BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 6, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Briefly Noted
'Costa Rican Communists Welcome Soviet Nuclear Blackmail: On 23 October,
Andolante, Costa Rican Communist Farty newspaper in San Jose published the
following telegram sent to Khrushchev by Manuel Mora Valverde, Secretary
General of the Partido Vanguardia Popular, which is the name used by the
Communist Party of Costa Rica: "The people, a great party, and the
communist regime make possible the marvelous advance of Soviet Science.
We applaud your words affirming that Soviet power is to be used to guarantee
universal peace and to eliminate danger of war. " This telegram was sent
in the face of unanimous condemnation, on the part of all other elements in
Coata Rica, of the refusal of the Soviets to call off their nuclear testing. On
17 October, Khrushchev announced that Soviet Russia would explode a 50-
megaton nuclear device. On 23 October, the Soviets exploded a 25-megaton
auuclear device and, on 30 October, one of 50-megatons. Using similar
statements made by other Communist parties, we indicate that, while the
whole world condemns Khrushchev's criminal disregard of human lives, his
faithful minions faithfully congratulate him.
Cuban Communists Receive their Basic Primer from Moscow: Havana's Prensa
ati.na reported on 20 October that the leaflet on the program of the Soviet
-Communist Party, edited officially by the Cuban national press for distribution
to the entire country, is now being distributed to the employees of the
Education Ministry. This will no doubt serve as basic primer in all the
schools which now serve as indoctrination centers where the minds of the
young are formed.
Bertrand Russell Says: (East Berlin radio to U. S. Forces, 24 October). It was
a clean bomb the Soviets exploded on 23 October. A Soviet Embassy spokesman
in London made this revelation today to Bertrand Russell, one of the world's
leading philosophers. The 89-year-old Earl Russell afterwards told the (word
indistinct) he had been informed that yesterday's multimegaton atomic blast is
very clean, with no fallout. This indicates that Soviet scientists may have
cracked the problem of control of nuclear fusion and may have harnessed atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.
(New York Times, 25 October.) The world-wide explosion of anger was
typified by Bertrand Russell, the 89-year-old British philosopher and pacifist,
who walked out of the Soviet Embassy in London in disgust. Earl Russell had led
delegations of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Committee of 100,
anti-nuclear organizations, to the Embassy to protest against the latest and
biggest explosion. After an hour Lord Russell left, explaining he had done so
because Victor Loginov, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires, had "reverted to the old
rigamarole and propaganda. " Lord Russell said he walked out because he could
take refreshments of caviar, sherry, peanuts and tea, but could not "swallow
comments about the innocence of the Soviet Union. " "The Russians were so
innocent, " he went on. "Never had there been suc Z innocence in the hist ory of
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,~ (Continued)
 Briefly Not I Gb" I *r_Release 20
mankind. I could see no point in staying. I just took my leave and left. " Des-
cribing his talk with Mr. Loginov, Lord Russell said: "He said it was a
wonderful bomb, very clean and no fallout. He said they had been forced
into the tests by the Americans and it was a purely defensive move. " Lord
Russell delivered to the Russians a letter saying the nuclear arms race could
end only "in the extermination of both sides. " He said the discussion was "very
friendly and courteous, " and Mr. Loginov had promised to do his best to
forward the letter and a report of Lord Russell's statements to Premier
Khrushchev of the Soviet Union.
Demon Tsarapkin: News m _-dia assets may be interested in a striking UPI
photo of Semyon Tsarapkin denouncing a resolution against the testing of the
50-megaton bomb, at the UN, October 25, 1961. In closeup, it pictures a
demoniac expression on the face of the Soviet delegate. Replay in connection
with future Tsarapkin activities might be considered.
he Greatest Free Trading Community on Earth: Walter Lippmann's article
The Common Market and the U.S.A. " New York Herald Tribune, 26 October
1961 -- see Press Comment, 26 October) describes and analyzes the significance
.f the Common Market, which will embrace all 19 European countries which
belonged to the first European organization fot free economic cooperation, the
CEEC. He applauds the revival of Western Europe, which started with the
Marshall Plan, as now making possible the use of joint resources with the United
States to accomplish better the tasks we have jointly in the world. He calls for
a liberal U. S. trading policy, simplifying the arrangements under GATT which
made possible a stimulation of multilateral world trade. /The article provides
further data in connection with Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #77, Item 449,
dated 23 October 1961.7
Soviet Megatons Cause Castro Cheers: On 19 October 1961, Luis Gomez
Wanguemert commented on Havana CQM Television Network: "Despite all the
furor and preparations for war, imperialism is weaker than socialism. To
defend this marvelous world, the Soviet Union has thoughtfully equipped itself
with the most powerful and the best arms that can be handled by the best of men.
Yes, enormous resources and wealth which were needed for peaceful construc-
tion had to be set aside to be used for defense. These sacrifices were not made
in vain. The prospects of Cuba are growing. The tremendous bomb of 50 million
tons of 'Ifi1T is a formidable witness to this truth. " We single out Cuba as the
only alleged "Non-Aligned" nation which has had the effrontery to cheer at the
prospect of slow death and destruction which will inevitably result from the
Soviets' latest nuclear explosions.
Another Communist Agricultural Failure: A sugar beet experiment which was
being conducted, at the Kwadaso Agricultural Training Center in Ghana by a
four member East German agricultural team has met with the complete failure
that might have been expected of such an experiment under Communist auspices.
The lack of success is merely a repetition of the same agricultural story in
all the Sine --~~WsW c ~. n~ ~~8 gfi ?~~iQQQ4X1Ey1~ io tried
to grow cabbage, tomatoes and corn, also without success.
(Continued)
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Khrushch and Insects
The following appeared in Forum, published in Vienna, in September:
(Translation ours)
CAUTIOUS DICTIONARY
From the Worterbuch der russischen Sprache (Dictionary of the Russian
language) by S. I. Oshegov, State Publishing House for Foreign and International
Dictionaries, Moscow, 1952 Edition, page 806:
Khrushch -- m. , Name of certain beetles, for ex. of
cockchafers (Tr: a European flying beetle);
insect injurious to crops.
Prom the same dictionary, 1960 Edition, p. 856:
Khrushch -- m. , name of beetles of the species to which
cockchafers belong.
Period. Just so no one has any evil thoughts.
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aw J T 6 November 1961
451. GHANA: Nkrumah Further Reduces Opposition 25X1C10b
Background: The life of anybody opposing the policies of President
Nkrumah ever since Ghana became independent four years ago has not been
easy; in recent weeks it has become almost impossible. On 3 October the
Nkrumah regime arrested prominent political adversaries and leaders of
strikes the previous month against the austerity budget that increased taxation
and imposed a system of deductions from wages as compulsory national savings.
Among those taken into custody were: P.K.K. Quaido, a member of the moder
ate wing of the ruling Convention People's Party and a former Cabinet Member;
Joseph Appiah, the deputy leader of the small parliamentary group of the
opposition United Party and son-in-law of the well-known British politician, the
'.ate Sir Stafford Cripps; and the veteran politician, J. B. Danquah, whom many
of his fellow citizens regard as the true father of their country rather than
Kwame Nkrumah. The Cabinet had been re-shuffled: at the request of Nkrum;7.h
six Ministers had resigned, including the Minister of Health and former Finance
Minister, K, A. Gbedemah, a moderate who for years had worked closely with
Nkrumah. Gbedemah reportedly has now fled the country. The regime had
already expelled almost all the British officials, including army officers, who
had been still serving in Ghana,. One of the last remaining British officials in
a high post to be removed from office was Geoffrey Bing, Communist former
Laborite member of the British parliament, who was serving as Attorney
General. Bing, however, has been asked to remain in Ghana where, it is said,
he will be kept "to carry out certain assignments". The removal of British
officers comes on the eve of the expected visit (November 9-20) by Queen
Elizabeth of Great Britain. Prior to these recent events Nkrumah had been
absent from the country for some weeks, visiting East Europe, the Soviet Union
and Communist China. At the Belgrade Conference of "non-aligned" states,
he was one of the leaders in promoting the double standard, of seeing evil only
if it occurred in the West. In a speech at Tashkent on July 17 he said: "The
peoples of the Soviet Union by the manner in which they have welded many
republics and nationalities into one great country have demonstrated the
effectiveness of political union, and this is most inspiring for us in our struggle
for the political unification of the African continent. " Two days later at Kiev
he said, on the same subject: "This is an achievement which we can surely
emulate in Africa, where the conditions for unity are so favorable and the
25X1C10b
necessity so imperative."
(continued)
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Background: At Christmastide 1960 in Havana a life-size representation
of the crib surrounded by the holy family and groups of shepherds, depicted
Fidel Castro, his brother Raul and various members of the Government among
those who came to adore the Christ child. Just as Castro, by this means,
attempted to identify himself with the deep-seated devotion of the Cuban people,
he has similarly attempted to portray himself and his Communist regime as
being a member of the Latin-American family or, when it suits him better,
as a leader of the neutral or unaligned nations.
Since May 1961, Cuban Communists have attempted to convince Latin-
American leaders that their regime wishes to remain a member of the inter-
American community, does not intend to intervene in the internal affairs of the
other A terican Republics, and desires to have cordial relations with all States
of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, on the basis of respect
for Cuba's sovereignty, as a socialist but not Communist state.
During the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council (IA-ECOSOC) of the Organization of American States (OAS), which took
place from 5 to 15 August at Punta del Este, Uruguay, "Che" Guevara, Cuba's
economic commissar, announced that Cuba intended "to cooperate in the
strengthening of the inter-American system, on the basis of true independence
and friendship with various nations. " He said that he believed in a system of
"genuine peaceful coexistence in the Americas" and that Cuba pursued an
"independent" foreign policy. Subsequently, he alleged that Cuba's relations
Soviet Russia were strictly commercial.
It is worth notirig,here that, during his visits to Latin America, "Che"
Guevara has not hesitated to play on the fact that he is Argentinian by birth
and still retains Argentinian citizenship. His family still lives in the Argentine.
Although the Soviets frowned on the idea of the meeting of Non-Aligned
nations proposed by Nasser and Tito, they apparently made no effort to dissuade
Castro from attending as a member of the Non-Aligned nations. This, on the
contrary, suited the purpose of the Soviets who have been somewhat reluctant
to see Cuba too closely identified as a Soviet Bloc nation for fear that this might
alienate the other Latin American nations vsho have tended to look with favor
upon Castro's original successful revolution against Batista's dictatorship.
Castro's first effort to identify himself vith the Non-Aligned nations took
place during the preparatory conference in Cairo in rune 1961.
During the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations which took place in Belgrade
during the first week of September 1961, President Oswaldo Dorticos of Cuba
adopted such a violent position, in effect paraphrasing the statements made by
Khrushchev on various international problems, that the neutral leaders, par-
ticularly Tito and Nasser, wondered whether their invitation to Cuba had not been
a monumental error. Dorticos, nonetheless, attempted to gain a position of lead-
ership over the non-aligned nations.
_ _ .,_.... A (Continued)
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 452. (Cont.) S., Lei 6 November 1961
The aftfS j dE e s~ 1 lgl~fb`n ~7 ~~EbO(~ ~4'~'I-1-bas been
unequivocally stated by Castro, Dorticos, Guevara and others, in spite of
efforts to portray Cuba as a member of the inter-American community or as
a neutral member of the Non-Aligned nations. Castro's official proclamation,
on May 1, that Cuba was the first Social Democratic Republic of Latin America,
leaves no room for any doubt as to Cuba's exact place within the Communist
orbit.
As if to confirm Cuba's position , Oswaldo Dorticos, during Ks trip to
Czechoslovakia, Moscow and Peking after the B elgrade meeting in September,
carefully spelled out his subservience to all phases of Soviet doctrine. In the
Cuban-Czech communique Dorticos officially went on record advocating the
fostering of what he referred to as the "liberation movements" of Latin
America. Castro and his lieute nants have consistently attempted to identify their
bald Communist "liberation movement" with the 26th of July Movement, which
had widespread appeal throughout Latin America as a valid indigenous uprising
against the dictatorship of Batista. In this manner Cuba has sought to identify
with popular sympathies in Latin America. and to assert leadership over the
n~_sses in that hemisphere. Cuban leaders have, while denying any intention to
ita.terfere in the internal affairs of other countries, recommended the use of
the Cuban-stye:>e guerrilla warfare to the peoples of Brazil and other countries.
On 11 September, in a speech in Moscow, Dorticos praised the CPSU draft party
program as the "document which is the herald of the future radiant era of
mankind". The joint Cuban-Soviet communique, issued on 21 September, stated
that "both parties have reasserted the identity of their positions in all inter-
national problems".
The State controlled radio in Havana at no time attempts to camouflage
the fact that it preaches unadulterated Communist doctrine. On 17 September,
Lionel Soto, speaking over Radio Centro said: "The revolution (in Cuba) had
found itself confronted with alack of socialist cadres and this created a problem
of prime importance. The honest and hardworking must be formed into revolu-
tionary cadres because many of them do not have an understanding of "socialism"
(i. e. communism). He explained that the study of Merxism and Leninism must
be undertaken if the science of "socialism" is to be understood. Schools, such as
the Jose Marti boarding school in Rio del Mar, have been established for the
indoctrination of children in the theory of Marxism-Leninism.
On 17 October, Havana Radio stated: "The 22nd Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party represents a hallmark in the history of mankind".... It marks
the start of a new period in the hi story of mankind, It is the point of departure
of the most advanced stage in human and social decelopment. "
On 18 October, Luis Gomez Wanguemert, speaking over Havana CQM
Television Network said: "If the 22n d Congress of the Communist Party has an
exceptional importance for all mankind, it has a special meaning for our own
people engaged in the task of building "socialism"... The people to have chosen
the path of "socialism" (i. e. Cuba) know now for sure that this road will surely
and firmly lead to the definitive state of justice, progress, and welfare --
Communism. "
The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been
attended by the leaders (in most cases the Secretary General) of the Communist
Parties of every country. In the case of Cuba, however, the delegation consisted
2
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 452. (Cont.) S 6 November 1961
of member p eh, gM tgp gtp/~ } AQ~~apg 14 TO100 grmation
of this monolithic state party was announced by Fidel Castro on 26 July 1961.
(See Bi-Weekly Guidance #433). Many of its leaders are former leaders of the
Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) which was the name used by the Communist
Party of Cuba. The ORI members who attended are:
Blas Roca, National Director of the ORI (former Secretary General of
the PSP)
Captain Emilio Aragones, National Director of the ORI.
Augustin Martinez Sanchez, National Director of the ORI, (Minister of
Labor, who masterminded the take -over of the free labor unions by the
communists).
Rita Diaz, a local secretary of the ORI (former PSP leader).
Since the PSP no longer cfficially exists in Cuba, it appears quite clear
that the only party officially existing in Cuba today, the CRI, is none other than
the Communist Party of Cuba.
During his address to the 22nd Congress on 21 October, Blas Roca was
reported by Radio Moscow to have stressed that the patriotic, democratic and
"socialist" Cuban revolution, as well as its rapid and successful development,
were a brilliant practical realization of the CPSU draft program's thesis on the
nature of the modern era, which is marked by the transition from capitalism
to "socialism". Referring to Blas Roca as the "Head of the Delegation of the
Integrated Revolutionary Organization", the Moscow radio reported that he had
said that "the Cuban people drew inspiration and new strength for further strugg
from the CPSU draft program. "
Finally, Paul Boa, Cuba's Foreign Minister, in a press interview on Z O
October over Havana CQM Television Network, stated: "What was utopia is be-
coming historical reality in the Soviet Union. Communism is the realization of
all the dreams of mankind".
Should there still remain any doubt concerning the total subservience of
the Cuban Communists to their Soviet masters, the position adopted by Cuba in
the UN regarding the Soviet nuclear tests should convince even the greatest
skeptics. Cuba was the only self-claimed non-bloc country to vote with the Soviet
bloc countries against an eight nation resolution, considered by the General
Assembly of the UN sitting as the Political Committee, which urged Soviet
Russia to cancel its plans to set off a 50-megaton nuclear explosion. The resolu-
tion was approved by a vote of 75 to 10. Further, when Paul Boa spoke to Cuban
Foreign Ministry personnel during the week of October 23 (reported in the Nev,
York HeraldTribune on October 27) he said: "There will be a Communist society'
in this century. The program of the Soviet Communist Party means that manki:,d
enters with a firm step on the roads of Communism. The death of capitalism is
decreed by history but the body still has to be buried. " 25X1C10b
3
ffimffilmw~
ff cc nn,,,,
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453. AFRICA: Luthuli Awarded Nobel Peace Prize
25X1C10b
Background: For the first time the Nobel peace prize has been awarded
to an African. The winner on the present occasion (for the year 1960) is Albert
John Luthuli, a Zulu Chief and President General of the African National
Congress, dismissed in 1953 by the South African Government and later debarred
from attending any gatherings public or private. Luthuli (he himself spells it
Lutuli but he is known in South Africa and internationally as Luthuli) was
nominated for the prize by Swedish Social Democrats and the announcement
that he had won was made at the same time that a similar announcement,
covering the year 1961, was made for the late Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Dag Hammerskjold. For years Luthuli has been intimately involved
in action against the South African Government's segregation (apartheid)
policies. He has now received an award which has placed him suddenly on the
world stage along with previous winners of the Nobel peace prize such as
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil and Dag Hammer-
skjold. It is true that there are many others in South Africa who have followed
a similar policy and others who have attained national prominence for the same
reasons. Nobody, however, has surpassed or even equalled him for peaceful
resistance - in the true Gandhi manner. It is interesting that Gandhi as a
young lawyer was engaged in much the same struggle in South Africa before
returning to his native land, India, to lead the peaceful fight for independence
there. Luthuli, like Gandhi, is widely known as a firm believer in non-violent
resistance to all the edicts of apartheid in South Africa. He is also known as
a political moderate who rejects the extremes of both left and right. He was
born in 1898 (he himself says he does not know the exact date of his birth) at
Solusia Mission Station in Southern Rhodesia where his father was doing
Christian missionary work as evangelist-interpreter for the Seventh Day
Adventist Church. The family later moved to Groutville (named after an
American missionary) in South Africa where Luthuli went to Primary School.
He completed his intermediate school education at Edendale, a Methodist
institution, and later joined the Teachers' Training Department in the same
institution. After spending 16 years, during which he joined the Christian
church, as a teacher, he led the life of an elected Zulu Chief, principally
involving administrative and judiciary duties. He gradually became involved
in the political struggle, always following non-violent methods. The chieftain-
ship had more and more involved him in what he has called "the vital problems
of African life" and to this day, even under severe restrictions, he is still
25?pp. (as he has put it) "knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly
at a closed and barred door. "
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International Stands with Free World Against Communism
issues t Ju jt 41~+f uY S..a vv--.. ~~?__ --_
in M etin in Rome on 27 October the Socialist International ,
Backgrou ? g
representing the Democratic Socialist parties of forty-three countries, adopted
ten resolutions. They, unanimously and by acclamation, proclaimed the
solidarity of the Socialist International with the Berliners and condemned the
"savage brutality" of the East Berlin Wall. They urged the West to take the
diplomatic initiative to safeguard peace in Berlinand the freedom of its people.
They argued against the continued partition of Germany. They argued for
controlled disarmament in Centrol Europe. They expressed their total opposi-
tion to the Soviet "troika" plan for the UN Secretariat, while arguing for some
reform in the organization of the Secretariat. They expressed deep concern
over the widening gap in living standards between the industrialized nations
and those still developing. They condemned racial segregation in South Africa,
They urged peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. They favored enlarge
ment of the UN Security Council, with India as a (presumably permanent)
member. They proposed that an International Peace Corps be established.
They favored admission of Communist China to the UN.
The Socialist International represents the forces of organized Democratic
Socialism throughout the world. These socialists are essentially non-communis'
and indeed have reason based on history to fear communist interference and
infiltration. They represent a substantial segment of labor and leftist thought
outside of the Communist Bloc. Their influence in most countries in Europe,
the Near East, and in some non-communist Asian and Latin American countries
is considerable. Their achievements are particularly notable in Western
Europe, while in Japan, Indonesia, Burma, India and Ceylon they have carried
Ob
ked weight. ._ . , , ? _ _
(continued)
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 25X1C1Ob
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 454.
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ovem er
Socialist International Stands with Free World Against Communism
Background: Meeting in Rome, on 27 October the Socialist International ,
representing the Democratic Socialist parties of forty-three countries, adopted
,y and by acclamation, proclaimed the
ten resolutions. They, unanimoush
solidarity of the Socialist International with the Berliners and condemned the
"savage brutality" of the East Berlin Wall. They urged the West to take the
diplomatic initiative to safeguard peace in Berlinand the freedom of its people.
They argued against the continued partition of Germany. They argued for
controlled disarmament in Centrol Europe. They expressed their total opposi-
tion to the Soviet "troika" plan for the UN Secretariat, while arguing for some
reform in the organization of the Secretariat. They expressed deep concern
over the widening gap in living standards between the industrialized nations
and those still developing. They condemned racial segregation in South Africa.
They urged peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. They favored enlarge-,
Ynent of the UN Security Council, with India as a (presumably permament)
member. They proposed that an International Peace Corps be established,
They favored admission of Communist China to the UN.
The Socialist International represents the forces of organized Democratic
Socialism throughout the world. These socialists are essentially non-communis'
and indeed. have reason based on history to fear communist interference and
infiltration. They represent a substantial segment of labor and leftist thought
outside of the Communist Bloc. Their influence in most countries in Europe,
the Near East, and in some non-communist Asian and Latin American countries
is considerable. Their achievements are particularly notable in Western
Europe, while in Japan, Indonesia, Burma, India and Ceylon they have carried
marked weight.
(continued)
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 ...~ 6 November 1961 25X1C10b
455. What t apybaed Ea mF a QocMdlUis=`~uAewMe(TSG 1P. eA 100040011-6
Background: Once European nations and the US had planted their flags
and sent their merchants to areas populated by non-Europeans, there was no
turning back for those areas. The native cultures were unable to compete
militarily, economically, or scientifically with the West; at most, they could
maintain their traditional religious beliefs and some remnants of their tradi-
tional social patterns. Beginning with Japan, the nations affected have drawn
tie: inevitable conclusions, i. e. that the only way to achieve and preserve real
independence, to advance their economic and cultural status, is to follow the
example of the modern industrialized nations.
Today, most of these peoples have political independence, but with the
exception of Japan, their countries are still underdeveloped. And today, two
different patterns of development are available: the West-European-American
and the Communist. (There are in fact two different Communist patterns,
Moscow's and Peiping's, but for the purposes of this discussion, we may regard
them as one. ) The present and potential leaders of these countries face a choice
between adopting a th%rjoughly planned, tightly controlled system on the
Communist pattern,/a free choice system, e. g. a free enterprise or democratic
socialist crientation, modelled on the societies of Western Europe and the United
States. The essential choice, be it emphasized, is not between capitalism and
socialism, but between a system where economic and political decisions are
reached by compr_':>mise between competing interests (public and/or private), and
one in which all such decisions are made unilaterally by a single leader or a
small ruling clique. For a centralized leadership, making all decisions and oper-
ating according to a fixed plan, cannot maintain itself and carry out its program
unless it employs a totalitarian ideology and suppresses all criticism ruthlessly.
Communist leadership is opposed to free choice; we consider free choice essen-
tial, the foundation for political freedom, individual self-realization, cultural
advance and human dignity.
Although Communist ideology is rigid and exclusive, certain beliefs make
it a tempting alternative to leaders of opinion in underdeveloped countries. We
must recognize these beliefs frankly:
1. Western Europe and the United States are widely considered
racialist and colonialist -- even though racialism is now discredited or
on the defensive everywhere except in South Africa, and even though the
Russian empire is the only one to have annexed, rather than lost, huge
territories in the 20th century.
2. Communist organizations offer to impoverished intellectuals
opportunities for personal advancement and the exercise of power not
available to them in conventional societies.
3. Communist planning appears to promise more rapid modern-
ization than could be attained by an open society.
(Continued)
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 455. (Cont.).- 6 November 1961
4
Apo-rovd&f4wa@ehedser2a"li1St U fwACpROO-k8
W%4W i and
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growing faster an wwaes e:hn power, hence cornmuns as a bandwagon
appeal. The fear oTSovi :t power should not, however, be over-rated as
a motivating force. Men who have fought in jungles or lived in prison are
not likely to be cowards, and in any case, the Soviet threat does not
appear to be directed primarily at them. If they fear anything in
connection with this problem of choice, it is their own public opinion:,.
What can the West say or do to dispel these ideas? Beliefs 2 through 4
above, the positive appeals, are based on promise rather than performance.
Re Pt. 2 (Careers for impoverished intellectuals). Those who hope to
make a career with communism might well reflect on the fact that, of all the 1917
leaders, only Lenin is still honored, Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Trotsky, and now Stalin all being disgraced (most of them found a violent death. )
Similarly, of Stalin's last associates, Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich,
Bulganin, Saburov, Pervukhim, and Voroshilov have all been denounced or worse;
only Mikoyan, Suslov, and kh.rushchev himself are still prominent. Of course,
a real careerist will not be deterred by the statistics; national and international
society can only seek to protect itself against the real gangsters by exposing their
selfish, power-seeking motivation. There are others, however, who sincerely
aspire to help their countries. We should explain to them that "schools" such as
the "Friendship University" are intended to train obedient agitators; at best, the
career they prepare for is that of a puppet leader, a Walter Ulbricht. On the
other hand, by gaining a technical and cultural education at western or western-
modelled universities, potential leaders can effectively serve their countries aid
join the ranks of the world's intellectual elite. The Western pattern offers able
young leaders a chance to develop in accordance with their abilities, to seek
answers in a community of thought that admits the possibility of new aid original
solutions.
Re pt. 3 (Communist plannind): It is a misconception to think that the alter-
native to Communist state planning is no planning. Pure laisser faire capitalism
never existed, and since the world depression of the 19301x, all Western nations
have given social security and public works programs priority flever the interests
of the rentier (coupon-clipper) and the banker. One decisive reflection of this
change was the end of the international gold standard; another was the epread of
effective labor union organization to all Western countries. It is m exaggeration
to say that there has been a social revolution in the West in the last 30 years. It
has been accomplished, however, without dogma, hence without branding the old
elite as outcasts, or depriving them of all voice in affairs. Thus the West does not
stand for a rigid Victorian capitalist society, approaching the brink of class
warfare or imperialist war, but rather for a gradual revolution in which increasing
benefits are being gained by the masses.
The West does not oppose planning, it only recognizes that planning has its
limits. Every country is endowed with certain resources in land, minerals,
l.a.bor, and industrial plant. These constitute its wealth. Some increase in wealth
can be obtained by organizational improvements -- that is, by planning -- but
there is a limit to what can be accomplished in a few years. Planners cannot
suddenly multiply the number of man-hours or the number of acres of farmland.
indeed, the only rapid way to increase national wealth is to import it -- that is,
to get loans or grants from abroad. Communist planning often juggles resources
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 455. (Copt,) _ _. 6 November 1961
in an ahem ~ 14W r. y
o ojkF Mc0JWM 11 j6 iralA30-d8g&'MQ 10( Q4I gncrease
which appears in one sector (such as steel production) does not come out of
a magic lamp, it is bought by actual sacrifices in other sectors (such as agri-
culture and especially consumer goods). This sacrifice could not be imposed
without totalitarian minority rule. Communist rulers are typically devoted to
the building-up of heavy industry, which means military power and vhich also
represents a sort of large machinery fetishism -- an outdated ideal, recalling
the era of Big Bertha, the Forth Bridge, and the Corliss steam engine. Under-
developed countries certainly need an industrial base, but for most of them the
"problem of problems" is assuring a food supply for a growing population.
Experience shows that the adoption of Communist planning by an Ztnderdeveloped
nation means, with some certainty, that human beings are going to starve. On
the other hand, balanced development with western assistance offers a chance --
for many lands the only chance -- to outmatch the growth of population.
Re pt. 4 (The rapid growth of Communist power): While Soviet production
has indeed grown, actual performance has been less striking than the picture
presented by Communist propaganda. The propaganda technique employed is to
stress certain economic sectors, to which resources have been diverted from
other sectors. Moreover, Communist attainments have usually proved
unimpressive when compared with free societies under comparable conditions.
East Berlin could not stand the "peaceful competition" of West Berlin, and so
Ulbricht has to build his wall. The Indian mixed economy attained an average
annual industrial growth rate of 9 to 10% in the last decade, while West
Germany (less socialized and with greater previous development, but like the
Soviet Union with a backlog of reconstruction to accomplish) had an average
annual industrial growth rate of 13. 6% in the same period. The Soviet 7-Year
Plan schedules an industrial growth rate of 8. 8% per annum, although
Khrushchev claims that 10% was achieved in the first three years. 1 Far from
dying, private enterprise tends to grow irresistibly wherever -- as in India --
it is permitted to participate in a growing economy. Lenin had to resort to it to
restore the ravages of war and revolution, and even today, after forty-four
years of Soviet power, the tiny private plots on the collective farms still produce
48. 2% of the Soviet meat and lard output, 48. 5% of the milk supply, and 78%
of the egg yields. Private enterprise is at its best in expanding conditions;
Western governments have found state ownership useful mainly in times of
depression or in unprofitable industries (like the British coal industry, or the
British, Canadian, and French railroad systems) where, for social reasons,
lA comparison of over-all production, rather than merely industrial production,
would be less favorable to the Soviet Union than this. Also, Soviet growth claims
are inflated bir means of various Soviet statistical practices and by padded
production reports; Soviet annual industrial growth will probably be 8% or less,
rather than the 8. 8%a-of the 7-Year Plan, the approximately 9. 5% of the first ten
years of the Twenty-Year Program, or Khrushchev's 10%. Steel production, the
backbone of Soviet industry, is not expected to grow faster than 7%, even in the
20-Year Program, and under normal conditions, over-all industrial production
growth equals or only exceeds very slightly the growth rate in steel.
3
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 455. (font,) 6 November 1961
bankruptcy an80a EFAMq :E@ 1( ~1 a14~k@~: FZpF3a8~ 6~~k?~q1 1~
suppose that the Soviet economy as a whole would have grown more rapidly if
there had been no Communist dictatorship.
Still, one might argue that since the bias of Soviet growth really does
further military strength, communism might be made the 'rave of the future"
by force. This, of course, depends ultimately on the will of the non-Communist
world. The West is not presently behind in over-all military strength; where
the Soviets have gained advantages in certain fields, such as large rockets or
conventional ground forces, this has been due to Western interest in other
pursuits, rather than incapacity, and the gaps are now being closed. The
question of meeting Communist force is one for underdeveloped countries as
well as for the West; the neutrals must make their decision on the kind of
society they want and act accordingly.
On pt. 1 (The concept of the West as colonialist and racialist), we face,
not a promise, but a somewhat distorted past picture improperly applied to the
present. Today most Westerners would be tongue-tied if asked to defend
colonialism, let alone racialism. The latter was permanently discredited by
: elsen and Buchenwald; we don't defend it and we refuse to be identified with it.
Significantly, humor at the expense of Jews and negroes has completely
disappeared from the respectable Western press. The question of colonialism
is somewhat more complicated. As a political phenomenon, colonialism is dead
or dying, and rightly so. Charges are made today of economic "neocolonial
ism", but the US itself absorbed a large amount of foreign investment in the
19th century without feeling any threat to its independence; and gunboats and
marines no longer appear when foreign properties are nationalized. Even if
we look at the past, the colonialists-in many areas did more than govern and
exploit. While there was some self-deception involved in such concepts as
"stewardship" and "la mission civilisatrice", these ideas were not wholly false.
This has been proven particularly in the Philippines and in certain former
British colonies, where western democratic institutions have taken root. Leaders
in these countries may be outspoken opponents of colonialism, but they are also
wedded to western concepts of parliamentary democracy and judicial process.
The truth is that Western industry and military technology were and are only a
part -- and not the most important part -- of what the West has carried to the
rest of the world. These aspects of Western society developed in an atmosphere
of political freedom, scientific enquiry, and respect for human dignity, where
religious belief and tolerance existed together. Newton, Darwin, and Einstein
were products of Western culture. There is a long tradition of political and
moral thought in the West, beginning with Pericles, influenced by Christianity,
and extending through Shakespeare, Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson, Hamilton,
Tocqueville, Lincoln and George Bernard Shaw to Albert Camus and George
Orwell -- and we might also add, Karl Marx and Harold Laski, neither of whom
could have emerged in a totalitarian society. It is the West which has identified
the problem of political power and its control as the central problem for society.
It is the Communists who attempt to conceal its importance, precisely for the
purpose of exercising power. The Communists offer a truncated version of
Western progress, a two-dimensional facade painted with pictures of factory
chimneys and stamping mills. The West itself offers a rich culture, one which
can moreover be accommodated to the traditions and the beliefs of non-Western
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(Continued)
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NUMBER 78
6 November 1961
ADDENDUM
Item 452 - See Bi-Weekly #75, Item #433, dated 25 September 1961, Castro's
Cuba - Socialist or Communist?
See Dept. of State Instruction No. CW-3443, dated 18 October 1961,
Subject: Cuba's Alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc (CONF) and
its UNCLASSIFIED enclosure #3, Text of Soviet-Cuban Commun,-.
que and enclosure #4, Text of Chinese Cuban Communique.
Item 456 - See Bi-Weekly #62, Item #367, dated 27 March 1961, The Indivi-
dual in the Communist State.
1. Castro Urges Guerrilla Warfare in Brazil (Excerpts from the address of
Fidel Castro before the Conference on Production, August 29, 1961).
2. Excerpts from Speech of President Dorticos at the Non-Aligned Confer-
ence, Belgrade, September 2, 1961.
3. Excerpts from Cuban-Czech Communique of September 11, 1961 on the
Occasion of the Visit to Czechoslovakia of President Oswaldo Dorticos.
4. Adam Schaff on Humanism and Freedom (5 articles).
451. GHANA: Nkrumah Further Reduces Opposition - G.
452. THE CUBAN TROIKA: Moscow, Belgrade, Punta del Este - A, C, D, F,
I, S, U.
453. AFRICA: Luthuli Awarded Nobel Peace Prize - G.
454. Socialist International Stands with Free World Against Communism - S,
T.
455. What the West has to Offer the Underdeveloped Nations - E, I, P.
456. Prominent Polish Marxist on Socialist Humanism and Freedom - C, H.
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9 November 1961
Excerpts from Cuban-Czech Communique of September ii, 1961 on the
Occasion of the Visit to Czechoslovakia of President Osvaldo Dorticos
"Evaluatin g the international situation, the two Presidents agreed that
the existence and growth of the world socialist system constitutes the principal
factor which determines the character of the present period of history. The
extensive development, economically, scientifically, technically, and
culturally in this system reflected in the colossal feats of the Soviet cosmic
flights opens unique possibilities for a new apogee f6r?welfare and happiness
for all humanity. The untiring efforts for peace and the high-principled policy
of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist camp represents a guarantee for
freedom and independence and a boost to the aspirations of the peaceful
people of all nations. "
The President of the Republic of Cuba and the President of the
Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia emphatically condemned the imperialist
policy of bellicose threats, intimidations, and aggressions against the freedom
of the peoples and against world peace.
The two presidents consider it necessary that the consequent application
of the principles of peaceful coexistence and collaboration among nations with
different social systems -- in agreement with the contents of the "resolution on
the measures for the application and the broadening of peaceful relations and
good neighborliness. among t he nations, " adopted by the Thirteenth U. N.
General Assembly -- constitute the basis of the policy of all the governments
in international relations.
They went on record, unanimously, that the foreign policy of both
nations is completely oriented in this respect and that one of its principal
objectives is to contribute, as efficiently as possible, to the maintenance of
world peace.
The two high representatives were in accord that it is necessary to
eliminate all the handicaps which block the way to the lessening of international
tension and of the achievement of a policy of peaceful coexistence. They
particularly asserted their conviction that it is necessary to eradicate all the
vestiges of the Second World War. In this respect, the two statesmen under-
scored with special emphasis the urgency for the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Germany.
The growth of militarism and revanchism in West Germany entails a
grave danger which threatens world peace. The postponement of the conclusion
of a peace treaty only strengthens the aggressive aspirations of militarist
West German circles and feeds the wellsprings of international discord.
The two high representatives of Cuba and Czechoslovakia went on record
concerning the successes of the development of the liberation movements of the
nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, expressing their warmest
sympathy for these movements.
The two Presidents expressed their conviction that the United Nations
fulfills an important role in the solution of the most pressing problems.
However, the structure of the United Nations should adjust itself to the sub-
stantial changes which have occurred in the world since its founding, so it may
convert itself into an efficient instrument for the peaceful solution of inter-
national conflicts. In the United Nations and in all the organizations, there
should be an equitable representation of all the principal groups of states which
exist in the world at present; namely, the neutral nations, the socialist states,
(Continued)
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and the Western powers with their allies. In this respect, the two parties
expressed their support of the recognition of t he legal right of representation of
the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the incorporation of
the Mongolian People's Republic in the aforementioned organization.
The process cf organization of planned economic development already
under way, as well as the direction given to the national development for the
creation of a socialist future for Cuba, are among the great conquests which
the heroic Cuban people were able to achieve, assure, and defend gloriously
under the guidance of its Revolutionary Government headed by Fidel Castro.
The Cuban and Czech Presidents underscored t heir common accord on
the contribution of the Cuban revolution to the national liberation movements
.4.nd their contribution to the cause of peace, freedom, and progress in all the
world; stressing as well that Cuba also contributes in an important manner in
the field of international relations, and above all in the United Nations, in
support of the policy of peaceful coexistence and collaboration among all the
nations.
The Cuban President expressed his full appreciation for the prodigious
worked carried out by the Czech Government and people in the construction of
a developed socialist society, as well as his warm recognition of the great
contribution of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic to the maintenance of
peace, and his deep gratitude for the decisive assistance which it is giving
the Cuban Government and people in the field of technical progress and national
economic development.
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Excerpts from Speech of President Dorticos at the Non-Aligned Conference,
Belgrade, September 2, 1961
On these continents / sia and Africa! and in Latin America, for various
reasona and in different forms, economic and political imperialism, in its
desperate and agonizing convulsions, is intending to drown the movements
of national liberation in blood and misery. International perfidy, bribery
on a world scale, and military violence are today the instruments which are
being used inhumanly by colonialist and imperialist countries.
The imperialists' stubbonness in our continent has reached the limit
where the U. S. Government is not e ven prepared to tolerate other friendly
governments maintaining an independent foreign policy and defending the
:.ight of self-determination of the Cuban people. Today we have to regret that
-is a consequence of that stubbornness and of the imperialist pressure united
Kith the reactionary national oligarchic groups, the constitutional ex-President
of Brazil, Sr. Janio Quadros, has felt himself obliged to decline to fulfill
his duties, and that fraternal nation is today exposed to the danger of a
reactionary military dictatorship. This is certainly not the road to peace and
there are no signs that the imperialist powers are sincerely disposed to coexist
peacefully with the nations and peoples unwilling to submit to their designs.
We must insist that the German problem should be solved by peaceful
negotiations; and, as rearmament is now an undoubted fact, we must call for
the immediate signature of a peace treaty whichwou.ld confirm the frontiers
of Germany as they were established at Potsdam. Further, in considering the
German problem., we cannot overlook one indisputable geographical and
historical fact -- namely, the actual existence of two German States. It is
only from this standpoint that the German problem can be approached.
On a number of occasions, and particularly in the case of the Congo,
there has been abundant evidence that the composition and structure of the
United Nations Secretariat, far from being suitable for the execution and
implementation of decisions, tends in practice to result in their distortion.
It must therefore be said at the outset that the present structure is not suited
to the purposes of the Organization as defined in the Charter. In the first
place, we must acknowledge that the Secretariat should no longer remain under
the control of a single individual, whose assumed neutrality -- as has been
shown by events in the Congo and by the murder of I umumba -- does not
offer any guarantee that the Organization's executive powers will be properly
used. At this Conference we must try to reach agreement on the urgent need
to modify the structure of the Secretariat and thereby to ensure impartiality
in the implementation of decisions.
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CASTRO URGES GUERRILLA WARFARE IN
B.A ZIL
/Excerpts from the address of Fidel Castro before the Confeince
on Production, August 29, 1961 Translation
"That is the situation there (Ed. - in Brazil). All popular forces of
the left, progressive and nationalistic, are grouping against the coup. The
Congress is against the coup; the military men are being left isolated. It may
be t hat they may continue their absurd plans. We know perfectly well that if
the people resist, the military will not be able to carry out their maneuver. In
gigantic country such as Brazil, those military men do not know what revolu-
tionary guerrillas are. If the people ofB razil take advantage of Cuba's exper-
ience, if they hurl themselves into the struggle, in the mountains, in the
jungles, in the woods, in that immense territory, in that immense theater of
war which is Brazil, and if advantage is taken of Cuba's experience and they
take up arms and organize a guerrilla war not a conventional battle on the
plains - if they do not have available sufficient forces to organize the guerrilla
struggle in Brazil, let them use Cuba's experience in which a very few men
were able to confront the professional army. In addition, the Brazilian Army
counts on many honorable military men, on revolutionary military men, on
nationalistic military men who will never join the group of fascistic instigators of
a coup - pro-imperialists who are directing this maneuver against the people
of Brazil. If the workers and the peasants aid the students and the progressive
men and honest military men take up arms and organize not one fighting front
but a thousand fighting fronts, never will the group of reactionary military men
be able to count on anything to crush the people with certainty; and in spite of
the initial attempts, the ~ military might carry out a movement which they could
however not implant; neither the army, which is with the reaction, or even
the forces of NATO, would be able to destroy the Brazilian revolutionary
movement. We, naturally, know that these blows are also directed against us... "
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 20 November 1961
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Any C PSU Members in the Wave of the Future ?
The CPSU has always made a point of keeping the Soviet people and its
own membership in a certain state of insecurity. In 1919, party members were
"reregistered", with the result that half of the membership of over 250, 000,
1/4 of the party, were expelled. According to Khrushchev's sewn Sectet Speech
of 1956, 98 out of the 139 members and candidate rembers of the Central
Committee elected at the 17th Congress in January 1934 were purged in 1937
and 1938; in those days being purged usually meant death either in the labor
camps or by shooting. It is estimated that over 1, 500, 000 party members
were purged between 1933 and 1939, the 1933 party membership having been
3, 555, 338. At the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev announced that 200, 000
members had been dropped from the party in the last six years. Also at the
?2nd Congress, Khrushchev paid his respects to the "old Bolsheviks" present;
it would have been interesting to have had a show of hands of the old
Bolsheviks to see how many were left.
Cuban Communists Using Chinese Communist Texts:
According to a New China News Agency release of 22 September, the
C7.Aban National Publication Bureau announced that 250, 000 copies of Spanish
translations of Mao Tse-Tung's works have been sold in Cuba since the
beginning of 1961. In addition, 180, 000 copies of various Spanish language books
concerning China and a large quantity of Chinese Communist magazines were
reported to have been sold in the same period. We wonder whether, in view
of Khrushchev's thinly veiled attack on Mao Tse-Tung in his speech to the 22nd
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on 17 October, the Cuban Communists
will persist in spreading the dogmatism of Mao.
Opposition to Soviet Economic Aid:
The newspaper La Nacion of La Paz, which is the organ of the official
party of Bolivia, has expressed opposition to the acceptance of the Soviet
offer of aid. The newspaper pointed out that in Cuba, Soviet credits have
taken the shape of weapons, some machinery, but no capital. We suggest
that this type of Soviet aid is in direct contrast with the aid proposed by the
Alliance for Progress, the basic purpose of which is to enable the Latin
American countries to develop their own resources.
Stalin's Birthday:
The attention of all stations is called to the fact that December 21 is
Stalin's birthday. Suitable econiums might well be placed in left-wing press
publications, as well as letters to the editor, etc. It should also be borne
in mind that March 5 is the 8th anniversary of Stalin's death, and preparations
should be made for running suitable memorials on that date.
(Continued)
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 ~_~_riq' November 1961
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The Eastern Orthodox Church Conference: --
The Eastern Orthodox Church conference, which took place 24-30
September on the Greek Island of Rhodes and whichwas attended by delegations
from Russia and other Bloc countries, found the Bloc delegates, under Soviet
leadership following the usual Soviet line. It was commented that their speeches
frequently appeared straight out of the Communist Party handbook. They
scored no significant success however in achieving a dominant position in the
hierarchy, although they did manage to secure deletion of an item opposing
"atheism" and adding items or racial discrimination, Orthodoxy in areas
of rapid social change and the contributions of Orthodoxy to peace, liberty
and love among people.
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 ' Ap oved F Rele se ?i60 if 6: -- 71-~1 p? og~fi ~ ~ 25X1C10b
457. Boastful~ais out ~Pr cu ure at t e n on~
Background: Addressing the 22nd CPSU Congress on 17 October,
Khrushchev included some statements and figures in an effort to show how
Soviet agriculture had already contributed and would continue to contribute its
part during the "entry of the Soviet Union into the period of the comprehensive
construction of Communism". He said, inter alia, -.that "our reserves are vast;
they will make it possible, in the next few years -- as the decisions of the
January plenum noted -- to increase... meat 13 million tons and milk to 50
million tons a year. 1"Over the past five-year period the gross output of
agriculture has increased, compared with the preceding five-year period, by
43 percent. The output of grain, meat, milk and other agricultural products has
increased considerably. " In order to arrive at this favorable picture of Soviet
agriculture Khrushchev has omitted facts, juggled figures, and uttered platitudes
fcr the future. Soviet agriculture, stagnant under Stalin, did increase 50%0
between 1953 and 1958 -- and although this signifies a real increase, the per-
centage jump is large, and to that extent misleading, only because the base
year for measurement (1953) was so low in yield. Further, when Khrushchev
speaks of the 43% increase of the last five years, he refers to the 1956-1961
period which included two exceptionally good years (which are also included
in the 1953-1958 span), followed by three poor years. The use of five-year
periods, rather than individual years, is a transparent attempt to conceal the
failure of these recent years. Moreover, the increased production of 1957 and
1958 were the result of a special, all out agricultural effort in the virgin lands,
favored by unusual weather, which could not be repeated. What has not been
said is that the harvest reaped in those two years is probably in part responsible
for the subsequent decline, -- the soil was exploited and not renewed; the
nachinery was hard used aid not maintained; the manpower from the cities was
thrown in for qui ck returns and was not maintained at the same level; and
Mother Nature could not be expected, by all predictive criteria, to continue
the unusual weather which favored the 1957-1958.harvests. (US output per
person employed in agriculture has increased to-thirds during the last decade. )
The statements by Khrushchev, noted above, were inconsistent with
some he made to the party central committee plenum last January (which had
r.:~. t to discuss agricultural probl-ems) when he described agriculture as "out of
step" with industry and the demands of the consumer, and called for organiza-
tional changes, an increase in agricultural investment, and the introduction of
new material incentives for improving the quality of farm production. In the 17
October speech, it should be noted, Khrushchev did make a number of references
to agricultural shortcomings of the USSR. He spoke, for example, of "the
mistakes a nd shortcomings in the leadership of collective and state farms" and
of the necessity of overcoming "in a short period the backwardness in -:
agriculture". "We shall, " he said, "have to, as it were, shake up some people
in some places, clean up the pores a little, as the frequenters of bathhouses
do, to enable the body to make a more normal use of oxygen. And, showing
only too clearly the lack of understanding at the highest (rlevel in the Soviet Union
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of agricultu,prove
problems, Khrushchev made this revealing statement: "And
what is the solution to the animal husbandry problem ? It is primarily to increase
meat, milk and butter production. " In other words, the solution to the animal
husbandy problem is to solve the animal husbandry problem. Pravda on 2
October (just before Khrushchev's speech) said: "Results of work cbne on
kolkhozes (collective farms) and sockhozes (state farms) have been compre-
hensively analyzed and shortcomings decisively disclosed at the congresses of
union republics... As a result, the country is not receiving a considerable
quantity of meat and milk.... Winter comes even earlier on the virgin lands
of Kazakhstan than in the Ukraine. But here, too, not everything has been
readied to meet the winter. The plan for constructing livestock shelters has been
fulfilled by only several percent. Hundreds of cow sheds and pigsties have no
roofs, and tens of thousands of hectares of straw has not yet been gathered
into ricks.... "
.Farm output is supposed in the Soviet Union to rise at 8 percent per
annum -- probably an unattainable rate. The grain target originally fixed for
1960 was 180 million tons,' it was later postponed to 1965. As for Khrushchev's
boasts not long ago that the USSR would outproduce the US in Treat, milk and
butter by 1961, he is now talking about outproducing the US by 1980, and in
arriving at his fanciful figures he never seems to allow for expansion in the US
production rate.
One Soviet agricultural problem is that of over expansion -- overloading
the land and expecting too much of it. The typical Soviet response to agricul-
?nural failures is to blame organizations and individuals. (The Chinese
Communists, on the other hand, choose to blame the weather. ) Infatuation with
gigantism has made the Soviet farms too large to be efficient economic units,
and failure to understandthe nature of agriculture as a biological process, with
inherent uncontrollable elements, has led to attempts to establish factory-type
methods and organizations. A basic distrust of individual initiative and enter-25X1C10b
prise has made it impossible to decentralize decision-making effectively.
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 25X1C1Ob
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 20 November 1961
-eff ai fsR~~~~sc70T~j @@Q~~~1 X161 25X1 C10b
c0,rQc_ga?c
Background: The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) is ache -
duled to meet in Moscow December 4-16 to discuss and approve a program
of world-wide trade union action previously adopted by the WFTU Executive
Bureau at a meeting held in Prague 23-26 June 1961. The program was '
subsequently published as a supplement to the August 1961 issue of The World
Trade Union Movement. On 30 July, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of the.-
19 1 Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), sub-
sequently presented to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU convening in Moscow
17 October 1961, and adopted with only minor changes. V. V. Grishin, Soviet
Vice-President of WFTU, is a candidate member of the new Presidium,
elected at the 22nd CPSU Congress.
The World Peace Council is now scheduled to meet in Stockholm 16-20
December and has announced its intention of enlisting the support of trade
unions everywhere in a new "Peace" campaign.
On 22-24 September, 1961, the International Trade Union Conference
for a German Peace Treaty, a Peaceful Solution of the Problem of West
Berlin and Against Military Provocations was held in East Berlin.
Reports emanating from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria indicate
increased Communist Party dissatisfaction with the role local labor unions
and workers have been playing in furthering Communist political aims, and
with their "pre-occupation" with labor rights and interests.
The Draft Program for the Fifth World Trade Union Congress (See
Book Dispatch #2798 and attachment) demonstrated primary concern for the
role WFTU should play as a tool of the CPSU, being larded with communist
propaganda lines on such issues as "peace", "anti-colonialism", "anti-
imperialism", "peaceful coexistence" and the like. Extracts from the Draft
Program for the 22nd CPSU Congress (see "Khrushchev's Blueprint for Comm-
unist Conquest", distributed with Book Dispatch #2776, indexed under Labor/
Labor Parties and Trade Unions) and statements made at the East Berlin
meeting in September (see attachment) clearly show the intended role of labor
unions in the Communist scheme of things. The consecutive timing of the 22nd
CPSU Congress and the Fifth Trade Union Congress is obviously no accident.
The WFTU is being called to Moscow to hear the doctrine laid down at the 22nd
Congress and to receive appropriate i.hstructions. It is also likely that a dele-
gation will be selected to attend the Stockholm meeting of the World Peace
Council, which follows immediately after the WFTU meeting.
Since the withdrawal of the non-Communist unions from WFTU in 1948
(the Draft Program launches a campaign to entice them back) there was never
open c ontr`d~ 83'e&fa eled's~ 0 l rl}~abti` i4-1F 6p1vi d'IUO0~40 r~lt %n of a
(Continued)
 458. (Cont.) - - - 20 November 1961
program prevc~~~Then, at
the llth Session of the General Council of WFTU held in Peking, sharp conflict
flared up between the Soviet and Chinese trade union leaders, despite the
presence at the meeting of numerous leaders from non-Communist unions. This
conflict has not since been resolved. In view of clear evidence of Moscow-
Peking disagreement at the 22nd CPSU Congress and subsequently, it is highly
possible that the rift will be reflected at the 5th World Labor Congress in
December. 25X1C10b
 Backgronnncl: In many respects, the attacks on Stalin at the 22nd CPSU
Congress hardly went as far as those made in Khru.shchevls Secret Speech at
the 20tkt Congress. Speakers spent more time accusing the Albanians and the
"anti-pa3?q" group of Stalinism than on the attacks on the dead dictator himself.
'61-it unlike the situation in 1956, the anti-Stalin speeches at the 22nd C, PSU
s s?ere broadcast, almost immediately, for all the world to hear.
2-ace, the Congress, Stalin's body has been remc red from the Lenin-Stalin
Knau 1.u:-n, and streets, provinces, and cities -- even historic Staiingrad
itself -- have been renamed. Stalin has now been officially degraded before
everyone, including many Soviet citizens and non-Soviet Communists who did
spot know of the earlier attacks, or who refused to believe in them. Even this
summer young visitors to Moscow from Ghana returned home wearing Stalin
biittons. Many non-Soviet Communists have kept Stalin's picture on their walls
to this day. During this very same Congress efforts have been made, despite.
attacks on the "personality cult", to establish Khrushchev as the fountain of
Communist wisdom. (See Attachment) Only one foreign Communist, Chou En-lai,
clar.ed to criticize Khrushchev, if only implicitly, and his criticism was that
nan-Soviet parties should not be criticized in public.
It is true that Khrushchev's cult is not the same as Stalin's was. The
difference in the types of ovations given them reflects this. But it is Khrushchev
who is more truly, more typically Communist. Stalin borrowed from his
Caucasian heritage, from the images of Tsarist history, and from Hitler and
Mussolini, so that he combined with Communism the characteristics of
Georgian conspiracy and brutality, Romanov autocracy, and Fascist irrational-
ism. Khrushchev on the other hand uses the concept of "collective leadership"
in the same way that Communists use such other cons-epts as "peace", "freedom",
"democracy", "disarmament", or "working class", -- that is, deceptively. The
Khrushchev approach and the Stalin approach each has its advantages.
Khrushchev, exploiting a term which is everywhere regarded as "good", is
more difficult to attack; he specializes in the manipulation of verbal symbols.
Stalin, on the other hand, appealed to revolutionary romanticism and Russian
tradition; he was a "father image", an all-powerful, if also terrible, god. In
casting off all ties with Stalin, Khrushchev has probably weakened a movement
which depends largely on irrational appeals.
Every individual or group has what might be called a "credit rating",
not only in the sense of financial soundness, but also in the sense of general
:j:cptete for reliability, truthfulness, and trustworthiness. In politics, too, it is
important to keep faith. The successful candidate may not always carry out his
campaign promises, but he is vulnerable to attack if le does not; if not entirely
honest, he is likely at least to carry out his pledges to those who have con-
tHbuted to his campaign fund. Ifs he is a machine candidate, or the representative
of a closed party organization (like the Commu he will keep faith with the
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 459.,. (Cont.) _ 20 November 1961 VOW Approved For Release 2001/11/16 CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040011-6
organization. Credit is especially important in international politics; the
diplomat must guard his reputation for reporting faithfully what he is told, and
a power must fulfill its commitments, even at the cost of war, if it is to re-
main a power. Of .course, some people manage to maintain a higher credit
rating than they deserve by concealing their failures and falsifications, but
such persons, if they are wise, do not suddenly start shouting that all their
old friends are crooks. They do not, for example, tell all the customers that the
grocery firm they now head used to put sand in the sugar. Since last March
Khrushchev has been recklessly damaging his foreign political credit -- refusing
to continue serious negotiations for a test control ban, launching a new Berlin
crisis (with a deadline, since modified), and starting a new series of atmos-
pheric nuclear tests, obviously well-prepared in advance. Now, with his pubii-
de-Stalinization campaign, he has further destroyed his credit, at home as well
as abroad. For many Communists, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, he
has been breaking down the idol in which they had a vested interest, namely,
the monolithic, international, revolutionary elite party, moving in a straight
line across history. The fact that Stalin had his hard, terroristic side made
those who accepted him as their leader all the more firmly committed to him,
and for years they have defended him. Not only is Khrushchev now eating his
own words, he is forcing all the others who once praised Stalin to eat their own
words too. Loyal Communists will swallow a great deal, but it is hard for any-
one to swallow being made a fool of in the eyes of his enemies.
There is also another problem, that of the long-term goals of the move-
ment. Khrushchev has expended a great deal of energy in presenting Soviet
communism as the "wave of the future". But he has done much himself to under-
cut the appeal of Communism as the pattern of tomorrow. Where religious faith
has weakened, the universal longing for immortality usually takes the form of a
desire to leave some lasting memorial to one's life work: the ordinary citizen
finds immortality in planning for his own children's future, or in participating
in a social movement; the more ambitious person hopes to leave a name in
history, or at least to be respected by that group (profession, party,
neighborhood) to which he belongs. These desires are thwarted by the leader
who rewrites history. Will the local party leader be written off, despite loyal
service, because he was associated with a Trotskyite faction or with an "anti-
Party group"? Will children be barred from a university because their father
had the wrong political associations? If as mighty a man as Stalin once was
can be removed from his tomb, and his name stricken from its walls, what is
there that is lasting? 25X1C10b
continued)
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 460. KHRUSH~VVtNc3E-S'3I.,M
East -~rope
~ ( Ito fec 01e 619 25X1C10b
Background: Khrushchev's public and definitive denunciation of the
person and deeds of Joseph Stalin came as a surprise not only to the West, but
also to the foreign delegates to the 22nd CPSU Congress, some of whom a
r,-tv days earlier, upon their arrival, had dutifully decorated the bier of the
zunct dictator. This open condemnation of the "errors and distortions " of the
Stalinist era from the dais of the 22nd CPSU Congress will certainly have an
important long range influence on the people of the USSR and East Europe and
y their attitude toward communism. The rationale behind this decision, which
casts doubt upon an entire era, must have been of over-riding importance.
Mr. Khrushchev stated these reasons to the Congress:
"What would have happened to our country if the personality
cult had not been condemned, its evil consequences not overcome,
and Lenin's principles of party and state activities not restored?
This would have threatened the divorcing of the party from the
masses and from the people, serious violations of Soviet democracy
and revolutionary legality, a slowing down of economic development
of the country, a reduction of the rate of communist construction and
therefore of the improvement of the working people's well-being.
In the field of international relations this would have led to a weaken-
ing of the Soviet Union's position in the world arena, to a deterioration
of relations with other countries, which would be fraught with grave
consequences. "
In other words, the de-Stalinization campaign was related first of all
to internal policies. To build a Communist society in the USSR during the next
twenty years requires the continued effort and cooperation of the Russian
people. Obviously, this cannot be accomplished by a party "divorced from the
masses". Nor, as Khrushchev has taken pains to point out, can it be
accomplished by "violations of Soviet democracy and revolutionary legality",
i. e. , by coercion and terror, since this would "reduce the rate of Communist
construction". Rather the Soviet leaders feel they must now rely more on
incentive and less on police repression, and are attempting therefore to equate
the new millenium of communism with more freedom, more consumer goods,
even with some degree of democracy within the party. Thus, by publicly expos-
ia.g Stalin's crimes, Khrushchev appears to be telling the people of the Soviet
Union (and by extension the people of East Europe), that coercion - at least in
its former blatant an,. arbitrary form - belongs to a period of Soviet society
which is irrevocably gone. The removal of Stalin's body from its place of honor
rd the obliteration of all tie reminders of Stalin's presence are being used to
demonstrate in a graphic and unforgettable manner that each violations belong to
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 460. Cant. - .20 November 1961
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a Stalinist past, the very memory of which is being erased from the pages of
Soviet Russia's history. Concomitantly, Khrushchev has sought to establish
once and for all, the validity of his internal program, warning the Stalinist
diehards at home that their foot-dragging would no longer be tolerated.
Within a Communist bloc context, there is the explicit condemnation
of Enver Hoxha and, implicit in this, a much larger and more important
target, the condemnation of Mao and Communist China. Apparently,
Khrushchev felt that the time for a showdown with the Chinese had arrived;
t':us the denunciation of Stalin and the cult of personality in general can be
a.tterpreted as an attempt to reaffirm Moscow's position as the sole inter-
reter of crthodoxy for the Communist world. Here, Khrushchev probably
did not aDunt on Peking's acquiescence but must have decided the time had
come to expose the Chinese heresy and bring about its isolation from the rest
of the bloc. Moreover, by excommunicating Hoxha, Khrushchev warned the
. est of the Eastern bloc that such heresies would no longer be tolerated. He
.lso reminded the satellite leaders that an era of "Khrushchevian Communism."
was being inaugurated and that the courses of action which it stands for are
expected to be carried out in practice and not merely paid lip service to.
Externally, Khrushchev tells us that if the Stalinist group had been in
;)cwer, there would have been a "deterioration of relations with other coun-
tries" and a "weakening of the Soviet Union's position in the world arena",
thereby emphasizing the validity of his own program for handling relations
with the West and the neutralists. In other words Khrushchev has strongly
reaffirmed his thesis of "peaceful coexistence" and the mre subtle and oblique
methods which it encompasses (if compared with Stalin's, Molotov's, or
Mao's diplomatic concepts), as the only accepted method of advancing
communism.
While it is difficult to predict what particular form the reaction to
Khrushchev's latest de-Stalinization campaign will take in East Europe, there
are already indications of the Satellite leaders' concern with this development.
A. high-ranking Polish official predicts renewed public pressure in Poland for
greater freedom and, within the party itself, the reappearance of revisionism.
In this connection, a recent article by member of the Central Committee
Secretariat ?ambrowski called for a higher degree of democracy within the
party. In Bulgaria, a satellite known for its Stalinist predilections, the gov-
ernment announced on 4 November that all projects and locations bearing the
name of Stalin would be renamed for Lenin. In East Germany, where
Khrushchev's denunciation of the cult of the individual must have a particular
ominous ring for the party stalwarts, Ulbricht, who returned from the 22nd
Congress in a subdued and chastened mood, is belatedly also beginning
de-Stalinization; he announced, that as far as Germany was concerned, the
cult of the individual, existed - as everyone could plainly see - solely around
the person of that arch-revanchist in West Germany, Konrad Adenauer.
2
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 460. (Cont.') '-- D r- A-1- 1 November 1961
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What then is likely to be the effect of Khrushchev's pronouncements on
the Communist regimes an the peoples of East Europe? In a word, disillusion
for the one and a resurgence of hope for the other. While dramatic upheavals
of the type experienced in 1956 are unlikely, the long range effect on East
Europe of Khrushchev's campaign against Stalin and his ghostly remnants may
be considerable. Bearing in mind Khrushchev's statement to the 21st Congress
that the bloc will enter the Communist millenium together, there is every
reason to argue that the Communist leaders as well as the people of East
Europe have a basis for interpreting Khrushchev's promise that incentives will
replace coercion as applying equally to them. 25X1C10b
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 Aqoo ov d_ For Release 2 i.J 1 ?/1 I - -
461. THERE SULTS OF THE 22ND CPSU "ON .ARE S
0b~~Av1e0~~19~1
NOTE: This is a first, comprehensive, but unavoidably summary
guidance dealing with the complex issues resulting from the Congress,
prepared b e f o r e all relevant information has been received, let
alone fully analyzed.
25X1C10b
REFERENCES:
(a) Guidance #421, 28 August 1961, "The Draft of the New CPSU
Program. "
(b) Guidance #425, 11 September 1961, "The Reality of Sino-Soviet
Tensions. "
(c) Guidance #426, 11 September 1961, "The 22nd CPSU Congress"
(d) Book Dispatch #2776, 31 August 1961, "Draft of CPSU Program"
(with UNCLASSIFIED staff study, "Khrushchev's Blueprint for
Communist Conquest"). 25X1C10b
Background: Preparations for the 22nd CPSU Congress, held 17-31
October in Moscow, strongly indicated that it was originally intended to serve
three principal purposes:
a. To restore the position of the CPSU--and its leader
Khrushchev--to the top of the World Communist Movement (a position
somewhat shaken by the Moscow Declaration of 81 Communist Parties,
November 1960), especially through adoption of a new program;
b. To complete Khrushchev's mastery of the domestic party
and government apparatus, mainly by means of changes in party
statutes and by electing a Central Committee composed of his
henchmen;
c. To strengthen Khrushchev's foreign policy, especially in the
Berlin crisis, by a show of internal strength and international unity
at the Congress, accompanied by external, dramatic features such as
new space "spectaculars", etc.
Actually, the proceedings of the Congress, while demonstrating
Khrushchev's supremacy within the CPSU and forcefully expressing his and
the party's claim to hegemony in the World Communist Movement, did not
accomplish all the above ends:
T (Continued)
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 1- t, 19
Cant. \pproved For Release P78-0306000gb606T1=6 61
a. The "space spectaculars" did not materialize: on the con-
trary, Gagarin's odd disappearance, allegedly into a hospital, explained
by a mysterious automobile accident and Titov's admitted space-sick-
ness, while in orbit, have aroused suspicions that the first two Soviet
men in space may have to pay with their health, if not with their lives,
for Khrushchev's propaganda victories.
b. The immediate impact of the ambitious new party program
was considerably reduced by the unprecedented attacks against the
Albanian Communist party leaders and against the "anti-party group",
Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others, within the
CPSU, first voiced by Khrushchev and repeated by numerous
speakers, including a number of foreign delegates, although by
no means all.
c. These attacks officially publicized Sino-Soviet tensions,
hardly mentioned in public by any official Communist source heretofore,
with large-scale publicity by the Communists themselves, underlined
Khrushchev's denunciation of the Albanians, Chou-En-Lai's premature
departure from the Congress, and the Albanian CP's angry denuncia-
tion of Khrushchev as a "splitter and underminer of international
Communism".
d. Khrushchev and other speakers denounced Stalin for various
crimes and errors: unlike the 20th Congress, where such denunciations
had been limited to a secret session (still not disclosed to the general
Soviet public), it was done this ti me in public session and reported by
mass media; this led to the removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's side
(but he was re-buried at the Kremlin wall, with other Communist
"heroes") and Khrushchev spoke of a monument to be erected in honor
of Stalin's victims.
e. Election of the new Central Committee increased the number
of full members from 133 to 175 and the number of candidates from 122
to 156. Of the total, approximately 200 are reported to be new (i. e.
Khrushchev's handpicked followers), while only about 125 full and
candidate members were re-elected. The Presidium, meanwhile, was
reduced from 14 full and 9 candidate members to 11 full and 5 candidate-
members. The Secretariat, however, was expanded from 5 to 9 secre-
taries (comparable to cabinet members in a democracy). Perhaps the
most significant changes in the Presidium and Secretariat are: Mme
Furtseva, the only woman member, and Mr. Mukhitdinov, the only
member of Asian origin, were dropped from the Presidium (though
re-elected to the Central Committee); among the new Secretaries are
Shelepin, formerly Intelligence (KGB) Chief, Ponomarev, head of the
International Department in the Central Committee staff, and Ilichev,
head of the Agitprop department in that staff.
2
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 461. (Conti) 20 November 1961
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g. Discipline in the Communists ranks, within the CPSU as well
as throughout the International movement, is obviously suffering -
heavily as a result of these several conflicts and of the "final"down-
grading of Stalin, still venerated as leader, teacher and "father
image" by millions inside and outside the Soviet Union. Doubts about
how far this new purge will go are likely to weaken further the cohesion
within Communist parties.
The Congress was by far the largest and most-prosperous-looking
CPSU convention ever held: 4, 408 voting and 405 non-voting delegates partici-
SUa.ted (the key for electing delegates had been changed from 5, 000 to 2, 000
.tembers, thus increasing them by 250%) plus sizeable delegations from about
20 foreign Communist parties; the sessions were held in a modernistic new
theater, equipped with all the latest conveniences, erected within the Kremlin
walls and completed just in time for the Congress. The affluence of the new
Communist ruling class was shown by numerous cars put at the disposal of the
high-ranking delegates; all participants were offered theatrical performances,
special exhibitions and other tangible status symbols.
The world viewed the Congress against the :doubly ominous background
cf the Berlin crisis and of the largest series of Soviet nuclear tests, climaxed
(but not ended, contrary to Khrushchev's announcement) with a 50 xn;w?gatron
explosion. Khrushchev omitted t he 31 December deadline. for the conclusion of
a peace treaty with East Germany (provided the West could convince him in the
meantime that it was willing to negotiate "seriously", i. e. accept at least
some of Khrushchev's major demands). This vagueness about the deadline --
contrasting with previous reports, alleging that the treaty-was to be signed
immediately after, or even before, the CPSU Congress -- plus the new wave
of "Anti-Stalinism" may have worried East German CP boss Ulbricht, who
has always been Stalin's obedient servant and who is still ruling East Germany
in the worst Stalinist tradition. There were, however, no indications that
Khrushchev was willing to "soften" his demands on Berlin. On the contrary, a
number of "hard actions" in Berlin, his sharp note to Finland (demanding
consultation on West German "threats of aggression") and his announcement
that he might continue nuclear tests "indefinitely", if the US would dare to
follow his example and undertake atmospheric tests, leave little hope for an
early reduction of the (Khrushchev-originated) international tensions. 25X1C10b
3 ll
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 Approved For Release 200'?1 / 78-03061A0 1( @*W~%r 1961
462. SOUTH VIETNAM: A Communist Attempt of Liberation Thru
Assassination 25X1 C10b
Background:
a. General: International Communism's support and direction
of the Vietnamese Communist guerrilla forces (Viet Cong) operating
in South Vietnam has its roots in clearly enunciated Communist
doctrine, despite the Communist claim that the Viet Cong are purely
local South Vietnamese patriots seeking liberation from the "colonialist
regime of DIEM".
b. Communist Doctrine: That the Communists have advertised
their intent to mount guerrilla warfare under the guise of support to
national wars of liberation is clearly revealed in the following material.
(1) The Moscow Manifesto of December 1960, signed by
81 Communist Parties, including the Chinese, stated:
"The national liberation movement receives powerful
support from the international working class move-
ment... Communists have always recognized the
progressive, revolutionary significance of national
liberation wars; they are the most active champions
of national independence... They will do the utmost
for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its
sphere of action by an active struggle for peace,
democracy and national liberation. "
(2) Khrushchev, on 6 January 1961, in a speech commenting
on the Moscow meeting which adopted the above Manifesto made
it clear that the ultimate extension of international communism's
support of national liberation wars is active assistance to the
Viet Cong guerrillas. He stated:
"Now about national liberation wars. Recent examples
of wars of this kind are the armed struggle waged by
the people of Vietnam... The communists support
just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without
reservations and they march in the van of the peoples
fighting for liberation. "
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 A4Iroof Lb & FCe eR&96' 4/16 ? IA t'beo ff4&1666 W&Yf-g
22nd Congress stated that:
"The Socialist countries are sincere and true friends of
peoples fighting for their liberation and of those that
have freed themselves from imperialist tyranny and
render them all-around support. "
In Khrushchev' s 18 October report on this program, two short
paragraphs after stating "communists are opponents of a
forcible, artificial implantation of this or that social political
system in other countries... and will not seek victory by inter-
fering in the internal affairs of other countries", he states:
"The people of one country or another who rise to fight
will not find themselves alone in the struggle against
world imperialism. Powerful international forces are
at their side, having at their disposal all that is necessary
to give effective moral and material support. "
Khrushchev concluded treatment of this subject by stating:
"Communists are against the export of revolution, and this
is well known to the West".
(4) Keeping in mind that the Communists mean the West and
nations friendly to it when they speak of imperialism, it becomes
clear from the above that their announced policy is to provide
all means of support to any who will rise up against a non-Com-
munist government. Additionally, the Communist claim that
they do not advocate "export of revolution" is ridiculous in
view of their repeated promises to support "national liberation
wars" which elsewhere in their doctrine, are the announced
final objectives of their "united front". In a few words, Mr.
W. W.Rostow, Special Asst. to the President, summed up all
the above --in the New Leader article. (See Press Comment,
August 1961) Speaking of Khrushchev's 6 January speech
(paragraph (2) above), Rostow noted:
"Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev... explained at great
length that the Communists fully support what he called
wars of national liberation and would march in the front
rank with the peoples waging such struggles. The military
arm of Khrushchev's doctrine is clearly guerrilla warfare. "
c. Communist Rules of Conduct for the Guerrilla: the Communists
attach overriding importance to the notion that the guerrilla, if he is to
survive, if he is to win recruits, must be the friend of the local inhabi-
tants and engage in no excesses. MAOlis most frequently quoted as
identifying this important relationship:
lMao Tse i vs~ 85 ~ n ~1 t~~ ri 78fOjftW $~6ht 0 9d11 t Japari'1939
`" T (continued)
 462. (ContApproved For Release 2001/11/16: CIA-RDP78-03061A00010DOo40eb bgr 1961
"The people are like water and the army is like fish.
How can it be difficult for the fish to survive if they
immerse themselves within the mass of the water.
But if the water is taken away or dries up, the fish
must also die and pass away. All guerrillas must
think hard and fully understand this basic truth... "
Chu Te, now Cl airman of the National People's Congress of the Chicom
regime wrote:
"The masses must be both the base and mother of
guerrillas and a guerrilla force divorced from the
people is like a fish out of water whose death is
imminent... To insure the sympathy of the people,
guerrillas must adhere to strict discipline and the
customs and traditions of the people must be
respected. It
"Ch &" Guevara, one of Fidel Castro's chief Communist lieutenants,
writes:
"The guerrilla must have rigid self-control... avoid
a single excess, a single act of misbehavior, even
when circumstances would permit and disturb the rich
as little as possible in the first of the development
of the war. But the war will follow its course. The
contradictions will become increasingly sharp and a
moment will corn when many of those that view the
revolution with some sympathy will take a position
diametrically opposed.. At that moment the guerrilla
must act and become the standard bearer of the
popular cause, punishing justly all treason...
Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism. Terrorism
and personal assassination are absolutely different
phases. We sincerely believe that it is a negative
weapon which produces in no way the desired effects,
which can turn people against a given revolutionary
movement. "
d. Terrorist Tactics of the Viet Cong: Contrary to the doctrine
that the -;guerrilla is the friend of the people, it is estimated that 400
to 500 citizens of South Vietnam are murdered each month by the
Viet Cong guerrillas. While the regular forces of South Vietnam have
suffered many casualties, the Viet Cong, with the obvious objective
of eroding government at the village level, concentrate their attacks
on killing village chiefs, public health administrators, nurses,
1Chu Te, On Guerrilla Warfare, Shanghai, 1939. -
z
"he Guevara , CiFn ol~~c~d F1~S P 1~'v: RDP;78L56?61 A000100040011-6
 Approved For I7elease 8-03061Ab6OWW0*gU~qr61961
462. (Cont. )
teachers, and local self defense part-time militia. This program
of assassination at the gross roots level is greatly enhanced by the
Soviet airlift of supplies to southeastern Laos from which regular
North Vietnam forces, disguised as Viet Cong, infiltrate into cen-
tral South Vietnam reinforcing the ranks of the Viet Cong and
assuring them a steady flow of arms and ammunitions. The savagry
of -Viet Cong terrorist tactics was dramatically revealed on 17 October
1961 with the discovery of Colonel Hoang Thuy NAM's mutilated body.
Colonel NAM, South Vietnam's chief liaison officer with the Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC) was kidnapped by the Viet Cong on
or about 10 October. An examination of his body revealed that he
had been severely tortured prior to being murdered by the Viet Gong.
For details concerning outraged South Vietnam's reaction to Colonel
NAM's assassination see New York Times 20 October 1961 (Press
Comment 20 October) and New York Times, 25 October 1961 (Press
Comment 25 October). 25X1 C10b
(continued)
 25X1C1Ob
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 2a' November 1961
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NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S PAST: FACTS WORTH REMEMBERING
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was born on 17 April 1894 in Kalinovka,
a Russian village a few miles from the Ukrainian border. It is possible,
t hough not proven, t hat his fat her may have been one Sergei N ikolayevich
Khrushchev, a landowner i n K al i novka who was also an off icial in t he
Tsarist Mini st ry of Interior, and who i s said t o have been discharged and
deprived of his land for anti -tsarist activity. Nikita worked as a young man
in the Dori Basin of the Ukraine; according t o his own remarks made on
carious occasions, he held various jobs as a coal miner, a harvest laborer,
a worker in a chemical factory, a fit ter, and an iron-worker. During the
1-1918 war, he somehow managed to evade mil it ary service in the tsar' s
army, but he j oined t he R ed Guards in March 1918. It is probable that this
eras his first political action, and his forceful personality and speaking abilit',
:)unmade him party secretary of his regiment. In 1920, Khr.ushchev agai.,.
',;;came a worker, and soon began to rise in the lower ranks of the party. l
had previously only 1 earned to read and write, but in 1922 he entered one of
the .so-called "workers' faculties" three-year secondary schools. His mind
uncluttered by bourgeois education, he soaked up the principles of Marxism-
Leninism. On finishing his training, he became a full-time party apparatchik
-.n city of Stalino (now Donetsk) in the Don Basin of the Ukraine .
Kaganovich was at this time Secretary-General of the Party in the Ukraine
and became Khrushchev' s sponsor; by 1928, Khrushchev was taking part in
secret meetings of the Ukrainian party leadership, concerned with emergency
measures arising from production difficulties in the Don Basin. When
Kaganovich was promoted to a position in Moscow, Khrushchev was promoted
to a position in Kiev. Speeches by Khrushchev in this period reflect merely
a complete loyalty to the party leadership, and a stress on developing the
powers of the professional party workers as opposed to the non-professional
party committees. In 1929-31, Khrushchev spent a year and a half in the J. V.
Stalin Industrial Academy in Mosocw, but he left without completing his course
to become a rayon Secretary in Moscow, under Kaganovich. According to one
source, he was lucky enough to meet Stalin' s second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva,
and she passed on to him her position as party secretary at the school. In
January 1932 he became second secretary of Moscow City, in other words
Kaganovich' s deputy. According to one source, partly supported by an article
in a Ukrainian paper in 1938, Khrushchev had first attracted Kaganovich's
attention by making anti-Trotsky speeches in 1923.
By 1;'32, if not before, Khrushchev had come to know Stalin, who was--
aside from his higher offices--a member of the Moscow City party committee.
Khrushchev's abilities as a clown, his proficiency at dancing the gopak, may
have given him some social entree into Stalin's entourage. Certainly he
demonstrated his serious talents as a straw boss who "could get the work out'",
in the construction of the first section of the Moscow subway. He had already
1 ald experience in pushing production under dangerous working conditions in
, ,he Don Basin in the period of the Shakhty trials, and it is very likely this
ability which explains his rise in the Ukrainian apparatus, his appointment
to the J. V. Stalin Academy, his departure from that academy for party work
in Moscow, and his rapid rise in that apparatus. Like his master, Kaganovich,
he was a "trouble shooter", a man who could crack down on subordinates at
a time when purge and the threat of purge were essential instruments of party
control. He spoke, praising Stalin and Kaganovich, at the 17th Congress of
the CPSU in 1934, and in 1935 became First Secretary of the Moscow City and
Oblast party organizations. Although not an official on the national level, this
positilon in the capital meant that he was in effect a member of the top levels of
the Soviet leadership.
In both his secret speech of 25 February 1956 and his public speech at the
22nd Congress on 27 October 1961, Khrushchev described the reign of terror
which began after the mysterious murder of Sergei Kirov on I December 1934.
In 1956 he pointed out that top officials of the Leningrad NKVD had been given
light sentences at first, but then in 1937 had been shot: "We can assume,"
'Khrushchev said, "that t_~ey were shot in order to cover the traces of the
organizers of Ki-rov's killing. " And in 1961, he asked, "Why were both
officials of the NKVD, escorting Kirov's chief bodyguard, shot later? This
means that someone needed to have them liquidated to remove all traces."
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Evidently the "someone" was Stalin. In his secret speech, Khrushchev said:
"After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repression and brutal acts
of violation of Socialist legality began. On the evening of 1 December 1934,
on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau- -which was
given two days later, casually) the Secretary of the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee, Yenukidze, " signed a directive for speeding up trials
and executions. Khrushchev can claim to have come out against Yenukidze
at an earlier date, in 1935. But his reasons then were different; on 13 June
1935, Pravda reported a Khrushchev speech to a group of Moscow activists as
follows:
The active listened with special attention to the second part
of the report which dealt with the official apparatus of the
Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
and with Yenukidze. A few months ago in this same hall of
the Conservatoire, the sad news of the murder of Sergei
Mironovich Ki rov struck the Moscow active like a thunder-
bolt. The shot which struck Comrade Kirov showed that
our enemies stop at nothing. Exposed and maddened, they
resort to any kind of foul deed, from setting fire to kolkhoz
sheepfolds, poisoning food in workers' canteens to murder
of the leaders of the people. All the necessary deductions
should have been drawn from this signal. Yenukidze, how-
ever, having lost all the qualities of a Bolshevik, preferred
to be a "kind uncle" to the enemies of our party. "
In other words, instead of violating socialist legality, Yenukidze was showing
too much concern for it. Let the 1935 Khrushchev continue:
"Comrade Khrushchev spoke about the contamination of the
official apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Executive
Committee, and about the political and moral degeneration
of Yenukidze, who had allowed the sworn enemies of the
working class to penetrate into it.
The Party showed great trust in Yenukidze, giving him
responsible work to do, said Comrade Khrushchev, but
he did not justify that trust. He betrayed the cause of the
revolution. He degenerated politically and morally. Even
in the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party he
spoke not like a Communist but like a bad business manager,
a petty bourgeois, a degenerate. His expulsion from the
ranks of the party proves once again that the Bolsheviks show
no mercy to anyone who flouts the responsibilities of a
Communist .
To thunderous applause from the whole hall, Comrade
Khrushchev appealed fcr still greater vigilance, for a fight
against rotten liberalism, for a still greater closing of the
ranks of the Moscow Bolsheviks around the Central Committee
and the Leader of the Party, Comrade Stalin. "
In calling for "still greater vigilance, for a fight against rotten liberalism",
Khrus'_ichev was then furthering the campaign of "mass repression and
brutal acts of violation of Socialist legality" which he denounced in 1956.
M o re giver, one must wonder if, in thus attacking Yenukidze, he was not
knowingly helping Stalin in the liquidation of a man who knew too much.
Yenukidze, like the two NKVD officials, was shot in 1937.
The Ukrainians CP had, in Stalin's eyes, begun to develop dangerous
nationalist (i. e. , ,Ukrainian nationalist) tendencies. In August 1937, Pravda
announced that a special commission, composed of Molotov, Yezhov
(the head of she NKVD), and Khrushchev was coming to investigate the
situation at Kiev. The commission was preceded by an NKVD contingent,
which placed the Ukrainian party leadership under guard. Molotov demanded
that the Ukrainian party organization accept Khrushchev as its new First
Secretary. The Ukrainian Central Committee bravely rejected this demand,
but did (with one exception) accept a second demand that they come to Moscow
to confer with Stalin. (The exception , Panas Lyubchenko, committed suicide.)
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As a result of the trip, all the members of the Ukrainian Politburo were at
least arrested, while all the members of the Orgburo and the Control Commis-
sion died. The three secretaries of the Ukrainian party,- Kosior, Khataevich,
and Popov, lost their lives. (At the 22nd Congress in 1961 Khrushchev said
Kos-ior "perished innocently"; he does not seem to have said so in 1937.)
Of 62 members and 40 candidate members of the Ukrainian Central Committee,
all but two were purged. Then, on 28 January 1938, Pravda announced that the
plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee (actually non-existent at this point)
had named Khrushchev as its new First Secretary. Khrushchev's appointment
was made more legal in June 1938, when a Congress of the Ukrainian party
was held. At this Congress, Khrushchev told his audience: "The enemies of
-the people, the bourgeois nationalists... removed the Russian language from
the school curriculum.... Comrades, now all the peoples will learn Russiari',
It appears that Khrushchev's Russification policy did not confine itself to
linguistic training. In 1943, while the Nazis were in occupation, a Ukrainian
doctor caused some digging in an area which had been fenced off by the Nla w' ~
near Vinnitsa, in the Central Ukraine. Eventually 95 mass graves were
discovered, containing 9,439 victims. 1390 bodies were-discovered
buried in the Gorky Park of Culture and Rest. Of the victims, 676 were
identified: they included 212 peasants, 82 workers, 51 government officials,
26 specialists, 16 soldiers and 4 priests. The graves were investigated by
an international commission, and photographs made which were displayed in
New York in 1954. Relatives identified some of the bodies in 1943 as those of
people arrested for "nationalism" in late 1937 and 1938. The investigating
expert: concluded that the deaths had occurred between 1938 and 1940. It was
during this period that Khrushchev became known as "the Hammer of the
Ukraine". According to a report in an Armenian newspaper, published since.
the 22nd Congress, Malenkov was guilty of arresting more than 3500 promine__t
Armenians in a few months in 1937, many of whom were shot. The Reuters
report states: "Bardam ants / chief of the Armenian KGB_J told a Party
meeting Tuesday in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, that in 1937 Malenkov was
given the assignment of repressing the Republic's Party apparatus. This was
after the Soviet secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, had personally shot the
Armenian Communist Party First Secretary. " Actually, Malenkov was
conducting the Armenian phase of the same purge of nationalists that Khrushche,
was conducting in the Ukraine.
In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, the Soviet Union bestirred
itself to make some annexations of its own. Aside from absorbing the Baltic
states, Moscow sent IA ultimatum to Rumania, demanding the cession of
Bukovina. The German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenberg, sent a
message to the German Foreign Ministry on 11 July 1940 stating:
"I cannot get rid of the impression that it was Ukrainian circles
in the Kremlin who have advocated and put through the claim for
cession of Northern Bukovina. On several occasions, as for instance
during the negotiations regarding the German-Soviet border in Poland,
a very strong Ukrainian influence in the Kremlin was evident. Herr
Stalin told me personally at that time that he was prepared to make
concessions -north of the boundary line where it runs through White
Russia, but this was impossible in the south where the Ukrainians
live. Consequently, the cession of the city of Sinyava, very much
desired by us, was cancelled by the Soviet Government after it had
f=-: st agreed to it. It has not yet been possible to determine where
this strong Ukrainian influence originates. There is no especially
influential Ukrainian known to be among the immediate entourage of
the leaders in the Kremlin. "
Schulenberg specu'.;ated that the influence might be a minor official at that
time in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin; Khrushchev would appear to be a
likelier candidate. While Schulenberg appears to have been naive or
disingenuous in reporting that there was a "very strong Ukrainian influence
in the Kremlix", it is quite possible that, aside from strategic considerations,
Khrushchev was arguing persuasively for an enlargement of the Ukraine, and
that he may have been behind the reversal over the city of Sinyava. Stalin
did not, of course, submit his decisions to a majority vote in the Politburo,
but necessarily, he did work out decisions together with the officials who
3 (continued)
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 were most "~JY~~ A Mv2Ld0 Ii~1d 6dib~l RYA gAdOdfi0tib 0A~~~' of
Bukovina, Khrushchev would have been one of those consulted.
In regard to Khrushchev's wartime career, volume 7 of the Bolshaya
Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, issued in June 1951, only mentioned Khrushchev
as tenth in a list of 14 wartime leaders; Malenkov was credited with organizing
the defense of Stalingrad. But volume 22, issued in September 1953, ranked
Khrushchev third in a list of 11 wartime political generals and industrial
directors. Recent Soviet historiography plays down Khrushchev's role in the
defeat of the Soviet army at Kiev, and plays up his role at Stalingrad (now
Volgograd). Khrushchev's wartime activities are now virtually the only part
of his pre-1953 history to get much Soviet attention; apparently he hopes, by
concentrating on this phase, to depict himself as outside the inner circle of
the party--as a participant in the glorious Patriotic War, but not a participant
in Stalinist purges and repressions.
After 1943, as the Nazis withdrew, Khrushchev's primary responsibility
was once again to rule the Ukraine. He took part in the planning of the new
Polish regime, making his first trip outside the Soviet Union to Warsaw in
1945; shortly thereafter a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship was signed betweer
Warsaw and Moscow. But Stalin never let any of his instruments become too
secure. In 1946, Khrushchev was forced to move some of his own faithful
followers from their positions. Then in March 1947, he himself was auddenly
removed from his post and replaced by Kaganovich. A Malenkov man, N. S.
Patolichev, was named as Ukrainian Second Secretary; it may be that this
marks the point when Khrushchev resolved eventually to settle his scores with
Kaganovich and with Malenkov. Fortunately for Khrushchev, he was restored
as Ukrainian First Secretary (though not as Ukrainian Premier) in December
1947, and he set about restoring the damage to his personal machine. He was
able, at a time when his rivals were engaged in-fighting in the Kremlin, to
build up a network of dependents in his large bailiwick. In December 1949,
Khrushchev was transferred from the Ukraine to the post of Secretary of
Mosocw Oblast, which he had held in the 1930's. This gave him a valuable
chance to extend his personal party machinery; it also brought him into daily
contact with Stalin again.
Stalin's death has yet to be fully explained, but it came at a time when a
number of the top leaders, and particularly Khrushchev, were in ixnminetzt
danger of purge or worse. Now there was a succession problem. Who of the
leadership- -Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, and Khrushchev vxAre the most promi-
nent--would become dictator? At first It appeared that Malenkov would
assume all of Stalin's powers, but within 9 days the others combined to take
from him the title of First Secretary. Khrushchev has recently given an
unofficial description of how in late June or early July 1953, he grappled with
Beria, who was then machine-gunned by General Moskalenko. The fact that
this explanation was not made at the 22nd Congress itself suggests that it was
not endorsed by all the presidium, and that Khrushchev may have exaggerated
his own role. At all events, Beria was eliminated. On 13 September 1953,
Khrushchev succeeded in becoming First Secretary, an all-important success,
which he had, however, to exploit cautiously. Malenkov was still Premier.
Pravda, under Khrushchev's control, began at the end of 1954 to return to
praises of Stalin and to link Khrushchev with him; the party newspaper also
argued for more stress on heavy industry, as against Malenkov's stress on
consumer goods, and the idea that nuclear weapons had made wars too dangerov
expressed by Malenkov, was attacked. On Z5 January 1955, Khrushchev
denounced Malenkov's program, speaking ominously of "rightist deviation, a
regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin and
their like once preached. On 8 February Malenkov resigned his premiership.
Possibly because the others demanded it, possibly for tactical reasons of his
own, Khrushchev now began to shift from Stalinism tothe advocacy of collective
leadership. Instead of accusing his rivals of rightist deviation, he was soon
implying that they were the Stalinists. But by 1957, the other party leaders
were alarmed at Khrushchev's growing power, and a majority of the presidium
members voted to demote Khrushchev from his post of First Secretary.
Bulgenin, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Saburov and Shepilov
all opposed KhrushchevButhrushchev's long years in control of the Ukraine
4 (continued)
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 and the Mo?ppio a WoiPP1a?16 ?GI i p `$ '1( iet
party organization, now yielded dividends. He was able to appeal to the Central
Committee, where a majority of members were his personal followers; he also
appealed to ]Marshal Zhukov for military protection for himself and his friends.
Once his position was made secure by a Central Committee vote, he wasted
little time in attacking his opponents as the "Anti-Party group", and took
care to get rid of Zhukov at the earliest opportunity. The name is of course
a typical Khrushchevian semantic club; Malenkov et al. were a group in that
they were all Communists- -and ill opposed to Khrushchev- -but in little else.
The name only makes sense if Khrushchev can say, paraphrasing Louis XIV,
"I am the party". Perhaps the essential purpose of the 22nd Congress was to
say this more loudly, to foreign as well as Soviet Communists.
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 20 November 1961
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Fifth World Trade Union Congress and Soviet Propaganda
The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) is scheduled to meet in
Moscow 4-16 December 1'9G1 to discuss and approve a program of world-wide
trade union action previously adopted by the WFTU Executive Bureau at a
meeting held in Prague 23-26 June 1961. On 30 July 1961 Moscow Radio broad-
cast.. ' the text of the 1961 Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) for the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, which was sc'leduled for and
met in Gc sober 1961.
` c ce mid--S :ptember both the CPSU and the WFTU have placed a max1-?
mum amount of emphasis on the problem of Germany and the Berlin Cr.sis.
To support the Soviet position the WFTU secretariat met with the Secretariat
of tae Free German Trade Union (FDGB) in East Berlin on 23-29 August 1961
1.11
plan for an international trade union conference which could be used as a
.c: ur;din board for Soviet propaganda . Accordingly from 22-2.1 September
6 t1'e :tnteruational Trade Union Conference for the German Peace treaty,
of the Problem of West Berlin and Against Military Provoca-
i or;s was held in East Berlin.
''n.st Berlin Union Conference: A letter from Khrushchev to-the conference
..~
Stated.
''? am confident that your conference called on the initiative
of the World Trade Union Federation will undoubtedly play a major
role in the mobilization of the w orking people and trade unions of
Europe and the entire world for the active struggle for the conclusion
of a peace treaty with Germany, for a peaceful solution of the West
German problem, against imperialist war provocations, for general
and complete disarmament, and for stable peace and international
security. "
The Berlin conference issued a memorandum at its conclusion which
nl stated the basic Soviet position in regard to Germany and Berlin. The
:,onference also issued two appeals. One, addressed to the working people of
all counties, contained the following statement:
UWWNorkinyg people of all countries:
Whatever your convictions aid whatever trade union organizations you
may belong to, your unity of action on an international scale is the main,
condition for the achievement of your common goals:
- the preservation of peace, which is now being threatened:
- general and complete disarmament, the only means of putting an end
to thze atomic threat and nuclear weapons tests:
- peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.
By c mn .orted struggle let us gain an urgent conclusion of a German p c-:'--
treaty and the solution of the West Berlin problem through negccl'_A.:c~-.
-second appeal was addressed to the working people and trade unions of W-.,s'.
n-rrnany and included the following:
"Working people of Western Germany, you cannot wish a repetition of
Nazi crimes. Like we, you must realize that the conclusion of a
German peace treaty is the best way to ensuring your own security
and creating conditions favorable for the unification of Germany along
peaceful and democratic lines. The peace treaty will be the most
effective means of preserving peace in Europe and in the whole world.
it will facilitate the solution of the problem of general and complete
disarmament, which the vast masses of working people are striving
for. We call upon you to redouble your efforts and fight resolutely and
jointly with us to achieve these aims.
"Wage your struggle at factories, construction projects and
institutions, in towns and villages. Stop the hand of revenge-seekers
and militarists.
"Work, in c:)operation with your class brothers in the GDR and
their trade -unions, for the signing of a peace treaty with the two
German states and the conversion of West Berlin into a free demilitar-
ized cifir.
"Turn your trade unions into mighty bastions of struggle against
military pre; arations.
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"Fight against vile military propaganda, expose those who act
as zealous agents of Nazi generals in the working-class movement.
"Fight for the implementation of decisions of your trade union
congresses directed against the armament of the Bundeswehr and the
preparation of war.
"Demand observance of trade union freedoms and democratic
rights and an end to the persecution of the working people and all
Democratic Peoples fighting for peace and disarmament.
".Realize the historical responsibility shouldered by you! Think
of the grave responsibility that will rest with you if you fail to unite,
if you leave in isolation those v}a.o are fighting courageously in your
country! By nct entering resolutely upon the path of struggle you
would directly connive at the preparation of a new militarist provocat-7.on
which would be the beginning of a terrible atomic war.
"The working people of all the world whom we represent are
ready to support you in this. They are fighting in their countries for
the same peaceful aims. Today the forces of world peace are the
strongest. They can prevent a new war if they unite and act in a most
resolute way everywhere.
"We know that such forces exist in your country as well. We
want to believe in them. We call upon these force?sw;to act, and fight
resolutely before it is too late. You German working people must be
their strongest and most active contingent.
"The World Federation of Trade Unions and its 114 million
members fighting tirelessly for lasting peace remain staunchly loyal
to the decisions adopted unanimously by trade union organizations dur,-Av-,
the establishment of the WFTU in 1945, and today they demand
liquidation of militarism and the securing of peace through an irnmed ._,
conclusion of the peace treaty.
"Let us unite all our forces and crush our common enemy, the
imperialist instigators of war!
"Let us, through joint action, secure the signing of aGerman
peace treaty and the solution of the problem of West Berlin through
negotiation., "
WFTU Draft Program: Of probable major importance at the World Congress
of Trade Unions in December and thereafter is the trade union unity program
of WFTU. The new draft program explicitly calls for attacks on and exposure
~f ICFTU leaders for their anti-Communism, for their support of splits in t'-,4:
working class at the national and international levels, and as reformist advoc l9r_
of class collaboration. It places great emphasis on the ICFTU leaders as ca=.--
italist tools and instruments of the monopolies. At the same time, instead of
announcing the successes achieved in unity operations directed at the ICFTU
affiliates, it calls for a more vigorous prosecution of unity from below on c`as;
questions, at both the national and international levels, as a means of dis-
crediting and eliminating anti-Communist leaders.
`i'he WFTU program states that its main task is to wage a decisive
~,fruggle for unity in the trade union movement, for the unity of all working
class forces. To accomplish this task the WFTU urges all workers and trade
unionists to increase their efforts:
To give a devastating answer to all those who hope to continue the cold
war in the international trade union movement and who are trying to
deepen and lengthen the break in it.
To develop and strengthen fraternal relations between the trade unions
of all countries in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.
To make their struggle for the vital interests of the workers more
active on the basis of united action.
To strengthen continually the fraternal international solidarity of the
workers in all countries.
To widen the struggle for the unity of the trade union movement
nationally and internationally in each branch of industry and in each
undertaking.
2 (End)
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 Approved Fof-Release 2001/11/16: CIA-RDP78-0306tA0Q&I1 O4 tUr 1961
CULTS: Stalin and Khrushchev
The Cult c-f Stalin
"Hail the greatest genius of mankind, teacher and leader, who leads us
victoriously to Communism, our own Stalin (Stcsr.P.V app:; nae, turning into an
ovation. All rise, there are shouts of 'Hurrah!, ' ' Hail the great Stalin',
'Comrade Stalin, hurrah!')"
-N. S. Khrushchev, cited in 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party.
(Russian zdition, Moscow, 1939J, p. 174.
"Every Bolshevik, every worker, every citizen of our Soviet country must
cearly realize that the successful and victorious destruction of fascist agents--
".1i those contemptible Trotskyites, Bukharinites and bourgeois naticnaists--ici
first of all, personally to our leader, our great Stalin. (Loud ovaticn,"'
N. S. Khrushchev, cited in 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Par-,"-,
': as sia:n edition, Moscow, 1939 , p. 170.
"Comrades! The Soviet Union under the genius leadership of our wise leader
and military commander Generalissimo Stalin /stormy applause, turning into
an ovation. All rise, there are shotAn s: 'Hail Stalin, ' 'Long life to our own
father, Stalin (in Ukrainian)' /not only defended its freedom and independence,
but made the decisive contribution to the struggle of all the United Nations
against the German-Fascist usurpers, and saved the nations and civilization of
'_'?.irope and the whole world from Fascist enslavement. "
N. S. Khrushchev, Restore Agriculture in the Soviet Ukraine Faster: Speech
al the Republican Conference of Leaders of Agriculture in the Ukraine,
January 18, 1946 (Russian edition, Kiev, 1946), p. 5.
-he leadership of our Leninist Central Committee and above all of Comrade
:talin personally, has been felt by our entire Party. We :workers in the Moscow
organization have felt this leadership... personally of Comrade Stalin directly
and particularly from day to day in all questions... Under the leadership of
Comrade Stalin the Right has been beaten in our Party, beaten in the Moscow
organization... /,which.-is / ideologically united around the Central Committee,
around our genius leader, Comrade Stalin. This principled ideological unity
as been achieved thanks to the able daily leadership which we have had in t .e
>~rson of Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich. We have carried out in our Moscow
organization a purge which has still more strengthened the fighting capacity of
o-:;:r ranks.
?-N. S. Khrushchev, speech at 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party,
3 4.
On the subject of collective leadership, Stalin stated to the German writer I:m l
Ludwig on 13 December 1931: "In this areopagus /the Central Cornrnitt.e/ is
concentrated the wisdom of our Party. "
"We must fight against the incorrect understanding on the part of some, of to
process of creating a classless society. There are some who understand this
cuestion in the following way: We can, they say, rejoice... soon there will be no
classes and we will not have to continue with the class war. /But/ the class war
? gill not diminish, and we must ixiobilize the forces of the Party, the forces of
the working class, to make stronger the organs of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat / i. e. , the NKVD / for the final annihilation of the class enemies- of all
the remnants of the Rightists and 'Leftists' and all the other opportunists who have
wanted and who want to put brakes on our further successful movement forward. "
-N. S. Khrushchev, speech at 17th Congress of the All-Union Communicc Party,
1934.
"For all these successes the Ukrainian people like all the peop3. ;, of the Soviet
Union are indebted to t o j olshevik Par.9 , indebted to the le wd,:r of tl.Warty and
people, the gr:- at Stalin. "
-N. S. Khraishc l?v, in The S~.alinirt Friendship of NationaIat~es: A Guarantee for
the Invincibility of Our Homy c.nc_?uss.ian edition, M^osca~,T, 1949// p'1Q. ~~~
( ontin. ed)
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040011-6
 "ComraddAl fg39 dd @IM@@~iQQ1$~i h 1 ~Pb~ ~~rA cially
about young collective farms of the western provinces of the Ukraine, and
-gives them every sort of assistance. "
-N. S. Khrushchev, in Pravda Ukrainy, Oct. 30, 1949.
"The vigilance of Ukrainian workers and peasants has increased. We will con-
stantly raise this quality and kill like cockroaches any abominable creatures
which foreign intelligence services may send to our Ukrainian land. The
Ukrainian people, having destroyed enemies and traitors, has rallied even
more tightly around the Bolshevik Party and our great Stalin. "
-N. S. Khrushchev, 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Russian
edition, Moscow, 1939 , p. 170.
"These successes did not come of themselves; they were won in the cruel
struggle with enemies of the working class, with enemies of the peasantry, w'!.'-
enemies of our people, in the struggle with agents of fascist espionage--with
Trotskyite s, Bukharinites, and bourgeois rntionali4ts. "
-N. S. Khrushchev, 18th Congress of tAll-Union Communist Party (Russian
edition, Moscow, 1939, p 1 9.
"Comrade Stalin illuminates our lives with the brilliant light of science; he
provides a program of action and directs our victorious movement towards
C,ommun:'s:m.... Glory to the great Stalin!"
-Anastas Mikoyan, speech in 19th Party Congress, 1952.
Lail T3Lc E ul (f ititrushchev
"Every time you / Khrushchev/ go abroad, you take with you a part of each one
of us.... Every time /-you % return from abroad having successfully fulfilled
a mission of peace and friendship, Sou/ not only return to us Ta part of each
cne of us'-- you/ enrich for all of us our understanding of the supreme tasks
which are ,presented before the peoples in the struggle for peace and progress. "
-Pravda, 2.1 Oct. 1961?.
"Did the Trotskyites at this time / 1937actually constitute such a danger to our
Party and to the Soviet state ? We should recall that in 1927 on the eve of the
XVth Party Congress only some 4000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724, 000 for the Party line. During the
1.0 years which were passed between the XVth Party Congress and the FebruarT:._.