BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 11, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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4= I-
BI -WEEKIjY
PROPA6AN-DA G[IDANCE
NUMBER : 109
/ d
DATE : 11 ebruaVY 19,
Central Propaganda Directive 7
Briefly Noted
Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes
Basic Communist Failings
European Integration--
Temporary Check
Significant Shortages in
Soviet Agriculture
Captured Viet Cong Document
Admits Communist Weaknesses
Why the United States Will
Defend Europe
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". 11 February 1963
W
25X1C10b
Briefly Noted
The Cuban Crisis Through RED Glasses
In reviewing the Cuban crisis, the New York Times of 28 January
(Western edition) noted:
"Last Oct. 29--just one week after President Kennedy
had confronted Khrushchev on the Cuban issue -"Pra-cla
headlined its page ona-'Guarantee Peace and Secu iYy 7f
the Peoples.'
"That headline stated the theme of the Russian inter-
pretation of the Cuban affair: That by protecting Cuba
from American invasion, Khrushchevhad averted world-
wide atomic war. The theme has been hammered home
since in speeches, editorials and diplomatic exchanges...."
Seen through RED glasses, Khrushchev is the "Prince of Peace,"
not the perpetrator of the crime that caused the crisis. The heaviest
guns of the Communist propaganda machine have been employed to re-
write history. There is an obvious need to establish the facts, to
counteract Communist propaganda and to insure an accurate historical
record of the Cuban crisis.
To serve this objective, three unclassified attachments are pro-
vided: First, "c~'ho is the Prince of Peace ?" which io a brief state-
ment of how propaganda alters the fL c:ts (marked "Not for
Verbatim Publicat: on," F_xnple variations--adapt. tioi: to each local
audience plus paraphrasia _ are all that will. be nze= pied to use it);
second, an article from T e New Republic w1i.ch gives "chapter and
verse" of the Con muniti-,! r^Paganda line; and "The 'Prince of
Peace' Story for the Soviet .P~.ople," ' a eoUecti.on of statements from
a Look magazine story of I8 December 1962 which the Kremlin re-
move when it reprinted an abridged version of "154 Hours on the
tin.. of War" in its 5 January 1963 issue of Za Rubezhom, in an effort
to make it appear that US writers were affirrnir~ that: the US was the
aggressor rather than the Soviet Union (it is possible that USIA may
send this collection of quotations to its post4.
a.;,Y `Wati on >mong pove rty-
stric?-.e . -rd-..wr, ary .r.ts 13 r.utrr .~ Ia or,.., ?.c. i i ", Mexico and
poses a threat to the nations economic and poli':zcal, scc. uri:;y.
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) 11 February 1963
Mexico's 48-year-old land reform program has won the praise of
many. President Lopez Mateos has distributed 24 million acres to
peasants in four years compared with 96 million acres by former ad-
ministrations over the previous 44 years. But graft, corruption, and
bureaucracy take their toll and Mexico's new land owner usually lacks
the know-how and finances to fully utilize his land. Rising birth rates
and dwindling income contribute to the peasant's problems.
Communist agitators have seized upon these conditions to foment
unrest and incite violence. Squatters brigades have invaded big .
ranches and farms; pitched battles with federal troops, rioting and
violence have occurred in a few cases. Communists formed an Inde-
pendent Campesina Central (CCI) claiming membership of one million.
COI's leaders claim their objective is to exert pressure for faster
and bigger land distribution. At the organization meeting, former
President Lazaro Cardenas praised Cuba's agrarian program as a
model. In an attempt to curb growing unrest, President Lopez Mateos
has promised to increase the pace of his program and break up every
large private ranch and farm within two years. (See Press Comment,
especially 5 February issue, for details:)
Developments in Mexico underscore the importance of the funda-
mental objective of the Alliance for Progress--"to bring our people
accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the
framework of personal dignity and political liberty"--and its specific
land-reform goals. Communist exploitation of weak spots in Mexico--
with its widely-praised, long-term land reform efforts--sounds a
25X1 C10b special warning for Mexico's neighbors.
Translations of ONE DAY OF WAN DENISOVICH Published
Translations are now appearing of the first Soviet-published
novel on Stalin's prison camps, ONE DAY OF WAN DENISOVICH
(See Guidance #614d). This book is now available in two American
editions, one published by Frederick Praeger and one by E. P.
Dutton. Victor Gollancz is publishing; a Dritish edition, it is ex-
pected that there will shortly be a Japanese edition, and other
editions will probably follow. The London Observer printed brief
excerpts, shortly after the novel, fixsCZ?~ame out m ov * Mir (see
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(Briefly Noted) " '`' r " rMN 11 February 1963
Press Comment, 10 December 1962). and the Saturday Evening Post
has pu i a onger excerpts in its 9 February issue.
The fact that there are two American editions of the same book
(the first such duplication since MEIN KAMPF was published in
translation in the 1930's) might furnish additional reason for editorial
and literary commentary. The Praeger translation is by Max Hayward
and Ronald Hingley, and appears to be far superior in style. The
Dutton translation is by Ralph Parker, a Moscow correspondent of the
London Daily Worker who in 1949 wrote a book of Stalinist propaganda,
CONSPIRACY X =ST PEACE. Parker does not seem to have
omitted any details from his translation (after all, the story was first
published with Khrushehevts blessing), and Harrison Salisbury even
maintains that Parker's translation is more accurate. But perhaps be-
cause of his long residence in the USSR, Parker uses outdated slang,
and his sentences lack strength, clarity, and fluency. The Dutton /
Parker translation (which is also used by Gollancz) is authorized by the
Soviet government, and the Soviets are themselves publishing it in the
periodical Soviet Literature No. 3, 1963: this version is also in the
process of appearing serially in the Moscow News.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn's ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH not
only reveals conditions in the camps, but also provides a surprisingly
frank picture of the corruption and wirepull}ng which still take place
throughout Soviet society. We recommend stressing this latter aspect
in our output. The discussion of this book also provides an occasion
for calling attention to other books on Soviet prisons and camps, some
of which (e. g. Krasnov and Weissberg) are superior in their account
of camp and-prison conditions. A list of some of these books is con-
tained in an attachment.
Border Conflict Costs the CPI Its Local Fronts
On 22 December 1962 Thought magazine, published in New Delhi,
reported in an article entitmradely Woes" Tee Press Comment
of 24 January 19651 that the Sino-Indian border conflict as created
serious difficulties for the Communist Party of India (CPI). The fairly
lengthy article, among other things, elaborates on the following develop-
ments in the local fronts: The India-China Friendship Association has
become extinct; the Indian branch of the World Peace Council has been
indiscreetly silent for some time with some of its supporters turning
their backs on the WPC and others repudiating it; the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee has collapsed ("its foundations gave way burying
the organization as well as its leaders under its moral debris"); the
All-India Trade Union Congress, the oldest and most organized front,
shows signs of waning influence over the Indian proletariat; the All
India Progressive Writers Association seems to have lost its direction--
some of its members have even appealed to the WPC to condemn China
for its perfidy.
The article points out that while some of the in ernational fronts,
such as the women's (WIDF), the teachers, (FISE), the lawyers
(IADL) , and the journalists (IOJ), never enjoyed a mass base in India,
they did provide a useful bait to draw in unsuspecting and apolitical
persons and non-Communist socialists.
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(Briefly NotedCont. )-?; February 1963
With the weakening, if not disappearance, of the "transmission
belts, " the article points out the CPI is finding it difficult not only to
recruit new cadres but also to act as the eyes and ears of Moscow.
However, the article also cautions that the CPI may be able to stage
a comeback, particularly on the trade union front and that Communist
"nationalists" ("Dange-ites") are facing tough opposition, particularly
in Bengal, from pro-Peking leaders, whether arrested or gone under-
ground.
Special Notice
CHICOM POLEMICAL BOOKLET
The Common Enemy
Available on Direct Order from Peking
Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose the Common Enemy
Foreign Language Press, The State Bookstore
Guozi Shudian, P. O. Box 399, Peking
People's Republic of China
The People's Republic of China (CPR) is publishing a
booklet containing its three recent and most outspoken
papers on its ideological dispute with the Soviet Bloc,
namely: "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti
and Us, It the editorial of December 31, 1962 which
marked a new phase in the dispute; the People's Dail
editorial of December 15, 1962 whose title is use or
the brochure; and "Leninism and Modern Revisionism,"
published in the first 1963 issue (January 14) of Red Flag.
The booklet, according to CPR announcements via radio
to Moscow and in its home service rat is presumed that
broadcasts have also been made to 9EA in English and
that periodicals will carry notices, in addition to the fact
that the CPR will itself mail, copies abroad"], may be
ordered by mail from the above address (apparently
without charge).
The announcement said it will be published in the following
foreign languages: Russian and English, to be followed by
French, Spanish, Japanese and Esperanto. The three
articles are also being published separately in the above
languages as well as in German, Vietnamese and Arabic.
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5 March 211D cemlbeers 18ary of 7 9 to the 5 arcdeath 1of S 953) A L I
14 March Eightieth anniversary of the death of KARL MAR X
(1818. 1883)
28-30 March W de Janeiro,, cuCuban rrently scheduled for 2$ 30 March 1963
Rio
1 April Fifteenth anniversary of beginning of BERLIN BLOCKADE
(1948)
11 April International Day of Liberation from sponsored Fascis y by
(or Day of Remembrance) the Communist Front: International Federation
of Resistance Fighters (FIR).
17 April Birthda of N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR
ounc of Ministers, First Sect'etary of the CPSU
Central Committee (1894)
24 April World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for
Peaceful Coexistence (Communist)
April Twentieth Anniversary of Germans' discovery of
the Communist KATYN massacre
April Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, currently scheduled
for Indonesia in April 1963 (see DIR 12399 dated
22 January 1963 to Stations of participating nations at
preparatory conference held in Djakarta in February).
14 May Warsaw Pact, 20-year mutual defense treaty signed at
arsaw y FSSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and East Germany, in 1955.
5
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February 1963
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6 W ,,b. Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings
BACKGROUND:
"A people commits suicide the clay on which
it bases its existence on a single crop. "
--Jose Marti, 1883.
Capitalizing on its good soil, warm climate and considerable
moisture, Cuba has, in the past, produced sugar more cheaply than
any other country and has been the largest producer and exporter of
sugar in the world. But Cuba's production today is falling far short
of pre-revolution days. Since the Cuban regime's agrarian policy
the only element which has changed, now conforms to the classic pat-
tern of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, the plight of
Cuba's important sugar industry is testimony to the shortcomings of
that system. The details may be found in Cuba's own admissions (s ee
the unclassified attachment, "Fact Sheet on Cuba's Suga:r Industry").
The highlights are summarized below.
ThePoolicy. When a developing Communist movement needs the
supporter the peasants, "land for the landless" is its battle cry (see
the Briefly Noted item, "Communists Exploit Peasant Unrest in Mexico").
Once the movement gains power, a token distribution of land is made by
the new regime. Later, after a period of consolidation, the regime
reneges on its promises and takes the land for itself. This Communist.
pattern is exactly what happened in Cuba (see Guidance Item 592,
"Cuba: B evolution Betrayed"),
Under Cuba's so-callad Agrarian Reform Law of 1959, some
large estates were divided and small parcels distributed to peasants.
Small land owners held 57 per cent of the land before the revolution;
after Castro's promised "land reform, " they showed a gain of two per
cent, The remaining 41 per cent of Cuba's land was organized Tn of co-
operatives and a few state farms. Then came the third decree of Com-
munist agrarian "reform"--conversion to state or so-called "people's"
farms. "The people's farm is like. a factory, " Instead of becoming
land owners as Castro had promised, the peasants are simply wage
earners.
EmulatinLwother Communist comrades, Cuba's radicals preached
"overnight" industrialization and "great leap forwards" in mechaniza-
tion. These advances coupled with diversification of agriculture would
free the nation from sugar--a seasonal one-crop economy dependent
upon foreign markets. Thousands of peasants were organized into mili-
tary and militia units; parades and meetings consumed much of the
working day and lengthy speeches and "educational" courses the nights;
peasants flocked to the cities to get the rewards of their revolution,
many seeking employment as replacements for the professionals and
skilled workers who fled Cuba in large numbers. The net result was
neglect and even abandonment of the cane fields--largest income-
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(621.gnt.) t. '""' 11 February 1963
note of alarm was sounded as sugar production dropped more
tan 30 per cent below previous norms, Cuba was unable to m et . pn-
itmentq to CommunistrBloc nations, much less gain needed fpreigu,
pr.chanCv, through sales to other nations, The director of the agar
industry declared in August 1962;
" .veryone is well aware of the discargani ation, .. and
the loss of conscience regarding the need tq produce cane,
owing to the policy carried out by the Agrarian Reform
Institute... , there is total disorganization and apathy with
respect to cane production, and this is sharply reflected
in the present harvegt, , . * the policy of .ban,c tning cane iq
also beginning tp spread.
"In view of this situation, we consider that the
revolutionary government should take steps without
delay to increase 1963 production. "
Suddenly, sugar became the nationts number one crop again and
all-out efforts were ordered ~o increase production. New planting goals
were set, but the regime had an inkling of the troubles to come when
only 80 per cent of the planting goals were achieved. "Sugar cane, "
declared Ernesto "Che" Guevara., "must be the center of our work in
the years to come, " The major task was one of undoing the damage
the regime had already done,
The Or anization. In typical Communist style, committee was
piled on committee in a bureaucratic form that finally prompted the
leaders tp deplore the piles of paper that delayed action and the workers
to protest that meetings, rallies, parades and other devices designed
to stimulate enthusiasm were sapping their strength and actually in-
terfering with production.
A super-committee was named to mobilize the 1963 sugar luir-
vest, The biggest problem: lack of manpower. First it was announced
that 95, 000 workers would be needed, This was later scaled down to
50, 000 supplementary workers. Volunteers were called for--preferably
those with experience. "Permanent" volunteers were solicited. Finally
in desperation, the nationts unions were given quotas of "permanent
volunteer" workers they w ere responsible, for delivering to the can,,
fi .~ L!s.'
Emulating the "down-to-the-countryside"drives of Communist
China and other Red models, leaders of the regime set an example for
professionals and others lacking cane-cutting experience by volunteer-
ing for weekend duty. But this drew a cry and at least one provincial
official pleaded "Volunteer workers should know something about_-a the
work. "
'Substitute and make-shift incentives were decreed to overcome
the workerst apathy. First, wages were raised, but the $2. 50 per day
average for a cane cutter still fell short of the $5 or $6 figure of pro-
Castro days. Work "norms" or quotas were set for lndiyiduals and
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(621. Cont.)
groups; "glorious worker" awards were announced; competition was
encouraged; extra food rations were authorized; strict discipline was
enforced, restrictions placed on movement from one job to another,
and controls put on sick leave and absenteeism. Rallies and exhorta-
tions became the order of the day. .
The W or'~_er s. How to meet the labor shortage ? The Red hand-
ook sayM' mc;et`-,`Hgs, havt g: discussions, organizing our work, setting
goals, " etc. The Cuban regime tried them all and still fell short. More
than one labor official complained of the endless chain of speeches,
meetings, rallies, parades, etc. So how did the regime launch their
"volunteer" brigade into the cane fields in January 1963? With a rally
and a parade.
But shortages of food, shoes, transportation and other essentials
plus`` the effect of the regime's shifting policy from "we're no longer
slaves of cane" to "everyone must work in the cane fields" and the ab-
sence of real incentives began to show in poor work in the cane fields.
Officials were especially critical of the young workers whom they had
counted upon to be the vanguard of the 1963 sugar harvest. Retired
cane workers were drafted and there were reports of attempts to import
experienced workers.
The Machines. Critical shortages of skilled mechanics as well
as vital lubricants, spare parts and experienced managers affected the
machinery of agriculture and industry. When the regime confiscated
the sugar mills, skilled management, trained workers and expert me-
chanics wee replaced with "trusted revolutionaries." But the sugar
mills began to break down and some even were dismantled and "canni-
balized" in order to keep others running.
The regime announced it would overcome the labor shortage by
developing machines to do the cane harvesting. Cuba's official news
agency told audiences outside of Cuba that 1, 000 cane-cutting machines
and 500 cane-lifting machines were at work. These were the totals
promised for delivery by 30 December 1962. But the people inside Cuba
had been told by "Chef' Guevara that the promise had not been kept and
could not be kept. Reports of students assembling machines belied their
presence in the fields; reports of problems and difficulties in operating
the machines belied their effectiveness.
Use of the make-shift machines actually caused. greater work.
Laborers had to clear areas for the machine to work. Mechanization
requires, for example : better roads, gas and oil; cane washers and
other extra efforts at the mills to remove dirt and rocks which the in-
human machines picked up with the cane; trained operators and more
mechanics--all in addition to the time and considerable expense of
creating the machines in the first place. And above all, machines could
not cure the fundamental problem of several years of neglect of the cane
fields and the lag in utilizing better varieties of cane, improved fertili-
zers and insecticides, etc.
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(62L font.
Cuba's efforts to mechanize stimulated comparisons with the
ill-fated back-yard furnaces of Communist China--the frantic program
to establish that "no home is complete without one" and the complete
abandonment of the effort when it proved costly and utterly useless.
The Protection. While the lagging spirit of the workers gives
a clue to their enthusiasm for the regime and its efforts, the picture
becomes clearer when one considers the several appeals to protect the
sugar harvest. "Strict discipline" was ordered and special efforts made
to prevent fires "be they instigated by counterrevolutionaries or the
bad revolutionaries. " The military and militia were ordered on duty
And in some areas special "watch" committees were organized to pro-
vide 24-hour guards for the cane fields.
Again, we see the Communist pattern of propaganda that the
regime enjoys total and complete support of all the people coupled with
extensive measures to guard against sabotage, to organize and control
the people, to maintain larger-than-necessary military establishments,
to recruit militia throughout the countryside, etc.
The R e salts. And what are the results of Cubat s "enlightened
socialist" program--its emulation of the Soviet Communist model?
Cuba's officials admit the 1963 sugar harvest faces difficulties. While
no official target figure has been announced, one sugar boss said in
August 1962 that the maximum harvest would be 5, 350, 000 metric tons.
This is less than the 1962 goal, which makes it more realistic, but it is
still an optimistic estimate since the actual 1962 harvest was only
4, 800, 000 metric t'-ns. The latter figure was achieved, as was the
1961 harvest, by employing more land than had ever been devoted to
sugar cane before. By comparison, pre-Castro production ran as high
as nearly 6, 000, 000 metric tons.
Reports of some areas lagging behind even the reduced accom-
plishments of 1962, of some mills not working to capacity, of admitted
shortages of labor, skilled mechanics, transportation, etc. , give cre-
dence to some estimates that the 1963 harvest will be lucky to top
4, 000, 000 tons.
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11 February 1963
6Z3 FE, b. Si nificant Shortages in Soviet Agriculture
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BACKGROUND: Preliminary examination of Soviet agricultural
output for t M year 2, making due allowances for the usual Soviet
overestimation--for example--of grain production, shows that produc-
tion has fallen to about the level of 195$_. This fall becomes a signifi-
cant factor in an economy whose agricultural production is alreacy tt.Do
low, in view of the seven per cent increase in population in the preced-
ing fc;ux years, and the failure to fulfill the projected increase in pro-
duction estimated in economic plans. The most striking shortage was
in the production of potatoes--which is staple in the diet and an impor-
tant livestock feed in northern European USSR (Byelorussia, the Baltic
Republics, and the Central, Volga-Vyatsk and Northwest regions of
the RSFSR).
Production of potatoes for 1962, according to preliminary esti-
matcs, was 68.8 million tons--the lowest since 1950, the earliest year
for which postwar statistics are available. (See Annex attached: "Pro-
duction of Potatoes in the USSR, 1950-1962. ") Some 18 million tons of
the 1962 potato crop will have to be set aside for seed, leaving 50. 8
million tons for food, feed, waste and industrial use, which constitutes
slightly more than two-thirds of the quantity available for these uses
during the past six years. If, moreover, normal deductions are made
for waste and industrial use, only about 41. 8 million tons will be avail-
able for use as forxl and feed in the 1962/1963 consumption year. In
contrast with this, 55 million tons were consumed for food and feed
alone during the 1961/1962 consumption year. The prospects for the
1963 crop outlook are worsened by the fact that: (a) growing, and har-
vesting conditions in 1962 apparently reduced the quality of the crop--
potatoes recently seen in the Moscow market reportedly are the poorest
in years; (b) Europe has not yet emerged from what has been the coldest
winter in many years.
Plenum speeches by Communist Party leaders, both in the Byelo-
russian and the Baltic Republics, further indicate the seriousness with
which the general agricultural outlook is regarded at least in the north-
ern European USSR. Crops were ruined because of flooding on 30 per
cent of the seeded area of Byelorussia and there have been similar losses
in the Baltic Republics. Communist Party leaders go s^ far (following
the Communist Chinese pattern) as to describe the harshness of the
weather in the Baltic area as similar to the terrible year 1928--"variously
described. by them as a year of famine, starvation and unbelievable dif-
ficulties for the bourgeois peasantry. They hastened to add that in 1962,
under socialism, these difficulties have been overcome, omitting the
mention of what specific remedies have been undertaken to alleviate
the situation--and also not mentioning the fact that the Baltic States did
recover from the calamitous crop-year of 1928 as independent countrl s,
being spared the incredible horrors of Stalin's post-1928, anti-kulak,
vicious war upon the Soviet peasantry.
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(623. Cont.) lebruary 1963
During the last two years (1961-1962) there have been a number
of reports of civilian unrest in the USSR--riots in the Novocherkassk
(near Rostov) and Grozny areas; refusal of Soviet dockworkers to load
butter o-'-:.ships bound for Cuba; labor troubles in Kemerovo--to name
the most prominent. Some of these disturbances appear to have been
associated with consumer dissatisfaction--for example, with the retail
price increase in livestock products in June 1962, which almost cer-
tainly was an important factor in triggering the Novocherkassk riots.
It should b-- noted, however, that consumer dissatisfaction is the result
of a number of factors, and it is extremely difficult (and perhaps unwise)
to try to measure precisely any one of them. But it does seem to be
true that elements of discontent in the USSR --other than unhappiness
with the Communist regime per se--may be foreseen for the period
between now and next summer, particularly in a densely populated area
such as northern European USSR which contains about 27 per cent of
the population of the entire country. All this will be a source of con-
tinuing discontent during the next few months at least unless the regime
is prepared to: transfer food and feed from surplus areas (if any) to
those where the shortages occur; draw upon such reserves as it can find;
reduce its food exports; and/or (again after the pattern established by
the Chinese Communists) appeal to the free world to come to its rescue.
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624 AF, FE, NF, WH. Captured Viet Cong Document Admits Communist
Vl ca kn z s s e s
BACKGROUND: A Viet Cong /ommunist guerrillas in South
Vietnamlocument dated September 1962, recently captured, reapprai ses
politicaTand military strategy, reports on progress made over the past
year and outlines the tasks ahead. Designed to exhort the guerrilla
fighter to greater efforts in a somewhat deteriorating situation, the
document explains past mistakes and future difficulties but gives assur-
ances of ultimate victory. The certainty of Communist victory in this
or any "popular revolutionary movement" or "just"war is based on the
doctrine of historic inevitability, despite the Vict Cong's own warning
of previously unexpected military difficulties and their tacit admission
of vulnerability, i. e. , "It is only by isolating us that the enemy may
have hope; s of destroying us. 11
The Viet Cong leadership admits to significant miscalculation
in their 1961 appraisal, saying "... we underestimated the U. S. capacity
for intervention and underestimated the enemy... the idea of a prolonged
struggle full of hardships was not thoroughly understood... " mphasis
added. The document expresses equal surprise at the previaus mis-
calculation as to the popular nature of the strong Vietnamese resistance
to the Viet Cong, as follows:
'1 *the people's struggles for their essential rights were
not intensified as they should have been to oppose more force-
fully the reactionary policies of the enemy /L? c.,, the Govern-
ment of Vietnam7 .... The movement was still weak and slow;
particularly in contended areas, in those under enemy control,
and in cities.
Turning to the political tactics of the struggle, the document
predicts that
..the enemy may 8 et bogged clown and be compelled
to negotiate and compromise... the result may be a situa-
tion like that of Laos... the present situation in Laos is a
very important transitional step for the Lao revolution...
Now we are fighting /n South Vietnam`/ and at the same time
demanding the formation of a coalition government; and de-
manding peace and neutrality... and to persuade peace seekers
in the very ranks of the enemy.
The success of the strategic hamlet plan, put into effect within
the year by the South Vietnamese government, is evidenced by the plans
for :sabotaging and weakening the hamlets and by the statement that
, our counteraction of the encm ' 1an-95- of s;tratc ie hamlets
.. w~ a most important strug o carri ?u .... by
Political and military forces, and b different branches of
the party..-.. mphasis in original
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l February 1963
(624. Cont.) "
Examples of Communist Aression, Subversion and Miscalcula-
tions. Communist aggression and subversion have been exposed and
documented in many countries besides Vietnam. The most recent and
potentially most dangerous aggression, and one involving serious mis-
calculation, was Khru.shchevis failure to anticipate Americas: - will and
ability to rid the "ATestern Hemisphere of the Soviet aggressive military
threat in Cuba. Going backward through time, the following attempts,
among others, at subversion and aggression can be listed:
in 1961 the Soviet Union, eager to believe that Guinea was nearly
in the 'ommunist bag, encouraged teachers' demonstrations in which
Soviet citizens were implicated, and President Toure expelled the
Soviet Ambassador for attempts to overthrow his regime.
In 1960, Soviet officials were expelled from the Congo after show-
ing, by many crude activities, that they were too eager to operate in
Leopoldville where Soviet bloc arms were subsequently uncovered by
Congoles officers.
As early as 1948 (the subversion and aggression in the takeover
of all East Europe were completed by this date) Stalin failed to take con-
trol of 'Test Berlin in the infamous blockade to which French, British
and American allies responded so vigorously.
In the Philippines the guy urrilla harassed the government and
the people from their mountain strongholds for several years following
the close of the war, but their military effectiveness and popular appeal
were destroyed.
Communist insurgents fought in Malayan jungles for 12 bloody
years but failed to take over the government- --defeated by Malayan-
British military cooperation and by lack of a popular uprising to sup-
port them.
Similar attempts at subversion and aggression by indigenous
Communists, supported by established Communist governments, are
being carried on in every continent on the globe. The captured Viet
Cong document, but one evidence of the military and political tactics
currently being pursued, serves as an example of general Communist
strategy to subvert the world.
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1 February 1963
625 W:,EF. Why the United States Will Defend Europe.
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Certain Europeans have said that the United
States would hesitate and even fail to defend its NATO allies from Soviet
attack; if the Soviets attacked, so the argument runs, the US would bow
out in order to avert a Soviet nuclear attack on its own territory. Some
of those who express this idea seem positively anxious to remove US
influence from European affairs. For reasons of his own, General
de Gaulle acts in a way cal culated to produce just such a withdrawal.
Yet the withdrawal will occur only if all European governments (presum-
ably in some sudden wave of anti-American feeling) ask for it. As long
as most of these governm nts desire US support, it can be assumed that
the US will remain at the side of its allies, for the following reasons:
Historic. The white population of the United States (90% of the
total) is descended from European ancestors, or from natives of such
countries as Turkey and Armenia. By language, the United States in-
herits a share in one of the major European cultures, that of the British
Isles, but although that culture has contributed more than any other,
America is not "Anglo-Saxon, " i.e. anglicized. Large numbers of
German, Scandinavian, Dutch, Polish, Hungarian, Italian, Russian,
Greek, and other immigrants have added their own national contributions.
France sent fewer immigrants, but France made possible American in-
dependence, and Paris has been described as the place where good
Americans go when they die. Everywhere in Europe, one finds families
with American relatives or individuals with American friends. Americans
eat European-style food, wearuropean- style clothes, read many
European books, and often listen to European music. European culture
has now probably penetrated more thoroughly than ever, thanks to the
exposure of many American soldiers and travellers, and to the relaxa-
tion in US tariffs. It is partly because they themselves have fused the
various European cultures that Americans regard a united Europe as
logical and inevitable.
Because America was remote from Europe in the days of horse
and sail, Washington urged his countrymen to abstain from European
alliances and European problems. But while they tried for over a cen-
tury to follow his advice, the Americans were guarded by the British
Navy, and British policy served American interests as well as British
by supporting a balance of power in Europe. After 1914, isolation lost
its reality, though politicians and newspapers still found it a profitable
rallying cry, especially since it was naively expected to keep the US
out of war. Witting and unwitting German propagandists tried to use
isolation to keep Am. rica-irom opposing Germany. But America acted
to tip the balance against G-!rmany in both world wars, ultimately be-
cause authoritarian leaders controlling European industry and an aggres-
sive military machine could have dictated to the rest of the world.
Despite isolationism, Americans have never been able to remain wholly
aloof from European affairs, and they have been involved in hostilities
- T (625. Continued)
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(625. Cont,) ~+?+ .l February 1963
in every major world conflict since the War of the Spanish Succession
(1701-1713). Since the conversion of Senator Vandenberg to bipartisan
foreign policy in 1947, isolationism in its older sense has ceased to
be even a serious dream in the American mind.
Economic. Economic and financial relations are not decisive
in deciding such questions as whether to react to a military threat.
But they help to establish the atmosphere in which such decisions will
be made. Countries which trade heavily together tend to remain
friendly despite political frictions, and vice versa.
Europeans who think of the US as far off probably pay little at-
tention to trade. Actually, US exports to western Europe increased
from $4. 5 billion in 1958 to $6. 3 billion in 1961; imports from Europe
went from $3. 3 billion to $4. 0 billion. ('mss contrast of exports and
imports might suggest an "unfavorable balance of trade" for Europe;
actually payments were balanced by "invisible imports, " especially
US payments supporting NATO forces in Europe). We hear much talk
about overseas agriculture, but the bulk of world trade takes place
between developed capitalist countries; regrettably, the share of less
developed nations in world exports fell from 31. 5% in 1953 to 24. 7% in
1960.
Non-military US government aid (grants and credits) for Euro-
pean recovery totalled $25 billion from July 1945 to March 1961. Of
this, $6. 7 billion went to the United Kingdom, $5. 3 billion to France,
$3.7 billion to West Germany, $3 billion to Italy, $966 million to the
Netherlands, and $703 million to. Belgium. Europeans should regard
these sums, not as something for which they must forever carry a
burden of gratitude, but as a practical yardstick with which to gauge
the American interest in a free and prosperous Europe.
Military- Technical. Historically-minded anti- "Anglo-Saxon"
Europeans are influenced by the memory of the opening stages of the
two world wars. In 1914, the British at first only mobilized four divi-
sions to share in the defense against five major German Armies, and
American troops only began serious fighting in the spring of 1918, one
year after America's entry in the war. Similarly, it is recalled that
in 1940 the small BEF was cut off and pushed into the sea, and that the
British and Americans returned to Italy only in 1943 and to France in
1944. These recollections tend to pass over the contribution of the British
and Americans to final victory, especially that of the British in the
first war, but that of both in the second. In any case, whatever justice
there may be in the historic reproach of tardy assistance, it could not
be levelled at the US today. There are now 400, 000 US servicemen in
Western ;C~urope, mainly in West Germany. These include six infantry
divisions, and equipment for two other divisions whose men could be
flown in; none of these forces was diverted from Europe during the
Cuban crisis. The West German services themselves now muster
450, 000 men, 12 divisions. France has only two divisions of her army
remaining committed to NATO. American medium range missiles in
some countries are being replaced by Polaris submarines, but this
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(625. Cont. W February 1963
replacement serves to increase over-all NATO defense power, to make
it less vulnerable, and to offer less encouragement to hostile attack on
populous areas.
If a Soviet attack is to take place, two possibilities present them-
a. Counting on p. numerical superiority, the Soviets
might launch a heavy conventional attack, most likely in
Germany. In this case, the presence of US and British
troops in Germany, organizationally integrated under
NATO with German Federal Republic forces, ensures
that the US and Britain will be involved. American lives
would be among the first lost. If the Soviet forces could
not be halted by conventional m bans--and surely it is in
:Europe's interest to avoid nuclear warfare if possible--
tactical nuclear weapons already on hand in Europe
could be used to fire small-scale nuclear warheads.
If these also failed to halt the Soviet advance, ICBM's
and strategic aircraft could be called in. American
doctrine is based on ability to meet a Soviet attack at
any level with superior force, and at the highest level,
the US has the whole range of its strategic deterrent,
including SAC, its ICBM's and invulnerable Polaris
missiles. The latter could not be knocked out even with
an, overwhelming attack on the US itself.
b. Another possibility is that the Soviets might launch
a surprise nuclear attack. But even the heaviest Soviet
attack would leave the US able to counterattack with Polaris
missiles, SAC planes on airborne alert and hardened- site
Minuteman missiles in the US. If the Soviet attack only
struck European targets, the Soviets would leave all US
forces outside Europe untouched, an even more dangerous
situation for them. Emotionally, the deaths of millions of
Europeans and tens or hundreds of thousands of US nation-
als in Europe would offer extreme provocation; rationally,
US leaders would feel impelled to strike back before US
capabilities to knock out Soviet weapons were seriously
reduced. A surprise nuclear attack limited to Europe is
thus highly improbable. Aside from these considerations,
the US has offered to establish a multilateral nuclear force
under NATO, which would ultimately give Europeans par-
ticipation in NATO's nuclear force and a share in responsi-
bility for its use.
Political. If there is any lesson that Americans believe can
be drawn from the two world wars, it is that the best -way to secure
peace is by timely opposition to aggressors, and not by appeasement
or isolation. This idea has been prominent in President Kennedy's
speeches, and it was this idea which caused the US to lead in the forma-
tion of NATO. The US signature on the North Atlantic Treaty formally
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commits the US to join in resisting aggression in NATO Europe. The
US has honored and will continue to honor its collective defense arrange-
ments such as NATO and OAS treaties; these are indeed the cornerstones
of free world security. For a great power, faithfulness to defensive
obligations is not only a matter of integrity; such faithfulness is neces-
sary for the responsible exercise of its power. If the US did nit honor
its European obligations, its government would stand exposed as feeble
and cowardly. Not only would the US lose its world position, not only
would US promises and guarantees lose their value, but the willingness
of the US to defend its own territory would be called into question. If
the Soviets were to annex--more or less undamaged--the population,
industry, and resources of western Europe, and to direct this new power
against the US, the US would be compelled to become a garrison state
as well, and freedom might be extinguished everywhere. This is not
a state of affairs the Americans intend to accept.
The US has the power and the will (demonstrated last fall in con-
nection with Cuba) to defend itself and its allies. Is there any other
government which third countries can trust as well to deter Soviet attack,
to defend their interests?
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WHO IS THE PRINCE OF PEACE?
The scene: Reglia, a small village in Cuba.
The man on stage: A correspondent for the US Communist Party
newspaper, The Worker.
The action: Portraying (as described in The Worker, 16 December
1962) a Red "peeping Tom. "
Red "peeping Tom" speaks:
'T hiking through the streets, late at night, you could
see through the open windows, the parlors of the
citizens. A picture of Jesus Christ would be hanging
large on one wall, or a statue of a saint, dressed in
white. On another wall was the figure of Fidel Castro.
And, in many a house, on a third wall, you'll see the
picture of Vladimir Lenin. "
As if anticipating that this trioka arrangement would tax the audi-
ence's credulity, and unable to resist the opportunity to insert, in a
subtle way, some Communist Party doctrine, Red "peeping Tom" con-
tinue st
"You remember reading Lenin's observation that
religion need not be a bar to radical and revolu-
tionary thought,
(Whereupon we must admit that we do remember such an
observation and furthermore, that we detect a wily attempt to steer us
away from the Lenin observation we do remember, i. e. , "Religion is
the opium of the people. Religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the
slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent
human life. ")
and here (Red "peeping Tom" continues), in these working-
class homes of Reglia, you saw him (Lenin) sharing the
parlor with Fidel Castro and the Prince of Peace. "
The curtain closes, but the memory lingers on.
This drama includes many of the essential ingredients of Com-
munist propaganda--identification with the working class, claims of the
"common man's" respect bordering on idolatry, association on a par with
local leaders, affinity with local customs, religious symbols and per-
sonages as desired, etc. And we know that Red "peeping Tom" can play
the roles of Judas or Jesus, as the occasion demands, with equal finesse.
And what of facts? Is Lenin's picture really to be seen in many
of these workers' homes in this small Cuban village? Well, we also
know that Communist propaganda is not wedded to the truth. As the
former director general of the Soviet press agency lass put it: "Nothing
can be left to chance. Readers cannot simply be given the bare facts
from which they might form their own opinions." And as an editor of
the official Czech news agency explained his implementation of this policy:
"Almost all news must be slanted, adapted to the party line or, in the
cynical jargon of a Communist journalist, 'cooked' "
By "cooking" the news, Communist propaganda converts Khrushchev
standing in Cuba with his hands full of offensive missiles into Khrushchev
hovering protectively over Cuba, his hands full of peace doves. In re-
writing history, the Red propagandist turns the perpetrator of the Cuban
crisis into the "savior of the peace. " By blatant "cooking" of the facts,
Khrushchev is robed in white, fitted with a halo, given the title of "Prince
of Peace" and recommended for the Nobel Peace Prize.
The extent of the twists, squirms and shifts in Communist propa-
ganda on the Cuban crisis is documented in ""Cooking? the Cuban News:
That Historic Week as Seen in Czechoslovakia" in The New Republic,
29 December 1962. The article reveals the techniques of control over
public opinion as exercised in a Communist nation. The Communist
propaganda machine was caught off-guard as the Cuban crisis broke;
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completely mobilizMu "in around-the-clocii service of Soviet propaganda, "
all media concentrated on vociferously denying the US exposb of Soviet
rnicsiles in Cuba ("slander and fabrication"); and, when Khrushchev
acknowledged heed been caught " -d-mi sile" handed, made an unabashed
shift to tine line, "",she Soviet Union has achieved a great new victory in
its struggle for peace. "
To avoid any doubt as to who is the "Prince of Peace," and to
insure that the "bar-, facts" are not allowed to be the base upon which
the wc,rld may form its own opinions, Communist propaganda declares:
"All sensible people 'of the world now see the Soviet
Union for what it truly is--it and its. unchanging
socialist peace policy, its stand for brotherhood
aiid,ito strtiggl_ for the future; of,mankind.... Looked
at strictly from the view-point of international law
and logic... the Soviet Union and the Cuban Republic
demonstrated during the course of the whol:~ affair
not only a determination to defend law and order,
but, as well, a maximal effort to prevent war... "
Stripper: of Soviet propaganda, in their raw "uncooked" state,
the facts give us a very different picture:
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Tar. New RtrufLtc
llrctMurx 29, i96x
"Cooking" the Cuban News
That Historic Week as Seen in Czechoslovakia
by Stanislav JCoutnik
The former general director of the Soviet Press Agency
Tass, Palgunov, once wrote in a brochure which later
became the fundamental textbook for all Communist
news agencies, that every news item or report printed
must be a piece of "agitation." News must be "fighting
and persuasive, and for this reason it must be explained
to the reader by a properly timely commentary." Fur-
thermore, wrote Palgunov, "Nothing can be left to
chance. Readers cannot simply be given the bare facts
from which they might form their own opinions.".
Just how these guide-lines apply in practice was ex-
plained by Antonin Buzek who, until recently, headed
the London bureau of Cateka, the official Czechoslovak
news agency, and, prior to that, served as the agency's
managing foreign editor. He chose to ask for political
asylum in Great Britain just after he had offered
the post of chief of,the foreign news department in
Prague. He wrote: "Almost all news must be slanted,
adapted to the party line or, in the cynical jargon of a
Communist journalist, 'cooked.' The basic policy of
Cateka, as far. as foreign news is concerned, is to wait
for a hint from Moscow -'waiting for Tass', so to
speak." (Forum Service, London, March, i962..)
This technique of control over public opinion is im-
portant to keep in mind; it is the guide by which the
Czech press attempted to report the events which took
place between the 22nd and 28th of October - "an
historical week of worldwide crisis," as the Czech press
now refers to it.
President Kennedy's announcement of American
measures against the Soviet installations in Cuba ap-
parently took the Czechoslovak regime and its propa-
ganda apparatus by complete surprise. Rude Pravo
(the organ of the Central Committee of the Czechoslo-
vak Communist Party), on October 20, was still writing
about "several tourist excursions which would be flying
to Cuba during November and December" - without
specifying what sort of "tourists" these would be. On
Monday, October 22, after the President's declaration
had already been made public, Radio Prague's com-
mentator first of all reported the news of the sudden
return of leading government figures to Washington,
but then added: "I suppose that this campaign . . .
again is being exaggerated ... its purpose smells of
propaganda and an effort to exert pressure." He ampli-
fied his ,forecast: "I feel, first of all, that if the United
States were to mount an invasion at this time, it would
have to mass a substantially increased number of air
and naval forces in the Caribbean area ... It seems
most probable that Washington needs this new anti-
Cuban campaign for domestic and international rea-
sons.... The US Government is, thereby, attempting
to justify new arms_.expen_ditures.... It is, from the
STANISLAv KouTNIK, research associate at the Russian
Research Center, Harvard University, has written ex-
tensively on, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
standpoint of international politics, an attempt at creat-
ing an atmosphere which will discourage English, Nor-
wegian and Italian shipping concerns ... from keeping
their ships on routes to Cuba ... Economic, political
i and psychological pressure is naturally a double-edged
weapon. . . ;" he said.
It is apparent from the allusions to various types of
non-military pressure that the regime and its propa-
ganda set-up were convinced up to the very last mo-
ment of the determination of the US President to take
action in some manner other than military.
The relatively restrained Czechoslovak government
declaration, run by every newspaper in the country on
the 23rd of October, merely stated: "No sovereign
state can allow ships sailing under its flag to be de-
tained by another state and prevented from reaching
their destination ... nor will they permit control to
be exerted over the purposes of voyages. [Note: Two
Czech ships which had been on their way to Cuba re-
turned to port.] The assumption of such a right by
the United States may result in an enormous expan-
sion of the scope of international conflicts." This dec-
laration does not speak of any single conflict which
could be construed to mean war, but, rather, of conflicts
in general. The conflict might be nothing more than an
exchange of notes of protest. Another sentence further
along does not appear to regard the American block-
ade as aggression; it rather warns against further steps
by the American Government: "Every aggressor - and
the American militarists had better keep this in mind
- must reckon with the fact that if he were to run the
risk of committing aggression, he is certain to be
repaid with a crushing retaliatory blow." In conclusion
Prague declared that, "The Czechoslovak people fully
and honorably intend to meet all their obligations to
the Cuban Republic." Similarly cautious as well was
the concurrent "spontaneous declarations of all the
workers": "... We will, as suppliers of equipment for
Cuban industry, fulfill all our commitments on time."
In neither of these two declarations is mention made of
either military aid or further arms shipments.
In the days that followed, every newspaper, radio
station and other organ was mobilized in around-the-
clock service of Soviet propaganda. Yet while the
Prague regime was following the Soviet line in a reason-
ably meticulous manner, it did, nevertheless, deviate
greatly enough from this line to merit attention. Espe-
cially noteworthy is the way in which the Czechoslovak
Stalinist leadership spoke out not so much aggressively
as with downright vulgarity. Thus Rude Pravo, on
October 24, characterized President Kennedy's speech
as: ". - . the sort of arrogance rarely witnessed in his-
tory.... Nations cannot swindle with impugnity in
today's world...." Radio Prague's commentator of the
day spoke of "Kennedy's stupid announcement"; and
several hours later, on the program "Radio Prague's
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Chat with Listeners," the American President was
identified with Hitler: "Hitler first wanted privileges"
for Henlein and then eventually occupied all the border .
territories until, finally, he occupied us as well. The
same thing could happen today, were we to give
ground. After Cuba could come Berlin, then all of .
Germany. And then it would be our turn -but under
even worse conditions than before...." This particu-
lar broadcast of the "Chat" then proceeded to examine
the motives behind the American move. The com-
mentator asserted: "A puppet government composed
of Cuban counter-revolutionists would be brought in-
to play.... In substance, Washington is planning the
creation of some sort of new ,government resembling
Chiang Kai-shek's." The commentator supplied an in-
[cresting answer to a listener's question about "whether
the American action has some connection with our
preparations for signing a peace treaty with Germany."
The commentator appeared to expect Khrushchev to
provoke a crisis in Berlin very soon: "A really very
probable connection does seem to exist.... Two factors
are particularly evident it the case of Berlin: First of
all, Berlin would be militarily indefensible for the West,
and, secondly, the signing of a peace treaty is certain
to mean the utter defeat of American military policy in
Europe. And this defeat is already underway...."'
Radio Prague's comparison of the American Govern-
ment to Hitler was snatched up the following day by
every paper in the country.. Rude .'ravo's lead article
ran this way: "Corpo: al Hitler, obsessed as he was by
the self-same scheme for world domination, introduced
a certain brand of crudity in his dealings. But even he,
the worst mass murderer in history, took pains to pro-
vide each of his aggressions with a semblance of iustifi-
President of the United States of America has, as the
representative of aggressive forces, gone even further,
than Hitler.... The inspection of imports on their way
to Cuba is not only a move against freedom, but a move
.taken directly against humanity... ."
Undone in Prague
Very nearly the same words were broadcast by Radio
Prague on the evening of the 25th of October in a dis-
patch from its New York correspondent, Karel Kyncl.
Kyncl thus describes the response to the whole crisis as
felt in the USA: "The only thing printed supporting the
policy of the Kennedy Administration was distributed
by rz youngsters posted outside the entrance to an
office here in New York.... There were leaflets issued
by the American Nazi Party. Nothing could be more
characteristic of the aims of Kennedy's policy."
During the succeeding days, after overseas radio sta
tions had informed the Czechoslovak people that
America was accusing the Soviet Union of shipping
rockets with nuclear war-heads to Cuba, and of build-
ing launching pads for them, the regime maintained
that these indictments were "slander and fabrication":
'.'an egregious assertion," wrote Rude Pravo on October
25: "Everyone knows" it added next day, "that neither
do any Soviet military installations exist in Cuba, nor
are any being built" on the Caribbean island.
On Saturday, October 27, Khrushchev admitted the'
universally known facts." Just how this admission:
tripped up Czechoslovak Communist propaganda is
revealed by Radio Prague's commentator who, many'
hours after the admission had been made public, quoted
from the Soviet newspapers Sovietskaja Rossija and
Pravda, and the London Daily Worker, printed on the
immediately preceding days, which had characterized
Kennedy's disclosure of the installations as a "lie."
That evening Radio Prague's commentator 'offered
j the opinion that there would have to be an "exchange"
worked out: the base in Cuba for the bases in Turkey.
This was the first official Czech allusion to bases in
Cuba - and, at that, it was made en passant. The com-
mentator declared that, "The American demand which
attempted to restrict the liquidation of rocket installa-
tions to the Western Hemisphere alone has now boom-
eranged back against the United States t" And, before
the end of its evening transmission, the Radio broad-
cast a letter to Cuba "written by a Czechoslovak
school-girl in the fifth grade, and published just prior
to this program by Vecerni Praha: 'Dear Cuba, We
know that you'll stand fast!' '
The press and radio had to retreat. Apparently it was
a retreat which the Novotny regime wanted far less
than Khrushchev. On Sunday,. October 28, the entire
propaganda machinery turned to autumnal sentimen-
tality, resignation and petulent abuse. Thus Rude
Pravo's leading article for that day, entitled "This
Sunday . . ." began with this sentence: "This Sunday
seems like any other. . . . Time passes as it usually
does . . . yet once again we're one experience richer.
... Our advance forward and our striving for peace
obviously have not halted for a moment. On the con-
trary! They've not halted for the very reason that we
know just what is happening. . . ." An outburst of
rage follows: "Once again ... and all the more vividly
... we have seen with what unconcealed ruthlessness,
with what purely Hitler-like arrogance those gentlemen
in their dinner-jackets and generals' and admirals'
uniforms are capable of whipping up trouble against
the peace of the world...."
And what of Nikita Khrushchev who had admitted
that the Soviet Union did indeed have installations in
Cuba, which he offered to ship back home? Rude Pravo '
and with it all the organs of Czechoslovak Communist
propaganda had this to say: "In the course of a very
serious crisis for which the American imperialists are
to blame ... a further significant step was taken on
Saturday by the Soviet Government ... the proposals
of the Soviet Union are equable, reasonable and real-
istic ... they give the world cause for hope - and more
time to the imperialists to do some reconsidering .. .
in order that they might finally realize that an abyss
lies agape before all of us; that the path they have
'chosen will not lead to a liquidation of the crisis which
has developed nor contribute to the establishment of
;normal, peaceful relations between states. These goals
are implicit in the path chosen by the Soviet Union. It
has chosen to follow this path, as it always has done
in the paast, becau:re it has with it the sympathy of the
entire world..... The Soviet Union has achieved a great
new victory in its struggle for peace ... "
. Rude Pravo thereupon proceeded to instruct the pop-
ulation on how to help the forces of peace to victory
over the danger which had been fabricated: "Each of
us can contribute with his informed, citizenly de-
meanor, with steadfastness and discretion.... As al-
ways at such times as these, we are all the more strong-
ly reinforced in the awareness of the fact that we are on
the side of right, honor and law - now as in years past.
All sensible people of the world now see the Soviet
Union for what it truly is - it and its unchanging so-
cialist peace policy, its stand for brotherhood and its
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struggle for the future of mankind. . . ." Elsewhere
. in the paper, bold headlines draw the reader to the
contents of an important announcement: "TAKE- FULL
ADVANTAGE OF SUNDAY FOR A RAPID POTATO HARVEST."
Less conspicuous are the reports of artists and writers
who had been hurriedly sent into the field by the regime
to ascertain just how the people felt about the whole
Cuban affair. The writer Krista Bendova sent from
Bratislava a typical report: "The fact that Cuba was,
in many instances, no longer being discussed seems to
be a further example.of the people's awareness of the
issues: they are calmly and unrelentingly going about
their seemingly ant-like occupations at the very mo-
ment when the threat of annihilation hangs over the
world-at a time when the bourgeoisie and nihilists
are losing their nerve and sense of purpose in life....
And it suddenly dawns upon you that this ant-like,
steady-disciplined labor is a part of a more important
historical framework. This labor does, in the final
analysis, seem to say more than all the words which
proclaim 'Cuba; you're not alone!' 'We're with you
Cuba!' 'We shall be victorious!' "
And what should be told the school-children? An
entire issue of Rude Pravo's "Sunday Supplement for
' Children ' was devoted to Cuba. A school-boy named
Josef Malin submitted' a letter "To Pedro in Havana,"
in the name of all Czechoslovak children, in which he
wrote: "The American President is afraid of the exam-
ple which Cuban patriots are setting for the other na-
tions of Latin America.... May our friendship grow
even stronger!" An account- is given to the children
in the article entitled "Hands off Cuba, Kennedy!"
"Do you know, dear children, what an American
.blockade of Cuba can do? It can cause the slow-
down of production and the over-all shortage of
raw materials and machinery; a lack of proper
clothing, food, medicine - and even of school sup-
plies. And that's not all. If Cuba were not to have
sufficient defenses any aggressive state could at-
tack and destroy it.... The Soviet Government
forcefully responded to the challenge that the
USSR would not abandon Cuba in its hour of
need. You children have already read in your
history books about how the valiant, courageous
Soviet Union and its people defeated Hitler and
liberated many lands-including Czechoslovakia
- from him.... So don't worry, children. The
Americans will have to retreat from the Carib-
bean!" -
Milena Honzikova - apparently one of those "tourists"
whose excursions were mentioned by Rude Pravo on
October zo - contributed an article that day, to which
the children of Prague were referred:
"Fidel -- Khrushchev -- Paz." For it's only in Cuba
that you can hear both The Internationale and the
revolutionary march Adalaute Cubanos sung
naturally as the childrens' first songs. The revolu-
tion is, after all, responsible for providing every-
thing which fills their lives...."
She observed something quite different and interesting
in Cardenas, where "on the previous day zoo cowardly
people were in the streets, while nearly everyone else
was indoors because of the rain. They were shouting
that they'd had enough of the privations caused by
the American embargo and that there ought to be a
surrender...." The situation the following day was,
she writes, quite different:
"Thousands came out today to give their answer.
A lengthy militia review was staged.... Foot-
soldiers passed by with automatic rifles slung
over their shoulders. , .There was something
incredibly moving about the joy with which they
bore their weapons along, in an over-flowing tide
whose power grows in the knowledge that the
fate of the revolution is in their hands... .
By Monday, October 29, the entire gigantic propaganda
apparatus had begun to admit. to realities. OA radio
Prague's - "Chat," during which: the question "But',
won't Cuba be left defenseless?" had often been asked
by listeners, one of the program's participants replied:
"The question of the future of Cuba will henceforth
basically depend upon the agreement to which Presi-
dent Kennedy has already assented in principle." 'After
a week of comparing Kennedy to Hitler, Mussolini and
Nero, Czechoslovak propaganda admitted in a concil-
iatory manner over Radio Prague that "Cuba's future
does not depend so much.upon the Soviet Union as it
does upon the peaceful intentions of the United States
... the possibilities for an agreement exist, and negoti-
ations are what are most needed at the present time."
And- Those Technicians?
`'This historic week" -- like every other fairy-tale
- had to end with a bit of moral advice. Hesitation and
silence had lasted for several days. But on November
4, Rude Pravo finally wrote: "Looked at strictly from
the view-point of international law and logic . . . the
Soviet Union and the Cuban Republic demonstrated
during the course of the whole affair not only a deter-
mination to defend law and order, but, as well, a
maximal effort to prevent war. Hundreds of millions
of people throughout the world were aware of this
stand and appreciated it enormously...." And Radio
Bratislava indulged in some deep brooding on the same
day over "... the pre-eminence of socialist morality
"There are children from three years onward in
.the school in Candelaria . . . fair-haired little
girls whom the sun never tans; little Negro girls
whose ebony skin can never pale. One of the
very first notions they have about the world is
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over American morality." Not a single word had been
uttered all the while on the fate of several Czech
"technicians" in Cuba during those "critical days."
What did the people think during that week? They
behaved much as they had during the 1956 Hungarian
uprising. "The Cuban question" has never been popular
with the people. According to the Italian daily It
Tempo (May 5, 1:962) the chief slogan shouted during
the May Day student demonstrations in Prague was
"Cuba si - meat No!' France-Presse Agency repcrted
several other slogans shouted on May Day: "We stint
in great and small and to Cuba give it all!" and
"Prague's lines lengthen that Havana's may shorten."
Prague's evening paper Voderni Praha wrote specifi-
cally about "the two Pragues" which were observable.
just at that time. One of them was the Prague of organ-
ized demonstrations and "unanimous protest resolu-
tions." "And the 'other' Prague?" the writer asked:
"It's really nothing more than a shadow ... although,
even so, one can't help but saying something about it.
What about those scare-mongers and hoarders . .
who dodged the demonstrations in order to rush off' to
get to the stores before anyone else? What about them?
Just what sort of front-line fighters are these? Do they
expect to fight against international piracy by buying
tins of cooking oil or cartons of salt? What do these
people really believe in? ... in the weight of hoarded
provisions or in the power of our camp? Shame on
them! Ought we not to assure our Cuban friends that
we're standing solidly behind them ... instead of mass-
ing in front of Prague's stores?"
Here, from among innumerable quotations regarding
the interests of the population during the crisis, are a
few sentences from a commentary broadcast by Radio
Prague on October z8: "Do you know, madam, why
you can't get beefsteak? We're exporting tons of meat
to East Germany! And to all those African countries!
And just look at all those brand-new statesmen taking
trips here! All that's got to cost something, let me tell
you! It's all got to come from somewhere!" The Radio's
political commentator drew the following conclusion:
"The most absurd nonsense is being spread about the
influence of our foreign policy on our domestic situa-
tion ... and there are many people who appear to be-
lieve that there's something to all this talk....
A final note: by November 1.1, Radio Bratislava was
not only talking of peaceful coexistence, but also of
"some kind of collaboration ... mutual concession ... "
between capitalistic and socialistic systems. That same
day, Radio Prague capped its gyrations by taking a
brand new position, peaceful co-existence for the sake
of "permitting the capitalistic world to slow down its
acute and chronic economic problems." President Ken-
nedy, apparently, moved in two weeks from being
Hitler to being a friend who needs support.
"The Missiles That Weren't Here Are All Gone."
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The "Prince of Peace" Story for the
Soviet -People
The Kremlin has informed the Soviet people about the Cuban
crisis--but not exactly as it is known to the rest of the world. To make
its version appear credible, the Kremlin reprinted a Look magazine
story of December 18, 1962, in the January 5, 1963 issue of Za Rubezhom.
BUT, a good one-quarter of the article was not presented in this abridged
version--it could not be since the Communist aim since October 1962
has been to reconstruct the Cuban crisis so that the United States would
appear as the aggressor and the Soviet Union as the savior of peace.
Portions of the Look story (referenced to the pages on which it appeared)
which were not reprinted are as follows:
page 43, sixth paragraph (underlined portion omitted);
"The Russians were cramming the 750-mile-long
Caribbean island with light jet bombers and missiles
that pointed at America's heartland. It
page 44, fifth full paragraph (omitted entirely except for
first eight words):
"Cuba was on every official mind in Washington
because of Khrushchev's daring midsummer move.
A stream of freighters, some Russian, some
under Russian charter, had crossed the Atlantic
to Cuba, their holds filled with weapons, their
decks covered with suspicious crates. By Septem-
ber, Cuban refugees were telling Central Intelli-
gence Agency operatives--and Republican senators --
stories of missile bases being constructed by
Soviet technicians in Cuba. "
page 49, first full paragraph (omitted entirely):
"Two related events occurred during this September-
October period. First, operatives inside -Cuba re-
ported the arrival of a Red Army general, known to
be a top missile-and-rocket expert. Second, a
Russian Embassy officer in Washington returned
from a Moscow vacation and sought out the Presi-
dent's br:~ther, Attorney General Robert F. lc nnedy.
Khrushchev, said this official, had told him personally
he wanted President Kennedy to know that no weapon
capable of hitting American soil would be placed in
Cuba. This curious message conflicted, as did so
many things involving the Kremlin, with the intel-
ligence about the presence of the mis sile-and-rocket
general. "
page 49, second full paragraph (underlined portions omitted):
"The photo logjam broke on October 14, when U-2
planes and low-flying fighters returned with pictures
that were to shake the world. Working all though
Sunday night, hundreds of photo interpreters compajCed
thousands of the new photographs with earlier ones.
The evidence was unmistakable. The Soviets had
installed mobile missiles that. could hit targets as
distant as Washington, D. C. and were preparing sites
for fi xted 2, 500 mile missiles that could destroy cities
in all but the northwestern corner of the United States.
IL-28 bombers were assembled, ready to strike.
Khrushchev suddenly had a gun at America's belly.
"
50, first, full paragraph, third sentence (omitted entirely):
"The threat to American citizens was too grave. "
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page 50, second column, last full paragraph, last two sentences
(on "Operation X"; underlined portions omitted):
"Such an assault would kill Russians without warning
and might spark the impulsive Khrushchev into
atomic retaliation--the dreaded global fire storm.
Bob Kenne dy said flath at one se s sion: 'My brothe
will never be a party to a Pearl Harbor.' "
page 50, fourth paragraph, fourth sentence (discussing "Operation X";
underlined protion omitted):
"'t'hey were given 15 minutes to knock out the missiles,
so that Castro could not touch off a world holocaust by
firing nuclear warheads at American cities. "
Page 50, third column, third full paragraph, third sentence (under-
lined portion omitted):
"Kennedy campaigned in Connecticut, was booed at
Yale by unsuspecting students who wanted a stronger
Cuban policy."
page 50, last paragraph, continuing on page 51, and page 51, first
full paragraph (omitted entirely)::
"The big White House meeting earlier that day was
the one in which President Kennedy, in his rocker,
faced the dour Gromyko. Rusk and Thompson flanked
them. Gromyko talked tough on Berlin, threatened a
Soviet move after our November 6 elections. Kennedy
made no mention of the Cuban missile sites. He had
no intention of tipping his hand to the Russians until
American policy jelled.
"But Kennedy did leave the room and return to read
sternly from a September 13 statement of his. This
vowed to do 'whatever must be done' if the Soviet
buildup turned Cuba into 'an offensive military base'
threatening our security. Gromyko blandly replied
that the arms in Cuba were purely defensive in nature.
Kennedy did not argue, but Gromyko's lie--the second
official Russian falsehood within a month--stuck in his
throat. "
page 52, last paragraph, continuing onto page 54 (underlined por-
tion omitted):
"The White House cconfidentially asked top network
officials for radio and TV time Monday night. Don
Wilson, de-nuty director of the U. S. Information Agency,
and Salin er prevailed on telephone-company officials
to make secret connections with 11 radio stations in
nine cities, so the stations could beam Spanish transla-
tions of the President's speech to Cuba and South America.
page 54, second column, fourth full paragraph (omitted entirely):
"The biggest worry now was that the Russians might
get :wind of the operation and make the first move in
the UN. Gromyko was due to fly back to Russia from
Idlcwild Airport at 2 p.m. , and an operative was dis-
patched to watch his movements. He reported by phone
that Gromyko took off on schedule, after making an
innocuous plane-side statement, apparently unaware
of th, impending American action. "
page 54, third column, first two full paragraphs (omitted entirely):
"The legislative meeting lasted longer. After the
briefings by Rusk and McCon:, two men spoke out
against the President's course--Sen. Richard B.
Russell (I (sn , Ga, ), chairman of the Senate Armed
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Services Committee, and Sen. J, William Fulbright
(Dem. , Ark. ), chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. Both argued for an invasion.
Russell said a blockade was the least effective measure,
irritating the most nations and taking the most time,
The President calmly defended his decision, Blunt
Charlie Halleck broke up the coi,fer nce. 'I'm standing
with thw PresidentT, said the Republican leader.
ItA thk minutes ticked toward 7 p,m. , Salinger and
Newton Minow, chairman of th! Federal Comm unicm-
tions Commission, called managers of the 11 powerful.
radio stations selected to broadcast the speech in
Spanish. When they protested that they had no cut-in
facilities, Salinger revealed that the lines already hs.ci
been laid, Later, startled Americans tuned to the
stations were to hear a voico speaking in Spanish,
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"There was an excessive enthusiasm, an excessive
optimism for the development of new agricultural forms
to the detriment of sugar cane. ..It;wpuldbe crn?plet4Y..,
wrong to think that sugar cane should be con p1etel re-
placed by other roducts... " Minister of Industry
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Havana CMQ TV Network
20 Dec. 1962 .
"Some',... errors have undeniabI been costly`,' among
them, -particul'arly, a certain aisreg_ard of the importance
to our economy of the sugar industry during this initial
period and for some years of our future development.
This has been an error... which has affected our export
capacity, so decisive in the development of an open
economy like Cubans." ` President Osvaldo Dorticos,
Cuba Socialista, January 1963.
"The National Sugar Committee, then received the final
report on the planting of new cane for 1962, which reached
a total of 12, 986 caba erias,, equivalent to 83. 4 per cent
of the goal of 15, 580 caballerias. " Havana Radio Rebelde,
19 an:'163 ,
* * * *
"Our general average last year was approximately
4, 000 arrobas* per caballeria. This is' extremciy low.
The sugar cane was very bad cared fore Besides, it
was frequently attacked by fire...
"Today, Cuba still depends on an efficient suar-P.ro-
duction for its accelerated development.. we must never
think that our development is not linked to this industry.
This is why wejive it so muchimportance. " Minister
of Indiiistry Zrne s to "C'Re"Guevara., Havana CMS TV
Network, 20- Dec. 1962.
*An arroba equals 25. 35'pounds..
The Organization
"What was the first reaction of the revolution, or of
the revolutionar comrades ? It was an attempt to flee
from the spirit that meant to a great extent being the.
s of the cane... The fundamental probleme
s-
next harvest consists also in the lack of manpower:
For this reason, we must take political and a.c nnis-
trative steps to guarantee. the affluence of canecu.tters.. .
We mean by using men in labor where their inexperience
will allow them to produce the most. For example,
behind the canecutting machines where the harvest re-
quires no skill. Cancutting requires long preparation
and great physical stamina. These ineierienced men
so employed will also cause the least damage. The
volunteer cancutters naturally do not have the skill to
cut cane as}i# should be cut and, consequently, the
feldssuf?er from
"We must also i prove labor disci ,line during the
harvest time. We must take very serious steps in order
to avoid fires, be they instigated by`the counterrevolu-
tionarie s or the bad revolutionarie s. We must ask for
a strict disciRli.ne...we: must improve the cultivation
methods; we must improve the stock... We must work
on an accelerated development of the canecutting__
machines... to Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che"
Guevara; -Havana CMQ TV Network, 20 Dec. 1962.
2
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"At the meeting we studied last yearts experience
and ... some corrections will be necessary. In the
first place, we are going to make an effort in all sectors
t~procu~re as permanent macheteros comrades who have
at some time cu.t cane; who have wor efias mac~ieteros
... As youu know,we are pulling macheteros from the
factories, from work centers, . .
... we require that you make an effort to inform the
permanent macheteros of the average amount of.cutting
and loading they perform per battalion... , many labor_
unions returned from sugar cane euttin du.r.in _the _last
harvest, believin that theyhad cut ahigher average?
than they had actua Y cut. _Ge'nerall -they confused
their -atigue with the yield from their work.. .
".. , we established an average quota for all the perm -
anent macheteros...We believe that it would be proper
to assign a quota. r. " CTC--R (Central de Trabajadores
Cuba Revolucionaria-Workers' Committee for Defense
of the Revolution) Secretary General Lazaro Pena,
Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Dec. 1962.
"The CTC-R also .announced that all available cane
will be milled and that there. will, be a shorty ,e of cane.
cutters....HoweverI the CTC-R .assures that the help
of volunteer workers will contribute to the most brillant
success of the new sugar harvest. The Cuban labor union
center also announced the creation of incentives...
". . , contrary to the situation under capitalism, today
there are not too many canecutters in Cuba--rather. there
are too few... only they canecuttincmachine can resolve .
the situation far the .sugar iarve.st of the future.. .
achine s do not bring them either unemployment or
hunger, but rather.. . they are the beginning of defini-
tive liberation from the hard work of canecutting and
stacking... The machines we possess are_few and will
therefore not be enough to make-up for the shortage
of canecutters...
"The CTC-R appeals to the agricultural workers union
... to overcome the, certain difficulty of bad cane in various
areas. The CTC-R also exhorts the workers to revent
the improper and unauthorized burning of certain cane
because of the impatience of corriracles, administrators,
or workers.
"The CTC-R calls upon all the union leaders to or-
ganize emulation, mobilization and all action. . .It calls
upon 'them to :see' to the supply of cadres of workers' in
the sugar harvest. " Havana Reloj Nacional Network,
Jan. 1963.
"A.'national subcommittee has been set up in the Ministry
of , Indus tries to control the sugar harvest. daily throughout
the. country. It will be responsible .for the -lair solution of
alI the~ro's~lems that arise.... The :subcommittee will turn
in a weekly report on the progress of the harvest and will
meet daily.." Havana CMQ Radio, 'll 'Jan, 1963.
"In provincial reports presented at the meeting, it
was revealed that in addition to the lack of labor, the
--greatest difficulties to be overcome .re the lag in the
repair of roads anj the sho_rte_of-shoes, ti.res, roe.,
tools, as well as certain food items... lack of numbers of
permanent canecutters.., cj.e iciencies demonstrated in the
su.~ of v?luntee . rs....
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"With .respect to the mechanization of??the 'work::,: con-
firmad the decision of the. government to accele'r'ate the
construction of 500' cane loaders of which. the firfirst will
be delivered soon. At the same time, work is being
rushed to complete the donstruetion of the' 1yf 000 cane
cuttin machines...'rPana .adio Rude, 19 Jan.
1963.
"We are' short 95, 000 sugar. cane- cutters? in Cuba.
Ninety- ive'.thousand are still need. to cut sugar cane..
We. cannot import, them from another country nor from
any planet: W e are, going to cut 'some of the sugar c'ane
with the machine s but the machine s are only, in they ex
erimental stage. the will not resolve this
roblem for us as yet: The only thing which will resolve
the proIem... Will' be by holding meetings., having di.s
cussions, organizing our work, setting goals, control,
and by fulfilling agreements and goals... 11 Report at
National Sugar Plenum, Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Dec.
1962.
"Formerly, "one'.could preteriA .tobe rich,, influential.,,
or a playboy.. Some pretended tohave a great deal: of
cash and'others pretended to be big shots. 1 .16
"But nobody in "uba"thought'. if retending to be a
cane cutter (rnachetero) until after the revolutic
"Last night, Che Muevara7 straightened' us out
1 1.
"It s eems that we don't make the grade as 'mac.heteros.
"We ruin the .cane, In the future. we'll loadi.t.
"The machines and 'those who know how1' will cut''
the cane. Those of us who don't will load. it.
" IVatural.ly, some `resist the idea that they don't know
how to cut cane;
'I'm not the one he's 'talking about,'' they say, 'because
I cut cane like a house afire.'
"Since none of these 'underdeveloped macheteros' can
be found, it is going to be necessary to figure out a method
to determine' cane cutting abilities.
"Without bothering to look at the figures, Cubans have
believed seriously that, in raising and processing cane,
we were the world champions.
"On the contrary, the figures show that.our yield per
caballeria is low.
"Our average yield per caballeria is 4, 000 arrovas.
In Hawaii the average i's double this amount.
"But we eat 20 pounds more sugar per year than any
other country in the world.
"Siquitrilla has known more than one . fellow who has
eaten more mxw. than he cut. Walking sugar, mills.
"What is good about all this is that by following the
true road, we will continue making real triumphs.. . "
-by'Siquitrilla, La Tarde, 23 De'c. 1962.'
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"The third sugar harvest will begin on 10 January
all over the country.... An e stimate of manpower needs
has been made, needs which will be less this year be-
cause we are using canecuting rnacn s.... The Cu"ans
revolutionary workers organization has urgently called
on 25 national organizations to furnish 50, Q00 permanent
volunteer workers who will go to the canefields, organized
in battalions, full of enthusiasm....
"Sugar is our most important source'of foreign currency....
Knowing the difficulties that could arise, the main one being
lack of manpower--even with the machines--the victory
now depends on organization. If Hoy, 7 Jan. 1963.
"The victory of the sugar harvest depends upon organi-
zation.... The CTC-R has made an appeal to the 25 national
unions to contribute 5,Q,,.,,9Q.Q_. permanent drolu.nteers organ-
ized into battalions .... many workers last year could not
participate.. because they lacked transportation. We
have seen what insufficient transportation,,,too mapy_
ceremonies and festivities on working days, or time
devoted by the sugar workers to other crows can do. "
Radio Havana, 7 Jan. 1963.
CTC-R Executive Committee and provincial delegations
met 8 Jan. "to discuss the formation of permanent cane-
cuttinn volunteer br ades7 which will word through
the sugar harvest, and part-time or weekend volunteers. "
Revolucion, 8 Jan. l963:_-
... CTC-R leaders and the members of the executive
committee of the 25 national trade unions and of the sev-
eral trade union groups wi join the-cane'cutters on
Saturdays and Sundays... " Havana Radio Rebelde,
8 Jan. 1963
"Benito Sanchez, secretary. general of the CTC-R in
Camaguey said thousands of workers will be needed.
but emphasized that volunteer workers should know
something about the' 'd'1k.'" Hoy,' 9 Jan. 1963.
"... thousands of volunteer cancutters, carrying
their knapsacks and machetes, will gather in front
of the national capitol in Havana to take part in a
parade before they leave for Camaguey Province.
Camaguey needs no fewer than 45, 000 canecutters....
the national trade unions are carrying out a brotherly
competition to attain the target of 50, 000 permanent
ss.
voluntary c-anecuttexs f r o m t h e w orking Id-a"'
R a io Havana, 9 Tai 1963.
"The National Sugar Industry Workers Union has
called on retired sugar workers who are physically
fit to cut sugar to sign up as volunteer canecutters... "
Havana Radio Progreso, 9 Jan. 1963.
". .. steps have been taken to give the canecutters
an extra ration of food, in addition to the food they
lice dairy-,: so that t ey may conserve their strength
for the task facing them. " Santa Clara Centro Radial
Revolucionario, 10 Jan. 1963.
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 "What is basic duty of the workin c1 ? It
ApprouedlEor:ReJease .QQ T tl =R1 200010003-7
of the revolutions
ry, and work must be taken by all
as their basic duty..--
the young peopi_e... have in many cases not yet:
been able to rise to the same -heights in daily. work......
When the word'sacrifice' refers to the obscure, pex.--
hapsboring, but daily and enormously -effective .task
of work done... we see today a little. The young. people
are not in the lead.... And this is not normal.. .
'We, after four years, of. revolution have aririve'd?:at,_
a more or less critical_ point. '. Minister of Industry
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Radio Havana, 28 Jan. 1963.
"Today it is necessary to increase production and pro-
ductivity in industry and agriculture for the good of- our
revolution: ... In Cuba, this is a time for work... ".
Revolution,, 28 Jan. 1963.
"If we do not produce, at the increasing-pace demanded
by the moment... the revolution vyili s iltlike aplant
without water." E1.Munc?o, 28 Jan. 1963.
The Machines:
"iiepairs will. be finished in 95 per-cent. of the ;.sugar
mills by the third week'in' December '" El Mundb,
2 Nov. 1962.
"... the'e'stabli:shtrient of people's' schools in the
areas of-the eight sugar-mills which are-.-currently
being disxn.antled' foi`repairs /to other mills?7 was
discussed. " Hoy, 23 Nov. 1962.
"A thorough study has been made of the manpower
shortage... and every means has been tried to correct'
the shortage by the use of canec ttin mac-homes.. ,
1, 000 were to be .manufactured.... The promise was
the delivery of all the machines was to be made on
31 December. This is a promise that has no
kept.... and it will not be kept... .
"However, we must not have too many illusions about
the canecutting machines.. '.. naturally, no machine can
run for 24 hours.... the stability of the machines will
be determined at the end of the harvest. We are also
faced with the tast of teaching 1, 000 tractor drivers
to specialize i1n the canecutting process. It is rela-
tively hard to drive the machine.... The work is
diffroult for a single person... may be the forerunners
of more perfect machines. We must rely on the cane-
cutting machines. We must mechanize the cane culti-
vation and aspire to a 100 per cent mechanization... .
"This year we needed people to operate 1, 000 tractor-
canecutters, 1, 000 canecutting machines and at the same
time 500 cane loaders in the form of cranes.. . .with
the difficulties these machines offer, we must have at
least two tractor operators for each work unit. In
other words, just to operate the machines which ar_e
groins to resolve an insignificant p
g art of Cuba's pro-
ram this year, we would need 3, 000 tractor operators
.... to this figure we add the number of mechanics re-
quired to service the canecutting machines, and the
number of mechanics required for the development of
the assembly line production.... So far we have been
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"The coordination that must exist in a ugar field
when machines are working in it is much greater than
when m cheterostare 'working it it.y _This is the reason
why we have worked up to now to select the most rudi-
mentary machine.. . .In order to complete the cane-
cutting machines, we have had to pull mechanics from
the petroleum and electrical industry.... We have a
s zor at je a qualified manpower across the entire
scope of our economy. We also have a shortage of
technicians who can serve as managers o our man-
power. 11 Minister of Industry rnesto "Che'Guevara,
Havana CMQ TV Network, 20 Dec. 1962.
"Before the canecutting machine s -could cut the cane,
several macheteros and 'pathmakers' opened a path
through the center of each stand of cane to permit the
canecutting machines to operate. " Cruces Emisora,
CMHK, 19 Dec. 1962.
"The tests confirmed that cane-cutting machines should
be used on level, cleared land. As a result of the tests,
ad. ustments wi1I-75e"'Trade` E-Me machines so that it will
separate cane from foreign elements. The poss1 i ity
o 'iFeRd anizing loading operations is being studied with
ho e s t ~a __ a it s 0-acting mac ne s c n put into
operation in 1964. ' a are, 17 ec. LV6Z.
"The 'Patria o Muerte' Sugar Mill reported that the
operation of cane cutting machines in its fields is im-
proving as the operators acquire experience. Ijoyj
29 Dec. 1962.
"I want to harp on this again even though last year I
harped quite a lot on this matter of the sugar harvest,
that a great effort was made with the canecutting ma-
chine trials....
"The machines have proved to be an effective means of
assisting in the sugar harvest and are a first ste
However, something has happened. Yesterday, Tednesday,
the machines were idle, waiting for workers, the weeders,
the rakers and the loaders, who did not show up on the job....
"The human element continues to be the most important
factor.... Not even with 10, 000 machines can we solve the
problem of the sugar cane cutting and we only have 1, 000
machines." Kuchilian, Havana CMQ TV Network, 28 Dec.
1962.
"Students of the Machinery Operators' School of Holguin,
Pinar del Rio Province, are assembling 50 cane-cutting
machines. " Hoy, Z Jan. 1963.
"Fifty new cane cutting machines are being made ready...
Young students are doing the assembly work rapidly de-
spite their inexperience. " Havana Radio R cbelde, 2 Jan.
1963.
"Five hundred sugar cane-lifting machines will be as-
sem bled,,.. These machines were designed by Cuban experts.
Havana Radio, 18 Jan. 1963,
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machines... the first great step has been taken in Cuba
to solve the serious manpower shortage... . The Paco
Cabrera shop, in Camaguey Province, in the center of
our country, was given the task of building 100 cane-
liftin machines... and 20 of these are already operat-
ing~in the cane-fields. " Prensa Latina, 30 Jan. 1963.
The Protection
"Fires No, Care Yes" posters giving reasons for
increased fire prevention in sugar cane fields are being
distributed. Revolucion, 3 Dec. 1962.
"The necessity for permanent enlistment of volunteer
workers... was recognized... Specific measures will be
taken to avoid all kinds of fire, including fire put inten-
tionally to bad cane fields. . . " Hoy, 13 Dec. 1962.
"...we will avert sabotage by the enemies of the
revolution who will surely try to interrupt tiieAiird
pcopTe's sugar harvest... with the motto: 'Not one
cane stalk shall be left standing!'.... the people,
massively... will... turn eve ry sugar cane field and
.every sugar mill into an insurmountable trench ort'he
revolution. " Santiago Circuito Oriental de Radio,
12 Jan. 1963.
The Results
"This provincial distribution of the mills in operation,
as well as the production figures, indicate the growing
. dange r of a lag in the process of the sugar harvest... .
the amounts of cane processed so far has been very much
less than that of tame period year. " Santa Cara
Centro a vo. ucionario, an. I963.
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8
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Frod.uctio a of ?Potatoes in the USs -ft
1;`50 - 62
Year
1.950
1951
1952
1953
195-41
1955
1956
1957
1953
1959
1960
1961
1962
96
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built up .and consolidate our forces to make 'provisionss to cope with
the enemy's new schemes; to strengthen capacity of the masses for
struggle'inthemilitary; political, economic, and cultural fields;
to seer t`o the .*sic problems connected, with a, prolonged struggle,
such as setting up bases, preserving and developing the.forces.
M. Comments=on the Revolutionary Movement in the South and the Enemy's
....a. v.:.&:L1v1Ly.
X hough the enemy fou ht the movement more harshly than before
andltough our endeavor to build up and consolidate our forces was
a}1su*fxcient to keep up with the rapid development of the movement, we
oinued to xnake progress and to preserve and increase our forces.
In spite of increased terrorism on the part of the enemy, our
political movement held on and was strengthened, and extended further
in certain areas, `particularly in the Delta, in Zones I, V, and VI. The
am
aganda cam
6ple's movement- was intensified through extensive prop
4Mgns; through struggles to'demnnd essential rights, to oppose'
terrorism, killing, plunder, poison-spraying; and even included people
u; strategic hamlets. These struggle activities took place continuously,
everywhere, and developed arnovement of political opinion which ex-
1ended to.the very ranks of the enemy's Army and civil servants to .
oppose U.S. imperialist aggressors, and to `demand peace and neu-
trality and a democratic coalition government. The people's movement
against the strategic hamlets and the regroupment of population began
to extend and assumed the most stubborn spects; in certain areas,
many strategic hamlets were destroyed. In the process of the struggle,
the people's organizations were extended and strengthened. However,
in many areas, the people's struggles for their essential rights were
not intensified as they should have been to oppose more forcefully the
reactionary policies of the enemy, such as strategic hamlets, regroup
ment of people, draft, militarization of the youth of both sexes,
extortion, etc. The movement was still weak and slow; particularly
in contended areas, in those under enemy control, and in. cities.?
Leadership Was still defective in that it followed o. rigid pattern, lacked
flexibility, and lacked awareness of a prolonged struggle so that the
people's forces were not adequately strengthened.'
In providing leadership to oppose the strategic hamlets, enemy
schemes and designs were underestimated so that our forces were
not adequately consolidated for this purpose.
In the. recent past, our leadership has achieved many results, and
had many points of excellence, but also some shortcomings, the most
important of which were as follows:,
.We underestimated the schemes, designs, and capacities of
the U. S. At the meeting in Oct ober' 1961, an evaluation of the
enemy was made, but it was not quite accurate. For that reason,
leadership was not appropriate; we saw most of the advantages,
but overlooked the difficulties; we considered the advance of the
revolution as an,easy and rapid process,' and were not fully aware
of the fact that this is a prolonged and hard struggle; we failed to
combat subjective attitudes. Thus, when carrying out the offensive
against the enemy, we did not make enough effort to build up and
develop our forces and to strengthen the people; we did not make
q.'3eauate`provisions to eo;se with the enemy's efforts in fighting
and destroying us. In leading activities in the three types of areas,
we did not give enough attention to the setting up of bases and to
extending the. movement in weak areas and in cities. At the meeting
in October 1.961, the problem of defeating the Staley Plan was
brought up, but because. we did not make 'an accurate evaluation
of the enemy's schemes and did not succeed in overcoming our
weaknesses, `the measures. prescribed to cope with the .enemy were
still too general, particularly in connection with the strategic,
hamlets and the regroupment of people.
In certain places and at certain moments, in implementing the
policies of the Party, we still leaned towards the right. The degree
of this shortcoming varied with different areas and different echelons.
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The plans and,policies only pre scribed general principles, but
did not include concrete `procedures' suitable to the status...of the
movement.
The leadership approach and the organization of working methods
to ensure proper implementation of the Party's plains and policies
were not realistic enough, not quite consistent with the abilities of
the "structures" and.the people; and we were slow in detecting mis-
take s and new ~roblerns .
In summary, although the movement has extended considerably,
has achieved many results, and set up stable structures, it still has
important weaknesses and shortcomings in its process of de?z lopinent
which we should be fully aware of and should resolutely overcome in
order to-lead the revolution to further successes.
The U.S. is adopting ~a new strategy, conformable with the. Staley-
Taylor Plan, in order to resume the initiative,. with:the wicl ed purpose
of isolating the revolution and our armed forces from. the,.peaple in SVN.
It is only by isolating us that the enemy may have hopes of destroying us.
In order to isolate the South from the North, the enemy hasI accused
the North of invading the South, slandered the revolutionary movement
in the South, and set up a white belt along the 17th parallel and the bor-
der area adjacent to Laos and Cambodia, in order to cut all. relationship
of the revolution tn,the South with the outside world.
In order to isolate the revolutionary forces from the :-people they
hurriedly set up a system of centers to regroup rural and urban.. people,
under the slogan of '?strategic hamlets," with the purpose of controlling
the people, contending with us for manpower andeconomic resources,
reoccupying rural areas to isolate us from the people, and concentrating
forces to destroy us. They are intensifying the people's activities
against the revolution.
Because their forces and, their capacities are limited, while they
are urging: various areas to carry out military activities, to set up
strategic hamlets,, and to regroup the people; they also concentrate
forces to intensify military activities in.the Delta of SVN, ana to
attack populated spots in three areas of SVN, the most important of
which is the Western area. ' W rile they eagerly set up strategic ham-
lets in weak contended areas, they intensify military activities to
regroup the people in areas near our bases and continue to use planes,
helicopters, and commando units to attack us, and to subject our pro-
tected base areas to economic blockade, with a view to carrying out
large-scale offensive action to destroy our bases.
They have continued their scheme of dividing the people, antago-
nizing Catholics, and non-Catholics, and slandering the policies of our
Front; for instance,, they used agents to egg: on the, Can ;o.diana:
against us; they propounded autonomy to lure the :mountaineers; they
bribed the Cao Dai and Hoa Ha.o, and urged them to fight the .revo-
lution. Pro-French and pro-U. S. ' elements also increased activities
within the people's organizations, religious groups, and the ethnic
minorities to secure.a backing, to plan activities to fight us, and to
fight Diem; they are also' intensifying activity with the. purpose of
winning over the intermediate strata of the population.
IV. Plans and Specific Activities for the immediate Future.
We should promote a comprehensive movement of political and
military struggle; carry out a'continuous offensive to reduce enemy
forces; build up our own forces; intensify action upon the Army;
disorganize enemy forces; c^unteract the enerr_ylo sc'terne, whic'.a
4 air-:.c at separating the masses from the revolution; sabotage
strategic hamlets; lessen enemy pressure in areas where the move-
ment is still weak; oppose military operations; fight enemy commandos
and spies; strengthen and extend our local bases; strengthen the people
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in the politicail, military,. economic,,and,?cultural. fields; and, builtl up
a powerful- military force which will cooperate the` peo13le to`de-
feat the enemy.
In order to counteract, ep.erray: scheme s?, we should sabotage
strategic hamlets; ?prev{ r.t.the enemy froth bestging z.nd'att ckirig
our bases -and;::v:=?ge. forward the developx??lenti" nd'coi. olidaiiobn"of
our forces.. :'The ra.eetLI felt that.the. fell +win sentsdl ac:i~rities
should be carried out, along with the various' act?ivitie s, of -the' Party.
Oppo and Pe^ y -in Stra g c_Hamlets and. Regroupment Centers
The eeerr':'- ? s .;.ac .lining military aid cav liars persor.-nel to
conduct tern.4~,ist ar.d morping-up operations .and to set '1S.p
strategic hamlets and regroupme:~,t.ce iters so as to isolate
our armed forces, and our cadres and'Party mei fiber`s, for"
the purpose of destroying `the revolutionary mov. ,ement in the
South, and.resuming,control, ov the people through a com-
bination of. military, poli~t cal,. ' economic; anil cultural scheme.'s .
He has combined such. policie as . the 'a'rmy draft, mobilizing
:. compulsory labor, extortion, .etc., He not only delimits the
boundaries in bases, but also in' areas And in villages=for'the
purpose of repelling snd.destroying us.
With his present military superiority; the'enemy'can set-:
up. a number of strategic hamlets, set ul3 a white belt in
certain areas, andharasq Lour bases.` Be will increase
activities to destroy production, to plunder- property; }and
to, make further:,difficulties, for .the., people. He will intensify
terrorism to upset the.people.
This scheme is s o ;rope 'tart to the `enemy that he'?calls it
"unique natior}al policy'' because in the. Staley plan, it is con
sider.ed as.the.,one most essenti.I'fact'or that '~will determ'ne
victory. Thus, as (ar as we are concerned, our count yr
action of the enemy's plan of strategic hamlets a ht
ment centers will make, it possible for: us to preser-:We and
develop our. movement. This will be a most imnoriany r b : struggle
..
to be carried out b various, echelons n various area
o itical and military 'forces `and by different 'branr;hes af'the,
.arty; this will be rolonge and stubborn`struggle,l and; , .
Is. only when there is a big :change in the`relativity of strength
tween the enemy and us that we can'com_pletely defeat.this .
Some Important Problems.
Although the people and the "cells heave' fairly good morale
and have acquired enough..experience.., they should not be sub=
jective because this.stubborn and prolonged-st,ruggle"to Oppose
strategic hamlets and regroupment centers.required better
moral preparation, a more comprehensive and stronger move-
ment, and better and more flexible leadership. It will be very
-important to set up and preserve covert structures' so as to
maintain the movement and tle strength. oft he people in order,
to oppose and defeat the enemy's schemes. " We should realize.
that our structures in weak and contended areas 'are -still.-' '
inadequate and overt, and we should try to remed;r'this short- '
coming. In base areas and in areas adjacent to our bases, we
should prevent the enemy from regrouping the population and
delimiting boundaries, by carrying out various forms of
struggle. We should have two types of members:.., legal and
illegal ones (their numbers will vary depending on the area);
when the enemy rounds up the people, we will introduce
covertly those people who' are capable -of production and of
protecting the bases; when the situation is tense, we will
exhort the regrouped people to struggle and 'retur- n, and we
will withdraw the covert people; we will thus "tug back and
forth" with the enemy.
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With regard to military activities, we should urgently intensify
the people's movement, sex up combat villages, and extend guer-
rilla warfare. In areas wliete strategic hamlets have been or are
being set up, we should h 4e the guerrillas harass the enemy, and
organize secret self .defen a corps members to create disturbances,
to chastise resolute Ly the evil-doers, and paralyze them completely.
We will concentrate our ar~ned forces to carry out military oper-
ations in a very large area, fight continuously, and penetrate deeply
into the enemy's rear areas to destroy the lines of communication.
In providing leadership, the cells and the district committees
should concentrate on the struggle against strategic hamlets and
regroupment centers. At the zone and provincial levels, we should
assign committee members and cadres who already have assured
direct leadership in areas where there are many strategic hamlets.
3. Setting up Bases
Because a base is not a temporary station for the troops and
various organizations, nor a retreat, but a place to build up and
develop revolutionary forces, in every respect, to attack enemy
areas, and because it is like "a flag representing the revolution
and the new system, " the various echelons should under. stand
that it is their responsibility to consolidate the forces and the
facilities to set up bases.
4. Administration of Rural Areas
In providing leadership for rural administration, the various
echelons should carry out the policies properly, and see that the
administrative organizations and methods are cor_siste.rnn;. Situ-
ations such as cadres holding all the jobs, or the creation of
unrealistic organizations, should be avoided.
5. Intensifying the Political Struggle
... there are circumstances when the struggle should be
extremely resolute, and go as far as bloodshed in order to
be successful, as when the people oppose compulsory evacu-
ation from their land and homes; when they oppose regroup-
ment, strategic hamlets, drafting for the Army or for
compulsory :Labor, etc.
We should make the people see clearly the practical results
obtained directly or indirectly through struggle; meanwhile, we
should continue to organize, develop and strengthen the people's
forces, and to further the people's political awareness in order
to maintain and extend the struggle movement.
We should continue to lead the people in their struggle;
utilize the overt and legal economic, cultural and social
organizations as a means to gather forces to struggle against
the enemy.
6. Intensifying the Military Struggle
We should organize attacks against the enemy in his rear
areas to upset him. In the past, such activities were n,?glected;
there was no adequate preparation or organization, and weapoas
and facilities were lacking. Now, we should set up spca:.1aliz d
units and clandestine forces to attack ways of communication,
warehouses, airports, and U. S. offices particularly. Public
utilities such as electric plants, machines, etc. , are not to be
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movement, it is also capable of inducing enemy units to oppose
the war and to rebel. In order for the slogan to' be more specific
and more effective, it can be worded as follows: "the people, the
troops and officers in the SVN Army should get together` to oppose
U. S. aggression. " In addition, there will be other slogans aimed
at the troops and officers, to stimulate their nationalism, to urge
them to oppose the U. S. and the war, to demand peace, and to oppose
U. S. commanders.
At present, the people's movement for action against the Army
is fairly extensive on the surface, but activities such as organizing
and developing revolutionary structures should be carried out deeper
within the enemy's Army. Generally speaking, we should continue
to rely upon the people, the troops' families, the captured and sur-
rendered troops, to intensify action against the Army, but we should
also provide closer leadership and make use of more realistic methods.
Because most officers come from the upper strata of the popu-
lation, our methods should be nearly the same as those used to work
upon the upper strata. We should extend the range of their expec-
tations to induce them to side with the revolution.
9.Economic and Financial Activities
The purpose of financial activities is to increase incomes,
to economize and to improve financial management, Recently,
the various echelons did not fully realize the importance of finan-
cial activities to provide for the needs of the revolution. Action
against the people to obtain contributions from them was still in-
adequate; there were still injustices and inconsistencies; other
national resources that could have been exploited were overlooked;
financial management was still defective. In the coming period,
we should make a survey to determine the potential incomes and
the sources of income for each area; and cut down those expendi-
tures that are not absolutely necessary.
The main source of income will still be the contributions of
the people and the results will depend upon the methods used in
urging the people to give voluntarily. We should work upon the
people to make them realize that it is the responsibility of every-
one to contribute to the needs of the revolution.
10. Counterespionage Activities
Counterespionage policies should be sound and specific and should
aim at educating and reforming a majority of backward and erring
elements, and at chastising the few refractory chiefs. We should
be very cautious in making arrests. Specific rules should be pre-
scribed in connection with arrests, investigations and judgments,
to ensure that policies are properly implemented. In places where
mistakes have been made, corrective measures should be taken,
but we should be very careful and not let the enemy take advantage
of the situation.
The system of security and protection should be strengthened;
short courses should be organized to train cadres, especially in
the villages, to give, the cadres and the personnel in the security
and protection systems a better understanding of their responsibili-
ties and of the policies.
11. Communications and Transportation
This is a very important activity. Recently, some results
have been achieved, but they were insufficient and far below the
goals contimplated in our plans
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12. Activities of the Party
Significant results have been achieved during the part few years
with ro garb. to build wing u , the Party. In m;,i.y ple ces, the number
of mer;,.herrr !,.as i icreas:,>z': two or th:caec tiniec. } hwevr r, the Party
develo-:'d ve :'y sl? wly in w ak 'z.reas and ii~~uder+. very {.ow women
or m.e.x~bers ?'rcari r'a ?ia3 ???.s groups. Cadres were not trained enough
to m-act the Lacreasing needs.
We have succeeded to e. certain extent in overcoming rightists and
urce.r',li.nty, and in promoting the id:-a of aa:tack?in_F the enemy and
duvel.o :rig the mo*.r?71~.en rnean,,hile. beca.r :e p*0icie: were not well
under stood, thou gi_tle s s and :;hurt-.:: ighte. J attitude h3', l evcloped
which is characterized l y song-.rltme-at with present acb. evemcnts.
Recen::Zy, in view of the increac3 in U.S. military intervention, a
fear of the U. S. and of a long hard st uggie has developed even
though confi,'.ence in the certain, victnry of the revolution. still persists.
Gen(,"-ally spz aking, edl ration.z.,Ll acti.v ties within the P'.-?.:rty were still
inadequate; the capacities and efficil-;ncy of the cadres ;-,, d Party
mernters weren;`.t in keeping w-th the regiikemc-nts fo= guiding the
movement. Orga1' zation3 for specialized activi es vswere lacking and
working methods ?.t various echelons were still defective. At the
village level in particular, the capacities of the cells as well. as their
organization and v,. rki g methods vr~.:re not cons tent ,.with the
development of the sltr.a`ion in rural. areas. Meanwhile, certain areas
have not been able to settle V:3?7i internal problems between old and new
mernbers properly; and problems rs-.?. in to Pa j?`y members and
cadres who had been imprisoned and released have not been solved
in conformance with policies.
In connection with the coming activities of the Party, the following
question should be given special attention. With regard to moral
leadership, we should educate Party members to ma.lre them realize
that this is a long hard struggle, but. that the are :apatIle of gradually
defeating th -enemy an:1 gaining advantages step by stop before
achieving victory, We should be fiJ.i.y aware of the di,'-C: .culties, but
by promoting re5r:lutior and persevar?ence. by s-tinnuI.a;! ?u1g the fighting
spirit, optimism and co-,ifidence, wa will surely lead the revolution to
victory. Meanwhile, we should overcome pessimistic attitudes in
view of the intensification of enemy destructive activities.
We should develop the Party in areas, villages, and hamlets
where we have few members ; more women and members from
religious sects should be recruited for the Party. Cadres in Saigon
should be increased, and cadres should be assigned to weak areas
to build up Party structures.
In consolidating the Party, the main activity will be education.
Depending on the character aid po? ition of each area, constant
goals will be pre.:-cribed for the consolidation task. The goals for
consolidation in rural areas vril.l be: to improve the capacity for
rural administration; and to build up and lead political and military
forces to oppose terrorism. Party structures should be kept secret
and protected, and provided with g?nidance for a prolonged struggle.
The enemy is still capable of carrying out relerl.less attacks in
certain rural areas, particularly in those where strategic hamlets
are to be ectabliched, and we sho^a].U develop Party members, labor-
youth mern.bers ,nd cadres f(:r clan 1estine actin ies. In case of
emergency, when the enemy threat increases, r.-ells will be set up
and the cl?~.ndestire system will stay and stick to the people to lead
the movement.
(See project concerning crganization)
25 September 1962
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010003-7