice the truth because they pretend that the liberation of Asia,
-Africa and Latin America is possible even without the participation of
progressive organisations throughout the world, without those white people
who because of their views 'actively fight against imperialism and its
colonial attributes.
There are in fact people with short memories who want to forget
that the liberation of Africa would have been inconceivable without the
Great October Socialist Revolution, without. the existence of the power-
ful Socialist community, without the defeat of fascism in the Second
World War, without the selfless struggle of the progressive forces inside
the imperialist countries. The danger of imparting to the solidarity
movement some kind of a nationalistic slant exists, and this danger was
evident at the Moshi conference.
The main'thing that put me, a veteran of the Afro-Asian conferences,
on guard was the relatively "good-natured" attitude of the imperialists
to the proceedings at Moshi. I recalled the first All-African Peoples'
Conference in Accra and the First Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in
Cairo. There the imperialists, particularly the Americans, rushed into
battle discarding almost all disguise. Things went to such lengths that
Irving Brown, representative of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in Western Europe and
Northern Africa, despite his official position, personally translated
delegates' speeches from French into English and vice versa to give a
favaoitrable tinge to some of the statements. In Accra the conference
organisers (the official "host" on that occasion was the British Governor-
General Lord Listowel, who opened this conference against imperialism:)
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decorated the hall with the flags of all the United Nations members.
Among them were the flags of the colonial Powers against which the cot:-
ference was directed, and also of puppet regimes, like that of the
Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan. Even in little things one saw that
the colonialists were giving battle to the peoples of Africa and Asia
at the solidarity conferences. Now, in 1963, they behaved very modestly,
although the choice of Tanganyika as the conference site was very symbolic.
After the First World War,, it was Tanganyika, wrested by the British from
the Germans, that completed the solid British colonial chain from Cairo
to Capetown. Now it was the place where debates were held on how to
eliminate all forms of colonialism once and for all.
There is no need to speak at length about the importance of such
conferences. The struggle for the complete independence of Africa is
far from over. The young independent states have not yet grown strong,
while colonialism, enriched with the experience of recent years, has
become more flexible and cunning. That is why the Afro-Asian peoples
need solidarity now, like the air they breathe.
While tremendous changes have occurred in Africa since the first soli-
darity conferences and new trends and new conditions have
arisen, the form of expressing solidarity through these conferences has
remained unaltered. A certain discrepancy between form and content has
appeared and was apparent at the latest conference.
In 1957, when the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in
Cairo, there were few independent states in Africa apart from the "old"
ones, like Ethiopia and Liberia. The winning of independence and freedom
was the main task confronting almost all the African countries. The
national-liberation movements followed different political directions,
but they were all brought together by one common objective -- the over-
throw of the colonial regimes. If a delegation failed to attend the con-
ference, the colonial authorities were to blame, and all the delegates
vigorously denounced their action. At that time the conference was able
to voice its unanimous opinion on all general issues, inasmuch as there
were almost no specific questions.
Today there are many independent states on the African continent.
Many public and political organisations which a few years ago were lead-
ing the fight for independence have become ruling parties. In some coun-
tries opposition parties and organisations have appeared. At times it
is opposition from the Left, the kind that seeks to push on the Govern-
ment which wants to stop halfway and is inclined to find a common lan-
guage with the former metropolitan country. There is opposition from
the Right which thinks that the policy of the Government is too revolu-
tionary. There are also countries with no opposition, since many young
African states have introduced the one-party system.
Whereas formerly it was clear who should take, part in solidarity
conferences, it is now much harder to decide. If the ruling party is
represented it is bound to inject an element of statehood, of international
relations into the conference. A left opposition may attend which is
denounced in its own country as "the agent of third states"; if the
Right opposition attends, the question arises: is it worthwhile, from
the standpoint of over-all African interests, to lend importance to
this opposition by allowing it to participate in the conference? The
participation of one or another delegation, especially against the
wishes of the Government of the country concerned, may therefore do
more harm than good to general African solidarity, viewed in the light
of the common interests of completely abolishing colonialism.
Inter-state relations and official foreign policy lines are in-
creasingly having an effect on the proceedings of solidarity conferences.
Member countries of the Afro-Malagasy Union, as I noted earlier, were
absent at Moshi, and border issues are being brought up more and more
often at such conferences. In these conditions conference recommendations
impose few obligations and are not really binding on anyone. Nor is it
clear who will carry them out. A Kenyan delegate, for example, told me
that as soon as he returned home he would find the decisions of the
Moshi conference relegated to the background by the struggle between
KANU and KADU.
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A great many purely local, specific problems have arisen in each
country, which all-African or Afro-Asian public conferences are unable
to settle.
Africa has today become a continent of independent states, while
the general concept of "Africa" has been cast into political oblivion..
Therefore it would be appropriate, for example, to call a conference on
the struggle against racialism in the South African Republic, in support
of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique in their fight against Salazar
Portugal, against the artificial federations created by the colonialists
who want to an tribalism, etc. The first'undertaking of this kind is
the recommendation of the Moshi conference to arrange an Afro-Asian con-
ference on cultural questions.
Other questions are increasingly being transferred to governmental
meetings and conferences of African states where the struggle between
different political trends and orientations is now being fought out.
The imperialists and their agents have shifted their main attention
to this field, having realised in time that governmental policy has now
advanced to the fore and that this is where battle must be joined with
the mounting national-liberation movement of the African peoples.
What direction will governmental policy follow, i rhat paths of eco-
nomic development will be taken, who will provide economic aid and on
what terms? -- these and many other questions on which the future of
African states depends, are now`being decided at governmental level.
(In many African countries Governments are not formed by political
parties, but themselves organise mass political parties in order to
create a broad base for themselves.) While emphasis is correctly being
laid on the struggle for economic independence, it would be premature
for Africa to reduce everything to economic problems.
A struggle is under way as to who will determine the direction of
economic'aevelopmeAt (this'is clearly revealed by the internal,politi-
cal struggle'in Senegal, Ghana and other African states).' On this
question'too the imperialists naturally do not want to'yield to the
African progressive forces which see the future of`Africa in Socialism.
The struggle around these issues is no less bitter than it was in
the period directly prior to the winning of political independence.
There are the examples of 'the assassination of President.'Sylvanus Olympia,
the numerous plots against President Kwame'Nkrumah;.the arrest of
Mamadou Dia in Senegal, the anti-Communist terror in some Arab coun-
tries, etc. The imperialists'do.not'neeessarily have to do this dirty
work themselves since they have. agents . who were'carefully groomed and
bred in the spirit of Western."civilisation" during colonial rule.
These pro-colonialist' circles knocked together,the Afro-Malagasy
Union, for example, which has'now._openly pitted'itself against African
opinion, assembled in Moshi to demonstrate all-African solidarity rein-
forced by solidarity with the peoples. of Asia and Latin America. This
Union has been set up on the basis of the "French-speaking countries",
former 'French colonies which?economically are still bound hand and foot
to the metropolitan country. Within this bloc there is "solidarity"
not in the struggle for the complete abolition of colonialism, but in
preserving ties with France..
Such Afro-Malagasy solidarity is ' bf': most 'benefit to' (French ii eri-
alism -- since it represents' amore flexible way of keeping former
colonies in check by invisible reins and in this way strikes a blow
at all-African solidarity.
Bargaining is now going on over . the terms for binding the Afro-
Malagasy Union to the European Common Market. France and her allies
would also like to draw the former British colonies (Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and perhaps some others') into this. net. Moreover, they make no
secret of the fact that this is a struggle between imperialists for
influence in Africa. This Is?the meaning and purpose o.' such an
alliance as the Afro-Malagasy Union.
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Everything associated with colonialism has been implacably criticised
and condemned at the solidarity conferences, but usually nothing has been
said about colonialism's African agents for fear that this could harm
African solidarity. In the present conditions, however, this "silence"
unwittingly screens or even exonerates the actions of those African
leaders who,.together with the colonialists, are blocking the rca d of
the African peoples to genuine independence.
When the call of Soviet fishing boats at a'southern Madagascar port
for fresh water, a normal thing under maritime law, is used by Philibert
Tsiranana, President of the Malagasy Republic, as a pretext to urge
France and other NATO Powers virtually to occupy Madagascar by naval and
air forces of this bloc to protect the island from a mythical "Communist
menace", he inflicts on.the African people no-less, and perhaps greater,
harm than the colonialists themselves. The French colonialists will
calmly exploit Tsiranana's request to spread nee-colonialist propaganda
about the equal relations France has supposedly established with her
former colonies.
We could also refer to the pro-colonialist policy pursued by
Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast Republic, and some other
leaders of former French colonies. All these matters however are bound
up with the general question of foreign policy orientation, and the
policy of economic attachment toihe former metropolitan country. But
there are dangerous symptoms of another kind. They are to be found in
the sphere, of internal politics in countries where power has been taken
over by men brought up in the spirit of Western "civilisation", and not
by patriots ready to make any sacrifice for the future of their people.
We could refer, for example, to the artificial expansion of the adminis-
trative apparatus in Nigeria with the direct co-operation of the coloni-
alists who themselves drew up the country's constitution even prior to
the proclamation of` independence. This was done in keeping with the
old policy of "divide and rule" and for the personal enrichment of a
definite group at the expense of the national budget.
The American.FOreign Affairs has counted up that Nigeria has one
Governor-General, three Governors, one Federal Prime Minister and regional
Prime Ministers, over 100 ministers and almost as many deputy-ministers,
and a large number of members of the eight Federal and regional Legisla-
tive Assemblies. The result is that;Nigeria, with a smaller population
than Britain, pays four times as'much for the . maintenance of the country's
administrative machine. Is not this too much for a young country badly
in need. of funds for building up an,.independent economy? The country
i also..hand in yet'another.way: a stratum 'of government officialis,
'divorced from-the:people'and brought up in the old spirit of the colonial
administration, is?created;'it is not particularly interested in innova-
tions nor is it prepared to make. any sacrifices for the good of the state.
We could, here refer to the authoritative opinion of David Dacko,
President of the?CentralAfrican Republic,(the former French colony of
Ubangi-Shari, which wasvery backward economically). 'Addressing.the
National Assert ly last year, he spoke anxiously about thy: conduct of the
administration set up after the ; winning~of 'independence., The President
said that. there was inter-trjbai rivalry for jobs and posts in the ministries
and departments, which natLrally was undermining the unity of the people
in face of yesterday's colonialists. Noting that the people believed
in the new administration, the President asked: "But do we'not live'today
in the most beautiful villa's, drive around in luxurious cars ani eat regu-
larly every day? Aren't we, the e3.ite, responsible for the disorders
and the extinetion- of'the people,. ,for not solving the problems which doom
them. to. poverty?."
President Dacko quoted a deputy'-who said that in some respects-the
African elite was even more dangerous for the country's future than
colonialism. "We must not forget that it'will be against us that the
masses will rise up if we do not remedy the situation in good time," the
President declared in conclusion.
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How serious this question is can also be judged from the very strict
measures taken by President Kwame Nkrumah against ministers of his Govern-
ment who sought to enrich themselves. He rightly branded their acts as a
plot against the republic's national independence.
It is important to realise that the proclamation of independence
of the African states owing to the abolition there of the political and
economic monopoly of a colonial Power has opened up their borders to other
Powers who seek to gain influence there. American, West German and
Japanese monopolies have swarmed into the former French and British
colonies in Africa. They would all like to give them "aid", knowing in
advance that a good deal of it would go on bribing government officials
or for administrative purposes, and not on economic development. Politi-
cally they make use of this "aid" to foster a feeling of dependence among
the leaders of the young states. At the same time their propaganda seeks
to convince the Africans that most of the new countries are unable to
develop their economy and culture with their own resources and are fully
dependent on foreign Powers.
U.S. "aid' in the form of surplus agricultural commodities has a
particularly demoralising influence. American propaganda centres (which
receive for thier upkeep 20 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of
the delivered agricultural commodities) tell the Africans that the
assistance given by the Socialist countries in building dams, power sta-
tions and heavy industry plants will make itself felt only in many
years' time, while the United States, you see, is even now "saving" the
people from starvation and poverty.
This type of propaganda does influence some people. Some leaders
of the newly independent states like to be in the position of a beautiful
young girl who has many "suitors" and expects to get something from every
one of them. The attitude of these African leaders who want to "keep
their suitors on a string" is to the economic, and also political
advantage of the monopolies both of the former metropolitan country and
capitalist states which have never had any colonies in Africa.
There is a great desire for Socialism among the African peoples who
have tasted all the "blessings" of capitalism under colonial rule. Aware
of this, imperialist propagandists are losing all hope of discrediting
the experience of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries among
wide sections of the people (I am not speaking of the narrow stratum of
administrative personnel and'perhaps intellectuals brought up under the
colonial regime and convinced of the superiority of Western civilisation).
The colon'ialists.have therefore invented a new ruse, picturing the Soviet
Union as after the same objectives in Africa as the United States and
the other Powers which want'-to get a firm. grip on the African continent
and its natural wealth.
After.this kind of:spaaeiior?,. the monopoly propagandists find it
easier'to.'declare that local progressive organisations, including
Communist, are "agents of Moscow" bent on tying Africa to the Soviet
chariot. Choose who gives you better service'today, American propagan-
dists tell the African peoples. They lay stress not on future develop-
ment, but on current exigencies which make it easier to influence a
country by a showy display of economic "aid".''They want to substitute
high-pressure salesmanship for the real issue it the competition between
the two systems, which is most directly. linked with the question of the
African countries' future development. -.
It is a pity that this propaganda leads some African political leaders
away from the right road.
Personally I am not surprised-at the appearance of many theories
of "African Socialism". First, this reflects the tremendous striving
of the African peoples for Socialism and, second, it shocrs that the
African countries arr increasingly turning from an object of history
into a subject, a fact which is exerting ever greater influence on the
development of mankind. Psychologically, it is understandable why so.
many African leaders want to put forward their awn theory of their
country's development along Socialist lines.
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Iwo,
 The Senegalese journal LtUnite Africaine has written: "Africa must
no longer allow others to do its thinking for it. It must no longer be
satisfied with ready-made patterns, obsolescent schemes, imported doctrines
and ideologies." For many years the colonialist concept of the world
was indeed dinned into the heads of the Africans. After liberation
colonial ideological chauvinism almost inevitably aroused a reaction in
the form of ideological nationalism, which tries to limit human experience
to the African continent (African originality) and temporarily refuses
to see the tried and tested experience of all mankind.
A few words should be said about the latest theories of international
relations circulating in Africa, which, I an deeply convinced, are a
product ndt of African "originality", but of the subtle, corrupting
propaganda of the neocolonialists.
An article by President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, one of the
ing leaders of the new Africa, was published in the Tunisian weekly
P=rigue at the end of last year. The main theses of this article,
only in more concise form, were outlined in his speech which'I heard at
the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi. President Nyerere
holds that "a second invasion of Africa" is now taking place, which is
more dangerous than the first invasion by the colonialists. The difference
in these invasions, in hisgopinionm is that during the first invasion
the foreign Powers disunited the African peoples by inciting some tribes
against others, while now they are inciting not tribes, but entire coun-
tries, because the political geography of Africa has changed so greatly
in the meantime.
Who, in Nyerere's opinion, is engaged in the "second invasion of
Africa"? He draws an equation sign between the rich capitalist states
and, what he calls, the rich Socialist countries, because both, he asserts,
are using their wealth not to wipe out poverty but to."gain might and
prestige'
Although President Nyerere mentions neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union by name, it is clear to all whom he means. He con-
cludes that the principal task of the poor (read, African) countries is
"vigilantly to watch that neither some nor other of the rich countries
utilise them as their tool", and to create the unity of the African
peoples under the banner of pan-Africanism.
I want to repeat that after my many visits to Africa, I an not sur-
prised that there is some mistrust of the Great Powers and, frankly
speaking, of all whites in general.
These sentiments were fed by colonialism and it would be ridiculous
to think that they could be eradicated. in two or three years.
The leaders of the African states might, however, be expected to
be more wary of neo-colonialist bait dangling from rusty colonial hooks.
They ought to realise that today when the correlation of forces in the
world has changed in favour of Socialism.and when the formerly oppressed
peoples want to follow the Socialist road, imperialist propaganda is-eager
to claim that the Socialist countires are as self-seeking as the capitalist
Powers. Moreover, the imperialists rely on their extensive colonialist
experience and on another advantage (temporary and overrated), namely,
that many of the present leading people in Africa have been educated in
the spirit of Western "civilisation" and are infected with capitalist
ideology.
To draw a sign of equation between the capitalist and the Socialist
countries means a failure to see that the abolition of colonialism and
the rise of the many independent states in Africa is extremely closely
bound up with the existence of the powerful Socialist community; to see
that the Soviet Union uses its wealth not to "gain might and prestige",
not to subjugate other countries, as Mr. Nyerere infers, but to abolish
poverty the world over, Africa included. Only. Soviet people as Marxists
hold that this cannot be achieved by a redistribution.of existing wealth
among consumers. They think that the less developed countries must be
given real assistance in building up their independent economy.
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Theories, like the ones we heard in Moshi, cannot be regarded as
being to the credit of African nationalism about which the inve...tors of
these theories are so concerned. Speaking of these theories, N. S.
Khrushchov said at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany that "this confused thinking pollutes the minds of the 1-berated
peoples and makes it easier for the colonialists to preserve their posi-
tions in the young independent countries".. What kind of African nationa-
lism is this if. the harvest of these theories is reaped by the colonialists,
the sworn enemies of any sign of African nationalism or originality (who
if not the colonialists has falsified the history of the African peoples,
asserting that they had neither a culture nor even a history to speak of!).
These countries, as I said earlier, have ceased to be an object of
history. They now have their own interests. Naturally many elements in
these countries are still bound, as though by an umbilical cord, to the
colonialist Powers and are economically dependent on the big monopolies.
These elements act as vehicles of imperialist influence. At the present
moment, however, nationalism can play an.independent role in international.
affairs, moreover, a role which is often at.,variance frith the interests
of the imperialist Powers.,- .
All these are temporary phenomena and. eventuel,.ly each country will
have to choose one or another road of development, ,, the more so since
there is no "third road", much as it maybe desired . by the advocates of
"originality". History. is implacable and does not forgive confused.
thinking even iftsprings from, the best..of intentions. .
There are.still many. .dif'ficult~es ,facing. the. African peoples. What
is most needed...tp...surz punt them. is' unity, ,and ,it ts to. develop and streng-
then this unity that the solidarity movement was created and Afro-Asian
solidarity conferences are held. The biggest enemy of this unity is
Americar}, imperialism which now in fact. heads all the colonial Powers.
U.S. imperialism employs every ruse and artifice to.break up the unity
of the African peoples. It does not necessarily do it itself, but often
resorts to the services of Afri.Can leaders who are closely associated
with the colonialists and are,prepared:to make any . compromise. at the
expense of the people.
The American imperialists and their'neo-colonialist colleagues do
not disdairi.ai.means: economic pressure alongside hypocritical
"philanthropy" and "aid", diplomatic talks combined with terror and assas-
sination of outstanding African fighters for freedom, ideological sub-
version together with provocat .ols.,;.bla,ckmaii and lying propaganda.;
The peoples of.Africa have to exercise ' the .greatest vigilance,
they.must. learn. tp differentiate. .between . friends ' and enemies and to
match shoulder to shoulder towards their cherished goal -- the complete
emancipation of the African continent from colonialism. To repulse neo-
.,colonialism the African peoples mist.streugthen to,the utmost their.
unity and their solidarity with all.,progressive forces of the world...
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. Chios in Castrots Cub<
Edward Behr, former Reuter correspondent and a Saturday
Evening Post editor, wrote in the C June 1963 issue oche
Post, n the above title:
"The Cuban revolution has failed. Four years after Fidel
Castro's take-over, this once prosperous Caribbean island is in
an inextricable mess. Its agriculture and industry are nearing
collapse. Under Castro's Communist-dominated regime, a para-
lyzing bureaucracy is wasting badly needed Soviet aid. In
short there is a tremendous -- indeed comical -- discrepancy
between the image projected by Cubats propaganda machine and
the reality of Cuba today.
"I recently spent three weeks in Cuba. . . ?. I worked
on a sugar plantation as a volunteer machetero. I talked to
scores of Cubans, both high and low. . . . I talked to em-
bittered Soviet-bloc technicians. In the company of a polish
engineer, I went on a tour of Havana's houses of ill fame,
which Cuban officials say no longer exist, ending up in a
brothel catering specially to Russian soliders. . . I came
away with facts which contradict some rosy, recent reports.
"Despite Soviet arms, promises and investments, however,
I found in Cuba only one flourishing industry -- the creation
of Communist propaganda designed to bide the differences be-
tween the Cuban image and the truth . . . . everything is
crumbling at the edges. Nothing works any more. Nothing can
be replaced if it goes wrong. . . . Today cars in various
states of disrepair litter the streets . . . they story of
Cuba's once-prosperous agriculture and its budding industry
is a story of almost fatal failure. 'It will take five years,'
a Russian economist working in Cuba said, 'just to consolidate
the country.'
Sugar Production Lags
"What has happened to Cuba's sugar industry,
once the most efficient in the world? Absenteeism on a large
scale . . . valuable sugarcane fields were uprooted . . .
enthusiasm is waning . . most of the Soviet-made mechanical
cane cutters have broken down . . . bureaucracy and idleness. . .
"And the Japanese embassy is still chortling over the case
of the Japanese watermelon farmer, long settled in Cuba, who
produced 130 tons of watermelons on his 10-acre farm; the people's
farm next door, which had planted watermelons over 130 acres,
produced 10 tons.
"Cuba's estimated 10,000 Soviet-bloc technicians include
burly women cotton pickers from Uzber:istan, chemical engineers
from Poland, police and army officers from East Germany, teachers
and doctors from Czechoslovakia as well as Russians in almost
every walk of life. . . . they are appalled by the confusion
and waste. 'Guess what happened today?' said one. May ordered
130,000 hospital thermos ters. They showed up today. They are
weather thermo;eters, for God's sake.''
I'lThey want me to plant a million oil-palm seedlings in
eight days,' a French agricultural expert complained. 'They
don't even want to know where. . .?
"'How can I work under such conditions?' says a Pole,
Communist "Gains"
"What gains Communism brings to such people is open to some
quebtion. One employee in the Education Ministry told me how
she watched a schoolteacher write a sentence on a blackboard
for the class to copy.. 'Every word contained a spelling mistake,
including the word 'school'.' Standards have plummeted even
further in the universities.
"A Polish lecturer at Havana University explains: 'These
people want a formula for everything . . . they no longer think
for themselves . . .'
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THE RED DICTIONARY: IMPERIALISM, COLONY, COLON I. ,&A
IMPERIALISM: "A State policy which leads to the annexation
of terr, or en's-'and the national oppression of occupied countries."
Lenin in "Imperialism-the Highest Stage of Capitalism."
a predatory foreign policy." -- Eshakov,
Standard Dictionary ,of the Russian Language.
". . . . an essential feature of imperialism is
the rivalry . . . for the conquest of territory . . . to weaken
the adversary and undermine his hegemony." -- Lenin, Selected
Works, Vol. V.
COLONY: "An industrially backward country which has com-
pletely-" Lost independent sovereignty, politically, economically
and culturally and is under the domination, suppression and
exploitation of imperialist countries. These countries supply
raw material to imperialist countries and the imperialists
market commodities in the colonial areas. Large investments are
made by the imperialists to take over control of the colonial
areas.
"Semi-colonial countries appear on the surface to have
independence and sovereignty but actually are manipulated
politically, economically, and culturally by imperialists."
-- Dictionary of New Terms, Shanghai, 1952.
COLONIALISM: "The colonizers . . < bribe people who have
Power, ins a-'[. T"''good governments' and set up aggressive blocs
They allot fonds for 'economic aids;' they give armaments to
certain countries 'free of charge.' But in return the states
which receive these arms must supply the colonizers with cannon
fodder, set up big armies and thereby exhaust their peoples.
The colonizers give a dollar in 'aid' in order to receive ten
dollars later in return by exploiting the peoples who have
accepted such 'aid.' After this, they enslave the peoples
politically. Such are the 'new' forms of colonial domination."
-- Khrushchev, Pravda, 30 Dec. 1955.
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 g y wai ins, their
turn while the Cuban girls argued interminably with a couple
of Cuban militiamen who wanted to close the place down for
the night. Lost year.. I was told, business was far more brisk.
"Even before last October's crisis, the Russians were not
popular in Cuba, either with the Cubans or the other East
Europeans. 'They live apart from the rest of us,' says a Polish
factory manager. . . . They suffer, too, from two major draw-
backs. They are utterly unused to giving, and -- in a country
where 60 percent of the population is colored or of mixed blood
-- they are profoundly racist.
"So far the revolution has meant a steady deterioration in
living standards. . . It is, to the Russians, a costly white
elephant. It has yet to demonstrate that Communism brings
anything but hardships, muddle, and economic regression. It is
producing nothing but millions of half-baked Communists, so
crudely untutored that they are, in the words of a Communist-
bloc adviser, 'unfit for export.""
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 CPYRGHT
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Cuba's Most Vocal Critics: Soviet Bloc Technicians
THE non Sunday Times, 26 May 1963:
"It is significant that the most vocal critics of Castro today
are to be found, not among the cautious, resigned remnants of Cuba's
middle class, but among the Soviet bloc technicians there. As
efficient technocrats and specialists in their various fields,
they know a country in a mess when they see one.
"Today most Cubans see . . . the gradual breakdown of trans-
port, the impossibility of getting the smallest and simplest
spare parts. . . . 'Cuba has a flavour all its own'. . . . As
anyone arriving in Havana soon finds out, the flavour is one of
rotting garbage, over-powering Russian petrol fumes and exposure,
24-hours a day, to Cuba's sole really flourishing industry: its
Communist propaganda . . . Shops are dispiritingly bare . . .
All but the topmost Cuban officials are dogmatic. Communists-
come-lately whose keenness is equalled only by their ignorance
of the outside world. . .
"Cuban officials agree that the next five years will be a
transition period. During this time, presumably, the remain-
ing American-made cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, factory
machines, buses and lorries will have brok9n down. A third of
Cuba's buses has already bson in mobilised owing to a shortage of
spare parts. Cars in various slates of decay litter the sides
of roads. Water ouppli,es in Cuba are subject to the vagaries
of American-made pumps which are beyond the ingenuity of even
the most skilled Cuban mechanic. Teiephonos are breaking down.
And, oriinou ly, there are no signs that t. e Soviet bloc can
come to the re cue by yuppLying either spare parts or comparable
goods.
-a:i -11_1rtg E-22 'homy
"Cuban officials admit that the revolution has ?",ed to a
deterioration of livirY sta,ndarcas . . . Cubans dismiss the
shortages of con;eumer goods with the answer that, productive
investments come first. But, as the Soviet bloc techsaicians
are quick to point out, both Castro's agricultural and industrial
development programmes have gone seriously wrong. . . . Nowhere
is failure more visible than in the field which matters most to
Cuba's economy: sugar production. Until 1961, production
oscillated between 5.5 and 6,5 million tons. This year, the
harvest will be around 3 million tons. . . . Absenteeism,
combined with a daily minimum wage regardless of work actually
done, plus a heavy drift to the towns, to the army and to the
softer 'people's farms' explains the light of the sugar industry
The 'penrole's farm,' are plRgued with bureaucracy. . .
Absenteeism is high /in industry7 and the Czech::a, Poles and East
Germans who run most of Cuba's TEcotories today are driven to
desperation by the Cubans' lackadaisical ways. . . . Cubans tend
to look down their no ;o, at Soviet products, and Rumanian tele-
phones have x i.gh t ly been s n lod out f:r so=)cia1 deri ivn. The
Russian tractors, adap -ed in Cuba to work as cane-cutters, have
been an almost total failure.
`v
. . . thero is a deep-seated difference between Castro and
Khrushchev on the ways and means of spreading the Cuban example
? ? ? . he /'astro7 is in favour of 'direct action' by armed
re'-dels, exploiting peasant discontent with the backing of 'liberals'
who can be eliminated later . . . The last thing Khrushchev wants
is the massive export to the rest of Latin America of half-baked
Communists 'suitable,' as one Eastern European in Cuba put it,
'only for home consumption.' This, and not aid . . . has been
the main topic of discussion between Castro and Khrushchev this
month, Despite newly found cordiality between Khrushchev and
Castro, there is a feeling in Cuba, that Khrushchev is not entirely
displeased with the American cordon sanitaire which cuts off
Cuba from the rest of the world except or air and sea communi-
cations controlled from Moscow."
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 CPYRGHT
Approv t~ Ofir
David Rousset, writing in the Italian-language monthly,
Corrispondenze Socialista (Socialist Correspondence), Rome,
1arc , reports
"The first thing I was struck by in Cuba was the deterio-
ration of the cities and the disaffection of the Cubans toward
Castroism. . . Today the cities are falling apart and the farm
youths are Invading them. . Gradually paralysis spreads over
the cities. It threatens industry. It beats against the plan-
tations. . . . The technical substructure established by the
Americans in Cuba is gradually coming apart. From factories to
light switches -- everything in Cuba Is American.
"Thus the Cuban can make a very instructive comparison every
day: a comparison between the quality of the American products
and the quality of the Russian products. This, at the same time,
only increases his imagination and his discontent. . . . As far
as the Cuban city dweller is concerned, there is no longer any
doubt but that people in the United States live better than in
the USSR.
"The technical deterioration goes hand-in-hand with the
scarcity in consumer products and the almost vertical drop in the
quality of consumer articles. , . . Within a span of 2 months,
all prices rose between 100 and 200 per cent. . . . Rationing
has caused a tremendous price rise . . . today the ration card
dominates the country. . . the people in general are expecting
the situation to become worse and worse.
"The cities have become hostile . . . they are at the point
of breaking with the leaders of the revolution . . . about 50 per
cent of the medical profession fled from the island and the
figure would be 100 per cent if.you included the surgeons. and
specialists. . . . Practically all the-administrators, tech-
nicians, farm managers, engineers, and a very large percentage
of skilled workers have left Cuba.. This vast exodus has created
a vacuum that cannot be filled. . . . The foreign experts, most
of whom know very little Spanish and are ignorant of the local
traditions, remain an. alien body."
CPYRGHT
Cuba's Standard of Living Higher than USSR
Guillermo Martinez Marquez, reported in the Spanish-language
newspaper, La Esfera (The Sphere), Caracas, Venezuela, 18 April
1963: ~-- -- -.___
e Russian technicians, who actually disembarked to dis-
mantle some industries installed in Cuba and unknown in Russia,
have the mission of industralizing the country. The reality of
the most recent statistics proves that in proportion to the number
of its inhabitants, Cuba has more rooms, more hospital beds, more
schools, more newspapers, more automobiles, more highways, more.
televisions, more radio receivers, more movie houses, more tele-
phones, better doctors, better food, less illiteracy, and a higher
standard of living than the Russians. Faced with the axiom that
one cannot give what he does not have, Marxist dialectics has
succeeded in convincing some ingenues that Communism is going to
give Cuba what it had not been able to give the Russians In the
45 years since the so-called revolution of October 1917."
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USSR MW CUBA: A STATISTICAL COMPARISON
The Soviet Union is a socialist country, Cuba is striving
to emulate the Soviet example and to be called a "socialist"
state -also. How far does Cuba have to go?
As an example, selected items from the Statistical Yearbook
of the United Nations for 1961 and from the Soviet statistical
handbook, Narodnoye osyays ov SS.SR, for 1956 and 1959, offer a
base for comparison.
Housin : In 1953, 6 million Cubans lived in 7.9 million
rooms. Housing: that these rooms were small, say, 6 square meters,
each Cuban had 7.9 square meters of housing space. In 1955, the
average Russ an had square meters of housing space.
Meat: In 1948/49, the average Cuban ate twice as much meat
as the average Russian did in 1959.
Cars: In 1958, the Cubans had 8 times as many passenger
automobiles as an equal number of Russians ii1959.
TV Sets: In 1960, Cubans had 4 times as many television
receiving sets as equal number of Rus ans n 1960.
Summary: For Cuba to "achieve" socialism, therefore, the
Castro reg e must destroy about 140,000 cars, 400,000 TV sets
and several hundred thousand houses and eat less. The latest
reports from Havana indicate that considerable progress is being
made on Cuba's road to socialism.
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