BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 15, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

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 15 January 1962
Ann ri
480. Rye f Rif 20~?Re ' 9J&9 PhZW 1 ~ @@07-0
os a ec i / et ., . ~ PA4QQ 25X1 C10b
Back; round: It seems almost incredible - so much has happened - but
only -Ti t e more than a year and a half has passed since the Belgians gave
Congo its independence on June 30, 1960. The present situation, perhaps,
can be seen as arising from the events of last August, when all elements of
the Congo body politic, except Tshombe, President of Katanga Province
(although provision had been made for Katanga representation also), had
agreed through the national Leopoldville parliament upon the formation of
a new government under the moderate, anti-Communist Prime Ministership
of Cyrille Adoula. The inauguration of the Adoula government brought to an
end (at least for the time being) the illegal, breakaway regime of Antoine
Cizenga, who had sought to replace the late pro-Communist Lumumba as
national Prime Minister and whom in turn the Communists have long sought
to make their puppet. Adoula has been described by Secretary Rusk as
"a roan of intelligence, moderation and nation-wide stature. He has made
clear his determination to keep his country from control of any foreign
quarter. " With his moderation, Adoula has emerged from the background
f tribalism in the Congo as a man not only of unusual sanity and steadiness -
like Nyerere of Tanganyika - but of outstanding firmness of purpose with a
real gift of leadership.
After UN forces had overcome resistance at the Katanga capital of
Elizabethville, and accompanied by the usual Congolese disorder as to where
a meeting between Adoula and Tshombe was to take place, the Katanga leader
agreed to meet the national Prime Minister at Kitona on the Congo's west
coast. There, on December 31, 1961, agreement was reached between the
two leaders on the reintegration of Katanga Province into the national govern-
ment. It is to be hoped that Tshombe, who as the leader of Katanga is in a
:relatively strong financial position, will not welsh on this agreement.
Katanga is not only in the best financial position of any province in the Congo,
its propaganda agents (whether in support of secessi on or whatever it might be)
are well-heeled abroad.
UN forces in the Congo must be freed to attend to other urgent work in
the Congo. Gizenga, although he is first Vice-Prime Minister of the Congo
under Adoula, has abandoned that regime and fled to his stronghold at
Stanleyville. Unless the Katanga situation is relatively stabilized, serious
menaces such as the dissidence of Gizenga, and others following his lead,
cannot be dealt with and the cold war will come to the Congo with a vengeance
with still more bloodshed to follow. 25X1 C10b
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481. The Russian Orthodox Church - Reli i~ousInstitution or Tool of
25X1 C 10b Communism? 25X1 C 10b
Background: During the course of the past year the Russian Orthodox
Church has actively engaged itself in building up its relationships with
Western religious organizations, but especially with the Greek Orthodox
Church and the World Council of Churches. During the winter of 1960-61,
a delegation toured the Near East, visiting Istanbul, Jerusalem, Beirut,
Athens and elsewhere and concerning itself with discussions of preparations
for the Eastern (Greek) Orthodox Church Conference to be held at Rhodes,
A delegation attended the Rhodes Conference, September 24 to 30, 1961,
and was prominently active there. In mid-November, it attended the
conference of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi and was formally
admitted to membership. On all these several occasions, the most prominent
b;ussian individual was Archbishop Nikodim (Boris Rotov), Partiarch of
Moscow and All the Russias, who is generally conceded to be the rising star
of the Russian Orthodox Church.
At the time of the Near East tour, it was generally considered probable
that the Russians were maneuvering for leadership of the Eastern Orthodox
Church and dominance of the proposed Ecumenical Council,, preparations
for which were undertaken at the Rhodes Conference. While this did not
eventuate (probably because of the firm control exercised by the Greek
Orthodox delegations) the Russians were able, both at Rhodes and New Delhi,
not only to exercise considerable influence but more importantly to plug the
all-to-familiar Communist propaganda themes of "Disarmament", "World
Peace". "Anti-Colonialism. " At Rhodes, one reporter who saw a copy of
Nikodim's speech said that it was straight out of the Communist Party
handbook. Also at Rhodes, the Russians successfully opposed a proposal
to condemn atheism.
As of 1961, the Russian Orthodox Church claims 50, 000, 000 "believers",
30, 000 priests, 20, 000, churches and "over" 50 monasteries (the figures are
from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia). While these figures are considered
overly generous, the important fact is that even if the figures are accepted
at face value, they represent a decline from pre -revolutionary Russia figures
of 24, 000 churches, 88, 000 priests and 975 monasteries. The 1914 totals
were 77, 767 churches, 117, 916 priests and 1, 025 monasteries.
Early communism bluntly identified itself with Atheism and crudely
persecuted all organized religion.. Recognition of the strength of certain
institutions led to a new tactic of attempting to capture religious leadership
(either by converting the true leaders or by replacing them with trusted
Communists from within their own religious or minority groups) and
redirecting the work of the Church into Communist ideological indoctrination.
At the present time, crude persecution and attacks on organized religion
are foresworn; without changing basic doctrine, Communists now manipulate
religious institutions (i. e. organized bodies, churches) through controlling
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 481. (6ppto)ved For Release 20 P78 O61 OOted 007-0
officials, and buttress this with more sophisticated, creative propaganda
against religious dogma, ritual, etc. , and for "scientific atheism.
Organized religions in the Soviet Union are subjected to varying degrees
of interference and pressure, dependent largely upon two factors; their
willingness to cooperate with or acquiesce in the dictates of the CPSU, and
the degree of their relationship to a non-Soviet religious organization. At
the head of the list is the Russian Orthodox Church, which enjoys its position
not only because it is willing to cooperate but also because it is the established
religion of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the old Imperial
Russia) and hence not subject to suspicion of fostering resistance to or revolt
from Soviet rule. The Lutherans and the Baptists are more closely restricted
in their activities but are tolerated, while the Roman Catholic Church is not
only persecuted institutionally but has to face the competition of a National
Church directly under the thumb of the CPSU. Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews
(recognized as a national minority in the USSR) and Moslems are rigorously
suppressed as organized religions and regularly discriminated against as
individuals, While Russian Orthodox clerics travel far and wide, peddling
the government line - as they peddled it under the Tsars - the Moslem
Central Asian ecclesiastics are kept under iron surveillance and rarely
permitted to go even to Mecca because of the Russian fear that Islam might
once again, as it has several times before, serve as the catalyst for a
Central Asian national liberation movement.
The Government
Russia, has always b
From time to time, t
influential priests ha
the Czars, the Russ
of openly and deliber
like - or of attacking
not hesitated to do th
success. Their effor
"Scientific Atheism"
and superstitution of
can be judged on the
The current effort to
as a vehicle for prom
free world represent
not be interpreted as
f the USSR, no less than the ruling elite of Czarist
en ambivalent concerning the Russian Orthodox Church.
e church hierarchy and individual high churchmen or
e been used for political purposes. Of course, tinder
n Orthodox Church was the established religion, and
and state could be managed without the necessity either
ti ly assaulting the physical indicia of religious worship -
rches, monasteries, chapels, church schools and the
he basis of religious belief as such. The CPSU has
former, and their ovvnnAigtu e s demonstrate their
s against the latter,/promulgate the doctrine of
s a substitute for the ancient, deeply implanted faith
he vast majority of Russians, has been, in so far as
asis of the available evidence, singularly unsuccessful.
se the formal edifice of the Russian Orthodox Church
ting Soviet Communist propaganda throughout the
a new and different approach and does not and must 25X1 C10b
real change of basic Communist doctrine on religion.
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 January 1962
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482. Communist China: National People's Congress To Convene .5 March 1962
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Background:
a. General On 25 December 1961, the Standing Committee of
the Second Nati.ona eople's Congress (NPC) announced that the third
session of the NPC would be convened in Peiping on 5 March 1962. The
NPC is the rubber stamp legislative body of the CPR and the Chinese
equivalent of the USSR's Supreme Soviet. Despite the constitutional
requirement that the NPC meet annually, no session has been held
since March-April 1960, presumably because of the regime's reluctance
to publicize its economic failures. It will be recalled that Premier
Chou -En-lai departed Moscow shortly after the opening of the 22nd
CPSU Congress and sought to excuse his abrupt departure by asserting
that his presence was being required in Peiping in order to prepare
for the NPC. Peiping has also announced that a session of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will open in
Peiping on 5 March.
b. National Peo le's Congress (NPC) The NPC, as defined
by the 1954 Constitution, is "the highest organ of state authority" in
Communist China and the "exclusive legislative authority in the
country. " In practice the NPC has no real power and acts primarily
as a sounding board for Communist Party policy statements and as a
channel for transmitting party policy to the nation. Past sessions
have been short, voting is by "unanimous decision" and speeches
have parroted the party line after it has been explained to the session.
It should be borne in mind that national policy and direction are not
formulated in the government of state structure, but by the party;
hence a National People's Congress, such as will be convened on
5 March 1962 is of little importance compared to a National Party
Congress. Nevertheless the NPC will serve the important function
of publicizing and disseminating party decisions, primarily as they
pertain to economic plans and programs for 1962.
c. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
The CP1CC- organized in 1949 as an ad hoc constituent assembly.
Once it had adopted the Organic Law of the Central People's Government
which provided for the "election" of the NPC it ceased to exist as a
political organ of the regime. It has, however, developed into the chief
united-front organization of the re ime and its members are drawn
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 482. (Cont.)
15 January 1962
from z-'aar y co n?ro uec m s sO ine organiz~a ions P ins ~i ficaO nO-Jaem ~~2i
parties, -- and various nationality groups. The CPPCC is empowered to
"advise" the regime, but its chief value is to lend some flavor of
"democracy" to the Communist regime's internal structure and to serve
as a vehicle to spread party decisions.
d. NPC Meeting A ainst a Backdrop of Repeated Economic
Failures Year-end statements by CPR media implicitly admit a dg-cline
in heavy and light industry output, cite drops in cotton and industrial
crops, and note that while the 1961 grain crop was better than 1960's,
it was poor. The regime acknowledges a lag in mining and chemical
industries and sees further cuts in capital construction for 1962. The
People's Daily alludes also to a possible further retreat in policy on
agricultural communes. In general, we may expect NPC proceedings
to reflect a further "leap back" from the radical policies associated
with the 1958-60 "leap forward" program. The _People's Daily sees
1962 as a period for "adjustments in all fields" with the ain effort
to be in the agricultural field. Crop failures, requiring increased
imports of grain; malnutrition and disease, underlined by last year's
outbreak of cholera; an increase in Sino-Soviet tensions emerging
from the 22nd CPSU Congress; and the regime's failure to gain
admission to the United Nations, all underline the CPR's continued
failure to solve outstanding problems.
Important or new manifestations of existing Sino-Soviet tensions
may not emerge from the NPC. However, Premier Chou En-lai has
made a practice of addressing the opening and closing sessions of the
Congress, at which time he reviews the foreign policies of the CPR.
In this context it would not be surprising for him to allude to his current
quarrel with the Soviet Union at least indirectly by noting, for example,
continued CFR support to Albania, the need for unity among Communist
nations, the priority assigned to "supporting national wars of liberation"
as opposed to "peaceful co-existence, It or the futility of negotiating with
capitalist countries. Because of the internal, governmental nature of
the NPC, coupled with the fact that foreign delegations are not to be
expected, it would be most unusual if the NPC were utilized as a forum
for presenting the CPR side of its dispute with Moscow. However, we
do not completely discount the possibility that the Congress will be used
for just such a purpose and we should be alert to this contingency. 25X1 C1 Ob
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483. Suspension of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and Albania
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Background: On 3 December 1961, the Soviet Union informed Albania
that it was wit drawing its entire embassy staff and commercial representation
from Tirana and simultaneously demanded the withdrawal of the Albanian
Embassy staff and the commercial counselor from Moscow. The Eastern
European satellites in turn have severely curtailed their relations with Tirana.
The USSR's suspension of diplomatic and economic relations is the latest in
a series of Soviet actions designed to warn the Communist Parties that the
CFSU intends to reassert its authority and that the penalty for flouting this
authority has been increased. Since the break with Albania has been extended
from the sphere of party relations to government relations, continued Chinese
support of Albania now means the endorsement of a regime which officially -
though not unanimously - has been declared heretical and excommunicated
from the Communist commonwealth. Khrushchev's action also forces an
unwelcome choice on the Communist leaders of Japan, Indonesia, North
Korea and North Vietnam who have been engaged in an awkward balancing
act since Khrushchev's public condemnation of Albanian actions at the 22nd
CPSU Congress and in the face of Peking's continued endorsement of the
Tirana regime.
Three accusations were leveled by Moscow in its notes to Albania
regarding the suspension of governmental relations. Two of these concerned
an Albanian demand that Moscow reduce by two thirds the size of its embassy
in Tirana and an accusation that Albania was interfering with the work of the
Soviet Embassy staff in Tirana. The third complaint cited "hostile" activity
carried on by Albanians in the USSR, referring particularly to the Albanian
Embassy's distribution of documents -- which included several of Hoxha's
attacks against Khrushchev -- to selected Western Embassies on 25 November.
Meanwhile, the Chinese have in effect declared that they will not retreat in
the face of this latest Soviet response to their continued support of Albania.
Since the death of Stalin and the consolidation of the Communist revolution
in China, the right of the CPSU to make decisions for the entire bloc has
increasingly been challenged. In this connection, the case of Albania is an
instructive example of the attempt of one party to dissent from the dicta of
the CPSU on questions involving its own vital interests (ultimately, the
continuance in power and very lives of the present leaders). Hoxha and
company have long been apprehensive that, if relations between Moscow and
Belgrade improved to the point of Belgrade's return to the bloc the Albanian
party would again fall under Yugoslav domination (as was the case before the
break with Tito occurred in 1948). Therefore the Albanians demurred in
decisions which promoted a rapprochment with the Yugoslavs and insisted
on a hard line toward all "revisionists. " (See attachment for an outline of
this trend in Soviet-Albanian relations.) On two separate occasions the
Soviet Union organized coups in an attempt to replace the current Albanian
leade e' ~1IYI~.Y07-0
thwar eanw i e, as ovie economic aid was wiz raven, irana
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483. (Cont.
obtained assistance from Communist China which was also in the process
of challenging Soviet authority since it too had discovered that decisions
reached in Moscow on the basis of what was useful to the development of
the Soviet Union 45 years after the Bolshevik revolution had little validity
or applicability to Chinese problems. At the 81 Party Conference in Moscow
in November - December, 1.960, the Soviet Union attempted - unsuccessfully -
to get formal recognition of its right to make decisions binding on the entire
Communist world. China and Albania refused to acknowledge this right and
the fundamental disagreement was papered over in a Declaration of this
conference, which while it stated that the "generally acknowledged vanguard
of the world Communist movement has been and will continue to be the
CPSU....... " and that the "experience of the CPSU....... is of fundamental
IS _gnificance for the entire international Communist movement... " refused
to accept and formalize the principle of the CPSU's right to make decisions
binding upon the entire movement. Instead, the problem was left in the
following vague terminology:
"All Marxist-Leninist parties independently and equally work out a
policy proceeding from the specific conditions of their countries,
guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and extend mutual
support to each other.... Every party is responsible to the working
class and working movement. When necessar y, communist and
workers parties hold conferences to discuss topical issues, to
exchange experience, to gain views by means of consultations and
agreement on joint action in the struggle for common aims. When
this or that party raises questions about the activity of another
fraternal party, its leadership turns to the leadership of the party
in question and, when necessary, meetings and consultations are
held. The experience and outcome of the meetings of representa-
tives of communist parties held during the past few years,
particularly the outcome of the two largest conferences of November
1957 and the present conference, show that, in present conditions,
such conferences are an effective form of mutual exchange of views
and experience and enrichment, through collective effort, of
Marxist-Leninist theory and the working out of united positions in
the struggle for common aims."
In the light of the above statement, signed by the 81 Communist Parties,
Khrushchev's unilateral ZZnd CPSU Congress condemnation of Albania for
"fractionalism" (i. e. for independently working out a policy proceeding
from the specific conditions obtaining in Albania) and renewed attack on
Stalin, were direct violations of the 81 Party agreement and an attempt by
the CPSU to reassert its hegemony over the world Communist movement.
It was for this reason that Chou En-lai walked out of the gathering and
Members
returned to Peking. Albania did not even attend the meeting.
of a number of the other fraternal parties, such as the Italian Communist
Party and the Polish Worker's Party, while not agreeing with the methods
or ideological viewpoints of Tirana and Peking, have also taken exception
to the arbitrary methods used by Khrushchev to reassert his authority. 25X1 C1 Ob
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484. Nuclear Testing and Disarmament
gyn. anrr+.o~~.r
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25X1 C10b Background: Last spring there was genuine, if cautious, hope that the
Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom would be able to
start moving toward general disarmament by concluding a nuclear test ban
treaty By August, it was becoming apparent that 25X1 C10b
Khrushchev had lost interest in such a treaty ( and on
the 31st of that month, the Soviets announced that the were resuming
nuclear testing in the atmosphere thus torpedoing 25X1C10b
hopes that no more fallout would be added to the atmosphere. This guidance
is intended to bring recipients up to date on nuclear testing and disarmament
developments since the Soviet test resumption on September 1, 1961.
Immediately after the Soviet tests began, President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan proposed a voluntary ban on nuclear tests in the
atmosphere -- which would, however, be checked by national monitoring
facilities. When (5 September) it became clear, after three tests, that
the USSR was continuing an intensive test program, Kennedy ordered a
resumption of U. S. tests underground. The Belgrade neutrals conference
did not condemn the Soviet testing, but took a "plague on both your houses"
line, calling (6 September) for an immediate resumption of negotiations
"on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. " When
the UN General Assembly met, India led the neutralists., submitting a
resolution calling for a resumption of an uncontrolled test ban, notwithstanding
the proven futility of any ban without safeguards. On 2 November, this
Indian resolution was approved 72 to 21 in the Political Committee, the USSR,
the UK, and the U. S. all voting against it. On 14 November, the Political
Committee passed other resolutions to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons
in war (60-16, the U.S. and UK maintaining in opposition that Soviet threats
made it suicidal to renounce the use of nuclear weapons in defense) and
to bar the testing or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Africa (57-0, with
42 countries, including the Western powers, abstaining). The voting in the
UN this fall shows (other cases could also be cited) that any resolution which
purports to support disarmament will be adopted by a heavy majority.
Despite the Berlin crisis and even the resumption of testing, negotiations
between McCloy and Zorin on general disarmament had continued, and on
20 September a joint statement appeared, endorsing a broad set of general
disarmament principles. The U. S. secured recognition of many of the
principles in its general plan (submitted by President Kennedy to the UN
on 25 September: see Press Comment, 26 September), but the Soviets
refused to agree that, after each stage of disarmament, the stock of
weapons remaining should be verified. They called this verification
espionage, while the U. S. insisted that it was essential to prevent the
secret retention of arms. (If there were to be "general and complete
disarmament," a Nation which had secreted a thousand tanks could march
over whole continents.) Another point of difference also remained: the
make-up of the disarmament negotiating committee, which would work out
a treaty. The USSR wanted to replace the ten-nation committee (five
Communist, five Western powers) with a 15-nation group, bringing in 5
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troika, making a counter-proposal of a 20-nation committee (10 neutrals).
On 13 December, agreement was finally announced on the make-up of an
18-member committee (West: U.S., UK, Canada, France, Italy; Soviet bloc:
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, USSR; others: Brazil, Mexico,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burma, India, UAR, Sweden). The new eight nations
were selected on the basis of geographical distribution. General disarmament
talks are now tentatively scheduled to begin in Geneva on 14 March.
The test-ban talks had been recessed on 9 September, actually no doubt
as a result of stalemate and test resumption, but officially in order to await
the debate of the UN General Assembly. On 9 November, the Assembly voted
71 to 11 for a U. S. -UK sponsored resolution to resume test-ban negotiations,
and negotiations did commence again at Geneva on 28 November. They
immediately ran into a road-block, when the Soviets, ignoring all past
discussions, presented a proposal for a renunciation of tests in the atmosphere,
outer speace, and in water -- these to be detected by national detection
systems -- and an on-faith renunciation of underground tests, pending progress
toward general disarmament. (U. S. experts do not believe outer space and
under-water tests can be reliably detected without a world-wide international
surveillance system.) The Soviet proposal thus provided no safeguard against
the secret preparation of new tests. The main purpose, presumably, was to
embarrass the U. S. in its underground testing and possible future atmospheric
testing -- "don't do as I do, do as I say. " Other tactics were also employed
for this purpose: on 17 December, Mikhail Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
to the U. S. , stated on television that if the U. S. did not stop underground
testing "at once, then of course we will start our tests again, and not only
ordinary bombs, but perhaps superbombs also, " When asked if his government
was planning a 100 megaton explosion, Menshikov said: "Quite possible, quite
possible." -The test-ban talks recessed again before Christmas, but are due
to resume 16 January.
During the Soviet test series, world interest focused on fallout and on the
use of the tests for purposes of terror and intimidation. These were indeed
real aspects of the Soviet tests, but their importance should now be qualified
somewhat: fallout did not turn out to be as heavy as expected, and the tests
did serve to improve Soviet nuclear techniques. In retrospect, the main
result may have been the demonstration that world opinion has little influence
on Soviet policy. Hostile public reaction may have been one reason why a 100
megaton weapon was not tested, but other large explosions did occur, and an
extremely intensive test series took place, in spite of all protests. This fact
puts the whole disarmament problem in a somewhat different perspective.
Most past disarmament proposals have relied, in greater or lesser degree,
on the assumption that moral pressure, expressed through world opinion,
would keep nations from arming. The Indian viewpoint perfectly exemplifies
this approach, even though moral considerations proved of little weight when
it came to annexing Goa. The United States realized that the Soviet Union was
prepared to violate any agreement when it served their interest, but for some
time at least) it still believed thgt the Soviets would be anxious to conceal
their violations. In the test-ban negotiations, we therefore works to develop
an inspection mechanism as a deterrent to secret testing. But the Soviet test
series now indicates that, instead of worrying so much about secret under-
ground tests, we must be more concerned over the likelihood that any
agreement, disarmament or otherwise, may be ublicl scrapped when it
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 484. pgprd Fo1HCe1ease 2090in= -rya-RnP7$ 306J!4gRRVPPg9 7-0
the USSR will respect. Now the U. S. did, in the test-ban talks, press also
for the establishment of the principle of international organs of control; we
hoped that once international controls had been successfully used in connection
with nuclear testing, they could be extended to all forms of disarmament. The
new U. S, general disarmament program provides for the gradual development
of international verification and peacekeeping machinery. International
control seems the logical ultimate answer -- but we are a long way from it
today. Under present conditions, reliance must be placed on other measures,
namely the national strength of those states which respect the principle of
freedom of choice, and which are determined to preserve it. In flouting
world opinion, the USSR not only negates the hopes placed on the influence
of that opinion, it also shows dangerous over-confidence in the strength of
her own military and power -political position. Unfortunately, by its
categoric rejection of any controlled test-ban, and by its unilateral resumption
of nuclear testing, the Scar iet Union has destroyed confidence and put the
world back into an arms race. Consequently, until a controlled arms agreement
is reached, the U. S, must provide the necessary deterrent itself, in
combination with other free governments. We believe that a contrclled
disarmament agreement would be in our interest, and also in the genuine
interest of the Soviet Union. It appears, however, that the Soviet Union will
not recognize this interest until it is convinced that bullying and deception
do not work. 25X1 C1 Ob