BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 11, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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OEWO4
11 September 1961
Editorial Page
It is probable that Soviet actions in resuming nuclear testing and
refusing to continue negotiating on a nuclear test-ban at this time result
from the failure of Khrushchev's German policy to catapult the West into
concessions, and thereby upset his timetable. The nuclear tests and
disarmament problems, however, should not be tied solely to the German
situation. Whatever the end of the German problem, the threat and fear
tactics in the Soviet armament strategy will continue to be used in
attempts to weaken the will of the free world to resist continuing Soviet
demands.
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11 September 1961
Briefly Noted
Definition of Cuban "Socialism" - The Cuban police in Havana has
banned the publication of Voz Proletaria, the press organ of the local
Trotskyite section. In addition, it has destroyed the plates of Trotsky's
book, the Revolution Betrayed, which was in process of publication. It is to
be noted that this took place while the Cuban government was playing host
to Vittorio Vidali (Communist member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies)
and the Spanish Communist leader Lister, both of whom organized and
sirected the massacre of anarchists and Trotskyists during the Spanish Civil
Wat. In spite of Castro's assertions that Cuba is not a Communist but a
Socialist State, it would appear that his favorite form of "Socialism" is one
which receives its directives directly from Moscow.
"Horror Bomb" - Attention is directed to an article from the Washington
Post of 10 September, "'Horror Bomb' Is Cut To Size by Cube Root, " by
Zygmunt Litynski. (See Press Comment, 12 September 1961). This article
(or other articles based on it) is highly recommended where it is desirable to
allay exaggerated fears of the military importance of Khrushchev's 100 megaton
bomb. As shown in Guidance #428, Khrushchev is seeking to mobilize world
opinion; this article could be a useful weapon in thwarting his intention. The
fact that, as the article points out, the 100 megaton bomb is militarily pointless
does not, of course, negate the fact that it will create a sizable amount of
fallout. Along the same line, to show that the Soviet Union does not enjoy
military superiority, we recall to your attention Guidance #365 of 27 March
1961, "The Nuclear Submarine -- An American Technical Triumph". (Note
that, as a later correction indicated, the Minuteman missile will not after
all be mounted on railroad cars, but on "hardened" underground pads. )
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Background: Following the Moscow Declaration in December 1960, an
uneasy truce seemed to prevail in the Communist Bloc. Within the last two
months, however, direct friction between Moscow and Peiping has again become
evident. Referring to Isaac Deutscher's celebrated London Sunday Times
account (See Press Comment, 5 July 1961), Polish officials have said that, in
substance if not in fact, Deutscher's story reflected the Moscow-Peiping
situation "with 90 percent accuracy. " Genuine signs of Sino-Soviet tension
include the following:
a. The greatest present irritant in Moscow-Peiping relations is
probably Albania. At the Bucharest Congress in June 1960, Albania took
a strongly pro-Chinese position, and at the 81.Party Conference in Moscow
in November 1960, she pursued (as Walter Ulbricht disclosed) a "dogmatic
and sectarian" attitude; in fact, Hoxha and Khrushchev exchanged insults.
Albanian "left-wing" positions have been restated since the Moscow
Conference at national congresses in February and May 1961. Peiping
has granted Albania a new $125, 000, 000 credit, and in a communique of
25 April, made it plain that the aid is a reward for supporting Peiping' S'
position. At the end of May, an Albanian court condemned to death four
defendants, ostensibly agents of the "Yugoslavs, Greeks, and U. S. Sixth
Fleet," a verdict actually aimed at Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempts
to overthrow the Hoxha regime. Moscow maintained a propaganda silenc~c
and withdrew its military personnel and submarines. (See Guidances #304,
#390, and #401.)
b. There are indications that the USSR is endeavoring to make its
relaticn s with Yugoslavia closer and warner. For example, the Yugos4av
Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, arrived in Moscow on 7 July to see
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. This would appear to be related to
Albanian developments, and "Yugoslav revisionism" is of course
anathema to Peiping. (See Guidance #284.)
c. On 3 July the Kremlin sent a delegation, headed by the leading
Soviet theoretician, Mikhail A. Suslov, to the 40th anniversary celebra-
tions of the Mongolian Republic at Ulan Bator. (Suslov also visited India
recently). No delegation was sent to the 40th anniversary of the Chinese
Communist Party at Peiping. In speaking at Ulan Bator on 4 July,
Suslov stressed Communist solidarity and the "peaceful co-existence"
policy, and made no reference to China.
d. The Soviet Trade Ministry has made a point of disclosing in
Vneshnaya Torgovliya (Forein Trade) that Communist China owes the
USSR more than $300, 000, 000, due to the Chinese failures to meet
export committments. The Soviets have also revealed that Soviet
exports of complex machinery to China will be reduced. Last month,
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Moscow's Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (Economic Gazette) published
extensive data on Chicom production which had been withheld from
Peiping's own official announcement. The USSR has refused to send
food to feed the starving Chinese, with the exception of a shipment
of surplus Cuban sugar.
e. Moscow published last month in Partinaya Zhizn (Party Life)
its own version of the 40 year history of the Chinese party. Harry
Schwartz of the New York Times summarized this article as follows:
"This Soviet version /of Chicom history/ differs
markedly from the Chinese Communists' own public line
on this history. In the Soviet version, Mao Tse-tung is
only one of several Chinese Communist party leaders
who urged correct tactics in the party's early years.
Moreover, the article denies, in effect, that the Chinese
Communist party had made any fundamental contributirn s
to the knowledge of how to build socialism. The Soviet
magazine asserts that the Chinese experience, has funda-
mentally shown the correctness and universality of the
general principles of Socialist revolution and construction.
It has shown, the article said, "that the work begun in
October 1917 by the Russian Communists is the model for
Communists of all countries, including also for China. To
emphasize this point, the Soviet article hails the collectivi-
zation of Chinese agriculture on the Soviet model in the
nineteen fifties as 'the great revolutionary change' in
Chinese history. It suggests error in the much more
radical formation of the Chinese people's communes in
1958. The Communist International according to the
Soviet publication, gave instructions in the Nineteen
Twenties for Chinese Communist to stress revolutionary
activity among the peasants. This implies that Mr. Mao's
contribution in this area was not novel. The article also
gives credit to Lenin rather than to Mr. Mao for the idea
of purchasing property from capitalists, The technique
has been employed by the Chinese Communists to end
private industry and trade. "
It appears that Khrushchev has decided that he must establish his
mastery over the bloc, once and for all. It is striking that, since the Albanian
developments, all the pressure in Sino-Soviet relations seems to come from
the Soviet side. On 5 July, Peiping radio reported that Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi had been entertained at a banquet in Moscow by Khrushchev
and all the leading dignitaries, but Tass only reported that Gromyko received
:hen Yi, "who had stopped over in Moscow. " On 8 July, Pravda (perhaps
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to check rumors arising from the Deutscher article) published a statement by
Chen Xi, entitled "China for Peaceful Coexistence", denouncing "gossip" about
Sino-Soviet relations. In publishing this statement, however, the Soviets seemed
to be trying to commit China to complete support of Soviet positions, to imply
a Soviet triumph; a statement by a Soviet leader recognizing the equality of
China would have been more pertinent to the questions raised by Deutscher.
(In any case) Chen Yi's statement, printed without dateline, had actually been
made before he left Geneva, to a Canadian TV correspondent,)
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426. The 22nd CPSU Congress
8-030"W%JA 4fli d 961
Background: The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union CPSU is scheduled to begin in Moscow on 17 October. It is the first
"regular" Congress since the 20th Congress, held in February 1956 and made
memorable by Khrushchevts secret speech, downgrading Stalin, and by major
deviations from Stalin's principal policies. The 21st Congress was not
designated as a "regular" congress and did not elect a new Central Committee.
The 22nd Congress will be attended by approximately 4, 500 delegates,
since representation -- which used to be I delegate for 5, 000 party members --
has been expanded to 1 delegate for 2, 000 members (the CPSU has now over
8 1/2 million members). Most foreign Communist Parties, inside and outside
the Bloc, will be represented by high-ranking delegations and the Congress will
undoubtedly be used for many formal and informal contacts between Soviet and
:.reign party officials: nothing definite is known as yet concerning a large
formal meeting with the foreign delegates, comparable with the conference of
81 Communist Parties last November.
Khrushchev will be the paramount figure at the Congress: he is scheduled
to deliver both principal speeches, the report of the Central Committee and the
report on the new party, program. There will be, of course, the customary
speeches by leading foreign delegates and carefully stage-managed "debates".
Main purposes of the Congress, as much as can be estimated at this
moment, are likely to be:
a. to proclaim Khrushchev as the leader of the World Communist
Movement -- based on whatever successes in the Berlin crisis he will
be able to maintain at that time, plus his support of "liberation wars" in
Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, etc. , as well as "his" successes in _..
space flight, etc. -- and to demonstrate unanimous support for his forth-
coming moves to complete the "downfall of U. S. imperialism, " for his
action against the UN, etc. ;
b. to present Khrushchev as the leading authority on Communist
ideology and doctrine (thus implicitly refuting Chicom claims about Mao's
superiority in this field), as author of the new party program. (See also
Guidance #421, 28 August 1961: "The Draft of the CPSU Program");
c. To strengthen I4 rushchev's grip on the party apparat by electing a
new Central Committee, packed with staunch supporters of Khrushchev,
and adopting new party statutes, facilitating his continued control (e. g. by
facilitating replacement of older, unregenerate officials, as suggested in
the draft program).
Khrushchev will try hard to obtain some substantive concessions from the
West before the Congress opens: this is likely to result in a further increase of
the tensions created by his threats regarding Berlin, by his resumption of
nuclear tests and other recent moves. These developments may change the
conditions under vhich the Congress will meet. Appearance of an internti
opposition within the CPSU (whether Stalinist, pro-Chinese or reflecting
Malenkov's "anti-party group")NNis unlikely, though the final version of the pro-
gram or theApprro ie oor eofease ZO6 3r/ , `rC1~ _%pf24 AW66fMgbbqJ*y reflect
(Continued)
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427. The Forthcoming Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations
Background: On 19 September, the Sixteenth General Assembly of the
United Nations will be convened in New York, with ninety-nine member nations
and possibly several more to be admitted. There are many ports of divergence
and possible conflict facing the world and it is not possible to predict which of
the widespread and diverse issues will either be stressed or cause outspoken--
if not heated - debate. There can be no question that voting by "bloc" - that
is, ly grouped national self-interest or ideological commitment - will assume
seriou3 importance. The non-committed national states now have a numerical
voting majority. Those belonging to the Afro-Asian community - with few
exceptions extending east from the Atlantic to the South Pacific - constitute
the largest group. The adherents of communism, including the USSR, and the
atellites have the least voting weight. The West lies in between. Since none of
.he three groups controls a clear majority, the basic contest is the formation
of a majority on each issue. It is an age-old problem in parliamentary
a s semhh e s - a problem Western Europe and the United States and Canada havc-
fully understood for many years (and a problem India and Japan are beginning
to understand and cope with) - but which the USSR and much of the rest of the
world do not. Most succinctly stated, it is the problem of achieving the
significant majority of votes at the right moment in any parliamentary of
general assembly.
The Special Session on Bizerte, which opened in New York on 21 August,
offers perhaps a general indication of what may happen at the 16th General
Assembly. At that Special Session the whole-hearted support accorded Tunis
against France by the Afro-Asian states, joined by most of the un-committed
nations in other geographic areas, clearly indicates that on questions conce colonialism and related issues there will be a solid majority supporting an inde-
pendent position. That the USSR will continue its assault on the US and the c:;?t
is highly probable. That the issue of reorganization of the UN Secretariat and of
general support - including financial - of the UN will cause much debate and
disclose many shades of opinion (with the USSR ever pressing for a weaker UN)
cannot be questioned. It is uncertain whether the Berlin problem will be
formally put before the General Assembly t?.iis session, but the issue will be
present in the minds of everyone, and is expected to be the subject of extensive
discussion. The pending 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), convening in mid-October, will be an influential factor in the
voting pattern of the Communist Bloc states. The resumption of nuclear testing
will have its influence.
One of the most difficult issues will be the admission of Communist China.
That, however, is being treated in a separate Guidance and need not be dis-
cussed here other than to say that our path is a thorny one.
Against this background, the United States, supported by the West
generally, will maintain and press a position embracing the following points:
a. Support of retention and extension of a strong Secretariat headed by
a single Secretary-General, strengthening of UN administrative proce-
duredures and finances,
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proposal), and opposition to any proposal to move UN Headquarters
from New York.
b. Extension of understanding and consultation between the West and
the uncommitted nations on all UN matters; development of further
cooperative efforts between the industrialized states of the Free World
and the newly developed countries to promote the extension of financial
assistance and technical advice and guidance, making use of UN channels;
c. Holding firm on t he necessity for a reasonable and sound
approach toward all matters involving international security and the risk
of war, including Berlin, disarmament, prohibition of nuclear fission
testing, and the right of all nations to be free from interference or the
threat of interference from outside their borders;
d. Exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities wherever possible, with particular
reference to their unilateral actions, their failure to cooperate within or
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429. SO VIE'IR EeP6 5 FL~L ~
Background: The Soviet Union's statement of 31 August on the resumption
of nuclear weapons tests stated: "The harmful effects of thermonuclear weapon
tests on living organisms are well known in the Soviet Union, therefore every
measure is being taken to minimize such effects" and noted that this decision
to carry out tests was taken with "heavy heart". On 3 September the President
of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in a joint
proposal to Khrushchev called for an agreement between the three not to conduct
nnac.lear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive
7",.1.1-out. The Una f UKK G=tatement noted that: "Their aim in this proposal is to
protect mankind from the increasing hazards from atmospheric pollution and to
contrib.trce to the reduction of international tensions. "
Though there ig considerable divergence of opinion in scientific and
::n--dical circles over the scope of damage that, may be inflicted on mankind's
inaalth from continued nuclear weapons testin g, world opinion particularly in
Asia is deeply concerned with and vulnerable to the subject of hazards of
radioactive fall.. out.
Since testing sites used by all atomic powers to date are in relatively
isolated areas there is little concern over the direct or short-term fall-out
that covers the target or blast area. The real danger growing out of nuclear
tests stems from the radioactive debris that finds its way into the earth's
stratosphere. This long term fall-out virtually circles the globe and settles back
to earth months or years after the explosion. The special hazards to the human
race are to be found in those radioactive elements of the fall-out which are
taken into the body and ly their nature have a tendency to accumulate or build
up in deposits. The most talked about and potentially dangerous element is
strontium 90, which like radium, is retained in the body and deposited in bone.
Through fall-out it contaminates the soil and eventually contaminates man's food
supply and may cause bone tumors, aplastic anemia or leukemia. An official
Of the US Atomic Energy Commission is quoted in the 31 August New York Times
that "the strontium 90 already created by nuclear explosions could cause 50 to
100 cases of bone cancer a year for the next seventy years and twice that many
cases of leukemia, cancer of the blood."
Prior to the suspension of tests in October 1958, Soviet scientists produced
numerous articles on the perils of radioactive fall-out. As noted in the New York
Times of 4 September 1961 (See Press Comment, dated 6 September) Soviet
Professor A. M. Kuzin in mid-1958 observed that if nuclear tests continued,
7, 000, 000 lives per generation would be lost due to diseases caused by the
radioactivity. Three years ago prominent Soviet scientist A. P. Vinogradov
stated radioactive contamination of man's environment is "criminal". The Soviet
magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in October 1958 declared: "Radio active fall-out
is a grave hazard to the health of the people living today and threatens the normal
development of future generations." Concerning possible effects on future
generations, some scientists feel that cesium 137, a radioactive element found
in fall-out, will contribute to various genetic disorders and diseases. Cesium 137
has characteristics similar to strontium 90 in that it is taken up by plant life,
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enters the human food chain and adds to the normal radioactivity of the human
body. Unlike strontium 90, cesium 137 is absorbed by the soft tissues of the
body rather than the bone.
As is well known the Soviets are conducting a series of atmospheric tests
of low to intermediate yield nuclear weapons in the Semipalatinsk area of
Central Asia. They have declared their intent to test bombs of a strength up to
100 million tons of TNT, a force 5, 000 times greater than the bomb exploded
over Hiroshima. As outlined in Item #428 world reaction outside the Soviet
bloc to the Soviet's resumption of tests has been one of alarm, shock, and
disgust with the irresponsibility of the Soviet move.
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acKgrouncl: During Fresident Nkrumah's visit to the USSR in July, he ,
indicated, in a number of speeches, that the USSR was a model to be emulated
in the search for political union in Africa. In his luncheon speech of 11 July at
the Kremlin, he declared: "Slow remarkable it is that within the short space
of time, you have welded fifteen Republics and seventy-three nationalities into
one strong state and achieved nearly one hundred percent literacy".
At Tashkent on 17 July, the President repeated his themes when he said:
"I have been struck by the fact that sixty different nationalities in this Republic
have been able to come together and to support the great development program
of your government. " Referring to the welding together of "nationalities" as
demonstrating the effectiveness of political union, he went on to say: "The
strength and unity of the nationalities of this Republic is symbolic of the
.,strength and power of the Soviet Union itself. " Subsequently, in the same speech
he said: "The peoples of the Soviet Union by the manner in vhich they have
.gelded many Republics and nationalities into one great country, have demon-
strated the effectiveness of political union, and this is most inspiring for us in
our struggle for the political unification of the African continent. Comrade
Chairman, this is a great lesson for Ghana and for Africa as a whole. The
example of the Uzbek Republic and of the Soviet Union shows that our ideal of
African unity is not a mere dream but a distinct possibility and, indeed, a
necessity for survival and development in Africa. ""
In a speech at Kiev on 19 July, President Nkrumah referred to the welding
together of many republics and nationalities into one country as demonstrating
the effectiveness of political union and added: "This is an achievement which
we can surely emulate in Africa where the conditions for unity are so favorable
and the necessity so imperative." He went on to suggest that existing national
boundaries in Africa should be revised saying: "Our present territorial
boundaries were demarcated for us in a manner calculated to assist the
imperialists and colonialists in their plans for domination, exploitation and
control. We, therefore, have a clear duty to rediscover the links formerly
uniting our people and which can form the only basis for African strength and
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