BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 3, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 1999/08~a ift-PnP78-03061A0002000A00021363
Briefly Noted
Chinese Occupation and Colonization of Tibet
Thirteen years ago on 23 May, organized Tibetan resistance to
the Chinese Red Army ended and the Chinese Communist occupation and
colonization of Tibet was initiated. This anniversary has had very
little publicity, even in the neutralist and non-aligned countries
that take such fierce pride in their opposition to imperialism and
colonialism, not to mention aggression and interference in the
internal affairs of other countries. There is no indication, for
example, that these nations are making any plans to get the Tibetan
issue on the Fall 1963 agenda of the UN General Assembly. It is an
ironic fact that Red China's rape of Tibet is being allowed to fade
from the world's memory largely because the Chinese Communists'
wanton attack on India is more recent and thus more "newsworthy."
Immediately after the forced signing of the Chinese-Tibetan
agreement in 1951, the Chinese Communists began violating the agree-
ments and undertook the communization of Tibet. The Tibetan people
resisted the attempts to impose upon them a way of life that was
alien to their history and incompatible with their religion. The
disaffection of the Tibetan people for their Red Chinese occupiers
culminated in the March 1959 revolt of the Dalai Lama which was
mercilessly crushed. There is ample evidence of the genocide that
has since been inflicted upon the Tibetan people and this must
remain on the conscience of all men who respect the rights of
pence-loving nations and who value their own freedom. Tibet's only
desire toward her neighbors was to live in peace with them and
because of this desire, Tibet no longer exists as a free and
independent nation.
The neutralist and non-aligned nations, particularly India and
others in southeast Asia who are Red China's neighbors, should under-
stand that their willingness to forget Tibet will only encourage
Peking to carry out the same pattern somewhere else. India parti-
cularly should take the initiative in reviving publicity about Tibet:
not only has she recently acquired additional experience regarding
Red China's aggressiveness, but one important reason the Chinese
Communists absorbed Tibet was to use it as a base to penetrate the
Tibetan-Indian border areas which ultimately became part of the
pretext for unprovoked attacks against India itself.
On December 20, 1961, the United Nations approved -- by a vote
of 56 to 11, with 29 abstentions -- a resolution calling on the
Chinese Communists to free the Tibetan people and grant them their
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the right to self-
determination. The appeals set forth in that resolution have
universal validity and deserve the constant and continuing support
of all men who oppose international aggression regardless of whether
that aggression happens to be the news of the day. This resolution
should be recalled to the delegations attending the UN 18th General
Assembly which opens in September.
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(Briefly Noted Continuec
 (ha MgiFpg,F( lgase)1999/08/244 . ClA-RDPJ8-03061 A00020 0 0002-1une 1 63
Cuba's Communism No Longer "Sugar-Coated"
Cuba's average sugar crop from 1957 through 1961 was 6,303,060
tons despite artificial restrictions. The 1962 crop -- Cuba's
first year of declared Communism -- fell to 4, 803, 00,E tons which
was 60,000 tons short of Cuba's commitments to the Communist Bloc.
The prospects for 1963 -- Cuba's "Year of Organization" -- suggest
a total of, at the most, 3.5 to 4 million tons and many estimates
are lower.
Failure to meet production goals belies the propaganda about
"glorious" Communist "achievements" and underscores Cuba's economic
plight. Cuba promised to sell the Communist Bloc 4,360,000 tons of
sugar a year through 1965 in return for equipment and other barter
ite Ds. Obviously, it will not be able to fulfill its promise and
even heavier outlays from the Communist Bloc will be required to
maintain Cuba. Sugar sold on the open market is reaping premium
prices, but Cuba's small production leaves it no surplus to tale
advantage of this development. Reports persist that Soviet Russia
is re-selling Cuba's sugar for a profit.
Many of the reasons for Cuba's dwindling sugar production were
cited in a previous Propaganda Guidance -- Item 621 WH, b . "Cuba's
Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings" (see also Item 615 W}a,
"1963: Cuba's 'Year of Organization'"). They include bureaucratic
inefficiency, failing equipment, lack of manpower, absence of
shillec1 technicians and managers, shortage of cane, fertilizer and
irrigation limitations, shortages of transportation, equipment,
sugar bags, etc. Reduced wages, military conscription, Militia
.mobilization, parades and other trappings of a Communist State have
taken their toll. Exhortations for greater effort and the promise
of machines to do the work have failed to alleviate the situation.
The outlook for next year is not much better.
We cite Cuba's sugar record as an example of "fulfillment" of
Communist promises and one of the underlying reasons for Castrc's
prolonged trip to Moscow.
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DES 'fefly Noted)
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June 1963
DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
24 June WIDE's Fifth Congress, Moscow, 24-29 June 1963
25 June North Korea broadcasts declaration of war;
forces invade Republic Y South Korea TI 0)
26 June Allied airlift to Berlin begins successful
answer to Soviet blockade - fifteenth
anniversary (1948)
27 June
28 June
28 June
1 July
8th Congress of American Educate:,, Rio de
Janeiro, 27 June - 1 July.
Poznan, Poland: revolt against Communist rule;
44 killed and hundreds wounded (1956)
Cominform expels Yugoslav
anniversary C1548)
arty - fifteenth
Chinese Communist Party founded (1921)
4 July Republic of the Philippines granted independence
by the USA (1946)
7 July Communist IUS backing International Seminar for
underdeveloped countries, Salvador, Bahia,
Brazil. 7 - 14 July.
7 July Argentina: general elections scheduled
9 July ICFTU Vienna World Youth Rally July 9-19.
20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement
1954_ Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam)
22 July OAS Panama Declaration of political and eco-
nomic philosophy 1956. (US invited first
International Conference of American States
to W^shington in 1899, the first step toward
creating the Pan American Union.)
31 July Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against
Communist guerrillas, 1960.
August Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco
State scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist
Governor Miguel Arraes.
6 August 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, Santiago,
Chile, 6 - 11 August.
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(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 199 - DP78-03OUA000200020002-7
OMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
14-27 May 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. After months of approaches, proposals and counter-proposals,
the Soviet and Chinese Parties are finally agreed to a meeting of
high-level delegations in Moscow July 5 to discuss their differ-
ences on ideological and tactical matters. Both delegations will
include top ideological specialists, at a level just below "the
sup g sit . ?
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2. However, both sides continue to press their political-ideolog-
ical warfare with unabated vigor, in a series of political actions,
official statements, speeches and published articles.
3. Both sides seem to have made some progress in their efforts to
line up support for their respective positions, -- with Peking
apparently having more to show in the way of results. The Chinese
succeeded in getting a joint statement in tune with their line
si;nod with the unaligned North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh and another
by the already aligned New Zealand CP boss, and saw the chief of
the important Soviet-wooed and formerly unaligned Indonesian Party
come out with a speech which seemed to put the PKI openly on Pe insg~as
side. They also followed up on their success at the Djakarta Afro-
Asian Journalists Conference last month by their ostentatious
reception and fetin? of delegates of seven A-A countries from the
conference. Moscow's month-long red-carpet pampering of Castro
seems to have atoned to some degree for the damage to the Soviet
image resulting from last fall's "capitulationisn," producing a
joint statement on their side, -- and Tito and his cohorts spoke
out in defense of the Soviet line.
4. Moscow observers agree that Khrushchev seems to have bounced
back from any threat to his leadership, demonstrating new vigor
and confidence in his authority. Topping in the New York Times
(May 25) reports that diplomatic representatives cite two principal
factors in Khrushchev's rebound: Kozlov's illness, renewing the
Party's difficulties in agreeing on a possible successor, and the
Castro visit. Khrushchev has seemed to draw strength from his
association with Castro, it is said, and Castro's written alignment
with the CPSU is a considerable tangible achievement.
Significance: Although it is practically impossible to predict the
course it ter ll take and the immediately visible results, the forth-
coming Moscow bilateral meeting may be one of the most momentous
events in the history of world Communise. Both protagonists have
been acting more like enemies preparing their positions for combat
than fraternal members of the sane club trying to reach agreement
by Pive-and-take. The consensus of Western analysts is that the
factors favoring conflict between the two are indeed of such
magn~i
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future no long-term prospect is for continued worsening of
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:-arty-state rivalry and hostility. However, in its-struggle for
support by the rest of the world Communist movement, each party is
under heavy pressure to make a maximum apparent effort to restore
unity. This compulsion is probably the only factor which brought
the apparently reluctant soviets to agree to this meeting and it
will be a strong force acting to prevent any open rupture of
relations and even tending to produce so-no sort of "papering-over"
agreement which both could accept. In any case, the basic causes
of conflict will in all likelihood be little affected by any
"agreements" which may be announced, and the exposure of them by 25X1 C1 Ob
all means pcssiblo will continue to be a top-priority task for us.
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#4 14-27 May 1963
May 7 and 12 - The Albanians continued their attacks on Khrushchev
and o w h articles in their cultural weekly Drita on the 7th
and Zeri i Popullit on the 12th.
mraw 1-4 - The CPSU announced that the plenum scheduled for 28 May
would be postponed to 13 June. The announcement stated that the
decision was made on 3 May, -- as though to link it with Kozlov's
illness which was announced on 4 May. On the same day, Peking
announced its acceptance of a new PSU proposal that the bilateral
talks in Moscow begin on 5 July.
May 15 - The CPSU announced the names of a top-level delegation,
hea ecl by Suslov, for talks with the Chinese beginning 5 July.
The announcement recounted that the C?SU had originally proposed
15 May for the talks, that the CCP hnd proposed postponing until
mid-June and that the CPSU had countered with the 5 July date
"because June is filled with previously planned events, including
some that are international in nature." (There has been subsequent
speculation that the really important "international" event in June
might be Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia: such a visit has been
referred to as forthcoming in a 16 May article by Unita's Moscow
correspondent Boffa and in a 20 May Radio Moscow brow ca ast to Serbo-
Croatian to Yugoslavia.) And on the same date, Pravda L,d a teea
by French CP chief Torez to an FCP plenum denounctngg he "left-wind,
deviation" of the Chicoms as the main danger to international
communism.
May 15-10 - Chinese chairman Liu Shao-chi climaxed his week-long
visit t? North Vietnam by delivering a sharp polemical speech to
the Marxist Institute in Hanoi on the 15th and winning Ho Chi Minh's
signature to a joint statement on the 16th which gave an iiapression
of Vietnamese support for Chinese views. The Vietnamese avoided
any clear-cut commitment to the Chinese side and did not really
move from their previous "non-alignment": 'owever, the statement
conveyed the appearance of support by emphasizing a number of
common ideological positions in conflict with the Soviet line and
including Ho's tribute to China's "socialist construction" while
omitting mention of other questions on which Ho's views are closer
to the Soviets. At the Party school, Liu stated that the interna-
tional Coimaunist movement is now "in a crucial period of utmost
importance" because of an "acute struggle between the Marxist-
Leninists and the modern revisionists" centered around whether the
people of the world "should carry out revolutions or not, and
whether the proletarian parties should lead the world's people in
revolutions or not." It is the task of all Marxist-Leninists, he
said, "not to evade the challenge of modern revisionists but to
unite to smash its attack completely," and he urged all Communists
to study the works of Stalin -- as well as Marx, Engels and Lenin.
The joint statement puts both parties on record as emphasizing unity
on the basis of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow resolutions, which means
that "in the present circumstances, revisionism, in other words,
right opportunism, is the main danger in the international
Communist movement.... It seeks persistently to...deny the histori-
ca ggsgell} P a I*DF 65663'i4l9t92?4012b002-7
prolet he period o ransi ion from capitalism to
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social3sr, and ommun .... ugos avia is the cork trated expression
'of modern revisionist 'theories.' ... Further exposure of the Yugo
Slav revisionist clique remains an essential task of the Marxist-
Leninist parties of all countries." Both parties also "reaffirm
the necessity of calling a meeting of representatives of the Communist
and workers parties of the whole world in order to eliminate the
differences and strengthen unity," for which "it is necessary to
make adequate preparations," including bilateral talks such as those
scheduled between the CPSU and CCP, which are greeted with satis-
faction. "Ho Chi Minh pays warm tribute to the great successes
achieved by the Chinese people in socialist construction under the
leadership of the CCP and Chairman Mao Tse-tung and guided by the
three red banners -- the general line for socialist construction,
the great leap forward, and the people's communes."
May 1S - Delivering a major policy speech to a CC plenum of the
Yugoslav Party, Tito voiced his gratitude to Khrushchev and his
associates for making possible improved relations with the CPSU
(tharouh the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses) and
then launched into a hard-hitting attack on the Chinese, who "are
persisting in their dogmatic positions on relations within ... the
Coxmryaunist movement." Noting that "we have been accused of revision-
ism" by the Chinese leaders, Tito acknowledged that "we do not
consider ourselves infallible, just as we do not consider a Commu-
nist Party or movement infallible, and least of all the CCP leader-
ship.11 However, "practice and results are the best gauges of the
correct application of the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin," and
"if we regard the practice and the results achieved by the Chinese
Corrtaunists in their internal development, then their errors have
been of Himalayan proportion in comparison with ours." Noting the
Chinese claim that the Yugoslav economy is in a continual and
profound crisis provoked by a return to capitalism, Tito said "I
am sure that they would be extremely happy to find themselves in
such a crisis." He states his opinion that the Chinese charge of
Yuoslav return to capitalism is made solely to undercut "the great
prestige Yugoslavia enjoys in the Asian and African countries," and
goes on to accuse the Chinese of developing "nationalism of the
worst possible kind" which is reflected "in the policy of pitting
the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against the peoples
of Europe and the developed countries." He also points an accusing
finger at the Chinese for inducing factional strife and interference
in the internal affairs of other parties and countries by disseminat-
ing in other countries "various kinds of pamphlets with a dogmatic
content, materials containing slanders and distortions of the truth,"
against other parties and their leaders. Finally, in foreign policy,
he accuses the Chinese of outright Trotskyism in their slogan of "a
permanent offensive." Other participants in the plenum also attacked
the Chinese, including Dobrivoje Vidic, who stated that "about 400
anti-Yugoslav articles have appeared in the Chinese press in the last
five months. 11
May 1C-19 - Journalists from Basutoland, Cameroon, Ceylon, Japan,
Pakistan, South Africa and Zanzibar who had attended the A-A
Journalists Conference in Djakarta 24-30 April were received and
feted in Peking by the All-China Journalists Association and the
Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, whose chairman,
Liao 9J9/ba~24 :A61 t[ 8 00?~0~0~afi0~ 7
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ox fo ng a new orgy nation of their own -- the Afro-Asian
journalists Association, " according to Nom.
May 19 and 25 - Comrade V.G. Wilcox, Secretary General of the CP
o? Nevi ea~:and, arrive in Peking at the invitation of the CC CCP,
according to NCNA. On 25 May NCNA reported a joint CPNZ-CCp
statement which includoc the assertion that "to side with the
Yugoslav revisionists is nothing but betrayal of Marxism-Leninism."
May 20 - Radio Belgrade announced that the Yuaos)av Secretariat
o oreign Affairs had handed the Chinese charge a note protesting
"the brutal and slanderous attack on Yugoslavia and its foreign
policy contained in the joint declaration of the Chairman of the
CPR, Liu Shao-chi, and the President of the DVR, Ho Chi Minh,
published on 16 May in Hanoi."
May 20 - NCNA announced that the combined issue Nos. 10-11 of Red
F? a had just been Published, with the last seven chapters ITO-S.
77712rough 19 -- and conclusion of the massive series on "Lenin's
Struggle Against Revisionism and Opportunism." The conclusion
states that Lenin's 30-year struggle shows that "although revision-
ists and opportunists may raise a loud clamor for some time, they
are generally only a reverse current in the whole Coramunist move-
ment, and will eventually be overcome by the revolutionary tide of
Marxism-Leninism. t,
May 23 - Speaking at a Moscow stadium rally in official farewell
c> astrc, Khrushchev referred only briefly to differences with
the Chinese, which he said were the subject of fabrications in the
bourgeois press, and he promised to "do everything to have this
(CCP-CPSU) meeting ...elimim to the differences." However, he was
obviously alluding to the Chinese when he said: "It is necessary
to fight resolutely against any division of the revolutionary
forces under any pretext. Non-class division by continent, color
or skin, or any other standard, means a division of the forces of
the working class." The joint Khrushchev-Castro statement signed
the same day put Cuba firmly in the Soviet camp.
May 26 - Pravda printed a full page of extracts from the 18 May
o speechddc-.scribed above, although they reportedly edited out
Tito's strongest attacks on Peking. On the same day, Indonesian
CP chief Aidit, addressing a Communist rally of 10,000 in
Djakarta, seemed to confirm the P1(I's alignment with Peking as
he denounced Tito and his brand of communism.
May 27 - NCNA reports that the North Korean 'arty paper Nodong
Faun carried an editorial replying to the May 1S Tito speech
aging the Chinese line.
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14-27 xmai 1963
7 et 12 niai - Les Albanais continuent leurs attaques contre Khroutchev at Tito avec
'des articles dana leur hebdomadaire culturel "Drita" le 7 mai at Bans "Zeri i Popul-
lit" le 12 mai.
14 mai - Le PC'.US a annonce que la reunion pleniere qui devait avoir lieu le 28 mai
sera remise au 18 juin. L'annonce disait que la ddcision avait 4tg prise le 3 mai,
-- corame pour impliquer qu'il y a l un rapport avec la maladie de Kozlov qui a etg
annoncee le 4 mai. Le mine jour, Pekin a annonc4 qu'il acceptait la nouvelle pro-
position du PCUS que des entretiens bilateraux aient lieu A. Moscou A partir du 5
uillet.
5 ruai - Le PCUS a annonce lea name de ceux qui composent une d.dldgation de hauts
personnaes sous la direction de Souslov pour lea entretiens avec lea Chinois qui
wont commencer le 5 juillet. L'annonce disait que le PCUS avait tout d'abord pro-
:posd la date du 15 mai pour ees entretiens, que le PCC await propose de remettre
jusqu'A la mi-juin at que le parti conmuniste de 1'Union Sovidtique avait repondu
an proposant is 5 millet "parce que juin eat rempli d'dvdnements prdvus ant'erieu-
re,-rient, parti lesquels ii y an a qui sont de nature internationals." (On a pensd
par la suite que l'dvdnement "international" vraiment important devant avoir lieu
an juin pourrait 19tre la visite de Khrouchtchev en Yiwgoslavie: it a dtd question
de cette visits comme 4tant sur le point de se faire dans un article du 16 mai par
Doffa qui est le correspondant A Moscou du journal "L'Unita", at dans une dmission
is Radio Moscou an date du 20 mai adressde A. la You;oslavie an lan,ue serbo-croate).
Le mtwe jour, "Pravda" publiait un discours de Tliorez le chef du PC francais, a-
,iressd A une rdunion pld`nibre du PCF at ddnoncant la "deviation vera la gauche" des
Chinois conmunistes comne dtant le principal dancer menacant le commmunisme inter-
national.
15-16 mai - L'homme d'Etat chinois, Liu S hao-chi a terming la visite dune semaine
qu'il a faite au Nord Viet-nam an prononcant un discours nettement poldmique .
1'Institut Marxiste a Hanoi le 15 mai, at en obtenant le 16 qu'Ho Chi Minh signe un
conmmuniqud en conmun donnant 1'impression d'un appui vietnamien pour lea vues chi-
noises. Dana ce communiqud redige an consraun, qui n'allait pas aussi loin que
heaucoup d'observateurs auraient cru, et qui dtait certainement loin de ce que Liu
aurait voulu obtenir, le Vietnamien a d'vitg de a'en ;alter nettement du catd.chinois
et an eat en sonuae restd & sa position prdcddente de "non-engagement". Mais la
declaration a donnd 1'im.presaion d'appuyer lea Chinois peace qu'elle a soulignd
plusieurs positions idd'olo6iques qu'ils ont en commun et qui ne concordant pas avec
!a liens" sovietique, et aussi parce que Ho a fait 1'6lo;e de la "construction so-
cialiste" de la Chine tout en se gardant de mentionner d'autres questions sur lea-
quelles lea vues de Ho se rapprochent davanta a de celles des Soviets. A 114cole
du parts, Liu a declare que le mouvement communiste international traversait an ce
moment "une pdriode critique de la plus grande importance" du fait dune "lutte in-
tense entre lea marxistes-l4ninistes et lea rdvisionnistes modernes"; lutte dont
1'objet est de decider at lea peuples du aaonde "doivent faire des revolutions ou
non, at si lea partis proldtaires doivent ou non diriger lea peuples du monde dans
ces rdsolutions." Z1 est du devoir de tous lea marxistes-ldninistes, a-t-il dit,
"de ne pas se soustraire au ddfi ports par lea r4visionnistes modernes mais de
a'unir pour dcraser compl4tement leur attaque." Il a vivement incite tous lea com-
munistes A dtudier lea oeuvres de Staline -- comme teller de Marx, d'Engels at de
L4nine. Le corauniqud redigd en cormun prend acte du fait que lea deux partir in-
sistent sur le besoin d'unite an se basant sur lea resolutions de Moscou de 1957 et
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 de 196O,Ap~ ~cesiL,~xd~f~el s ~ 918/a~4cc x ~ t A, 24 ~ sme,
autrement dit 1 t opportuni sme de droite, est le principal dander menagant le ,mauve ?.
zr1nt:commun3.ste international... Il cherche constamment ft,,, nier le besoin histo-
xique de la r'volution proldtaire et de la dictature du proldtariat pendant la p4--
riode de transition du capitalisme au socialisme et au comununisme... La Yougosla-
vie est l'expression concentrde des tth4eries' r4visionnintes modernes,.. Sl faut
continuer ft dMnoncer la clique r4visionniste youzjoslave et ceci reste une t9che es-
sentielle des partis narxistes?ldninistes de tous lea pays." Les deu`c partis ant
aussi "rdaffirm4 la n4cessitd de convoquer une r4union des reprdsentants des partis
communistes et travail.listes du monde entier de fagon A 4liminer lee diff4rences
et A. affermir ltunit4." "Il est n4cessaire de se pr4parer convenablement ft cette
rd=ion," et c'est pourquoi lea entretiens bilatdraux comme ceux qui doivent avoir
lieu entre le PLUS et le PCC sont accueill.is avec satisfaction. "Ho Chi Minh fait
chaudenient l'4loge des Brands succes auxquels est arriv4 le peuple chinois dans la
construction du sacialisme sous la, directinn du parts communiste chinois et de son
pr4sident Mao Tsd-toun,; avec l'aide des trois banni4res rouges pour montrer le che-
:min -- la li!;ne de conduite g4n?rale pour la construction du socialisme, le grand
'bond en avant, et lea communes populaires."
:18 mai - Pronongant un important discours devant une r4union pl4niere du comity' cen-
tral du parti you oslave, Tito a exprimd la gratitude qu'ii dprouve pour Khroucht-
chev et sea associ4s parce qutils out rendu possible l'am4lioratien des relations
avec le PCUS (gr9ce aux d4cisions des XXe et XXTIe confines du parti), puis it west
la=4 dans une dure attaque contre lea Chinois qui "s'ent?tent f. conserver leurs
positions dogxcatiques vis-f-vis des relations au sein du mouvement communiste et du
d4veloppement futur de ce mouvement," Faisant remarquer que "noes avons 4th' accus4s
de r4visionnisme" par lea chefs chinois, Tito reconnai~t que "nous ne nous considd-
rons pas infaillibles, tout connie nous ne consid4rons pas un parti ou mouvement com-
znuniste infail.l,ible, et surtout pas lea chefs du PCC." Toutefois, "la pratique et
:Les r4sultats obtenus sont la meilleure fagon.de ju er de l'application correcte des
th4ories de Marx, dtEn.els et de Ldnine", et "si nous consid4rons is. pratique et
:es r4sultats obtenus par lee communistes chinois dans leur d6veloppement intdrieur,
alors leurs erreurs out lee proportions de 1tHimalaya par camparaison aver lea n--
tree." Remarquant que lea Chinois soutiennent que 1 4conomie you,, oslave est dans
un dtat de crise continuelle et profonde, provoqu4e par un retour au capitalisnle,
Tito dit "Je suss ser qutil ne leur d4plairait pas de se trouver dans une crise
aa,rmne !A nitre." Il exprime son opinion que itaccusation chinoise que is. You_ osla-
vie retourne au capitalisme est faite surtout pour miner "le ;,rand presti.;e que is.
You.;oslavie posshde dans lea pays de itAsie et de ltAfrique". Il continue en accu-
s,ant lea Chinois de favoriser le d4veloppement "dtun nationalisme de is. pine espece"
cjui se voit par sa politique "dtopposer lea peupies de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et de
7;'Am4rique Latine contre lea peuples de 1'Europe et des pays ddvelopp4s." II
pointe aussi un doi4;t accusateur vers lea Chinois parce qutils favorisent lea con-
flits entre factions, et ltin;4rence dans lea affaires int4rieures des autres par-
tis et pays, en disstminant dons dtautres pays "divers genres de pamphlets avant un
conterai do natique, des brochures contenant des calonnies et des d4forrnations de is.
vdrit4" contre d'autres partis et leurs chefs. Enfin, pour ce qui est de is. politi-
que 4trangere, it accuse lea Chinois de trotskysme pur et staple en affichant "une
offensive permanente." Dtautres participants ft is. r4union pl4niere se stint aussi
attaqu4s au:> Chinois, entre autres Dobrivo,je Vidic qui a d4clar4 "qutenviron 400
articles anti-youLoslaves avaient 4t4 publi4s dans is. presse chinoise an cours des
cinq derniers mois."
18-19 us i - Des journalistes venant du Basutoland, du Cameroun., de Ceylan, du Japan,
du Pakistan, de 12Union Sud-Africaine et de Zanzibar, qui out assist' $ is. confdrence
des journalistes afro-asiatiques f. Djakarta du 24 an 30 avril, ont 4t4 requs et
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 itt4s It PTOwd ="sRA"Se '~999~9~8d' t.i -I Pc3u 3t661~'lfl?D O ^OI(~Os~?~it~
Chinois pour la solidarit4 afro-asiatique dont le president, Liao Cheng-chih "a f4-
1~citd les journalistes asiatiques et africains d'avoir formd une nouvelle organisa-
tion qui soit la leur en propre -- 1'Association des Journalistes Afro-,Asiatiques",
d'apres ce que dit 1'Agence dtlnformations de la Nouvelle Chine.
19 et 25 mai Aux dires de 1tA;ence dtlnformations de la Nouvelle Chine (AMC), le
camarade V. G. ??Tilcox, secr4taire e4n4ral du PC de la Nouvelle Z4lande, est arrivd
h P41tin r4pondant & 1'invitation du comit6 central du PCC. Le 25 mai, AINC rappor-
tait un communiqu4 r4dir;6 en commun per le PCNZ et par le PCC dans lequel se trou-
vait l'affirmation que "se ranger du c$t4 des r?visionnistes you;oslaves 6tait tout
simplement trahir le rnarxisme-ldninisme.
20 mai - Radio Belgrade a annoncd que le secrdtariat des Affaires 4tranGbres yougo -
slave await remis au char;;' d'affaires chinois une note protestant contra "l'atta
que brutale et diffaana.toire contre la Yougoslavie et sa politique 4trangere, conte-
nue dans la d4claration r4'dije en commun par le pr4sident de la R6publique Popu-
laire Chinoise, Liu Chao-chi, et le pr4sident de la R6publique Populaire du Viet-
nam, Ho Chi Minh, publ.ide le 16 mai f. Hanoi. "
20 ma.i - L'AINC a annoned que les num4ros combinds 10 et 11 du "Drapeau Rouge" ve-
iza nt juste d'9tre publids contenant les Sept derniers chapitres -- Nos. 13 A. 19
cornpris -- et la conclusion de 1'4norme s6rie sur ."La lutte de L4nine contre le r4-
visionnisme et l'opportunisme." La conclusion dit que lea efforts de Ldnine qui se
sont poursuivis pendant trente ans montrent que "bien que les r6visionnistes et les
opportunistes peuvent faire beaucoup de bruit pendant quelque temps, ils ne sont g4-
n$raleinent qu'un contre-courant dans l'ensemble du mouvement communiste et un jour
ou 1'autre la mar4e rdvolutionnaire du marxisme -ldninisme en aura raison."
23 mai - Parlant f. un grand rassemblement au stade de Moscou A ltoccasion dune
-fete d'adieu officielle pour Castro, Khrouchtchev n'a fait que brievement allusion
aux diff4rences avec les Chinois, lesquelles, a-t-il dit, sont le sujet J'un'tas
d'histoires fabriqu4es dens la presse bourgeoise; it a promis de faire "tout en son
pouvoir pour que cette r4union (PCC-PCUS)... dlimine les diff4rences." Toutefois,
it faisait dvidemment allusion aux Chinois quand it a dit:"Il faut latter rdsolument
contre toute division des forces r4volutionnaires, quel que soit le prdtexte qui les
divise. Une division hors des classes de la soci4t4 par continent, couleur de la
peau, ou tout autre fondement, signifie une division des forces de la classe ouvrie-
re." La d4claration r4dig4e en commun par Khrouchtchev et Castro, sin4e le mtkne
jour, a fermement placd Cuba dens le camp sovi4tique.
26 inai - "Pravda" a imprimd toute une page d'extraits du discours que Tito a pronon-
c? le 18 mai et dont ii est question plus haut, mais it paratt qu'on a supprim4 les
attaques les plus violentes de Tito contre P4kin. Le mine jour, Aidit, le chef du
PC de 11Indon4sie, s'adressant ft un rassemblement communiste de 10.000 personnes ft
Djakarta, a donn4 l'impression de confirmer que le PC de 1'Indon4sie est du cetd de
P6kin pttr la faron dont it a d4nonc4 Tito et son genre de communisme.
27 tnai L"AINC rapporte que le journal du parti de la Cor4e du Nord, "Nodong Sinmun"
contient un dditorial qui r4pond dens le sens Chinois an discours prononcd par Tito
le 18 mai.
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 Approved For R astMCIZ89ffiB NSM1 tDMIAW61 A000200020002-7
No. 4 14-27 Mayo 1963
7 y 12 Mayo: Los albaneses continuaron sus ataques contra Kruschev y Tito con ar-
tum o os en su semanario cultural "Drita" el dfa 7 y en "Zeri i Popullit" el 12.
144 Mayo: El PCUS annunci6 (jue el pleno a celebrarse el 28 de mayo serfa pospuesto
:pasta el 18 de Junco. La noticia dec]ard que esto habfa sido resuelto el 3 de
:Mayo -- coma tratando de relacionarlo con la enfermedad de Kozlov, anunciada el
1. de mayo. El mismo dfa Pekin anunci6 su aceptaci6n de una nueva propuesta del
PCUS en el sentido de iniciar las conversations bilaterales en Mosed el 5 de Julio.
15 Mayo: Moscd anunci6 los nombres de una delegac16n al mds alto nivel, encabezada
or Suslov, Para las conversations con los chinos a comenzar el 5 de Julio. El
anuncio record6 que el PCUS habfa propuesto originalmente el 15 de mayo Para las
conversaciones, que el PC chino habfa sugerido una posposici6n hasta mediados de
junco y que el PCUS entonces habfa propuesto la fecha de 5 de Julio "porque ,Junin
estd lleno de acontecimientos previamente programados, incluso algunos de naturaleza
internacione.i." (Luego ha habido comentarios en el sentido de que el acontecimiento
11 international" de verdadera importancia en Junco podrfa ser la visita de Kruschev
a Yugoslavia: que semejante visita ocurrirfa habfa sido declarado en un artfculo de
16 de mayo escrito por Boffa, corresponsal en Mosci de "Unitd" y en una transmisi6n
de Radio Mosc4 en servocroata a Yugoslavia el 20 de mayo.) En la misma fecha
`!Pravda" public6 un discurso del lfder del PC francds, Thorez, al pleno del Partido
denunciando la "desviaci6n de izquierda" de los comunistas chinos como el principal
peligro Para el comunismo international.
15-16 Mayo: El lider chino Liu Shao-chi coron6 su semana de visita a Vietnam del
Norte pronunciando un fuerte discurso poi6mico en el Instituto Marxista en Hanoi el
15 y consiguiendo la firma de Ho Chi Minh Para una declaraci6n conjunta el 16 que
daba la impresi6n de apoyo vietnamis al punto de vista chino. En dicho documento,
que no lleg6 al extremo que muchos observadores hablan augurado y qued6 seguramente
muy a la zaga de lo que Liu hubiera sugerido, los vietnameses evitaron todo com-
promiso claro hacia el lado chino y realmente no cambiaron de su anterior "no ali-
Yeamiento;" no obstante, di6 la apariencia de apoyo subrayando cierto niimero de
positions ideol6gicas comunes en conflicto con la linea sovidtica e incluyendo el
$aludo de Ho Para la "construcci6n socialists" china mientras que omitfa mencionar
otras cuestiones en las cuales las opinions de Ho estdn mds de acuerdo con las so-
vi6ticas. En la escuela del Partido Liu declar6 que el movimiento comunista inter-
nacional se halla ahora "en un crucial perfodo de mdxima importancia" a causa de
una "aguda lucha entre los marxistas-leninistas y los revisionistas moderns" acerca
de si los pueblos del mundo "deberdn o no lievar a cabo revoluciones y si los par-
tidos proletarios deber6,n o no dirigir a los pueblos del mundo en revoluciones."
Declar6 ser tarea de todos cos marxistas-leninistas "no evadir el reto de los re-
visionistas modernos sino unirse Para destrozar su ataque completamente" e inst6 a
todos los comunistas a estudiar las obras de Stalin -- asi coma las de de Marx,
Engels y Lenin. La declaracidn conjunta deciara oficialmente que ambos Partidos
subrayan la unidad a base de las resoluciones de Mosciidje1957 y 1960, lo que
significa que, "en las actuales circunstancias el revisionisto, o sea el oportunismo
de derecha, es el principal peligro Para el movimiento comunista internacional....
Busca persistentemente ... negar la necesidad hist6rica de la revoluci6n proletaria
y la dictadura del proletariado en el perfodo de transicidn del capitalismo al so-
cialismo y el comunismo.... Yugoslavia es la expresi6n concentrada de las modernas
'teorfas' revisionistas.... La ulterior denuncia de la camarilla revisionista
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 yugoslaAI L iid5 s4A 4crs lQcs7?a4 P6 =Te RPi aq0 dos
Jos passes." Ambos Partidos tambidn "reafirman la necesidad de convocar una re-
uni6n de Partidos comunistas y obreros de todo el mundo para eliminar las divergen-
cias y fortalecer la unidad," para la cual "es preciso hacer preparativos adecuados;
incluyendo conversations bilaterales como las programadas entre el PCUS y el PC
chino, las cuales se saludan con satisfacci6n. "Ho Chi Minh rinde c6lido tributo a
]os grandes dxitos conseguidos por el pueblo china en la construcc16n socialista
bajo la direcc16n del PC chino y el lider Mao Tse-tung y guiado per las tres ban-
deras rojas -- la linea general para la construcc16n socialista, el gran salto ade-
lante y las comunas del pueblo."
18 Mayo: Tito, en un discurso programdtico principal ante un pleno del Comt6 cen-
tral del PC yugoslavo, expres6 su gratitud a Kruschev y compafieros de este par hacer
posibles mejores relaciones con el PCUS (a travels de las resolutions del XX y el
XXII Congreso del Partido) y luego lanz6 un violento ataque contra los chinos, que
"persisten en sus posiciones dogmdticas en cuanto a las relaciones internas y el
ulterior desarrollo del movimiento comunista." Tomando nota de que "hemos sido acu-
sados de revisionismo" por los lideres chinos, Tito reconoci6 que "no nos creemos
infalibles, los mismo que no consideramos infalible, a un movimiento o Partido comu-
nista, y mucho menos al liderato del PC chino." Sin embargo, "la prdctica y los re-
sultados son los mejores medidores de la correcta aplicaci6n de las teorfas de Marx,
2ngels y Lenin," y "si consideramos la prdctica y'los resultados conseguidos por los
chinos comunistas en su desarrollo interno, entonces sus errores han sido tan grander
como las Himalayas en comparaci6n a los nuestros." Tomando nota del argumento
chino de que la economla yugoslava estd en continua y profunda crisis a causa de un
regreso al capitalismo, Tito declar6 que "estoy seguro que a ellos les complaceria
sobremanera estar en una crisis semejante." Expres6 su opinion de que la acusaci6n
china de regreso al capitalismo por parte de los yugoslavos la hacen solo para so-
cavar "el gran presitigio de que goza Yugoslavia en los passes de Asia y Africa,
acusando luego a los chinos de desarroilar un "nacionalismo de la peor clase" que se
refleja "en la polltica de poner a los pueblos de Asia, Africa y Ammrica Latina
contra los pueblos de Europa y los palses desarrollados." Tambidn apunta un lndice
acusador hacia los chinos por inducir la lucha faccionaria y la intromisi6n en los
asuntos internos de otros partidos y palses difundiendo en otros palses "diversas
clases de folletos de contenido dogmdtico, materiales que contienen calumnias y de-
formaciones de la verdad" contra otros partidos y sus lfderes. Finalmente, en
quanto a politica exterior, acusa a los chinos de trotskismo abierto por su consign
de "una ofensiva permanente." Otros que tomaron parte en el pleno atacaron tambidn
a los chinos, entre ellos Dobrivoje Vidic, quien declar6 que "unos 400 articulos
contra Yugoslavia han aparecido en la prensa china en los oltimos cinco meses."
18-19 Mayo: Periodiatas de Basutolandia, Cameron, Ceildn, Jap6n, Pakistdn, Africa
del Sur y y Zanzlbarr que hablan asistido a la Conferencia de periodistas afroasidticos
en Jakarta de 24 a 30 de abril fueron recibidos y festejados en Pekln por la Asocia-
cidn de periodistas de toda China y el Comit6 chino de solidaridad afroasidtica,
cuyo presidente Liao Cheng-chip "felicit6 a los periodistas asidticos y africanos
par la formaci6n de una nueva organizaci6n propia, la Asociaci5n afroasidtica de
;periodistas," de acuerdo con la Agencia Nueva China (Sinjua).
19 y 25 Mayo: El camarada V. G. Wilcox, secretario general del PC de Nueva Zelandia,
:Lleg6 a Pekin a invitaci6n del Comit6 Central del PC china, segon informaci6n de
Sinjua. El 25 de mayo dicha agencia inform6 sabre una declaraci6n conjunta del PC
de Nueva Zelandia y el PC chino que inclufa el aserto de que "abanderarse con los
revisionistas yugoslavos no es otra cosa que traicidn al marxismo-leninismo."
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 20 Mayo A 1n-teEbWE6e a,S8491 10 (ZAiiQiArRDQa7t9Az.Q AQ QP2gQ@kl7ava
MET a entregado al encargado chino una nota protestando "el brutal y calumnioso
ataque sobre Yugoslavia y su politica exterior contenido en la declaraci6n conjunta
del presidente del PC de China, Liu Shao-chi, y el Presidente de la Repdblica demo-
crdtica vietnamesa, Ho Chi Minh, publicada en Hanoi el 16 de mayo."
20 Mayo: Sinjua anunci6 que el ndmero combinado 10-11 de "Bandera Roja"' acababa de
salir, con los d1timos siete capitulos -- 13 a 19 -- y la conclusi6n de la volumi-
nosa serie sobre "La lucha de Lenin contra el revisionismo y el oportunismo." La
conclusi6n declara que la lucha de Lenin de 30 aflos demuestra que "aunque los revi-
sionistas y oportunistas puedan mantener un ruidoso clamoreo por algun tiempo, son
generalmente solo una contracorriente en el movimiento comunista total y serdn en
definitiva superados por la marea revolucionaria del comunismo-leninismo."
23 Mayo: Hablando en un mitin en e1 Estadio de Moscd en la despedida official a
Castro, Kruschev se refiri6 solo brevemente a las divergencias con los chinos, que
declar6 ser el tema de fabricaciones en la prensa burguesa, y prometi6 "hacerlo todo
porque dicha reuni6n Centre el PC chino y el PLUS) ... elimine las divergencias."
No obstante, en alusi6n evidente a los chinos afiad16: "Es preciso luchar resuelta-
mente contra cualquier divisidn de las fuerzas revolucionaras bajo cualquier pre-
texto. La divisi6n no per clase sino por continente, color de la tez o cualquier
Qtra norma significa una divisi6n de las fuerzas de la clase obrera." La declara-
gi6n conjunta de Kruschev y Castro firmada el mismo dia puso a Cuba firmemente en
el campo sovidtico.
~6 Mayo: "Pravda'" public6 una pdgina entera de extractos del discurso de Tito de-
scrito md,s arriba, aunque se dice que recortando los ataques mds fuertes contra
Pekin. El mismo dia, el jefe Aidit del PC indonesio, dirigidndose a una manifesta-
ci6n comunista de 10,000 personas en Jakarta, aparent6 confirmar la alineaci6n del
PC indonesio con Pekin al denunciar a Tito y su especie de comunismo.
27 Mayo: Informa Sinjua que "Nodong Sinmun," 6rgano del PC norcoreano, public6 un
editorial replicando al discurso de Tito de 18 de mayo en tdrminos de 1a lfnea china.
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 3 June 1963
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bb4. The American Struggle for Negro Equality
1. The US Government is committed to equal rights for all
citizens. The major judicial stop toward overcoming segrega on of
the races in the US was the Supreme Court decision of 1954 that
"separate but equal" school facilities were "inherently unequal."
and therefore unlawful under the constitution. The following year
the Court ruled "federal, state or local laws... requiring or per-
mi ttin g such discrimination must give way" and that the states must
begin "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance" with
the 1954 ruling. In a precedent-setting decision on discriminatory
practice by private establishments, the Supreme Court ruled on
May 21, 1963, that the Negro's effort to obtain equal service at
stores, restaurants, and theatres could not be prevented by uncon-
stitutional segregation laws.
Complementing ,judicial rulings on the constitutional questions,
the Executive Branch of the government under the President has out-
lawed discrimination in fields within its jurisdiction by promulgat-
ing the Fair Employment Practices Act, Fair Education Practices Act,
Fair Housing Law and by abolishing segregation in the Armed Forces.
The US Government moved troops into Oxford, Mississippi, in
October 1962 to assist a Negro student's court-ordered entry into
the University in the face of threatened violence. President Keita
of Mali recognized the import of the US Government's determination
to protect the right of one of its Negro citizens when he tele-
graphed congratulations to President Kennedy for his decisive action.
The Justice Department is making increasing use of lawsuits on
behalf of persons denied voting registration or entry to desegre-
gatecd school facilities. An aggressive Presidential Committee on
Equal Opportunity is pressing government contractors to hire
Negroes; government representatives are acting as mediators at the
scene of racial differences, persuading fair minded citizens to
ta: co the lead in settling their differences, pressuring segregation-
ist officials to uphold the laws of the land.
In addition to the exercise of official powers, the President
and other government officials are using the prestige of their high
offices to give strong personal leadership to individuals, groups
and civic leaders in the drive to establish equal opportunity in
all areas of civil life, e.g. education, employment, voting.
The African Foreign Ministers Conference meeting in Addis
Ababa recognized the US Government's determination to protect the
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rights of its minority citizens. On May 21st they agreed to
recommend to the Heads of State that the Conference ... "expresses
its satisfaction with the attempt of the Federal Government of the
US to end these intolerable practices which might harm the relations
of the Governments and peoples of Africa and the Government and
people of the US of America."
2. Increasing Progress is being made toward civil rights.
Dramatic gains have eon made in the key fields in the pas wenaty
years. Voting. Negroes in all Southern states have been register-
ing faster an whites where, one generation ago, virtually no
Negroes voted. The growing Negro vote will help defeat the
segregationist whose traditional resistance to change must be over-
came. Median income of the Negro has increased sixfold in the past
twenty years as contrasted with a fourfold increase for whites.
Between 1959 and 1963 the Census Bureau shows a rise in Negro
income of 13 per cent and white of 3 per cent. The rate of unemploy-
ment among Negroes, however, is 8.7 per cent of the Negro work force
as against 4.7 of the white. Transportation segregation has
virtually disappeared in all ut a very few southern towns. Public
accommodations in urban areas are increasingly desegregated. Statutes specifically forbidding discrimination now exist in 28
states and the District of Co'.u-mbia. Discrimination in housing has
shown little improvement and is usually due to economic rather than
either legal or social factors. Lynching, often used abroad to
present a distorted picture of the Negro in America, has virtually
cdisappeared. Statistics show seven lynchings in the past ten years
as against 105 in 1901 or 161 in 1692.
Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish economist, reform leader and Senator,
told a commencement class at the predominantly Negro Howard Univer-
sity, in Washington D.C., June 1962: "...in historical perspective
the rapidity of progress is astonishing. Let us remember that
practically all of this progress has taken place in the short period
of the last twenty years." Citing the growing affluence of society
and the reality of American constitutional ideals as factors in his
a?Traisal he said "...the trend moves steeply upward. In this new
epoch, the Negro cause is a winning one." Myrdal's 1942 book
An American Dilemma, the Negro problem and Modern Democracy (Myrdal,
Sterner and Rose. 20th anniversary Edition Harper and
Row; $16.50) foresaw., big changes in the status of the Negro. 25X1C10b
 25X1C10b
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25X1C10b OFF ' a. Communism in North Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh Between Peking
and oscow - ?---
BACKGROUND :
Relations with China. Because of geographic position and
historic precedent, a etnamese have always been keenly aware
of the threat from their powerful and demanding Chinese neighbor,
and having successfully maintained their own national identity
during a thousand years of Chinese occupation and domination, the
Vietnamese have had a wealth of experience in resisting Chi:neso
incursions. Traditionally, Vietnamese policy has been to pay
public obeisance to Chinese suzerainty (token tribute: allowing
the Chinese to invest Vietnamese emperors with office when they
succeeded to the throne, etc.) while zealously protecting their
right to govern themselves. Thus, historically, there is a pattern
of formal acceptance of Chinese interest in Vietnam affairs and
at the same time of resistance to attempts by the Chinese to inter-
fere in the actual governing of the country. Generally speaking,
the attitude of most Vietnamese toward China, engendered by this
perennial relationship of a weaker to a stronger power, is one of
latent fear and active dislike. Vietnamese children have been
raised on stories of Chinese rapaciousness and cruelty, and the
occupation of North Vietnam by Chinese national forces in 1945 and
1946, which looted and raped and plundered, only served to confirm
the age-old hatred and apprehension. It is unlikely that allegiance
to a common Marxist doctrine could modify in a few years an attitude
that is the product of centuries.
There is no denying, however,the importance to the North Viet-
namese Communist leaders -- particularly in their war with the
French -- of the Communist takeover in China. From 1949 to the
end of the war with the French, Ho Chi Minh was the recipient of
extensive Chinese military, economic and technical aid which was
an important contribution to Ho's ultimate victory at Dien Bien
Phu. More important even, in the long run, than the concrete mili-
tary and economic aid from Mao, was the fact that the revolution-
ary situation in which Ho Chi Minh and his men had to operate had
basic similarities with that of China; therefore, the North Viet-
namese Communists were in a position to profit, in their own mic-
rocosm, from the vastness and variety of Chinese Communist exper-
ience. Obviously, the theory of a peasant revolution operating
from rural bases and using the tactics of a broad united front
against a better equipped and numerically superior enemy is an
application of Marxism-Leninism which bears much more directly on
the situation in Vietnam than that of the classic three-stage pro-
letarian-based revolution. Moreover, despite the tactical zigs
and zags, the over-all strategy of the Chinese Communists, with
its emphasis on militancy and aggressive action, fitted in much
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better with Vietnamese recent experience with the French and with
their aspirations for taking over South Vietnam than the gradualism
being advocated by the USSR.
While the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Hanoi in Novem-
ber 1954 provided the North Vietnamese leaders with an opportunity
to counterbalance Chinese influence, not only their interpretation
of Marxist-Leninist theory and its specific application, but the
very organization of the Vietnamese party itself and its military
and mass organs all bear a basic resemblance to their Chinese
counterparts.
Relations with the Soviet Union. Throughout the war of
liberation from French rule, the ewers of the Viet Minh had
pledged themselves to fight until all of Vietnam were liberated
and united. Russian pressure obliged the Vietnamese Communists
to sign the Geneva Agreements of 1954. This act, because it pa-
tently consented to the division of the country and stopped short
of their promises of continuing the struggle until the entire
country was reunited, placed the DRV leaders in an embarrassing
position. Their loss of face was intensified when they failed to
persuade the Diem government to hold national elections as speci-
fied in the Geneva Agreements. Thus, Khrushchev's strategy of
"peaceful co-existence" -- with its corollary of a temporary
status quo in Southeast Asia -- which corresponded to Soviet
strategical needs in 1954, was clearly a liability to North Viet-
nam. Pressure from the Soviets to follow a soft tactical line
with continued emphasis on united front tactics was also a handi-
cap to the party domestically in applying stringent Communist
measures to rebuild the economy.
When, more than a year after the Geneva Conference, it became
apparent that the new Diem government would not agree to the hold-
ing of nation-wide elections, the Party decided to press forward
on the domestic front with a program of vigorous socialization.
Seeking aid at this time for reconstruction of the North Vietnamese
economy, Ho received three times more from Peking than from Moscow.
The ruthless agrarian reform policy which Hanoi adopted in 1956
was clearly modelled on the Chinese pattern.
Much of Khrushchev's new program as enunciated at the 20th
CPSU Congress was anathema to Ho and the Vietnamese leadership
since it was patently unsuited to the situation the Vietnamese
Communists faced. For example, the Lao Dong Party resolution,
commenting with evident distaste on Khrushchev's theory of the
non-inevitability of war, stressed instead the need for "strug,gle"
and "vigilance." lnd, at various times, Soviet de-Stalinization
was publicly blamed for the pessimism and skepticism which had
infected the Party. In January 1957, the Soviets actually proposed
that both North and South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations
as separate states, thus placing the stamp of approval on the ter-
ritorial division. Following the failure (from Ho's point of view)
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of the Geneva Agreement, the unpalatable course which Khrushchev
set at the 20th CPSU Congress, and the disastrous consequences of
the forced Chicom-style collectivization program, the North Viet-
namese Communists began to emphasize the importance to the Vietnam-
ese people of finding their own path: "our party has already
achieved considerable results in the way of creative application
of Marxism-Leninism to conditions in Vietnam." By late 1959, in
place of the previous praises for the Chinese model and "ideology
of Mao Tse-tung," Hanoi began ascribing all its revolutionary
victories to Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, Lenin's " ost outstanding
disciple" who had "creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the
concrete c=onditions of Vietnam." By 1960 there were indications
that the North Vietnamese leaders were beginning to look to the
Soviet Union for guidance in economic development programs. The
extension of sizeable economic credits by both Moscow and Peking
in the winter of 1960-1961 testified to the effectiveness of North
Vietnam's effort to steer a middle course in domestic policy through
the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. Ho Chi Minh has made several
efforts to act as mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute and to effect
a reconciliation between Moscow and Peking.
Ho Chi Minh. The ability of North Vietnam to play off one of
its powerful `benefactors against the other and to develop its own
indigenous forms -)f Marxism-Leninism depends by and large on the
ability of an ascetic but benevolent looking heptagenarian who for
many years has been the dominant Communist personality not only in
Vietnam but in Laos, Cambodia and -- at one time -- in all South-
east Asia. If indeed a way exists to maintain such a balance, Lo
Chi Minh will probably find it.
Since 1911 when he left Indochina as a cabin boy on a French
tramp steamer, Ho has struggled with singleminded ruthlessness and
with considerable ability for the "liberation" of Southeast Asia
and for the establishment of "socialism." Between 1911 and 1925,
Ho travelled in Europe and Russia, was a founding member of the
French Communist Party (1920), and became the leading Communist
expert in Southeast Asia. From Paris and Moscow he organized,
trained and directed his compatriots in the art of resistance.
In 1925, he returned to his homeland as Comintern representative
for Southeast 4sia and during the next 10 years helped to found
the majority of Communist parties in that part of the world. In
1940. he emerged as the unchallenged leader of Vietnamese communism
and subsequently of the resistance against the Japanese occupation.
During this period, Ho's unrivalled ability for political intrigue
enabled him again and again to out-maneuver his opponents. Thus,
in 1945, when the French were seeking to re-impose control over
their former colonial appendage, they found themselves facing the
most sophisticated, experienced and able Communist in Southeast
Asia, who, paradoxically, enjoyed both the reputation of a leader
of high standing in, international communism and, at home, the
popularity and esteem of a great patriot. Today, after almost
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10 years of Communist government in North Vietnam and despite the
failure of many of his programs, Ho remains the best known and most
popular leader in Vietnam, the final proof of his political acumen.
Summary. While the Sino-Soviet dispute and competition for
Vietnamese allegiance is certainly a challenge even to Hots skill
at manipulation, it has had important advantages for the Viet-
namese Communists in that (a) it has permited Ho to exact aid on
a larger scale than would have been possible otherwise (as of mid
1962 the USSR had extended 365 million dollars worth and China
477 million) and (b) most important, it has allowed North Vietnam
to use Russia as a counterweight to Chinese domination and to
avoid loss of national independence.
While its relations with China and the USSR have had many
vicissitudes, North Vietnari has managed to avoid becoming the
satellite of either and is currently using the Sino-Soviet dispute
to maintain its independence from both and to further assert its
25X1C1Ob own brand of communism.
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BACKGROUND: British Guiana, a small country of some 80,000
square miles th a population of around 600,030 situated on the
northeast coast of South America, is in a desperately chaotic con-
dition after close to two years of domestic control by Premier
Cheddi Jagan's government. The immediate crisis has been a serious
food shortage and Jagan's use of strike breakers to end a month old
strike. The strike was the Trade Union Council's (TUC) answer to
Jagan's attempt to gain control of the labor movement through April
legislative proposals giving the government the right to deterraine
which unions should be recognized by employers for collective bar-
gaining. The widespread strike, supported by unions all over the
world through blacklisting ships bound for British Guiana, has been
carried out without serious violence and with maintenance of essen-
tial public utilities.
This strike came on the heels of other demonstrations led by
opposition parties against the governnent's economic maladministra-
tion, reflected, for example, in: increasing unemployment which
is now about 20 percent; decreasing tax revenues; decreasing busi-
ness activity (merchants are loath to re-establish business disruptad
a year ago in Georgetown or to establish new ones in cities subject
to civil disturbances -- chambers of commerce in several cities are
backing the strike against the government) ; and foreign investment
has come almost to a halt as a result of the unstable political
situation.
The strike was the second time that Jagan has aroused the
people to strong open resistance. In February 1962 his budget pro-
posals, including forced savings (a Communist practice), were met
with riots in Georgetown from which the capital has not recovered
and which reverberated through the economic life of the country.
Political Parties. Jagan's Communist-dominated People's
Progressive Party ), supported mainly by the East Indian rural
population (rice farmers and sugar workers form the backbone), Egon
20 seats (with approximately 42% of the popular vote) in the February
1962 elections to form the government with which the British were
expected to negotiate full independence by 1963. The People's
National Congress (PNC), led by L. Forbes Burnham and drawing its
support almost wholly from the ur!jan Negro community (slightly
smaller than the East Indian which accounts for almost half of the
population) won eleven seats with approximately 41% of the popular
vote. While less radical and pro-Bloc than the PPP, it favors a
leftist policy and nonalignment in foreign affairs. Four seats
were won by the multi-racial United Force Party (UF) with 16% of
the popular vote, based on the small commercial class including the
t ion.
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 ?(666. Cont.) 3 June 1963
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a anA inept adminis t io a and increas-
ing Communist om na ion are causing discontent within the PPP and
among its East Indian supporters. Opposition exists but is badly
disorganized and weak against the well controlled party machine.
Speaker of the legislative assembly Ral,ma.n Gajraj, elected by the
PPP apparently because he could influence the Muslim vote, now
says that Islam and communism are incompatible. A visit to Berlin
and the Wall is reported to be the reason for his change of mind
about the PPP leadership. He has spoken out against the adminis-
tration's labor bill, for which The Mirror took him to task.
Attorney-General Ramsahoye, while 3iscontented, was reported late
last year to be re uc an to resign this post and his legislative
seat lest this action bring down the government.
The PPP and PNC have been unwilling to compromise the differ-
ences which resulted. in the failure of the London conference on
independence in October-November 1962 (which should have provided
for the transfer of British control over external affairs and
defense with the drafting of a new constitution and the setting of
a date for full independence). The PNC wants elections to be held
before independence on the basis of the proportional representation,
giving it an opportunity to gain a majority in the Congress. (The
PPP won 20 seats against the PNC's 11 by gaining a mere 1.7% margin
of the popular vote. The PPP now has only 18 seats since Balram
Singh Rai was expelled from the party and the election of one
other delegate was invalidated. The opposition now controls 16
seats, the original 11 PNC and 4 UF with Rai now voting against the
PPP.) Jagan refuses to consider either proposal, demanding instead
that the British grant immediate independence to his government.
',3NC leader Forbes Burnham has turned down a recent Jagan proposal
for a coalition government with the PPP.
Jagan's inefficiency and inability to run the government, and
his willingness to sacrifice good labor practice for the sake of
dictatorial control, have led to some doubts among his East Indian
supporters. But they have no alternative East Indian leader, and
they will not vote for the PNC, that is, for a Negro.
The multi-racial OF is in a difficult position with the uncer-
tainty of racial tensions. It supports the TUC demands and could
conceivably wield the balance in future Assembly voting.
Jagan's Machine. Although Jagan's Communist orientation was
early recognize, t e chairman of the British committee in London,
investigating the Georgetown riots of February, was probably among
the first to make a decisive statement when he said that Jagan's
testimony established him as a Communist "beyond peradventure"
(i.e. doubt), Jagan's own statements have clarified his political
position. For example, on April 26th of this year, in a speech
delivered for him by his wife to the Winnipeg Press Club, he said:
"Will socialists like me be allowed to bring about
the millennium by peaceful means? Or is Fidel
Castro's way of armed struggle the only way out?"
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His radical, dictatorial position was further established when,
according to an official TUC release on May 20th he is reported
to have said to union delegates, at a meeting which he requested:
"Gentlemen, I can assure you that if this government
is overthrown the supporters of the government will
not take it sitting down. There will be a war and a
blood bath. There will be a second Congo here."
Jagan has increasingly staffed his party and government with
Communists, concomitantly developing other Communist ties and
policies. It is believed that his wife, radical, longtime Commu-
nist activist Janet Jagan, has been the strong element in
bungling, inept Cheddi's move into Communist ranks. Among the
increasingly obvious Communist steps taken by Jagan and his PPP
party machine are the following:
1) PPP's official political paper Thunder follows
the Communist line. The Mirror, co=ercial counterpart
to Thunder, is controlled through the New Guiana Com-
pany, Ltd. by Minister of Finance Charles Jacob, Jr.
with several deputy directors who are active cr office
holding PPP members. One recent article, illustrative
of the "socialist" line of the paper, was "I Can Be a
Christian and a Communist at the Same Time."
2) Janet Jagaa, editor of Thunder, is a recognized
government spokesman and considered to be the party's
main tactician. She has made goodwill trips to Communist
countries, e.g. East Germany and most recently the China
Mainland where she was greated by Mao, as well as to the
USSR. It is believed that British Guiana would recognize
the CPR if Jagan should control a fully independent gov-
ernment.
3) Jagan openly rigged the April 1962 PPP congress
which ousted the only anti-Corununist member of the
Executive Council, Balram Singh Rai (which shook the
faith of some East Indian peasants). In June 1962 Rai
was also removed as Minister for Home Affairs and
expelled from the PPP. In his place Claude Christian
was appointed. As a youth leader Christian, identified
as at least a Coi:miunist sympathizer, was active in
sending students to Cuba and the Soviet 3loc. His new
Position gives him control, among other things, over
the police.
4) Although Jagan's government is seeking trade
and aid wherever it can be found, it is probably of
significance that: capital equipment has been obtained
from East Berlin -- Minister for Commerce and Trade
Hubbard made a trip to East Germany; the Minister of
Agriculture, I3rindley Bonn, is increasingly attacking
the UK and the US; trade ties and other contacts with
Cuba and Soviet Bloc countries are increasing; requests
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specified that they be from Communist Bloc coun-
tries or from countries whose governments are
known for their leftist views.
5) Students are being sent in increasing num-
bers to Communist countries -- there are now
approximately 60 in the USSR and the Bloc and 43
in Cuba.
6) Measures to strengthen the party along
Communist cell lines are being introduced, includ-
ing Communist-supervised courses for organizers,
and training of youth groups as security guards.
General indoctrination courses are offered under
the title Socialist Political Education, and a
government socialist university is scheduled to
open this fall.
7) Jagan (and mainly his wife) has recruited
a number of foreign Communists and Communist
sympathizers to assist him. From Trinidad, Jack
ICelshall, reported to be a Communist, is the gov-
ernment's adv.a.ser for public relations and Jagants
personal secretary. WPC member Dr. Gyandhand
(Indian) is on the government's planning commission.
Several members of the CP of Great Britain have been
imported to run PPP training courses, publications,
and so forth. Minister of Labor, Housing and Health,
Ranji Chandisingh, was born in Trinidad, became a
member o. the in Great Britain, and was brought
to British Guiana by Janet to edit Thunder some five
25X1C1Ob years ago.
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 Approved For Releasg 19991 78-03061 1 2 -7
667 AF,FF,NF. Afro-Asian Journalist Conference Widens Sino-Soviet
25X1 C10b o-n# Tt__
BACKGROUND: Sponsored by the Indonesian Government, with
Presi ear Sarno as patron, the first Afro-Asian Journalist Con-
ference (AAJC) opened in Djakarta on 24 April and closed in Bandung
on 30 April. The Conference was preceded by an AAJC Preparatory
Committee meeting held in Djakarta from 5 to 10 February 1963.
The AMC endeavor stemmed from a meeting of the international
Communist front International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
in Budapest in 1962, where 20 Afro-Asian countries agreed that
Afro-Asian journalists should hold a meeting in Bandung.
While the AAJC was ostensibly to be a meeting of professional
journalists from Afro-Asian countries to discuss professional ques-
tions, there were, not surprisingly, early indications that the
Conference was to be a substitute and helpful precursor of a
second Asian-African Bandung Conference of Heads of State, and
that with Communist and pro-Communist groups having contributed
their efforts toward organizing the Conference, they would utilize
it as a propaganda platform against "imperialism" and "colonial-
ism," for "national liberation," and give it a general anti-Western
atmosphere. It was also presumed that the Conference would permit
the IOJ to gain additional influence in the ranks of Afro-Asian
journalists; and it would show a great resemblance to the third
Afro-Asian Solidarity (AAPSO) Conference held in Moshi, Tanganyika,
4-11 February 1963 (see Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #110, item
625, dated 25 February 1963), in the general tenor of its resolu-
tions and public statements with its pro-Communist orientation ex-
pected to be even more marked.
The Conference followed its predicted course, with the excep-
tions that: it provided more of a display of the Sino-Soviet rift
than anticipated; the Soviet-dominated IOJ "parent organization"
found itself outmaneuvered and weakened, if indeed not split, with
the establishment of an Afro-Asian Journalist Association (AAJA.)
and an Afro-Asian press Bureau, both to be headquartered in Djakarta-
and the Indonesian sponsors, with apparent governmental consent,
did the Chinese bidding in this Chicom-led, Chicom-oriented Con-
ference which exceeded any previous Afro-Asian conference in its
anti-US, anti-Western militancy.
The Conference was attended by representatives from some 40
Asian and African countries, and "observers" from the Soviet Union,
other countries including Cuba, the All-Africa Journalist Associa-
tion, and the IOJ.
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3 June 1963
Communist Delegations Stack the Conference. The Preparatory
Comm tees .C se's o delegates and issued invitations indicated
that only old hands at the business of stage-managed, Communist-
controlled international conferences were to attend. For example,
the Indonesian government paid the way of a South Vietnamese dele-
gate to Djakarta, but his seating was refused and instead a Commu-
nist Viet Cong "liberation front" delegation was acknowledged as
the legitimate representation of South Vietnam, in addition to the
delegation of North Vietnam. The North Korean delegation repre-
sented North and South Korea; the invitation to the South Korean
delegation "did not arrive." The Secretary General of the National
Press Club of Japan sent a telegram to President Sukarno stating
that the Japanese delegation to the Conference was "thoroughly
dominated by people committed to the support of the Communist bloc,"
that the Japanese delegation represented only a small section of
the Japanese press, and that the selection of its members was po-
litically inspired. (The telegram also stated that the Conference
could facilitate Communist penetration of public information media
throughout the Afro-Asian area.) The delegate from Cameroun was
an African student from Peking. Some countries were doubly rep-
resented: there were, for instance, two delegations from Jordon,
which promptly started quarrelling among themselves, etc. There
was no provision for a credentials committee. When the issue was
raised on the first day, it was brushed aside by the Indonesian
Chairman (Djawoto, chief editor of the Indonesian Government's news
agency ANTARA and chairman of the Indonesian Journalist Association)
on the ground that the selection of delegates had been on the basis
of "independent research."
Methods of Control. Such maneuvers became more explicit as
the con erence procee- ed. A panel of 20 names to constitute the
conference presidium) was submitted by the Indonesian delegation
and accepted by Djawoto without discussion. Malaya, India, Mongolia
and the Philippines objected to this "very undemocratic" nomination
procedure in place of election as provided in the Conference rules,
but they were overruled.
The main controversy, however, arose over Mongolia's motion
to accord membership to the Soviet Union, represented at the Con-
ference by 10 delegates. (The Preparatory Meeting had assigned
"observer" status to the Soviet delegation with the final status
to be resolved at the main conference.) Eight countries backed
the Mongolian motion, arguing in the main that a large part of Sbv-
iet territory and population belonged to Asia. There were immedi-
ate protests, obviously pre-arranged. After some time it was
The presidium consisted of Indonesia, the CPR, Ceylon, North
Borneo (independence movement), Syria, the UAR, Angola, North Korea,
South Africa (in exile), Tanganyika, Mali, Japan, Pakistan, Niger,
Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rhodesia, Kuwait, and South Vietnam (National
Liberation Front).
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3 June 1963
announced from the chair that with due regard to the "consensus?
the USSR could only participate in observer status. (As it turned
our, the "consensus" was a formula used as a stick to beat down
anything that the Chicoms and their supporters did not like.) The
chief of the Soviet delegation termed this decision of the Confer-
ence "undemocratic" and "incomprehensible" but also said: "We
will always be with you in the struggle against imperialism and
colonialism .... It
The IOJ Loses influence: Creation of the AAJA. In accordance
with plans of the Preparatory Meeting, the Conference decided to
create an Afro-Asian Journalist Association (AAJA) whose constitu-
tion says that "inspired by the Bandung spirit, the journalists
from 40 countries of Asia and Africa decided upon the formation of
their own association," and that the headquarters as well as a
press bureau of the AAJA will be located in Djakarta. The AAJA
did not admit the Soviets, neither did it announce an affiliation
with the IOJ. The Mongolian delegation issued a statement of
reservation (FBIS Daily, Indonesia, 3 May) in which it is stated
inter alia: "It is quite clear that without the participation of
the Sjournalists' organization, without widening the scope and
cooperation with other progressive journalists' organizations, as
for instance the IOJ (International Organization of Journalists)
in which a number of journalists organizations from Asia and Africa
are also participating, the Afro-Asian Journalist Association will
not fully serve the cause of the strengthening of the unity and
solidarity of the progressive and democratic journalistic forces
from Asia and Africa as well as from the whole world."
Whether the establishment of the AAJA represents an outright
split of the IOJ remains to be seen; it may still announce an
affiliation, however loose, with the IOJ and function quasi-
independently in the Afro-Asian area. There can be no questiop,
however, that the Soviet-influenced IOJ has suffered a great loss
of prestige and has been weakened. If the Chicom hand had not
been shown so strongly in the Conference as a whole as well as in
the forming of the AAJA, one-could accept the appearance of the
latter as still another indication of the growing emphasis on re-
gional structures and activities within international Communist
fronts -- an operational concept which began to develop when the
world-wide fronts were becoming too compromised. The status of
the AAJA vis-a-vis the IOJ would seem to depend largely on general
developments in the next few months in the relations between the
Soviets and the Chicoms. Not only will it be important to observe
whether the AAJA gains stature and momentum, but also whether na-
tional affiliations with it will be accompanied by severance of
ties with the IOJ. According to available reports only the Indian
delegation failed to sign the "Djakarta Declaration" under which
the AAJA was established; Malaya and the Philippines, which ini-
tially were most unwilling to sign, at the last minute found them-
selves stampeded into doing so.
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3 June 1963
The constitution of the AAJA says that, inspired by the Bandung
spirit, Afro-Asian journalists pursue the objective of establish-
ing the closest of cooperation among themselves, the peoples and
the respective governments, and strengthening their solidarity in
the struggle for national independence against colonialism and im-
perialism in all its forms and manifestations, and for world peace,
justice, freedom, and equality.
Resolutions. Amidst thunderous applause the meeting adopted
some p reso u ions which demonstrated a most militant spirit.
Most of the resolutions were directed against imperialism and
colonialism, with emphasis on the condemnation of US imperialism
for its purported acts of aggression against and intervention and
enslavement of Asian and African (and Latin American) countries.
To note a few examples:
Peace Corps. A resolution condemning imperialist and neo-
colonialist ac ivities noted with utmost regret the dispatch of
US intelligence agents to Africa and Asia in the guise of the
Peace Corps.
Laos. The resolution on the Laotian situation states: "The
Conference resolutely condemns the imperialist intervention in
Laos' internal affairs and disruption of Laotian peace, neutrality,
and independence; the Conference energetically condemns US im-
perialism for assassinating Quinim Pholsena and other Laotian pa-
triots; the Conference condemns US imperialism for its direct
supplies of arms and aircraft to suppress the Laotian people and
for launching attacks on the troops of the neutralist group and
patriots.
"The Conference resolutely demands that the US stop immediately
its aggression against the intervention in Laos and withdraw all
its troops, military personnel, and arms. It resolutely demands
that the US strictly observe the Geneva agreements and respect
Laotian peace, neutrality and independence..."
Korea. The resolution on Korea says: "The Afro-Asian jour-
nalise,' "conference holds that the occupation of South Korea by the
US imperialists and their policy of aggression are the great ob-
stacles to the peaceful unification of Korea and the cause of all
the sufferings and misfortunes of the journalists and the people
in South Korea and strongly demands the prompt withdrawal of the
US imperialist aggressive army from South Korea..."
South Vietnam. The resolution on the situation in South Viet-
nam concemns a aggressive war, the policy of strategic hamlets
of the US imperialists in South Vietnam, and particularly the use
of noxious chemicals as ameans of war, destroying crops and animals,
poisoning the health of the South Vietnamese people, in an attempt
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3 June 1963
to exterminate the patriotic forces which are struggling for na-
tional indepdpendence and peace in South Vietnam. This aggressive
war, considered as "experiemental war" by the US imperialists,
severely threatens peace and national independence of the Afro-
Asian peoples.
Cuba. The resolution on Cuba condemns the continued activities
perpetrated against the Cuban people by the US imperialists. It
considers the five demands put forward by the Cuban Revolutionary
Government as the just and minimum demands for the guarantee of
peace in Cuba and the Caribbean. It fully supports these five
demands of the Cuban Revolutionary Government and the heroic Cuban
people and calls upon all Afro-Asian journalists and people as
well as all progressive mankind to do likewise. The Conference
further assured the valiant Cuban people and revolutionary govern-
ment of its relentless and unreserved support and solidarity in
their struggle against Yankee imperialism and the forces of reac-
tion.
Taiwan. The resolution on Taiwan "condemns the US imperialist
occupation of Taiwan, the territory of the CPR." It condemns the
US imperialists for creating tension in the Taiwan Strait and
menacing peace in Asia and the world, and firmly demands that the
US imperialists and their armed forces immediately withdraw from
the Taiwan. Strait.
(North Borneo)
Similar resolutions deal with North Kalimantar; Angola; South
Africa; Southwest Africa; the high commission territories of
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland; Rhodesia and Nyasaland;
Zanzibar; Portuguese Guinea, etc.
Military Pacts. The resolution condemning military pacts "calls
upon an- r can peoples to double their efforts and unite their
forces by all means in the struggle for the liquidation of all
military pacts and bases on the Asian-African continents, to call
upon the governments concerned to discontinue any negotiation with
the imperialist countries toward the formation of an aggressive
military alliance."
The resolution on ending of colonialism urges the governments
of the countries of Asia and Africa to set up soon an Asian-African
commission to look into individual cases of colonial or imperialist
occupation still continuing in the region and to take effective
steps for their early liqu?.daation.
Israel. A resolution on Israel condemns "the role played by
Isra'd1 's an agent of world imperialism, condemns the military
and nuclear aid, given by the USA to Israel, and supports the rights
of the Arab Palestine refugees to regain their country which was
grabbed by imperialism to create the artificial state of Israel."
Bandung Conference. The resolution on the second Bandung con-
ference stresses the need of further strengthening the solidarity
and cooperation of the Asian-African governments the objective
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of speeding up the complete liquidation of colonialism and neo-
colonialism on both continents, and expresses full support for
the efforts to convene the second Bandung conference at the earli-
est possible date. The conference appeals to all Asian-African
journalists to urge their respective governments to take positive
steps for the convening of this conference of Afro-Asian govern-
ments.
A-A Conferences. A resolution supports the holding of the
third Asian-African writers conference in Indonesia in 1963, the
holding of an Asian-African film festival next year, and the idea
of convening a conference of trade unions of Africa and Asia in
accordance with the Bandung spirit.
Ganefo. The resolution on Ganefo (Games of the New Emerging
Forces) welcomes and supports the idea initiated by Indonesia to
convene the games of the new emerging forces, in which sportsmen
and sportswomen of the progressive countries of Africa, Asian, and
Latin America and the socialist countries would take part."
Three Continent Journalists Conference. The Conference also
called for the holding of an Asian-Africa-Latin American Jour-
nalists Conference in Cuba.
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Negro Problem: Evasions and Solution
Those who call for an immediate and to racial discrimination
in the United States and for full equality for the Negro strike a
responsive chord in many breasts. What they do not say, however,
is that in making this demand, they are asking for something more
than the issuance of laws and the use of state powers -- they are
asking for a change in human attitudes. Liberal Americans believe
that this change can a accomplishe"d-,uauut there are no successful
precedents to follow, and if the change is made with nothing
worse than the Birmingham riots, Americans may count themselves
fortunate.
In other areas of the world it has been possible to solve
racial or other minority problems by other means. One favorite
solution is the expulsion of the minority group; this has been
applied in India (the Moslems), and Algeria and Kenya (the settlers),
But even in these cases the solution was only accozir.~lished after
serious bloodshed. Another solution is secession, as applied by
the former African and Asian non-settlement colonies of European
empires, or by Ireland, Iceland, Norway or Cyprus. This method
is good where applicable, but life the expulsion solution, is hardly
practical for the United States. One element in the American
Black Muslim program is said to be the establishment of a black
nation within the American South, but most Negroes recognize that
such a ghetto arrangement would be economically disastrous. One
could almost say that these procedures are not solutions to racial
and minority problems, but rather ova.sions of them. Such solu-
tions are accomplished, not by reconciling the races, but by
separating them. Those who are in the fortunate position of being
able painlessly to apply the separation technique should hesitate
a moment before criticizing those who are unable to apply it, or
who could only apply it by imposing gross hardships.
The closest parallel to the American problem is that existing
in South Africa. Here the separation technique (Apartheid) is
being applied internally, and it is in fact impos$ix; '..adships.
Americans have largely come to recognize that internal separation
is dangerous and unjust, and they are moving away from separation
or segregation, as it is called in the United States. Any other
procedure would create explosive conditions (as indeed is happen-
ing in South Africa), and would not serve the long-term interests
of either race. But the reconciliation of races requires a high
degree of maturity on both sides, and it is scarcely surprising
that some individuals fail to rise to this standard.
It is worth remembering that attitudes on such matters as race
are largely acquired in early childhood, and that those who acquire
these attitudes may live on for three-quarters of a century. There
are men now in leading positions in the South who can remember when
lynchings were frequent occur:-nc3 (161 negro lynchings in 1892),
and when the Ku Klux Klan was a real, and not just imaginary, power.
Southern whites are justly proud of the military record of the
Confederacy, and it is easy for them to look back with nostalgia to
the "Old South," forgetting the harshness and exploitation that
supported the plantation system. No one readily admits that he
and his forefathers have been wrong all their lives. White South-
erners have, by and urge, changed in their attitudes tremendously
in the last forty years; they cannot be compared with, say, the
rigid colons of French Algeria. But a few have not changed and
more are (raid, and hence the course of gradual progress is
occasionally punctuated with Little Rocks and Birminghams.
Some say that if there is resistance to desegregation, so much
the worse for it: it must be destroyed. It is to be suspected
that many of those who take this view have their own ends to serve,
which are not these of racial equality but those of gaining political
power. At any rate, we would note that a radical solution was in
fact attempted once in the United States. After the Civil War,-
Negroes voted freely and were elected to state offices and to Con-
gress, In South Carolina, Negroes at one time outnumbered whites
in the state legislature. This was possible because Federal.
troops occupied the South and protected the Negroes. But the whites
were not?i~:,:ta11y prepared to recognize the Negroes as equals. The
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Ku Klux Klan sprang up to intimidate the Negroes, and after Federal
troops were withdrawn in 1877, the Negro gradually returned to a
position little better than slavery, reaching his nadir in the 1890AL
The point is that there are no easy solutions to questions
like the racial problem in the United States. If a solution is
advanced which looks easy, it is only a pseudo-solution,. Americans
are making slow but real progress toward a real solution to this
problem. We do not know of any other country which, faced by a
similar problem, can say as much.
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THE NEW LEADER
Revolution in an Open Society
By Reinhold Niebuhr
The Negro revolution, which is daily gathering force and un-
doubtedly will gather more force before it reaches its objectives
and finally spends itself in fulfillment, is an interesting his-
torical phenomenon. It is a revolution within the framework of a
democratic society.
If historical phenomena were as neat and orderly as our cate-
gories of history, revolutions would occur only in moribund tradi-
tional societies where there is no free and mutual adjustment of
interests and where the most defrauded segment of the community
cannot move to-attain its rights without shattering the whole rigid
structure of a hierarchial community. We know of the revolutions
in 17th century England, 18th century France and'20th century Russia
Yet even in those revolutions the peasants and the rising craftsmen
arose as a revolutionary force only when internal strains and
external exertions weakened the old order and gave them an oppor-
tunity to do so.
The motive power of their revolutionary actions was resentment
against'agc;-old grievances and injustices, borne "patiently" until
deliverance seemed near; and 'the hopes generated by cracks in the
old order.' Revolutionary ardor is never, as Marx thought, pure
resentment. It is a combination of resentment and hope. That is
why revolutionary movements become more revolutionary in the process
of their success. We should know about this double motive of
revolutions as we watch the Negro revolution in its ups and downs,
and begin to wonder why, as it meets with comparative success, it is
developing more and more force.
Nor should we have too much difficulty in accounting for the
strange ph .nomenon of a Negro revolution taking place in an open
society, rather than in a traditional one. An open society pre-
vents revolutions by allowing all economic, racial and cultural
.groups freedom to state their claims and defend their interests.
The claims may not always be granted, or the interests acknowledged.
But in a truly democratic society there is always some hope that
genuine interests will gradually be recognized, and that in a spirit
of mutual accommodation failure to grant them will be justified by
their clearly interfering with other legitimate interests.
Thus, democratic communities are subject to an evolutionary
process of adjustment, and not revolutions of the dispossessed. The
current Negro revolution can be understood only if it is realized
that the Negroes. comprise a disinherited enclave in a free'society.
They bear the same unsatisifed longings of the ages, the same ac-
cumulated resentments against unredressed injustices, which the
peasants of the ossified traditional communities bore in past cen-
turies and which, according to`Marx, the "proletariat' bore. But,
happily,-democratic society redressed these conditions, making the
Marxist aprocalypse of doom and utopia otiose throughout the whole
of Western Europe. Of course, Western culture required a whole
century to come to terms with the realities of modern industry. The
mills of both God and democracy grind exceedingly slowly.
The Negroes, however, were left out of.all, or at any rate
most, of the beneficient consequences of this fluid evolutionary
process. Despite the promises of a'nation "conceived in liberty and
dedicated to the proposition that'all men are created equal," they
lived in slavery in the self-conscious and self righteous young
nation "brought forth" on a new continent . Despite the fact that
the slavery issue caused the Civil War, the victory of the North
did more to "save the union," acknowledged by Lincoln to be his
"primary purpose," than to emancipate the Negroes. Despite the
assurances of the Fourteenth Amendment, Negroes remained both.right-
less and powerless-in the sense that they were voteless.
After the Civil War, even the free states did not hasten to
enfranchise Negroes under the Fourteenth Amendment'. And today, a
century later, most of the riots in the.South are due to efforts,
to give Negroes the vote. These facts are almost too obvious to be
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sympathetic whites must be remainded, as we recently have been by the
gifted Negro novelist James Baldwin, of the historical reasons.for
the depth and breadth and virulence of Negro resentments.
The enclave of hopeless injustice in our generally open society
obviously has its core in the "deep South" -- in Mississippi and Ala-
bama and, in varying degrees, other states of the old Confederacy.
But it also encompasses the entire nation, particularly the Northern
urban centers to which the Southern Negroes fled. Here they are
"emancipated," in the sense that they can vote, while being newly
enslaved, in the sense that they must live in ghettos such as Harlem.
Still, these enclaves of injustice are in a community that is
otherwise 'open." indeed, some of the effects of the present inte-
gration controversy stem from the contradictory influences of an open
society containing a closed enclave. Birmingham illustrates the
situation most poignantly. Under Martin Luther King's leadership,
the Negroes conducted mass demonstrations against all forms of
segregation. A joint interracial committee finally resolved the
"tension" by promising desegregation of the large downtown depart-
ment store facilities, promotion of Negroes to sales positions, and
the formation of a permanent commission on race relations. These
were the consequences of an open society allowing competition and
accommodation of conflicting interests.
But on the night the accord was reached, a group of recalcitrant
whites, opposed to opening the closed enclave, bombed the house of
a Negro leader and the motel where the committee had met. Earlier,
the same sort of men murdered a pure-hearted mail carrier who was
carrying a message about the necessity for integration to the
Governor of Alabama. A group of Birmingham Negroes, enraged by the
bombing, went beserk, rioted and ruthlessly laid waste to several
homes and businesses. Curiously -- or perhaps not so curiously --
these Negroes were not part of the group which had won accommodation
from the whites. They were a group of hopeless men for whom the
promise of Negro job opportunities seemed worthless, because they
would be unemployed in any case. They spoke from the depths of the
enclave of hopelessness.
Both the open society and the enclave of hopeless injustice will
continue to have their contradictory effects. Whites, along with
Negroes who retain hope of getting justice, will rejoice that this
is not South Africa and that the only conceivable conclusion of the
struggle is not a blood bath of violent revolution. An open society
will in time encroach upon the boundaries of the enclave. Negroes
with votes will use their power in favor of Negroes without votes.
TT:ue, some of them may be demagogic Congressmen with unsavory
records of racism in reverse. But, it should be remembered, we are
dealing with outraged-human beings, not with angels of virtue.
Some Negroes have already escaped from the enclave of prejudice
by dint of extraordinary talent -- in sports, in the theater, in the
concert hall.! This is,. to be sure, a bitter irony in this form of
injustice. But even now only the most talented women are able to
establish "equal rights" with men in politics and business. What is
significant is that Negroes with high talent are breaking out of the
enclave in increasing numbers, thus revealing the virtue of an open
society, enlarging its openness, and refuting the libel about the
"innate inferiority" of their race.
Another result of an open society is that, despite the educa-
tional handicaps from which the present drive for educational inte-
gration may ultimately rescue them, an ever greater number of Negroes
are getting a university education either in Negro or integrated
colleges. And these college students, especially in their sit-in
protests against segregated eating places but also in the general
agitation for justice, are performing the same service for their
race which the articulate craftsmen performed for the less articulate
peasants in the late middle ages and in the revolutions which
established free governments.
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These are the obvious consequences of the openness of our
society. But the forces of tradition and custom, which uphold
special privileges for a dominant race, are still powerful enough
to preserve the enclaves of injustice for a century or more to
come. We will have the tension of the integration struggle with
us as long as we live in the precarious peace of the nuclear
dilemma. The Negroes will naturally be impatient, and their im-
patience will hasten the process of justice and embarrass the
"moderates."
Strangely enough, the only true proponents of a neat "class
struggle" between the reces are the Black Muslims, who believe
Allah will perform the service which Marx expected from the "his-
torical dialectic"; that is, guarantee them a black paradise in
the nation. Since there is no "increasing misery" among Negroes
in this country, however, there is no increasing revolutionary
ardor, only constant pressure. We shall live for a long time with
this pressure and with the contradictory consequences of a revolu-
tion in an open society.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy was probably too optimistic
in his recent analogy between the history of the Irish and the
Negroes in America. After pointing out that an Irish Catholic
was elected President less than a century after the anti-Irish
riots of the "know nothing" movement, he predicted that a Negro
could be elected President in another half century. But the
analogy is not exact. The Irish merely affronted us by having a
different religion and a different place of origin than the "true"
Americans. The Negroes affront us by diverging from the dominant
type all too obviously. Their skin is black. And our celebrated
reason is too errant to digest the difference.
3
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
July 9, 1962
The Negro Problem: A Prognosis
by Gunnar Myrdal
As we can now look back over the era of Reconstruction with
the wisdom of hindsight, we see clearly that the reason why so
much went wrong and why so little permanent improvement of the lot
of the Negroes in the South resulted was this: that the political
revolution was not backed up by economic and social reform. As
usual the leaders of that time tried to do great things too cheaply
without paying the costs. The slogan "six acres and a mule" was
never taken seriously by those in power-- just as in most of the
underdeveloped countries of the world today land and tenancy re-
forms are proposed as programs and sometimes even enacted into
law, but frustrated and nullified by the resistance of the vested
interests.
In America this type of Reconstruction led to the great na-
tional compromise worked out in the late 1870's. The Negro people
were left again to the mercy of the White upper caste in the South,
now embittered by all that had followed their military defeat.
Economically, the South deteriorated to a colonial status in its
relation to the North, and as late as the Thirties Franklin
Roosevelt could still characterize the South as the nation's "Prob-
lem number one. "
Until the end of the Thirties the status of the Negro people
remained on the whole about unchanged. There were advances on
some fronts, but retreats on others. Twenty years ago this era of
relative stagnation so far as the Negroes' position is concerned
had so impressed itself on American thinking that even the social
scientists had generally come to believe that it was the natural
order of things. Progress was foredoomed to be very gradual and
slow, they believed, and nothing very much could be done to speed
it up. In mi~ study of the Negro problem in America at that time
I came to the contrary conclusion, however, that this period of
stagnation was only a temporary balancing of forces which was just
on the verge of being broken. I saw big changes in the offing.
And, as we know, this actually happened. These last 20 years
have been filled with advances on all fronts: in the labor market,
in education, in the fields of social welfare and housing, in the
structure of law and law observance, and generally in the enjoyment
of more equal opportunities to do things, to move in society, to
work, produce and consume without meeting segregation and discrimi-
nation. No historical trend of social change is a straight line,
and there have been occasional setbacks. Prejudice itself is also
slow to disappear, though its legal and institutional retaining
walls are crumbling. There is still a long road to travel before
America becomes in fact the egalitarian country of its creed. But
in historical perspective the rapidty of progress is astonishing.
Let us remember that practically all of this progress has taken
place in the short period of the last 20 years, following six
decades of stagnation -- and that its coming was not anticipated
by most students of the American scene.
The progressive achievements of recent years have not been won
without efforts. in the general advance unfortunate incidents occur
which deeply disturb the participants. In a sense, unpleasant
incidents even have a function to fulfill in this process of advance.
In the last chapter of An American Dilemma I quoted a remark once
made to me by a prominent an conservative Negro social scientist
in the South; I can now reveal that the man I characterized in this
way was my late friend Charles S. Johnson, the great sociologist
and the first Negro president of Fisk University. He stated as his
considered opinion that tensions are not necessarily bad and that
unddr certain conditions even race riots may have wholesome effects
in the long run. He continued in about the following way.
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race situation should ever become fixed, if the Negro were really
accommodated, then, and only then, would I despair about a con-
tinued great improvement for Negroes. As long as there is friction
and fighting, there is hope."
In this light, the Little Rock disturbances and the many other
unfortunate incidents reported daily in the American press have
their positive role to play in giving momentum to social advance.
I realize that it is much easier for an outsider to take this lofty
philosophical view than it is for the American citizen who has a
duty to take a part in pressing social advance as rapidly as possi..
ble. And it must be particularly difficult for the young Negro
intellectual who bears scars in his soul from all that yet remains
of segregation and discrimination in American life. Nevertheless
I maintain that it is important to see clearly that the trend moves
steeply upwards, in order to avoid discouragement and to sustain
the determination required in the skirmishing that may still be
necessary. In this new epoch the Negro cause is a winning one.
I have not the slightest doubt that we shall continuously see
great improvement in the Negro's status in American society, and I
even foresee that the rising trend of the past two decades will
accelerate. It would take me far afield to explain all my reasons
for this conviction. But, among them, on the material side, is the
growing affluence of a society which provides more elbow room for
everybody and has little interest in pushing anybody into the ditch.
On the spiritual side, there is the reality of the ideals enshrined
in your constitution and rooted in the hearts of the American people.
With rising levels of education the hold of these ideals in America
is continuously strengthened. Increasingly, the false and derogatory
beliefs about Negroes, which have filled the function of rationalizes
ing prejudices, can be expressed only by those willing to betray
their own lack of culture. As the white and Negro people are
increasingly mingling in work and pleasure, all are discovering that
they are the same sort of people with the same cultural moorings,
the same likes and dislikes, and the same aspirations and ambitions
for themselves and for America.
Just as until women are completely emancipated, every ambitious
woman has also to stand for women's rights, so even today every
Negro intellectual must feel called upon to supplement his work in
his chosen vocation by being a "race man." This situation will
remain until Negroes are generally accepted everywhere on a par with
whites.
I should not be fully candid with you, if at this point I did
not stress another implication of the integration of the Negroes in
the wider American society, namely that the Negro professional middle
and upper class will have to surrender economic monopolies which
they have held, and are still holding, on the basis of prejudice.
You cannot cry for the breaking down of the walls of segregation and
discrimination while, at the same time, hoping to retain 'Petty
monopoly preserves among Negro clientele to give you a comfortable
and uncontested economic safety. You must have the courage to
choose a harder life in which your abilities will be tested against
the norms established in the wider American society, and indeed in
the whole world.
In the future America... there will be no place for a Negro
university.
As the integration process proceeds the problems of the Negroes
will gradually tend to disappear as separate problems. For a long
time yet, there will undoubtedly be problems of breaking down
segregation and discrimination against Negro families in housing.
But the general problem of slum clearance in American cities is the
bigger and more important one. And the Negro's stake in that bigger
problem is the greater as there is no hope for a satisfactory sepa-
rate solution to the housing problems of Negroes as long as slums
remain a blot in American cities. The schools most Negro children
attend are bad in the South and often in some parts of the North,
but many other schools are also bad, and the best hope for Negroes,
particularly in this period of desegregation, is a campaign for
improving the checks en L w' .of
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.r.ular interest in the extension of social security, an area in
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which America is still rather backward (particularly in the field
of health and hospitalization) by comparison with the most advanced
countries. In this situation it is both natural and necessary that
Negroes should support and join those forces in American society
which stand for general social and economic progress. When narrower
group interests are submerged and the pursuit of social advance for
the white community is brought to the fore, a major step toward the
complete integration of Negroes in American society will have been
taken.
It probably still is broadly true, though less now than 20 to
30 years ago, that the Negroes are the "last hired and the first
fired," and the incidence of unemployment of Negro workers is
disproportionately heavy. The state of full employment, created
by the war and preserved in the immediate postwar years, was of
great importance on the economic side in supporting the rising trend
in the Negrots status. The relative economic stagnation in America
and the high level of unemployment in the Fifties is, for the same
reason, particularly menacing for Negro advance. If continued
stagnation should be the lasting condition for the American economy
in the decades to come it will spell frustration internally and
externally for America, and it might even slow down the upward
trend of the Negro advance I have talked about. When I have ex-
pressed my faith that the trend to improvement of the Negroes' status
will continue and indeed gather momentum, I have done so because
I cannot believe that the American people will tolerate a stagnating
economy for much longer. It is not necessary. Any economist worth
his salt can tell you what is needed in the field of public policy
to make America again a country of bold and rapid economic progress.
To fight discrimination against Negroes in the labor market
remains naturally a task that cannot be relaxed. But much more
important is the recreation of the conditions for American economic
progress, as nothing is more effective in liquidating discrimination
than full employment and a rising trend of incomes to all.
GUNNAR MYRDAL is a Swedish economist. During the 1930is'
he produced the classic sociological study of the Ameri-
can Negro, An American Dilemma. The present article is
taken from an address to t e graduating class of Howard
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icy o integration.