BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 17, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release4999/08 8-03061AQLj020U 2bM-8963
Briefly Noted
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Encounter Pamphlet: "Khrushchev on Culture."
Encounter, published in London by the Congress for Cultural
Freedom, `aas issued a special pamphlet (No.9) containing the text
of Khrushchev's S March 1963 speech on Soviet culture and other
matters, together with incisive comments and "notes" by Encounter's
editors. This pamphlet is aimed at intellectuals in free world
countries, and is admirably designed to expose the repressive posi-
tion of the CPSU in the field of art and literature, as well as the
attempts of Khrushchev to rewrite Soviet history. We strongly
recoiuiend that assets with a capability to circulate matter to edu-
cated audiences obtain copies of this pamphlet from Encounter,
25 Haymarket, London SW1, and distribute them. In some areas it
may be easier to obtain copies from local affiliates of the Con-
gress for Cultural Freedom. We are attaching copies to this
guidance for selected stations, and will furnish individual copies
to other stations on request, but cannot supply these paaphlets25X1C1Ob
It is possible that there may be some relaxation in the Soviet
cultural line; this could, for example, be decreed at the 18 June
CPSU Central Committee plenary meeting. If such a development
occurs, it will probably result, not only from the resistance of
the intellectuals themselves, but also from the adverse publicity
the Soviet line has received abroad, such as this pamphlet. The
fact that a Khrushchev speech is open to such adverse exploitation!
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:(Briefly Noted)
 (BAb UA48r0F &&9" 99/0 8-03061AQ,Q02Ao01OO?3-&''S
DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
1 July Chinese Communist Party founded (1921)
4 July
4 July
7 July
Republic of the Philippines granted independence
by the USA (1946)
Khrushchev ouster of "anti-Party group" announcl
(1957)
Communist IUS backing International Seminar for
underdeveloped countries, Salvador, Bahia, Brazil
Brazil 7 - 14 July.
7 July Argentina: general elections scheduled
9 July ICFTU Vienna World Youth Rally July 9-19.
10 July Lavrenti P. Beria expelled from the CPSU ten
years ago. Executed five months later (December
23, 1953) in a purge extending to the Ukraine,
Byelorussia and other Soviet states.
20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement
1954 C odia, Laos, Vietnam)
22 July
30 July
31 July
August
OAS Panama Declaration of principles signed by
19 Western Hemisphere countries in 1956. (US
invited first International Conference of Ameri-
can States to Washington in 1399, the first step
toward creating the Pan American Union.)
Pathet Lao guerrillas armed by Communist North
Vietnam attacked posts in northern Loos in 1959.
Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against
Communist guerrillas, 1960.
Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco
State scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist
Governor Miguel Arraes.
0 August 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, Santiago,
Chile, S - 11 August.
13 August
Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin
border by building a wall in 1901 (mmore than
30,003 refugees had registered in West Berlin in
the preceding month).
2
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#5 28 May - 10 June 1963
May 24 - June 5 - A high-level CPSU delegation led by Presidium
member Podgorny visited Rumania in an effort to persuade the
Rumanians to accept the Comecon "socialist division of labor"
plan for economic integration which would limit the scope of her
industrial development (in order to concentrate on agriculture).
Pravda on 31 May published the full text of a speech by Rumanian
Marty Secretary Ceaucescu during the delegation's 29 May visit to
the Brasov tractor works which made it clear that the Rumanians
were remaining adamant in their resistance. He cited Lenin to the
effect that the development of heavy industry is obligatory for
every country building socialism, and went on to say that "equali-
zation of the level of development of socialist countries is an
indispensable condition for the construction of Communist society"
(a Chinese view). The speeches made by P~odgorny and Rumanian
First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej on the eve of the Soviet departure
the following week -- as published by Pravda on 5 June -- indicate
that the Soviets had failed to move thanians. Commenting on
these and other evidences of Rumanian recalcitrance, New York
Times Moscow correspondent Topping on 5 June noted thong,
polemical CPSU letter of 30 March to the CCP had not been published
in full in the Rumanian press. The New York Times of 8 June
carried a round-up by its Washington correspondent, M.S. Handler,
of "information (which) has reached the US Government of a growing
dispute in the Soviet bloc over economic integration and trade re-
lations. The quarrels are said to far surpass the recently reported
disagreement between Rumania and the Soviet Union." Handler des-
cribed primarily Czech and Rumanian problems, but he wrote that
Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria were also involved.
May 20 - The extent of the CCP's wooing of foreign support is iradi-
catec by the following one-day listing of NCNA announcements:
-- a Peking banquet to welcome "a delegation of young
Japanese lawyers" which was "marked by the militant
friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples...."
-- a Peking banquet for a Bolivian delegation which
had arrived from Pyongyang. (NCNA subsequently
reported that at the farewell reception for the
Bolivians on 4 June, the leader stated: "We
Latin Americans are prepared to carry out a pro-
tracted and arduous struggle like the Chinese
people did.")
-- a Peking interview with "the head of the visiting
delegation of the National Union of Angolan Work-
ers," who said that "armed struggle is the only
way shown us by history to win national liberation
and freedom."
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--- a Pekin; interview with a Uganda journalist who
is "the secretary for research and information
of the Uganda People's Congress."
-- a joint communique signed in Bamako 18 May be-
tween the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
and the National Union of Mali Workers, and the
return of the Chinese delegation after their
Visit to Mali, Guinea and Ghana.
-- the arrival in Peking of the "first general sec-
retary of the General Confederation of Labor of
the Congo."
-- the departure from ?eking of "the delegation of
the Union of Working Youth of Albania."
-- the arrival of the "general secretary of the
Ceylon TU Federation" in Peking.
-- the departure of "the delegation of the Arab
Federation of Labor."
-- the departure of a "senior research worker" of
the Nkrunah University of Ghana.
-- a banquet for the Indonesian secretary of AAPSG.
-- the travels in southern China of the Indonesian
CP delegation which had attended the May Day
celebration in 'eking .
-- the return from Japan of a Chinese Buddhist
"good will delegation."
-- the return of two Chinese TU delegations from
Albania and Cuba, respectively.
-- the return of the Chinese Communist Youth dele-
gation from Cuba.
June 5 - In contrast to the Soviet difficulties with their European
n, :=. the Chinese apparently are having it their way with the
North Koreans. NK Presidium President Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Ki.n)
and entourage ,,rent by special train to `Peking "for a friendly visit
at the invitation of Liu Shac-chi,,, as NCNA out it, with "tumultuous
ovations" at the stations in Antung and Shenyang on the 5th and a
"tremendous" welcoming ceremony and procession in the capital the
following day. Although Liu's welcoming speech at the Peking sta-
tion (and also the ''people's Daily editorial of that day) strosse:i
their joint efforts in combatting modern revisionism and safeguard-
in unity, Choe made no mention of these subjects in his response.
2 (#5 Continued)
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At a banquet that evening, however, Liu returned insistently to
that theme: "To safeguard the purity of Marxism-Leninism, the
Korean Workers ?arty has wages an irreconcilable struggle against
modern revisionism... an army upheld e unity of the soca.a ist
camp and of e international Communist movement...." Choe took
his cue this time: "Today the parties and peoples of our two
countries, holding high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, are closely
united in waging a resolute struggle against imperialism and
revisionism...'," He concluded with what might be taken as a pledge
and a threat -- to whom it may concern: "No matter what storms
may rise, our people will forever fight together with the inese
people and forever remain their loyal comrades-in-arms." And by
the time Choe addressed the rally of 100,O03 in Peking on 8 June,
he was hammering away at revisionism in the best Chinese (or even
Albanian) manner, including passages such as the follV=ping:
"The revisionists are cunningly attempting to kill the
revolutionary spirit of the Marxist-Leninist theory,
paralyze the revolutionary consciousness of the popular
masses, and undermine the socialist camp from within.
They are serving the imperialists .... He one has the
right to violate at will this prescription ? he $ 0
Moscow tatemen which prescribed it as an essential
task of all Marxist-Leninist parties to expose the
Yugoslav revisionists and fight against the infiltra-
tion of their anti-Leninist ideology").... Only through
a determined struggle against revisionism came
genuine unity and solidarity o the soc alist camp and
the world Communist movement be safeguarded .... Marx-
ism-Leninisma has been attacked not only once or twice
by opportunists and revisionists of all hues....Today
the modern revisionists are again frantically challeng-
ing Marxism-Leninism .... There is no shadow of doubt that
the modern revisionists will meet the same fiasco as
their predecessors." (All underlining ours)
June 6-9 - Columns written in Be1?ra:de on 6 June by New York Tines
correspondent Binder and on 9 June by the London Observei s obert
Stephens (also published by the Washington Post on June des-
cribe Yugoslav wariness and uneasiness over te 5 July CPSU-CC'S
talks, caused in part by Pravda's omission of certain passages of
Tito's 13 May speech, especiallythe sentence which said:
"Any compromise or unprincipled agreements at the
expense of others, or at the expense of the funda-
mental principles on which the contemporary struggle
for Socialism rests, would do great harm to the work-
ino-class movement.''
The official Yugoslav line (Stephens wrote) is that Khrushchev will
survive and will not give way to Chinese pressure on any basic
point of his coexistence policy. The Yugoslavs believe that the
Chinese are not looking for a compromise and intend to use the
meeting to press their offensive against Khrushchev, while the
Soviets are trying to find a 'formula for a paper compromise that
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would reduce Chinese pressure and free Khrushchev's hands to resume
negotiations with the US. There will be no oven divorce between
Peking and Moscow but a continued unhappy marriage, in which
Khrushchev may find it more difficult to push ahead with negotiations
with the US, but he will not gc backwards. Nevertheless, as "one
of the most influential Yugoslav journalists" is quoted as saying,
"...vie should have learned by experience that you can't trust the
Russians too far."
June 10 - NCNA released in English their account of the 27 May North
Crean Party organ Nodong Sinmun article reacting to the 18 May Tito
speech to the Yugoslav - enur~i rientioned in our last Chronology)
As described by NCNA, the Korean attack on Tito and the modern revi-
sionists is almost as harsh and vicious as the language used by the
Albanians. The Tito report "constitutes one more outstanding 'feat'
in the service of the imperialists." It is "marked by its aim to
scww discord and enmity among Communist parties, split the Socialist
camp and disorganize the ranks of the international Communist move-
ment, while cunningly covering up all their crimes co ittedu in the
past against the international Communist and working class movement
and their anti-Marxist, revisionist policy."
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No. 5 28 mai - 10 juin 1963
21 mai - 5 juin: Une delegation de membres importants du Parti communique de 1'U-
n.ion sovietique s'est rendue en Roumanie sous la conduite de Podgorny, membre du
Presidium, dans le but de persuader lea Roumains h accepter le plan du Comecon sur
la "division du travail socialiste" dans une integration economique qui limiterait
le developpement industriel roumain (afin que ce pays se concentre sur 1'agriculture
La "Pravda" du 31 mai a fait parattre en entier un discours du Secretaire du Parti
'oumain Ceaucescu, prononce lors de la visite faite par la delegation le 29 mai h,
l'usine des tracteurs de Brasov, discours d'ot l'on pouvait tirer la certitude que
lea Roumains restaient intransigeants dans leur resistance. Ceaucescu cita la de-
claration de Lenine selon laquelle le developpement de 1'industrie lourde etait 0-
blogatoire pour tout pays en train de construire le socialisme, et alla jusqu'h dire
qu'une egalisation du niveau de developpement de pays socialistes "constituait une
F,ondition in4ispensable dans la construction de la societe communiste (ce qui re-
presente une opinion des Chinois). Les discours que, la semaine suivante, Podgorny
et le Premier-secretaire roumain Gheorghiu-Dej faisaient h la veille du depart des
Soviets ont subi un echec dons leur tentative de convaincre lea Roumains. Dans ces
commentaires sur ces marques d'opposition roumaine, ajoutees h bien d'autres, le
correspondant du "New York Times" a Moscou, Topping, soulignait le 5 juin qu'une
longue lettre de lolemique adrescee le 30 mars par le Parti communiste de 1'Union
Sovietique au Parti communique ch.inois, n'a pas ete publiee in extenso dans lea
journaux roumains. Le "New York Times" du 8 juin donnait un compte-rendu de nouvel
lea recueillies par M. S. Handler son correspondant a Washington, nouvelle qui "e-
tait parvenue au gouvernement des Etats-Unis et qui indiquait qu'une controverse
s'etendait dans lea pays du bloc sovietique au sujet de l'integration economique et
des relations commerciales. D'aprbs ce que l'on dit lea querelles depassent de loin
le desaccord entre la Roumanie et l'Union sovietique dont ii a ete question recem-
ment." Handler a surtout traits des problemes tcheques et roumains mail it precisa
que la Pologne, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie se trouvaient egalement impliquees.
28 mai: Pour juger des efforts qu'accomplit le Parti communiste chinois dans le but
ale s'assurer des soutiens dans lea pays strangers, i1 suffit de consulter la liste
suivante d'informations que 1'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a fait paraTtre
en une seule journee:
h Pekin, banquet pour souhaiter la bienvenue "h une delegation de jeunes a-
vocats.,;aponais," qui se passa "sous le sign de l'amitie militante entre lea
peuples chinois at japonais..."
h Pekin, banquet en 1'honneur dune delegation bolivienne arrivee de Pyongyanj
(1'Agence de la Chine nouvelle annoncait plus tard que le 4 juin, h une re-
ception d'adieux en l'honneur des Boliviens, le-:chef de cette delegation de-
clara:"Nous. Sud Americains, nous sommes pr6ts a mener une lutte aussi a3~due
et aussi prolongee que celle qu'a menee le peuple chinois.")
- h Pekin, une interview avec "le chef dune delegation de l'Union nationals
des travailleurs angolais," qui a declare que "l'bistoire nous montrait que
le combat arms constituait le seul moyen d'obtenir la liberation nationale
et la liberte."
- h Pekin, une interview avec un journaliste de 1'Ouganda. "Secretaire a la
recherche et h 1'information du Congrhs populaire de 1'0uganda."
- un communique collectif, signs h Bamako le 18 mai par la Federation pan-chi-
Ap /ddsF$unR 89i?8i24113 GMIRD R Mf A Ii.Q ONQU 3Alleurs
 A d IROr M 'R9~99 4io? UP~8er ~~A?9 2(~Q~i~.C, en
uinde et h Ghana.
- l'arrivee a Pdkin du "Premier-secrdtaire general de la Confederation gdndrale
du travail du Congo."
- le depart de Pekin "de la ddldgation de l'Union des jeunes travailleurs d'Al-
banie."
- l'arrivde h Pdkin du Secrdtaire gdndral de la Federation des syndicats pro-
fessionnels de Cdylan."
- le depart de la "ddldgation de la Fdddration arabe du travail."
- le depart "d'un charge de travaux de recherches" de l'universitd Nkroumah de
Ghana.
- un banquet en 1'honneur du secrdtaire indondsien de l'Organisation afro-asia-
tique de solidarite populaire.
- voyage en Chine Mezidionale de la ddldgation du Parti communiste indonesien,
qui participa aux fetes du Premier mai h Pdkin.
- retour du Japon "d"une delegation de bonne volontd" de bouddhistes chinois.
- retour, respectivement d'Albanie et de Cuba, de deux delegations syndicalis-
tes chinoises.
- retour de Cuba dune delegation chinoise de la Jeunesse communiste.
5 juin: Alors que lea Soviets eprouvent des difficultes avec leurs voisins europdens
lea Chinois de leer c$td semblent obtenir gain de cause avec lea Coreens du nord.
Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Kim), president du Presidium de is Corde du Nord, accom-
pagnd de tout un entourage, s'est rendu par train special h Pdkin "en visite amicale
1'invitation de Liu Shao-chi," et ainsi que le declare l'Agence de la Chine nou-
velle, it fut salue "par des orations brillantes" aux arre^ts de Antung et de Shenyang
le 5 juin, et par une cdrdmonie "formidable" de bienvenue et une procession dens la
capitale le jour s .avant. Bien que dans un discours de bienvenue prononcd h la gare
de Pekin (et reproduit le jour mae dens un editorial du Quotidien du Peuple), Liu
ait soulignd leur effort commun tendant h combattre le rdvisionnisme moderne et h
protdger 1'unitd, Choe de son c t ne fit aucune allusion ce sujet ans sa rdponse.
Le soir mime an banquet, Liu revenait cependant avec insistence sur le theme:"pour
sauvegarder la purete du marxisme-leninisme, le Parti des travailleurs coreens a me-
nd une lutte irreconciliable contre le rdvisionnisme moderne... et a soutenu avec
fermete l'unitd du camp socialiste et du mouvement communists international..."
Cette fois-ci Choe comprit l'allusion et declara:"Aujourd'hui, lea partis et lea
peuples de nos deux pays portent haut la bannidre du marxisme-leninisme, et sont d-
troitement unis dans une lutte resolue contre 1'impdrialisme et le?rdvisionnisme...!"
Sa conclusion peut-4'tre interprdtde comme dtant h 1a fois un engagement et une me-
nace h qui de droit:"Quels ue soient lea ore es ui dclateraient, notre peuple com-
battra toujours c8te h c8te avec le peuple chinois et reatera idle h jamais h sea
camarades d'armes." Le 8 juin an rassemblement de 100,000 personnes h Pekin, Choe
se trouvait ddjh en pleine attaque du rdvisionnisme dens le meilleur style chinois
(mine albanais) qui contenait des declarations comme celle qui suit par exemple:
"Les rdvisionnistes cherchent sournoisement a ddtruire l'esprit rVdvolutionnaire
de is thdorie marxiste-ldniniste, a paralyser la conscience revolutionnaire des
masses p* g,VEFA ~ 1J~~9 4e 1 0~3d18 6k3~~6 Q(~ Q @~9 i3c~ Its
 travai bWbVg&Fbw Rgbft$
.19 10.8/ 4i1'G~fA-~ a$ aee O QQQ 6ion ces
prescriptions tddclaration de Moscou de 1960 prescrivant en tant quetlche essen-
tielle de taus lea Partis marxistes-ldninistes de denoncer lea revisionnistes yougo.
slaves et de combattre 1'infiltration de leur ideologie anti-lbniniste")... Ce
nest que per une lutte resolue contre le revisionnisme que Von parviendra h sauve-
gar er un et so idarit r e e du camp socialiste ainsi cue le mouvement .'
communiste mondial... C'eat plus dune ou deux fois que le marxisme-leninisme sleet
trouvd attaqud par des opportunistes et des rdvisionnistes de toutes lea teintes...
Aujourd'hui, lea rdvisionnistes moderns s'attaquent de nouveau dune manibre for-
cende au marxisme-ldninisme... 11 n'y a 1'ombre d'un doute que lea revisionnistes
moderns aboutiront h un echec semblable h celui de leurs prdddcesseurs." (Tous
lea passages soulignds Pont dte par nous).
6-9 juin: Un article de Belgrade, date du 6 juin, par Binder, correspondant du "New
York Times", et un autre du 9 juin par Stephens, correspondant du "London observer"
(reproduit le 10 juin par le "Washington Post") parle de sentiments de mefiance et
de malaise au sujet des entretiens des partis communistes sovietiques et chinoia
prdvus pour le 5 juilleja:j sentiments souleves en partie par l'omission dans la "Prav-
da" de certains passages du discours prononce par Tito le 18 mai, et notamment de la
phrase suivante:
"Tout compromis ou tout accord sans?$crupules aux depends des autres,
ou aux depends des principes fondamentaux sur leaquels repose-.,:la lutte
actuelle pour le eocialiste ferait un tort dnorme au mouvement de la
classe ouvrii:re."
Le point de vue yougoslave (dcrit Stephens) eat que Khrouchtchef parviendra . sur-
vivre et ne cedera aux pressions chinoises sur aucun des points fondamentaux de sa
politique de coexistence: lea Yougoslaves estiment que lea Chinois ne cherchent pas
h parvenir h un compromis, et qu'ils out 1'intention de profiter de la reunion pour
pousser leur offensive contre Khrouchtchef, alors que lea Soviets sont h la recherche
dune formule de compromis fictif, qui attenuerait la pression chinoise et redonne-
rait h Khrouchtchef lea mains libres pour reprendre sea negotiations avec lea Etats-
Unis. I1 n'y aura pas de divorce public entre Pekin et Moscou, mais une continuation
d'un mauvais mariage, au cours duquel Khrouchtehev risque de s'apercevoir qu'il eat
plus difficile d'aller de l'avant dans lea negotiations avec lea Etats-Unis, sans
que pour cela it ne se decide de faire marche arrihre. Cependant, pour citer "un
des journalistes yougoslaves lea plus influents":..."Nous devrions savoir par ex-
perience qu'il ne faut trop faire confiance aux Russes."
lb juin: Le 27 mai l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle donnait en langue an-
glaise son compte-rendu de l'article du "Nodong Sinmoun", organ du Parti communis-
te de la Coree du Nord, article qui constituait la reaction de ce journal au dis-
cours de Tito prononce le 18 mai h la session pldniere du Parti yougoslave. (Voir
notre chronologie precedente). Si l'on en juge par le compte-rendu de l'Agence chi-
noise, l'attaque cordenne contre Tito et lea rdvisionnistes modernes a ete faire en
termer dont la violence et la brutalite sont comparables h celles pratiquees par lea
Albanais: le rapport de Tito "eat un nouvel exploit remarquable au service des im-
perialist-es". 11 eat "marque par le ddsir de seiner la discorde et la haine entre
lea partis communistes, de diviser le camp socialiste et de desorganiser lea range
du mouvement communiste,aternational, tout en masquant adroitement taus lea crimes
commis dens le passe contre l'Internationale communiste et le mouvement de la
classe ouvribre, ainsi que leur politique de rdvisionnisme anti-marxiste.
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CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS
No 5 28 Mayo - 10 Junco 1963
24+ Mayo - 5 Junio: Una delegaci6n de alto nivel del PCUS encabezada por Podgorny,
miembro del Presidium, fue a Rumania en una tentativa de persuadir a los rumanos
a que aceptaran el plan del Comecon de "divisi6n socialists del trabajo" para
is integraci6n econ6mica, el cual limitaria la amplitud del desarrollo econ6mico
de diche, naci6n (haciadolo con".cntrar el la agricultura). "Pravda" el 31 de
mayo public6 el texto compieto de un discurso pronunciado por Ceaucescu, secre-
tario del PC rumano, durante is visits de is delegaci6n a la fdbrica de trac-
tores de Brasov en el que puntualiz6 que los rumanos permenecian f&rreos en su
resistancia. Ceaucescu hizo cita de Lenin en el sentido de que el desarrollo
de is industria pesada es obligatorio pars todo pals que estd construyendo el
socialiemo, s aciendo que "la igualizaci6n del nivel de desarroilo de los
passes socialistas es una condicibn indispensable para la construcci6n de is
sociedad socialista"' (opini6n china). Los discursos pronunciados par Podgorny
y por el primer secretario Gheorgiu-Dej del Partido rumano estando a panto de
partir la delegac16n la semano siguiente -- segdn los publicara "Pravda" el 5
de junco -- indican que los sovidticos no consiguieron hacer cambiar a los
rumanos. Comentado sobre este y otros comprobantes de la tozudez rumana, el
"New York Times" public6 el 5 de ,junco un informe de Topping, su corresponssal
en Mosed, que hacta notar que la prensa rumana no habia publicado integramente
is larga y pol4mica carts del PCUS del 30 de marzo dirigida por el PCUS al
Partido chino. El "New York Times" de 8 de junco public6 un reportaje pox su
corresponsal en Washington, M. S. Handler, sobre "datos (que) han liegado al
Gobierno de los EE. UU. sobre una creciente disputa en el Bloque sovi6tico con
respecto a is integraci6n econ6mica y las relaciones comerciales. Se dice que
las rencillas sobrepasan por mucho el desacuerdo entre Rumania y las Uni6n
Sovi6tica informado recientemente." Handler se refiri6 mayormente a los pro-
blemas checo y rumano, pero declar6 que Polonia, Hungria y Bulgaria tambi6n
estaban inmiscuidas.
28 Mayo: El punto hasta el eual el PC chino estd tratando de ganarse el apoyo
extranjero lo indica la siguiente relac16n de acontecimientos anunciados per is
Agencia chino de noticias (Sinjua):
-- un banquete en Pekin de bienvenida a "una delegaci6n de jdvenes letrados
japoneses" en el cual "se evidenci6 una militante amistad entre los pue-
blos chino y japonds..."
-- un banqete en Pekin en honor a una delegaci6n boliviana llegada de
Pyongyang. (Sinjua inform6 mds tarde que el la recepci6n de despedida
a los bolivienos el 4+ de junco, el lider de ellos declar6: "Nosotros
los latinoamericanos estamos listos a Ilevar a cabo una prolongada y
ardua lucha coma to hizo el pueblo chino.")
-- una entreviata en Pekin con "el jefe de la delegaci6n visitante de is
Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores Angoleses," el coal manifeat6 que "la
lucha armada es el dnico Camino que nos muestra is historia para con-
quistar la liberaci6n nacional y la libertad."
-- una entrevista en Pekin con un periodista de Uganda "secretario de in-
vests a or R a ease /del: Co rO$ 'N-M ~de0 ~~1b003-6
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-- un coiunicado conjunto firmado en Bamako el 18 de mayo entre la
Pederaci8n c Sir dicatos de Toda China y :L Uni do National de Traba-
,jadoxes Ma%, t?;s, -i o1 re reso de la dolegaol.c n c ina de su visita a
Mali, Guinea y Ghana.
-- la llegada a Pekin del "primer aecretario general de la Confedexaci6n
Gener.l del TrabaJo del Congo."
-- la partida de Pekin de "la delegaci6n de la Uni6n de J6venes Trabaja-
dores de Albania."
-- la llegada a Pekin del "secretario general de la Federaci6n Sindical
de Ceildn."
-- la partida de "la delegaci6n de "la Federaci6n Arabe del Trabajo."
-- la partida de "un obrero avanzado de investigaci6n de is Universidad
Nkrumah de Ghana.
-- un banquete en honor al secretario indonesio de la Organizaci6n de
Solidaridad de los Pueblos Afroasidticos.
-- el viaje en el sur de China de is delegaci6n del PC indonesio que
asisti6 a la celebraci6n del Primero de Mayo en Pekin.
-- el regreso del Jap6n de una 'delegaci6n de buena voluntad" budista
china.
-- el regreso de dos delegaciones sindicales chinas de Albania y Cuba,
respectivamente.
-- el regreso de Cuba de la delegaci6n de la Juventud Comunista china.
5 Junio; En contraste con las dificultades que tiepen los sovi6ticos con sus
vet nos europeos, los chinos parece que se est&n saliendo con las suyas con los
norcoreanos. El presidente Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Kim) del Presidium norco-
reeno y su sequito viajaron en tren a Pekin "en visita amistosa a invitaci6n
de Liu Shao-chi," segdn Sinjua, con "ovaciones tumultuosas" en las estaciones
de Antung y Shenyang el dia 5 y una "tremenda" eeremonia y procesi6n de bien-
venida en is capital al dia siguiente. Aunque el discurso de bienvenida de
Liu en la estacion de Pekin, (asi como el editorial del "Diario del Pueblo"
el mismo dia) pusieron 6nfasis en sus esfuerzos conjuntos combatiendo el revi-
sionismo moderno y asegurando is unidad, Choe en su respuesta no hizo mention
de estas materias. En un banquete en is noche del mismo dia, Liu volvi6 in-
sistentemente a is carga: "Para resguardar la pureza del marxismo-leninismo,
el Partido Coreano de los Trabajadores ha mantenido una lucha irreconciliable
contra el revisionismo modern ... y firmemente sosten do a unidad del cameo
socialists y del movimiento comunista international ..." Esta vez Choe oy6 al
apuntador y manifest6: "Hoy los Partidos y pueblos de nuestros dos palaes,
enarbolando la bandera del marxismo-leninismo, est6n estrechamente unidos lu-
chando resueltamente contra.el imperialismo y el revisionismo ..."
Concluy6 con to que se podria interpretar como compromiso o amenaza -- a quien
interese: "No orta au 6 tormentas surjan, nuestro pueblo luchard'eternamente
junto al pueblo chino y por siempre permanecerd como su leal compaflero de armas."
Y cuando Choe se dirigi6 al mitin de 100.000 en Pekin el 8 de junio, ya estaba
f*7 4AMMd0ZM3 -
gold ftffl O se 0 en ~ pasajes -9 como 9 los /"/2 e siguientes:
ban u
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"Los revisionistas estdn tratando maliciosamente de matar el espfritu
revolucionario de la teoria marxista-leninista, paralizar la conciencia
revolucionaria de las masas populares y socavar el cameo socialista desde
adentro. Estrin sirviendo a los imperialietas ... Nadie tiene el derecho
a violar a voluntad este precepto (la Declaracidn de Mosc de 9 0 que
preceptu coma tarea esencial de todos los Partidos marxistas-leninistas
denunciar a los revisionistas yugoslavos y luchar contra la inf iltraci6n
de an ideologia antileninista") ... Solo por medio de una resuelta lucha
contra el revisionismo pueden ser resguardadas la unidad y solidaridad
leg tunas del. cameo socialists y del movimiento comunista mundial ...
El marxismo-leninismo ha sido atacado no solamente una o dos veces por
oportunistas de todos los colores ... Hoy los revisionistas moderns
estdn de nuevo retando frendticamente el marxisno-leninismo .?.. No hay
ni sombra de duda que los revisionistas modernos se llevardn el mismo
chasco que los que les precedieron." (Todo el subrayado es nuestro.)
6-9 Julio: En sendos articulos escritos en Belgrado el 6 de Junio por el
corresponsal Binder del "Nev York Times" y el 9 de junio por Stephens del
"Observer" de Londres (reproducido por el "Washington Post" el 10 de Juriio)
se describe la cautela e inquietud de los yugoslavos con respecto a Ras con-
versaciones de 5 de Julio entre el PCUS y el Partido chino, debido en parte
a la omisidn en "Pravda" de ciertos pasajes del discurso de Tito de 18 de mayo,
especialmente la frase siguiente:
"Cualesquier componendas o acuerdoa faltos de principio a expensas de
otros, o a expensas de los principios fundamentales sobre los cuales
descansa la lucha contempordnea por el socialisto, haria grave daZo al
movimiento obrero,"
La linea oficial yugoslava (escribid Stephens) es clue Kruschev se aalvard y
no cederd ante ninguna presi6n china en ning6n panto bdsico de au polftica
de coexistencia. Los yugoslavos creep que los chinos no estdn buscando com-
ponendas y tienen intenci6n de aprovechar la reuni6n pars proseguir la ofensiva
contra Krusehev, mientras que los sovi6ticos estdn tratando de encontrar una
f6rmula pars una componenda "de papel" que disminuya la presi6n china y desate
las manos de Kruschev pars recomenzar las negociaciones con los Estados Unidos.
No habrd divorcio abierto entre Pekin y Moscu sino que continuard un matrimonio
desdichado, en el cual Kruschev puede encontrar mds diflcil seguir adelante con
las negotiations con los Estados Unidos, pero no retrocederd. Peso a todo eso,
en frase atribuida a "uno de los periodistas yugoslavos de mayor influencia,"
... debidramos haber aprendido que a los rusos no se les puede confiar demasi-
ado."
10 Junio: Sinjua public6 en inglds su relato sobre el articulo de 27 de mayo
en el rgano "Nodong Sinmum" del Partido norcoreano en reacci6n al discurso de
Tito al pleno yugoslavo el 18 de mayo. (Vdase nuestra ultima Cronologia)
Segdn Sinjua, el ataque coreano contra Tito y los revisionistas modernos es
casi taxi rudo y salvaje como el lenguaJe empleado por los albaneses. El infor-
me de Tito "constituye una 'proeza' sobresaliente mds al servicio de los impe-
rialistas." Estd "distinguido por an prop6sito de sembrar la discordia y ene-
mistad entre los Partidos comunistas, dividir el cameo socialista y desorgani-
zar las filas del movimiento comunista international, mientras que maliciosa-
mente encubre todos los delitos que hen cometido en el pasado contra el movi-
miento internacional comunista y obrero y su politics antimarxista y revisio-
nista."
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 Approved For Relea 1994 78-0306'O002DOWD W3t-663
368. Castro's Mission to Moscow
BACKGROUND: In the same mysterious manner in which he made
the trio the Soviet Union 37 clays earlier, Cuba's Fidel Castro
climbed aboard a Soviet TU-114 in Murmansk on 3 June, waved good-
bye to Premier Khrushchev and headed for home. No officials were
on hand at Havana's airport to greet him. He phoned the President
to announce his return and took a taxi (for which he and his com-
panions had no money to pay the fare) into the city.
His solitary return was in sharp contrast to the crowds he
had met at every turn in his tour of the Soviet Union. For 37 days
Castro had walked the "red carpet." He had spent long hours with
Khrushchev, talked with other top Soviet leaders, visited most of
Russia's major cities, toured factories, military bases, farms and
schools and been lionized by large crowds at a series of banquets,
receptions, rallies and parades.
In Moscow he received, according to the New York Times (5 May),
"the biggest welcome the Soviet capital has accorded a foreign
visitor." At the traditional May Day parade in Red Square he stood
next to Khrushchev and waved as the quarter of a million marchers
chanted "Fidel-Khrushchev" during their five-hour march. He was
given the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" -- the USSR's highest
award, very seldom given to foreigners -- and the Order of Lenin
and the Gold Star Modal.
Moscow had had little to cheer about in recent months: Castro b
trip had boosted sagging Soviet morale, added luster to his own tar-
nished reputation and strengthened Khrushchev's position for the
5 July Sine-Soviet discussions. When Havana Radio announced his
return an hour after his plane landed, ships, trains and factories
blew their whistles, special editions of newspapers hailed his
return. Anticipation mounted for his promised report to the nation
on the results of his 37-day mission to Moscow. On 4 June he re-
ported via radio and television in a three-hour, 3C-minute "inter-
view" with a panel of three newsmen.
Castro's Report. Castro's version of "meet the press" was a
rambling, u sae n ec informal talk. He deferred answering several
direct questions and displayed irritation with members of the panel
for their attempts to question him even in general terms. He was
irritated by noises, by the mumbles of translators and by reactions
of the studio audience.
Castro was effusive in his praise of things Soviet and highly
critical of his fellow Cubans and their version of a socialist
state. The Soviet, he said, had many "green areas" in tlir cities;
Cuba had "very little ... we do not even have a single tree." The
Soviets had many forms of transportation and a subway system; Cuba
has only one type of transportation. The Soviets have a one-class
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 (632A 44 end For Releaj1999/0 8-0306W00a0 Z. ;3
industrious society; Cuba has too many bureaucrats -- "everybody
is a volunteer in the front rank in demanding things but everybody
hangs back when it comes to producing."
"A visiting Cuban feels a little ashamed," Castro said, "be-
cause we have not given the economy all of the importance it merits
...* we agitate a great deal, we mobilize ourselves too much...
but it seems a little as if we build all of that in the air -- that
is, without taking into consideration that everything must have a
basis, an absolute fundamental basis, which is the economy. We 'feel
somewhat ashamed because we have many comrades who ... do not even
know that there is an economy."
In what could have served as a commentary on his report, Castro
said: "Vie tend to eulogize and to become apologetic. We are
extremely confused. We go from one extreme to the other. We do not
interpret everything right."
Castro reserved his most effusive praise for Khrushchev, "a
great leader and a formidable adversary of imperialism." His
"magnificent impression of Comrade Khrushchev" included: "extra-
ordinarily human character," "simple man of great simplicity," "a
hard worker, very well organized," "extraordinarily intelligent man,"
"extraordinary mental energy," "complete mental lucidity... mental
agility, quick thinking," "a most honorable man." "He is," Castro
declared, "without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects that
I have ever known ... He is a veritable authority on economic
problems. He talks with the authority of one who knows the problems
of agriculture, of industry, of the economy." And, Castro concluded,
"he perfectly combined his profound theoretical knowledge with great
practical experience."
Castro reported that he did not go to seek economic aid but
that Khrushchev "took the initiative" in suggesting that the Soviets
pay more for Cuba's sugar. (The Soviets pay 4 a pound under an
earlier agreement; Castro reported that Khrushchev proposed an
increase of one third, to 60 a pound. The current free market price
is about 120 per pound. Castro did not mention the latter figure
but called Khrushchev's offer "a very great contribution.") He also
said that Khrushchev took a personal interest in Cuba's cane-cutting
problems, provided "a number of ideas on what the machine should be"
to solve these problems, mobilized "all Soviet technology and indus-
try" to develop it and promised that "within two years the matter of
mechanizing the cane harvest would be completely taken care of."
With all his praise of things Soviet and criticism of things
Cuban, Castro did note one specific offer he made to Khrushchov as
Cuban socialist aid to the land of the Bolshoi Ballet and great
musical traditions -- to "send some instructors; ... dancing
teachers ... or music teachers could help them."
JcintC Muni ue. However interesting Castro's "mission-t6-+
Moscow report, a as so devoid of specifics as to make it necessary
to review the joint communique and exchanges of Castro-Khrushchev
speeches to evaluate the visit. Castro and Khrushchev signed a tint
12 state
-le Op III i P 909/0144- 1 ! UM 2Q~p( 0~3~9f
caa arewell cer2monies."
Q r. rOORMUMOM fnrn
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The major theme of Khrushchev's speech was that the Castro
regime should concentrate on consolidation and economic development.
He made bellicose statements about defending Cuba from imperialist
aggression, but there was no indication of a formal Soviet-Cuban
defense pact. He indicated his support of caution and easing of
tensions to avoid provocations of the US. Above all, the speech
reflected the importance attached to Castro's visit as a symbol of
Cuban support of the USSR in its confrontation with Communist China
-- a solidarity designed to refute Chinese charges that the Soviets
abandoned Cuba and backed down before the "paper tiger."
Castro's response reflected the same sort of praise for the
USSR and Khrushchev which he included in his report to the Cuban
people. He declared Cuba's desire to live in peace and maintain
friendly relations with all countries including the US. (In a ges-
ture to demonstrate his sincerity he offered to renew trade with
the US maintaining that the American people suffered because they
could not obtain Cuban tobacco and will find it harder to get sugar
this year.) He made an oblique reference to Sino-Soviet differences
by pleading for unity in the socialist camp -- "Unity of the inter-
national Communist movement is the slogan of all Marxist-Leninists."
While the joint communique said Castro and Khrushchev had agreed
upon "measures for the further development of economic, trade, and
scientific-cultural relations," it did not describe any such agree-
mients or reveal any new Soviet commitments. The communique did state
that the price the Soviets would pay for Cuba's sugar was being
adjusted "so as to bring this price in line th the level of world
prices," leaving the impression the Soviets would meet the l2a;-a-
pound world price. (There are indications the Soviets do not even
intend to honor the cut-rate v~-a-poun;l price Castro revealed they
would pay. The Soviets have no need for Cuba's sugar and reportedly
were re-selling it at higher prices and it is reported that they have
released their claim to one million tons of sugar to allow Cuba to
sell it on the world market. This, in effect, will reduce the
subsidy that the Soviets have to pay to maintain Cuba.)
The communique appeared to endorse the Soviet position on the
adlvantages of "peaceful coexistence" in promoting Communist in-
fluence and the "struggle for socialism." But at the same time,
Khrushchev made militant remarks about the Soviet "international
duty" to aid other Communist parties and so-called "national lihor-
ation" movements.
"What does it mean to render help to the national liberation
movement?" Khrushchev answered his own question in his 23 May
speech: "It means, first of all, to struggle against the inter-
ference of imperialism in the internal affairs of peoples of the
liberated countries, to lend all-cut support, including supply of
arms, to the peoples who are waging a just struggle against the
foreign yoke."
This potentially ominous warning of an increasing Communist
threat -- especially to Latin America -- may prove to be the most
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significant result of Castrots visit to the Soviet Union. The Castro-
Khrushchev joint car=unique revealed that Khrushchev had accepted
an invitation to visit Cuba -- he may utilize the trip to consolidate
his influence over Castro and to give new itapetus to aiding; "national
25X1 C1 Ob liberation" movements in Latin America.
 25X1C10b
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17 June 1963
669. The Outlook for the Sino-Soviet Meeting of 5 July 1963
U ACKGROUND :
A meeting is arranged. On 21 February 1963, the Kremlin
proposed in an open letter to Peking an official discussion on the
unresolved questions between the CPSU and the CCP. The Chinese
Communists replied on 9 March, agreeing to the meeting, but sug-
gesting that it be held in Peking with Khrushchev attending. The
Chinese also suggested that the agenda give priority to the strat-
egy and tactics of revolution and to opposing imperialism and
defending world peace. Neither the form of the Chinese agenda nor
the suggestion that Khrushchev come as a penitent to Peking can
have been very attractive to the Soviet leader: on 30 March
Moscow sent another message, suggesting that the agenda emphasize
"the further strengthening of the might of the world socialist
system and its conversion into the decisive factor of the develop-
ment of human society," and next to that, questions of struggle
for peace and peaceful coexistence; the Soviets also proposed
that Mao come to Moscow for the meeting, to be held on 15 May.
On 9 May, the Chinese proposed postponing the meeting until the
middle of June, and on 11 May the Soviets answered, suggesting a
further delay until 5 July. The meeting is now scheduled to be
held in Moscow, but neither Mao nor Khrushchev will attend. The
Soviet delegation is to be headed by Mikhail Suslov, the veteran
Soviet ideologist, while Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of
the CCP Central Committee is to lead the Chinese representatives.
The mere recital of this background shows the difficulty in
bringing about the Sino-Soviet meeting.
Attempts to build support. As the time for the Sine-Soviet
meeting in Moscow approaches, it is difficult to see any signs
of a desire to compromise on either side. Evidently one of the
main reasons why the Soviets so ardently wooed Castro during his
prolonged visit to the USSR was that they wished to commit him
firmly to their camp, as opposed to the Chinese Communist camp.
Thus, the Soviets saw to it that the joint Soviet-Cuban communi-
que of 23 May gave strong support to the Soviet position on
peaceful coexistence, the dangers of nuclear war, the impossi-
bility of exporting revolution, and the need to stress economic
development. In his fare- 25X1C10b
well speech to Castro, made also on 23 May, Khrushchev seemed to
be hitting at the Chinese when he said:
"It is necessary to fight resolutely against any division
of the revolutionary forces under any pretext. Non-class
division by continent, color of skin, or any other standard,
means a division of the forces of the working class."
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(669.Cunt.) 17 June 1963
Meanwhile the Chinese have not been idle. As if in answer
to the Soviet-Cuban communique of 23 May, a joint statement of
the CCP and the New Zealand CP of 25 May emphasized that reliance
on peaceful coexistence as a means to bring about a peaceful tran-
sition to socialism was "a modern version of social democracy,"
and the joint statement also condemned acts of "adventurism and
capitulationism," as the Chinese describe Soviet policy in Cuba.
On 15 May, while touring in North Vietnam, Liu Shao-chi, the
Chinese Chief of State and Mao's heir apparent, made a speech
stating:
"The International Communist Movement is now in a crucial
period of utmost importance. An acute struggle between
the Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists is
going on on a worldwide scale over a series of important
problems of principle. The polemics are centered on
whether the peoples of the world should carry out revo-
lutions or not, and whether proletarian parties should
lead the world's people in revolution or not."
That the Chinese are indeed carrying on a worldwide struggle is
shown by reports of Chinese efforts to circulate leaflets and
other material in all areas, including western Europe and even
the East European satellites. For example, Lajos Lederer
reported in the London Observer of 5 May that the Chinese Embassy
in Budapest was distributing leaflets, and that 40 Chinese study-
ing in Hungary had broken up an international student seminar
with their accusations against Khrushchev for splitting the Com-
munist movement. The Chinese have also been pushing forward in
their efforts to win over front organizations: following their
success at the Djakarta Afro-Asian Journalists Conference in
25X1 C10b April they lavishly a' lcl entert ne a number of these journalists in Peking on 18-19 May.
Apparently as a result of Liu Shao-chi's efforts in Southeast
Asia, Ho Chi Minh signed with him a joint statement supporting
Chicom positions, and the Indonesian CP seems to have been won
over to Peking, with Red Flag endorsing its lines. New Chicory
charges of Indian border vio ations (in broadcasts during the
first week of June), and renewed Pathet Lao attacks on Laotian
neutralist forces seem to spell new Chicom aggressiveness, and
new embarrassments for Moscow.
Soviet problems and position. Speaking generally, the Soviets
seem o be in a difficult situation. Following the first sputniks,
Moscow apparently concluded that communism was advancing in the
underdeveloped areas of the world, that the Bloc could be con-
trolled without using Stalinist terror, and that rocket and space
successes could be parlayed into such an impression of Soviet
military superiority that the West would bow to Soviet demands.
None of these expectations has worked out. The greatest Soviet
success, the communization of Cuba, must now taste bitter-sweet
in Soviet mouths, since it led to the greatest Soviet setback
since the failure of the Berlin blockade. Indeed, it may be that
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17 June 1963
The attempt to place medium range missiles in Cuba represented a
last desperate effort to attain an overawing strategic position
vis-a-vis the United States. The attempt to use trade and aid
programs to win influence and prestige has often worked out poorly,
as in the cases of Egypt, Syria, Guinea and Iraq; even Indonesia,
despite vast expenditures, remains dubious, with its CP turning
to Peking. Many of the front movements, such as the Afro-Asian
Peoples' Solidarity Organization, have also proved uncontrollable
by Moscow. As a result of such experiences, a recent article by
V. Kudryavtsev in International Affairs (Moscow, May 1963) sug-
gested that the CP mus wor w n the local African govern-
ments if it is ever to bring them to the stage of "socialism."
According to the Italian CP paper L'Unita of 8 and 9 May, a Moscow
meeting sponsored by the Soviet Insti e for World Economics
heard papers by Institute collaborators stating that, contrary to
Chicom beliefs, Asian, African and Latin American revolutions
cannot defeat imperialism, which can only be conquered by
"socialist" revolutions in the industrialized countries. Such
articles and statements are intended to lead to the conclusion
that only "peaceful coexistence" can conquer for Communism. Yet
the failure of Soviet threats and maneuvers, the decline in the
usefulness of the fronts (including the World Peace Council, which
among other things quietly called off a meeting scheduled for
8 June in Warsaw), and the divisive effects of peaceful co-
existence (with its non-Leninist implications) on the world Com-
munist movement, suggested that attempts to deceive both capi-
talists and orthodox Communists -- such as the "peaceful co-
existence" campaign represents -- cannot succeed. Now the Kremlin
must face the fact that even its leadership in the world movement
is crumbling: things have reached the point where the leader of
the Italian CP can freely criticize Soviet doctrines on art and
literature, and Rumania can conduct flirtations (with trade and
scientific-technical agreements) with the dissidents in Peking.
(See Chronology -- Communist Dissensions in this issue.) The
extraordinary efforts required to weld Castro to Moscow are a
revelation of weakness. The Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance is obstructed and evaded by its satellite members. The
bloc no longer marches on Moscowts orders.
Chinese problems and position. The Chinese seem to be gain-
ing s rend , yet they have eir problems too. It will be
extremely difficult -- probably impossible -- for them even to
acquire the leadership in the world Communist movement once
exercised by Stalin. In some ways their position is not
Stalinist, but Trotskyite, the position of the romantic revo-
lutionary who calls for revolution when he has not the means to
bring it about. Their strongest appeal is in the underdeveloped
countries, and in those areas they are tempted to expand their
doctrine of "East Wind versus West Wind" into racialism. But
the underdeveloped peoples do not want to be oriental, they want
to be industrialized. The Chinese should have even less reason
than the Soviets to want an open split in the movement -- though
they like to compare themselves with Lenin's "splendid isolation'"
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(66T. Cont.) 17 June 1963
in the Second International. Within the movement they can exert
considerable influence, but outside it, they will be weak and
vulnerable.
Possible developments. Against this background, it seems
that there are ree poss le results for the 5 July conference:
1. Theoretically, there might be a grand reconciliation.
But every present indication makes this extremely unlikely.
To begin with, such a reconciliation could hardly occur
without the presence of Khrushchev and Mao, and secondly,
there is no sign that either side is relenting in its stand.
2. There might be an open break. This is-definitely
possible, yet Khrushchev can hardly be anxious to preside
over the dissolution of the Communist Empire, while Mao
would lose strength from a break.
3. There might be superficial agreement, resolving
none of the basic causes of the conflict. One question
on which some statement will be expected is the question
of a world conference of Communist parties, yet it is
virtually impossible for the disputants to agree on who
shall attend, let alone on what shall be discussed.
Generally the Soviets do not want such a meeting but the
Chicoms do. Perhaps this difficulty can be glossed over
with a vague statement that a world meeting will occur at
a date still to be announced. An agreement to tone down
open polemics or to resume aid for China and/or Albania is
also conceivable.
It is also possible, of course, that at the last moment some
pretext will be found for postponing the conference once more.
25X1 C10t
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670 AF. Danger of Racial-Explosion in South Africa
BACKGROUND:
Policy. In May 1963 the parliament of the Republic of
South Afr cassed two new apartheid laws, adding to the tighten-
ing cycle of segregation, protest, and further segregation of the
Republic's nearly eleven million Africans. Called "Bantu," the
South African Negro's forced separation from the whites and coloreds
(mixed blood) is the core of the country's socio-economic policies,
the motivating factor for rising extremist opposition and the target
of bitter attacks from other nations.
Prime Minister Vervioerd's government, with the support of the
majority of the Afrikaners (the descendents of Boer settlers), is
attempting to implement its decision that separation -- not inte-
gration -- of the races is the only way the European fifth of the
population can retain control of its own affairs In the country.
Total separation of the races is considered impraccical even by
VerEwroerd and company in this the most highly industrialized country
on the continent because African labor is essential for industrial,
commercial and domestic service. The new Bantu laws will help pro-
vide a readily available, but controlled, labor pool for the white
communities by stringently restricting the African's right to live
or work according to his own choice. This also arbitrarily breaks
up African families.
Complementing the Bantu laws is the General Law Amendment of
May 2nd which, according to the International Commission of Jurists
embodies "many of the worst features of the Stalinist regime." Its
provisions include removal of habeas corpus, requiring the accused
to prove his own innocence, arrest w ou warrant, indefinite im-
prisonment without trial and denial of other legal safeguards.
The government is pushing a "Bantustan" program which will
transfer all Africans not needed in the labor force into eight widely
scattered areas, comprising approximately thirteen percent of the
country. In these areas Africans are presumably to be permitted
their own autonomous political development under chiefs who are
salaried government servants. But economically the African will
still be dependent on the white South African areas; politically he
will be subject to ultimate rule from Pretoria. Most Africans
strongly object to the Bantustan program but many see it as the best
way to gain ultimate independence from the whites. Poverty is the
usual lot of the Bantustan African despite the fact that the white
South African has the highest living standard in Africa.
(670. Continued)
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Political divisions generally follow racial, cultural lines.
Most of the r kaners support the ruling; Nationalist Party which
came to power in 1946 by advocating apartheid as the answer to the
"them or Vs" racial situation which they believed the white minor-
ity faced. 4 healthy economy, base. on abundant mineral resources,
and a large, well-trained army have sustained the government which
clai-nis to be strongly pro-West and anti-Communist.
The largest of the white opposition parties, the United Party,
draws its adherents from English-speaking populations and advocates
fewer racial restrictions; the small Progressive and Liberal parties
want none at all. None has sufficient sur_uport from the conservative
white electorate to threaten the powerful Nationalist Party govern-
ment.
Of the outlawed non-white parties, the largest is the African
National Congress (ANC), led by Nobel prize-winner Albert Luthuli
and including among its leaders a number of known Communists. The
ANC's multi-racial stance and non-violent opposition have proven in-
effective in combatting the government's apartheid policies. The
militant, sabotage arm of the ANC, called the Spear of the Nation,
is now receiving the active support of the small South African Com-
mau.nist Party (SACP), underground since 1953. A 1963 SACP manifesto
caller for a united front of national liberation. However, a London
Daily Worker article of April 17th called for revolutionary action
to overthrow white domination through cooperation with the ANC and
condemned the other nationalist groups.
The Communist decision to work through the nationalist ANC and
to advocate a policy of "answering violence with violence" may intrc-
duco a foreign element into the picture as CPs of other countries
lend their support through arms, training, or money for the SACP-
supported fighters. An ANC-authored article in Pravda of March 3rd
has already called for "international help" for 3t program.
The more extreme Pan-African Congress (PAC), advocating a
strictly "African Africa," inspired the 1:63 demonstrations which led
to the Sharpeville shootings and ultimately to jailing of their
leader and banning of the party. Extremist elements of PAC are be-
lieved to have formed the core of the violently anti-white Poqo
organization which called for widespread racial violence as recently
as early 1963. The South African police claim to have broken the
organization by arrests of thousands in the Spring of 1963.
External Relations. Attacks on the Afrikaner government's in-
movau e adherence to is apartheid policy led to South Africa's
withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1961. Severing Common-
wealth ties has had little effect on South Africa's economic situa-
tion and none on the apartheid program.
Another source of international friction is the government's
refusal to concede United Nations' jurisdiction over neighboring
South West Africa, now administered as an almost integral part of
South Africa itself. A German colony until 1918 mandated to South
Africa by the League of Nations after World War I, South West Africa
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has international status and should be a supervisory responsibility
of the UN, according to an international Court of Justice ruling of
1950. Although conceding some legitimate international concerns
for South West Africa, Vorwoerd's government refuses UN supervision
and continues to rule this relatively prosperous area under what it
claims are the terms of the lapsed mandate. An early 1964 ruling
is expected on a suit now in the Court charging that South African
apartheid policies contravene the terns of the League mandate.
South Africa may refuse to comply with any unfavorable ruling, thus
inviting further international friction.
The growth of Afro-Asian influence in pushing the UN case has
been paralleled by independent African moves. The African heads
of state, meeting in Addis Ababa in May, called on countries having
"traditional relations" with South Africa to apply UN sanctions
against her, to support the UN special committee on apartheid, and
to sever diplomatic relations with both South Africa and Portugal.
This so-called "decolonialization" resolution also called for a
boycott of trade and other economic measures and promised to aid
movements of national liberation. (See also BPG Item #672 "The
African Heads of State Meeting" in this issue)
The imminent dissolution of the Central African Federation
(Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) to the northeast has
led to speculation that Sir Winston Field, Prime Minister of South-
ern Rhodesia, will seek support for his white-supremacy government
from Verwoerd. Such a bloc of racist states in Black Africa could
25X1C1Obonly draw increasing fire from its neighbors and from the UN.
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671 EE,FE,NE. Sino-Soviet Border Controversies
IBACICC?OUND: On 12 December 1962 Premier Khrushchev referred to
Communist hi a's criticism of Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis
and, in justifying his having reached an accommodation with the
"imperialists," he chided Communist China for having failed to kick
the "imperialists" out of Hong Kong and Macao. The US Communist
Party repeated and expanded the Soviet charge on 9 January 1963.
The Peking People's Daily editorial of 8 March took up these charges
by discussing"a'little of the history of Imperialist aggression
against China." The editorial listed 12 countries, including Tsarist
Russia, who had "carried out unbridled aggression against China."
The Pacple's Daily referred to a "large number of unequal treaties"
that China had been compelled to sign and specifically mentioned
nine of them, four of which were between Russia and China and in-
volved the cession of extensive territory by China to Russia. The
Treaty of Ai Gun (1858) gave some 135,003 square miles of Chinese land
by moving the border from the Yabloncvy and Stanovoi Mountain Ranges
in Siberia eastward to the Amur River; the Treaty of Peking (1863)
gave Russia some 350,000 square miles, including the Chinese terri-
tory east of the Ussuri River that makes up the USSR's Far Eastern
provinces including the city of Vladivostok; and the Treaty of Ili
(1331) gave Russia the lower Ili valley which previously was part of
Chinese Sinkiang. The fourth "unequal treaty" between China and
Russia gave Russia a series of unilateral economic and consular
privileges in China.
(For a detailed description of these treaties and maps of the
territories involved see the article entitled "Borders of China" in
the 20 April 1963 issue of The New Republic and an article by
Chalmers Roberts in the 23 Apra 53 issue of The Washington Post.
For an excellent analysis of the Sino-Soviet border problem, see
"Will There Be a Reconquest of Siberia" in the 22 March issue of
Christ and Welt. The former two articles are reprinted in the
30 April Issue of Press Comment and the latter is in the 1 May issue
of Press Comment.)
The People's Daily editorial explained that when the People's
Republic o China was founded "our government declared that it would
examine the treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments. . .
and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them accor'ing
to their respective contents." The People's Daily added that all
"these legacies from the past" would ue set a "when the time is
ripe." Thus far in this context neither side has made reference to
the Treaty of 1924 which re-established normal relations between
China and the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution. This treaty
was supposed to implement the Soviet declaration of 1919 which pro-
ciaiiied that "The (USSR) government of Workers and Peasants has .
declared null and veil . the treaties which were to enable .
Tsarist Russia to enslave the people of the East and principally the
occa a of China." The s a0~8 nJ f A60620002 ?i~v' s
?ccaACt~v~o~ea cu I )vv ets are no
(671. Continued)
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imperialistic and also as proof of Communist Fraternal relations.
It is not referred to currently by the Soviets for obvious reasons,
although Chinese reluctance to cite this treaty is somewhat more
obscure. Perhaps they simply prefer to withhold it for later use.
It could be a potent device to be used in challenging the current
Soviet leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to the original concepts
of their own revolution and to the ideas of Lenin. At any rate, the
Chinese have served notice that they are at liberty to bring up the
25X1C10b question of these treaties "when the time is ripe."
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672 AF,g. The African Heads of State Meeting
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: The meeting of the African Heads of State in
Addis a 2-26 May) culminated in the signing of a charter (see
attachment) of the new Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was
signed by all 30 independent African governments present. Only 3
governments were absent: Morocco boycotted the meeting ostensibly
because of Mauritania's presence, but it is expected that it will
become a co-signator at a later date. Togo was not seated, presum-
ably in deference to Guinean President Toure's continuing opposition
to the Grunitsky regime, but may be given an opportunity to join the
OAU. The white-ruled Union of South Africa, pursuing apartheid
policies, was not invited.
The meeting took place in an atmosphere of general rapproche-
ment and moderation. Indeed, the conference was a remarkable
achievement in that agreement was reached in four days on a number
of basic issues, despite personal rivalries and serious differences
in approach. The charter was adopted in the face of a strong but
unsuccessful plea of President Nkrumah of Ghana for immediate organ-
ic union and a recommendation by the preceding Foreign Ministers'
meeting to postpone the adoption of a charter. The charter was
developed with the assistance of a representative of the Organiza-
tion of American states at the invitation of the Ethiopian Govern-
ment. The charter is essentially of the OAS type. It provides for
a summit-level assembly to meet annually, a ministerial council to
meet at least twice yearly, and a secretariat currently (and prob-
attly permanently) to be located at Addis Ababa. It establishes a
commission for mediation, conciliation and arbitration as well as
other functional commissions for defense, economic, social and
scientific purposes with the details remaining to be worked out.
The charter does not include provisions for collective security or
a parliamentary assembly. These institutions presumably will
supersede the rivalries between the militant Casablanca powers and
the moderate Monrovia states. However, basically regional group-
ings, such as the African and Malagasy Union (UAM) of 13 French-
speaking states, can be expected to continue for some time and to
play important roles.
The charter represents an important step in.the African states'
attempts to find cooperative solutions to many of the continent's
difficult and important problems. It is fairly realistic in view of
the present capabilities of the member states and makes very little
concession to extremists and their opinions. But it will be some
time before the charter will be implemented and there undoubtedly
will be many disputes over details of the new pan-African structure,
including and particularly over the designation of key personnel.
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It appears that the secretariat will be located in Addis Ababa,
with assembly and council meetings to be rotated among other
capitals and the various commissions to be headquartered elsewhere.
A meeting of OAU foreign ministers is to be held in Dakar in July
to chart the next steps.
Ethiopian United Nations representative Tesfaye Febre-Egzy
was named temporary secretary general of the OAU. There is specu-
lation among certain African leaders that Tesfaye may be in
sympathy with Nkrumah's policies and that he could conceivably use
the position as secretary to inject a more militant policy into
the OAU than envisaged by the signatories of the charter. Further,
the six-nation committee (Ghana, UAR, Uganda, Tanganyika, Niger
and Nigeria) set up by the conference to appoint deputy secretaries
will include representatives who may well attempt to regain some
of the ground in the secretariat's work which Nkrumah lost at the
meeting.
The resolutions which were adopted reflect the trends in
African nationalism and non-alignment. Several of the key reso?.u-
tions appeared to have been carefully framed as a direct challenge
to the West and were supported by the most pro-Western of the
African states.
The resolution on decolonization calls on all independent
African states to support dependent people in Africa in their
struggle for freedom and independence; calls for the establishment
of a special fund to be contributed to by the member states by
15 July to supply practical and financial aid to the various
African national liberation movements; calls on African states to
intervene with the great powers to stop supporting colonialist
governments, particularly Portugal "which is conducting a real war
of genocide in Africa"; informs the Western nations that they must
choose between friendship with the African peoples and support of
powers that oppress them; demands the breaking off of diplomatic
and consular relations between all African states and the govern-
ments of Portugal and South Africa so long as they persist in their
present attitude towards decolonization; asks for boycotting the
foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa by: (a) prohibiting
in-port of goods, (b) closing African ports and airports to their
ships and planes, and (c) forbidding the planes of those two
countries to overfly the territories of all African states.
The resolution establishes a nine-nation committee to be
located in Dar-es-Salaam to coordinate assistance to nationalist
movements, 21 of which had observer-lobbyists in attendance who
were recognized by the assembly.
Nkrumah, Toure (Guinea), Ben Bella (Algeria) and Obote (Uganda)
were leading the way in the formulation of this militant posture
on the freedom fight of the still-dependent African territories.
The resolution on apartheid and racism, which condemns racial
discrimination everywhere,iexpresses deep concern over racial dis-
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the continent, particularly in the United States. At the same
time, the resolution expressed appreciation of the US Government's
efforts to end discrimination. As part of the resolution against
apartheid, a special fund was set up for an anti-apartheid movement.
The reso ution appeals to all governments still having iplomatic,
consular and economic relations with the Union of South Africa to
break these off and cease any other form of encouragement of
apartheid.
The resolution on general disarmament says that the conference
has agreed unanimously on the removal of military bases from Africa
and the disentanglement of African countries from military pacts
with foreign powers; declares Africa a denuclearized zone; and
appeals to the great powers to reduce arms and to sign a disarma-
ment agreement with effective controls.
A resolution on Africa, Non-Alignment and the UN reaffirms
dedication to the purposes and principles of the UN charter;
accepts all obligations contained in that charter, including finan-
cial obligations; and requests that steps be taken for better
African representation in the principal organs of the UN.
A resolution on economic problems asks that Africa develop
its own economy which should tend to eliminate the need for exter-
nal economic aid. External aid should be unconditional and not
prejudicial to the independence of African states. The conference
resolved to establish a preparatory economic committee to study
possibilities of establishing a free trade area between various
African countries, a common external tariff to protect industries,
a pan-African monetary zone, and means for developing trade between
African states.
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" . . . The surprise note in this trip of Fidel . . . is
that in Cuba they did not-know about it. The news. given by
Radio Rebeldo'surpris'ed the, Cubans..... But all this happens
naturally in systems'of'government 1-ike those. which rule Cuba
now.. . Fidel Castro in Moscow. . . . to appear before the
.master . . ." El Heraldo, Barranquilla, Colombia, April 29,1963.
"Castro''s trip to Moscow had been, schedu-l.ed for. a long
time, but was to have been later. Just a few days ago, the
Cuban press, publishing the program of 1 May celebrations in
Havana, announced that Castro would attend. Was it Castro or
Khrushchev who suddenly insisted on advancing the trip's date?
'perhaps the Soviet Premier deemed necessary the
presence, on I May on Red Square, of the least controversial
socialist revolutionist today. . . , presenting Castro as an
American prize exhibit . " France Observateur (France
Observer),, Paris, May 2, 1963.
Castro's visit. to Moscow was not his own idea but
Khrushchev's . . . . After Khrushchev's withdrawal of Soviet
arses from Cuba in October,.som'e method of pacification was nec-
essary and the most logical and ostentatious moment was the
first of May celebrations. . . . Khrushchev took advantage of
the opportunity to'invite the. vain Castro to Moscow and show
him off as'a hero of the Communist World. . . . Although
Castro never loses an opportunity to proclaim the national
sovereignty of Cuba, he is still completely dependent economi-
cally"on. the USSR.". Julian Corkin, editorial "The .Consecration
of Castro in Red` Square," La.Hora, Guatemala City, May 21, 1963.
" Castro is the main pawn . . . The bearded Commu-
nist has not'hidden his resentment toward Khrushchev for with-
drawing the. armament and the Communist troops from his island.
21 Pais, Cali, Colombia, May 3, 1963.
" Castro is no better than a Soviet puppet, a
satellite of Moscow...
it
. . . Both..Khrushchev and Castro seem to have their own
versions of the'most'serious question in international politics
of recent years which brought the world, almost to the brink of
another world war. "Their answers as to how-the Soviet missiles
and-weapons came to be planted in Cuba are contradictory.
Khrushchev contends this was due to Cuba's request. But Castro
contended that. it was at the request of Russia ...
Such a'posture leads Castro to.admit implicitly that he has
betrayed the revolution'and.put.Cuba into the hands of new
imperialism. And when the 'game' was up, Khrushchev did not
wait a moment even'to_inform Castro that he was pulling the
missiles out of Cuba. ko.gave it the look of a dramatic gesture,
spontaneous, in the interests of'world peace.. What more is
needed than' these acts :to'skio)r that Castro is nothing .more than
a Soviet puppet -- Soviet p1.acement of missiles in Cuba to
serve Soviet aims, and the 'stthsequent withdrawkl of the missiles
without so much of a by-your--4eave to .Castro. , .
" Castro should behave-- like all other satellites."
"'Puppet' Visiting Moscow," editorial, The Mail, Madras, India,
April 20, 1363. . .
" . . . Moscow was covered`, with posters . . . This natu-
rally is for propaganda.'. It `was the style of Hitler and the
style of Mussolini, the style o9.,.4 ..ctaatorships. . . . Totali-
tarianism, red or white, settles not on the truth of its regime
or on the goodness of its doctrines or the nobility of its
behavior, but on?propaganda, propaganda is the battering ram
of Communism. Therefore in Moscow and Peking and in Havana,
there are people with only one mission: to inflate dogs. One
of these dogs is Fidel Castro., " La Patria, Manizales,
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" . . . in all this sham, there was no sign or evidence
that one chief of state was visiting another. Everybody under-
stood, and some commented on the fact, that the visit was the
execution of an order for propaganda purposes. The bearded
puppet in-the service of Moscow. . ." El Heraldo, Barranquilla,
Colombia, May 4, 1963.
It . .. Khrushchev wants to rub out the memory of the Oct-
ober 1962 crisis when he yielded before . . Kennedy . . .
"Despite his tropical impetuosity, his disconnected oratory,
and his disordered attitude before persons of state, Castro did
not go to. Moscow to return to Cuba with empty hands. . . . This
is the second act of Communist intervention in the Caribbean.
And it may be the prologue of an intervention even more profound
in Latin America. . . ." El Tiempo, Bogota, Colombia, May 9, 1963.
he.prolonged travels of Fidel Castro in the Soviet Union
continue to be wrapped in the veil of secrecy and mystery . . .
the Cuban leader is rather isolated . not allowed to make
personal contacts with the common people and even less so with
correspondents. . . an extensive program of visits . . . all
organized . . with the purpose of showing him everything which
is impressive and .-.iagnificent in Soviet Russia and of hiding
from him the darker side and the poverty . . . Contrary to the
statements initially made by the world press, the reception
given to Castro in Red Square was characterized by a lack of
enthusiasm and spontaneity of which, furthermore, Prensa Latina
/uba's official news agency7 itself was a witness, when it
:said that the Soviet government had invited the people to come
to Red Square, which means that the Soviet government decided
which sectors of the population and in what number should appear.
" . . . in spite of the cruel severity of the totalitarian
Soviet-Cuban regime, despite the enormous sacrifices made by
the Cuban people for freedom from the new tyranny, the flames
of popular resistance burn here and there with a new vigor.
They furnish irrefutable proof that the truly revolutionary
people want the bread and the liberty which Castro robbed from
their country.
" . . . we would not be surprised if the current rumors . .
were confirmed According to these rumors, Fidel Castro may be
trying to cure himself in the Soviet Union, of the sickness from
which he suffers, the symptoms of which are insomnia and periodical
eruptions of irrational behavior. . . ." 0 Estado de Sao Paulo,
5!~,o Paulo, Brazil, May ll, 1963.
"The visit of,Dr. Fidel Castro to Moscow has at least been
the occasion for some plainspeaking by the Communists. It is
no longer left.to others to-say that these have ulterior ambi-
tions in the Western Hemisphere. 'The Cuban revolution opened
up a front of active struggle against imperialism in Latin
America,' declared the Communist Party paper Pravda which added
that the Castro revolution provided a powerfu stimulus to the
yaovement of the Latin American peoples for their 'full national
liberation.'
"Soviet Premier Khrushchev . . promised full Soviet sup-
port for the Castro regime. From all accounts, it is a funny
sort of 'freedom' that the Cubans. are now enjoying but then
Mr. Khrushchev's idea of what constitutes freedom is rather dif-
ferent from the usual acceptance of the word.
"Dr. Castro was even more revealing. 'If the Soviet Union
did not exist,' he said, 'there. would be no Cuban revolution . . .
Put thin -does, not :mean that ?d~ha Sov i.,a. Union made this .revolution
. It is only -r4a Soviet U.Lio:_: t fay holds back the imperialist
1k - attack on our country.'
"The Cuban revolutionary leader also said that they were
always great admirers of Lenin, but after they became acquainted
with the Soviet Union the image of Lenin took on massive
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Proportions. We seem to see here the suggestion that Dr. C.stro
only gradually committed himself into the Communist toils
that it was Soviet Russian willingness to support his revolution
from ulterior motives that led Dr. Castro to become the whole-
hearted Marxist-Leninist he now appears to be. That Moscow was
chiefly interested in Cuba as providing a suitable bridgehead
for the ideological conquest of all Latin America is a foregone
conclusion.
. . . We can hardly imagine two peoples that have less
in corm-ion . . .
it . the rece?ntion in Moscow's Red Square given to Dr.
Castro seems to have been carefully organized rather than spon-
taneous.
"We cannot, of course, foresee what plans Mr. Khrushchev
and Dr. Castro will concoct between them. They are not likely
to bode well for the peace of the Western Hemistphere, in any
case. . . . it should also put the American nations doubly on
their guard.
" . in actual fact the Cuban revolution has merely moved
from one form of exploitation to another! . " The Japan Times,
April 33, 1363.
'rasters in the Kre:nl.n. .
. .
Cuba is definitely enrolled as
a Communist satellite . .
."
El Pais, Cali, Colombia, May .4,
Cartoon: "Castro's Gift to Khrushchev" _ shows Castro p:r?e-
senting "Cuba," a female figure in chains, to Khrushchev.
Excelsior, Mexico City, May 4, 1963.
3
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RACE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA
"Tearing a Country Apart" by Colin Legum (who revisiting South Africa)
In The Observer, London April 28-May 5, 1963
"There is no mistaking the change in temper in South Africa in
the three 'quiet' years since the Sharpeville shootings. On all sides
now there is a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of violence.
"Government spokesmen lead public opinion in preparing . . . for
what lies ahead. They no longer say 'If violence comes,' but as
Dr. Verwoerd recently said: 'When combat is necessary in place of the
pen, we will not hesitate.'
"Violence has also become the language of.the Africans -- from
Congress leaders to women domestic workers.... All talk now is about
the tactics of violence, no longer about its relevance. . There
is almost a desire for violence, as an outlet for the growing sense
of helplessness . . . .
"It is not difficult to find out what is happening in Dr.
Ven,aoerd's republic as a result of the government's policy of uproot-
ing and reorganizing the lives and relationships of millions of
peop le . . . .
"One out of three of the Republic's eleven million Africans no
longer has the legal right to live anywhere in the country. Where
these people may live is a decision for bureaucrats. Well ovex
130,000 people have already been forcibly removed from one area to
another, or from the towns to the stagnant, workless native reserves.
Another 500,000 are under notice of removal. And by the time the
process of creating Bantustans is completed, well over five million
people will have been uprooted under the plans already announced.
Not since Stalin moved the Volga Germans and Hitler moved Europe's
Jews has there been such a calculated effort to transport populations
solely for the purpose of serving the interests of a ruling oligarchy.
"One should begin perhaps by describing what Dr. Verwoerd is
trying to do, and why he is being allowed to do it.
"His premise (a correct one) is that nowhere in Africa will
Africans be willing to share power. Their demand everywhere is to be
politically' dominant . Therefore, if a European community the size of
South Africa's wants to maintain control over its own affairs it must
refuse to surrender any political power. He has put two choices to
the white electorate: integration of the races or separation -- and
they have decisively rejected the first. They are willing, therefore,
to endorse whatever action maybe necessary to achieve the second.
They see it as a simple choice between 'them' or 'us.'
"The Prime Minister, however, recognizes that it is impossible
to go on forever denying political rights or economic opportunities
to Africans. And, since he refuses to allow these in the present
Republic, his solution to the dilemma is to divide South Africa into
nine parts -- a white part, occupying 87 per cent of the land, and
:eight black parts, the Bantustans. These, in time, will be allowed
to grow to independence. But until this happens they are to be con-
trolled, guided and assisted by the whites.
"This partitioning of South Africa into nine separate states is
what is now being attempted. Dr. Verwoerd, and with him the majority
of whites, believe this is the only hope for white survival on condi-
tions acceptable to themselves.
"Before taking a closer look at the way these plans are working
out, it.is important to describe briefly what is involved in tearing
the races apart and in setting up Bantustans. The Republic's eleven
million Africans are distributed roughly in three equal parts between
the reserves. (the future Bantustans), the white areas and the white
farms. The.declared official policy is that, in future, the sole
criterion for any African to be anywhere in the white areas will be
whether or not his labor is needed there.; this decree will affect two-
thirds of the total African population.
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"Nobody knows for sure how many Africans will be declared surplus
to the needs of whites. The fact that an African has been born and
has lived all his life in a particular place will no longer be relevant
to his right to go on living there once the new Bantu Laws Amendment
Bill is passed. With half a million Africans at present unemployed,
one gets some idea of the immediate surplus that will be pushed back
either into the reserves or into labor depots. From there they will
be directed, not only where, but also for whom they may work. if they
lose their job they must leave their place of: residence until another
job is found for them.
"The Bantustans are to be reorganized to absorb the surplus work-
ers. But the land (13 per cent of the country's total) is insufficieit
for those already living there. It has been estimated that 3,600,000
people will have to leave the land in the reserves to enable farming
to be made productive.
"To provide homes and work for these millions, in addition to
those declared surplus to the needs of white areas, the government
proposes to build hundreds of new towns inside the borders of the
Bantustans. Just across the borderline, white-owned industries are to
be located, drawing their labor from the Bantustan populations. Mean-
while, the removals from the towns are being pushed ahead even though
the 'border industries' are nowhere near ready to absorb the numbers
of displaced workers. . . .
"The government has already set up its first Bantustan in the
Transkei, an area the size of Denmark, in the eastern Cape Province.
It is the traditional homeland of the Xhosa-speaking people (1,500,0OQ
"The constitution for the Transkei makes it the equivalent of a
British colony. Instead of a governor it has a commissioner-general
-- a tough, right-wing former Nationalist M.P.- -- who holds all ulti-
mate power on behalf of the Republican Government. The functions of
the Transkei Territorial Authority are restricted to local affairs.
Its Parliament consists of 64 chiefs and 45 elected members. Since
the chiefs can be disciplined or dismissed at will by the Republican
Government, it has the power to control the nonelected majority.
"The Transkei is known as 'Verwoerd's Reich' because its first
'Prime Minister' is Chief Kaiser Matanzima, a 35-year-old, sophisti-
cated,, tough university graduate. He is a perfect partner for Dr.
Verwoerd. He, too, believes in apartheid: it fits in well with his
own deeply held attachment to black racism.
"The government has gambled heavily on Matanzima. If he lets
them down, or fails, Bantustan would suffer a serious setback, and so
would Dr. Verwoerd. Ma.tanzima is no easy tiger to ride. He has al-
ready demanded that all the.land between the Fish River and Zululand
(which includes the whole of Natal) should be-handed over to
Bantustan. And he has begun to menace the white traders in the
Transkei. On this point.Verwoerd,'s attitude is consistent: he be-
lieves that, just as the blacks have no inherent rights in the white
areas, so the whites have none in the Bantustans.
"Matanzima's chief opponent is the most powerful chief in the
Transkei -- Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu.. He has
resisted all government. pressures to make him cooperate; if the gov-
ernment hesitates to depose him it is because it fears the trouble
this would bring from the numerous Tembu people. Sabata stands
firmly for an interracial society. . . .
"Things are not going well in the first.Bantustan. A state of.
emergency, proclaimed when Pondo peasants revolted in 1961, is: still
in force. The leader of this revolt., Magaduzele Bentzwana, heads a
violent underground movement in the hills. He has sworn not to be
taken alive.
"A second underground violence movement, Pogo,. has been responsi-
ble for several killings of whites and blacks in the Transkei. oogo's
immediate target is to kill chiefs who support Matanzima; his own life
is constantly threatened, and he moves everywhere under heavy guard.
Matanzima's police are notorious for the brutality they show to their
opponents,. who. are. no less violent in their own methods.
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. "Thus the Transkei , which until the advent of Bantustan had
been one of the most tranquil parts of South Africa -- has been
turned into an armed camp, divided between the supporters and oppo-
nents of Chief Matanzima. Violence has already become an important
factor in the way things work out in the first of the eight
Bantustans. But still the government is not hesitating to push
ahead its plans to establish another seven."
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"Has South Africa a Future?" by Frank Giles (traveling foreign editors
In The Sunday Times, London, March 13, 1963
"The first impression that a visitor to South Africa receives
today is of a rich and immensely promising country being led with
slow but apparent certainty towards disaster.
"On the practical side, admittedly, it is tempting to question
whether the shortcomings of apartheid ar9 so great. 'From the moral
and human point of view apartheid is detestable, but for the moment
it works' was how an experienced foreign diplomatist, stationed in
Capetown, judged the situation. . . .
"Criticism from outside is easy. It riust, in all fairness, be
considered natural for many white South Africans in fear for their
way of life (and perhaps their lives themselves) to see things
differently and find present conditions quite acceptable if not
actually pleasant. But inquiries soon reveal the flaws (apart from
its inhumanity) of apartheid.
"In its latest form, it seeks to create a series of Bantu
(African)'homelands' in the traditional tribal areas where the
African will be able to exercise his political rights and develop
himself, socially and economically, without the interference or
harmful impact of white civilization. This may in theory be a noble
vision, but it cannot accommodate two simple facts: first, the
'homelands,' many of them no better than rural slums, are incapable
in the foreseeable future of supporting any substantial increase in
their existing populations of about 4.5 million. Secondly, the six
million Africans living outside the homelands, who supply the cheap
labor force indispensable to the economy, are to continue to be
denied any sort of status in the white areas where they live and
work. . . .
"The lack of any political rights for the Africans living in
the white areas is justified by a comparison with Italians working
in France, or Mexicans in the United States -- 'If they wish to
exercise their rights as, citizens they return to their own coun-
tr1ae.' Not only does this argument overlook the fact that vast
numbers of the Bantu in the industrial areas have become de-
tribalized, losing all touch with their homelands and transforming
themselves into a depressed proletariat, but it also passes over all
the many aspects of racial discrimination which make the African's
life a permanently underprivileged one. . . .
"Difficult as it may be to find aught for one's comfort in
South Africa today, none the less I believe that there are redeeming
features, even in Nationalist policy, and that the outside world
must by no means despair of a land whose racial problems are, it
must be recognized, unique.
"To begin with, the very application of apartheid policy has
brought its own incidental benefits. For the first time, a South
African Government, however questionable its philosophy, is doing
something about the native. 'Separate development' means putting
Africans to live in townships away from the white areas, and a huge
program of native housing has been undertaken, with results that are
visibly impressive by African or any other standards. The people
who inhabit these townships may not have the vote or access to free-
hold rights, but they live for the most part in conditions far better
than those to be found in, for example, the Southern Rhodesian
townships. . . .
"The biggest rift in the lute of Nationalist thinking is to be
seen, I think, in the practical realization of the Bantustan idea.
So far, only one of the native reserve areas.-- the Transkei, a
fertile and picturesque but poverty-stricken rigion lying between
East London and Durban -- is being prepared for so-called self-,
government and independence by means of a constitution which will
come into force some time this year. But the protents of this
development are such-that it is not impossible that it may lead to
an upsurge of African nationalism which the white Nationalists will
be increasingly incapable of controlling.
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"Very few of the Liberals or progressives would agree, it is
true, with this view that the Bantustans may be transformed into so
many daggers pointed at the hearts of their creators. They can
produce what they think to be cast-iron reasons why Transkei's
'nationhood:' is only one more example of Nationalist hypocrisy.
They may be right, and certainly most of the educated Africans I
talked to in Johannesburg and elsewhere thought like this.
"But it is significant that some of Verwoerd's own party are
beginning, despite the massive safeguards and reservations built
into the Transkei constitution, audibly to protest about what they
fear will be a Frankenstein monster, to the point that Verwoerd
has even been accused of being a liberal. Far-fetched though this
may sound, it is undeniable that the theory of Bantustan, and still
more its impending practice as embodied in the new Transkei con-
stitution, establishes an entirely new factor in South African
politics: that the black man has political rights, and that he is
to exercise them within his own homeland by the one-man-one-vote
method. is it really conceivable that once this principle, has been
ter-
admitted it will be possible to limit it, in face of all the inter-
nal and external pressures which will surely be forthcoming,
nal a
number of prescribed African areas?"
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"The Overthrow of Apartheid" by Patrick Duncan (South African editor
of Contact who has fled the country)
In The New Republic March 9, 1953
"The Communists' best hope in Africa lies in a land which has
not yet found freedom -- South Africa.
"Through the unyielding oppressiveness of the apartheid govern-
ment there is now no chance of a peaceful transition to freedom and
democracy. The way to power in South Africa now lies through the
use of force, and the movement that first successfully uses force
against apartheid is assured of overwhelming world support.
"The Communists and their allies have pioneered the use of
sabotage against Dr. Verwoerd's government and are well in the rung-
Wing in the race to open the shooting war this year or next. One of
the leading anti-apartheid movements, the African National Congress,
has for years been anti-Western and during the Cuba crisis it sent
messages of encouragement to Castro. Also, Dr. Verwoerd's government
is pathologically afraid of communism and smears as Communist any
democratic protest against apartheid. The oppressed, who hate
apartheid, are therefore tempted to love apartheid's foes, including
communism. All these factors make it possible that the South African
revolution will be begun by the Communists. What this would mean was
well nut by a recent American letterwriter to The Observer (Dec.
16, 1962). 'Should a major uprising against the South rican Govern
anent be led by Co=s unists,' he wrote, 'the Western world would be
confronted with a choice of evils of unprecedented difficulty.'
"The best, perhaps the only guarantee that a future free South
Africa will be non-Communist is that the South African revolution be
begun and led to victory by men who are not Communist. Such men
exist within South Africa, but they have insufficient arms and money.
They must now be given what they need.
"Although the idea of launching and powering a revolution for
the attainment of democratic rights will seem fantastic to more cau-
tious spirits in London and Washington, there are precedents. To
quote President Kennedy: 'Most political revolutions -- including
our own -- have been buoyed by outside aid in men, weapons and ideas'
(Strategy of Peace).
"There is another Southern African field in which the West dare
not allow itself to be outplayed and outbid. Intertwined with the
South African revolution is the question of Southwest Africa. Almosi
certainly the United Nations will decide in the near future to remove
the one-time mandate from the control of the South African Government
Any such move will require teeth if it is to be successful, and
supporters of a policy of tough action will no doubt have been en-
couraged by the recent military successes of the United Nations
troops in Katanga, only 400 miles away from Southwest Africa.
When this decision to unlock Southwest Africa from the grip of
Verwoerd's Government is made, the West will be faced with this
choice: to cooperate with the United Nations, to finance, arm and
transport its force (backed by an all but unanimous vote of the
General Assembly and enjoying the sympathy of virtually the whole
human race), or to sit by and watch the Soviets do it.
"In Southwest Africa and South Africa., America's policy of nur-
turing freedom and blocking.commu.n.ism leads irresistibly to the use
of force, force to power the South African anti"apartheid revolution
and force to support the United Nations in Southwest Africa. A
foretaste of what lies ahead has been experienced in the fighting to
free Katanga from Tshombe's concealed colonialism. Africa south
of the Congo presents the West now with its next unavoidable choice:
is it for or against apartheid? Let the choice be made soon."
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CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
We, the Reads of African States and Governments assembled in the
City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control
their otm destiny;
CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity
are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations
of to African peoples;
CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human
resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in
splieres of. human endeavour;
INSPIRED by a common determination to strengthen understanding and
cooperation among our States in response to the aspirations of our
peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a large unity transcending
.ethnic and national differences;
CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dy-
namic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and
security must be established and maintained;
DETE.YINE'D to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence
as T-rell as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and
to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms;
DEDICATED to the general progress of Africa;
PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our
adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive coopera-
tion among states;
DESIROUS that all African States should henceforth unite so that
the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured;
RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our states by establishing
and strengthening common institutions;
HAVE agreed to the present Charter.
ESTABLISI NT
Article I
1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish
an Organization to be known as the "Organization of AFRICAN UNITY."
2. The Organization shall include the Continental African States,
Madagascar and all the islands surrounding Africa.
PURPOSES Article IT
1. The Organization shall have the following purposes:
a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;.
. to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts
to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity
and independence;
d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
e. to promote international cooperation, having due regard to
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonise
their general policies, especially in the following fields:
a. Political and diplomatic cooperation;
b. economic cooperation, including transport and communi-
cations;
c. educational and cultural cooperation;
d. healtah, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation;
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e. scientific and technical cooperation; and
f. cooperation for defence and security.
PRINCIPLES Article III
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II,
solemnly affirm and declare their a&;erence to the follorin& principles:
1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
member State and for its inalienable right to independent
existence;
4. peaceful settlement of dispute by negotiation, ;mediation, con-
ciliation or arbitration;
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assas-
sination as well as of subversive activities on the part of
neighbouring States or any other States;
6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African
territories which are still dependent;
7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all
blocs.
____;RSHIP Article IV
Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to be-
come a Member of the Organization.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF M& BER STATES Article V
All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.
Article VI
The Member States pledfe themselves to observe scrupulously the
principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.
INSTITUTIONS
The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the follow-
ing principal institutions:
1. The assembly of Heads of State and Government;
2. the Council of Ministers;
3. the General Secretariat;
4. the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT Article VIII
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme
organ of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this
Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co-
ordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organization. It
may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs
and any specialized agencies which ray be created in accordance with the
present Charter.
The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State, Government
or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once
a year. At the request of any Member State, and approval by the major ty
of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary Session.
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Article X
1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a ti-ro-thirds majority
of the members of the Organization.
3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether
or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple
majority of all Member States of the Organization.
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Oranization shall
form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly.
The Assembly shall have the pairer to determine its ovm rules of
procedure.
TEE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Article XII
The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or such
other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States.
The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When
requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member
States, it slAl.l meet in extraordinary session.
The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the respon-
sibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.
It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the
Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate
inter-African cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the
Assembly and in conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter.
Article XIV
1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the
Council of Ministers.
3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council, shall form
a quorum for any meeting of the Council.
The Council shall have the power to determine its own rule of pro-
cedure.
GENERAL SECRETARIAT Article XVI
There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organiza-
tion, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The
Administrative Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the
Secretariat.
There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the
Oranization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of States
and Governments.
The functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-General,
of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat
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shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations
approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
1. In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secretary-
General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions
from any government or from any other authority external to the
organization. They shall refrain from any action which might
reflect on their position as international officials responsible
only to the organization.
2. Each member of the organization undertakes to respect the ex-
clusive character of the responsibilities of the Administrative
Secretary-General and the Staff and not to seek to influence
them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
COWISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION Article XIX
Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peace-
ful metes and, to this end, decide to establish a Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and the condition
of service shall be defined by a separate protocol to be approved by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Specialized Commissions Article XX
The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it
may deem necessary, including the following:
1. Economic and Social Commission;
2. Educational and Cultural Commission;
3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission;
4. Defence Commission;
5. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.
Article XXI
Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX shall be com-
posed of the Ministers Concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentaries
desir ated by the Governments of the Member States.
The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be carried out
in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the
regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.
THE BUDGET Article XXIII
The budget of the Organization prepared by the Administrative
Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The
budget shall be provided by contributions from Member States in accor-
dance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, how-
ever, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty
percent of the yearly regular budget of the Organization. The Member
States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly.
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER Article XXIV
This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign
African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes.
The original instrument, done if possible in African languages, in
English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited
with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies
thereof to all independent sovereign African states.
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Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government
of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit.
ENTRY INTO FORCE Article XXV
This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by
the Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two-
thirds of the signatory States.
REGISTRATION OF THE CHARTER Article XXVI
This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the
Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in
conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER Article XXVII
Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this
Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government of the Organizations.
ADHESION AND ACCESSION Article XXVIII
1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify
the Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede
to this Charter.
2. The Administrative Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such
notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admis-
sion shall be decided by a simple majority of Member States. The decision
of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Administrative Secretary-
General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communi-
cate the decision to the State concerned.
MISCELLANEOUS Article XXIX
The working languages of the Organization and all its institutions
shall be, if possible.. African languages, English and French.
Article XXX
The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the
Organization gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organization,
provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers.
Article XXXI
The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immuni-
ties to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective
territories of the Member States.
CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP Article XXXII
Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward
a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. At the
end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn,
the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State,
which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organization.
AMENDIENT TO THE CHARTER Article XXXIII
This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes
a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect;
provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the
Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly
notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment
shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of all the
Member States,
In faith whereof, We, the Heads of African States and Government,
have signed this Charter.
Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, this 25th day of May, 1963.
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