BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

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E DI':. ~p it ~.7L P'AG~
The strasses which have been developing in the International Communist
movement, associated for some time with the Sino-5eviet conflict, carne to
anew head at the ?2nd CPSU C?ngress in Gctc~ber in Moscow with an open
show of defiance by ~lbanie,. ~'he Sino-Soviet-Filbanian disputes created
a chain reaction which has raised serious d~~ctrinal problems affecting intra-
and inter-party reiatiQns. if a few words wexe to be selected to describe
the nature of the problems raised in the International Communist complex,
they would be: nationalism; polyeentrism (pluralism); ar_d .fractiorialism~-
The authority of the C~'SU has been challenged in the international move-
ment; the au.tlio~rty of the top leaders in Communist Parties has been
challengedi. Seriflus questions have been asked as to the validity of one road
to comrzYUnisrn any of democratic centralism (more freedom of speeciz,
disci~.ssion and right to question decisions have been demanded). The
structure of authc.>rity throughout the Communist movement has been
challenged, as have basic theories as to the nature of communism itself.
Documents and articles -from Blac and non-Bloc Communist Party
~?fficials and leaders tell the story more vividly than any second hand
cGr~zlzzent on the struggles now being waged. The dissemination of statements
from each C~ammunist Party to others around the world is the best means 25X1 C10b
of exploiting the internal problemQ of international Communism.
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BRIEFLY NOTED
Soviet Militar Bud et Increased; We may expect that during the coming year,
ension etween t e Hite totes and the USSR will continue to prevail. One
sure sign of this is the 1962 Soviet budget, announced in eaxly December. The
original 1961 budget allowed far a defense expenditure of 9, 2 50, 000, 000 rubles.
In July, during the opening stages of the Berlin crisis, this was suddenly
increased to 12, 400, 000, 000 rubles. Now the 1962 budget contains a further
increase to 13, 410, 000, 000 rubles. These published budget figures are by no
means an accurate index to actual Soviet military expenditure, many parts of
~rhich axe hidden under other budget categories. (Actually, increased. Soviet
military expenditures probably began before July, in connection with secret
p~feparations for the resumption of la.xge-scale atmospheric testing;
Khrushchev, however, portrayed the jump in expenditure as a reply to
President Kennedy's call for increased American arms expenditures, which
had arisen from Khrushchev's Berlin crisis'.) Nevertheless, they are political
barametexs, intended to show both the Soviet public and the rest of the world
*.hat, in foreign affairs, the t3'SSR proposes to follow a firm line. In discussing
~:ny Western military preparations, or the continuing Amer icon undergxaund
r.~.clee.r test program, we should be careful to focus attention on the Soviet
:- ~ ilit~txy preparations and diglornatic moves which have obliged the West ba~
make counter-moves. Khrushchev set off the Berlin crisis at Vienna., and
Khrushchev was first to resume nuclear testing, in the atmosphere, after
long secxet preparations..
l.~a i Teachers Union Withdraws From the Communist-Front International
e eration a eac ers nions ; e raga eac ers neon unto.
recent y a mem ex o s een Hawn to be so penetrated by Communists
as to be regarded generally as a Cammunist-front organization, However, on
11 September 1961, the Baghdad daily Al-Fa r__A_l Jadid published a very
damning letter to the Secretary of F~ii~-Tsrague over the signatuxe of Dx.
Mohammed Nasser, Fxesident of the Iraqi Teachers Union. He says in this
letter that because of the actions in Iraq of agents of FISE, which he describes
as "a federation. , ,controlled by the 'I~achers Association in the Communist
States," the Iraqi Teachers Union feels compelled to withdraw from VISE.
Since FISE is recognized as being Communist controlled, it can naturally
be expected to "support the principles of international proletarianism."
However, Dr. Nasser points out, "we cannot share your opinion in supporting ,
the principles of international proletarianism, i. e. , Marxist Communism,"
for "the Iraqi Republic and its Teachers Association are not Communist."
He strongly condemns the agents of FLSE in Iraq far their actions, which
were "very antagonistic to our nationality, our religion, our high principles,
our ethical values," during the period after the revolution of July, 1958,
when the agents imagined they were in control of (or would be in control of ~
tyranny and bxutal acts ~e like of which Iraq has never experienced in its long
history. " This sharp reversal should be played wherever there is (or may be ~
Cammunist penetra4ion of any unions, emphasizing the case of Iraq, where
there has been so notable a change in a Teachers Union after bitter experience
with Communist attempts to use the union for their own purposes. This, of
course, applies paxticularly to anv media which directly ar indirectly ma
xeach Arab audiences.
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475. The 22nd CPSU Congress: Peiish Repercussions 25X1C10b
...^ ~~ ..
Back round: In East Europe, the most immediately interesting reactions
to Khrus c ev s repudiation of Stalin have occurred in Poland, where the
regime appears tc be considering the inauguration of mare liberal policies.
At the 2123 No?Jember plenum of the Central Committee, Gomullca indicated
the party's concern that the renewed de-Stalinization campaign would have
serious repercussions in Poland leading on the one hand to public pressure
for greater freedom and on the other to a reinvigoration of revisionist
sentiments within the party itself. First Secretary Gomulka told the plenum
the correct policy of every party should be "formed by creative, undistorted
Marxism-Leninism, which takes into consideration conditions in each
country. " This statement typifies Gomullca's policies which are based on a
desire for freedom to handle internal problems in a flexible manner while
stressing the need to adhere to ovex-all bloc policies. The Polish Communist
leader attacked the idea of establishing central or regional organizations to
direct the activities of ali parties and defended interparty conferences such
as were held in Bucharest and Moscow during 1960 as necessary for the clear
elaboration of the principles and policies of Communist countries. He further
urged that the decisions of these meetings be binding upon the participants
(an obvious allusion to the Chinese and Albanians}.
Gomuika's concern over the effect of the de-Stalinization campaign in
Poland is apparently well founded. Since the Soviet Congress, autharatative
articles by well-known party and non-party figures have called for liberal-
ization and increased freedoms within Poland and the bloc in general. The
December issue of Howe Dropi , the theoretical organ of the Polish Central
Committee, stated t at it is 'not sufficient" to avoid the more embarrassing
erross of the Stalinist era, but that the "entire system" must be condemned
and liquidated and the "whole truth" stated. Oskar Lange, a leading Polish
economist and Central Committee member who has been an advocate of
more liberal forms of Polish communism, was among those speakers at
the pkenurn to suggest a new framework. He emphasized that the policies
Khrushchev enunciated at the 22nd CPSU Congress involve basic changes of
method and called for a rejection of conservative practices and traditionalism.
Tadeusz Daniszews~[i, Chief of the Institute for Party History, stated in
Polit ka of 2 December that it was time to document Stalin's liquidation of
t~war Polish Communist Party and, in order to make a fresh start,
to study and condemn on a world-wide basis all such "tragic chapters" in
the Communist movement:
"The dissolution of the Polish Communist Party, with all its wall-
known consequences, took place at a moment when the Party was
going through a period of ideological triumph, when it offered an
example of appropriate implementation of the resolutions of the
Seventh Congress of the Comintern, when it had begun to be a
real Party of the workers and the nation. -The greater therefore
was the tragedy of the Polish communists... we owe to the
present leaders of the CPSU.. ,the complete rehabilitation of
t~~,a~tlci~ake~sa?~?ap~sta~ ~~~~[~oa~aoo~?aa~oo5-2
(Continued]
 475. (Co ~, P ...~x January 1962
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up the struggle against the remnants of the personalty cult,
dissociating itself from the apologists of Stalinism, bringing.
back the Leninist principle of equality among the fraternal
parties, the CPSU brought a fresh breath of socialist humanism
into political life not only in the USSR and the socialist countries
but far beyond the camp's boundaries."
On 10 December, Comrade Sokorski, Chief of the Polish radio and a candidate
member of the Central Committee, said aver the state radio that radical changes
must be made in Poland's political, economic, cultural and moral life.
?Implying that rehabilitation of those condemned unjustly is not enough, he called
fc?r a vigorous pxogram calculated to restore confidence and to instill vigor into
`.he Polish nation.
Demands for liberalization were expressed even more forcefully by Polish
intellectuals. Such statements were carried by both party and non-party
,journals as well as by the official radio. For example, i.n a thinly veiled
allegorical dissertation ^n freedom of scientific expression published on 26
October, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, President of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Chairman of the Polish Philosophical Society and member c:f the Academy
of Sciences of the USSR and Bulgaria, maintained that freedom of speech
should "be a matter of course, while its limitation should be supported by
special justification." The 23 November issue of Prze lad Kultur,_a,,ln~,, one
:~f the leading cultural weeklies, published an artic-Ie on t e subject of
S'Freedom and Scientific Rigors" in which Leopold Infeld, internationally
known Polish physicist and disciple of Albert Einstein. stated:
"The present situation is not as important as the direction in which
we are going, as important as the increase or further restriction
of freedoms. I agree to the present state of aff airs on the condition
that our children's freedom will be incxeased, not decreased. We
talk about competition with the West. This competition cannot be
purely economic. It must also be apparent in the-field of freedom... .
Only through a simultaneous raising of the standard of living and
the extensic:n cf freedom will our socialist system gain more and
more followers and will win in the competition with capitalist
countries, "
The 30 November issue of the same journal, carried an article entitled
"A Few Words on Fruitful Discussions" by Roman Ingaxden (Senior) an
eminent esthetician, in which the latter addresses his readers in the following
terms
"Freedam of discussion? Of course. It is a necessary condition
to all progress in science and an equally essential factor in any
cultural and social develapment. But if such a discussion is to
be truly fruitful, its freedom must not be purely formal. It must
above all stem from an honest inner desire of all participants and
it must be conducted with complete safeguarding of their inner
freedom. "
On 9 December, Z cie Warszaw published an article by Stanislaw
Ehrlich Professor of aw a saw University and party member, entitled
"My Three Pennies' Worth on the Freedom of Scientific Expression. " The ,
following are pextinent excerpts from Professor Ehrlich's article:
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"It appears that the intellectual climate created by the 22nd Congress
favors a discussion and--let us make this clear--a regeneration
of freedom of scientific discussion.. , .What strikes me in our
scientific life is the painful shortage--I am speaking about the
social sciences--^f ar. exchane of ideas among the various branches.. , .
Freedom of scientific research is also hampered by conformity,
traditionalism and conservatism.... If we do not establish for
scientific creation at least an appropriate climate--I would not
say institutional guarantees--the conditions for fruitful research
will be missing. We should not expect that the cult of personality
will automatically have positive effects in the realm of science... .
Actually the cult of personality cannot be identified with just one
person, nor with the imposition of stiff regulations from above.
It also grows from below; it is created by eager beavers who offered
their sexvices to politicians.. , .Under such conditions there
appeared sometimes in the scientific milieu self-appointed guardians
~f entire scientific branches who even today, under changed political
conditions, still attempt to exert their harmful supervision, "
It is also noteworthy that the newspaper Tr bona Ludu of 1? November
carried extensive excerpts from Palmiro Togllat is 'November speech to
the Italian Gentral C~mmittea, in which the Italian Secretary General stressed
the need for a detailed investigatis,~n into the history of Stalinist transgressions
and measures necessary to guard against their recurrence, the desireability
:.~f debate and discussion within the Italian Communist Party, and the need for
equality among all Communist parties. On 21 November Z cie Warsaw
carried a dispatch from its Rome correspondent Ignacy rasic s e. it ed
"The Immediate and Future Prospects," in which the Ia. er discussed the
10-12 November plenum of the Malian Communist Party. rasicki stressed
those aspects of the lrtalian plenum which helped to illustrate the Italian
communist's desire to take into zecaunt the specific conditions and traditions
of Italy, quoting Togliatti as sang that the Italian road to communism is not
bound to be a faithful copy of the Soviet model He also quotes one of the plenu.n}
speakers who said that the ItaLta.n communists must find a modus vivendi betweYe~.
the new foams of direct democracy and the institutions of bourgeois democracy,
institutions which "we want to retain. "
The intense longing far Ereedam to which the above statements of Polish
party members and intellectuals testify, are an indication of haw the pr:.blems'
involved in de-Stalinization affect the Palish Communist Party. In what
measure Gvmulka, like Togliatti in Italy, is purposely taking the lead in
"liberalization ~'~ in the hope cf getting the jump on the revisionist elements
within the party and thus controlling the degree and extent of the reaction, is
not yet clear. However, it is evident even at this date that the Polish party
once again has taken the lead in East Europe in the search for new "indigenous' 25X1 C10b
forms with which to fill the void left by the repudiation of Stalin and his era.
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476. A RICA: President Toure of Guinea Attacks Communists 25X1 C10b
Background: On 11 December President Sekou Toure of Guinea, a Lenin
Peacesraze wig n.er, created a sensation in Guinea (which was given independence
'oy France three years ago) by publicly asserting that Communists had been
f,~zl.eci in a plot against his government. Toure's attack upon the Communists
.vas a particular surprise because of his personal association with the Communist
~I~c, because of his relaxed attitude, at least, i.xi allowing Guinean organization,?
y;,::j associate with various Communist fronts, and because of the Guinean practice
in the UN of associating with the USSR. In the speech referred to, Toure
disclosed that there had been complicity in the plot by an "Eastern Bloc Errkbassy.
IIe did not state which Embassy this was but, shortly after the speech, '
Ambassador of the USSR Solod was forced to leave Conakry, the Guinean capital,
The Cornrnunists apparently had overplayed their hand in Guinea. Widespread
discontent with the government in Guinea for not improving living conditi?~ns had.
oentered several months before an the Guinean Teachers Union, which had its:
~~wn grievances aver such matters as the loss of alleged benefits in housing
allowances and cavertime pay enjoyed under the French regime. Rumors of
inefficiency, corruption and high living by ranking :officials had been exploited'
by the Communists and left-wing elements, who spread the thesis (and probably
still are) that the workers succeeded in making the Guinean revolution and they
c ~ntinue tc be its vanguard. The Guinean Union of Teachers is a member of
WEAN (Federation of Teachers of Black Africa), the leftist and extremist
teachers' arm of UGTAN (General Werkera Union of Black Africa}. In November
the Executive Board of the Guinean Teachers Union was dissolved and its 12
members were jailed. Five were sentenced for a term of 5 to 10 years and
the rest were. acquitted. The 12 were headed by Koumandian Keita (not to be
confused with his namesake, the President of Iviali} and Ray Autxa, bath
well-known as Communists, both old CP militants, and both anti-West. Keita
is Secretary General of the Guinean Teachers Union and the FEAN and .~.lso '
an official of the larger Communist Front union FISE (International Federation.
of Teachers Unions), He and Autxa were charged with "subversive and anti-
revclution activities.. " The anti-Communist accusations by Toure, who is
well aware of the Communist affiliations of Keita, Autra (and other Guineans),
do not necessarily represent a sudden change of attitude and policy on his part.
He may simply be using these attacks upon the subversive activities of
Cammunists (there are hundreds of Communist Blac nationals in Guinea) to 25X1 C10b
divert attention from the steady deterioration of Guinea's economy,
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 47 7. ~Rt~i~U R'i~1~ l~~f~i~x~~ a
~8~0611A1~~$'~~~t~~a5-5X1 C10b
Background; The UN General Assex;zbly an 15 Becember rejected a Soviet
sponsore res`olntion which called for the immediate removal of "the repre-
sentative of the Chiang lE~ai-shek clique" and the seating of the Chinese
Communist government in the UN. The vote was 48 against the resolution,
3'7 for it and 19 abstentions. This was the first direct test of the China
representation question. .Suring the current session, the United States
abandoned its ten-year moratorium against General Assembly debate in favor
of declaring tho topic "an important question. " Thus, -prior to the General
Assembly vote on the Soviet resolution, the United States together with
Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan introduced a resolution (adapted by a
vote of 61 to 34, with 7 abstentions) making any measure on Chinese member-
s?zip subject t?a the two-thirds majority required for an "important question. "
Ths Soviet resolution failed to get even a simple majority, but the adoption
of the_U. 5, five-power resolution Bets a Valui 'ale r-`,c~ '- -.t fnr r*,P fi~t~ii+n 25X1 C10b
- ~~+.~~?.+. ru ..aac,.~i u17R~JiJi"V VCLL OL
*he Peking regirne this year than last. Forty-eight nations, ar 4b per rent,
voted against the Soviet revolution compared to 4~ per cent of membership
which last year supported the L75_sponsored moratorium resolution against
debate of the question. With regard to the US-sponsored five-power reso-
lution, 61 nations, or 5$ per cent of the Assembly supported the American
view that the China question was "important, " (FYI ONLY: prior to the
opening of the current Assembly it was understood that if Nationalist China
vetoed the admission of Outer Mongolia to the UN, the Soviets would veto
the admission of Mauritania to which French African countries (Brazzaville
Group) were committed. The anticipated reaction of the Brazzaville Group
to Nationalist action was as follows: if Nationalist China vetoed
Outer 1vlangalia, the Group would support any resolution to give Communist
China the Nationalist seat in the UN; if Nationalist China did not veto
Outer Mongolia's application, the Group would oppose seating Communist
China, Under U. S. pressure Nationalist China abstained from voting on
the admission of Outer Mongolia and both Outer Mongolia and Mauritania
were admitted as new members. None of the .Brazzaville Group voted for
the Soviet resolution. Five of its members voted against it a~zd the other 25X1C10b
eight abstained.
(Continued)
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478. Stalinist Survivals 25X1 C10b
Background: The name of Joseph Stalin is linked in the world's mind
with 1~'se off' such totalitarian techniques of rule as secret security police,
assassination, slave labor camps, and rigid censorship of the written and
spoken word, Khrushchev attacked Stalin in a secret speech in 1956, and
led the way in making public attacks on the former leadex duing the recent
22nd CFSU Congress, There has also been much discussion of the trend to
liberalization in the Soviet Union, It is quite true that the Soviet regime is-
today much less repressive than it was; nevertheless, the change is a rela-
tive one, and present conditions would appear less attractive if they were not
always compared with the extraordinary violence and terror of the Stalin era.
If other comparisons were made, for example with Czarist Russia ar with
Fascist Italy, Khru.shchev's regime would show well in some respects but
poorly in others, on balance rating at about the same level.
Most of the changes which Khrushchev has brought abut are related to
the facts that his baekgrou.nd is that of a professional party official, and
that his power has been based on the party organization, particularly his
own group of personal supporters in the organization. Thus he has
consistently acted to diminish the independence of potentially rival sources
of power, such as the militat~y, the state machinery in Moscow, and the
police. While Stalin was also basically a party man, and while the party
was always omnipresent, he had used these various other power centers
to pursue a policy of divide and rule; Khrushchev acts to ensure their
complete subordination to the party, thus precluding any possible threat
to his position. While ending the political role of state organs, Khrushchev
does nt intend to weaken their ability to control the public, or to let them
wither away within any definite future period. In his 18 October 1961 speech,
Khrushchev painted out that, as the Hungarian "c ounterrevolu.tianary
rebellion" had shown in 1956, "the working class needs power capable of
suppressing the resistance of exploiters, consolidating- the victory of the
revolution, preventing in time the attempts at restoration of power of the
bourgeoisie, and insuring a defense against aggressive moves by inter-
national reaction. " Therefore, dictatorship was still needed, though now
in the name of "aIl the people, "rather than in that of the proletariat.
l~hrushchev stated: "the tasks which society can carry out only with the
help of the state have not been exhausted... The state will remain long
after the victory of the first phase of communism. ~, e. , after the end of
the 20 year program/. The process of the withering away of the state will
be a very long one.-'-It will embrace awhole -historical era and will be
completed when society is fully ripe for self-govexnment. " In other words,
don't hold your breath, comrades.
When Soviet leaders speak of state power in a domestic context, they
are thin~ting of an official repressive apparatus, such as the Prussian
state was in Karl Marx's mind, or the Czarist state in Lenin's. Tn the
Soviet Union, the state is directed by Communists and is thought to serve
the pagular interest, but it treats its enemies as Marx believed capitalist
states treated their enemies. In concrete terms, this means that Moscow
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must maintain a lame uniformed police farce and ors all-pervasive secret
+~~`li:~e..f'r~;s."...~~i~i3,3 th~.T7'.'V'~ (.i~1.'ri:~is~r4~r ~f Ini,:erior--ze;ular r>~IYCe} and
i'? 4
ktGB (Committee for State Security--secret police) have been reducers some-
what in number (The NiV~ leas n~.}w been abolished on the all-Union level} and
have been more thoroughly subjected to party control than in the past, their
efficiency has been carefully guarded. All residents of Soviet towns ant',. ~-
frontier areas wh~~ are 16 years of age or over are sti11 required to have pass-
ports. If a person is visiting for over ?2 haute or making a permanent change
of address, he mu: t register with the police within 2~ hours of arrival. Tn the
case of a permanent rraove, he must be deregistered from his place of former
residence, Many collective farmers have no passports, and must apply for
special documentation when they Leave their farms; this provides an additional
check on their movements, but na prudent citizen will travel without some
evidence that his travel is officially sanctioned. Every worker still has a
labox book, in which black marks may be recorded.
Pasternak was x7ot executed as an "enemy of the pe:~ple" but, after his
death, his woman-friend Madame ivinskaya was sentenced to eight years
for "illegal currency tra~t~s~actions." It is not necessary to give penal
sentences in many cases--a writer (as in p'asternak's case) can be expelled
from the Writers' Union, a student can be dismissed from the university,
or an official can be dropped f rem the party rolls or "reassigned" to the
Virgin Lands. Corresponding; with the revived cult of Lenin, there is a new
veneration for Felix Czerzhinsky, the faxzatical or ~.nizer of the Cheka under
Lenin: his statue has been put up in the square named aftex him in front of
the Lubyanka; biographies have been written about him; and his collected
writings have been published, I~hru,shchev's readiness to deal forcefully
with zeal trouble was proved after the Hungarian revolt: 145 executions
were reported in the Hungarian press up to 3u.ly 1957, but private estimates
were that 2, QOt~ had been executed anel 20, OQQ imprisoned. Assassination
has c~oppees up again in the cases of Lev ~ebet and Stefan Bandera, whom
FdGI3-man L'c+gdan 5tashinsky, by his own confession, executed in 1959 with
a poison pistol. The fact that these victems were Ukrainian exile politicians
and that Khrushchev has always taken an intense interest in the affairs of the
Ukraine suggests that the Soviet leader may have taken a personal interest
in these executions; certainly, he knew of the plats to carry them ovt, for
Stashinsky was awarc'led a high medal for his "services. " Since Stalin's
death, the Soviet f;overxxment has extended the death penaltyto~ apply to new
crixr~es: in 1954, to murder; in 195x, to "terrorism ancL baneitry;" and in -
1961 to em'oezzlernent of public property, countexfeiting of money or docu-
ments, and to criminals who disrupt prison discipline or attack the prison
administration. The latter reflects the continuing problems of the prison 25X1C10b
camps, now disguised as r" colones" (see Attachment},
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 Tanuary 1962
'479. Latin America o~ .pie i~'ath of Fro res3 ~ 1 C10b
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Back round: During his trip to Colombia, President Kennedy stated in
Bogota t at whereas the United States had made many mistakes in-its relations
with the other .t-1.merican republics, the leaders of Latin America must also
be ready to admit past mistakes and accept new responsibilities, He went on
to say that unless these leaders are willing to contribute the resources of
"Latin .America to national development, to initiate basic Rand and tax refarrns,
to tas~e the lead ixx improving the welfare bf the people, the leadership wil l
be taken from. them and "the heritage of centuries of Western civilization will
Le consumed in a few months of violence."
TherQ are welcome indications that some steps have already been taken
by the Latin. American countries. to initiate reforms. In. Venezuela, a major
agrarian refoxxn program is being implemented. In Colombia., new tax laws
have been passed which in effect provide for a mare equitable distribution
of the wealth; a major agrarian reform law has been passed; and, as a result
of the initiative of various private organizations, a study for community
development has been staxted and steps taken to establish credit unions to
provide low interest loans. In addition, a pxagram fox building low-cost
h*using is well undex way.
The ,government of Brazil, through the Sudene program, has introduce3
public work projects on the community level to solve some of the major
problems for the impoverished peoples of North-Eastern Brazil. A new wind
of hope is blowing in E1 Salvador where the government reform party on 1?
December won a sweeping election victory aver the wealthy Salvadoran
oligarchy which, heretofore, has managed to prevent changes which a~.ight
threaten the it dominant contxol over all the wealth of the country. The winning
Conciliation Paxty is prepaxing to introduce a long list of economic and
social reforms.
In Mexico, new steps have been taken to carry out a widespread program
far land redistribution. This, however, is nothing new in Mexico where
great social progress has been achieved steadily over the past years..
In every instance where the government has taken steps to initiate
reforms, whether in Brazil, Salvador, Colombia or Venezuela, the Commun-
ists have attempted to sabotage these reforms. President Lleras of
Colombia and President Betancourt of Venezuela, the outstanding leaders in
the field of reform today, have been particular targets of the Communists,
who fear economic and social reforms which meet the needs of the people
and eliminate those dissatisfactions used by Communists to exploit and
enslave the people. 25X1 C10b
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