INDICATIONS OF STRAIN IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010010-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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Indications of Strain in the Soviet Leadership
1. Vacillation over treatment of Peking. On 12
December 1962, Khrushchev taunted the Chinese with
not having solved the Hong Kong and Macao problems,
and on 7 January 1963 Pravda editorially laid down
a severe anti-Chicom line. Many people expected that
when Khrushchev spoke at the East German SED Congress
he would make an open break with Mao. But instead,
Khrushchev's 12 January speech to that Congress,
while full of political gamesmanship against Peking,
called for a cessation of inter-Party polemics. .A
Pravda editorial of 10 February contained a first
direct criticism of the Chinese, but also seemed to
offer Peking a modus vivendi: a recognition that
tactics might vary and an offer of a meeting. The
CPSU letter of 21 February was still more clearly
conciliatory. Then on 30 March, the CPSU sent
another letter, once again taking a very stiff position.
The above series of events represents, of course,
half of a two-sided exchange, one moreover in which
both Moscow and Peking are maneuvering and feinting;
these Soviet zigzags cannot be considered simply the
product of a Soviet policy conflict, though they may
be influenced by such a conflict. But a more recent
incident seems a clearer indicator of Soviet policy
differences in this area. In recent months Khrushchev
had awarded Yugoslavia the honorific title of "social-
ist country," although the Chicoms constantly attack
that country as "revisionist." Yet while the Soviet
May Day slogans published on 8 April described other
Communist countries as "building socialism," the
Soviets did not use this term in the slogan on Yugo-
slavia. This omission suggested a certain acceptance
of Chicom views. Then on 11 April, the Yugoslav
slogan was revised, and that country also became a
"builder of socialism." Apparently there had been an
attempt to flout the Khrushchev line, and the Soviet
chieftain had reimposed his views.
2. Problems of military influence. On 2 February
Marsha a inovs y, e i ?nister of efense, published
an article on the battle of Stalingrad which was
restrained in its praise for Khrushchev's generalship,
but which did give credit to Marshal Zhukov, whom
Khrushchev ousted in 1957 for putting army ahead of
party. On 22 February Malinovsky made a fire-eating
Armed Forces Day speech; Khrushchev attended the
ceremonies in uniform, but gave no major address.
Then on 26 February, Kommunist of the Armed Forces
published an article suggesting that on occasion
military figures had to be "active conductors of the
policy of the state," and saying (with quotes from
Engels) that the role of a military leader may be
greatest "at the moment of failure, when the army has
suffered defeat"; this last might have been a refer-
ence to Soviet policy defeat over Cuba, and a claim
that the military should take a stronger hand in
political affairs. On the other hand, there have
been several articles firmly asserting the supremacy
of the party in military affairs; this last would be
Khrushchev's position.
3. The Question of Priorities. Closely related
to the question of military influence is the question
of what kind of production should receive most empha-
sis. The establishment of a Supreme Economic Council
on 13 March, with the appointment of defense production
specialist D.F. Ustinov, meant (notwithstanding
Khrushchev's denial on 25 April) an increase in
emphasis on defense production and heavy industry,
and may have reflected increased military influence.
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An indicator of increased stress on rockets was the
appointment of Marshal S.S. Biryuzov, formerly chief
of the Strategic Rocket Forces, to become Chief of
the Soviet General Staff, replacing Marshal Zakharev,
who had a ground forces outlook. There are indeed
many indicators, including signs that the last two
years of the Seven Year Plan are being revised, show-
ing that the production of advanced weapons is now
receiving high priority. This necessarily involves
hardships in other sectors, as Khrushchev himself
plainly stated on 27 February. Khrushchev's old
goals of catching up with the United States in meat
and butter, or of overcoming the housing shortage,
are bound to recede even further into the future;
one might suppose that he would resist such changes
of emphasis, or more likely, that others might ques-
tion whether he was the man to carry them out. We
should remember, however, that he has also posed on
occasion as the champion of heavy industry, not only
when ousting Malenkov in 1955, but also even at the
November 1962 CPSU plenum.
4. Indecisive handling of literature and art.
The efforts of writers and artists to gain freedom
of expression represent a dnger in the eyes of all
CPSU leaders; there is no pro-Ehrenburg or pro-
Neizvestniy party in the Kremlin. But Khrushchev,
though inherently very conservative in this field,
unintentionally encouraged the writers and artists
by permitting (for political reasons) the publica-
tion of Solzhenitsyn's ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH
and Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs." In particular,
Frol Kozlov, who has had a heart attack, might well
take umbrage at "Stalin's Heirs," which says:
"Evidently not for nothing do Stalin's heirs suffer
heart attacks." In general, as in the case of
stepped-up arms production, other Soviet leaders
may question whether Khrushchev is tough enough on
the issue of intellectual freedom. Such criticisms
might gain strength from the fact that even now,
five months after the start of the campaign against
artistic freedom, Khrushchev and his cultural lieu-
tenant, Leonid Ilichev, have failed to obtain
unqualified self-criticism from the erring intellec-
tuals.
5. The abortive third anti-Stalin campaign.
Khrushchev had used the 20th and 22nd CPSU congresses
as platforms for political campaigns, ostensibly
aimed at Stalin and actually directed against stagna-
tion and rival elements in the CPSU and the world
Communist movement. The publications referred to
above, as well as the polemics against Peking, sug-
gested last fall that a third anti-Stalin campaign
was getting started. At the same time, there were
official claims, supported by a "newly discovered"
Lenin document, that economic goals had priority
over political goals in Soviet policy. Against this
4 This might suggest that the ground forces are being downgraded;
on 27 February, in his election speech, Khrushchev stated that
future wars would be over in one day, perhaps implying -- as he
explicitly stated in 1961 -- that ground forces were becoming
superfluous. Yet the Party's chief representative with the forces,
General A.A. Yepishev, a man with no military experience and
almost certainly a Khrushchev supporter, asserted in one article
both that the role of mass (ground) armies grows with modern tech-
nology and that "Soviet scholars under the leadership of the Party
had solved most military problems -- not the soldiers." There may
be other explanations for Zakharov's fall; a news report in the 4 April
Evening Star links his name with that of Oleg Penkovskty, soon to
face trial for espionage against the Soviet Union.
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background, the proposals for reorganizing the Party
into industrial and agricultural sectors looked like
a scheme for downgrading or dismissing any Party of-
ficials unsympathetic to Khrushchev. But the Novem-
ber reforms have been at least partly offset by the
creation of the Supreme Economic Council and in his
8 March speech to the writers and artists, Khrushchev
partially reversed himself on Stalin, not only claim-
ing that he and other leaders had been ignorant "of
Stalin's abuse of power and . . . instances of
arbitrariness," but also giving Stalin credit for
stamping out opposition groups in the 1920's and
1930's. One could interpret this as a retreat by
Khrushchev under pressure from more conservative
elements.
OW WO WO S. OW
Aside from the zones of conflict described above, there have
been other possible indications of instability in the leadership.
Kozlov, Khrushchev's heir apparent and most likely competitor,
attended a ballet performance together with Khrushchev (and with-
out other leadership personalities) on 8 March; this joint appear-
ance may have been intended as a demonstration of solidarity
between the two men, or it may have been intended to show that
Kozlov was soon to be joint ruler with Khrushchev. On 1 April,
the First Secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast criticized (in a Pravda
article) past performance by the local oblast committee; this has
been regarded as criticism of A.P. Kirilenko, former Sverdlovsk
Oblast Secretary and now Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Central
Committee, Moreover, in a recent Pravda listing of RSFSR party
officials, Kirilenko's name dropped from an alphabetical position
to a place below Kozlov and Kosygin. Kirilenko, thought to be a
Khrushchev supporter, had become a full member of the CPSU
Presidium on 26 April 1962, at the same time that I.V. Spiridonov,
believed to be a Kozlov man, was "released from his duties" as a
Central Committee Secretary and as First Secretary of Leningrad
Oblast. The 1962 Kirilenko-Spiridonov changes were interpreted as
meaning a loss of status for Kozlov; present loss of prestige by
Kirilenko suggests that this process has been reversed. A plenum
of the Central Committee has been scheduled for 28 May, ostensibly
to discuss ideological questions such as the future of the arts.
Whether or not the rumors are true that Khrushchev will then set
a date for his resignation, the plenum is likely to produce new
information on the status of the Soviet leadership. In 1957,
Khrushchev used a special plenum meeting to become dictator, ousting
the "anti-party group"; conceivably the upcoming meeting might
either remove him from power or confirm him in it.
3
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COMMUNIQUE
OF CAPTAIN KONG LE
FORMER HEAD OF THE AUGUST 9, 1.960 COUP
NOW COMMANDEr OF THE NEUTRALIST ARMY
Recently there has been a group of people who tried to stir
up trouble within the Neutralist Army-controlled areas intending
to cause a split within the Army and making the situation in Laos
become more tense again. They do this in order that unification
of Laos will be put off indefinitely. They also do this to make
the Neutralist Army weaker so that they can do anything they please
in extending their influence, in spreading their political doc-
trine, and building up their own party within our controlled area.
This group has received the encouragement and the help of a po-
litical party friendly to foreign countries. It has taken the
occasion to use the policy of the coup announced in Vientiane on
August 9, 1960 as its instrument to deceive some officers and
soldiers in the Neutralist Army as well as the people who don't
know about such things. The group has done this to build up a
separate force to carry out its policy and enlarge its party in
preparation for the forthcoming elections or have further fight-
ing if the results of the elections are not satisfactory.
Therefore, in my capacity as head of the 1960 Vientiane coup
and as Commander of the Neutralist forces, I deem it necessary to
make this announcement so that the people will understand the
truth as follows:
The coup (which I led) by the 2nd Parachute Battalion in
Vientiane in 1960 was to overthrow the government friendly to
foreigners and to set up a new government with a policy harmoni-
ous with the wishes of the Lao people. I did this to make the
Kingdom of Laos peaceful and truly neutral between the two worlds,
i.e. the communist and free worlds. I also did this so that the
civil war which had lasted over ten years would cease by bring-
ing together as one people under the King the Lao who were divided.
After I along with the officers and soldiers of the 2nd Parachute
Battalion made our coup, it was the same. I tried in every way
to correct the various internal problems peacefully to avoid the
shedding of blood. Later on it was necessary to order the Neu-
tralist Army to fight with weapons but on every occasion I tried
to use peaceful methods to solve the internal problems. I want
to repeat again to make absolutely clear that the 2nd Parachute
Battalion's coup in Vientiane was not for the sake of any one
party or to create any big shots or to confer ranks but the coup
was carried out for the benefit of all 3,000,000 Lao people.
Therefore, I am absolutely unwilling for any group to take ad-
vantage of that coup as a cover for its own purposes.
In the past two years because of the harmonious leadership
of Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma, because of the unified
resistance of the officers and soldiers of the National Army as
well as the people who are patriots and really, want neutrality
throughout the country, because of the unity between all patriotic
forces, e.g. between the Neutralist Army and the NUM armed forces,
and because of the support of the governments and people of for-
eign countries which wanted peace and neutrality for the army and
people of Laos, we finally succeeded. The Coalition Government
was set up which was accepted by various countries in the world.
Two sides and thirteen countries let our Kingdom become a peaceful
and neutral country with harmony and full sovereignty over its
territory. Then the worrisome situation in our country gradually
improved and became cleared up in a heart-warming way. But while
we Lao people were becoming happy at the wonderful results that
we had received, while the Coalition Government under the leader-
ship of Prince Souvanna Phouma was starting to build national unity,
restore peace and implement the neutrality which we had just re-
ceived, something happened which we hadn't dreamed of in the
Neutralist Army-controlled areas, i.e., in Kieng Khouang and
Phong Saly.
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What happened was really not accidental but was started by
those who had evil intentions towards our trmy and Lao neutrality.
A group did this using a definite plan.
At first this group tried to make up malicious reports in order
to divide the people. For instance they said that this officer
or that officer in the Neutralist Army would start a coup here or
there in order to make the people believe them and be afraid. ,
They even announced the hour And date and gave various kinds of
evidence. Moreover, they openly tried.to make me arrest Neutral-
ist officers. When they saw that their plan would not succeed -
they made up, more,malicious.rumors to attack various people in
the Neutralist ranks again, even including Prime Minister Prince
SouVanna Phouma. Their first attack on him which they spread
among the people was that he had brought in Japanese to Laos, that
he had gone to Thailand where he was bought by the Thais, that
he had gone to North Viet-Nam. to split Laos off with Viet-Nam and
108,000 other stories. When they saw that these attacks had .
achieved some results they spread them even wider when the Coali-
tion Government agreed to send Lao Ambassadors to the various
socialist countries and when the Prime Minister received special
powers from the Assembly. This group mobilized its strength even
to forcing (people) to sign their names in opposition to the
Government. '
Nevertheless, because of the patience of Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma and the steadfastness of every officer and soldier in the
Neutralist Army the disturbed situation which this group started
intentionally finally clampaddown and things returned to normal
In this area.
...This group, received their lessons from their communist
bases...when Prime Minister. Souvanna Phouma went abroad...to
destroy the Neutralist forces.
,...Afterwards they used tricks to provoke the soldiers and
people to overthrow Colonel Ketsana....but they didn't succeed.
Then on February, 12 they used an assassin to murder Ketsana.
Besides this they killed or arrested all the members of the Neu-
tralist party in a savage way until many people lost their lives...
Now when we see the situation in our country is moving towards
peace and the three forces which had been fighting each other
before are now together starting to understand one another, the
communist followers are taking even more risks by using tricks
to stir up and buy off the Neutralist officers and soldiers.
They are getting them to violate the discipline of the Neutralist
officers and soldiers. They are getting them to violate the dis-
cipline of the Neutralist forces by disobeying the orders of the
Neutralist headquarters or having them cut off the Neutralist
forces using soldiers and economic (blockade). At the same time
the foreigners who are their bosses are creating 108,000 different
kinds of trouble. They are holding up various goods from all the
countries with good intentions to aid Laos. They are net letting
them reach the hands of the Neutralist forces and people in the
areas under the control of the Neutralist Army. They are stealth-
ily sending soldiers, weapons and war equipment in order to help
a group which opposes a neutral policy for the nation.
Recently they increased their propaganda to divide the Neu-
tralist ranks and the people. They did this to conceal from the
criticism of people throughout the country and the world their
tricks to bring in foreign forces to Lao territory.
Nevertheless, the truth is the truth. Even though they try
to use money and goods to buy off the soldiers and people to come
over to them, our army and people every day see clearly into
their terrible tricks to make the Kingdom of Laos a new kind of
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colony of international communism. They hope to make Lao terri-
tory their base to disturb the peace of all the countries in
Southeast Asia and spread their evil policy among the people in
various countries.
Our army and people see this clearly and absolutely affirm
that we are really neutral, not leaning left or right. (We want)
the Kingdom of Laos we love to be peaceful and harmonious. If
they use the Neutralist policy as a cover, we firmly believe
without doubt that one day they will be punished by all the people.
As Commander of the Neutralist Army and former head of the
1960 Vientiane coup I call on all our brother officers and sol-
diers in the National Army, in the NLHX armed forces and in the
Savannakhet forces together with out brothers throughout the coun-
try to unite closely together and join to support the Coalition
Government and preserve the neutrality of our country....
I call on all our brothers to stand firmly for peace and not
believe the propaganda of foreign lackeys who are working to
destroy peace and national harmony. I believe firmly without
any doubt that under the wise and harmonious leadership of Prime
Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma, our believed leader, our Kingdom
of Laos must have peace, neutrality, and national harmony.
Mang Khay March 30, 1963
Captain Kong Le
Commander of the Neutralist
Army and Head of the August 8,
1960 Coup
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, 140
Civil War, in Laos
Neutrality Attacked
1. Beginning of the Problem
It is well-known that in Phong Saly, Xieng Khouang, Yang
Vieng, Kassy, Muong Hiem, Mahaxay, and Nhommarath, instead of
peaceful cooperation in accordance with Neutralist policy and
the wishes of the Prime Minister, these places have become the
stage for continual encroachments and one side's taking advan-
tage of the other. The heads of the two sides went to run the
government in Vientiane with the head of the right faction.
The deputy head of the left faction, the NLHX, used his forces
to try in every way to divide the Neutralist forces and weaken
them. They used propaganda to attack the Neutralists and the
branch executive committees and members of the Lao Pen Kang
(Neutralist) Party in the villages and provinces. They divided,
threatened, arrested, and killed until everyone was suspect.
Besides provoking dissension, they infiltrated the ranks of the
Neutralist army and tried to divide the Second Military Region
under the command of Col. Ketsana Vongsouvanh in order that left-
leaning Neutralist officers would take over. They provoked the
Chao Anou Artillery Regiment to shoot down a plane which the
Prime Minister ordered to take food to the Neutralists. They
designated an assassin to kill Col. Ketsana Vongsouvanh. They
incited Col. Deuane and Major Thiep to resist the commander
and split their forces off to stir up trouble in the Neutralist
ranks. Finally Kong Le had had enough and ordered the arrest
of officers who had stirred all this, but Col. Deuane escaped
and the NLHX sheltered him.
Our Neutralists who had been pressured politically,
militarily, and economically were not dissolved as the leftists
had expected. Instead they were able to solve their own situa-
tion with continuing patience and were unwilling to submit to
the control of the leftists in any way.
2. Creating The? Problem,
After Deuane and 210 followers split off and joined the
NLHX on March 12 the situation in Xieng Khouang became more
tense. The Neutralist soldiers were continually attacked by the
opposition, but the Neutralist headquarters did not consider this
significant until March 31 at 2 p.m., when Cpl. Kong Sy,
stationed with the 5th Battalion Headquarters (Khang Khay), took
his wife to dig up insects near his camp. He was shot and killed
immediately by soldiers of an NLHX Anti-aircraft unit. They
freed his wife who found her way back to camp and asked the
officer in charge to send someone to look for her husband's body.
The commander ordered his followers to investigate immediately.
When the soldiers left the camp, they were shot by machine guns
of the opposition along the way. When they saw they could not
resist they ran back to their camp.
There was no way to go in and get the soldier's body so
they asked the Neutralist MPs to help them, but the MPs feared
that it was too big for them to deal with. In order to avoid
fighting they took the group to see Kong Le at the PDJ. Kong Le
was informed of the affair, he ordered Lt. Col. Sabap to take a
force and bring back the body without fail. Col. Sabap took his
troops to the place of the incident immediately. About 15 min-
utes after Col. Sabap's car passed Phonesavan on the way to
Khang Khay, Capt. Done of the NLHX came to report to the MPs
that the NLHX had shot and killed three government soldiers at
Nong Sedet. This report mads the MPs wonder whether it was the
same matter as the previous one or anew incident, because
there were two Nong Sedets, one Khang Khay and another one
between Phonesavan and Ithang Khay. In order not to lose time the
MPs and the NLHX immediately went to investigate. But in a
short time they saw Col. Sabap's car returning with the body.
They said that while they were bringing back the body, the NUDE
had ambushed them along the way. After Col. Sabap had related
this matter to the MPs he took the soldier's body back to the
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ln rmation. When the reached Nong Sedet they saw nothing
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unusual and went up to Houei Kham which is about one km. from
Nong Sedet on the way to Khang Khay next to the NUDE camp.
When the MPs reached Houei Kham they saw the NLHX troops
pull three bodies out of the water and bury them. When they
saw this; the MPs got out of their cars and ran straight over.
When they got there they sawthe bodies were clothed only in
loin cloths. Our policemen took the bodies back to Phonesavan.
On investigation they learned that the three bodies were Sgt.
Somkith of the 2nd Company of the Third AA Battalion, Cpl. Kan
of the 2nd Company of the Third AA Battalion and Cpl. Kong of
the Tank BattaliOn. Six civilians who had been interrogated by
the NLHX were freed and told our *Aide the following story:
We went fishing at Houei Kham, unaware that area was forbidden.
We understood that it was al/ Lao territory and we thought that
at Houei Kham there were fish ad went there'. As we were fish-
ing in the stream? there we:saw ode company of' NLHX soldiers
with firearts who'surrounded us. and threatened us. They asked
"don't you -know this 'is out area? .Why do rou darei to trespass?"
They rushed to the bank of the stream and pointea, saying:
"Who are soldiers and who are villagers?" The.thrde soldiers
said nothing though the red hats on their head' said they were
soldierg. Kham One, the comMandet of the NLHX Company, pulled
out his gun and shbutedl Are you a follower of Neutraligt Gen.
Khamlome? We will kill all of Khamlome's and, Kon g Le's followers.
You know well that no matter who I am, you will remember that
we're communists, fighting for national independence. When he
finished speaking., they shot the soldiers wearing red hats in
the head and they died immediately. When the NLHX started to
leave, they saw four guns on the bank of the stream and knew
there must be four soldiers. They threatened again:- Who else
is a soldier? Come out. Those who had not' been killed were
afraid and pleaded that they were civilians. But since the
soldiers had brought four guns, they were seized and imprisoned
in the camp.
The three bodies Were sent to the PDJ, the Neutralist
headquarters on the samenight. That night the soldiers from
all of our units went on the alert to await new ::incidents.
The coldiers were very angry and wanted to take revenge for
their dead companions; but Kong Le appealed to them to hold off
so this matter wouldn't spread and urged his men to seek a peace-
ful solution. This incident took place March 31.
3. Incidents Spread
On April 11 at 6 p.m. after the situatioh became temporarily
calm, the Neutralist MPs at Phonesavan received a report from. ,
1st Lt. Sit, commander Of the 2nd CoMpany-at KhadgKhay, that
his Company was surrounded. The MPs sent a light tank to
investigate. 'When the.tank'reached Khang Khay; Deuane's soldiers
fired at it with heavy artillery. One soldier in the tank died
and 5 were injured. About 33 minuteslater, fearing that the
1st tank was in danger, the Tank Company at Ban Ngoi sent
another tank after it with 2nd Lt. Bonn Ma, 1st Sgt. Kong Chai
and another 5 men. When the tank reached the cUrVe at Ban &mei
Kham where ,Col. Sabap had been ambushed the previous day, a -
NLHX soldier blocked the toad but the tank did notStop and the
NLHX who were waiting in ambush shot a bazooka it it. Lt. Bolin Ma,
the driver, Lt. Done, and Sgt. Kong Chai died immediately and
the others were seriously wounded.-
.
Headquarters then sent two tanks and another troop carrier
to help the 2nd Company which had been surrounded. The vehicles
reached Houei Kham.and saw 'the damaged tanks and bodies 6f the
three soldiers and-took them to the 2nd itompany at Khang'Khay.
After they took them there they returned to ,pick up the one
wounded Man. They didn't see the other four Men and got the
impression they were captured. ' On the morning Of 3 April, the
Neutralist MPs got in= touch With the NLHX security unit at
Phonesavan and requested them to: contact their headquarters at
Khang Khay to ask for discussions. The NLHX were unwilling to
dome to Phonesavan and our side was unwilling to leaVe. Finally
the NLHX agreed to send Col. thamnien'as representatiVe. Dis-
cussions started in the Muong Pek muong office. The Neutralists
had Col. Soulvivanh E14.4 representative. They agreed to let
them go In to takd 'out the dead soldiers with officials of the
two sides goinr. together. When they reached the place of the
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Kham along wi t e ree rom e t n ,
gether. They learned that the five bodies which they saw after-
wards *ere the soldiers who had gotten out of the damaged tanks
but who were killed afterwards by the NLHX.
On the evening of 3 April, the 2nd Neutralist Company which
had been surrounded in the middle of Khang Khay tried to break
out. The NLHX and Deuane's sides shot at them for about 40 min-
utes but fortunately our side had no casualties and successfully
rejoined its compatriots.
The tense situation got worse and showed signs of becoming
a savage war between the two sides. The NLMX asked for discus-
sions again on 4 April, but the Neutralists refused because when-
ever they sent people they were shot at by the 11LSX. They thought
that there was no safety and asked the NLHX to come discuss things
at Phonesavan, where the Neutralists would guarantee security.
The NLHX believed this promise and the Neutralists sent soldiers
from their security unit together with NUM soldiers to bring
back the NLHX representative at Khang Khay.
At the discussions on April 4 the Neutralists had Lt. Col.
Sabap and Lt. Col. Phannola and the NLHX had Lt. Col. Chamnien
as representatives. At the discussion they agreed that there
would be no fighting for 48 hours; no movement from their former
strongpoints; no reinforcements; and the NLHX would not encourage
Col. Deuane's forces.
4. Fighting
The three points that we have related up till now are in
great detail because these events occurred at Khang Khay and
Phonesavan where we followed them throughout. But there was
also fighting in widely scattered other areas. We therefore will
not discuss the details, but only review the general situation.
Reports from the PDJ say that 1 April at Khang Khay and
Phonesavan was dull and there was no serious fighting. Three
truckloads of NLHX mixed with North Vietnamese moved from the
PDJ/Phonesavan towards Xieng Khouang to reinforce the NLHX and
the forces of Major Thiep, the rebel to the forces there. Kong Le
indicated on 1 April that Xieng Khouang would probably be attacked
and if anything serious happened it would be the NLHX and North
Vietnamese who were responsible. A report on 1 April indicated
that the NLHX and Major Thiep's group had tightly encircled the
town of Xieng Khouang and would absolutely not let civilians or
neutralist troops out of the city. This made the situatiaithere
much more tense. Another instance, the NLHX seized Lo Chou, a
Lao Soung (Meo) Nai Kong in Xieng Khouang and a committee member
of the Lao Pen Kang (Neutralist) Party in Muong Khoun. They
killed him and his son at the Xieng Khouang market in front of the
population in a most horrible and savage manner. The situation
in the town was tense until April 5. The NLEX and forces of Major
Thiep, the rebel, initiated their attack on the strongpoints of
the Neutralists within and around Xieng Khouang. There was a
heavy attack all day on 5 April. Our Neutralists had fewer
forces but they fought bravely and patiently with their full
strength. The enemy side had North Vietnamese reinforcements at
a strongpoint in the caves of Kap Kai. Mixed with the enemy
forces they moved from there to attack our Neutralists throughout
the evening from April 5. The Korth Vietnamese controlled the
heavy artillery which shelled our strongpoints and controlled the
NLHX and forces of Major Thiep, the rebel, advancing towards our
Neutralist forces on the battlefield of Xieng Khouang. Altogether
there were 4 battalions. Finally we had to withdraw from Xieng
Khouang itself and set up a new line outside the city. The city
itself fell to the opposition on 5 April.
Since it was clear that there were North Vietnamese helping
the NLHX, Kong Le appealed to the ICC to come investigate the
North Vietnamese who had invaded Laos in various points in Xieng
Khouang and elsewhere. The ICC went up only to the PDJ on 6 April
and got the report of Kong Le and it returned to Vientiane the
same day. On 13 April the three Commissioners to the ICC again
went to the PDJ and returned the same day.
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To summarize, the discussions between the representatives of
the two sides and between Kong Le and Siagkapo on 4 April brought
no results at all because the NLHX, supported by the North Viet-
namese, acted contrary to the agreement and did not respect it in
any way. Moreover, the NLHX kept encroaching on the strong points
of our Neutralists at Ban Ngoi near Phonesavan on 5 April.
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