BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100070010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 5, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

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25X1 C10b =on @w&mwm& 5 November 1962
ADDENDUM
590.
The Stashinsky Case and the Subject Nationalities in the Soviet Union -
E,J,U
591.
The Current Status of Walter Ulbricht - C , 0
592.
Cuba: Revolution Betrayed - D, J, P, T, V
593.
The Power Struggle Underlying Current International Tensions -
E, K, U
594.
Sino-Indian Conflict Expands - A, F, K
595.
Utilizing the Crisis to Expose Communist Fronts and Fellow Travelers- U
c ~ (Addendum)
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CASTRO BETRAYS THE CUBAN REV UTION
In chapter and verse one may trace Castro's betrayal of the promising
revolution which put him into power in Cuba. Here are some examples:
A rarian Reform. Perhaps no battlecry epitomizes the appeal of Com-
munism better t an Land for the Landless"; certainly no other exposes the
failure and deception of Communism as well as it does. As the Organization
of American States special consultative committee on security concluded,
Communist promises of delivering land to the landless constitute "the most
tragic deceit practiced by the Communists." In his betrayal of the Cuban
Revolution, Castro confirms the OAS evaluation.
From the outset Castro posed as a national "champion" of the peasants.
However, he acquired his "championship" via curious and twisted reasoning.
He declared (addressing the Congress of Peasants 24 February 1959):
"I was not born poor. I was born rich. I was not the son
of a landless peasant. I was the son of a rich landowner.
I never lived in a miserable house. I was near poverty,
but I never suffered from it. That is why I do not defend
the landowners, but the people and the peasants. The
Prime Minister is the leader of the peasants and no one
can defend them better than he. "
Agrarian reform was one of Castro's original panaceas offered to the
people. It was a promise before he gained power and he repeated it in his
first public statements after the success of the revolution. He declared
(in the 24 February speech noted above) that without agrarian reform the
country's economy would founder and everybody would be ruined. It was
necessary, therefore, to break up the big estates. Castro promised the
peasants that the land would be theirs and that nobody would take it away
from them.
By 27 March 1960, the "champion of the peasants" was singing a differ-
ent tune. He revealed a "modification" in his "land for the landless" pledges.
The large sugar estates would not be broken up into parcels for the peasant;
they would be converted into cooperatives. "Split up the sugar cane planta-
tions," why, Castro said, "imagine what the results would have been! A
tiny piece of land for each family with separate administration, and contracting,
and machinery for each piece. "
Castro painted a glowing picture of the cooperatives, but added (in a
17 May 1961 speech as quoted by Blas Roca in Cuba Socialista, September
1961):
"Only you can decide whether you want to organize coop-
eratives . . . The Revolution respects your will in this
matter. If you are not convinced that cooperatives are
the solution, t (emphasis added) to maintain yourselves
on small parce s. it
Also in May 1961, Castro ridiculed the idea that farms would be collec-
tivized. "The revolution would never do such a foolish thing," he said. "If
a farmer prefers to keep his bit of land, then the revolution will never try
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But by early 1961, state farms began to appear. Castro proclaimed the
"happiness" of the peasants over this development. The peasant, Castro
declared (Revolucion, 8 March 1961), saw "no difference now between him-
self and the national authority."
On 13 November 1961 (talking to "revolutionary orienters"), Castro
admitted agricultural problems and in a veiled way revealed his next move:
to take land away from the peasants, abolish the cooperatives and convert
to state farms. He said:
"Naturally when the time comes to reorganize all this, it
is much more difficult to take away than to give, thus
creating a problem. This is, simply because the workers
do not have a clear understanding . . . "
Castro declared (10 May 1962 speaking in Matanzas Province): "We
are not going to be afraid of appearing to have taken a step backward. "
His admitted "step backward" was to collectivize the cooperatives- -to
form so-called "people's farms" copying the Soviet state farm plan in
which the government owns the land and the peasant becomes a state
worker.
The final step--the difficult part of taking away--was accomplished
without the publicity Castro's propagandists usually attached to his acts.
But the act was summed up in a statement by an agricultural official
(Carlos Rafael Rodeiguez, Revolution, 17 May 1962) when he referred to
the "transformation of cane cooperatives into people's farms announced by
Fidel (Castro) a few days ago,"
Castro addressed a "Congress of Cooperatives" on 18 August 1962 and
the Congress approved his decision to convert cooperatives into state farms.
Thus, agrarian reform had traveled the full circle. As applied to Cuba's
most important agricultural product- -sugarcane- -the workers were first
promised land; then the plantations were turned into cooperatives (with
propaganda stressing this made the workers part owners); then, the coop-
eratives became state farms which left the worker back where - he started--
landless and working for the land owner, in this case, the state.
Liy g Standards. As "champion" of the people, Castro regularly
insisted in his early statements that the chief aim of his revolutionary pro-
gram was to improve the living standards of the people. Pre-Castro Cuba
was one of the richest nations in Latin America (in the top five in per capita
income and manufacturing, for example), but Castro promised that each
peasant would have more than ever before.
In promulgating the Agrarian Reform Law on 17 May 1959, Castro
declared that its implementation would mean two.million Cubans "will have
their income increased and will become buyers in the" domestic market."
On 10 June 1959 (in an interview in Revolucion), Castro claimed: "Next year
we will have other resources and pro uction will have increased considerably..."
A year and a half after taking control, Castro told the people he was
accomplishing the goal of raising their living standards and that an even
better future was ahead. But by early 1961 Castro acknowledged that he
hadn't been too ffec ive; there were hitches in his program. On 8 April 1961,
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he stated: "Today some things, it is true, are lacking." In presenting the
1962 economic program (21 October 1961), Castro admitted: "Our economy
cannot afford to do more for the people than it is doing right now. "
On a radio interview on 13 March 1962, Castro announced rationing for
oils, butter, rice, beans and milk. Soap and toothpaste would be rationed
in major cities and in Havana--where almost one-third of Cuba's population
lives lives--additional rationed items would be beef, chickens, fish, eggs and
produce.
A Havana broadcast of 14 March 1962 claimed that Castro's announcement
of rationing was received by the people "with great enthusiasm. " The broad-
cast reasoned that rationing meant "that some people who have been getting
less than their share will now get more."
But it didn't work out that way. Writing in the Manchester Guardian the
first week in June, 1962, David Holden reported that rationing in Havana was
"severe and inefficient. " He reported that his friends in Cuba were unable
to secure even their authorized quotas of rationed items.
Castro said on 14 May 1962 (addressing the Camaguey Sugar Plenum):
"This is the price that people must pay for the right to
a better future. We have difficulties. We know that . . . .
Imagine the unimaginable of a revolution without
difficulties . "
Or one might observe: Imagine the unimaginable of a Communist country
without food shortages. The state farm system was evidently working as
well in Cuba as it was in Soviet Russia and the people suffered from shortages
of food and other necessities.
The Cuban peasant found he couldn't eat promises and his standard of
living was going down, even below pre -Castro levels.
Elections. In his first political declaration from the Sierra Maestra
in Jury- Castro included a "formal promise" of general elections at
the end of one year and an "absolute guarantee" of freedom of information,
press and all individual and political rights provided in the 1940 constitution.
This was the promise to the Cuban people--a promise that helped
inspire them to take up arms and overthrow a regime that was dening them
these same constitutional provisions. Castro elaborated on his promises
in a February 1958, magazine article (in the now defunct C :)ronet) in which
he said he was fighting for a "genuine representative government" and
"truly honest" general elections within 12 months. He defended himself
against the accusation "of plotting to replace military dictatorship with
revolutionary dictatorship. "
In his first speech after assuming power (9 January 1959), Castro
promised that elections would be held "as soon as possible." One month
later he promised the people elections would be held in two years. After
that positive statement, Castro became progressively vague. He argued
that the Cuban people didn't want elections; the people, he said in 1961, have
"no time" for elections. Finally ,: e ridiculed the idea of elections altogether.
Castr~ ?showed s ii1ar respect for his other promises toe orce the
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to the Cuban people:
*28 February 1959:. "It is not necessary to have a constitutional
convention. The next thing will be general elections. . . . Any place where
the government wants to be in for very long without free elections . . it
begins to make inventions, planning ways to be there a long time. We are
not in that class. . . . The people do not want elections now."
*8 April 1959: "Clean and honest elections, yes. We are the first to
favor elections and submitting matters to popular verdicts . ... "
*9 June 1959: "The consensus is this: that as soon as the nation
demand-we will have elections. . . . Later we may again sound out
when the people want elections held.
*2 September 1960: "This, here, this certainly is representation,
because we gave no a lotbox-stuffing. here, ncr fraud, nor bought votes, nor
political sergeants, nor a machine, nor bottles, nor anything. This, here,
is pure. This one--this one really is- a democracy free of impurities. This
is a truly pasturized democracy. Can there be anything purer than a
meeting of minds of all the people ?" .
*2 Max 1961: "A revolution expressing' the will of the people is an
election every day, not every four years. . . . Direct, government by
the people has replaced the conception of pseudodemocracy. Do the
people have time for elections? No!"
Communism. Castro's early public statements were anti-Communist,
but be ore 15>_ was over his tone changed. In a four-hour television talk
on 22 October, Castro asserted: "I declare that all that is said in the United
States through the, press concerning Communism is a lie!" A few days
later (26 October 1959.in an interview with Henry J. Taylor of the Washing-
ton Dail News) Castro declared: "I am no Communist. Just because
Karl Marx had a beard and Castro also has a beard, Americans should not
jump to conclusions. . . . I want no foreign power dominating my country.
But his association with Communism mounted--internally-as well as
externally. In a Cuban-Soviet communique of 19 December 1960, the two
countries pledged to work together and, endorsed their respective domestic
and foreign policies. Moscow's TASS (reporting on an interview with
Castro which appeared in the Italian Communist Party organ, L'Unita)
on 1 February 1961 quoted Castro: "The Communists have she a much
blood and shown much heroism in the struggle for the cause of the Cuban
people. Now we continue to work together, honestly and fraternally. "
On 1 May 1961, Castro proclaimed Cuba was a "socialist" state:
"To those who talk to us,about the 1940 constitution we
say . . That constitution has been left behind by this
revolution, which, as we have said, is a socialist
revolution. . ... That new social system is called
socialism, and this new/ constitution will therefore
be a socialist constitution. "
Castro's brand of "socialism"was not, of course, the Western social.
democracy but rather the second stage in the newl proclaimed Communist
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and communism: This f: became "clear as Castro conn=ed to proclaim his
unequivocal embrace of communism.
In his historic "I-am-a-Marxist-Leninist" speech of 2 December 1961,
Castro said he was forming a new. political party to absorb all other parties
to "lead Cuba through socialism to a people's democracy o Fie dictatorship
of the proletariat." He said he had hitherto hidden his belief in Communism
from the Cuban people because "otherwise we might have alienated the
bourgeoise and other forces which we knew we would eventually have to fight.
"When I left the university, I was not a Marxist-Leninist,
but I was basically influenced by their works. . . . Do
I believe in Marxism? I believe absolutely in Marxism!
Did I believe in it on 1 January? I believed on 1 January.
Did I believe in it on 2 6 July? I believed in it on 2 6 July. . . .
Do I have doubts about Marxism? . . . I do not have the
slightest doubt. . . . That is why I began to tell you with
all candor, that we believe in Marxism, that we believe
that it is the most correct, most scientific, the only true
theory, the only true revolutionary theory. Yes, I state
it here, with complete satisfaction and with full confidence.
I am a Marxist TLeninist and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist
until the last day of my life. "
Since his 2 December confessional, Castro has continued to proclaim
his Marxist-Leninist oriBntation proudly stressing-that he is following the
Soviet model. For example, in a 22 December 1961 address to the "Schools
of Revolutionary Instruction," he called attention to the fact his "people's
farms" were the same as the Soviet "sovkhoz," that the "Schools of
Revolutionary Instructions" would be called "Schools of Marxism-Leninism"
in the USSR, and that his "political orienters" are counterparts of the Soviet
?agitators. "
Confirming his Marxist-Leninist position and necessarily related homage
and dependence upon the Soviet Union, Castro has executed a series of
military agreements with the Soviets. Examples of Soviet imperialism
became an every-day-affair for the Cubans as Soviets took over homes and
hotels, commandeered farms, schools, land; took over docks and ports;
built walls to hide their activities and limit Cuban access to the areas they
occupied, etc. The objective of this haste, secrecy and militancy became
public knowledge on 22 October 1962 when President Kennedy revealed the
Soviets had constructed medium range ballistic missile sites in Cuba.
Thus, Castro completed his betrayal of a promising revolution and his
betrayal of the Cuban people. In accepting the Soviet line in international
affairs, accepting Soviet arms, equipment, technicians and money and
embracing Communism "until the last day of my life," he completed a sellout
of his nation and his people. The full extent of his betrayal became evident
in late October when Khrushchev stated the arms in Cuba were his, were
manned by Soviets and that he would be willing to withdraw them under certain
conditions--E hort, Cuba was but a pwan in his program of world conquest
and domination.
Castro's promise of "Land for the Landless" has become "Less Land
for the Landless"; his promises of higher living standards have meant
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ration'
promises of elections have given away to his plan to remain perpetually in
power; his nationalism and anti-Communism have been shams to hide his
embrace of Communism and his role as a pawn in the scheme of international
Communism.
These are the facts in Castro's betrayal of Cuba's revolution.
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The Soviet Union and the Freedom of the Seas
The United States quarantine of Cuba raised questions about the freedom
of the seas. Pro-Soviet observers took pleasure in recalling that hitherto,
the United States had been an opponent of blockades, and had frequently become
embroiled with countries that tried to impose then. They ignored the .fact that
the United States obtained the agreement of the ?:vganization of American States
(with 20 favorable votes and one abstention) to taking sanctions, in accordance
with the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Article 8 of that treaty provided for
action to be taken to meet a threat to the peace of the Americas, including "the
use of armed force." As the crisis developed, it became clear that the blockade-
type action was designed to bring pressure short of invasion or bombing, that in
effect it was a means of postponing and, if possible, avoiding actual hostilities.
At this writing, it appears that the quarantine, together with the obvious
American resolve to take further measures if necessary, has produced the de-
sired result. It is likely, however, that more discussion will follow on the
subject of the supposed American infringement of the freedom of the seas.
It should not be supposed that the Soviet Union and previous Russian regimes
have always been champions of maritime freedom. By a ukase of 4/16 September
1821, Czar Alexander I unilaterally forbade all foreign vessels from approaching
Russian coasts and islands "within less than 100 Italian miles /11:e., 185 kilo-
meters7 under penalty of confiscation." Great Britain and the united States
successfully insisted on the abandonment of this Wider. In 1827, Russia joined
with France and Britain in a "peaceful blockade" of Turkey. War was not con-
sidered to have been declared, but the Turkish fleet was defeated in battle at
Navarino, and as a result, Greece obtained her independence. As one of the
Great Powers, Russia also participated in "peaceful blockades" around Greece
in 1886, Crete in 1897, and Montenegro in 1913; these blockades were designed
to prevent or limit the spread of hostilities, and although they showed a disregard
for the rights of small nations, they achieved their purpose.
Since the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR has been too much at odds with
other powers to join with them in imposing any "peaceful blockade".. But the
Soviet Union has continued to take unilateral action which has restricted the
freedom of the seas. In 1909, the Czar's government had asserted that Russian
territorial waters extended 12 miles from Russian shores, whereas most o Tier
nations a imitec their claims to a three or four mile limit. (If all nations
claimed and enforced a 12 mile limit, there would be no free entrance into the
Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Aegean Sea, or through the
English Channel, the Strait of Malacca, or some 60 other straits and passages.)
This claim, contested by the principal maritime powers, was reasserted by the
Soviet government in a decree on "the protection of state boundaries" dated
June 15, 1927. Unlike the claims of some other nations to extended water areas,
the Soviet 12 mile limit has been rigidly enforced. Swedish, Danish, and
Japanese fishermen have been repeatedly interned for infringements, real or
supposed, on Soviet waters. A Japanese protest of March 1959 stated that 744
Japanese vessels had been seized by the Soviets since 1945. The USSR refuses
to submit the question of the 12 mile limit to the International Court of Justice
in the Hague.
Soviet leaders have aimed at placing the seas surrounding the Soviet Union--
the 13lack--Sea, the Baltic, the Barents Seas, the Sea of Japan and the Sea of
Okhotsk--under Soviet control, even beyond the 12 mile limit. They claim that.,
these seas should be "closed seas," i.e. seas controlled by the powers immedi-
ately fronting on them. In effect, however, this would mean in each case Soviet
control, since Soviet power would outweigh the other countries involved.
1. Access to the Black Sea has been an object of contention since the
18th 'century. 71u"Ian policy has aimed, first, at barring the war-
ships of non-Black-Sea states, and second, at gaining effective
control of the straits at Constantinople (Istanbul). A secret treaty
concluded du-^ing World War I would have conceded the Czarist
government c:intro' of the straits, bu": this 'eras discarded when
Russia made a 4ep.irate peace with Germat.,,y. The Lausanne Con-
venticar of 19-1"1 the strc. ts, p .aced `hem under an
International Cc: xiillissio-~ with a Turkish c airman (and no Soviet
member), and nh)e :ed them freely to all nations. After war began
to threaten -in the 1930's, a new convention was concluded at
Montreux (19:36), giving Turkey sole crutrol of the straits, including
the right to-fortify them, and placing low limits on the amount of
non-Black -Sea war tonnage that ma,,( be admitted, while almost
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all warships of Black Sea powers are permitted to leave. This
convention, generally favorable to the USSR, is now in effect.
It does not satisfy Soviet desires, however; in 1945, Moscow
demanded that Turkey share the control of the straits with the
USSR, Bulgaria and Rumania, which would have meant effective
Soviet control. (The Soviets also claimed sections of Turkish
territory at Kars and Ardahan.) Turkey refused, and was
supported by the United States and Great Britain; the demand
was abandoned after Stalin ts death in 1953.
2. A Soviet handbook of international law says, "The E3altiu
should also be considered a closed sea." Sinnee 1957, the
Soviets have been urging the exclusion of non-Baltic warships.
But the non-Communist countries on the Baltic do not desire
to have that sea closed, in any sense. Incidents with aircraft
and ships have occurred, and the Soviets frequently block off
large areas for naval maneuvers, to the irritation of the
Scandinavian countries.
3. The Barents Sea is notable for the shooting down, by the Soviets
in July l9bo, o' a US IIB-47 airplane, which was travelling at
least 30 miles from Soviet territory.
4. In the Sea of Japan, the Soviets in 1957 drew a line 115 miles
long acrossPetei he Great Bay, making "internal waters"
out of a large area centering on Vladivostok. Foreign ships
or aircraft are required to obtain permission for access.
5. In March 1956, negotiations for a peace settlement between
Japan and the USSR broke down, and the Soviets immediately
and unilaterally declared restrictions on salmon fishing in
large areas of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Japan and Bering
Seas. Since the supply -ol z~"s ~iis a matter of life and death
for overpopulated Japan, the Japanese were soon compelled
to sign a fisheries treaty with the Soviet Union, according
to which Soviet and Japanese areas and quotas for fishing
are "agreed" on each year. Each year, Soviet pressure has
progressively reduced the area in which the Japanese may
fish, and the Sea of Okhotsk has now been completely closed
for salmon fishing (though not for some less important kinds
of fishing). The total area affected by the treaty extends
eastward in the Pacific to 1750 west longitude, beyond the
tip of the Aleutians, and the Sow this year proposed an
extension of the zone southward along the main Japanese
islands. Quotas for the Japanese salmon fishing catch
throughout the northwest Pacific area have been progressively
reduced from 120,000 metric tons in 1957 to 55,000 tons for
1963. There are many international agreements in force
intended to prevent the exhaustion of fisheries, and this is a
legitimate objective; the Soviet-Japanese agreement, however,
is used by the USSR to extend its economic and political power
and illustrates the pitfalls which Turkey and the Scandinavian
countries have been able to avoid. Aside from fishing, the
Soviets tried at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951,
and in peace talks with the Japanese in 1955-6, to obtain agree-
ment to making the Sea of Okhotsk a closed sea. Although the
Soviets failed to get agreement to their proposal, the Naval
Handbook of International Law, published by the Sovie ense
Ministry sn a ine a ea of Okhotsk as a closed sea.
If Soviet policies for closing neighboring seas succeed, they will in effect
make good the claim of Alexander I to a zone of "100 Italian miles "- -continuing,
as in many other fields, the imperialist traditions of Czarist .Russia. The
Berlin blockade of 1948 showed that the Soviets were quite ready - where, as in
the Berlin situation, they were able to do so - to impose unilateral blockades in
times of "peace."
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EXCERPTS FROM PEKING PE PL S , c o e 9b2
"More on Nehru's Philosophy in t e ig t o the Sind-Indian. Boundary Question"
1 ... What stand should the Marxist-Leninists ,take on this policy of reaction-
ary nationalism.followed by Nehru? Here a review of an episode in Chinese
history of more than 30 years ago may be useful. The Chinese people still
remember that when the S:)viet Union was the only socialist state in the world
it was provoked and attacked by China's reactionary, big bourgeoisie and big
landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that
the Soviet Government had .given vigorous support to the Kuomintang of China,
the Kuomintang reactionaries-headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after
their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, stirred
up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-
communist, antipopular moves. In December 1927 the Kuomintang reaction-
aries forcibly and outrageously closed down the Soviet consulates in various
cities of China;, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials, and broke off
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union... After a year or more, in July 1929
the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of the "Sing-Soviet agreements of
19,'24," manufactured "the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway" and arrested
more than 300 Soviet nationals.
When the Soviet Union repeatedly showed forbearance and proposed the holding
of a meeting to settle the Chinese Eastern Railway question peacefull, Chiang
Kai-shek took the self-restraint of the Soviet Union to mean that "the Soviet
Union meekly submits, not, daring to make the slightest resistance. " In
October of that year, the army of the Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the
Soviet border, stirring up an armed conflict between: China and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the Soviet Union was compelled to act in self-defense and defeated this
military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries..
Did the socialist Soviet Union do the right thing at-the, time ? History has long
since handed down. its verdict: It was absolutely the right thing to do. The
Soviet Union's resolute counterblow to the military provocation of the Kuomintang
reactionaries not only defended the interests of the socalist state but also
accorded with the interests of the Chinese .people and of the revolutionary
people of the world. Sinn-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to
Sino-Soviet relations of more than 30 years ago.
More than 30 years ago, when the Kuomintang reactinaries launched that
anti-Soviet campaign, the Chinese communists were not caught in the toils
of the reactionary nationalism of the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese commu-
nists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of
the Kuomintang government. The Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party issued a declaration on 24 September 1927 in which it solemnly
stated: "The reactionary Kuomintang government absolutely does not
represent revolutionary China, and its orders to sever diplomatic relations
with Russia absolutely do not represent the public opinion of the great majority
of the Chinese people. The reactionary Kuomintang government regards the
Soviet Union as an enemy, but we, the masses of the people, still regard the
Soviet Union as a good friend of China and will always unite with it in fighting
for the Chinese revolution and the world revolution. " Soong Ching-ling,
leader of the revolutionaries in the Kuomintang, also sent a cable to the
Kuomintang authorities at that time, denouncing them as "criminals ruining
the party and the nation."
After the reactionary Kuomintang clique launched the anti-Soviet war in
northeast China in July 1929 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party issued another declaration, calling on "the broad masses to rise against
the war on the Soviet Union." In response to this call, the Chinese communists
and the masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution
by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and
demonstrations . in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of
the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many communists, workers,
peasants, students, and progressives laid down their lives with glory.
Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the
Kuomintang ractionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly,
it was perfectly right. It was none other than the Chinese communists who
thoroughly exposed the false propaganda of narrow nationalism fanned up by the
Kuomintang reactionaries in their anti-Soviet campaign. It was none other
than the Chinese communists who upheld the truth and resolutely safeguarded
the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people under extremely difficult
conditions. Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the
Chinese communists by their acts during this incident proved themsdves
genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of
proletarian internationalism.
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Today, the communists and progressives df India are ixi a. situation somehat
similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than 30'
years ago. As a result of the reactionary po'licy'of"tlie Nehru government,
the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces are subjected to persecu-
tion. Each time the Nehru government stirs up an anti-China campaign, he
simultaneously mounts an attack !onthe Indian'Commun.ist Party and pro-
gressive forces, But large numbers. of Indian communists and progressives,
large numbers of politically conscious workers, peasants, intellectuals, and-
fair-minded people have not been deceived by the reactionary propaganda of
the Indian ruling 'circles, nor have they knuckled under to their attacks. In
the interests of the Indian people, they have, tinder extremely difficult
conditions, stood firm for truth, justice, and Sino-Indian friendship and waged
unflinching struggles. History will prove that it is they who really represent
the interests of the great Indian nation and-people.
2 ... The goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a
great empire unprecedented in Indians history. The sphere of influence of
this great. empire would include a series of countries from the Middle East
to southeast Asia and far surpass that of the colonial system. set up in Asia
in the past by the British Empire. Second, this ambitious Nehru believes,
that when the "regional grouping" with India a's ':'the center of economic and
political activity" is established, or, in other words, when the great empire
conceived by Nehru, comes into existence "minority problems will disappear"
in this region. . According to Nehru,. "the small national state is doomed, "
"it may survive as a culturally.-autonomous area but not'as an independent
political unit." In a word, it can only beta vassal in Nehru'sgreat empire.
3, It is quite clear that the Indian people are clear-sighted.. No deceit
on Nehru's part can fool the broad masses of the Indian people. . But it is
surprising that in. India, some self=styped Marxist-Leninists, such as
S. A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of "encroach-
ment" on Indian territory, alleging that "China has committed a breach of
faith," that one must "support the Indian Government," and so forth. How far
these so-called "Marxist-Leninists" have lagged behind the. ordinary. Indian
people in their understanding! How far have they departed from the. interests
of the Indian people, from the basic principles of .Marxism-Leninism and from
proletarian internationalism !
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E CERPTS;FROM PEKING PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL, 27 October 62
"More on Nehru's Philosophy ~t e ig;zt';'f the Sing-Indian Boundary Question"
I. ... What stand should the Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reaction-
ary nationalism followed by Nehru? Here a review of an episode in Chinese
history of more than 30 years ago may be useful. The Chinese people still
remember that when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world
it was provoked and attacked by China's reactio.onary, big bourgeoisie and big
landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that
the Soviet Government had given vigorous. support to the Kuomintang of China,
the Kuorriintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after
their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, stirred
up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-
communist, antipopular moves. In December 1927 the Kuomintang reaction-
aries f~crcibly and ;utrae ously closed down the Soviet consulates in various
cities coif China, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials, and broke off
di 1on1atic relations with the Soviet Union. After a year or more, in July 1929
the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of the "Sine-Soviet agreements of
1924," manufactured "the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway" and arrested
more than 300 Soviet nationals.
When the Soviet Union repeatedly showed forbearance and proposed the holding
of'a meeting to settle the. Chinese Eastern Railway question peacefull, Chiang
Kai-shek took the self-restraint of the Soviet Union to mean that "the Soviet
Union meekly submits, not daring to make the slightest resistance." In
October of that years the army of the Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the
Soviet border, stirring up an armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the Soviet Union was compelled to act in self-defense and defeated this
military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries.
Did the socialist Soviet Union do the right thing at the time ? History has long
since handed down its verdict: It was absolutely the right thing to do. The
Soviet Union's resolute counterblow to the military provocation of the Kuomintang
reactionaries not only defended the interests of the socialist state but also
accorded with the interests of the Chinese people and of the revolutionary
people of the world. Sino-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to
Sine-Soviet relations of more than 30 years ago.
More than 30 years ago, when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched that
anti-Soviet campaign, the Chinese communists were not caught in the toils
of the reactionary nationalism of the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese commu-
nists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of
the Kuomintang government. The Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party issued a declaration on 24 September 1927 in which it solemnly
stated: "The reactionary Kuomintang government absolutely does not
represent revolutionary China, and its orders to sever diplomatic relations
with Russia absolutely do not represent the public opinion of the great majority
of the Chinese people. The reactionary Kuomintang government regards the
Soviet Union as an enemy, but we, the masses of the people, still regard the
Soviet Union as a good friend of China and will always unite with it in fighting
for the Chinese revolution and the world revolution. " Soong Ching-ling,
leader of the revolutionaries in the Kuomintang, also sent a cable to the
Kuomintang authorities at that time, denouncing them as "criminals ruining
the party and the nation. "
After the reactionary Kuomintang clique launched the anti-Soviet war in
northeast China in July 1929 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party issued another declaration, calling on "the broad masses to rise against
the war on the Soviet Union." In response to this call, the Chinese communists
and the masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution
by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and
demonstrations in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of
the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many communists, workers,
peasants, students, and progressives laid down their lives with glory,
Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the
Kuomintang ractionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly,
it was perfectly right. It was none other than the Chinese communists who
thoroughly exposed the false propaganda of narrow nationalism fanned up by the
Kuomintang reactionaries in their anti-Soviet campaign. It was none other
than the Chinese communists who upheld the truth and resolutely safeguarded
the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people under extremely difficult
conditions. Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the
Chinese communists by their acts during this incident proved themsdves
genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of
proletarian internationalism.
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Toil y, the communists and progressives Of-India are-in a situation somewhat
similarto that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than 30
years ago. As a result of the reaction .ry,i~?licy,f.the Nehru government,
the Indian Communist Party and prog,xessive forces are subjected to persecu-
tion. Each time the Nehru government stirs up an anti-China campaign,, lip
simultaneously mounts an attack on the Indian Communist Party and pro-
gressive forces. But large numbers of Indian communists and..progressives;
large numbers of politically cpnscious workers, peasants,. intellectuals,and
fair-minded people have not been deceived' -by the reactionary;prQpaganda of
the Indian ruling circles, nor have they knuckled under to their attacks. In
the interests of the Indian people, they have, -under extremely difficult
conditions, stood firm for truth, justice,, and Sino-Indian friendship and waged
unflinching struggles. History will prove that it is they who really represent
the interests of the great Indian nation and people.
2 The goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a
great.empire unprecedented in India's history. , The sphere of influence of
this great empire would include a series of countries from the Middle, East
to southeast Asia and far surpass: that of the colonial .system set up in Asia
in the past by the British Empire.. Second, ..this ambitious Nehru believes
that when the "regional grouping" with India. as "the center of economic and
political activity" is established, or, in.other words, when the great empire
conceived by Nehru comes into existence, "Minority problems will disappear"
in this region. According to Nehru, "the small national state is doomed, "
"it may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent
political unit.'" In.a word, it can only be a. vassal in Nehru's great empire.
3? ... It is quite clear that the Indian people are clear-sighted. No deceit
on Nehru's part can fool the broad masses of the Indian People. But,it is
surprising that in India some self-styped Marxist:Leninists, such. as
S. A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of "encroach-
ment" on Indian territory,, alleging that . 'China;has committed'a breach of
faith, It that .one must "support the Lidian Governrhoht," and so: forth. How far
these so-called "Marxist-Lenuusts't lave lagged behind the ordinary Indian
people in their understanding.! How .far have they departed from the interests
of the Indian people; from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and from
proletarian internationalism!
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"Khrushchev in the Ukraine"
In August 1937, Pravda announced that a special com-
mission composed of Mo of tov, Yezhov (the head of the NKVD),
and Khrushchev was coming to investigate the situation at
Kiev. The commission was preceded by an NKVD contingent,
which placed the Ukrainian party leadership under guard.
Molotov demanded that the Ukrainian party organization accept
Khrushchev as its new First Secretary. The Ukrainian Central
Committee bravely rejected this demand, but did (with one
exception) accept a second demand that they come to Moscow
to confer with Stalin. (The exception, Panas Lyubchenko,
committed suicide.) As a result of the trip, all the members
of the Orgburo and the Control Commission died. The three
secretaries of the Ukrainian party, Kosior, Khataevich, and
Popov, lost their lives. (At the 22nd Congress in 1961
Khrushchev said Kosior "perished innocently"; he does not
seem to have said so in 1937.) Of 62 members and 40 candidate
members of the Ukrainian Central Committee, all but two were
purged. Then on 28 January 1938, Pravda announced that the
plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee (actually non-exist-
ent at this point) had named Khrushchev as its new First Secre-
tary. Khrushchev's appointment was made more legal in June
1938, when a Congress of the Ukrainian party was held. At this
Congress, Khrushchev told his audience: "The enemies of the
people, the bourgeois nationalists... removed the Russian
language from the school curriculum.... Comrades, now all
the peoples will learn Russian."
It appears that Khrushchev's Russification policy did not
confine itself to linguistic training. In 1943, while the Nazis
were in occupation, a Ukrainian doctor caused some digging in
an area which had been fenced off by the NKVD near Vinnitsa;
in the Central Ukraine. Eventually 95 mass graves were dis-
covered, containing 9,439 victims. One thousand three hundred
ninety bodies were discovered buried in the Gorky'., Park of
Culture and Rest. Of the victims, 676 were identified: they
included 212 peasants, 82 workers, 51 government officials,
26 specialists, 16 soldiers and 4 priests. The graves were
investigated by an international commission, and photographs
made which were displayed in New York in 1954. Relatives
identified some of the bodies in 1943 as those of people arrested
for "nationalism" in late 1937 and 1938. The investigating
experts concluded that the deaths had occurred between 1938 and
1940. It was during this period that Khrushchev became known
as "the Hammer of the Ukraine." According to a report in an
Armenian newspaper, published since the 22nd Congress,
Malenkov was guilty of arresting more than 3500 prominent
Armenians in a few months in 1937, many of whom were shot.
The Reuters report states: "Bardamants chief of the Armenian
KGB7 told a Party meeting Tuesday in Yerevan, the Armenian
capital, that in 1937 Malenkov was given the assignment of
repressing the Republic's Party apparatus. This was after the
Soviet secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, had personally shot
the Armenian Communist Party First Secretary." Actually,
Malenkov was conducting the Armenian phase of the same purge
of nationalists that Khrushchev was conducting in the Ukraine.
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TH i Ursa AINIAN SSR
1. Territor and Population, Resources and Indust
The territory occupied by ethnic Ukrainians is about 328,000 sq. m. with
nearly 50 million Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has an
area of 232,493 sq. m. and a population of 40.6 million.
The Ukraine exceeds in size such European countries as England, Austria,
Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland all put together. In
production of pig-ironer capita of population, the Ukrainian SSR surpasses
England, France, Italy an Germany; in steel production the Ukraine
surpasses France, England and Italy; in mining of iron ore the Ukraine is ahead
of all important countries, including the United States. During the year 1956,
the Ukraine produced 48% of the Soviet Union's total pig-iron, 38% steel, 56%
iron ore, nearly 1/3 hard coal, 53% coke, nearly 30% natural gas. Ukrainian
factories produced 80% of the Soviet Union's total of locomotives, nearly 50%
beet-harvesting combines, nearly 40% tractors, 60% traction plows, 48%
freight cars, 44% tractor sowers, and 72% of the Soviet Union's sugar.
The primary industrial region in the Ukraine is in the Donets Basic. In
1956 the output of the large machine building and metalworking industry ex-
ceeded the figure for 1913 more than 130 times. A variety of machine tools
are made in the Ukraine, as well as tractors, locomotives, turbines, ball-
bearings, precision tools, aircraft and automobiles.
The actual industrial potential of the country is much greater than the
figures indicate since under its present policy, the central Soviet Government
favors development of Asiatic regions for strategic reasons to the disadvantage
of Ukraine.
Known at one time-as "the granary of Europe" the Ukraine is now the
breadbasket and sugar-bowl of the far-flung Communist empire.
2. Highlights of Recent Ukrainian History and Politics
When World War I began in 1914, the Ukraine was partitioned among two
powers: the bulk of the Eastern and Central territory was within the Russian
Empire, and western Ukrainian- lands of Galicia, Bukovina and the Carpatho-
Ukraine were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The tsarist Russian
government was completely hostile to any and all Ukrainian aspirations for
independence, its plan being to obliterate the Ukraine through Russification
and assimilation. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was somewhat more liberal
in its treatment of the Ukrainians and permitted them a limited cultural and
administrative home-rule.
The one aim which united Ukrainians under both the Russians and the
Austrians on the eve of World War I was complete national independence in
a unified state. The Ukrainians took advantage of the overthrow of the
tsarist rule in 1917 and began setting up their own state. Even before the
outbreak of the Communist October Revolution in Russia, a Central Rada
(Council) was established in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev in March, 1917,
This body was the nucleus of the subsequent independent Ukrainian Govern-
ment. On January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada proclaimed the
independence of the Ukrainian National Republic and w thin one year it was
joined by West Ukraine which had proclaimed its independence after the
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A number of governments
recognized Ukraine de i:i and de facto.
Even during the initial stages of its organization, the Ukrainian nation
had to stand up to aggression on the part of Communist Russia. Notwith-
standing the fact that Soviet Russia (RSFSR) had officially recognized the
Ukrainian National Republic in a diplomatic note dated December 17, 1917,
the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia issued an ultimatum
to the Ukrainian Government the same month demanding the right of Russian
troops to enter the Ukraine. Following the ultimatum came a march of
Russian armies'upou the Ukraine. The new Ukrainian nation rejected the
ultimatum and accepted the challenge. Armed resistance to Communist
aggression lasted in organized army fighting until 1921, and partisan warfare
against the Red occupying power went on into the 1930's.
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It was only by overwhelming force of, arms that the Russian Communists
succeeded in conquering the Ukraine and their puppet government called
"Soviet Ukrainian" was set up under a reign of terror. The Ukrainians were
not, however, broken in spirit, and even under Communism continued their
struggle for their national rights. In addition to revolutionary and under-
ground resistance, there were attempts to. secure. rights unto the Ukrainian
people within the framework of the USSR. Even as early as the late 1920's
such forerunners of Tito and Gomulka appeared in the Ukraine in the persons
of the Ukrainian Communist leaders M. Skrypnyk, M. Shumsky, M. Khvylovy
and others who ch 3e Communism along a Ukrainian road and opposed Moscow's
policy of Russification and curtailment of Ukrainian national rights. They
stood for a truly independent Ukrainian SSR, Stalin and his regime dealt with
them summarily: many were liquidated immediately, and some were given
the chance to commit suicide. After the liquidation of Ukrainian national-
communists there came a wave of mass liquidation of Ukrainian intellectuals,
writers, cultural leaders and teachers. There were 223 writers and artists
alone, liquidated by the Soviet central government in 1933 and 1934. Many
were shot on the spot, others were sent to Siberia where they disappeared
without trace.
In liquidating Ukrainian patriots the.. present Prime Minister of the USSR,
N. S. Khrushchev was Stalin's most efficient tool. He was appointed First
Secretary of the ommunist Party of the .Ukraine in. January 1938, and while
holding this position he was responsible for the mass. executions of more than
10,000 Ukrainian patriots in ''innitsa which like Katyn in Poland, was a
mass grave and symbol of Moscow's policy of extermination.
Thus, before the outbreak of World War II, the. Ukraine became the
hardest hit ethnic area of the USSR in terms of mass terror carried out by
the Stalin regime. Attesting to its extent is.the fact that during the com-
pulsory collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930's, over.5 million
Ukrainian peasants died of famine, artifically induced to break. their
resistance. Hundreds of thousands of educated Ukrainians were deported
or liquidated at the same time,
3. World War II and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.
The Ukrainian people faced the outbreak of World War II believing
that war would give them a chance to shake off the Soviet Russian domi-
nation and regain Ukrainian independence. Other non-Russian nations of
the USSR had the same hopes. Nazi Germany failed to see this, however,
and its policy of terror made the Ukrainians and others actively opposed
to German conqu.e st. It is hardly surprising that following years of
Communist terror, the Ukrainian population greeted the advancing German
army as liberators, and hundreds of thousands of.Ukrainians in the Red
Army surrendered (700,000 in the Kiev "pocket' alone). The Ukrainian
people recognized the real intentions of German policy soon, and joined
in a relentless underground warfare against them. As early as the fall.
1942, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and. its policital underground leader-
ship went into action against the Germans and inflicted heavy losses upon
them. Given support by the entire population, ,the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army (UPA) and the underground organized in the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN), waged war on two fronts: against the German occupants
and against Communist partisans. The latter began operations in the
Ukraine. as soon as the Germans vt~1t1T :rew. .
This national struggle did not cease. even after the Soviet Army re-
occupied all of the Ukraine. Under the leadership of the Supreme
Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR ), an active armed struggle by tens
of thousands of UPA soldiers actively supported by the populace went on
day-by-day not for months, but for years, at least until 1950, the year in
which General Taras Chuprynka - Shukhevych, Commander-in-Chief of
the UPA, died in battle. This struggle went on not only on Ukrainian
territory, but also beyond its borders. Armed raids of UPA units initiated
or aided the nationalist underground struggle of other neighboring peoples.
The Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and the Byelorrussians. In 1947, a
detachment of the UPA soldiers, about 400 strong, made a fighting march
from the Ukraine to West Germany (where they were interned by the
American Army). At that time the West did not understand the power nor
the significance of this struggle of the UPA and of the underground
liberation struggle of other enslaved nations, and gave them no support
or encouragement.
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After 1952 there began in the Ukraine a mass movement of?resistance
of the people in all walks of life, particularly passive sabotage on collective
farms and in factories, absenteeism, higher wage demands, premium wages,
etc. Along with this, especially since 1954, the people began to isolate
themselves from all echelons of the administration and slowly rid themselves
of the fear of the MVD and MGB terror. The people hid their private thoughts
within a shell but made a common silent, cooperative effort to better their
social and living conditions.
4. Recent Developments.
Considering the danger of all these anti-Soviet processes and ferment
and to preserve the empire, the Soviet Government embarked on a policy
of liberalization after the death of Stalin. In addition to decentralization on
an All-Union scale, amnesty for political prisoners of concentration camps
and some improvement of the living standards of the people. in the USSR, for
the past five years have been noted especially in the Ukraine. Moscow
became particularly fond of stressing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR
and some of the liquidated Ukrainian writers have been partially rehabili-
tated, and the number of schools using Ukrainian as the language of instruction
has increased. Along with such liberalization, however, the course of
Ru,ssification in the Ukraine and,in other non-Russian republics continues
albeit in somewhat changed form. The attack also continues against so-called
Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who alledgedly are in the service of American
capitalism and the Vatican.
In summarizing the situation in the Ukraine, it must be stated that today
the Ukrainian people are facing another attempt by the Soviet Government to
include them, through the Ukrainian members of the Communist Party, as
junior partners to the Russians in the administration of the Soviet empire and .
at the same time to place upon them the burden of responsibility for the
policies of the party's Central Committee. On the other hand, the Ukrainian
people today are attempting, step by step, to regain their rights within the
framework of the Ukrainian SSR. It may sound paradoxical, but as a matter
of fact, the Ukrainian people are struggling for autonomy in their own
ostensibly sovereign country.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
Allen, W. E. D. , THE UKRAINE. A HISTORY. Cambridge University Press,
1941, 404 pp.
Armstrong, John A.., UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM 1939-1945. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1955. 322 pp.
Bahriany, Ivan, THE HUNTERS AND THE HUNTED. Toronto, 1956.
Borschak, Elie, ' jIYHOR ORLYK, FRANCE'S COSSACK GENERAL.
Toronto, Burns & MacEachern, 1956, 124 pp.
Chamberlin, William Henry, THE UKRAINE. A SUBMERGED NATION.
New York, The Macmillan Co. 1944, 91'pp.
Chirovsky, Nicholas L. Fr., THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE GROWTH
OF RUSSIA. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. XV 178 pp.
Dmytryshyn, Basil, MOSCOW AND THE UKRAINE, 1918-1953. A Study in
Bolshevik National Policy,. New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, 310 pp.
Doroshenko, Dmytro, History of the Ukraine. Edited and Introduced by
G. W. Simpson, University of Saszatc evan. Edmonton, 1940. IV 686 pp.
Doroshenko, Dmytro, and Oleksander Ohloblin, A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN
HISTORIOGRAPHY. New York, The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 1957. 456 pp.
Halychyn, Stephania, ed., 500 UKRAINIAN MAR TYRED WOMEN. New York,,
The United Ukrainian Wo:merr&b, Organizations of America, Inc. 1956, 155 pp.
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Hrushevsky, Michael, Prof., A HISTORY OF UKRAINE. Edited by O. J.
Frederiksen, Preface by George Vernadsky. Yale University Press,
New Haven, 3rd printing 1948, 629 pp.
Hryshko, Vasyl, EXPERIENCE WITH RUSSIA. New York, Ukrainian Congress
Committee. of America, Inc. 1956; 180 pp..
Lawrynenko, Jurij, UKRAINIAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIAN POLICY
TOWARD THE UKRAINE. Edited by David I. Goldstein. Foreword by
John S. Reshetar, Jr. New York, Rasearch Program on the USSR, 1953, 454pp
Lawton, Lancelot, UKRAINE: EUROPE'S GREATEST PROBLEM. London,
Perivan, 1950. 32 pp.
Lu.ckyj, George S. N. , .LITERARY POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE
1917-1934, New York, Columbia Univessity Press, 1956, 323 pp.
Majstrenko, Iwan, BOROT'BISM. A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UKRAINIAN COMMUNISM. New York, Research Program on the USSR.
1954, 325 pp.
Manning, Clarence A., UKRAINIAN LITERATURE, STUDIES OF THE LEADING
AUTHORS. Jersey City, 1944.
Manning, Clarence A. TARAS SHEVCHENKO, SELECTED POEMS. Jersey City
1945.
Manning, Clarence A. THE STORY OF THE UKRAINE. New York,
Philosophical Library, 1947, 326 pp.
Manning, Clarence A. TWENTIETH-CENTURY UKRAINE. New York, Bookman
Associates, 1951, 243 pp.
Manning, Clarence A. UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS. New York, Bookman
Associates, 1953, 223 pp.
Manning, Clarence A. HETMAN OF UKRAINE: IVAN MAZEPPA. New York,
Bookman Associates, 1957, 234 pp.
Martovych, Oleh R., NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE USSR. With Ethno-
graphical Map of the Soviet Union by Dr. Mykola Kulyckyj. Introduction by
John F. Stewart. Foreword by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, C. B. C, B. E. D.
S. O. Edinburgh, Scottish League for European Freedom, 1953. 58 pp.
Martovych, Oleh. UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN MODERN TIMES.
Introduction by John F. Stewart. Edinburgh, Scottish League for European
Freedom. 1952. 176 pp.
Pidhainy, S. O. ISLANDS OF DEATH, Toronto, 1955.
PIDHAINY, S.C. Ed., THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN. A WHITE
BOOK. 2 vols. I vol. XIV 543 pp, II vol. XXIV 712 pp. Detroit, Dobrus, 1955.
Pipes, Richard, THE - FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. Communism and
Nationalism 1917-1923. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1954, 355 pp.
Prychodko, Nicholas, ONE OF FIFTEEN MILLIONS. Toronto, 1951.
Reshetar, John S. Jr. THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION. A Study in Nationalism.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1952, 363 pp.
Ru.dnitsky, Stephan, UKRAINE, THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE. An Introduction
to its Geography. New York, Ukrainian Council of America, 1918, 369 pp.
6 maps.
Scholmer, Joseph, VCRKUTA. The Story of a Slave City in the Soviet Arctic.
London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954, 264 pp.
Sichynsky, Volodymyr, UKRAINE IN FOREIGN COMMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS.
From the VIth to XXth Century. New York, Ukrainian Congress Committee
of America, 1953, 236 pp.
Simpson, G. W. UKRAINE. A SERIES OF MAPS AND EXPLANATIONS
INDICATING THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY GEOGRAPHICAL
POSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE. London, Oxford University Press,
1942.
Smal-Stocki, Roman, THIS" NATIONALITY PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET UNION.
Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co. , 1952, 474 pp.
4
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Snowyd, D., SPIRIT OF UKRAINE: UKRAINIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO WORLD
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100070010-4