BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 8, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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:;:~: :;?:::::: :~:;?::;?::?::?:?:::::?~:: j ``
S pril 1 63
?.;::::::?.NUMB E 113
:Central Propaganda Directive
::Briefly Noted
.. 641. Interpreting the Sino-Soviet Dispute':
"A Plague on Both Your Houses"
'::642. Exposure of RIS Agents at ECAFE Con-
ferenco
ti ? :::~r : Pg. (" esurrection" )
?:643N.Rise of the Ba' ath
Party and Arab Unity {:~'?:~~: ?:'??:::
::644 d. Further Restrictions on Soviet Litera-
ture and Art
45 AF. African Summit: Meeting of the
African Heads of State (Conference of
s-:~
the Inter-African and Malagasy Organ
zat ion - IAMO), Addis Ababa., 23 May l9 6 - *
.......... .................: ~646FEa. The Japanese Left ......::?:?:
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(Briefly Noted Cont.'' S Ap: . 1963
DATES 25X1C10b
20 April Pan-American Games in Sao Paulo, 20 April -
5 May (per Briefly Noted)
24 April World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for
Peaceful Coexistence (Communist)
April Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, Indonesia
(Djakarta-Bandung), 24-30 April 1963
2S April Italian general elections scheduled
(See Briefly Noted last issue)
April Twentieth Anniversary of German's discovery of
the Co KATYN massacre
1 May World Holiday of Labor (celebrated by Communists,
Socialists, certain other Labor groups)
1 May Indonesia to Assume Sovereignty over West New
Guinea (See Briefly Noted last issue)
5 May Togo cabinet sets date for general elections,
previously named for 21 April
8 May VE Day, 1945
12 May 328 day Berlin land blockade ended as a result
of successful US airlift, 1949
14 May Warsaw Pact, 20-year mutual defense treaty
signed at Warsaw by USSR, Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and
East Germany, in 1955
23 May Conference of the Inter-African and Malagasy
Organization, Addis Ababa, 23 May 1963 (See
Item 645)
30 May Communist coup d'etat in Hungary, 1947
10 June Twentieth anniversary of Moscow's official
declaration disbanding the Communist International
(COMINTERN)
17 June Tenth anniversary of anti-Communist riot and
strike in Communist Germany against increased
work quotas; Soviet troops were required to
put down the riot (1953)
17 June Fifth anniversary of Communist Hungarian
Government's announcement of the trial and
execution of Imre Nagy, Gen. Pal Maleter and
other leaders of the Hungarian Revolt of
November 1956 (1958)
li?ii~.fi Briefly Noted)
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 -63
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641. Interpreting the Sino--Soviet Disute: " Pl ue_on Both
,r
Xol
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DACKG9 OUND :
History. Since the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956,
differences of opinion between Communist Parties and regimes
have come increasingly into the open. Principal antagonists are
the Soviet Union and the CPSU, on the one hand, Communist China
and the CCP, on the other hand. Other significant factors are:
the "modern revisionism" of Tito; the strident "left-wing' _:d} ;-
sencion of Communist Albania; "right-wing" deviations climaxed
by the uprising in Hungary, October - November 1956, and by the
"Polish October" (also in 1956) which resulted in the replace-
ment of the Stalinist Uierut regime by Gomulk.a; the "polycen-
trism" advocated by Togliatti and the Italian CP; factionalism
in several free world CPs--most conspicuous in India--and so
forth. Temporarily "contained" by the conferences of all Com-
munist Parties hold in Moscow in November 1957 and in October
1960, the differences erupted with new violence at the 22nd
Congress in October 1961, followed by direct confrontations at
a n .nber of major CP Congresses during the latter part of 1962
and a series of increasingly vituperative articles, speeches,
and letters. (F;3r details on this history, see also Di-Weekly
Propaganda Guidance Items # 633 "Peking Takes the Offensive
(1 ho Au'_s--Du. .' and qed Flag Statements)"; 620 EE,WE, a. "The
Sixth East German Communist (S3D) Party Congress: International
and National Aspects"; 609 "Sine-Soviet Confrontations at Party
Congresses in )Z.st Europe and Italy.")
Saptoms and Causes. The dissensions have been articulated
primarilyn form of doctrinal disputes, wherein Khrushchev and
the CPSU emphasize the need of adapting tactics to the changed
world situation--notably to the realities of nuclear war--pro-
claiming that "war is no longer fatally inevitable" and that
"peaceful co-existence is the basis of class struggle on a global
scale." Mao and the CCP, on the contrary, accuse the CPSU of
"modern revisionism," of misinterpreting, if not "betraying?
the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, while themselves calling the
imperialists "paper tigers" and insisting on world-wide class
war with no holds barred, especially with no fear of nuclear
char. Numerous other doctrinal issues--e.g. whether the Soviet
or the Chinese model should be followed by "national libera-
tion moveiients" in underdeveloped countries--are also involved.
~~ (641. Continued
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(6 1. Cont.)
Actually, however, these differences are by no means only--
or even primarily--ideological-doctrinal in nature: this is
merely the way in which Communists express tI^emselves, disguis-
ing their true motivations and intentions in he process.
Without ai: tempting here to resolve the innume able shades of
opinion expressed by various and sundry "demonologists," it
is safe to list, the following factors as playing major roles
in these dissensions:
a, Conflicting Stages of Development: 45 years have
passed since the Russian revolution: the Soviet
regime is no longer genuinely revolutionary (the
genei?ation of the Octobei.* Revolution being largely
dead), but makes use of revolutionary i ,J.e~ t logy for
its purposes (see also Bi-Weekly Propagar.d.a Guidance
Item #503 "The Thermidorean ?S :-!ctioaTM 6 Uarch 1962).
The Chinese, however, are still carried r?rward by
the momentum of their revolution o. 1949, still
under the leaders of that revolution.
b. Conflicting National Interests: Communist Parties
Tn power a sorB increasing y the traditional in-
terests of their countries: Khrushchev will not
abandon the Tsars' conquests in Asia and pursues
Tsarist policies concern.:+_ng the Tur:?',-ish Straits and,
the Baltic Sea; Mao follows Imperial Manchu tradi-
tions against Tibet, Southeast Asia, Formosa, etc.
Even Cps not in power have become increasingly con-
cerned with the national interest of "their" workers
(cf. the Italian CP and the Common Market: Propa-
ganda Guidance Item #613 ae. "Communists and the
Common Market-,-The WFTU Meeting in Leipzig on the
EEC").
c. Personalit Clashes: Khrushchev, pragmatic manager
an arty boss, with a bare minimum of doctrinal
proficiency, who did very little fighting--in the
Civil War, if at all--and never suffered for his
convictions (either in jail or in exile), differs
as a person fundamentally from Mao, Ho Chi Minh,
Tito, Togliatti, Thorez and others who are Commu-
nist doctrinaires in the traditional sense, who
have participated first-hand in revolutionary (or
at least subversive) action and taken considerable
personal risks in the process. Khrushchev, though
supreme boss of awesome nuclear, conventional-
military and industrial powers, does not, therefore,
command much respect or allegiance of his fellow
Party bosses in large parts of the WCM, especially
not in the key Parties in power or in opposition--
certainly not to the extent which would insure his
undisputed global leadership.
2
mma~ (641. Continued)
~?~!
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d. Lack of International Organization: Despite their
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0c rir. c.:r rma $ ent ' Ti LL '~1 iona _ unity o
the revolutionary proletariat," the Communists have
failed to reconstruct an effective international
organization since Stalin dissolved the COMI'NTIMIN
in 1943. Continued control through the Interna-
tional Department of the CPSU, liaison through the
COMINFORM (1947-1956), occasional "All-Party", con-
ferences (1957, 1960) achieved some results 'but
failed to provide an adequate, lasting solution,
The International Fronts, built up since 1945 as
a partial substitute for the COMINTE tN, though
quite effective as instruments of propaganda and
subversion, reflect the schism in the TCM rather
than contribute to overcome it.
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ril 1963
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642. Exposu ?e of R:IS Agents at 'ECAFE Conference
BACKGROUND: The 19th annual meeting of the United
Nations Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was
convened in Manila on 5 March 1963. ECAFE is a non-
political agency of the United Nations whose purpose is
to promote the economic development of the area. Its
sessions have been called "an economic Parliament of Asia"
whose member-countries are represented by high-ranking
government officials and experts. The "experts" representing
the Soviet Union, however, differ considerably from those of
other countries. According to the 16 March edition of the
Manila Times (and other Philippine. newspapers), 11 of the
23 Soviet delegates to the ECAFE meeting were trained
intelligence officers and "they have been contacting
Filipinos who are active in labor, student work, and the
pr,::ss. They have shown more interest in contacting various
people than in attending the ECAFE sessions." One report
said that "their (the Soviet delegates) activities here
indicate efforts to establish clandestine contacts and to
lay the groundwork for future undercover work in the guise
of official conferences." The Philippine press gave
biographic data on several of the Soviet delegates who have
served in espionage and other subversive capacities around
t as world, such as: A.S. Lavrentyev was active in
intelligence work in Calcutta from 1954 to 1956; M.S. Pankin
has been a highly regarded military intelligence officer
since he finished foreign-language school in Moscow 20 years
age; Y.V. Filiipov was an important link in the Soviet spy
network in Germany in 1951 where he posed as a newspaper
man; V.V. Moskov was expelled from Iraq in 1955 when that
country broke diplomatic relations with the USSR. /gee
Press Comment, March 25 and 26 for articles from the Philippines
on EC E,7
(642 Continued)
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Aril 1963
643 NE,g. Rise of the Ba?ath ("Resurrection") Party and
Arab -Unity
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: The 8 February coup in Iraq and that in
Syria one month later has brought to the forefront in both
countries govornments composed to a major extent by members
of a political group widespread in the Arab world--the Ba'ath,
or Resurrection, Party. The present Ba'ath party was created
in 1953 through the merger of two groups of Syrian origin
formed in the 19409--the Arab Resurrection (or Ba'ath) Party
and the Arab Socialist (or Ishtiraki) Party. The Resurrection,
sometimes called the Renaissance, party had been formed.by
Michel Aflaq, a Syrian teacher, who is a Christian, and
Salah al-Din Bitar, also a Syrian teacher, a Muslim who had
been a fellow-student of Aflaq's in the Sorbonne at ?aris
and is now the new Syrian Premier. The Arab Socialist party
had been organized by Akram al-Rawrani, an anti-western
leftist politician (who, having been deprived--among other
Syrians--of his civil rights, reportedly is now in hiding)
with the object of countering the Syrian Populist and
Nationalist Parties, both rightist groups.
The main emphasis of the Ba'ath party is on "Arab
Socialism"--a combination, as the Party's origin would
imply, of socialism and Arabism. It seeks to resuscitate
the glories of the Arab past, to achieve unity of the "Arab
homeland" (all Arabs favor Arab unity--which is not unlike
a politician's view of motherhood in other lands--but they
usually run into severe trouble fairly quickly when they try
to achieve it), and to free it from the influence and control
of the (undefined) "imperialists." Although the party has
its differences with ?resident Nasser of the UAR, mostly
because he tends to dominate everybody and everything within
reach, it is generally in agreement with Nasser's policy of
nonalignment with either the Communist Bloc or the free world.
Like all Arabs (except possibly some in the Maghreb) it
violently opposes any acceptance of Israel, which it considers
a creature (if not the creation) of the Western World.
The Ba'ath Party, with its widespread influence in the
Arab world (such as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and
Kuwait), never took root in Egypt, largely because it has
endeavored to follow policies that are not dependent upon
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ffi A,, i l 1963
merely one man who, for example, may be like Nasser a
charismatic ruler. The Ba'ath party does, indeed, advocate
legal restraints on the executive power and the guarantee
of individual liberties. On this point it disagrees strongly
with president Nasser, who, however, has pre-ompt d sore of
the Ba'ath party's economic ideas: redistribution of wealth;
state ownership and management of communications, public
utilities, and the chief means of production and transport;
revocation of foreign concessions; land reform; state
supervision of small industrial enterprises (with workers
sharing in their direction and profits); and state regulation
of inheritance and the ownership of property, although these
are asserted to be "natural rights."
Anti-Communist actions have so far not been nearly as
severe in Syria as they have been in Iraq, doubtless because
the Communist tentacles did not reach as far nor take as
uenacing a hold in Syria as they had under the Qasin regime
in Iraq. Iraq had been the recipient of Soviet economic and
military aid in large quantities while Qasim was in charge,
and "tochnicians" from the bloc by the hundreds were still
entering Iraq until the coup of February S. At the time of
Qasizy's fall, there were an estimated 500 Soviet military
specialists and some 753 economic technicians in Iraq. The
Iraqi Communists have taken a line just as antipathetic to
the new government as it has to them (see attached), although
some Communists (doubtless as an expedient) have indulged in
self-criticism which purportedly "exposed" some of their ?arty's
wrongdoings (see attached). The USSR government, however, far
from coraia to their rescue, has recognized the new regime
while continuing to conduct a vicious propaganda war in favor'
of uprisings and resistance by Iraqi Communists and by the
minority Kurds.
Meetings by representatives of the "liberated" Arab
countries (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen), trying to
reach unanimity on the degree of Arab unity desirable for all,
are not yet over. There does not seen to be a satisfactory
explanation as to why one should consider, say, the UAL. as
more "liberated" than, say, Tunisia. No agreement on unity
has yet been reached and no lasting one is likely at the
present time: the Ba'ath Party doesn't like any single ruler,
charismatic or otherwise; the states concerned disagree on
this point; and, within each state, there are vigorously
opposed views. The Ua'ath Party in Syria, for example, while
as much responsible as any group for the original Egypt-
Syria union, is now opposed to domination by Nasser--the
fawrani faction quite violently so. Nasser himself is
doubtless not prepared to accept less because of the existence
of pro-Nasser elements, especially in Syria. ?erhaps he will
decide to await another Syrian coup, more favorable to his views.
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The Irate. Ba' ath ?arty does not like the idea or prospect
of domination any more than Go the Syrians. The Algerians
have enormous economic, social and other problems of their
own and, in any event, at present at least, doubtlessly
regard the whole matter as relatively peripheral. And the
Yemenis (who have a civil war on their hands at the moment),
although lively to do what Nasser tells them, at least as long
as they rely on him for military and other assistance, do not
really carry as mach weight as do the others. 25X1C1Ob
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fW16?ObFurther Restrictions on Soviet Literature and Art
BACKGROUND: By a series of recent actions, the Soviet
leadership is trying once more to clamp down on intellectual
freedom. What was originally a campaign against "formalist"
and abstract art, sparked by Khrushchev's visit to public and
private exhibitions on 1 December 1962 (see Guidance #614 d,
14 January 1963), has now become primarily a wide-spread re-
pression of poets and writers. Many people suspect that cul-
tural conservatives, the bureaucrats formerly controlling
culture, deliberately confronted Khrushchev with abstract art
first, correctly expecting a hostile reaction; his animus was
then directed on to the field of literature, whose young rep-
resentatives had been tolerated by him as a tool in anti-Stalin
polemics. Ilya Ehrenburg and Yevgeni Yevtushenko unintention-
ally helped to embroil the writers with Khrushchev. Ehrenburg
wrote in his memoirs, appearing in Novy Mir, that Stalin's crimes
had been generally known, but that people ad wisely kept silent;
thus he implicitly raised the touchy question of Khrushchev's
behavior under Stalin. And Yevtushenko published a 4eries of
autobiographical articles in a French weekly, L'Expr ss, crit-
icizing many "Stalinist" attitudes, such as cormism and
anti-semitism, which are actually shared by many Soviet offi-
cials today, including Khrushchev. Aside from Khrushchev's
own attitudes, however, cultural hacks and Party ideologists
found it expedient to strike at the young poets indirectly, by
way of an attack on the abstract artists; unlike the artists,
the poets are genuinely and widely popular.
When experimental and progressive cultural activities are
being pushed to the wall, we ought to appreciate the force and
significance of the revolt against "socialist realism"--the
Communist euphemism for degrading art and literature into a
more tool of Party rule. This "liberal" movement (the label
is Khrushchev's) has had the following bases:
1. Certain teachers and schools were influenced by - Ell experimental eas. a yu n led and taught the
group of modern artists whose pictures were privately
shown to Khrushchev on 1 December. Ernst Neizvestny
was a real pioneer in sculpture, and influenced other
artists. In Keiv, students at the conservatory of
music were experimenting with music on the twelve-tone
scale.
2. Various Soviet writers (e.g., Yevtushenko, Andrey
Voznesensky, Victor Nekrasov) have been able to travel
abroad. These visits were doubtless intended totem
press the world with the vitality of Soviet literature,
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but they also permitted the visitors to keep abreast
of western developments. Publications from more lib-
eral East European countries, especially Poland, also
kept Soviet readers in touch with modern literature
and art.
3. Certain publications were hospitable to new and
original work. n Moscow, these included Zvezda (Star),
Novy Mir (New World), and (until mid-December) Litera-
turnaya Gaze'fa. iii Armenia, the local literary journal
Soveea kan rakanutyun (Soviet Literature) has been
scolde or pro singor defend ng formalism after the
mid-December redefinition of the Party line. Even
Pravda printed some of the work of Yevtushenko and
oz estvensky.
4. The membership of the Moscow divisions of both the
Union of Writers RSFSR and the Union of Artists `,i
a become liberal in tone, and oar f the unions
were tolerant. was die artists' union which staged
the main exhibition seen by Xhrushchov on 1 December.)
5. The artistic and literary experimenters were--and
doubtless s are--supported by youth and mem ers of
the scientific intelligentsia. Students At Vie`-A n '-
vers y o oscow have given a cold reception to de-
fenders of socialist realism in art. There has been
a notable lack of young men of talent who are also or-
thodox socialist realists, and it is all too obvious
that the current campaign against the "liberals" has
been spearheaded by old Stalinists. On a broader, more
popular level, young people all over the country have
taken to western dance nusic and western fads in cloth-
ing; even the Party's propaganda publications, like
Moscow News, now show girls with western hairdos, and
the Ivy League look has reached Moscow tailors. Some
Moscow artists reportedly support themselves by selling
their pictures to Soviet scientists and other well-
heeled members of the elite. In the continental Euro-
pean tradition, Soviet scientists seek to display a
broad, and not merely a technical, education. Some of
them have also fought battles with Party ideologists
in their own fields, on the questions of quantum physics,
relativity, or eugenics.
With the publication of Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs" last
October, and of Solzhenitsyn's ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH last
November, it seemed that the whole cultural revolt was coming
to an open boil. Before the crackdown really came into effect,
Victor Nekrasov had also published (in the November and Decem-
ber issues of Novy Mir) articles openly criticizing current
restraints SovieT7reedom, and openly admiring western aart,
films, and architecture. Ilya Ehrenburg was (as noted)
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explaining in print that his generation had known of Stalin's
crimes, and had found it wise to keep quiet about them. This
outbreak of free expression came close to being a direct attack
on Soviet leadership. Not only the literary and artistic hacks
were concerned; other Party officials seem to have been dis-
turbed at these goings-on at a time when the Party was being
reorganized from top to bottom (see Guidances #607, 3 December
1962, and #637, 25 March 1963), and when the USSR had suffered
a diplomatic defeat in Cuba and was close to a break with Peking.
The actions of the Soviet "establishment" in tightening
controls are listed in an unclassified attachment; these events
show how the Party has gradually encroached on the bases of
liberalism listed above. The writers and artists continued
to show some resistence until the meeting with Khrushchev 8
March, when the line was laid down more forcefully. Khrushchev's
s_jeech showed his touchiness on three subjects: (1) Ehrenburg's
assertion that the older generation knew of Stalin's crimes,
but kept quiet (Khrushchev denied that he knew, although he
had in effect admitted it in his 1956 Secret Speech); (2)
Nekrasov's and film director M. Khutsiyev's hints that there
was a split between generations (Khrushchev denied that there
was a split, but admitted in the speech that he was "perhaps
old-fashioned"); and (3) Robert Rozhdestvensky's suggestion
that the younger writers spoke for youth (Khrushchev stoutly
maintained that the Party spoke for youth). (For the text of
the speech, see Press Comment 8 April 1963.) Khrushchev failed
to be very convincing on any of these points, and he also
avoided giving a blanket endorsement to the views of the cul-
tural reactionaries. But, using Aesopian language, he made
it clear that liberalism would not be tolerated. He said:
"Can there be breaches of public order and
deviations from the will of the collective under
communism? There can. But they will obviously
be individual cases. One cannot suppose that
psychological disorder will be eliminated and
that the rules of community will be safe from
being violated by mentally deranged people. I
can't say for certain but there will obviously
be some means to curb the outbursts of lunatics.
Today, too, there is the strait-jacket which is
put on lunatics to deprive them of the possibility
of raving and doing harm to themselves and others."
Since his audience knew that several writers (including
Mikhail Naritsa, Valeriy Tarsis, Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin and
Valentin Ovechkin) had recently been committed to asylums, the
meaning was clear. The statement recalled Khrushchev's threats
at another meeting with writers in May 1957, when he said that
the Hungarian "counter-revolution" could have been prevented
if the Hungarian leaders had settled accounts with their writers;
if the CPSU had to settle with Soviet writers, "our hand would
not tremble."
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Since the S March meeting, repression has been steppe,1
up. Yevtushenko has been obliged to exercise self-criticism.
for permitting the publicati)n of his autobiography in L'ExTress;
the authorities have cancelled the trip to England of poet
Vladimir Sol3ukhtn; there have been proposal, that the various
unions in literature and the arts be amalamated, or even that
the party-member writers and artists be enrolled under plant
and factory organs. Meanwhile, Stefan Hermlin, head of the
poetry section of the East German Academy of Art, has been purged
because of alleged.penetration of "enemy" tendencies in East
German poetry, and. Soviet books dealing with the crimes of
Stalin are now banner E_,st Germany. An edition of a Czech
cultural journal (Kulturni Tvorba) has been confiscated because
of sympathetic ref ences Soov et "liberals." Step by step,
the Soviet regime. is closing in on its "liberals"--ending ex-
perimentation in schools, shutting off foreign contacts, chang-
ing or intimidating editors of literary journals, reshuffling
the writers' and artists' unions. But Soviet youth and the
sympathetic members of the scientific intelligentsia cannot
be stopped from thinking. If, as in Stalin's day, the regime
produces "silence.." that is likely to remain a surface phenom-
enon; Ehrenburg's most serious offense is that, in describing
the policy of silence, he has pointed out the limits of totali-
tarian control. Unlikely to change the direction of Soviet
opinion, artistic repression will presumably only isolate the
Party from the intelligent public, and the Party will become
increasingly a body of aging, outdated hacks. Yevtushenko and
his like have tried to reconcile freedom and progress with com-
munism; their effort failing, others will turn, not to communism
but against it, toward freedom. - L5X1C1Ob
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pril 1963
645 AF. AFRICAN SUMMIT: Meeting of the African Heads of
to a (Conference of the Inter-African and a agasy
rganiza io 1 -
25X1C10b AMO , AC]Mis Ababa, 23 May 1963.
BACKGROUND: The forthcoming meeting of African Heads
of State In is Ababa and the preceding Foreign Ministers'
Conference beginning in Addis Ababa on 18 May result from a
meeting of twenty (20) African states at Lagos in January of
last year. (See unclassified Attachment for a listing of
African states by various regional associations.) The Lagos
grouping, known as the Monrovia powers, included a considerable
majority of black Africa and represented, in general terms,
the expression of moderate Pan-African sentiment as opposed
to the so-called Casablanca group which links Guinea, Ghana,
and Mali.;-with the Maghrebian and Islamic states of Morocco,
the UAR, and Algeria. Despite their common aims on some basic
questions, and despite substantial divergencies within the
Monrovia group on specific issues, the Monrovia and Casablanca
groups have reflected a polarization in the developing move-
ment for pan-African unity. The Casablanca powers, in general,
sought faster and more radical solutions, criticized continu-
ing close relationships between African states and the metro-
pole as a lingering colonial vestige, and displayed an anti-
colonialism often indistinguishable from a sympathy for Bloc
interests. In contrast to the Monrovia states, all of the
Casablanca states, for example, received Bloc military aid
at one time or another. The Monrovia powers, containing a
fairly solid core of thirteen (13) countries (African Malagasy
Union - UAM) which maintain friendly ties with France, have
sought a more cautious path toward African cooperation,
stressing economic and technical cooperation and continued
friendly relationships with the West.
The Lagos meeting of the Monrovia group, in January 1962
started on a pessimistic note--boycott by the Casablanca
powers and confusion over the failure to invite the
Provisional Algerian Government--but concluded with a sense
of progress. The main result of the congress was a firm
step toward effective unity of the African states, calling
upon foreign ministers of the participating governments to
draw up terms for a permanent, all-African organization.
Developments during the past year have confirmed the
significance of the Lagos meeting and complicated problems
for the forthcoming Addis Ababa conference.
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on pril 1963
(1). A draft charter for the IAMO had been
drawn up and signed December 20-21, 1962, by 17 of
the original 20 states associated with the Monrovia
grouping. (Selected portions of the Charter are
contained in an unclassified Attachment.) Based upon
mutual respect for sovereignty, non-intervention in
the affairs of other states and peacefdl settlement
of disputes, it provides the first concrete expression
of moderate pan-African aims. The charter calls for
a consultative supranational framework consisting of
an Assembly of the Heads of State, a Council of Ministers,
and a permanent secretariat with a relatively wide range
of prerogatives, The signatory states agree to
cooperate in common defense against aggression and
subversion and in economic, educational, political,
scientific, and health and welfare efforts. In
contrast to this progress in organization displayed by
the Monrovia states, the Casablanca grouping has
become all but moribund, although its leaders are
individually among the most vocal and energetic
spokesmen for all-African nationalist causes. Guinea
and Mali have indicated a desire to adhere to IAMO,
and even Ghana.has been reported (in late February)
to have decided to attend. The Arab members of the
Casablanca powers-- Morocco, Algeria and the UAR--
are similarly reported to have requested invitations,
although it is not clear whether they intend to
become members. One complicating factor for member-
ship may be that by charter, the IAMO's secretary-
general must come from a French- or English-speaking
country, thus excluding a candidate from the Arab
countries. Three newly sovereign countries which were
not originally involved.in the Lagos conference, i.e.
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, are also expected to join.
So far the only known holdouts are Somalia, which is
engaged in a border dispute with Ethiopia and
dissatisfied with the IAMO's machinery for settling
disputes; and Tanganyika, which is the leading member
of PAFMECSA (Pan-African Freedom Movement of East,
Central and Southern Africa).
(2). The overthrow of the government and
assassination of President Olympic of Togo on
January 13 presents a specific issue for handling by
the participants at Addis Ababa. Twelve of the 13
UAM states have for the first time shown a major
divergence from French policy by refusing to
recognize the Togo rebel government of Grunitzky,
which the French support. Olympic attended the Lagos
meeting in 1962 and Togo is a charter member of IAMO.
More significantly, some African leaders may look
upon Olympia's assassination as a danger to the safety
2
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ril 1963
of other presidents and regimes and a foretaste of
continued instability and revolt, particularly if it is
"legitimatized" by passive acceptance as a fait accompli.
A strong suspicion of Ghanaian complicity in Te rev lt_
is evidenced by the UAM powers who have created a joint
defense staff, which however remains only a paper
exercise since none of the UAM countries appear willing
to surrender their sovereignty in this field. While
it has been reported that Ghana's request for admission
to IAMO will be granted, it is possible that some of
the UAM states will seek to make the Togo revolt a test
case at Addis Ababa, arguing that IAMO must take some
action or forfeit at its inception any hope of pro-
tecting Africa from a "Latin American pattern" of
revolutionary instability.
(3). Somalia has declined to attend the Addis
Ababa meeting because of its diplomatic differences
with Ethiopia over territorial claims. Engaged in a
border controversy, these two countries represent the
latent divisions which are repeated elsewhere--but
less sharply at the moment--between Morocco and
Mauritania, Guinea and Liberia, Zanzibar and Kenya,
and Ghana and Togo. Progress in settling the Sonalia-
Ethiopian dispute would enhance IAMO's stature and its
hope to achieve a role as arbiter of such disputes.
The IAMO must take definite steps to implement the
charter, select a headquarters site /fhe French reportedly
have offered a building for the secretariat in Dakar7, and
name a secretary-general. Given the personal and national
competition for leadership in Africa and the significant
role such a person could play, the states may not be able
to suppress their mutual suspicions and jealousies
sufficiently to appoint an effective leader. In addition
to dealing with these issues, and debating the terms of
the charter, the IAMO conference is likely to deal with a
wide range of issues of continuing interest to African states.
These include African questions, such as the continuing
vestiges of colonialism in Africa, the Angolan struggle for
independence, Apartheid and racial discrimination in South
Africa, the possibilities of an African Common Market and the
effects in Africa of the European Common Market, military
bases in Africa, and the French nuclear test program in the
Sahara; and international (i.e. non-African) questions,
which will probably e o secondary importance. The
discussions on international affairs may however have
considerable anti-Western, anti-colonial overtones.
(645 Continued)
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646 FE,a. The Japanese Left
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Since the end of World War II Japan has
been ruled bya succession of conservative governments which
have maintained a strong pro-Western and anti-Communist
orientation. The ruling conservative Liberal-Democratic
Party controls approximately 63?~percent of the popular vote
and governs by absolute majority. Since 1945, Japan has
not only recovered from the ravages of the Second World War
but has re-established itself as the leading industrial
nation of the Far East and the country with the highest
economic growth rate in the world (average annual growth of
9 percent from 1950-1963 with an 18 percent growth in 1959
and 11 percent in 1963). However, while economic recovery
has been rapid and remarkable, political and social
reconstruction has been far less certain and today there
is still a strong residue of political, social and
Psychological disorientation as the country gropes for
patterns with which to replace those swept away in the
post-War period. Japanese attitudes toward foreign affairs
combine a strong penchant for non-involvement with a desire
for US assurance of their military and economic security.
This latent neutralist sentiment has been particularly
marked in the generation which has come of age since the
War. Japanese experience in World War II produced a deep
distrust of militarism and authoritarian government and
concomitantly a desire to avoid the unpleasant realities of
international life while pursuing a goal of domestic economic
prosperity. Emergent Japanese democracy fostered an
excessive degree of political irresponsibility among all
major parties, the press, and intellectual elements. In
this setting there has been a marked tendency for polarization
of political concepts and political forces. Thus, sharply
contending political alternatives have been offered the
Japanese electorate by a radical Left favoring neutralism
and greater rapprochement with China and the USSR, and by a
conservative Right supporting the predominance of the United
States in Japanese affairs. The cleavage between Right and
Left remains deep, but the steady increase in the leftist
vote in Japan since World War II has been accompanied in the
past two years by evidence of a slight shift to the right
by the non-Communist Left.
The JSP. In the post-War era, the role of the Japanese
Socialist arty (JSP)--the country's second largest political
party--has been predominantly one of confused and sterile
opposition which in turn has been a factor in retarding the
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development of a meaningful two- or three-party system of
government in Japan and has adversely affected the growth
of democratic political institutions. Despite its fairly
strong representation in the Japanese parliament (211 out
of a total of 717 seats or approximately 33 percent) and
despite the number of genuine issues which it might
profitably have exploited, the JSP has not been able to
exercise an influence on the Liberal-Democratic Party or on
the electorate commensurate with its representation. In
the absence since World War II of strong leadership, the
JSP has been plagued by disunity, factionalism, irresponsible
power struggles, and disagreements over basic strategy
(parliamentary gradualism versus mass action and violence)
which have prevented it from achieving the position and
influence of left-socialist parties in generally similar
circumstances (c.f. the Italian Socialist Party under the
leadership of Pietro Nenni), and have provoked an attitude
of despair, bitterness and opportunism among its members.
The lack of steady leadership has resulted in an
alternation between the "gradual, " "reformist" tactics and
the use of violence and excess in such a manner as to
prevent the JSP from benefiting from either a united front
with the Japanese Communists or from appealing to the mass
electorate as a party of moderate and responsible reform.
In 1960, public criticism of JSP extremism in the struggle
against the US-Japanese security treaty caused the Party
to emphasize the achieve=gent of socialist aims by peaceful
means ("structural reform"). This image of respectability
helped the Party win 23 seats in the lower house elections
of November 1960 at the expense of the more moderate
Democratic Socialist Party. Subsequently, however, extreme
leftists--the Peace Comrades Society (Heiwa Doshikai)
faction--used the then Secretary General Saburo Eda's
alleged lack of militance in an attempt to replace him
with their candidate. The advance of the militants ran
into a snag when the former JSP Chairman Mosaburo Suzuki,
heading a Party delegation to Peking, acquiesced (probably
under pressure from extremists in his delegation) to the
"common enemy" statement about US imperialism (the JCP line)
and thus provoked a strong adverse reaction which damaged the
JSP's image with the Japanese electorate. In November 1962,
the extremist faction of the JSP finally did succeed in
ousting Eda as Secretary General because of his "excessively
liberal" views only to have their own candidate soundly
defeated by Tomomi Narita who, while inclined to a more
militant posture, in general appears to share the political
philosophy of the deposed Eda.
Differences between the moderate JSP faction and the
Japanese Communists (according to the 1962 Policy Handbook
of the JSP) can be summarized as follows:
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a. The JCP has not renounced the line of violent
revolution.
The JCP advocates a one-party dictatorship and does
not recognize the existence of opposin parties--
L~l
how will other parties in any united front fare
after the revolution?
c. The JCP has neglected the struggle from within the
Diet and has spent its energy in censuring from the
outside the activities of the JSP inside the Diet.
d. The JCP is tied to Moscow and Poking and therefore
is not really independent.
The JSP has frequently asserted also that it cannot form a
united front with the JCP as long as the latter insists on
imposing its own stand re the primacy of the "struggle against
American imperialism."
Regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, the JSP agrees--or at
least its current leaders agree--in general with the viewpoint
of the CPSU; however, since they have historic precedents of
friendship with the CCP they try to refrain from taking sides
or indulging in open criticism of Peking.
Roughly paralleling the stand of the JSP on all issues
is that of Japan's largest labor federation, the General
Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo). Though the Sohyo
leadership appears less committed to the JSP concept of
"structural reform," it stresses a position of "positive
neutrality" and joins the JSP in efforts to diminish JCP
influence in its own affiliates and in popular mass organiza-
tions such as the anti-nuclear weapons movement, which has
been thrown into complete discord and confusion by JSP/Sohyo
insistence on criticism of nuclear testing by any country, a
position which has placed them in direct opposTon to the
JCP and the Chinese Communists.
The Democratic Socialist Party (DS?). Formed in early
1960 by rightist dissidents from the , the DSP initially
included 54 members of the Japanese Diet and was supported
by Zenro, Japan's second largest trade union organization.
The Democratic Socialists entered the elections of November
1960 on a moderate platform which advocated an independent
foreign policy which was neither pro-Communist nor unduly
subservient to the United States, recognition of Communist
China and the gradual modification of the US-Japanese Security
Treaty. It stressed adherence to parliamentary democratic
practices and moderate trade unionism. However, the Japanese
voter, accustomed to a more dramatic and oversimplified
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presentation of issues, responded unenthusiastically and
elected only 17 members of the DSP to the Diet. In the
Rouse of Councillors election in 1962, only 11 DSP candidates
were voted in. The effect of this major defeat of the
Democratic Socialist Party was to renov for the imgediato
future any prospect of a moderate and responsible opposition
party to which governmental powers could be transferred
without radical re-orientation of Japan's political and
economic structure as well as her international affiliations.
The JCP. As for the Japanese Communist Party (JCP),
which i aa membership of approximately 90,000 and six seats
in the Diet, it too is divided over the course of the
"revolution" and the basic strategy involved in seizing
pottier. In general, the Party leadership believes that the
use of exclusively peaceful means will not bring about the
changes they advocate and that under prevailing Japanese
conditions a more militant and revolutionary approach is in
order. While conceding that the forces of the loft are
still too weak to seize and hold power and that the establish-
ment of pro-conditions for a successful revolution demand a
broad united front in order to profitably exploit public
sentiments favoring "peace" and a more independent fro reign
policy, the JCP leadership is convinced that the most
important requisite for takeover is to deprive the present
Japanese government of military and economic support from the
United States. Since, in their eyes, the United States
controls Japan's economic, political and military life
through the security treaty, "US imperialism" is for the-al
the main enemy and renouncement of the treaty their most
important Immediate objective.
Thus, the militant JCP leadership favors a "two-stage"
revolution on the premise that Japan is a semi-occupied
nation dominated by American imperialism and its ally,
Japanese monopoly capitalism. In this way, stage one is to
be a "people's democratic" revolution in which the JCP with
the assistance of other "progressive" forces (presumably the
JSP and cooperative elements of the bourgeoisie) seize power
and eliminate US influence and its lackeys, the local monopoly
capitalists. This first "revolution" would be followed
directly (i.e. without the traditional "liberal bourgeois"
interregnum) by the second or "socialist" stage of nationali-
zation of the industry, the land etc. as in East Europe.
Those in the Party who oppose this concept (previously
identified with Shojiro Kasuga, former Chairman of the
Central Committee Control and Auditing Con-mission who broke
with the JCP in July 1961) hypothesize that the country is
actually at a more advanced stage and that it is currently no
longer controlled by American imperialists but by the local
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monopoly capitalists. More important, like Palmiro Togliatti
and the majority of Italian Communists, they believe that
"seizure of power" and the first stage of the revolution can
be accomplished more effectively through gradualism and internal
reform. Naturally, these ideological differences relate
directly to vital practical issues such as increasing popular
support, exerting greater pressure on the government etc.
Above all, perhaps, the question of strategy relates to the
objective need for an effective united front with the more
powerful and influential JSP. The accomplishment of JCP
objectives is directly related to the degree of cooperation
they can develop with the Japanese socialists, who predominate
in Sohyo, the largest labor union, and in other mass organiza-
tions; however, the inflexibility, intransigence and extremism
of the JCP under the leadership of Secretary General Kenji
Miyamoto have alienated all but the most rabid JSP elements
and have contributed to the relative isolation which has
characterized the Japanese Communist Party since 1953 when
it abandoned the posture of respectability. The defection
of the Kasuga moderates in 1961 has tended to emphasize the
trend toward militancy and isolation.
While there is no conclusive evidence that JCP divisions
are exclusively along pro-Moscow or pro-Peking lines, the
Japanese Communists--on the basis of racial similarity,
geographic proximity, historic precedents, etc.--are
basically inclined toward the Chinese. And further, while
the JCP--which only stands to lose from any split in the
international movement--has adopted a position of strict
neutrality (its latest statements on the question being cited
as evidence of support by both Moscow and Peking), Miyamoto
and the Party leadership are convinced that the Communist
revolution in Japan cannot be effected along the Khrushchev
line.
Communist Dissidents. The Communist dissidents who
broke away from e in 1961 have not thus far been able
to pose an effective threat to the ?arty in terms of siphoning
off any appreciable number of Communist votes. They have,
however, been a constant source of concern to the Party as
evidenced by its continuing bitter attacks on them in its
publications. Since their defection from the JCP, the
dissidents have divided into two organizations, namely: the
Socialism Reform Movement (Shakaishugi Kakushin Undo),
headed by Tomcchika Naito and Hikoyoshi Nishikawa, which
functions as a political party and ran a candidate in the
last House of Councillors elections; and the United Socialism
League (Toitsu Shakaishugi Doraei), led by Shojiro Kasuga and
llo uzaemon Yamada, in which intellectuals predominate and
which does not favor the immediate formation of a political
party. These two organizations are not inimical, their
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differences being over the form of their opposition to the
JCP. A number of United Socialism League supporters have
lent their services to the JSP and have played an important
role in the development of the JSP "structural reform"
theory.
The dissidents are a particular source of irritation
to the JCP on the question of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
Socialist Reform Movement, in particular, through its organ,
Atarashii Rosen (New Route) holds up to constant public
attention its support of the Soviet line and its accusation
that the JCP is subservient to the Chinese Communists, causing
the Party to react in its own publications, thus emphasizing
the dilemma it faces in trying to remain neutral in the
dispute.
Neither dissident organization has a large membership,
but both have organ papers and are fairly vocal. They have
not induced any subsequent defections of JCP members in any
numbers, but it is possible, as evidenced by recent defections
in Saga Prefecture, that their emphasis on the Soviet line
may strike a receptive cord in the areas outside Tokyo and
cause the Party further trouble particularly if the latter
should appear to be becoming more militantly pro-Chinese.
25X1C10b
 25X1C1Ob
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TIII: JAPAN TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 24, 1963
Battle of Intelligence
Soviet Union Increasing'and Strengthening Espionage Apparatus
By HHOIt'I11 KOBAYASHI
The Intense rivalry l etween All of the facts known to
the United Stites and Soviet Australlan authorities concern-
Russia over nuclear weapons in? the Skripov case have been
and development of their means revealed through articles In the
of delivery is continuing with newspapers and the wire serv-
no end In sight despite the ef- ices. In many ways It looks
forts of the lit-nation Interna- like the same old story, and in
do nal Convention on Nuclear many ways it Is.
Disarmament In Geneva. But on the other hand, It I,,,'
One of the aspects of this also quite revealing, not only of
fierce competition Is shown 1 v the aims and methods of Soviet
the Intensified battle of int(,III? intelligence, but of the attitudes
gence between the two camps. and problems of the Soviet Gov-
Numerous espionage cases ernment. These aspects of the
have been revealed In the past case deserve careful considera-
several years. The Russian spy tion and should be brought to
Rudolf Abel was arrested In the the attention of the world pub-
U.S. The Lonsdale case occur- lic generally to Improve its
red in Britain in 1959 and, last understanding of the Soviet in-
year,'the Vassal spy case came telligenc?e services.
into the limelight while the Defection of '11legats'
Petrov and Skripov cases in In recent years the cases of
Australia also made headlines, some of these Illegal officers
The Soviet newspaper Izvestia have come to the attention of
criticized the United States in the public through arrest or de-
its issue of March 10 charging fection. It was the defection of
that a Red Army lieutenant one of them, Lt. Col. Relno
colonel had been kidnaped by an llaghanen that led to the arrest
che. In of colonel of State Security Ru?
American embassy atta
dolf
Moscow the trial of British husi- Abel, who nad been an "il-
nessman Greville Wynne is legal" for many years in the
about to start. United States. Another illegal
The West recently has been whose case received wide pith-
s ante concerned with Soviet Iiclty was that of Conon Mola-
espionage activities. At the dy, the man known as Lonsdale,
same time, the number of de- arrested In Britain In 1959 and
fections of Soviet spies is in- still imprisoned there.
creasing. Counteresplonage authorities
Skripov (rase of the Free World allege that
there are several other cases
On Feb. 7 this year, the Gov. In which the Soviet "illegals"
ernment of Australia declared have defected or been caught,
the first secretary of the Soviet but they have refused to give
Embassy in Canberra, Ivan Skrt- any particulars, presumably be?
pov, persona non grata, charg cause the "Illegals" in question
ing him with "elaborate prepa- are now working as "double
ration for espionage." agents."
Skripov was alleged to have In the period from the end of
recruited an Australian woman the Second World War to 1951
as his agent to support the in. the Soviet Union had succeed-
telligence operations of an uni- the in establishing good teiations
dentified man who has apparent- with Australia. Soviet purchas-
ly not been located by the Aus- es of Australian exports, pri-
tralian authorities. In the marily woo]. became an !ncrvas.
course of her work for Skripov, Ingly imporant factor in Aus-
the woman was given a high tr lia's economic life, although
speed radio transmitter, at)- Soviet Influence In Aust'celia waq
parently destined for use by the certainly never great. Then
unidentified man and she also came the Petrov case.
recovered from an Australian
graveyard a hidden Canadian Petrov Incident
passport, also apparently to Je Petrov was a Soviet Stalle
used by "Mr. X." security officer attached to the
Although the identity of the Soviet Embassy In Canhcrra. He
"Mr. X" called a "man of my- became tnc?reasingty attached to
stew" In the Australian press, the free and open Australian
remains unknown, his status life he saw around him and cl'is-
and the functions he was to per. illusioned with the system of
form are quite clear from the communism. Finally when h(,
evidence avallable. Ife was a began to be hounded by his
Soviet intelligence officer in the headquarters in Moscow for fai-
so-called "illegal apparat." That lure to fulfill certain assigned
is to say he was an officer of tasks, he defected and told all
the Committee of State Securi- to the Australian authorities,
ty KGB). Ills defection was one of the
Fish That Got Away most dramatic in history be-
While this man may prove to Carus(' after he had gone over
be one of the fish that got away. to the Australians, oflicials of
her i; profe,,sionally related to the Soviet Embassy tried to
ltudOIf Al ul and Gordon Lons- kidnap his wife and drag her
dale, two Soviet intelligcnc?e of- hack to the Soviet Union.
flcers from the "illegal apparat" The impact of the Petrov in-
who were arrc:tcd within the trident was Such that the Soviets
last few years in the United broke relations with the Aus-
State; and Great 131-itain. trallans and all of their careful
work in building up a new
Image of an enlightened and co-
operative Soviet Union was de-
stroyed. Then In 1959 the So-
viets reestablished relations
with Australia and Skripov ar-
rived In Canberra in 1959.
Increasing Activity
The impact on relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and
Australia of the Skripov case
still remains to be measured,
but it is certain that again Mos-
cow's efforts to present an en-
lightened and smiling counten-
ance "clown under" have been
wrecked and wrecked again by
a Soviet State security officer
engaged in trying to build up
an "Illegal apparat" in Aus-
tralia. One would think that
one such experience would be
enough, but knowing the So-
viets one must concede that pro-
bably their reaction to their
second failure will be to try
again.
Nikita Khrushchev has stated
with great frequency and occa-
sionally with eloquence that he
believes In peaceful coexistence
and that he denies the inevi-
tablllty of war. He has gone
so far as to say that nations
who engage In espionage are
preparing for war and to claim
that the Soviet Union does not
engage in such activity.
Counteresplonage authorities of
the West assert that at present
the Soviet Intelligence system is
not only engaging In espionage
to the limit of Its abilities, but
also giving special emphasis to
strengthening and to increasing
the size of its illegal apparatus
It is particularly noteworthy
that control within the struc-
tures of the state and the party
In the Soviet Union are being
reinforced.
Total Authority
It is the creation of the new
party-state control committee of
the Central Committee and -
even more significant-the ap-
pointment of Alexander N. She-
](,pill to bead this new control
organ.
The summary and comment-
ary on the statute of this new
committee which appeared in
Pravda on Jan. 18, this year
makes clear how total Shelep-
In's authority will be. It ap-
pear; incontrovertible that or-
ganizationally he now occupies
the party-slot which will weigh
most heavily on those elements
of Soviet society with the ini-
tiative and incentive to seek
liberalization.
Shelepin's job, It Is said, will
be to convert the vast party-
state structure into a massive
bureaucratic "KG I3 apparatus,"
rvghnenting Soviet society with-
in the framework of Khrush.
chevist "Stalinism."
Free World secur'ity' services
today are Increasingly alert to
the menace posed by the illegal
agents.
We Japanese fervently hop(,
that these espionage activities
which promotes distrust among
nations will be completely- wip-
ed out from this earth.
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8 April 1963
LIST OF UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Reference attachment
Briefly Noted "Battle of intelligence" from
The Japan Times, March 24, 1963
643 NE,g. "The Baghdad Press Attacks
Communism"
"Recent Statements by Arrested
Communists Over Baghdad Radi-"
"Chronology of Current Soviet
CampaI.n Against Artistic
and Literary Freedom"
"Regional Lssociations of
African States"
"Excerpts from 1962 Prop's ed
Charter of the Inter-African
and Malagasy States Organi-
sation"
Moscow's Stand on International
Communist Unity
Moscow's indecisive and often irrelevant answer
to the Chinese Communist challenge to its leadership
of the World Communist Movement, published in the
February 1963 issue of the World Marxist Review, is
reprinted and Interpreted in a short introductory
essay. Side by side with the text of the Reliew arti-
cle is a commentary pointing out its inaccuracies, in-
dicating omissions, and otherwise stressing significant
features of the "reply."
"Moscow's Stand on International Communist Unity"
(unclassified) is attached. 25X1C10b
25X1C10b
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The Baghdad daily, Al Thawra, in an editorial on 20 March 1963,
said:
"Communism is a tyrannical movement which wanted to
rule the country in spite of its small numbers and in
spite of the fact that eighty percent of the local Com-
munists are foreigners, a movement whose central com-
mittee met in a room at the Ministry of Defense.
"We had two enemies: Abd al Karim Qasim and commu-
nism. With those two enemies we could not live in peace.
That is why they both agreed to fight and crush the
nationalist movement. But one thing paralyzed this
agreement, because while agreeing to crush us, they
were at the same time struggling for power.
"We have triumphed and it is our right to purge the
country from their filth. It is our right to make an
extensive purge and to kill them all. They know that
this is our right, but they are trying by all means to
stop the using of this right, including the attacks
made by Moscow radio and the Communist states. They
are making plans to return to act against us, and we
are doing the same.
"We must rise to the level of the fight against the
enemies because any leniency with them will take us
below the level of the fight, the fight which must end
with one of us remaining in the field, and then regret
will be of no avail.tt
The Baghdad daily, Al Jihad, carried a column on 19 March
1064 which stated:
"We should not be content with fighting the local
Communists only because of their crimes and because they
resisted the 14 Ramadan revolution. We should fight
communism as an ideology because its tenets go counter
to our beliefs as Moslems. Communism is bent on de-
stroying the religion of Islam. Communism does not
believe in the existence of God and claims that life
is only matter; Why should we not fight communism for
its blasphemy and heresy.
"Our government may say whatever it likes regarding
communism for international considerations, but we, as
a Moslem people, must express what our immortal divine
religion dictates, and what the holy Koran says."
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cen fate ents By Arrested Communists Over Baghdad Radio
March 16: Brigadier Hasan Abbud, former commander of the
Mosul garrison, admitted that for some time he was a card-
holding member of the Communist Party. He described Qasim
as "selfish" and "hesitant" and a chronic "liar" who "had a
great flair for contradictions." He asserted that the
communists had backed Qasim completely and that Qasim in
return had helped the communists materially and morally.
Abbud described the circumstances surrounding his appointment
as the commander of the Mosul garrison just after the
Ash-Shawwaf uprising in March 1959 and said that both Qasim
and Major General al-Abdi, former chief of staff and military
governor general, told him he would receive his orders directly
from Taha ash-Shaykh Ahmad, the communist chief of Qasim's
military intelligence. He described the "grisly and barbaric"
crimes of the communists and their associates in Mosul and
other places after the suppression of Ash-Shawwaf's uprising
in Mosul. Abbud maintained that he was being treated well by
the authorities and the examining magistrates who were
questioning him.
March 6: Statement made by Iraqi Communist leader Sharif
ash- aykh: In order to refute misleading information media
and mercenary trumpets, we present these irrefutable confessions,
facts, and items of evidence which are above doubt and forgery
because the tongue convicts.
During the past few weeks, communist propaganda media have
been telling lies and fabrications. During the past few
weeks, the enemies of right and justice have been trying
desperately to distort the meaning of our progressive
revolution and its noble and good aims. During the past
few weeks, the rabid campaigns have continued to carry cheap
lies and to shed crocodile tears.
Today, however, we shall not reply to them. We shall not
waste our time. We shall not attempt to argue with them
about the lies they have reiterated every day. We shall let
their own witnesses voluntarily reveal the facts which the
rabid information media have refused to concede.
Today we shall begin with Sharif ash-Shaykh, a member of the
Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party. Citizens,
Sharif ash-Shaykh addresses you:
"I am lawyer Sharif ash-Shaykh. My party pseudonym
is Harith. I was a member of the party central
committee. I wish to tell the public about events
which involved the party and which occurred in
connection with the current national revolution
which has won control in our country.
"It is known that the Iraqi Communist Party drew up
a political plan to resist any revolution in the
country on the grounds that such a revolution
would endanger national independence. However, it
is especially important that everyone know that
Abd al-Karim Qasim's rule was a dictatorship which
caused calamities among all sections of the people,
except the reactionaries and the agents of imperialism.
Therefore, any plan to resist this dictatorship was
a sound plan provided that those who implements xt,
or rather those who staged the revolution, undertook
to combat imperialism and to support the general
national interests of the sons of the people. The
plan implemented by the party on the first day of
the revolution and the statements against the
revolution--which was aimed, as declared in the
first communique, against the criminal dictatorship
of Abd al-Karim Qasim--were wrong and very harmful
to all the interests of the country.
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"Undoubtedly the current national revolution has
declared itself against imperialism and has also
declared its readiness to destroy the dictatorship
under which the people suffered for many long years.
The first communique also announced airs which were
in the interest of all the people, except the
reactionaries. Therefore the party's attitude in
resisting this revolution and the propaganda carried
by the information media of the socialist countries
are not serving the people's interests but are only
serving to weaken the existing national revolutionary
regime which is anti-imperialist and against dictator-
ship and whose aims are in the interest of all the
sons of the people.
"Therefore all the sons of the people must take a
definite stand--first, on consolidating the
national revolution; and second, on resisting
these propaganda campaigns which are not in their
interest, nor in the interest of the sons of
Arabhood, nor in the interest of anyone in the world."
March 6: Isam al-Qadi, who had been in charge of the Baghdad
co aittee of the Iraqi Communist Party, said in a letter to
the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (read over
the radio): The policy of the treacherous Iraqi Communist
party against the revolution is aimed at killing innocent
people, creating dissension among the people, and attempting
to impede the march of the glorious revolution.
Al-Qadi added that this policy is part and parcel of the
party's hostile attitude toward national revolutionary
elements and its fight against such elements through
various ways and means. He also said that the attitude
adopted by the propaganda media of some of the communist
countries toward the Iraqi revolution shows a lack of
understanding of the meaning of the progressive revolution
against imperialism and feudalism.
March 6: Abd as-Sattar Majdi Muhammad Rida, in charge of
the -peasant's office of the Central Committee of the Iraqi
Communist Party having stated that Qasim, his clique, and
his henchmen in the party betrayed the revolution--both its
targets and achievements; Qasim, he added, imposed a
dictatorship on the people and depended on the Communist
Party to help suppress sincere nationalist elements. He
added: This was indeed a deceitful and dirty role which
led to disunity and a prolonging of the rule of the
murderous Qasimite regime.
The party played a criminal role in the events which took
place in Kirkuk and Mosul where the most abhorrent crimes
were committed. Later the party adopted a hostile attitude
toward the present blessed revolution and advocated the
carrying of arms against it instead of carrying arms against
the tyrant dictator. As a result, the party has added a new
crime to its criminal record.
Because of this criminal attitude adopted by the party,
innocent people--who would have enjoyed the people's
festivals and participated in the building of the country--
were killed.
March 7: Latif al-Haj Ali Haydar. Communist leader: My
party pseudonym is Miqdam (meaning: the daring). The party
mission entrusted to me was military organization of
officers and soldiers at Ar-Rashid camp. For a long time
the Communist Party asserted the need to consolidate Abd
al-Karim Qasim's regime on the grounds that it was a national
regime , and that any movement or revolution against the
regime would be an imperialist and reactionary movement which
would not serve the people's interests but the interests of
imperialism
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n tvhas basa , the party emphasized that it would resist any
movement against Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime.
"It is obvious that the Communist Party, which ever since
the outbreak of the national July revolution sought to
consolidate the autocratic and military dictatorship of
Qasim, had an interest in maintaining this regime. By
supporting Qasim's regime, the Communist Party intended to
destroy other national forces in order ultimately to seize
power when Karim Qasim remained alone in the arena. Thus,
when the blessed national revolution of 14 Ramadan broke out,
the party began to resist it and issued statements calling
for armed resistance. There followed resistance movements
against the revolution in various parts of Baghdad, including
the Kurdish quarter where I myself was. (Passage describing
the communist resistance in the Kurdish quarter omitted)
"The party's attitude toward the blessed 14 Ramadan revolution
has provided new evidence of the Communist Party's betrayal
of the mission which it was supposed to perform in order to
serve the people. The party has proved that it cares only
for its own interests and for its attempt to secure power
at the expense of the people's and homeland's interests. The
party's attitude is a followup to the chain of criminal and
traitorous stands it has taken ever since the outbreak of the
national July revolution.
"Therefore, the new series of propaganda campaigns launched
by the propaganda media in the socialist countries lacks
logic and evidence. On the contrary, the national revolutionary
authorities which were confronted by the armed resistance of
the Communist Party did not retaliate with a terrorist
campaign of revenge against the communists as individuals.
The authorities simply acted in a justifiable and legitimate
manner against a party which declared armed resistance against
the revolution from the very beginning.
"This campaign of propaganda is aimed at distorting the stand
of the revolutionary authorities and at distracting the
authorities in order to prevent them from carrying out the
constructive work which is expected of them, and which in
fact they are doing. This campaign does not serve the Iraqi
people's interests; nor does it enhance the attitude of the
revolutionary authority toward the socialist countries. This
authority does not consider the socialist countries as enemies;
but rather, in pursuance of the policy of neutrality, considers
them as countries with whom it can cooperate on the basis of
equality and nonalignment." (Brief passage omitted saying
that the propaganda campaign only serves reaction, imperialism,
and forces opposing Arab construction)
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Chronology of Current Soviet Campaign Against
Artistic and Literary Freedom
1 December 1962 - Khrushchev visits public and private art
exhibits, expresses disgust at abstract and "formalist"
art.
3 December - Pravda editorial "Art Belongs to the People"
condemns jazz and abstract art.
4 December - Boris loganson, moderate President of Soviet
Academy of Arts, replaced by conservative Vladimir
Aleksandrovich Serov.
17 December - Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, Chief of CPSU Central
Committee, spells out new Party line to 400 writers and
artists at meeting attended by Khrushchev, who added his
own sharp comments. Writers and artists defend themselves.
18 December - Dmitri Shostakovich's 13th Symphony, composed
to accompany five poems by Yevgeni Yevtushenko, performed
in Moscow despite attack by Ilichev. (Yevtushenko
later obliged to revise text.) Also on 18 December,
Party organization of Moscow division of the Writers'
Union fails to elect any conservative to its board.
24-26 December - CPSU Ideological Commission, headed by
Ilichev, meets with 140 young artists, writers and
composers.
27 December V.A..Kosolopov,:liberal editor of Literaturnaya
Gazeta, replaced by conservative Aleksandr akovsky.
31 December -.Article in Komm.unist by unofficial conservative
leader Vsevolod Koc etov appeals for a return to
inspirational literature, but'avoids name-calling.'-
4 January 1963 - A leksandr.Laktionov, conservative artist,
attacks .115 formalist artists,, . .5'art critics,, also
writers Ilya Ehrenburg and Yuriy Nagibin, in Pravda.
9 January 1963 - In article an Trud, Aleksandr Gerasimov,
.art dictator under ,Stalin, attacks' many of those
denounced by Lal ti-ono.v, also criticizes ;several
publications,includ.ing Literaturnaya Gaz?ta, the
Izvestia Sunday suppiement Nede ya, and ()goner.
Izvestia replies with mild criticism of`erasimov,
12 Juary .)
: .
14 January - Pravda publishes semi-recantation by artist
Andre y Va.>rnetsov., condemning abstract art but asserting
the rights of art:.ts,. to use all other styles. Also
on 14 January,, _ar,.ieje.:in Kommunist s'larply criticizes
L teraturnaya Ga et for b avi :g ailed sculptor Ernst
Neizve my whit dolayijig a critique of formalism with
bureaucrat is .red-tap.e...
29 January "V. 4 Yermilov attacks Ehrenburg in Izvestia
hitting mainly at Ehrenburg's doctrine of "si ence,"
(Ehrenburg reply `and,.Yermilov rebuttal appear. in
6 February :,Izvesti:a., with .editors siding strongly
witli Yermilov.
16 February -,Art uni.on".gfficial D..Mochalsky. admits in
article . `in Sovetsk.ya :Kultura. that Moscow division of
Artists Union bviid1ed in choosing pictures for
exhibition at its '3Oth Anniversary Exhibition (the
public exhibition seen by Khrushchev on 1 December;
this exhibition closed on. 17 February after attendance
by ?4)0, 003 people)..
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21 February - Boris Ioganson, former President of Soviet
Academy of Arts, publishes article in Kommunist condemning
abstractionism and maintaining that "t people" are the
supreme judges of art.
8 March Khrushchev addresses 7-8 March meeting of Party
leaders and Sob writers and artists, dismissing ideas
that Stalin generation guilty or that it split from
younger generation, condemning abstractionism and
formalism, and making veiled threat of asylum commit-
ment for those refusing to follow Party line. Khrushchev
also indicated that non-conforming artists would be kept
at home.
11 March - Painter Ye. Vuchetich and writer A. Chakovsky
urge in Pravda that all creative intellectuals should
be united into a single union.
14 March - Leningrad artists demand freedom of expression at
meeting called to lay down Party line.
16 March - V. Kochetov, in article in Literaturraya Gazeta,
joins in call for a single union. (0-H_1 r)h: rch,Tarty
Secretary Yusupov of Kazakhstan told his Central
Committee that he favored proposal made at 7-G March
meeting to abolish Party organizations in creative
unions, and put writer-artist Party members under Party
organs in plants and factories.))
19 March Ernst Neizvestny says on Moscow Radio,that an
artist has a right to experiment, but must not produce
something entirely severed from tradition; further, an
artist should listen to criticism.
27-29 March -- Work of young writers denounced at plenary
meeting of Soviet 'i riters' Union. Ycc,,tushenko admits
publication of autoobiography in L'Expross was mistake,
claims latter di.._a,orted his text; s ~riticisn of
him and of Neizveotny not destructive but constructive.
2 April - 'Writer Mikhail Sokolov (not to be confused with
Mikhail Sholokhov; says.in Literiturn-.va (,azeta article
that people like "=Te viushenko wh are ^ umat .re as
artists, civilians, and politicitc.,ns should stay home,
"learn sense--and only then go out as propagandists of
a new world."
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Regional Associations of African States
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Liberia
S . Le one
Mauretania
Senegal
Ivory Coast
Cameroons
Dahomey
Upper Volta
Niger
Chad
Congo (Braz)
Gabon
CAR
Malagasy
Togo
Congo (Lea)
Somalia
Libya
Tunsia
Morocco
UAR
Ghana
Guinea
Mali
Algeria
Tanganyika
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Sudan
Original Lagos Signers of Probable
Monrovia Conf. IAMO Charter UAM Casablanca IAMO
Powers Participants (Dec. '62) Members Powers Members
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 Approved For Lease 2 6th ' :ffH4a-RIDB'd8-q, 061A000200010007-3
PROPOSED CHARTER OF THE INTER-AFRiCAN
AND MALAGASY STATES ORGANISATION
(ADOPTED IN PRINCIPLE)
PREAMBLE
WE the ',African, and Malagasy Heads of States and. Governments
assembled'in'Lagos, Nigeria;
'INSPIRED by : the.aim?Qf.our peoples for brotherhood, soli-
darity, .co-operat.ion~and unit.y,:?as evidenced by the previous
historic conferences held in furtherance of this aim;
ANXIOUS to affirm our.adherence to the Charter of th.e.
United Nations and the Convention of Human Rights;
DEDICP,`TED to the progress of a
freed from colonisat.ion;
renascent.. Africa forever
DESIROUS''th4t all 'Africa should henceforth unite for the
preservat-iot of independence and freedom:. without; which the
welfare and ell-being. of its people.. cannot be assured;.
COIISCIOUS' of t'he responsibility of our governments and
peoples to demonstrate the. capacity of the human. race-to over-
come ethnic and national differences in the interest of peace
and to direct-all knowledge towards the promotion of human
progress;
CONVINCED that all?the independent_.African -and, Malagasy
States are des .rous,.of. creating an African solidarity to which
each State can , contribute its: experience ; and achievements,
WILLING to'weloome in a spirit of fraternity any concrete
proposal intended .,to..-promote =.effective.part icipat ion of all
independent African and Malagasy States in a common organisa-
tion;
RESOLVED..to '.'avo1.d. r~iyalr..y. . = ,-conf lict'~ among all "independ-~
ent African 'and 'Malagasy,-States by.,-consciously creating and
maintaining institutions.capab:le: ;of furthering a common des-
tiny.
HAVE agreed'..iao the present Charter and by these presents
establish an association of : African and Malagasy States.
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
ARTICLE . 1-.
1. The High Cant'r`actix}g, parties of,.African. and Malagasy States
do by the present,Charter . estakt:lish..the. organisation.. to.: be
known as the Inter African and,Malagasy ORGANISATION
2. This Organisations-abl shed,. for;,the .purpose of -pro-
moting a better f0-'.r .the peoples of.Afr,ica and Malagasy
by enlisting the:-efforts:o.finember states. through :.cooperative
and joint action6; in`order--toi
(a) atccslerate :'economic and social development and
(bY provide better and broader educational opportu-
int.excourse :.aria 'to ? promote, the pooling and effec-
tive: utilisation of t3 eir. resources;
nit);es for...its peoples;
(c) .rgi.se the .levee of.. health-..and well-being of its :
ie4p1.es,;.and.: 4 ;R
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(d) concert, as far as possible, political actions
and initiate new means of establishing relation-
ships in which the interests of the continent
of Africa and Malagasy will be better defined
and served.
The High Contracting Parties, in pursuit of these and
similar purposes, agree to attain these essential objectives:
(a) Economic Co-operation -
(i) to establish means for removing formal obstacles
to African and Malagasy trade so as to provide
markets sufficiently large to encourage the
growth of efficient industries;
(ii) to'e'stablish new sources and channels of trade
among.countries.and regions of..Africa,
(iii) to provide an institutional framework for
facilitating economic, commercial, and indus-
trial co-operation that shall-permit the mem-
ber states jointly to adopt suitable economic
programmes within appropriate regions and to
speak to the rest of the world on the basis
of common economic policies; and
(iv) to raise and.establish funds for the develop-
merit Of their resources.
(b) Educational and Cultural Co-operation -
(i) to modernise and expand educational, scientific,
and professional facilities on a co-operative
basis;
(ii) to facilitate a close alignment of educational
policies with a view to promoting the co-ordina-
tion of educational, scientific, and professional
institutions and programmes; and
(iii) to accelerate cultural exchangefor the widest
possible participation in and sharing of the
African and Malagasy cultural heritage.
(c) Health and Nutritional Co-operation -
(i) to control disease through joint action and to
provide joint programmes for appropriate services
and training; and
.(ii) toco-ordinate national health, medical, and
nutritional policies through planned programmes,
wit'h.a view to strengthening human potentialities.
(d) Political and 'Diplomatic Co-operation -
To foster. closer co-operation in. political and dip-
lomatic fields
(e) 'Scientific and Technical Co-operation -
To encourage scientific research and technical train-
ing and assistance on a co-operative basis among the
Afric _~n and Malagasy States.
(f) 'Co-operation for Defense -
To.explore the possibility of building up the defense
of the Africanand Malagasy, States against external
aggression and in safeguarding their territorial
integrity..
ARTICLE ,
For the realisation of the objectives stated in Articles
find 2, the Nigh' Contracting Parties adopt and affirm these
principles:
(a) sovereign equality of African and Malagasy States,
whatever may be the size of their territories, the
density of their. populations, or the value of their
possessions;
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non-interference in the internal affairs of Member
States;
(c) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each State and for its inalienable right to inde-
pendent existence;
(d) peaceful and harmonious settlement of all disputes
arising among the African and Malagasy States;
(e) unqualified condemnation of any subversive activity
on the part of neighbouring or other States;
(f) the constant promotion and fostering of all avail-
able means of co-operation in the fields of economics,
health,: nutrition, education, and culture; and
.(g) dedication to the total emancipation of the remaining
dependent territories of Africa.
ORGI'eNISATION OF CO-OPERATION AND SPECIALISED AGENCIES
ARTICLE 25
In order to establish conditions favourable to economic
co-operation and joint economic endeavours, the High Contract-
ing Parties herby. establish THE .ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN AND
MLLAQI,SY ACONOMIC. CO--OPERA `IC '.'AND, DEVELOPMENT-, which shall
function in .- acc:ordaance with''! a' treaty.'to. be negotiated and which
shall be' regarded as an integral part ' of the present t Charter .
CULTURAL CO-OPERATION
2 ' 8 "
The High Contr'xcting Pax ties agree to promote and accel-
erate the. consol ,dat?ion of our African cultures and traditions
in the. interest of - preserving' our' heritage, and shall use
their efforts in creating the 'machinery for their fulfilment.
_.(O-OPERATION IN THE 'FIELD OF HEALTH AND NUTRITION
-ARTICLE" 27 ,
The High Contracting Parties agree to engage in programmes
through joint actions ; to er.adicat.e disease; to co-ordinate
their respective health, medical and nutritional, policies; and
to provide appropriate services and training for these pur-
poses. The High Contracting-Parties agree to conclude a sepa-
rate treaty for co-operation in the fields of health and
:nutrition...
CO-4P tATI.O xN 'JE1E . FIELD OF : flESEARCI
.RTICLE 28. .
1. The High Contracting ':o arties agree that those member
States which have'.medicai institutions-shall serve the Organi-
sation in training` medical and paramedical personnel and shall
also undertake research, the nature and scope of which shall
include continuous ingtaiiry into and study of problems of health
-arid nutrition. ,
2.` Information derived from
.made available.. to all..,
these
inquiries
shall be
ARTICLE 29
The High Contracting Parties-further agree that a scien-
tific research organisation shall-?,be co-operatively established,
developed and supported. `Towards-?this end, they agree to con-
clud.e,a separate treat r. establishing a SCIENTIFIC TRAINING AND
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, which s h I.l seek to further coy-operat ion
among ,the !member states an the..various 'fields of scientific
research as: a moans `oaf romoting:their scientific and. inous-
trial. -growth.,:
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SPECIALISED AGENCIES
1,RTICLE 30
The Assembly shall have the power to establish such
Specialised Agencies as it may deem necessary from time to
time, and the officials of such agencies shall be appointed
by the Council of Ministers acting in consultation with the
Secretary-General.
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
ARTICLE 31
The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to settle
all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this
end agree to conclude a separate treaty establishing a PERMA-
NENT CONCILIATION COMMISSION, which shall function in accordance
with said treaty and which shall be regarded as forming an
integral part of the present Charter.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS
The High Contracting Parties agree that nothing herein
shall be understood or interpreted as impairing the commit-
ments or other rights and obligations of the member States
of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation under the
Charter of the United Nations Organisation.
* * * "* * * * * * * * *
REGISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION
The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Charter
shall after due ratification be registered with the Secretariat
of the United Nations through the Government of ..........in
conformity with I.rticle 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
The High Contracting Parties agree that any question which
may arise concerning the interpretation or the application
of this treaty shall be submitted for adjudication-, to the
International Court of Justice ,apt the Hague.
MISCELLANEOUS
ARTICLE 39
The Official languages of the Organisation and all its
organs shall be English and French.
* * * * * * *.* * * 4y*,
A`. DMI SSI ON Off' NEW :MEMBER STATES
ARTICLE 45
Any independent ,sovereign State in Africa under indigenous
African rule may at any time apply to the Secretary-General
for permission to adhere or accede to this Charter.
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? The attached article, reprinted
40 0
4 e.
from WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, may be
quoted freely, but notes and ;
4 comments must n o t be reprinted
verb a t i m .
M O S C O W ' S
S TAN D O N I N T E R N A T I O N A L
C O M M U N I S T U NIT Y
We are reprinting here the lead editorial from the February, 1963,
issue of WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, the English-language edition of PROBLEMS
OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, authoritative organ of the world communist Move-
ment, edited by an international, CPSU-controlled staff in Prague and
distributed in more than 20 languages and 4 - 500,000 copies among Com-
munist activists in all parts of the world (except China). There is every
reason to consider this article as the official position of the CPSU in
its current controversy with the Chinese and other foreign Communist
Parties, approved at least by the Agitprop Department of the CPSU Central
Secretariat, if not by the Presidium.
We have annotated the reprint with our comments, drawing attention
to the most significant passages of the editorial and pointing out their
weaknesses, contradictions and omissions. Our considered judgment of
the article as a whole can be summarized as follows: The CPSU's stand
in the great controversy is not so much characterized by what this
article says, but by what it does n o t say, by its omissions. Though
Communist writings in general are often couched in broad and vague gen-
eralizations, replete with half-truths, distortions and unproven innuendoes,
one would have expected that an editorial in the most authoritative
publication of the World Communist Movement, addressed to an elite of Com-
munist activists all around the globe, would be hard-hitting, topical,
logically convincing and supported by hard facts and conclusive evidence.
Instead, the article must be cruelly disappointing to Communist
readers, especially to those sympathizing with Khrushchev, as it must
disappoint any outside observer because of its political and intellectual
inadequacy. It e v a d e s all real issues; it does not even clearly
identify the antagonists; it avoids discussing the Yugoslav and Albanian
controversies; it bypasses other points of Chinese criticism -- notably
the accusation that the CPSU has violated the letter and the spirit of
the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960 -- by merely claiming that it is
not so (even though some of these violations, notably in the case of
Yugoslavia, are a matter of indisputable public record). While justly
accusing the (unnamed) Chinese of not offering a positive program, it
does not present any realistic solutions for the controversy, either.
Why should an article, appearing in such an important publication
on an issue of crucial consequence, be written so poorly and incon-
clusively? It would be misleading to assume that the CPSU simply can do
no better: while Khrushchev, personally, is rather a failure either as
a Marxist theoretician or as a writer, he has unquestionably adequate
staffs of theoreticians, writers, propagandists at his beck and call.
Though CPSU propagandists often blunder or perform ineptly, there is no
doubt in our minds that they could do far better than they have done
in this article.
Two other plausible explanations come to mind: either, the article
is a compromise (among contending factions in the Kremlin or between
CPSU and foreign CP representatives on the editorial board in Prague),
resulting in the elimination of all truly "controversial" statements; or,
the CPSU has already abandoned hope of arriving at a genuine reconciliation
with Peking and has produced this article merely as a formal show of its
willingness to "restore unity," putting all the blame on the other side,
while actually preparing to re-impose its hegemony over the World Com-
munist Movement -- possibly abandoning China, Albania, North Korea and a
few others, at least for the time being -- by "non-doctrinal" means,
i.e. on the strength of its far superior military, economic, diplomatic
and organizational resources.
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The present leaders of the CPSU, notably Khrushchev himself, are
caught in a t r a p of their own making. On the one hand, they try to
conduct pragmatic domestic and foreign policies based on the big power
status of the Soviet Union, taking Communism as a foundation to be
accepted and utilized (somewhat as the French played upon the ideals of
the 1789 Revolution until at least 1939), but no longer as a revolutionary
ideal to be fought for. At the same time, however, they try (or, at
least, have tried until now) to maintain their leadership in the World
Communist Movement on the basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrines -- a basis
on which they are obviously wide open to devastating criticism by the
Chinese Communists and all other die-hard Leninist-Stalinists inside
their own Party and throughout the world.
The only safe way out of this dilemma would be to admit frankly that
the Russian revolution has reached its Thermidor, that Marxist-Leninist
doctrines have grown obsolete and to make a realistic, new assessment of
the world today the basis of its own policies and of its relations to
Communists abroad. But neither Khrushchev nor his presumptive heirs and
successors are likely to do just that.
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World
Marxist
Review
Workers of all lands, unite!
English edition of
PROBLEMS OF PEACE
AND SOCIALISM
Published in Prague
VOLUME 6 FEBRUARY 1963 NUMBER 2
Cementing the Unity of the Communist
Movement is Our Internationalist Duty
THE attention of the world Communist movement is now focused on the task
strengthening its unity, cementing the Communist ranks the world over on the basis of
Marxism Leninism and the struggle against imperialism.
The reason for this is that the leaders of some parties disagree with the international Com-
munist movement on cardinal issues of policy. The differences are serious indeed. Some
Party publications have actually called for an ouMght split. This cannot but cause grave
concern to all Marxists-Leninists, to all sincere and consistent champions of social progress.
The Communist and Workers' Parties of the U.S.A., Italy France.. Finland, Britain.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Indonesia Japan, Argentina, Chile and
many other countries have issued statements stressing the urgent need to strengthen the
unity of the world Communist movement.
(Underlining added)
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I
Of late, differences have arisen in regard to vital questions of strategy set forth in the 1957
Declaration and 1960 Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties.
The Parties adhering to the positions of creative Marxism are consistently working, in full
conformity with the Declaration and Statement, for peaceful coexistence since this ensures the
most favourable conditions for revolutionary struggle. But there are also Parties whose
leaders, while recognising the principle of peaceful coexistence, nevertheless accuse the
Parties working for it of having made a deal with the imperialists, of pursuing the wrong line,
of getting together with them.
The Parties which believe in creative Marxism, in conformity with the theses of the
Declaration and Statement that world war can be prevented at the present time, are carrying
out measures aimed at banishing war from the life of society. But the press of certain Parties,
while conceding the possibility of averting world war in our time, claims that the policy of
maintaining peaceful relations with the capitalist camp, the policy pursued by the U.S.S.R.
and other socialist countries, is betrayal of the revolution and repudiation of class positions.
In conformity with the Declaration and Statement, the Parties adhering to creative Marxism
are waging an active struggle for disarmament. But the press of some Parties, while professing
to support disarmament, charges that those who are taking tangible steps towards this
objective are betraying the national-liberation movement and seeking to disarm the peoples
in the face of imperialism.
Guided by Lenin's counsel and the documents of the Moscow meetings concerning the
variety of forms of transition to socialism, the Parties subscribing to creative Marxism are
engaged in extensive theoretical and organisational work to ascertain the forms of transition
best suited to the conditions of each given country. But they are accused of renouncing
Marxism-Leninism, of relinquishing the class struggle, of abandoning socialism, succumbing
to revisionism and seeking conciliation with the bourgeoisie.
Some of the accusers have even gone so far as to forget the supreme duty which no detach-
ment of the revolutionary movement has a right to evade at crucial moments of the class war
with imperialism. In particular this was the case during the Caribbean crisis, when the world,
due to the aggressive policy of the U.S.A., was rapidly drifting towards a nuclear holocaust.
The imperative of the moment was to ensure united action by all peace partisans, and, indeed,
their unity grew hourly. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the combined actions of all
opponents of war, and the heroism of the people of Cuba, peace was upheld and Cuba saved
as a socialist country. But there were also political leaders who, indulging in pseudo-revolu-
tionary phraseology, chose to take a different stand ? they did not sup o t t e efforts to __.__.
V rr . L11V y wl ~~ to avci
war, thus violating the unity of the peoples in the fight for peace.
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Outright attacks were levelled against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its leaders
were accused of revisionism, and cries were raised for their removal. In a word, a blow was
struck at a Party which now bears the main burden of the struggle against imperialism, a
Party which is the rallying centre of all the forces fighting for national independence, peace
democracy and socialism. The blow was aimed also at the Communist Parties of most other
socialist countries which stand united against imperialism.
Attacked too were the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries which are staunchly
combating imperialism and reaction in their citadels and outposts-the U.S.A., Italy, France,
Britain, Spain, Portugal, Greece and other countries.
Nor have the parties in the countries which have recently won or are still fighting for
independence escaped accusations of conciliation with imperialism, their record in combating
imperialism and the blows they are delivering at it notwithstanding.
The critics of the parties adhering to creative Marxism advance no positive programme, no
consistent political line which would really facilitate the practical struggle against imperialism
and ensure tangible gains for the revolutionary movement.
Difficulties are also being created in the international trade union, youth and women's
democratic organisations and in the peace movement, which are being pressed to adopt a line
that would alienate large sections of the population from the democratic movement.
Clearly this is an attitude that may lead to a split in the international Communist
movement.
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To vindicate these disruptive actions a special concept is advanced which alleges that in the
world Communist movement there is a "majority" following a wrong line, and a "minority",
the custodian of true Marxism-Leninism, which in time will become the "majority". A
completely unwarranted analogy is drawn between the situation in the Second International
before the First World War and the present situation in the Communist movement. It is
averred that now as then the majority of the revolutionary working-class parties has taken an
opportunist stand.
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This argument is utterly groundless. That the views of the international Communist move-
ment are correct is proved by the entire experience of the masses, by the current revolutionary
activities of the working class and other progressive forces, by the success registered in build-
ing socialism and communism, and by the struggle against imperialism, for peace and national
and social progress. This experience shows that the Parties dedicated to creative Marxism are
right-not because they are many but because revolutionary practice, the sole criterion of
truth, offers ample proof of the creative nature of their theoretical views, the vitality of their
policy and the effectiveness of their revolutionary action.
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II
Solidarity and unity are in the very nature of the Communist movement. And this move-
ment, having its source in the working class, develops in accordance with inner laws stemming
from the objective position of this class.
To the international alliances of the capitalists of the various countries and their support of
one another the working class counterposes its international solidarity, proletarian inter-
nationalism. The victories won by the working-class movement in recent decades are the
victories not only of the national detachments of the working class and its Parties, but also of
the entire international proletariat. Without proletarian internationalism there can be no
successful struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.
The unity of the Marxist-Leninist Parties is the supreme expression of the unity and soli-
darity of the working class of all countries. This unity has its objective source in the identity
of the class interests of the proletariat and all working people irrespective of country and
nationality. the international Communist movement is the supreme manifestation o
this omunity of interests. Its ranks are cemented by the common ultimate aim of the work-
ing class-the triumph of communism on a world scale. Communists everywhere are also
spiritually at one, sharing as they do a common ideology, Marxism-Leninism. And whatever
the conditions in which they work, all Communists have a common enemy in international
imperialism.
In the course of its growth and in the changing conditions of the struggle the organic unity
of the Communist movement has seen different organisational forms-the communist
International, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, and the
conferences and meetings of representatives of the Communist Parties held from time to time.
But irrespective of the changes in form, unity always has been and remains the inviolable
basic principle of the Communist movement. The strength of the Marxist-Leninist Parties
lies in this unity. There can only be one international Communist movement and one Com-
munist Party in each country, just as there can be only one truth.
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Unity, then, is an inner law of the existence and development of each Communist Party
taken separately and of the world Communist movement as a whole. But unity does not come
about automatically, spontaneously, without effort to overcome difficulties and without
struggle. On the contrary, it is in struggle against all deviations from Marxism-Leninism, in
struggle against splitters of all hues that the unity of the international Communist movement
is shaped.
The national detachments of the working class find themselves in differing objective con-
ditions. There are differences in social structure, national traditions, level of consciousness
and degree of organisation of the masses, different degrees of preparedness for revolutionary
struggle and for building socialism.
It is only natural, therefore, that diverging viewpoints are possible in the Communist
movement.
But it should be said at the outset that these differences are by no means of one and the
same order. There can be different ways of applying the general principles of Marxism-
Leninism in accordance with the conditions of one or another country. This kind of difference
is not only permissible but necessary if Marxists-Leninists are not to become dogmatists and
lose touch with the life of their people. Such differences are inevitable.
Different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and reading different meanings into its
principles are another matter. Differences of this kind, though they spring up on the basis of
the specific objective conditions in which the various detachments of the working-class
movement find themselves, stem exclusively from subjective reasons. They must be reckoned
with, but they cannot essentially affect the perspectives of the movement as a whole unless
they develop into a theoretical and political platform hostile to Marxism-Leninism and harm-
ful to the struggle for socialism on the national as well as the international scale.
Particularly dangerous is a situation when people persistently cling to erroneous concepts,
universalise these concepts and try to impose them on the movement as a whole, and even
take organisational steps of one or another kind, challenging the very principles of proletarian
internationalism, even the principle of the unity of the Communist movement. In these
circumstances diverging viewpoints can grow into political differences.
But even then-and this should be emphasised-the root causes of the differences are of a
subjective order. They originate neither in the nature o the soda st system norm a nature
o the Communist Parties. Consequently, overcoming the disagreements depends above all
on the Communists themselves, on their maturity, their awareness of the duty they owe to the
working class and all humanity. The unity of the Communist movement is built by the
conscious labours of the Parties themselves.
It is more timely than ever to recall the injunction of the Moscow Statement: "It is the
supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist Party to work continuously for
greater unity in the world Communist movement.
"A resolute defence of the unity of the world Communist movement on the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and the prevention of any actions which
may undermine that unity, are a necessary condition for victory in the struggle for national
independence, democracy and peace, for the successful accomplishment of the tasks or the
socialist revolution and of the building of socialism and communism. Violation of these
principles would impair the forces of communism."
Differences in the Communist movement are a source of joy to all the enemies of com-
munism. Indeed, the imperialists openly talk about these differences being "an obstacle to
Communist success" and advantageous to the "free world", i.e., imperialism. The imperial-
ists, naturally, will try to turn them to their own advantage and to deepen them. But the
enemy's hopes must be dashed.
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In view of the tasks confronting the Communist movement, the danger of war and the
ceaseless imperialist intrigues and attacks, it would be a crime against the working people of
the whole world to allow any weakening of Communist unity. Both our contemporaries and
posterity will pass severe judgement on any leader who fails to see this and acts contrary to the
fundamental interests of the working people everywhere.
In the light of its grand goals and the danger presented by its still powerful enemy-
imperialism-the world Communist movement is in duty bound to overcome the differences
and to rally in greater unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. It is not a "majority" and a
"minority" that the Communist movement needs, but the inviolable unity of all Communists,
unity of ideology, strategic line and especially of action.
A particularly grave responsibility for the preservation of unity rests with the Parties of the
socialist countries, which have at their disposal not only ideological means of struggle but
also vast material resources serving the cause of building socialism and communism and
strengthening economic, political and ideological unity among them. The unity of the Com-
munist Parties of these countries is a vital component of the bond cementing both the Com-
munist movement as a whole and the entire contemporary movement of the peoples for
peace, democracy, national independence and socialism.
It is imperative for every Party and every Communist to comprehend the meaning and
necessity of the "international proletarian discipline" for which Lenin called. Lenin said:
"We take pride in the fact that we are solving the momentous issues of the workers' struggle
for emancipation in obedience to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat,
drawing on the experience of the workers of the various countries, taking into account their
knowledge and their will, and thereby building in deeds (and not in words, as the Renners,
Fritz Adlers and Otto Bauers do) the unity of the workers' class struggle for communism
throughout the world." "No class-conscious worker," Lenin wrote, "should stand aloof for a
moment from the international army of the workers".
in
How and in what way are differences to be resolved and unity cemented in the ranks of the
international Communist movement? Lenin helps us to find the answer to this vital question.
"Differences within political parties and between them are usually solved not only through
polemics on points of principle but by the very march of political life," Lenin said in his
Lessons of the Revolution. "In particular, differences concerning Party tactics, i.e., the Party's
political attitude, are often resolved by those in the wrong coming over, in effect, to the
correct path of struggle under the impact of the march of events which simply sweeps aside
the erroneous views, making them pointless and of no interest to anyone. This of course does
not mean that fundamental differences on tactics do not require thorough elucidation, which
alone can maintain a Party on a level with its theoretical convictions. No. It merely means
that it is essential to verify the tactical decisions as often as possible against the latest political
developments. Such a check-up is essential from the standpoint of both theory and practice:
theoretically, in order to ascertain whether the decisions taken are correct and what amend-
ments may have been necessitated y subse uent political events? practically, so as to learn
ow be guided by these decisions, to be able to see them as directives to be applied in
practice."
These ideas of Lenin, brimming with optimism, are a source of inspiration to Communists.
They know that life is the best teacher, that the logic of things, far better than anything else,
helps the working-class movement to discard everything erroneous and obsolete, and that this
is the way the great army of fighters for the working class gathers strength and cements its
unity.
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Every sincere Marxist-Leninist must keep abreast of events and verify his political position
by the pulsebeat of the time. Every Party must see to it that its political line accords with the
dictates of the moment, the tasks posed by life. Along these lines the correct way can be found
for overcoming the differences that have arisen in the international Communist movement.
Lenin pointed out that fundamental differences on political questions require a funda-
mental elucidation. The Parties have always explained to their members and to all working
people the principles of revolutionary policy, showing the need for unity on the basis of
creative Marxism-Leninism, teaching them to recognise the revisionists and dogmatists by
what they say and what they do, to compare their words with their deeds and thereby prepare
themselves to combat all encroachments on the unity of the Communists of all countries.
What distinguishes the Communist Parties from all other parties is that each member is
not only able but is obliged to take an active part in all the affairs of his own Party and of the
entire Communist movement. Violation of this principle in a number of Parties at the time of
the personality cult caused their. grave harm.
But the need to elucidate the theory and policy of the Parties, the need to discuss funda-
mental questions, does not predetermine the form of the discussion. Both the form and
methods of debate (sin
th
di
ce
e
scussion is between people of identical views) should cement,
not disunite the Communist ranks. In examining controversial questions it is essential always
to bear in mind that the debate is between fellow fighters for a common cause, between
Communists, men who have dedicated themselves to realising the aspirations of the working
class. The object in such debates should be to establish the truth, and hence it is necessary to
display tolerance, and respect for each other's viewpoints; subjective assessments should be
avoided, individual leaders or Parties should not be calumnied, and in no circumstances
should views which are alien to it be ascribed to a Party. Only in this way will it be possible to
ascertain where viewpoints coincide and where they differ; only in this way can the differences
be overcome.
Seeking to strengthen unity, the representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany made a number of proposals
aimed at ironing out the differences. The C.P.S.U. proposed that the open controversy
between Parties be ended and mutual recriminations stopped. This was supported by other
Communist Parties.
it is important not to give free rein to passions but soberly to analyse the situation and
find a way out without losing sight for a moment of the best interests of the entire movement,
the best interests of the working class and all progressive humanity.
The Communist Parties have a tried and tested method of solving disputed questions-
joint discussion. There is no doubt that this method will make it possible to rally the inter-
national Communist movement in close unity.
Lenin said: "Discussing questions, expressing and listening to different views, ascertaining
the opinion of the majority of organised Marxists, expressing this opinion in a decision bind-
ing on an conscientious y carrying out t is decision-this is what all clear-thinking
people everywhere in the world call unity."
It is generally agreed that this should be the purpose of the conference of Communist and
Workers' Parties which all the fraternal Parties reel shoul , But conference is thoroughly vu11vci1 u. 0 unless such a
prepared it can only aggravate the differences. Therefore, prepara-
tory work conducted without undue haste or heated controversy is essential to ensure that a
meeting of this kind will fulfil the purpose of greater unity.
The world Communist movement is a community of Parties. Here no Party is subordinated
to another. But no one will deny that in this single Communist community each Party is
obliged to respect the opinions of the others, to hearken to them, all the more so if these are
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the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the Parties whose strategy and tactics in regard
to the fundamental problems of the revolutionary struggle are the fruit of the experience of
decades. Communists everywhere, all Communist Parties, are entitled to insist-and indeed
do insist-on every individual in their ranks acting in the spirit of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, in the spirit of the unity of the entire movement, remembering that he who does
not do so places himself outside the ranks of the international army of Communists.
The unity of the Communist movement can be strengthened only by strict adherence to
Marxist-Leninist principles. And this involves not only adhering to the positions of creative
Marxism but giving all one's energies to the realisation of its principles. Only by "taking
into account first and foremost the basic distinctive features of different `epochs' . . . will we
be able to elaborate the correct tactics", Lenin said.
All the Communist Parties proceed from the basic premise that no unity is possible in the
world Communist movement except within the framework of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism as set forth in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement and subscribed to by all
the Communist Parties. It is of particular importance to strengthen the unity of Communist
will and action along the following lines:
active struggle everywhere, not in words but in deeds, to prevent world war, since this is
indispensable to continued progress in the socialist countries, to success in the struggle
for democracy and socialism the world over, and to victory in the national-liberation
revolutions;
strict adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence as the most expedient form of class
struggle on the international scale;
mastery of all means of struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution, including the
utilisation of opportunities for a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.
Implementation of these principles makes it incumbent on every Party and on the Com-
munist movement as a whole to wage a ceaseless struggle against revisionism and dogmatism,
as pointed out in the Declaration and Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties. No
one can call himself a creative Marxist who denies the existence of the new features of our
time. And if one recognises these new features one cannot but see that this new epoch
necessitates a new political line, a new strategic concept of the international revolutionary
movement. One cannot agree in words with some aspects of this new strategic concept and in
deeds depart from it in the basic respects, narrowing down the possibilities for struggle against
imperialism.
r
For the Communists in all countries the main thing has always been, regardless of contro-
versies and differences, their principal duty, the duty to fight, each in his own area of actin,
for the common cause, to exert every effort to meet their international responsibilities.This is
indispensable to genuine unity among the Communists and all working people everywhere,
to unity in the struggle for common goals.
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It would be a grave error-and one on which the imperialists are no doubt counting--for
the Communists to allow themselves to be diverted by disagreements from the most important
thing, from the struggle against imperialism, for national independence, for peace, demo-
cracy and socialism. The main enemy is international imperialism. And it is the guiding rule
for all Communists never to relax pressure against its positions, to hit ever harder, always
standing together in the common struggle. Guided by this rule, the Communists in the
socia ist countries are steadily building up their economy and culture, pursuing a foreign
policy of peace, yet ever watchful of the intrigues of imperialism, reinforcing the defences of
their countries, cementing the unity of the socialist camp and solidarity with the working
people of the capitalist world and with the peoples fighting against colonialism. The Com-
munists in the capitalist countries are redoubling their struggle for peace, democracy, for the
triumph of the socialist revolution; they are successfully building the unity of the working
people. The Communists and the masses generally in the countries which have won national
independence or are still fighting for independent statehood are increasing the pressure on the
colonialists, fighting for radical democratic changes, to overcome backwardness and to
launch out on the path of genuine progress.
The cause, the struggle for the cause, must come first. In this struggle we acquire valuable
experience which provides the criteria for verifying our positions. We shall not allow our
historical offensive against the positions of the old society to lose momentum. We shall
imbue our ranks with that feeling of teamwork, solidarity and mutual support which is a
prerequisite and a condition of unity.
The unity of the world Communist movement is shaped and consolidated in joint struggle
against the common enemy, in struggle for the common goal under one banner-the banner
of Marx and Lenin.
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