BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 9, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

SECRET
 r1 `~
Approved For ReLse 20 78-03061A990 .06$~(i0~9 9
Briefly Noted
1. Soviet Scientists on the Danger of Nuclear Tests. For the
information of those who are not already aware of its exis,once, the Soviets
issued a booklet in 1; 58 (arid later editions) entitled "Soviet Scientists on the
Dnager of Nuclear Tests. " For obvious reasons connecter with their resump-
tion of atmoshperic testing, they are no longer circulating this publication and
are reported to have removed it from bookstores in the USSR. We, on the
other hand, can use it not only to document the dangers of the fallout they are
cvaating, but also to _eveal the duplicity of their peace propaganda. We can
ak such rhetorical questions as "Do the Soviets still believe that tests are
so dangerous, and if so why did they resume testing in the atmosphere ?"
or "Why have the Soviets suppressed this booklet?" If the United States is
forced to test in the atmosphere at a later date, we can suggest that the
dangers described in this booklet must have been exaggerated, since the
S=iviets themselves ignored them. The articles in the booklet are at once
s,amewhat technical and highly propagandistic, so that the material is best
given to sophisticated readers or to capable assets for popularized interpre-
tation. Further copies of the booklet are available.
2. Ulbricht's Concentration Camp. We wish to direct attention to an
article, "Ulbricht's Concentration Camp", which appeared in the Vienna
Arbeiter-Zeitung, 12 September 1961 (See Press Comment, 29 Sep 61), and
came to the attention of the Director. This is an excellent short attack on
Walter Adolfevich Ulbricht, as the East German amateur architect is named
in the cadre files of the Central Committee xif the CPSU (see Book Dispatch
#1133, 17 March 1959, and attachment for a more complete expose on
Ulbricht's career). Some of the Arbeiter-Zeitunp statements are based on
an article which Ulbricht wrote during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
(and which is not included in Ulbricht's three volume collected works,
Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung): "Hilferding on 'The
Meaning of the War, "' printed in Stockhokxi in the German Communist
exile journal, Die Welt, 9 February 1940. We have obtained the original
text of this Ulbricht article and have reproduced it in Press Comment, 29
Sef 1961. In the translation, we have marked certain passages as
particularly suitable for our use; the underlining, however, follows the
italics in the original.
In his book, European Communism, pp. 249-250, Franz Borkenau
quotes certain passages in Ulbricht's 1940 article (his quotations correspond
with page 23, last three sentences of third paragraph, page 25, last four
sentences of third paragraph, and page Z6, second sentence in the third
paragraph in our Press Comment translation) and comments as follows:
The full shame of this document can only be brought out by
some reading between the lines. The 'Thyssen clique', in the
above-quoted article, simply stands for all anti-Nazi forces
(witness that the communists also subjected the conservative
and socialist anti-Nazi groupings to constant attacks), and
Approved For Release 2
4il 8-03061A00ec1QQR9
 Breifly Note
for Rek se 200- I-j 78-03061AO0010909r 1961
NOW
the request to expose them can only mean that the German
workers should 'expose' the enemies of Nazism, especially
in the army and in the civil service. That desire--material-
izing during that period in the cooperation between the Gestapo
and the NKVD--ties up with the formula, used a little further
above, about the struggle against 'reaction'; a formula which,
to the unsuspecting reader, may seem a residue from Popular
Front days. Actually, the fight against 'reaction' was one of
Goebbels' pet ideas, and his struggle against the old ruling
class and its influence in business, the army and the civil
service was, as has since been revealed by dramatic events
and ample documentation, very real. The Ulbricht article,
therefore, was not simply pro-German in a vague and merely
propagandist sense. It contained an offer of cooperation with
of the Nazi party against the German
the 'anti-capitalist' wing
High Command (then still under the influence of the conservatives)
and, of course, against the West.
Finally,-- we would also like to call attention to another anti-Ulbricht
article, "The Drive for Power," Die Wochen-Presse, Vienna, 2 Sep 61
(Press Comment, 22 September 1961),
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For Reiwse 20 8-03061AOQQ1I~f 49OQ91961
436. Soviet Pressure on CENTO Countries
Background: During recent weeks, the USSR has noticeably increased
its pressure on Middle East members of CENTO (the Central Treaty
Organization): Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. For all three countries, the recent
increase in pressure has largely been connected with Soviet publication of
classified documents of the (former) Baghdad Pact, CENT 0's predecessor,
apparently acquired following Qasim's 1958 revolution in Iraq. (NOTE: The
U, S. Government has not publicly admitted the authenticity of the documents).
Soviet Persian-language broadcasts have stressed alleged Baghdad Pact plans
for n4clear attacks on the USSR and an "atomic death zone" in Iran. Continuing
the long-standing Soviet condemnation of Iran, the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran
has threatened to intervene under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 unless Iran
abandons CENTO. The treaty, which is regarded by the Iranians as no longer
valid, is still maintained by the Soviets to contain certain provisions (initially
designed to permit the Bolsheviks to take action against any counter-revolution-
ary forces which might be established on Iranian soil) allowing the USSR the
right to intervene against any "aggressive forces" in Iran. Further, in spite
of objections by the Turkish Government, the USSR has endeavored to
propagandize in Turkey documents on the basis of which the Soviets charge the
CENTO alliance with aggressive intentions. It is questionable what the Soviets
hope to achieve in directing such accusations at Turkey, also a member of
NATO and long as much (or more) anti-Russian as it is anti-Soviet, unless it
is simply the desire to exacerbate existing tensions. In addition, the Soviet
press and radio have claimed the existence of a patently false Baghdad Pact
document which proposes the partition of Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran,
to threaten Pakistan with massive Soviet support for Afghanistan -- currently
undergoing another period of severely strained relations with Pakistan over
the long -lasting "Pushtunistan" issue. As far as Iran is concerned, the
Kremlin has apparently never forgiven the Shah for initiating and subsequently
breaking off negotiations for a non-aggression pact with the USSR in 1959. The
Soviet press and radio have continued their vitriolic campaign against Iran,
the fall of whose government in the not too distant future even Khrushchev has
repeatedly predicted. It is not clear whether the Soviets are using the occasion
of the major distraction of the Berlin issue with the free world to increase
pressure on the Middle East CENTO powers under the impression that they
can do so at present with relative immunity; or perhaps the pressure in this
part of the world is being used by the Soviets in order to partially divert the
attention of the free world from Berlin. 25X1 C10B
pprove or Release - V9MYRRA)
 5X1C1OB
L Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For Re se -03061A00.W00@491961 25X1C10B
Background: For years, before World War II as well as after it, nations
have discussed disarmament. Sometimes this discussion seams to have a quality
of unreality; as was: pointed out in Guidance #373, arms do not cause friction,
they result from friction. Nevertheless, as was also pointed out, an arms race
can have fatal consequences, one side trying to out-arm the other until the point
:.ziay be reached when the safest course appears to be to launch a "pre-emptive"
or "'preventive" attack. (The distinction between "pre-emptive" or "preventive"
attack is that the former is supposed to take place only if there are concrete
reasons for believing that the enemy is currently preparing to act; the difference,
however, is likely to be non-existent in practice.) This danger is very serious in
this ,..age of nuclear weapons, particularly when nuclear capabilities may spread
to additional countries. In view of the danger, the United States has advanced
new and far-reaching disarmament proposals. These proposals represent an
effort to make disarmament a practical, workable proposition.
Generally, the principal innovation in the US proposals is the adoption of
the idea, supported by France in the 1932 discussions, of strengthening the
machinery to keep the peace in a disarmed world. This is to be accomplished by
generally strengthening the UN peace-keeping machinery as well as ostablishing
an International Disarmament Organization to inspect and verify the agreements
reached, a UN peace observation group for investigating threatening situations,
and in later stages, a permanent international peace (or police) force under the
UN. The establishment of an International Disarmament Organization is nct new,
in that it reflects what has been ever since 1946 a basic US position, the position
that disarmament cannot be taken "on faith" but must be inspected. But the recog-
nition of the need for positive international control to maintain peace when coun-
tries have disarmed is a new policy for the United States. Those who take the
long view will doubtless see in this the continuation of the American evolution
away from isolation and towards acceptance of international, UN authority.
Aside from the idea of expanding peace-keeping machinery in phase with
disarmament, the American plan stresses the following principal points:
1. The control machinery shall verify what forces have been retained
as well as what has been destroyed or eliminated.
2. Disarmament shall proceed by stages, with the completion of an
earlier stage being verified before a succeeding stage is entered into.
3. Although efforts shall continue without interruption until a total
disarmament program is achieved, immediate piecemeal measures,
such as a controlled ban on nuclear testing, a ban on testing in outer
space, and a cut-off in the production of nuclear weapons, can be put
into effect without waiting for complete agreement on an over-all
disarmament plan.
Summing up, the US proposes that, first, there should be immediate dis-
armament action; second, all disarmament oblo t
Approved For Release 200"44A I- IA &g0g'50~1%
ue O%Vo
_. ~ ( ontm j
 437. (Copt'.. `?proved For Rekiase P78-03061A0% Q 18A@q0? 1
effective international controls; and third, adequate peace-keeping machinery
must be established.
A plan of course is one thing; an agreement. in this case involving many
countries, is something else. The USSR and its satellites, learning that the US
was to present a new proposal, broke off the last general disarmament
negotiations on 27 June 1960, the Polish acting chairman of the meeting refusing
to recognize Western representatives so that they might speak, by declaring
the meeting and the conference ended. This action was unprecedented in the
annals of international conferences. The UN in the fall of 1960 requested the
negotiating states, when negotiations resume, to work toward "general and
complete disarmament. "" In an effort to resume negotiations, talks took place
between McCloy and Zorin last summer (with UN approval) to establish (1) agree-
ment on principles, and (2) agreement on the make-up of a disarmament
conference.
A step forward was achieved when the two sides agreed on a set of princi-
ples to guide the negotiators in their work. The US agreed to work without
interruption toward "general and complete disarmament" in negotiations, while
the Soviet Union accepted (1) the need for building a strong UN peace-keeping
machinery as disarmament progresses; (2) the concept of disarmament by stages,
with each stage being verified before proceeding to the next; and (3) the idea of
agreeing on and carrying out individual measures before reaching agreement
on a total program. We may wonder if the Soviet agreement to the American
draft statement embodying these points was sincere, particularly with respect
to the last one; they can always block action at a later stage, and were perhaps
under some pressure, due to the bad publicity they were getting from their
nuclear test resumption, to make some conciliatory move. In any case, there
was one sentence of the American draft which they would not accept, even for
the sake of appearances: this sentence provided that the verification of disarma-
ment "should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but
also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at
any stage. " This is a very vital matter, since the mere scrapping of arms could
be very deceptive; what counts is being able to verify that armaments remaining
are at agreed levels. As a case in point, the Communist war-time guerrilla
organization in Greece, ELAS, undertook to stack arms and actually turned in
thousands of weapons, but then, at a critical moment, started a bloody civil war
with the arms it had secretly retained. The Soviets claim, of course, that
inspection of remaining forces would constitute espionage. But dsarmament
without it would be a farce.
On the question of who should participate in disarmament negotiations
which ended so unceremoniously in June 1960 involved 10 nations, 5 from the
Soviet bloc and 5 from the West. But in March 1961, the Soviets called for parti-
cipation in any future negotiations by 15 nations, adding five neutrals; this is an
application of the "troika" principle, and also a propaganda move to win neutral
support. The United States in reply has made several suggestions, ranging from
the original 10 members to the whole membership of the UN. The preferred US
solution is to add 10 other nations drawn from the major geographical areas of
the world, making a total of twenty: the nations proposed are India, Japan, UAR,
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 :tIA-RDP78-03061 A000100040009-9
(Continued)
 43'7. (Cont'r3proved For Ruse 100 Is 1.LT14U_R"E 2 3061Aa p9g61
Pakistan, Nigeria, Tunisia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Sweden.
Six months ago there was widespread hope in the US that the Soviet Union,
if only in its own interest, would participate in genuine negotiations for disarma-
ment. Events since, particularly the Soviet conduct in the nuclear test ban
discussions and in resuming mclear testing in the atmosphere, have made these
hopes evaporate. But all along, the Soviets have cynically used the issue of
disarmament to attain various short term ends: they identify uncontrolled
disarmament with peace, they stigmatize every attempt to approach the problem
responsibly as obstructionism or espionage. they appeal to the vanity and fuzzy
idealism of those who bear no responsibility for world security, they constantly
accuse the west of bad faith and of planning a nuclear attack, and they generally
regard the issue as a means of weakening and disuniting the west. The following
points must constantly be borne in mind:
1. Disarmament is not identical with peace unless it is accompanied
with effective peace-keeping machinery.
2. Disarmament is meaningless unless it signifies that there is a
proportional reduction of arms on all sides; the country with five tanks
can defeat the country with none.
3. The fact of disarmament must be established and verified, like a
scientific fact; it cannot be taken on faith.
4. The proof of a country's readiness to disarm is its willingness to
negotiate in line with the above principles; a call to one's opponent to
disarm is not a contribution to peace unless one is ready to disarm
oneself. Neither is it a contribution to peace when those who bear
no responsibility propose the unilateral disarmament of governments that
do bear it; their proposals can only influence the governments that are
responsive to public or world opinion, weakening them in the face of
those who, exactly because they are not responsive, are least scrupulous
in the use of force.
The value of the American proposals is not destroyed by the dark prospects
of the present moment. Aside from the hope that world tensions may someday
ease and that the Soviets may take a more reasonable position, disarmament is
only one of two sides to the American plan; the other side is the reinforcement
of means for maintaining peace. Logically, disarmament and peace-keeping
machinery must go hand in hand. This entails, among other things, the 25X1C1OB
maintenance of a strong UN Secretariat. If the American plan serves no other
purpose than to point this out to the world, it will have accomplished something.
(Continued)
 25X1C1OB
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For R e se 200 $-0306lAO4Q 01961 25X1C10B
'Raw
438. The Soviet Union is not Invulnerable
Background: Khrushchev has been seeking to magnify some successful
rocket shots and space probes into'. an image of an invincible Soviet colossus.
With wildly exaggerated propaganda, he has tried to convince the world that the
Soviet Union has outdistanced the West, and is now so powerful that all must
accept its dictates. In the midst of all the sound and fury, little attention was
given to the IS firing of Mercury-Atlas IV around the world on 13 September, with
a payload weight of 2, 700 lbs. (including a dummy astronaut), and a total weight
in. orbit of 11, 300 lbs. Soviet propaganda still claims that the heaviest US
satellite weighted only 500 lbs. The first test flight of the US Saturn booster is
scheduled for 13 October, and this rocket is expected to be capable of lifting
20, 000 lbs. into orbit, larger than anything orbitted by the Soviets. A second
generation Saturn being developed is expected to more than double this lift
capability, while plans are being made for an even larger vehicle, called the
Nova, capable of going to the moon and back. It will thus be seen that the
capability of lifting large loads, with its connotation of military/nuclear poten-
tial, is not a Soviet monopoly. Soviet leaders have also boasted much of their
multi-megaton bombs, but the US has developed a wide range of nuclear weapons
for actual military use, not for propaganda, and in his speech to the UN on 26
September, Gromyko made the admission (in order to justify Soviet test resump-
tion) that "On the whole the Western powers have conducted many more test
explosions than the Soviet Union has. "
Khrushchev and the CPSU cadres might profitably recall the history of
World War II. Possibly they have forgotten the fact, always concealed in Soviet
propaganda, that when the attack began, Soviet divisions outnumbered German
by approximately 3 to 2. Yet the Germans advanced during the first month at the
rate of 20 miles a day. During 1941, the Germans took at least 2, 000, 000 Soviet
prisoners, and the Soviets lost over 19, 000 tanks. Losses on this scale,
especially the millions of prisoners, indicate that many of the troops simply
surrendered without fighting. And in fact many soldiers, especially from
minority groups, came over to the Germans in droves, Bielorussians asked to
fight on the German side, and whole regiments of Cossacks deserted to the
enemy. Not only enlisted men and subalterns, but high-ranking officers, includ-
ing Timoshenko's chief of staff, went over to the Germans. Stalin was saved by
winter, by Hitler's mystical belief that it was more important to destroy
"Leningrad and Stalingrad, the breeding grounds of Bolshevism, " than Moscow,
and eventually by lend-lease. (See attachment)
By postponing his attack on Moscow in August 1941, after going two-thirds
of the way, Hitler missed his chance to seize the center of Soviet communica-
tions and government, and much of Soviet industry. Under a state planning
system, many things must be centrally administered that under a private enter-
prise system would be simply and directly settled between the parties immediately
concerned; a "socialist" state is therefore more vulnerable to disruption resulting
from an enemy attack on its capital than is the case with a capatilist country.
Moscow was the most vital point for the Soviet Union (despite the flight of the top
echelons), for whose defense they would have committed most of their remaining
Approved For Release 2001/11 1 : CI&_ Q74 ^?06(' RFjt0S9jp009-9
 Approved For Release 78-03061A000 PP~~~Q.91~61
438. (Conti )
forces. A successful encircling operation here, such as was performed
instead at Kiev, would have meant practically the end of effective, organized
Red Army resistance. Stalin might perhaps have retreated further eastward,
but a weakened Soviet Union might also have attracted a Japanese attack.
Let us suppose that war breaks out between East and West today.
Nuclear devastation would be very serious for us. But what matters most to
Khrushchev is the effect of our counter-attack on his country. It would be
possible for the U. S. with existing weapons to devastate the major Soviet
cities, particularly Moscow which was not seriously damaged during World
W .r II; in doing so we could deliver a crushing blow to the Soviet power
structure, which is still highly centralized on the party side if less so in
terms of current state organization. Soviet transport still depends almost
entirely on railroads which, like the telecommunication net, center on the
capital. A hasty evacuation of 300, 000 people, such as took place when
Hurricane Carla struck the Texas coast a few weeks ago, would be impossible
to carry out in the USSR. Moreover, fallout or crop damaging BW weapons
could well destroy the Soviet food supply, for which (unlike the American)
there is no significant reserve. Since there is a shortage of population
remaining even today from World War II (see Guidance 0318), the Soviet Union
would then face a vastly more populous China with depleted manpower and
without its present technical advantages. Even supposing that the Soviet ground
forces were able to advance to the English Channel, there would still exist
the problem of policing the conquered areas; Communist organizations in the
West would be as disrupted and decimated as the rest of West European society.
What would happen in Eastern Europe is suggested by the revolts in East
Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and the continued unpopularity of Communism
is demonstrated by Ulbricht's prison wall. Finally, Soviet forces would still
be thousands of miles from the shores of their principal opponent.
This survey of the prospects suggests that Khrushchev can hardly wish
to launch a general war if he is still capable of rational thinking. Presumably
he hopes to attain his aims by slow penetration. But this is not necessarily
rewarding either. The Korean War was in effect a military defeat for
Communism, since it aroused the U. S. and led to greatly increased military
expenditures in this country which have never returned to pre Korean levels.
A Soviet challenge in Berlin might lead to a U. S. counter-attack, but would
be much more likely to result in increased U. S. armament, including civil'
defense, limited war forces, and increased nuclear attack capability, while
also tightening and strengthening NATO. As Herman Kahn wrote in 1960:
"This would mean that as in Korea, even if we lost Berlin in the military
sense, the Russians would have lost their particular campaign. While Berlin
is important ethically and politically, its loss would not compare to the
greatly increased power and reserve on the side of the West. " Since Kahn
wrote the foregoing, Soviet policy has indeed begun to produce this result,
and if "successful,'' would do it much more thoroughly.
a
(continued)
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 438. (Cont. Approved For Rapse 20 QI1Q$6804961
Rome was never built in a day, or even in a short series of five year plans.
The history of human affairs is full of examples of the speculator who, building
on a narrow foundation of success, attempts to create grandiose paper empires.
As he progresses, he is forced to store up his credit with even-more-frantic
claims and falsifications. In finance, we have had John Law's Bubble and the
Southsea Bubble in 1719, the English "Railway Mania" of 1847, the French
Panama scandal (when scores of deputies were bought to keep their mouths shut),
the Florida real estate boom in the 1920's, and the fantastic career of Ivar
Kreuger. In politics, there have been such figures as John Wilkes, Aaron Burr,
General Boulanger, and Senator McCarthy. Sooner or later, the public awakens
to the lack of substance, and the house of cards tumbles to the ground. Is this
not perhaps what fate has in store for N.S. Khrushchev ? As Lincoln said,
"It is true that you can fool all of the people some of the time; you
can even fool some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool
all the people all of the time. "
3
3 JS ,, X h; T
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For iWease 2001/11/16': CIA-RDP78-030610100040009-9
9 October 1961
439, CUBA: The Decline and Fall of the Cuban Revolution
Background: When Fidel Castro started his struggle against the regime
of Fulgencio Batista, the majority of Cubans firmly believed that Castro was
dedicated to the overthrow of a dictatorship in order to bring freedom and
justice to the oppressed and backward people of Cuba. His advent also
promised the introduction of badly needed social and economic reforms in
the country. Unfortunately, neither the intellectuals. nor the social reformers
were sufficiently wary. In the euphoria of the period immediately following
the victory of the 26th of July Movement, they permitted Che Guevara, Raul
Castro, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and other Communist leaders
to usurp the ideals of "Castroism" and use Castro as a figurehead behind whom
'.hey could quietly take over complete control of the country. Consequently,
ncere believers in "Castroism, " sincere patriots whose only purpose was
to carry out badly needed reforms in the wake of an oppressive regime and
who had placed their faith in Castro as their leader, can only rue the day
when they dropped their guard and ceased to maintain their vigilance and thus
lost that for which they had suffered and fought. 25X1C10B
(continued)
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 25X1C1OB
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For RJase 2001/11116 CIA-RDP78-03061AQ0 100040009-9
xs , 9 October 1961 25X1C10B
Background: On 30 August last, the USSR abruptly announced the resump-
tion of nuclear weapons testing, punctuating the announcement by setting off a
nuclear explosion the very next clay. The long, rambling, apologetic and
contradictory announcement argued that the action was necessitated by threaten-
ing military moves of the Western powers, but did not specify what those moves
were. Since the announcement, the USSR has set off fifteen nuclear explosions.,
a.' of them in the atmosphere. It has furthermore announced a series of long-
i-ange rocket firings into the Pacific and has fired at least three, with an appro :i-
mate range of 7, 500 miles.
During the month of September, radio-active fallout reached a record high
and has been detected in many parts of the globe, evoking serious protests and
warnings from many sources both scientific and lay. By way of contrast, the
resumption of small, underground nuclear tests by the US in early September
has caused but little comment and has produced no fallout. The Soviet announce-
ment came on the eve of the Belgrade Conference of uncommitted nations and
just prior to the resumption at Geneva of talks on the banning of nuclear testing.
It also abruptly terminated a campaign of "peaceful coexistence" amongst
nations, for which the USSR and Communist parties over most of the world had
been beating the drums for years, and which had gained much support from
neutralists, pacifists and fellowtravellers and in addition many people genuinely
interested in serious efforts to prevent the outbreak of war, to promote true
disarmament and to abolish nuclear weapons.
The action taken by the Soviets is directly contrary to their frequent and
solemn undertaking not to resume nuclear weapons testing unless the Western
powers first resumed testing on their own. Indeed, as late as mid-August, at the
Seve?_nth World Conference against A and H Bombs meeting in Tokyo, both the
Soviet and the Chinese Communist delegates joined in a unanimous resolution
stating that "the first givernment to resume tests should be denounced as the
enemy of peace and mankind. " Moreover, atmospheric testing runs directly
counter to the 1958 grave warnings concerning fallout by the Academy of Science
of the USSR, published in a pamphlet and presumably widely distributed. Other
statements of Soviet scientists have reiterated the perils to Russians as well as
all other people inherent in atmospheric testing.
Throughout the.C6ld War, the Communist "peace campaign" has won the
support of many non-Communist groups and individuals in the West and else-
where, who oppose modern war in any form and who sincerely believe large-
scale warfare would be fatal to civilization because of the inevitable utilization
of nuclear weapons. There are also those groups and individuals who, motivated
by witting support of the USSR, fear of opposing the USSR, or fuzzy belief in the
sincerity of Soviet protestations, have gone along with this as with other
Communist propaganda campaigns.
At the same time, changes in Soviet tactics and abrupt and unexplained
reversals f olio a a a ~f
HE) lftbr3 -40~'66agd@ and
'prov~ForyfeleJS1r MM VA% 8W-A
Communist Parties outside of Russia, as witness the consternation created by
(Continued)
 tp 9 October 1961
440. (Co7Aroved For R,Wease 2001/11.T'I I - - 061W01000440009-9
Chairman Khrushchevts abrupt denunciation of Stalin. Even more importantly,
the USSR's callous abandonment from time to time of its policy of "peaceful
coexistence" has shocked many individuals and groups, who had supported such
a Soviet line in all sincerity, into open protest and denunciation, as witness the
impact of the brutal suppression of the Hungarian and East German revolts, and
the current sealing off of the border between East and West Berlin, which has
even involved shooting would-be escapees.
The current Soviet announcement and concurrent actions have aroused a
new storm of protest, especially violent amongst those organizations genuinely
desiring an ending to nuclear testing and the threat of nuclear warfare, such as
Lord Bertrand Russell's Committee of 100, Canon Collins Campaign for Nuclear
'Disarmament, the Race Marchers, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear F
Policy, the Iranian Association for Afro-Asian Cooperation, the Confederation
Chretienne des Syndicats Malagaches, Japan' s Zenro Seaman's Union and
affiliated fishing associations, the Ghanian Council for Nuclear Disarmament.
Norman Cousins and Linus Pauling were outspoken in their condemnation. Even
Corliss Lamont, whose status vis-a-vis the US is doubtful, expressed his
disillusionment. In New Delhi, more than 500 from the ranks of non-Communist
Trade Union members but under the leadership of the National Marxist Associa-
tion of India demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy. Harrison Salisbury
reported in the New York Times of 15 September that this sudden about-face
caused alarm and confusion at the Eighth Conference on Disarmament and World
Security, meeting at Stowe, Vermont and attended by Soviet scientists. There is
reason to believe that this sudden reversal has caught many Communists and
Communist parties completely bu surprise, causing confusion in t heir ranks an(
renewed doubts or misgivings concerning the wisdom of Moscow's decisions.
The recently announced program for the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, con-
vening in Moscow in October, specifically reiterates the now familiar Soviet line
that the downfall of capitalism is inevitable and imminent and states that the
growing strength of Communist and anti-war forces in the world "actually makes
it possible to banish world war from the life of society. " Such a position is cleax
vitiated by the threat of nuclear war implicit in the Soviet resumption of nuclear
25X1C10B
llicosity on Berlin and other crisis areas.
(Continued)
 25X1C1OB
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For I lease 20 061 QQJc ffq0i)g%1
441. TIBET: Forthcoming; Events of Propaganda Significance
.background: review of both Communist b oc and free world media
output in recent months reveals that the problem of Tibet has commanded little
attention. It is true that no outstanding, i. e. "newsworthy", event has focused
attention on Tibet. Consequently, Communist China's continued oppression and
occupation of Tibet have- received only passing attention and a major Communist
vulnerability has become partially submerged. Outlined below are at least three
(3) current topics directly related to Tibet which provide opportunities for us to
call attention to Tibet in the coming weeks:
(1) Question of Tibet on UNGA Agenda: On 25 September 1961 the 16th UN
General Assembly adopted an agenda item on the Question of Tibet as pro-
posed by Malaya and Thailand. Valerian A. Zorin, the Soviet Union's chief
delegate, contested the inscription of the item emphasizing that the
Assembly had no authority to debate the matter. He maintained that Tibet
was an integral part of Communist China and thus could not be discussed
without the presence of a delegation from Peiping. In proposing the item
which was finally adopted by a vote of 48 to 14, with 35 abstentions, Malaya
and Thailand noted that the situation in Tibet today has not improved and
remains a source of grave concern and expressed the hope that renewed
consideration of the question will pave the way for restoration of religious
and civil liberties of the. Tibetan people. The Peiping Regime was quick to
demonstrate its sensitivity to the inscription of Tibetan Question on the
UNGA agenda. On 28 September NCNA called it a United States plot to dis-
credit China at a time when it is seeking the restoration of its legitimate
rights in the UN. Calling Malaya and Thailand US stooges and regretting
that Britain, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were among those
voted for inclusion of the item on the agenda, the Peiping commentator
noted that "as everybody knows, Tibet is China's territory. " The quelling
of the Tibetan reactionaries rebellion and the conducting of the Democratic
reforms for which the Tibetan people have longed for ages are completely
the internal affairs of China.
It will be recalled that the co-sponsors, in placing the same item on last
years' 15th UNGA agenda, pointed out that from all indications, the Chinese
Communists had ignored the appeal of the 14th UNGA to respect the fundamental
human rights of the Tibetan people. This appeal of the 14th General Assembly took
the form of a resolution adopted 21 October 1959 by a vote of 45 to 9, with 26
abstentions. As might be expected the 9 votes against were cast by the Soviet bloc.
The resolution read as follows:
The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General
A s ApproVbc? oWR fib f/11f %': CIA-RDP78413061A000100040009-9
(Continued)
 441. (ContAoproved For pease 2 030614WDaL"1
Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to
which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include the
right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction,
Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage
of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have tradi-
tionally enjoyed,
Gravely concerned at reports including the official statements of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental
human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly
denied them,
Deploring the effect of these events in increasing international
tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time
when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible
leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations,
1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world
order based on the rule of law;
2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the
Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultu:,. al and religious life.
The above resolution was the last completed action by the United Nations
on the Tibetan problem. Unfortunately the UNGA failed to get around to the
topic in last year's Assembly. It is possible that under the strain of more press-
ing items on the current agenda, Tibet may once again fall off the end of the
agenda. The United States, in concert with the co-sponsors, will attempt to
preclude this. The co-sponsors will push for a resolution similar to the one
adopted in 1959, with the addition of some reference to self-determination. The
fact remains that the item is on the current agenda and only 14 nations sought
to avoid debate.
(2) Tibetan Exiles Lay Ground Work for Democratic Government: In July
of this year the Dalai Lama, together with his advisors and representatives
of all Tibetan groups in exile, prepared a draft declaration of principles
for a constitutional government in Tibet. The declaration is currently
being discussed and reviewed by the Tibetan peoples in India and Nepal
where it is estimated that 65, 000 Tibetans have sought exile since the
Chinese Communists crushed their revolt in 1958. The declaration envi-
sions an executive branch consisting of the Dalai Lama and his cabinet,
a popularly chosen bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. It
also includes provision for popular removal of the Dalai Lama from either
of his positions as head of state or church. It further provides for more
popular control over theregen.cies which have plagued Tibet at times with
autocratic rule during inter-regnums. The Dalai Lama hopes the dedlara-
tion will be finalized in time to permit its circulation among UNGA
delegates at the current Assembly session.
(3) Tibet to Hold "Democratic Elections": On 10 August 1961 the New China
News Agency NCNA reported that at a 2 August meeting of the Standing
Committee o the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous
e iaig seieco oe d~ are VIes betaan~region. The8 solut on noted that
 441. (Con6oproved For giease - DP78-03061A00b1 0o(4e000&g1
"democratic elections should be conducted in areas where conditions are
favorable. "" "To carry out this task properly the Standing Committee has
decided to conduct democratic elections in certain areas throughout Tibet
during the third quarter of 1961, based on the actual conditions of Tibet
and in accordance with the election law of the People's Republic of China
and the directive governing basic-level elections issued by the central
election committee on 3 April 1953, so that experiences can be obtained
to provide better guidance to elections throughout the Tibet region in the
future. " It is noted that the third quarter of 1961 is now behind us and we
have not seen any mention of elections having taken place in selected areas
of Tibet during the period. 25X1C1OB
A% X. JL (Continued)
 25X1C1OB
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040009-9
 Approved For lease 2001/11/16: CIA-RDP78-0306WO100040009-9
9 October 1295
442. The Norwegian Elections - A Political Lesson
Background: On September 11, in a national election, the Norwegian
Labor Party lost the absolute majority it had held in the 150-man National
Storting (parliament), dropping from 78 to 74 representatives. The Labor
party lost 19,260 votes, costing the party four seats. This setback is
specifically attributed to the inroads made by a new splinter group, the
Socialistic Folk Party, formed mainly by dissident Laborites, campaigning
on an anti-Nato, anti-foreign bases, anti-nuclear weapons platform. Basically,
however, the loss of control can be attributed to the failure of the Norwegian
Labor Party to evoke any real interest in the election or to challenge the
chorus of critical voices from minor groups which were heard and listened
to only because neither the Labor Party nor any other major political group
spoke out on current issues with a loud, clear voice. This is not a solitary
case. In Denmark, in the 1960 parliamentary elections, a splinter group
which had broken away from the Communists, led by Aksel Larsen, former
CP Chairman, took eleven seats and 149,482 votes, wiping out regular
communist representation and emerging as a new influence in Danish politics.
As Jorgen Schleimann, writing in the New Leader, said: "Larsen's success
may be explained in part by the fact that the electorate showed it was sick of
the depe