BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 6, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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01 -WE EK1jY
PRII PA GAkk DA G I DA V C E
DATE : 6 May 19,63 ~'? :? ? `
Central Propaganda Directive
}:Briefly Noted
:.Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions
#2, 16-29 Apr 1963 Unclassified Chronology :" ::::
Democratic Alternatives
653. Will Khrushchev Fall?
. ?"~ .....................
........... ........... ..:............
.............. ................................. ................
AFE WH[. Women's international Democratic
Federation (WIDF)
%:655 WH.
Mounting Communist Influence in ...............
"Neutral" Brazil
...................... .. ..
.....................................................
___
Ctii C
onnungommunist Chinese
NE, WE. Threat to India
7 EE,a.
Rumania Asserts Itself
656 FE WE, g. Laos: Renewed Communist
Aggression
List of
..............................................:??C1 CAttachments (unclassified)
................................................
................................................
...............
.r.........: ~ 5
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Briefly Noted
New Book Contains Stalin Revelations
A new book by Jack Fishman and J. Bernard Hutton, TIE PRIVATE
LIFE OF JOSIF STALIN, published by W.H. Allen in London, contains
a sensational account of the life of the Soviet dictator, describ-
ing his activities in robbing banks, running houses of prostitution,
betraying and executing other Bolshevik leaders, as well as his
better-known political blunders and excesses. The authors give
particular attention to Stalin's three wives and countless love
affairs. At the end of the story, it is suggested that Stalin's
death was due to poison, administered (possibly by mistake) by
Molotov. Khrushchev is portrayed as a heavy drinker and a tool of
Molotov, afraid to take any decisions on his own while Stalin lived.
In two respects, the writers seem to have given Stalin too much
credit; they suggest that he really was a great military leader in
World War II, and that he had fabulous vitality, especially in his
sex life. The authors are British newspapermen, one of them a
former Czech Communist with years of newspaper experience in Moscow.
25X1 C10
EICHMANN Associate Exposed as Communist Trade Agent
The arrest of Erich RAJAKOWITSCH on 17 April in Vienna fol-
lowing his voluntary surrender to Austrian authorities, has once
more (see Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #110, 25 February 1963,
re SS man Bartsch who was elevated to the Politburo of the East
German Communist Party) brought to light a case where the East
German Communist regime has used a notorious Nazi to accomplish its
political and economic ends. RAJAKOWITSCH, Austrian Nazi, SS
Captain, and EICHMANN aide, has been sought for the deaths of
thousands of Dutch and other Jews during the Hitler era. He
escaped punishment after World War II by resettling in Italy,
where he became wealthy in the export-import business. Research
by Italian, West Berlin and other Western European newspapers (see
current issues of Press Comment for clips) has revealed that most
of this business was on alha of East Germany, the Soviet Union,
and other Soviet Bloc countries. Although some of his fees
allegedly had to be kicked back to the Italian Communist Party, he
became rich in spite of his "contributions." A villa in Switzer-
land, costly automobiles and a life of luxury in Italy were an
integral part of his daily life.
Whenever the East German and other Communist agitprop depart-
ments seek to smear the Federal Republic of Germany with the taint
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MWENNOW (Briefly Noted Cont.)
 (Briefly Noted Coat _ ) 6 May 1963
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of re-nazification, we.note through appropriate assets that the
West Germans continue to prosecute cases of former Nazis who
committed crimes, but that the Communists bestow political and
economic rewards on them if they agree to serve Communist objec-
tives. We cite the cases of Bartsch and Rajakowitsch as recent
examples of the numerous documented cases of former Nazis
employed by the Communists.
2
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23 May
DATES 25X1C10b
Conference of the Inter-African and Malagasy
Organization.,..Addis Ababa, 23 May 1963 (See
Item 645)
2 A'1~~y Twentieth anniversary of Moscow's official an-
> uL*crxi.-'ht disbanding the Communist Inter-
nat i iiai (COMINTERN)
17 June Tenth anniversary of anti-Communist riot and
strike in Communist Germany against increased
work quotas; Soviet troops were required to
put down the riot (1953)
17 June Fifth anniversary of Communist Hungarian Gov-
ernment's announcement of the trial and
execution of Imre Nagy, Gen. Pal Maleter and
other leaders of the Hungarian Revolt of
November 1956 (1958)
23 June General elections scheduled for Argentina
24 June Women's International Democratic Federation
(WIDF) Fifth Congress, Moscow, 24-29 June 1963
25 June North Korean Forces invaded Republic of South
Korea; North Korean radio broadcast declaration
of war (1950)
26 June Fifteenth anniversary of beginning of Allied
airlift to Berlin in successful answer to
the Soviet blockade (1948)
28 June Poznan, Poland: revolt against Communist
rule; 44 killed and hundreds wounded (1956)
28 June Fifteenth anniversary of Cominform resolution
to expel the Yugoslav Party (1948)
1 July Chinese Communist Party founded,(1921)
4 July Philippines granted independence by USA (1946)
9 July ICFTU Vienna World Youth Rally July 9-19
20 July Ninth anniversary Geneva Agreement concluding
the war in In-,7o-China (1954) /Cambodia, Laos,
Vietnam?
22 July Seventh Anniversary Panama Declaration outline
political and economic philosophy of OAS
(July 13, 1888 -- Seventy-five years ago, US
issued invation to the first International
Conference of American States to be held in
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Pan American Union)3
(Briefly Noted).
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6 May 1963
652. Democratic Alternatives
BACKGROUND :
Significance of Problem. US foreign policy desires to see
in foreign coun r es open plural) societies and free (democratic,
constitutional) forms of government--lot because we want to re-
model the world in our image, but as a necessary safeguard against
further encroachments by Communist, Fascist or other totalitarian,
aggressive and war-like regimes and as the only reliable basis
for peace and ever closer cooperation and friendly relations be-
tween all nations which are absolutely and urgently necessary in
the nuclear age. It is neither desirable nor practicable that
all nations should emulate US patterns and laws: depending on
any nation's history and present stage of development, a wide range
of different forms of socio-economic structure and legal-political
order may be applicable. Essential, however--in the interest f
the nations and individuals concerned as well as for our national
security--is the rule of law, basic freedoms of the individual
and adequate stability of the country's institutions.
Critical Situations Increasing. Since the end of World War
T??r), e total number o - sovere gn nations has multiplied because
most former colonies and possessions have gained independence;
moreover, quite a few countries turned (or returned) from dicta-
torial to democratic regimes--including Germany, Austria, Italy,
Argentina, Brazil, Japan. At the same time, however, Communist
subversion and certain rightist and nec-Fascist movements from
within, as well as Communist threats and pressures from without,
combined with the lack of democratic experience and traditions,
are jeopardizing freedom in many of these newly established or
re-established democracies. We shall cite some of the most sig-
nificant types of such recent or current jeopardy--ranging from
the actual or imminent loss of freedom to developments which may
endanger freedom in the foreseeable future--in the parabraphs
below.
Elections Benefiting the Enemies of Democracy. In Guatemala,
the recent m any coup ousting res ems goras was s aged
to prevent elections which were expected to restore leftist, pro-
Communist Arevalo to the Presidency. In Argentina, elections last
year which resulted in considerable gains r fH-fascist Peron-
istas--actively supported by the Communists--were invalidated by
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the armed forces who deposed President Frondizl (who had permitted
the Peronistas--outlawe(i after the ouster of dictator Peron--to
reappear on the ballot and had failed to rally the democratic
majority against them). In Indonesia, where no general elections
have been held for years and `Toespi a the fact that the Indonesians
are presently talking about holding elections before the end of
1963, none are likely in the foreseeable future. Such elections--
if held now and under the prevailing political situation--would
presumably give the Indonesian CP a strong plurality. However
different these 3 country situations, they all have conditions in
common under which it is hardly advisable to press for unrestricted,
free elections since these would almost certainly bring enemies
of democracy to power.
Democratic Shortcomings lead to Autocratic Rule. In Pakistan,
the cons u Iona regime, established when e :ountry attained
independence in 1947, found itself deadlocked at an early stage
and dictatorial powers were assumed by President Ayub Khan. In
Burma, General Me Win, who assumed power in 1953 to forestall
possible internal chaos stemming from Communist inroads, rules
again as a dictator in his own right. This time He Win has
scrapped the former constitution and has embarked on a socialistic
campaign marked by extreme leftist tendencies and xenophobia.
In Peru, a military junta seized power last year to frustrate the
elecal victory of the leftist, though non-Communist Apristas.
In all these and similar situations, existing democratic regimes
proved unable to solve grave external or domestic problems, to
reform themselves in order to meet such contingencies, or to pro-
vent military or other autocratic forces from overthrowing the
legally constituted government.
One-Party Democracies? In a number of newly independent coun-
tries, especiaTiyinnAffrica--as in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and, to
an increasing extent, in Algeria--,thecuT ai_d_f_5rms of democracy
are being more or less observe , but all power is actually vested
in a single, autocratically organized party, led by one man (such
as Nkrumah). Opposition is either completely outlawed or severely
restricted (by law, administrative measures, or outright terror)
and the rights of individuals, though perhaps respected in private,
non-political matters, are ignored if they happen to run counter
to the interests of the ruling party, or even to the whim of the
big leader. /15emocracy is not dependent upon a multiple-party
system; it can exist in a one-party system as long as opposition
within that party is not prevented or subjugated to dictatorial
control. But a two-party system generally guarantees greater
exercise of democracy!? African nationalists attempt to justify
this arbitrary one-party or one-man rule by referring (a) to
trlba ra x cons which did not give play to a "loyal opposition"
once a decision was taken by a chief, variously influenced by his
council, and (b) to the custom of the Western democracies to
form in emergencies a "government of national unity," involving
all political parties and thereby, at least temporarily, eliminating
2
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6 May 1963
all opposition. Although some African leaders have tended to be-
lieve these arguments, they are not applicable: a war-time gov-
ernment of national unity, as it existed in most Western European
countries in World Wars I and II, never eliminated opposition
parties as separate identities and never abolished the rights of
the individual, despite certain obvious war-tine restrictions;
moreover, no African state today is faced with an emergency com-
parable with that of a general war.
Shortage of Democratic Alternatives. In Austria, the two major
parties, Catholics and Socialists, have jointly ruled in coalition
governments since 1945: the only opposition parties are the Com-
munists and the right-wing "Freedom" Party. In Italy, too, the
only parties outside the government coalition since 1945 have been
c=,=unists, Monarchists and Neo-Fascists. In Japan, the conserva-
tive Liberal-Democratic Party rules supported y a solid popular
majority: the only major opposition party, the Socialist Party,
unlike the European Socialist Parties, is predominantly a Marxist-
based left-wing movement, with some pro-Communist leanings and
at this time can hardly be considered a democratic alternative.
The countries enumerated in this paragraph (and others, in simi-
lar situations) all have functioning democratic governments and
need not experience constitutional crises of the types outlined
In the preceding paragraphs. Nevertheless, it is basically un-
healthy for any democratic regime if voters have only the choice
between a party supporting the government and an anti-democratic
(Communist, Fascist) candidate: expressing one's dissatisfaction
with the current administration by voting for the "outs" is a basic
democratic right--provided those "outs" will not undermine or
abolish that very democracy should they be voted "in." This may
sound somewhat academic to most practicing politicians in the
countries concerned (where, however, some people have been aware
of this problem for some time)--but vie aught to keep in mind that
an emergency, whether caused by an economic depression, the death
of an outstanding leader, by conflicts with other countries, or
the like:, may conjure up serious consequences out of what now
appear to be merely minor flaws in the political system.
3
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653. Will Khrushchev Fall?
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND :
Rumors of a power struggle. Early in April, reports from
Italy, purportedly from the a ia.n Communist Party, suggested
that leadership disagreements were occurring, in the Kremlin. The
pro-CPI Paese Sera reported from Moscow (2 April 1963) that a
debate was go ng on "of a liveliness without example," and added
references to the many problems that had to be solved. The
official CPI newspaper L'Unita carried (31 March) a Moscow-date-
lined story saying that scow was going through a "delicate and
interesting political moment.11 (L'Unita, however, denied on
2 April an Italian news agency report tat Khrushchev's party
position had "notably weakened in recent months.") Then on
15 April, Agence France Presse reported rumors that Khrushchev
would resign on reaching 63 and on 20 April,?in an apparently
related story, Edward Crankshaw wrote in the London observer that
Khrushchev would announce, at the May CPSU plenum, that he would
resign within two years. On 24 April, Khrushchev himself dropped
what may have been a hint of an impending resignation from some,
at least, of his offices; after stating that the CPSU must have
leaders, he indicated that in saying this, he was not thinking
of his own position, since he was 69 and "everyone understands
that I cannot hold for all time the position I now have in the
party and in the state."
Conditions and differences generating policy disputes.
None o the above indications can e considered very reliable.
Still, there have been factual developments which lend some
support to the belief that there are differences in the Kremlin
over leadership, or at least over policy; these are described
in an unclassified attachment. Obviously, most of even this
material is open to more than one interpretation, and in isolation,
some of the facts would hardly be worthy of notice. The problems
of the Soviet leadership are apparent, not so much from such
incidents as described in the attachment, as in the general trends
and conditions which can be identified. These include:
1. The growth of a dissatisfied and rebellious
youthful elite, led by poets and writers, and
connected with and backed by scientists and tech-
nicians.
2. The tendency of Communists in many countries
to consider revisionist ideas, especially in economics,
and to cease to look to Moscow for guidance. Many
of these same Communists sympathize with the rebels
mentioned in para. 1.
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3. The reaction of other Communists, especially
the Chinese, against any modification of past
revolutionary dogma to suit present conditions;
these elements are the true heirs of the old Bolsheviks,
and their Asian members lean to a racist form of anti-
imperialism.
4. The propensity of bureaucratic Soviet government
and management to discourage initiative, conceal failure,
report misleading generalities, and feather their own
nests; this gentry is neither revolutionary nor bourgeois,
but includes large numbers of stodgy and often corrupt
officials, wedded to the formulas of 20 years ago.
5. The progressive exhaustion of every cheap ex-
pedient for temporarily increasing the fr.fod supply --
the original expropriation by collectivization in the
early '30's, the more recent opening of the climatically
marginal "virgin lands," and last year's cultivation of
fallow grassland all having been tried. Heavy invest-
ment in machinery and chemical fertilizer are the
minimum steps necessary. Poland has found that the
real solution is the abandonment of collective farming.
G. The increasing need for housing and consumer
goods, if only to catch up with obsolescence and a
growing population.
7. The successive and increasingly decisive failure
of all attempts to take a short cut to a major Soviet
success in foreign affairs: the Berlin blockade, Korea,
massive aid to neutralist countries, diversionary
parties and fronts (e.g., US Progressive Party in 1948,
resistance veterans' groups, World Peace Congress),
megaton threats and spaceship boasts, and especially
the introduction of MRBM's in Cuba, Khrushchev has
hoped to lead Communism to triumph, but since Stalin's
death, Communism has lost rather than gained in most
of the world. Where the Communists did gain, in China,
Vietnam, and Cuba, it was not the work of the Soviets
and these countries are one of Moscow's greatest prob-
lems.(See para. 3 above.)
Inherent policy dilemma. In the face of such difficulties,
many Soviet leaders are undoubtedly inclined to turn to old
Stalinist methods, tried but not true. In particular, since
existing Soviet arms have produced no impression, they think that
the ramedy is to build more, forgetting that an aroused free
world can easily outproduce them. To some of these leaders,
Khrushchev may seem too liberal, too soft. But Khrushchev,
inherently a Stalinist himself, was pushed by the pressures of
the situation into his experiments. If he falls, his successors
will face the same pressures. A brilliant, vital Soviet leader --
no such is in sight now -- might perhaps be able to go beyond
Khrushchev's half-measures and overcome many Soviet problems.
But Ppprov njy, IkgP ado@WllLi"Az k p?WJD3W MMM010008-2
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654. AF,FE,WH. Women's-international Democratic Federation (WIDF);
Fifth World Congress, June 24 to 29, Moscow
BACKGROUND: The VWIDF has been one of the clearest examples
of E Communis "Front since its inception in 1945. It was founded
in Paris by the Communist-dominated Union des Fe.tlaraes Francaises
and :originally concentrated most of its activities on European
target audiences. Unlike most of the other fronts which possessed
some non-Communist membership, at least in the beginning, it could
not claim any significant non-Communist affiliations at its origins
and iaas failed in its efforts to attract any ever since. Membership
is open to women's organizations, groups of women, or in some
instances, to individual women. In the mid-fifties, the WIDF, as
other international Communist fronts, began to expand major opera-
tional efforts toward winning allegiance and support for its
propaganda aims from women in the underdeveloped and newly-independ-
?nt world areas. The 7IDF claims a membership of "over 200 million"
in 30 countries.
The present leadership of the WIDF includes president Eugenie
Cotton (the first and only President to date) of France, a Lenin
?eaco Prize winner, WPC official, for many years an ardent and
consistent Soviet supporter; Secretary General Carmen Zanti, a WPC
Bureau member and leader of the Communist front Union of Italian
Women; its roster of vice-presidents contains almost exclusively
activists in the WPC, and numbers two more Lenin prize winners,
one Communist deputy, one leading CP member, and 3 representatives
from Bloc countries. Expelled from France in 1951, the WIDF makes
its headquarters now in East Berlin.
WIDF's aims, as stated in its charter, are sufficiently broad
and pacific to attract a wide following among women throughout the
world. It ostensibly seeks to unite women in defense of women's
rights and equality; for the protection of children; against war
and aggression; for the promotion of peace, democracy, independence,
self-determination, reduction of armaments, prohibition of thermo-
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, etc. In practice,
of course, these noble objectives have suffered in the course of
their translation into WIDF's real propaganda themes. For example,
the WIDF has consistently attempted to strengthen the illusion of
the ideal conditions of women and children in the Soviet Union --
in contrast to the alleged inadequacies of food, housing or
medical attention in the "capitalist" world, and the exploitation
and oppression in the "colonial" countries. In the name of women
and motherhood, WIDF seems to assert a proprietary interest in
condemning the dangers of atomic war and the menace of radiation
caused by nuclear testing. WIDF's condemnation, of course, is
directed only at nuclear testing by western powers, while similar
activities and military preparations in the bloc are conveniently
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overlooked, if not defended. WIDF's policy has followed the various
zits and zags of Soviet policy and propaganda, as exemplified in
levelling germ warfare charges against the US in the Korean War, the
ejection and subsequent readmission of the Jugoslavian chapter, etc.,
etc.
WIDF meetings, such as the Bureau Meeting in Bamako in January
1963, and the International Women's Assembly for Disarmament in
Vienna in March 1962, and continuing propaganda releases have faith-
fully reflected Moscow's disarmament line, complete with condemna-
tions of "inhuman treatment of political prisoners" (in Venezuela,
Iraq, etc.). bitter tirades against warmongers in the US and
American "provocation" in Vietnam, expressions of solidarity with
Cuba, and so forth. Nonetheless, a somewhat militaristic note was
added to WIDF's militancy at the Congress of Women of the Americas
in Havana in January 1963 (sponsored by WIDF's Cuban affiliate)
when Wu Chuan-heng, head of the Chinese women's delegation, former
WIDF secretariat member (1957-53) and Secretary of the All-China
Women's Federation Secretariat stated that the "women...of China
resolutely support their Cuban brothers' and sisters' just struggle
against US aggression"; and when Fidel Castro, in a concluding
speech, declared that Latin America needed experts in leading the
people to revolution, that "the masses must be taken to the battle,"
and that women "must be revolutionary" and emulate their Cuban
sisters who paraded with the troops -- an example of their equality
with men. The discrepancy between the WIDF's professed, pacific
aims and its obvious subservience to aggressive Communist propaganda
has resulted in some ill will, not to say confusion, among delegates
who had not understood the true nature of the organization. Press
reports following the Vienna disarmament meeting, for example,
claimed that African women had been disillusioned by the way the
proceedings were handled and were largely responsible for moderating
the tone of the final resolution.
The WIDF has failed to impress the UN or its related bodies
with its claim to be a representative, non-political organization.
In 1952 it lost its consultative status with UNESCO. Two years
later, ECOSOC withdrew WIDF's Category "B" consultative status
which had been granted in 1947. Its reapplication for status with
ECOSOC was denied; and similar requests to UNESCO were disapproved
in 1960 and 1962. In the latter appeal, however, it was one of
the organizations to which the Director General granted "C" status,
which merely involves the right to exchange correspondence. Ironi-
cally, but as might be expected, WIDF has exploited this consolation
prize to suggest that it possesses "status" with the UN although it
has, in fact, been formally denied.
The forthcoming Moscow meeting is expected to reiterate
traditional Soviet propaganda themes on disarmament, peace,
sovereignty, national independence, US "militarism," rearmament
of West Germany, and so forth, couched in emotional appeals on
behalf of the world's women and children. It must be presumed
that the Congress will make efforts to attract sympathy and support
from women of the underdeveloped areas by playing on the theme of
anti-colonialism, directed, of course, against the West and charged
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of oppression and subjugation. 25X1C1Ob
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655 WH. Mounting Communist Influence in "Neutral" Brazil
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: When Brazilians were asked to rate the US and
the Soviet on in a recent public opinion poll, the majority
replied, in effect, "US si, Soviets no." According to a report
in The New York Times (Western edition) 4 March 1963, more than
half of those polled--52%--said they thought the US was a "good
or very good country." The Soviet box score: only 12% said it
was "good," 36% said it was "bad" and 52% gave no opinion.
In spite of this measure of Brazilian opinion, President Joao
Goulart has effected closer relations with the Soviets and their
satellites under the mantle of implementing an "independent" or
"neutralist" foreign policy. Diplomatic relations with the USSR
(broken in 1947 amid charges of a Soviet conspiracy to subvert
Brazil's democratic institutions) were resumed in 1961; diplomat-
ic relations with Eastern Europe have been expanded; cultural and
trade exchanges with the Soviets and their satellites have devel-
oped at a steady pace.
Goulart was on a trade mission to Communist China when he
learned that the unexpected resignation of President Janio Quadros
in August 1961 had elevated him, Brazil's vice president, to the
presidency. His return to Brazil was opposed by the ministers
of Army, Navy, and Air who issued a joint statement which accused
him of allowing-Communists to infiltrate key posts in the govern-
ment and charged that he "would without any doubt give the great-
est incentive to all those who want to see the country in chaos,
anarchy and civil war."
He became president only after the Congress approved a con-
stitutional amendment converting from a presidential to a par-
liamentary form of government with a figurehead president and
powerful prime minister. But Goulart managed to retain most of
the theoretically transferred presidential powers and waged an
aggressive political campaign to regain full authority. A na-
tional plebiscite in January 1963 restored full presidential
powers by a margin of 10 million of the 12 million votes cast.
Communist Influence. Goulart is not known to be a Communist,
but he as along s ory of seeking and receiving Communist sup-
port and has given the Communists considerable freedom of action
within the labor movement which forms the backbone of his Bra-
zilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB). Many
of his appointments, designed to entrench himself and his party,
have included individuals frequently associated with pro-Communist
fronts or causes.
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As his private secretary, for example, he named an avowed
Communist, Raul Rvff. Ryff, now Goulart's press secretary, has
been an active member of the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido
Communista Brasileiro, PCB) for over 30 years, held several po-
sitions in the PCB leadership, was an organizer and propagandist
for the Communists, held prominent positions in Communist fronts
and has even been jailed twice on charges of subversion.
As head of his civil cabinet, then minister of labor, later
prime minister and now his foreign minister, Goulart appointed
Hermes Lima--characterized as a left-wing Socialist with Commu-
nist sympathies and a record of actions favorable to communism.
He was a member of the generally pro-Communist Brazilian Social-
ist Party until 1959 and has been an adviser to PCB Secretary-
General Luis Prestes and an officer in several Communist fronts.
He was dismissed from the faculty of the University of Brazil
for Communist activities.
Minister of Labor Almino Afonso is described as a crypto-
Communist PTB leader. Minister of Planning Celso Furtado has
had close associations with leftist groups and is thought to have
been a member of the PCB as late as 1947. Chief of the Presiden-
tial Civil Household Evandro Lins E Silva, former attorney general,
has a long record of support of ommun s causes, has held impor-
tant posts in numerous Communist fronts and served as legal coun-
sel for members of the PCB and others accused of subversive
activities. Other top officials, most of whom are affiliated
with the Communist-infiltrated PTB, are identified as ultra na-
tionalists, anti-US, authoritarian or other classifications which
are identified with PCB objectives.
Many of the Communists or extreme leftists who occupy promi-
nent government positions are energetic, young, dynamic indi-
viduals aggressively seeking extensive social and economic reforms
--goals which have wide popular appeal. A prominent example of
this type of leader if Miguel Arraes, governor of the northeast
state of Pernambuco. Since taking office 31 January, he has
appointed a number of Communists or Communist-inclined individuals
to key state posts. He named a member of the PCB since 1934,
IDioaenes de Arruda Camara, who has been identified with PCB rural
affairs, to his staff--probably to develop agrarian reform plans.
The moderate conservative political force represented mainly
by the armed forces, as reflected in their oppositLft to Goulart's
becoming president, has been weakened through their own lack of
cohesiveness in political matters and Goulart's appointment of
officers with more leftist views to important command positions.
One such appointee, Osvino Ferreira Alves, commanding general of
the First Army in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's most important command
post, created a crisis early in April through a clash with anti-
Communist Minister of War Amaury Kruel.
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General Alves is described as an ultra nationalist who appears
to be a Communist sympathizer and is closely associated with and
supported by President Goulart's brother-in-law, Leonel BriZOIa,
leftist former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, n.; ] 1 e-
pntiei from Guanabara. His clash with General gruel was prompted
by developments connected with the Communist-sponsored Congress
of Solidarity with Cuba (see Guidance Item No. 651, "Congress of
Solidarity with Cuba: Aftermath"). After Governor Carlos Lacerda
of Guanabara state /r.e. Rio de Janeiro area7 banned the Congress
from his jurisdiction and put state police around the proposed
meeting site, Alves sent First Army troops to occupy federal
buildings and neutralize the state police--a move just short of
federal intervention. This provoked Lacerda into making a blis-
tering personal attack on President Goulart in which he denounced
his leftist activity.
Alves defended President Goulart, attacked Lacerda in personal
terms and demanded federal intervention to depose Lacerda and put
his First Army in charge of Guanabara state. He followed this
demand with a threat to give military protection to a leftist
labor meeting scheduled to meet in Rio and declared he would
order his troops to open fire on the state police if they inter-
fered. This outburst led Kruel to order Alves' arrest. Pro-left
and pro-right forces began to organize and agitate but the ten-
sion was eased by an announcement that the two generals had met
and the War Minister had "affirmed his authority, demanding man-
ifestations essential to military discipline."
Communist Activity. Organized in 1922, the Brazilian Commu-
nist Party has been illegal cxo-:, L f-47. This legal pro-
hibition, is more theoretical than practical although
the party is still prevented from taking a direct role in elec-
tions. Its membership is estimated at 23,000 but it
also counts on sizable non-party followings and substantial in-
fluence among other political groups. It is active in seeking
leadership and supporters among students and workers, has won
key positions among unions and other organized groups and is
working systematically to insert and recruit party members and
supporters at all levels of the government. It is estimated that
the PCB can count on 200,000 sympathizers.
There is constant agitation to legalize the PCB (for example,
a group claiming to represent 587 labor unions adopted resolu-
tions calling for PCB legalization last year). The over-all PCB
goal is to establish a radical nationalist government which would
break Brazil's long-standing alignment with the US on interna-
tional issues and grant PCB recognition and full freedom of action.
While It can't get its own name on the ballot, the PCB did back
several candidates in the October elections. It did not fare
well on a national basis, but did win some important victories
in certain key states.
For the past several years, the head of the PCB, Luis Carlos
Prestes, has led the group on a "soft" line and concentrated on
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may
the quest for legal status. But during 1961 he and his associates
were accused of revisionism and rightist deviation by three ex-
members of the PCB presidium and five other former central com-
mittee members. These dissidents were expelled from the PCB as
divisionists. They formed a Communist Party of Brazil early in
1962 and claimed to be the legitimate PCB. They seek and hope
for recognition from other Communist Parties--especially those
which advocate the more violent path to communism advocated by
the Chinese Communists, practiced by Castro and for which they,
unlike the regular PCB, are preparing by guerrilla warfare train-
ing and other activities.
A third element is introduced by the Brazilian Peasant Leagues
headed by pro-Communist Francisco Juliao. Juliao has repeatedly
expressed his admiration of Mao?Tse-tung and Castro. Closely
allied with Communists he has advocated violence in exploiting
peasant unrest with special reference to land reform. "Brazil's
path is the same as Cuba's," Juliao has declared. "In case our
demands are not accepted, we will have no alternative but to head
for the hills, let our beards grow and grab a rifle," the recently
elected congressman maintains.
Friction between these Communist or Communist-supporting ele-
ments has become more and more obvious. The PCB was reluctant
to back Juliao in sponsoring the Congress of Solidarity with Cuba,
for example (see Guidance Item No. 651). Prestes went to Cuba
from Moscow to discuss the subject; Juliao was already there and
admitted he didn't see eye-to-eye with Prestes. In an interview
with a Moscow correspondent of El Siglo, Chilean Communist news-
paper, Prestos charged that Jul ao "has practically abandoned his
activity among the peasants and dedicated himself to preparing
for 'the revolution.' In this respect he holds some very 'radical'
views, for which we have to criticize him many times!' Prestos
concluded: "His peasant movement has no organic structure. In
reality, the Brazilian peasants follow the lead of the Communists."
Differences have appeared even among "comrades." A recent
example was the position taken on Brazil's three-year economic
development plan. In an interview with the leftist-nationalist
Rio daily Ultima Flora, Khrushchev said he wished "the Brazilian
people all success in carrying out the plan." Prestes declared:
"We can't agree with this government and neither with the three-
year plan which it intends to load on the backs of the people."
The Khnu shchev interview appears as part of a broad campaign
to put the best Soviet foot forward in dealing with Brazil. Bra-
zil has received favorable treatment in the Soviet press and has
become a major target for Soviet propaganda. The latter employs
highly selective reports of Goulart's views and policies to pre-
sent him in a favorable light and to convey the impression that
his program and the goals professed by the Brazilian Communist
Party are in complete harmony. Anything that doesn't agree with
this picture is. misrepresented or not reported.
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6 May 1963
25X1C10b
The Soviet Union appears to have made Brazil a focal point,
with the exception of Cuba--a special case, of its Latin American
campaign. It has agreed to relieve Brazil of some of its surplus
coffee, made appealing offers to help oil-short Brazil develop
its large deposits of oil-bearing shale and on 20 April signed
a 5-year trade agreement which more than doubles last year's
volume of trade. Economic aid will be an agenda item for Brazil's
finance minister during a projected Moscow trip next September.
Cultural exchanges have been increased too. Brazil is being
treated as something of a showcase to demonstrate to other Latin
American nations the advantages of recognizing Soviet Russia and
accepting Khrushchev's offer of "peaceful coexistence."
Summary. Goulart and other leaders incline more toward per-
sonal oya ties than to political conviction. Many feel that
Communists represent no direct threat because they believe "they
can handle them." But the basic point of issue is reform--social,
economic, agrarian--to raise the standard of living and improve
the welfare of the people of Latin America's biggest nation.
Leaders affiliated with or willing to accommodate the far left,
promise quick and far-reaching accomplishments. Unless the gov-
ernment and the conservative elements effect reforms or meet the
challenges of the far left, they may lose by default.
The developments reported above reflect the steady trend
toward the left which has characterized Brazil's course during
Goulart's administration. The trend has accentuated political
and economic unrest and is being exploited by ultra nationalists
and leftists, including Communists and their sympathizers. The
Communists seek to manipulate legitimate Brazilian nationalism
for their own ends. Goulart maintains he will never let the
government fall into the hands of Communists but says he will
never ask for a declaration of ideological faith from any of his
advisers. His personal loyalties may become a liability which
could have an adverse effect upon Brazil and because of its
leadership, its size (5th largest country in the world), loca-
tion (bordering all South American nations except Chile and Ecua-
dor) and population (an estimated 70,000,000) and other factors,
an equally adverse effect on all of Latin America.
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 25X1C1Ob
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656. EE,FE,NE,WE. Continuing Communist Chinese Threat to India
BACKGROUND: The uneasy cease fire which has prevailed since
Novembe the Sino-Indian border war has brought the contending
nations no closer to solving their boundary disputes or to a
military armistice. Communist China takes noisy credit for the
cease fire, which was primarily imposed by the winter snows in
the Himalayas, while increasing a propaganda barrage designed to
make India appear the aggressor. At the same time, the Chicoms
have stepped up political maneuvers to increase their influence
throughout Asia.
Following unilateral announcement of a cease fire on Novem-
ber 20th, the Chinese Communists began a military withdrawal which,
by early March, they claimed to have completed in all the dis-
puted border areas. In early December six non-aligned nations --
Indon sia, Surma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR and Ghana -- met in
Colombo, Ceylon to discuss the dispute. Although they failed,
unsurprisingly, to address themselves to the substance of the con-
flict, they agreed on proposals to precede negotiations between
the disputants. India accepted the proposals with certain modifi-
cations and said that she would negotiate only if China would also
accent them. China has accepted them only "in principle" and
refuses to view them as preconditions to negotiation over the
lands seized from India.
Chinese moves. On March 2, 1963, Pakistan signed a border
agreemenw Ina, to become the latest country bordering
Communist China to make such a settlement (Burma, January 1960;
Nepal, March 1960; Mongolia, December 1902). The agreement was
undoubtedly calculated to prejudice discussions between India: and
Pakistan over claims to the Kashmir area, a portion of which
figured in the China-Pakistan border settlement. Communist
China's deliberately soft line in negotiating these boundary
settlements and the one now being discussed with Afghanistan,
suggests that she is emphasizing her own sweet reasonableness
with a view to tempting India into negotiations -- but with
expected Chicom gains. Also advertised as a move to create an
"atmosphere for peaceful settlement of the boundary question" was
China's release in early April of some 300 Indian prisoners-of-war
and her announced plan to release all of the more than three
thousand captured in the October-November fighting.
China, with the largest land army in the world, continues to
accuse an "aggressive" India of selling its non-alignment policy
for Western military aid. Peking news media have also implied
criticism of the USSR's military assistance to India by reporting
on the arrival and testing, in India, of MIGs and helicopters and
on plans for further Soviet assistance.
Additional efforts to increase her influence in states bor-
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traditionally an area in which India attempts to exert her influ-
ence, and the unprecedented visit of Liu Shao-chi (Mao's heir
apparent) to Burma, India's militarily weak neighbor. In addition,
Chinese Friendship Associations in Pakistan, Ceylon and Nepal have
been performing the role of front groups. Their increasingly vocal
praise of China, taken in the context of the Sino-Indian conflict,
serves the Communist cause well, even though in Pakistan, for
instance, the Communist Party is illegal.
The Chinese Communist Party attacked the Communist Party of
India (CPI) in a 0 March People's Daily editorial in which it
assailed the "revisionists in the CPI who defended Nehru's
resistance to Chicom aggression.
The combination of military and political accomplishments
of the past eight months has produced a major psychological achieve-
ment. The belief in Chinese Communist military and political
strength now appears so great that it has obliterated most specu-
lation on the great internal weaknesses which represent serious
problems for the CCs. The image which has emerged is of a China
capable of taking any initiative at her own time, for her own
purposes.
Indian moves. During the period since the cease fire, India
has 'ado a considerable effort to improve and increase her
military forces in anticipation of renewed Chicom attacks. Emer-
gency military assistance from the US and UK totalling more than
$100 million has somewhat eased the overwhelming financial burden
imposed by the need to continue economic development programs
while trying to wipe out the effects of long neglect of the military
establishment.
The USSR, silent during the Chinese Attacks of October and
November, rallied to protect her potential political influence in
India. A t,,-ken delivery of military aircraft has been made and
agreement reached to build an airframe factory in India. Although
American assistance to India is more than four times greater than
that of the USSR, the latter has provided some spectacular indus-
trial assistance calculated to impress the machine-hungry Indians.
On the diplomatic front India, weakened by the need to main-
tain troops in Kashmir, heeded those Western friends who came to
her aid against China, and reopened discussions with Pakistan on
their conflicting claims to Kashmir. (See Iii-Weekly Guidance
Item #339, March 25, 1003). A settlement of this long-st n:
problem between the two neighbors would enable India to concen-
trate political and military forces against the greater threat from
Communist China. However, traditional hostilities are so extreme
and possible solutions so fraught with new difficulties that a
meaningful settlement is not expected soon.
In addition to agreeing to the Colombo proposals for talks
with China under stated conditions, India has announced her will-
ingness to submit the border problem to the International Court of
Justice at the Hague, if direct negotiations with China should
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Chicom notes protesting border intrusions have been so
numerous and flagrantly propagandistic that Now Age of New Delhi,
organ of the Communist Party of India, said on April 7: "This
Chinese Note and the subsequent whipping up of the campaign in
the Chinese press against Indian policies, can lead one only to
the conclusion that the Chinese Government is determined to
'prove' by any means, the 'forecast' made earlier by Foreign
Minister Chen Yi that 'provocative actions on the part of Indian
troops will occur from time to time! '' rf ,
The split between Communist China and the USSR over the Sino-
Indian conflict has been matched by a split in the ranks of the
CPI. Chairman S.A. Dane and most of the CPI members have sup-
ported,for their own purposes, the Indian national interest and
decried the Chinese attack. A smaller faction, many of whose
leaders were jailed under Defense of India Act, hailed the Chinese
aggression and denounced India's military response.
Outlook. The possibility of further Chinese invasion of
Indian erri ory continues to exist. Retention of the Aksai Chin
plateau area in Ladakh on the northwest front, seized from India
during the October fighting, is generally believed to be of
strategic importance to Peking. Any real or imagined threat to
her continued occupation might provoke Chinese attacks. So-called
incidents on the other major front, the North East Frontier Area
between Assam and Tibet, might have the same results. Barring
such incidents and barring internal political pressures or external
problems with Tibet, Nationalist China, or even the Soviet Union,
China may stand for the immediate future on the territories already
taken, awaiting more favorable climates -- both meteorological and
political -- for expansion. But unforeseen events or inexplicable
twists in international communism could dictate renewed attacks
at any time.
Added to the continuing military threat there will undoubt-
edly be continuing psychological pressures from Peking. Additional
gestures of "peaceful intentions" are to be expected and could even
include eventual acceptance of the Colombo proposals. China may
also continue her demands that India negotiate without precondi-
tions. Indirect pressure on India, exercised through friendly
overtures to India's neighbors -- or enemies -- and propaganda
campaigns against India's friends, will probably be added to the
threat of renewed military action.
The Colombo group, anxious to be peacemakers between the
Asian neighbors, will continue to press its views on China. An
Indonesian editorial which appeared during the Chinese Communist
President's April visit to Djakarta, reflected the pride and
concern of the Colombo powers although Indonesia herself has not
accepted all the Colombo proposals. "It is incredible that the
results achieved at Colombo are considered incomplete.. .What is
not clear is why China has not accepted the proposals," said
Duta Masjarakat on 17 April 1963.
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657 EE,a. Rumania Asserts itself
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Communist Rumania, traditionally among the most
subserv:en __ Soviet satellites, has recently begun to assert
more economic independence in its relations with the USSR.
Rumania is apparently determined to resist the economic role it
has been assigned by the USSR within the Council for Economic
Mutual Assistance (CEMA). This resistance is related to its eco-
nomic progress and to its own plans for the establishment of heavy
industry in Rumania.
Party Status. By comparison with most of the other Communist
Parties o`'as ern Europe, the cohesion of the Rumanian CP has
been distinctive. Since there has been no real anti-Stalinist
alternative, and because the current leadership has been compara-
tively successful in developing an economically viable Communist
state, Rumania did not experience--either in 1956 or after the
22nd CPSU Congress--any of the internal upheavals which jarred
Hungary, Poland, or East Germany. After the 22nd CPSU Congress
in Moscow, the Rumanian leaders paid lip service to de-Staliniza-
tion: streets and villages were re-named, monuments dismantled;
however, within the Party itself, the men, the attitudes--even
the language in which the personality cult was denounced--retained
their Stalinist core.
efore World War II, the Rumanian Communist 'Part
was
ha
y
c
rac-
terized by numerical weakness (approximately 2,000 members) and
a tradition of internal strife. Thus, after the war, it was
obliged to rely on Soviet troops and secret police to a greater
extent than some of the other satellites and the local Communists
constituted little more than a facade for Soviet takeover. With
the successful elimination of the Moscow emigre group (Ana Pauker,
Vasile Luca, et al) by Gheorghiu Dej, First Secretary and Chair-
man of the State Council, Soviet influence was gradually reduced
and with it direct Soviet economic exploitation. However, the
reduction of police coercion and limited concessions to consumers
which have characterized most other Eastern European Communist
countries since 1956 are only beginning in Rumania.
Economic development since 1959. Economically, Rumania is
making progress; however, for years its economy was one of the
most impoverished and least productive in Eastern Europe. Its
industry has now reached a point where basic investments are be-
ginning to yield results and Rumanian industrial production
(partly because its starting point was so low) has one of the
highest growth rates in the world. Statistics for 1961 indicate
that imports exceed exports by 22 million dollars (largely because
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6 May 1963
of the increase in imports from industrially developed Western
countries). Trade increase over 1960 amounted to 18 percent
(Total trade in 1962 was 1.608 billion dollars.). Trade with non-
Bloc countries increased from 28 percent of the total in 1960 to
33 percen oTthe total in 1961. Trade with the West accounted
for 25 percent of total non-Bloc trade. Trade with underdeveloped
countries grew from six to eight percent of the total over the
same two-year period. In two years, Rumania attained approximately
80 percent of the goal (set in its Six-Year-Plan) for $2 billion
in foreign trade by 1965. The most remarkable aspect of this
growth is the volume of orders placed in the West. Between 1959
and. 1962, British firms alone concluded agreements for more than
350 million Swiss francs; France and West Germany have supplied
similar amounts and even larger projects are currently under ne-
gotiation. Trade agreements are generally based on the same for-
mula obtaining in the West; i.e., part of the total price is paid
as a down payment; a second installment is paid against the first
delivery, etc. To date, Rumania has been punctual about its fi-
nancial obligations. At the present stage of its economic devel-
opment, Rumania intends to expand its sources of raw materials and
to attain the highest possible degree of industrialization. The
country has large resources in oil, natural gas, coal, iron,
manganese ore, bauxite, salt and timber. Exports of primary ma-
terials are deliberately kept low as Rumania is increasingly un-
willing to play the role of supplier of raw materials (not even
to its CEMA partners) to the detriment of its own industrial pro-
duction. Within CEMA itself, Rumania is now playing a more inde-
pendent role because of its relative economic prosperity and its
ability to obtain investment goods from the West. Sympotomatic
of this independence is evidence that--in some areas--Rumania is
competing with the Soviet Union in the world markets.
Relations with the USSR and CEMA. On 23 August 1962 during
Rumania's ce a r-a ons of is eration," a certain reserve
toward the USSR was evident. No pictures of any Soviet leaders
other than Lenin were carried in the parade or displayed in the
Bucharest area and Khrushchev's recent visit to Rumania was dis-
missed with only passing reference. Bucharest's attitude on this
occasion probably reflected dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's
urging that Rumania give more emphasis to agriculture and to in-
dustry which supports agriculture. Significant disagreement with
the USSR over Rumania's role in CEMA became apparent from reports
regarding the 5-8 March 1963 Central Committee plenum of the
Rumanian CP according to which Rumania is refusing to accept a
CEMA decision that Rumania abandon plans for major new industries
and concentrate instead on petroleum products, fertilizers and
agriculture. This Rumanian position reportedly was approved by
the plenum in question and subsequently endorsed by a series of
regional Party rallies. There is evidence that the attitude of
the Rumanian government on this issue has wide popular support.
A specific Rumanian grievance is Soviet reluctance to grant suf-
ficient aid for the Galati iron and steel combine. Rumania has
received some aid from Western Europe for this project.
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While basic loyalty to Moscow is apparently not in question,
Chivu Stoica, leader of the Rumanian delegation to the 17Ith East
German SP (SED) Congress (January 1963) made no reference to the
Soviet Union's "leading role" in the socialist camp and emphasized
that it was the duty of every Communist Party to "respect the in-
dependence and equal rights of all communist parties." At the
Lenin anniversary meeting in Bucharest on 23 April 1963, Athanase
Joja, Central Committee and State Council member, emphasized the
"relations of a new type established among the socialist states,
relations whose immovable law is their complete equality in rights,
strict respect for independence and national sovereignty...."
and, more pointedly, "Experience in building the new social system
in our country as well as in other socialist countries demonstrates
the great importance of the Leninist teachings regarding socialist
industrialization, of Lenin's pointer...on the development of
society's forces of production." Rumania is also the only Soviet
Bloc country which has not restored contacts with Yugoslavia at
the Party level at a time when it is a basic tenet of Khrushchev's
policy line to regard Yugoslavia as a member of the Bloc in good
standing. In deciding to assert a modicum of iniative and inde-
pendence, Rumania appears to be taking advantage of the opportuni-
ties presented by Khuushchev's policies and by his pre-occupation
with more serious problems.
It should be noted in connection with the Rumanian stand that
in the period directly after the end of World War II until the
early nineteen-fifties, the USSR followed economic policies
(reminiscent of Hitler's plans for stripping the industry of his
conquered territories) which amounted to little more than direct
exploitation of the satellite economies. However, in the early
nineteen-fifties this relationship began changing as the Soviet
Union developed a greater stake in stabilizing its Eastern Euro-
pean appendages. The Polish and Hungarian events of 1956 accen-
tuated this trend and the USSR began to grant large credits to
bolster the shaky economies of most of these countries. At pres-
ent, with the exception of East Germany, large-scale credits have
come to an end and June 1962 ushered in a new period emphasizing
specialization within the framework of CEMA. Through this mechan-
ism the USSR hopes to promote economic viability of the Soviet
Bloc while making the satellites even more dependent on the Soviet
Union.
It should also be borne in mind that while Rumania is indeed
resisting Soviet economic dictates vis-a-vis CEMA, any Rumanian
deviations from the current Moscow line will be of a Stalinist
variety since they find Khurshchev's over-all program too "flexible.
25X1C10b
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25X1C10955 1,11,g. Laos: Renewed Communist Aggression
BACKGROUND: The civil war in Laos was brought to an end on
23 July 196 when the Geneva Agreements guaranteeing the independ-
ence, integrity and ~,:,5u.trality of Laos were signed by 14 Western,
Asian neutralist and Communist nations. Great Britain and the
Soviet Union were cc-chairmen of the conferences in Geneva and as
such have special responsibilities for assuring adherence to the
Agreements. These provide that the three Laotian factions (leftist,
rightist, and neutralist) will rule the Kingdom under the premier-
ship of neutralist Souvanna Phouma. A three-member International
Control Commission (ICC), consisting of an Indian, a Canadian and
a Polish representative, was appointed to supervise compliance with
the provisions of the Agreements.
The Geneva Agreements provided that all foreign troops be
withdrawn from Laos no later than 7 October 1902 and that "the with-
drawral of troops would be confined to routes and points determined
by the Laot_1a government in consultation with the ICC, which must
be notified in advance of the point and time of such withdrawals."
All US forces were withdrawn before the 7 October deadline. There
is no public evidence that some 10,000 North Vietnamese Communist
troops, reliably reported to be in Laos at the time of the cease
fire, were ever withdrawn: if any were withdrawn covertly, this
procedure was in distinct violation of the Agreements.
The Communist controlled Pathet Lao forces have consistently
thwarted the functioning of the ICC and prevented them from carry-
ing out their responsibilities to the Laotian government and to the
other 13 governments who signed the Geneva Agreements. Specifically,
the Pathet Lao have: refused to allow the ICC teams to enter the
territory controlled by them; prevented the central government
from creating a national Laotian army to maintain peace and
security in Laos; and, although publicly posing as stanch supporters
of Prince Souvanna Phouma, have never hesitated to defy his stated
policy and objectives. The best example of this occurred in
November 1962, when Neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma had specifi-
cally requested the United States for assistance in delivering
food supplies to neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars. The
United States responded to this plea and on 27 November, an unarmed
C-123 delivering rice to the neutralists was shot down by Pathet Lao
forces.
Reliable reports from Laos say that some 13,000 Chinese Com-
munist coolies, under the direction of 3 Chicom engineers, are
working on road-building projects to connect China's Yunnan
Province not only with northwest Laos, but with Thailand and Burma
as well. Some of these roads are already completed and are being
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.'violation of the Geneva Agreements. Communist China's zeal for
constructing a road network to connect Laos, Thailand and Burma
to mainland China -- the entire cost is borne by Red China --
inevitably brings to mind the road-building projects that preceded
the Chinese Communist takeover of Tibet and, more recently,
Chinese Communist use of similar combinations of roads and trails
to move heavy weapons and supplies with remarkable speed through
the Himalayas thus outflanking thousands of surprised Indian
defense troops.
The Communist Pathet Lao have also attempted to subvert the
neutralist forces and to cajole them into joining ranks with the
Pathet Lao. When this failed, they did not hesitate to resort to
force. On 31 March, Pathet Lao forces, supported by North Vietnam
Communist troops, attacked four neutralist positions on the Plain
of Jars in central Laos, thereby committing another flagrant vio-
lation of the Geneva accords. Neutralist General Kong Le issued
a statement labelling the Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat Party and its
Pathet Lao army as "foreign lackeys" who are trying "to make the
Kingdom of Laos a new kind of colony of international communism."
He charged that Colonel Deuane Sounnarath had been defected from
the neutralist army and was being used by the Pathet Lao to con-
ceal "their tricks to bring foreign forces into Laotian territory."
Deuane's soldiers were used in an attempt to make it appear that
the battle was between neutralists rather than an attack by the
Communist Pathet Lao on the neutralists. Kong Le also said that
the "foreigners who are the bosses" of the Neo Lao Flak Xat are
"stealthily sending soldiers, weapons and war equipment into Laos."
On 14 April Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
returned from the Plain of Jars with promises of a temporary cease
fire from General Kong Le and Communist Pathet Lao General Sinkapo,
but the Pathet Lao soon broke this pledge. On 18 April, Souvanna
stated that the Pathet Lao is trying to destroy his loyal neutral-
ist forces and that if they succeed, "Laos' neutrality will
disappear completely and the situation will become just as it was
bofc;re the accords guaranteeing Laos' neutrality were signed in
Gevena last July." If Kong Le' s forces are put out of action,
he said, then the Pathet Lao and the right-wing army of General
Phoumi will again face each other head on.
US policy has been and is to adhere scrupulously to the
Geneva Agreements even in the face of continuous, deliberate and
demonstrable violations of those Agreements by the Pathet Lao
under the direction of the North Vietnamese Communists.
The Soviet Union has yet to take a firm public stand in
solving the problem. Under Secretary of State Harriman, accord-
ing to newspaper reports of his recent talks in the Kremlin, says
that Khrushchev supports, in general terms, the need for peace
in a unified, neutral Laos. /FYI. Laos is a problem which he
would probably like to shed b7cause it adds to his troubles with
Pekin{-7 However, Moscow propaganda has waged a false and vicious
campai;n against the US in an attempt to prove that it is directly
intervening on the side of the rightists in Laos, instigating a
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The leftists, while more or less adhering to a cease fire,
are pursuing a tough political line. They will undoubtedly press
for stronger representation in Lao's three-party coalition govern-
ment, and for other political and geographical rearrangements
(i.e. in the placement of troops, the location of the capital)
which will strengthen their position. They will attempt to further
split the neutralists and separate them from the rightists.
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010008-2
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010008-2