BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 14, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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 Approved Fo Release 20011'hSl/ 6 Q-030"!" 0AIN~1160 1
Briefly Noted
Tass Summaries Untrustworthy: In the interests of filing an early story,
many Moscow correspondents cable reports to their newspapers or press
services based on Tass summaries. It has been noted that Tass reports of
Khrushchev speeches, especially when intended for European consumption,
suppress or play down belligerent passages, and stress offers to negotiate.
In this way, most of the western press, including the US press, got a some-
what mistaken impression of Khrushchev's 7 August address; this naturally
made it difficult for public opinion to understand why western governments
have not been more speedy in taking up negotiations. We note that Tass's
broadcast of Khrushchev's 11 August speech on Soviet-Rumanian friendship
omitted statements that the Acropolis would not be safe from nuclear attack,
and that the British lion had lost its power to frighten. Some of these
omitted accounts are included in the Washington Post's 12 August story (see
Press Comment, 15 August 1961). The columns of Joseph Alsop, frequently
reprinted in Press Comment, have called attention to many of Khrushchev's
aggressive statements, either to ambassodors or in the actual text of bis
speeches.
Reds Make Grain Deal Power Pla : Despite severe food shortages within
China itself, which reliable reports indicate are causing grave unrest, Red
China was reported today to be s hipping 2.2 million bushels of w heat
purchased from Canada to Albania to help break an economic blockade against
that country imposed by the USSR. (Washington Post:, 10 August 1961, p. A19)
E T
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415. Castro'ls BSI +"p&i~gf @$'t~~tMl/11/16: CIA-RDP78-03061A00100040005-3
Background: The Castro government suddenly announced on 5 August 1961
that all Cuban currency would be withdrawn from circulation and new money
issued, providing only a two-day period, 6 and 7 August, during which the
exchange of old for new money would take place. Each family would be allowed
to receive ZOO new pesos for 200 old, however, each family would be compbllbd'
to turn in all money in its possession. The amount above 200 pesos would be put
into special accounts from which nothing could be withdrawn for a period of
one week. According to the official announcement, this procedure would enable
the change-over to function more smoothly, and, at the end of the week, the
blocked funds could be freely withdrawn .
The reasons given by the Castro regime for this drastic action are the need
to remove the inflationary pressure Cf "hundreds of millions of pesos" held
abroad, the fact that it would be dangerous to have Cuban currency continue to be
printed abroad (Cuban currency is printed by The American Bank Note Company
aria the British firm of Thomas LaRue and Company, which together print the
currency of nearly all the small nations of the world), and to strike a blow at
Cuban exiles. As a Havana editorial puts it: "if the counter-revolutionaries want
to continue their intrigues, they will have to use dollars to finance them. "
There is little doubt that a mounting inflationary pressure exists in Cuba.
However, it results more from the economic policies of the Castro government
and the failure of the economy to p. roduce under state managers ent than from
"outside pressure. " Castro has been printing bank notes in large quantities to
enable him to meet his promises of wage increases, which cannot be based on
any other foundation because of the general decline in production and the tying of
Cuba's trade to the Communist Bloc. At the same time that paper wage increases
have risen by 500, 000, 000 pesos in the last two years, shortages of goods have
increased steadily. Not only have luxury items, such as American soaps,
appliances, etc. , disappeared, but essential foods have beco:-na increasingly
scarce. People now stand in long lines to obtain meat, cooking fats and even rice.
Whatever the ostensible reasons given for the move, this most fundamental
of economic controls has been a standard procedure in Conjrounist countries. The
Soviets took this step at the outset of their regime, and hags repeated the process
at regular intervals. The European satellites have followed. dame pattern, and
currently Bulgaria is reported to be about to do so again. C, co?.urse, non-Com-
munist governments faced with severe inflation, have occa3irr.t.al;ty been forced to
re-issue currency. The Communist pattern, however, has i.~-.n systematically
used to force people to submit to arbitrary state controlled prces, rationing of
goods and forced savings, with the added touch of the denunciation of those revealed
as having large amounts of currency as "enemies of the revolution. " It is clear
that this step by Castro, although it may proceed circumspectly at first and
actually permit withdrawals after one week as promised in the 5 August announce-
ment, marks the beginning of a Communist-style policy of confiscation and total 25X1C1Ob
economic control.
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Background: General Medaris suggested at the time of Gagarin's flight that
the Soviets had developed large-scale rockets because they had not been able to
develop small-scale nuclear bombs. Be this as it may, Moscow has known how to
make the most of its rocket program. Soviet rockets, in their twin guise as
scientific achievements and weapons vehicles, are the backbone of Khrushchev's
foreign policy. They constitute the main, almost the only real basis for claiming
that the balance of world power has shifted in favor of the USSR--that in Marxist
terms, there has been a "qualitative change. " Actually Soviet frontiers stand
where Stalin left them, the solidarity of the bloc has if anything decreased,
agricultural problems persist, and Soviet industry gains only slowly and in
selected areas on that of the free world. After a war in Korea and crises in
Southeast Asia, the Near East, Africa, and elsewhere, the post-Stalin bloc has
managed to pick up two new satellites (North Vietnam and Cuba) while losing
another (Guatemala) and pulling back from Austria. Even in the space field, the
US has orbited 45 earth satellites (28 still up) to the Soviet 13 (4 still up), and has
published far more scientific data. But Khrushchev has unquestionably some big
rockets, and he is vitally interested in exaggerating their importance.
To this end, the Kremlin has made an all-out attempt to exploit the Soviet
space flights for propaganda, Films purporting to show the Gagarin flight have
been shown around the world, although their content has provided very little
information about what actually happened. Gagarin (in contrast to Alan B. Shepard)
has apparently given up all astronautical activities to devote full time to touring
and to repeating -- in the most vague and impressionistic terms -- the story of
his flight. After travelling around the bloc and visiting Finland, the first astronaut
went on to London. His visit there, along with a Soviet trade exposition and per-
formances of the Leningrad Ballet, coincided with Khrushchev's menacing attitude
on Berlin, and apparently represented part of a carrot and stick effort to pry
Britain away from its NATO allies, Following this he went to Latin America,
attending the 26 July celebrations in Havana where he pledged "the armed help of
the Soviet people" in Cuba's "fight for freedom and independence. " But in spite of
this departure into politics, Gagarin was unprepared on 31 July for an ironic wel-
coming speech by the Governor of Rio de Janeiro who referred to Berlin, the Soviet
suppression of freedom, and the threat of a new world war; Gagarin made no effec
tare reply, and several appointments later that day were cancelled because he
"needed rest. " He went on to see Cyrus Eaton at Pugwash, Nova Scotia and from
there he hurried back to the USSR to greet Major Gherman Titov. Henceforth there
)r a sumably will be two ambassadors of good will. Pi for to Titov's flight, Gagarin
was reported to have received invitations to come to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and
Japan.
Nikita Khrushchev has not permitted the astronauts to take all the spptlight.
He has assumed the role of a second father to these young men, exchanging
lommunist catchwords, and boasts with them, and he has taken for himself a
lion's share of the credit, including an Order of Lenin for "the direction of the
creation and development of rocket industry, science and technology and the real-
ization of the world's first cosmic flight. " To give him his due, Khrushchev very
likely did provide the driving impetus behind the rocket program, recognizing its
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political value and propaganda potential. The whole propaganda orchestration,
with its combination of menace and self-congratulation, its claim of scientific
prowess and its concealment of scientific detail, bears the unmistakable
Khrushche vian stamp. It is interesting to note that, despite the unquestionable
proficiency of the USSR in the field of rocketry, fear of a failure still keeps them
from announcing a shot until the successful completion of the most ticklish
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 REVISIONIST 14August 1961
417. Faction f-i54 tW ftgao'/x&u&W'W03061A000100040005-3
Background: The long existing discord in the upper ranks of the Japanese
Communist Party, which prevented the adoption of the party program at the 7th
Congress in L958, broke into open factionalism during preparations for the 8th
Congress (25-31 July 1961) when Sojiro KASUGA, Chairman of the Control and
Revision (Auditing) Commission, publicly criticized the dictatorial methods used
by Secretary General Kenji MIYAMOTO and his supporters (the "mainstream"
elements) to suppress intra-party discussion of policies, and submitted his
resignation from the JCP.
On 8 July 1961, KASUGA issued the following statement at a press conference
in Tokyo: "I have seceded from the Japanese Communist Party for which I have
worked for nearly 40 years. However, I will remain a Communist and will make
efforts to reform the Communist Party. " Since KASUGA's resignation, the
w , espread dissatisfaction with the JCP leadership has come into the open. On
15 July, following KASUGA's announcement that he was leaving the Party,
Tokuzaemon YAMADA, Kozo KAMEYAMA, Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA and Chishu
"?AITO, as well as candidate members Soji UCHINO and Zengo HARA, fearing
hat they would be prevented from expressing their views at the Party Congress,
c,.r dilated an appeal calling for intra-Party democracy to break the bureaucratic
control of the mainstream element, asking for rediscussion of the draft Party
Platform without restriction from the mainstream, and the reelection of Congress
delegates in accordance with Party Regulations. The Party's answer to this appeal
was expulsion of the six, together with KASUGA at the Central Committee Plenum
20-22 July and condemnation of the secessionists as bogus Marxists and Leninists:
"It is a matter for profound regret that under the increasingly serious inter-
national situation, at a time when the whole party is desperately trying to make the
Congress a success, we see subversive elements engaging in new provocations....
mat this grave moment Shojiro K1;_;UGA. and his group openly started to destroy the
party from within. They have now joined the anti-Communist force and are ready
to serve the American and Japanese reactionaries. "
Actually, during his long Party career, KASUGA, who spent a total of 15
hears in prison before and during World War II for his Party activities, had held
such posts as Central Committee member and chairman of the Mass Movements
Department, and was chosen to head the Control Commission at the Seventh Party
Congress in July-August 1958. His break with the Party, announced by him at a
press conference on 8 July, was the first such defection of a major Party leader
since the May 1957 expulsion of Central Committee member Shigeo SHIDA, who
left the Party to try to form a National Communist Party. Three of the four
expelled Central Committee members, Rokuzaemon YA.MAL'A, Kozo KAMEYAMA,
and Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA had each served the Party for thirty years, candidate
member Soji UCHINO for over twenty-five years, and Cent'ai Committee member
Chishu NAITO and candidate member Ze ngo HARA fifteen years each. On 17 July,
the Chairman of the Japanes ocialiat Part/invite 1. the dent Communists to
j----in the JSP in an effrrt to encourage additional defections. On 23
.telly six former members of the Party's Tokyo Metropolitan Committee, Yasaburo
NODA, MasaxrppT1~,pets,~bU1'i1'Rtb,
6lfA0W5Ujroshi
 417. (Cont.) 14 August 1961
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SHIBA, and Akio TAKEI, issued a statement entitled, "A Protest Against the
Subversion of Intra-Party Democracy by Factional Bureaucrats. " As in the case
of the national officials, the Party's response to this appeal for more democracy
within the Party was, of course, expulsion by the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee
on 24 July. Apparently badly shaken by these blows to Party prestige and unity,
and worried lest it would not be able to control the Party Congress, the main-
stream also announced on 24 July the expulsion of intellectuals Noboru SATO,
Shuji OHASHI, and Ryo MAENO for what the Party called "anti-Party propaganda
activities in non-Communist publications. " Growing unrest among Party intellec-
tuals has long plagued Party leadership, which has made constant efforts to
restrict the freedom of discussion by such individuals not wholly in accord with
mainstream policies. Apparently still not sure how deep the roots of opposition
were, the Party also announced that Haruo SAKURAI and Koichi YUGAMI, until
recently officials of the Party's Self-Governing Bodies Department and Farmers
Department respectively, were under investigation for suspected violation of
Party Regulations.
At a meeting of 107 members of the anti-mainstream faction of the JCP in
Osaka on 30 July, KASUGA emphasized that he has no intention of forming a second
Communist Party, since there cannot be two Communist Parties. A few JCP
leaders have made the JCP their personal property and killed intraparty
democracy. The anti-leadership group is starting a new movement to promote the
proper development of the XP. This movement is based on Marxism-Leninism
and will gather all th-use, including non-JCP members, who oppose the present
bureaucratic JCP methods. Its basic principles are opposition to capitalism and
structural reform.
At the same meeting Makoto OMORI, suspended former member of the JCP
Osaka prefectural committee, reported on preparations to establish a Kansai
Regional Committee of a Socialist Workers Association. This organization and its
name are provisional pending a nationwide conference of about 300 anti-mainstream
delegates in Tokyo about 15-20 August.
The meeting elected 13 of the 17 members of this Kansai Regional Committee,
including Rokuzaemon YAMAD.A and Zengo HARA. This committee has acquired
a headquarters, as have two (3.0-tri.ct committees already established in Osaka.
Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA closed meeting with a speech which re-emphasized
avoidance of a second Commuru.st Party but said the new organization expected
criticism not only from the JC ]? but also from foreign "frate ?nal" parties, which
would be resisted. Nishikawa said the National Conference to be held in August 25X1C10b
would send appeals to foreign Communist parties.
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418. Khrushchev Loses Interest in a Te>t Ban
Background: During the latci3950"rr world public opinion, and especially
y
opinion m
such countries as India, Japan and Great Britain, became aroused on
the subject of the dangers of nuclear testing -- not only the ultimate threat of
atomic war but also the danger, which was often exaggerated, of nuclear fallout
from the tests themselves. On 10 May 1955, Khrushchev, capitalizing on world
sentiment, suggested an immediate cessation of nuclear tests. In June 1957 the
Soviets further suggested that tests be banned independently of the progress of
other disarmament measures, and indicated some willingness to accept inspec-
tion. The western negotiators had felt that a cessation of testing should at least
be accompanied by a cut-off in the production of new fissionable materials, thus
leading more surely to over-all nuclear disarmament. In 1958, at United States
initiative, scientific experts from eight nations met and recommended a control
system too police a test cessation agreement. On 31 October, 1958, US-UK-Soviet
test ban treaty negotiations began, along with a voluntary suspension of testing.
Shortly thereafter, the United States, in order to facilitate agreement on a test
ban, abandoned its insistence on a link between test cessation and progress on
other disarmament measures, such as a cut-off of fissionable materials produc-
tion.
As might be expected, the negotiations have had their ups and downs. The
Soviets fired off two nuclear explosions during the first week of November, 1958,
though apparently only to complete their pre-suspension tests; no Soviet testing
has been detected since. The US found that the experts, based on the research
available to them, had underestimated some of the controls required, and we
insisted on strengthening the control system; this led the Soviets to suspect that
we were trying to break off negotiations, although they ultimately recognized in
practice the validity of our position.
Until this year the principal problems have been:
(1) The Veto right. The Soviets wished to have a veto on all matters
of substance including decisions to send inspection teams to sites of
possible explosions. In the summer of 1960 they agreed that there might
be a limited number of inspections, not sub- j ect to veto, in the USSR.
(2) On-site inspections. To break the veto deadlock on on-site
inspection a Soviet Union agreed to allow only three annual inspections of
the over 100 unidentified earth tremors which occur in the USSR each year.
The US and UK proposed twenty.
(3) Make up of the Control Commission and Staff of the organization.
The Soviets have sought as many representatives as the US and UK together
on the governing control commission, and also to restrict the number of
neutrals. Throughout, the Soviets have demanded at least one-third of all
jobs in the control organization for themselves. Further, they have been
unwilling to allow more than a few foreigners (US/UK and neutrals) to
operate control posts in the USSR or conduct inspections in the USSR.
Despite the difficulties, a large measure of agreement had been reached.
Outstanding differences, usually involving ratios and figures, should, as the
Soviet Union stated in 1960, have been subject to negotiation. The Kennedy
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418. (Cont. } a`"
reach an agreement. On 19 April 1961, the US and UK presented at Geneva a
draft treat.t. al det :~ E;able tests -- in the atmosphere, outer space, under
the sea, ar,d uridbrground,of seismic magnitude 4.75 and above -- (such a treaty
would have barred more than 95%a of all past tests and all fallout), establishing
an 11-man control commission (USSR - 4, US and UK combined - 4, neutrals - 3),
providing for an impartial, neutral administrator and staff (which guaranteed the
Soviet Union equality of representation), and reducing the number of control posts
in the Soviet Union from 21 to 19, (full treaty would have 180 around the world) and
for 12 to 20 veto-free inspections in the territory of each of the nuclear powers
(USSR, UK, US) depending on the number of seismic disturbances. (There are
normally up to 100 seismic events per year in the USSR). All these ratios and
figures represent western concessions, and the western representatives have also
agreed to extend the "on faith" moratorium on small underground tests, to give
the USSR the veto on the total budget, and to open for complete inspection any US
nuclear devices used for research on test detection.
But unlike the 1957 12-Party Declaration, the 1960 81-Party Moscow Declara-
tion did not endorse a separate test ban. When Khrushchev saw Ambassador
Thompson on 9 March 1961, Thompson got the impression that the Soviet leader hac
lost interest in a nuclear test ban agreement, except as part of general disarma-
ment. This was borne out by what followed. On 21 March, Tsarapkin's opening
statement at the resumption of the Geneva talks charged for the first time that
French testing was blocking agreement, and also demanded the application of the
troika principle to the test ban control administration. In the weeks and months
that have followed, not one counter-concession has been offered to meet the new
Anglo-American proposals. In an aide memotre of 4 June, the Soviets proposed
that the nuclear test problem be settled as part of the "cardinal question" of
"general and complete disarmament, "" thus reversing their June 1957 position of
separating the test ban issue and proposing to throw out the window all that has
been achieved. Khrushchev seems to be trying to provoke the US into breaking
off the talks and assuming the onus of resuming tests. Some observers have
suggested that the Soviets would then set off a super bomb as part of the terror
side of their propaganda. Khrushchev has indicated he would like to develop a
huge 100 megaton bomb and that he has many devices ready to be tested. And it
may be that Chinese influence, or fear of Chinese criticism, has influenced
Khrushchev's policy. President Kennedy is anxious to "go the last mile" and to
try everything before giving up on what has seemed to be a practical first step 25X1C10b
toward disarmament.
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419. Britain Joins the Common Market gu
Background: On 31 July, before what the New York Times called "a tense
and sometimes rowdy" House of Commons, Prime Minister Macmillan announced
the decision of Her Majesty's Government to seek membership in the European
Common Market. His proposal was subsequently ratified by a 'ote of 313 to 5.
This marks a complete reversal of a 300-year old British policy of non-
commitment on the Continent.
The European Economic Community or Common Market was formed on
25 March 1957 with France, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Rome, binding themselves to create a tight
economic unit in graded steps over a twelve year period, during which time all
internal tariff barriers would be removed and a common tariff barrier erected
against the outside world. Additional provisions relating to labor, employment
rights, etc. have definite political and social overtones. This agreement marked
a long step forward in the post-war move toward an integrated and politically
unified Western Europe. The EEC countries have also recently begun the first
moves toward concrete political cooperation among themselves. It is this political
aspect of the EEC which has from the very beginning elicited the strong support
the United States has given the Common Market idea.
Subsequently, a similar but looser economic union known as the European
Free Trade Association was formed between Great Britain, Austria, Switzerland,
Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Sweden, providing for progressive mutual
reduction of tariffs in step with Common Market action. In March 1961, Greece
became associated with the Common Market and Finland with the European Free
Trade Association.
In December 1960, on the initiative of the United States, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was formed to replace the
earlier Marshall Plan organization known as the Organization for European Econ-
omic Cooperation (OEEG). The twenty-one members of this new organization
included all the members of both the EEC and EFTA. The purpose of this organi-
zation is to foster closer coordination of economic policies and to promote an
increased and coordinated aid effort in less developed areas.
All of these steps have demonstrated the increasing interdependence and
cooperation among the members of the Atlantic community and the concentrated
efforts in Europe to move toward a cohesive economic and political dntity. Great
Britain's decision marks the most important single move in recent years toward
this end. Already Denmark, also a member of the EFTA, and Ireland have
signified their intention to follow suit. It seems likely that other countries of
Europe will move in the same direction. The United Kingdom's action holds forth
the possibility of a single economic unit in Europe with a population and an
economic capability considerably surpassing that of the USSR. This unit, while
economic in form, would have Political intearatinn as ftm ?1t;tnat
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NUMBER 72
14 August 1961
ADDENDUM
Item #415 - See Item #399, 19 June 1961.
Item #416 - Attachment entitled "Gagarin News Conference Questions"
Item #417 - Attachment - Articles taken from Japanese newspapers
Item #420 Attachment entitled "The Chinese and the United Nations - Back-
ground and Situation"
This item will be forwarded within the next two or three days:.
420. The UN Debate on China
CROSS-INDEX
415. Castro's Currency Confiscation - D, P.
416. Soviet Exploitation of Space Exploits - E, 0,
417. Factionalism in the Japanese Communist Party - A, H, K.
418. Khrushchev Loses Interest in a Test Ban - E, R, S.
419. Britain Joins.the Common-Market - B, P, S.
420. The UN Debate on China - A, R, W.
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Attachment to Item #4+1'9.
Gagarin News Conference Questions 25X1C10b
1. Why doesn't the Soviet Union release basic scientific data as the
United States regularly does? (Full data, such as complete statistics, on all
U.S. space activities, are distributed to the press by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration).
2. Would you like to try out or inspect a Mercury capsule? Would you
invite a United States astronaut to inspect the Vostok?
3. When will the Vostok be put on display so that its construction and
instrumentation can be compared to the U.S. Mercury capsule?
Ii. Would the Soviets be willing to cooperate with the United States in
the joint exploration of space for peaceful and scientific purposes?
5. If you were invited to witness a Mercury launching could you arrange
for U.S. astronauts to witness a Soviet launching and recovery?
6. The Chkalov Air Club gave the official launching point of Vostok I
as Baykonur. Inna Yavorskaya, beientif is secretary of the ICIC, stated in
an article in SPACE AGE ASTRONOMY that the launch point was Kapustin Yar.
These points are several hundred miles apart. How do you account for the
discrepancy?
7. It has been noticed that some ships move into positions near the
earth trace of the Vostoks. What part do they play in the operation?
8. Your flight was the first of its kind. We assume it provided informa-
tion for subsequent flights--such as the one Titov has just made. What kind
of information was this or what experiments were conducted which helped Titov?
Was this made available to the United States for Shephard's flight?
9. Did Titov have more control of the craft than you did? What did you
do and what did he do?
10. Did either of you initiate the landing and if so how are you able
to come so close to a predetermined landing point?
11. How high were you when you ejected yourself from the spaceship?
Did you have an ?xygen mask on when you did this?
12. On 11 August, Titov disclosed that he chose to be ejected by parachute,
as you were, rather than landing in the capsule. Would it not have been desirable
to test a landing in the capsule?
13. Now that Titov has circled the earth 17 times, what are the possi-
bilities of both of you making the next flight? When do you think that will be?
14. The pictures of Vostok I looked large enough for several people. How
long do you think it will be before there are both men and women in the same
flight? In such a case, would they all land together in one big capsule or
would they each land with their own parachutes?
15. Major Titov was supposed to do calisthenics during his flight. How
do you do this while in a weightless condition ? (To Titov) Can you show us
what you did?
16. Will there be manned flight to the moon during the 22nd CPSU Congress?
17. In your interview with Mr. Bartell in the Netherlands West Indies, you
said that yo, next assignment was a flight to the moon. When do you plan to
make this trip and will you make it alone? Will you use your old ship Vostok I
for the flight?
18. What is the goal or goals of the Soviet space flight program?
19. Do space craft have any potential as military weapons? Considering
the accuracy of ICBMs, do you think it is even sensible to talk about space
weapons?
UNCLASSIFIED
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Asahi Shimbun (AM), 9 July 1961:
KASUGA S hojiro, Chairman of the Japan Communist Party's Central
Control and Auditing Committee, met with reporters in a ryokan in Hongo Moto-
rnachi at 5 o'clock p.m. on the 8th; he announced that he had that morning pre-
sented his notification of resignation from the Party to Party Headquarters and
issued a declaration of his resignation. KASUGA's resignation, according to his
statement, was directly occasioned by the mainstream faction's suppression of
the minority view of the anti-mainstream faction, including KASUGA, concerning
the draft Platform which has been a bone of contention between the two factions
for several years, leading up to the 8th Party Congress, which will begin on the
25th of this month.
His resignation seems likely to spread to Central Committee members and
others of the anti-mainstream faction who think as he does, and to make it
impossible to avoid the occurrence of considerable disturbance within the
Communist Party before the Congress.
Gist of Announcement of Resignation
1. I have resigned from tbz Japan Communist Party, in which I have been
active for nearly forty years. In the future I shall continue to be active as a
Communist and want to work for the substantive improvement of the Japan
Communist Party.
2. The Platform which they are trying to have approved by the 8th Party
Congress, to begin on the 25th, follows in the tradition of the 1951 Platform of
the fire-bottle period, which we have opposed far years; it is basically mistaken.
We think that a newly drawn up Platform must above all speak to the following
points.
First, the superiority of the Socialist forces is becoming difficult to
combat, the overall crisis of capitalism is worsening a step, and the possi-
bility is increasing that the renovationist forces can solve the problems of
peace and independence, democracy and Socialism, in a more advantageous
form--it should apply the spirit of the Moscow Manifesto, which correctly
described this character of the present era, properly to the situation in our
country, and define correctly the character, tasks, and form of the Japanese
revolution.
Second, it should correctly take up the fact that Japanese monopoly
capital, which has accomplished the revival of imperialism, while strength-
ening its military alliance with American imperialism, is making new attacks
on t Japanese people and again trying to march down the road to war, and
show specifically to the working masses the road to Socialism in Japan.
Third, it should correctly evaluate the energy of the laboring class,
shown here over several years in such great struggles as the Security Treaty
and _)Aike struggles, and clearly present the problem of advancing this
energy into a fight for Socialism.
However, the draft Platform which they are trying to have adopted is
essentially no different from that published three years ago which was not
adopted by the 7th Congress; it proceeds from the statement that "Japan is
an oppressed race under the military control of Anerica. "
JCP Declaration
Japan Communist Party Headquarters suddenly on the evening of the 8th
published a declaration from the Central Committee Presidium on the problem of
KASUGA's resignation.
He resigned because he could not get the support of a majority of the Central
Committee for his own view, and because the Party Congress would probably not
be managed as he wished; this is an action which ignores the ABC's of Marx-
Leninism and a shameful betrayal.
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The Party has guaranteed unprecedentedly democratic discussion in the
deliberations of the Central Committee. Accordingly, his statement that the
reason for his resignation is that he could not publish his views within the Party
is merely an excuse. The Party will formally decide upon the strbctest punishment.
(p. 2) INFLUENCE WITHIN THE PARTY GREAT
(Analysis) It appears that KASUGA's resignation will cause great reper-
cussions within the Party, which is awaiting the Congress, if only because he
was considered a "central personality in the anti-mainstream faction which has
opposed the mainstream faction headed by Secretary General MIYAMOTO Kenji
v~;;r the draft Platform.
The reason for his resignation, as stated in his declaration, was opposition
to mainstream views on the draft Platform to be presented to the Party Congress.
According to the draft Platform, carried in a supplement to the 30 April Akahata,
'r+, hat is.basically controlling Japan is American imperialism and Japanese
'r nopoly capital, which is allied with it in a subordinate position. " It asserts
that "a new democratic revolution, a people's democratic revolution" against the
control of these "two enemies" is "the present resolution in Japan. "
However, KASUGA and the others counter: "The draft Platform, while talk-
ing about 'two enemies,' insists that military control by American Imperialism is
the primary element of authority, and in effect, -by putting the main force behind
the anti-imperialism struggle, ignores the anti-monopoly struggle. " It states that
the draft Platform is in error.
AcEmrding to what KASUGA and the others say, such a draft Platform was
drawn up forcible by the mainstream faction, suppressing the views of the
minority of anti-mainstream Central Committee members, and because such
management of the Party by the mainstream is "dictatorship" he took the step of
resigning. At any rate, KASUGA's resignation gives the occasion for the Platform
problem, which has been a source of trouble within the Party for years, to be
resolved as the Party faces the 8th Congress.
Japan Communist Party Headquarters says that, if in the future there are
persons working with KASUGA, they will be resolutely expelled. However,
security authorities believe, "We don't know whether they will take the step of re-
signing or not, but it appears that there is a strong anti-mainstream faction of
five ~,r six men anion the -cadres. Perhaps he was influenced loy the Moscow
Manifesto, and perhaps it is true that KASUGA resigned because the mainstream
faction has recently taken a high-pressure attitude and out off criticism from the
anti-mainstream and he could stand it no longer. In some areas, there may be
mass defections stimulated by this, but the hegemony of the mainstream will
probably not be greatly shaken by these. The Party has bragged that in the past one
or two years Party influence has grown and its membership has doubled, but the
uproar over this resignation may become a minus. "
Statement by JSP Secretary General EDA:
The possibility that the members of the Conmunist Party mainstream might
defect has been reported previously, and already critic SATO Noboru has resigned
from the Party. The reason for this is that the Communist Party mainstream
committed the mistake of treating Japan, in which monopoly capitalism is advanced
and which is even increasingly taking on an imperialist coloration , like a backward
colony. On top of that, it appears that the recent management by the Party cadres
has increasingly tended to be extremely dictatorial, as in the era of TOKUDA
Kyuichi.
The men of the anti-mainstream were going to stay in the Party and boycott
the Congress, but does not Mr. KASUGA's resignation indicate that dissatisfaction
within the Party against the thinking and management of the Party cadres has
reached a peak?
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JCP ORGAN: KUSAGA SHIFTS TO ENEMY CAMP
Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 11 July 1961 -- T
(Editorial: "The Theory and Practices of a Party Wrecker")
(Text) Shojiro Kasuga's treacherous action means that he has shifted from the
Communist Party to the camp of enemy. His activities are all the more
impermissible because he was in the important position of chairman of the
control committee. There is no room for doubt that, at a time when the Eighth
JCP Congress is drawing near, his actions are by no means accidental, but
intentional. It is clear that he purposely selected the most suitable time and way
to deal the heaviest blow to the party. No cunning apology and excuse can conceal
the substance of his action.
The Central Committee Presidium immediately issbed a statement to the effect
hat a decisive measure will be taken against his faithless activities, and appealed
to the whole party to struggle against such acts of treachery. Chairman Nozaka of
the Central Committee released a long statement exposing the substance of the
ideology and acts of Shojiro Kasuga and emphasized that "the whole party should
consolidate under the leadership of the Central Committee in order to crush such
intrigues. " All party members are indignant at the party wrecker. The communist
organizations in various districts held emergency meetings and adopted resolu-
tions to struggle against betrayers and for a major success in the coming Eighth
JCP Congress.
We communists are not allowed to assume ambiguous attitudes toward a party
wrecker, whatever theoretical and political views we may have. Such attitudes
would be nothing but suicidal activities. The opinion that while Kasuga's action is
wrong, his theory is also one of the party theories, is absolutely wrong. It is
wrong to say that a party wrecker's theory and practices are mt one and the same.
His treacherous activities reveal the substance of his theory, which lacks the
characteristics of party doctrine.
When he realized that his theory could not be accepted by party members, he began
to abuse the party and chose an antiparty way. He knows that he cannot receive any
honor in the party; however, outside the party, rightwing Socialist Democrats and
all kinds of revisionists are willing to give him praise and encouragement. There-
fore, he decided to leave the party in order to continue his subversive activities.
This is the true nature of his ideology and theory.
In the first place, his withdrawal from the party has proved that his theory funda-
mentally corresponds with that of rightwing Social Democrats and revisionists.
When there is no consistence between ideology and theory, nobody can obtain
mental tranquility. In the second place, on the pretext of the platform problem he
tried to reject the implementation of decisions adopted by the seventh party
congress and guidance issued by the Central Committee. Therefore, he regarded
and used his theory on the platform problem as an "influential weapon. " Further-:
more, he pretended to be obedient to the party decision both in the Central Com-
mittee and control committee. On the other hand, however, he tried to spread
ideology and theory quite irreconcilable with the party decision, under the cover
of the platform problem. His double-tongued attitude was completely exposed by
his recent conduct. His theory was a weapon to achieve his objective and also a
means to cover up his activities.
In the third place, he knew that his theory was a great obstacle to the ideological
and political conformity of the party. By using his theory as a weapon, he has
virtually organized factional activities in the party through an imperceptible
method. This course of action proves that his ideology does not contain the basic
communist ideology that party unification comes first and the party's interests
should be put above the individual's interests.
His theory reflects his ideology. If there is no love for the party, no study of
party tradition , no effort to establish the basic principle of centralized democracy
3
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and to struggle for the unity and unification of tie party, any ideology will be
obliged to reveal its true character. Any theory based on an ideology which has no
.party characteristics and which ignores and is antagonistic to party characteristics
has nothing to do with the party and is useless to the party, no matter what form
it takes.
All party members must draw lessons from the deed of Shojiro Kasuga, and must
make best use of these lessons for the solidarity and advancement of the party.
The honorable name of a communist sits ill on the base qualities of his per-
sonality. As an individual, he is arrogant. Because of this arrogance, he always
save more .consideration to himself or his own faction than to the party.
Arrogance was the quality not of a communist but of a petit bourgeois. A career
in party activities alone cannot reform a man into a genuine communist in the
_%larxist-Leninist viewpoint, unless he tries hard to reform himself
ideologically, theoretically, and practically, according to the party principle.
;'lojiro Kasuga proved this before all party members.
Of course, we do not mean that our comrades who oppose the draft party platform
and regulation are all like Shoiro Kasuga. However, they must learn from what
Kasuga has done against the party, must refute his antiparty activities, and must
make efforts to reform themselves theoretically and ideologically through their
resolute struggle against his antiparty activities. If they intend to stick to Kasuga's
theory or to accuse the party Central Committee of an undemocratic attitude, all
other party members must resolutely struggle against them.
Communists know how to turn a misfortune into a blessing. Make all possible
efforts to frustrate antiparty activities, to win success for the coming party
congress, and to consolidate the political, ideological and organizational unity
of the party.
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Mainichi (1/3 Summary) 15 July 1961
JCP's Future Gloomy
(Commentary) --the eighth Congress of the Japan Communist Party will be
held in. Tokyo for a week from July 25 for the first time in three years since the
seventh Party Congress in July 1958. The most important subject of diecu sion
at the coming Congress is the Party platform. However, the situation ins de
and outside the JCP with its Congress close at hand appears to far from being
calm. Two incidents substantiating this fact have occurred of late. One of them is
the secession from the Party on July 8 by Shojiro KASUGA who hadheld the
important post of Chairman of the Central Control and Audit Committee and the
other is the Government's decision reached at the July 14 Cabinet meeting to
refuse entry into this country of delegates from foreign Communist parties to
attend the coming JCP Congress.
The KASUGA secession incident was a great shock to the JCP and is
receiving great attention from police authorities and various other quarters. In
this connection , the JCP Central Committee Presidium immediately issued a
statement, regarding K,A.SUGA's secession as "a traitorous anti-Party act, " and
clarified the attitude of taking severe actions against him. On the other hand,
KASUGA's statement on his secession from the Party called for qualitative reform
of the Party, emphasizing the following two points: 1) The draft platform to be
adopted is fundamentally mistaken and 2) Party leaders are sticking to the draft
instead of correcting the mistake and, in order to suppress all criticism and
opposition, are destroying intra-Party democracy and are becoming dictatorial.
In this connection, police authorities believe that the intra-JCP conflict over
the draft platform is becoming considerably intense and that the recent secession
incident was a tangible expression of this conflict, Their investigation reveals that
the central faction of the JCP is carrying out activid.es to shut delegates from the
anti-central faction out of the coming Congress and that all anti-central speeches
at the Congress will be blocked through impci,tion of restrictions on speeches
there. Furthermore, they observe that despite the intense intra-Party conflict,
the draft platform will be approved at the Congress without any difficulty.
However, the step taken on July 14 by the Government can be said to have
forestalled the JCP which was trying to enliven the Congress by receiving delegateE
from foreign communist parties. Among these foreign delegates, MUKHIZHINOV
(member of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee Presidium and Chaim
man of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet) is said to be the
right-hand man of Premier KHRUSHCHEV and ranks seventh in the hierarchy of
the Soviet Communist Party. PENG Cheng (Politburo member of the Chinese
Communist Party's Central Committee and Mayor of Peiping) is also the ninth
boss of the Chinese Communist Party and is regarded as a future hope. Some are
of the opinion that the JCP's central faction was trying to strengthen the Party's
unity, taking advantage of the visit to Japan by such "bigwigs". The Government
on the hand seems to have taken the recent step from the judgment that the situatiot
has become tense the to the series of moves leading up to the conclusion of the
military alliance with North Korea, in addition to the Security Treaty controversy
of last year, and the stepped-up activities of international communism since the
Moscow Declaration of 81 communist parties of the world.
Thus the JCP is being exposed to attacks from outside, but even within it
the problem of taking "severe action" against KASUGA and other members of the
anti-central faction is still pending. Outwardly, the coming Party Congress will
avoid confusion, but this will cause the intra-Party friction to become rooted
more deeply inwards. Such being the case the future of the JCP is expected
to be considerably difficult.
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Tokyo Shimbun (1/3 Summary) July 17, 1961
JCP Internal Conflict Intensifies
The Japan Communist Party plans to open its 8th Congress in Tokyo on
July 25 and to adopt formally its long-pending platform. But an intra-Party con-
flict over the draft platform has recently come to the fore. The Presidium of the
JCP's Central Committee on July 16 issued a statement calling for severe actions
against anti-Party elements at this time when several Central Committee members
of the anti-mainstream faction are showing signs of seceding from the Party
following on the heels of Chairman Shojiro KASUGA of the Central Control and
.l: .unlit Committee, mho has already left the Party. The JCP paltform controversy
has persistently continued since the seventh Party Congress of three years ago.
Hdated discussion on the matter at the eighth Party Congress had been expected,
but the eruption of trouble, such as secession from the Party, in advance of the
Congress shows how intense the conflict between the main and anti-main stream
factions is. Furthermore, in connection with the series of their moves leading up
to the conclusion of their military alliances with North Korea, it is certain that the
USSR and Communist China are attaching considerable importance to the existence
>f the JCP. Therefore, the current intra-Party dissension will be subjected to
greater international influence; in the future, as a result, the JCP's course
will become more complicated and will become as existence which should be
watched closely in connection with mass movements.
The new draft platform, which will be submitted to the eighth Party Congress
was finally approved at the 16th Central Committee general meeting in March. At
this meeting, Kozo KAMEYAMA, Rokuzaemon YAMADA, and six other members
of the Central Committee and candidates for the Central Committee opposed the
draft, but the main stream faction forced it through the meeting by a majority vote.
This was an unprecedented event since the formation of the Party, which has
always upheld the principle of unanimous decision. Such a high-handed attitude
of the main stream faction is attributed mainly to the faction's outnumbering the
anti-main stream faction and to the considerably strong support from the USSR
and Communist China.
With this as a background, KASUGA bolted the Party and some Central
Committee members of the anti-main stream faction are also showing moves to
quit the Party. The main stream faction on July 16 issued a statement through the
Presidium of the Central Committee and took the strong attitude of branding these
anti-main stream faction members as "instigators trying to destroy the Party",
and pledging "to take severe action against anti-Party elements. " It is considered
certain, therefore, that KA.SUGA ;and other anti-main stream faction members will
be expelled from the Party. This will provide momentum for the mainstream
faction to try to take the leadership in the Party by whatever means.
Be that as it may, what is causing the anti-main stream faction to take the
last resort of secession from the Party? To be sure, the direct reason seems to be
the theoretical and emotional conflict over the platform problem. At the national
activists conference held after the 16th Central Committee general meeting, the
main stream faction reportedly-virtually plac 'ed under house arrest the Central
Committee members of the anti-main stream faction, who opposed the draft
platform at that general meeting, and cut off their contact with subordinate organs
and the masses. Aside from this infra Party situation, what is interesting is that
it is seriously rumored in some quarters that there is some relation between the
anti-main stream faction and Moscow. What is regarded as the ground behind this
rumor is the view that tie JCP's draft platform or the JCP main stream faction's
opinion is rather nearer the line of Communist China while the anti-main stream
faction's stand has something in common with the peaceful co-existence policy of
Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV.
At any rate, it is almost certain that the platform will be adopted by a
majority vote at the forthcoming JCP Congress. But this does not mean putting an
6
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end to the intra-Party conflict. Rather, it will start off further internal trouble.
What is to be feared in this connection is that there is danger of the main stream
faction strengthening its attitude favoring centralization of power in order to
subjugate the an~i-main stream faction and its intensil ying its radical anti-
American struggle as order9.9d by Moscow. This view is based on the observation
that in vievi of t h- possible aggravation of international tension the only way for
the main stream faction to secure the leadership in the Party and continue to
obtain international support is through radical actions.
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ATTACHMENT to Item #420 UNCLASSIFIED 14 August
The Republic of China was awarded charter membership in the United Nations
(UN) Organization in 1945 as a signatory to the UN Charter when that document
was signed in San Francisco by representatives of 50 nations. Along with member-
ship in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Republic of China, as represented
by its accredited Government of the Republic of China (GRC), was awarded a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) as one of the Big Five allied
military powers of World War II: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States (US).*
On 1 October 1949, following the expulsion of GRC forces from their position
of power over the bulk of mainland China, Mao Tse-tung porclaimed the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and declared it to
be the "sole legal government representing all the people of the People's Republic
of China."/ The GRC subsequently removed its seat of government to the island of
Taiwan, which it claimed was an integral part of China -- a claim concurred in
by the PRC.
In November 1949 and January 1950 the PRC made representations to the UNGA
and UNSC, respectively, as their first approaches to affiliation with the UN.
These approaches were indirect, however, for in them the PRC merely denounced
the GRC UN delegation as unqualified to further represent China in the UN. In
august 1950 the PRC requested that arrangements be made for the seating of a
PRC delegation in the stead of the GRC delegation at the next regular UNGA
session. However, due to UN inaction, nothing came of any of these efforts. In
later years the PRC was invited to send representatives to special UN delibera-
tions, but the PRC appears not to have made any further direct efforts to obtain
inclusion in the world organization.
The major efforts within the UN itself toward PRC inclusion have been made
by the Soviet Union. On 13 January 1950 the Soviet delegate to the Security
Council proposed the unseating of the GRC delegation at a Council meeting. The
proposal was rejected, whereupon the Soviet delegation walked out of the Council
to remain out until the following 1 August. On that date the Soviets returned
since it was the turn of their representative to preside over the Council. As
one of his first acts, the Soviet UNSC president ruled that the GRC was not
qualified to occupy a Council seat, but his ruling was negated by a majority
vote of the Council.
From that time until 1954 the issue of PRC inclusion in the UN took the
form, primarily, of credentials tests offered at the outset of each UNGA regular
session by the Soviet Utiion.* On each occasion the Assembly's Credentials
Committee refrained from a studied examination of the problem.
One of the members of the GRC delegation signing the UN Charter was the
representative of the Chinese Communist Party, Tung Pi-wu. He was
accredited to the delegation by virtue of the GRC being empowered by
his party to represent it in the UN action, a situation which has since
given rise to a question as to whether or not the GRC may not after all
retain such power insofar as action concerning China's affairs in the UN
may be concerned. Tung is now a vice chairman of the PRC government.
See FBIS Daily Report, Far East, No. 191-1949, 4 October 1949, p. PPP 18.
The proclamation contained no definitive statement that the PRC was to be
considered the successor government of the Republic of China nor did it
contain any PRC claim to be henceforth considered the bona fide repre-
sentative government of the Republic of China in the United Nations.
In point of fact, the credentials aspect of the question has been raised
every year since 1949, but, except for events transpiring at the first
and second UNGA emergency special sessions in the fall of 1956, this
aspect has not been the focal point of the question since 1953.
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(Cont.) UNCLASSIFIED
14 August 1961
In 1954 and 1955 the Soviets introduced resolutions to seat the PRO and
India sought to include the matter as an issue for debate on the UNGA agenda
from 1956 to 1959 -- unsuccessfully. In 1960 the Soviet Union again tried to
raise the question, this time, per the Indian example, as an agenda item, but
again without success.
This lack of success can be traced directly to the efforts of the US UN
delegation. From 1951 through 1960 US resolutions cAlling for the postponement
of consideration of the China UN representation question by the UNGA were
approved by the Assembly.* It is these resolutions that have come to be known,
collectively, as the moratorium. How and where the moratorium tactic has been
employed by the US during the past ten years is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The question of Chinese UN representation was raised as a point of order
during the opening meeting of the UNGA regular session in the fall of 1950
before the appointment of the Credentials Committee for that session, normally
the Assembly's first order of business. It was resolved at that time by the
establishment of a special committee charged with considering the question. In
accordance with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, the GRC delegation was seated
will full privileges pending the results of the committee's study. Eventually,
the special committee submitted a report that contained no recommendations. The
Assembly took note of the report but did not further act, and the GRC delegation
continued its functions.
During the next three years UNGA action on the Chinese UN representation
question originated in the Assembly's Credentials Committee. As the outset of
each regular UNGA session in this period the Soviets sought to have the
credentials of the GRC declared invalid in favor of seating a delegation from
the PRC. On each occasion the committee voted its approval of US-sponsored
resolutions to proscribe further discussion of the question during the remainder
of the session and transmitted this view to the UNGA itself as part of its
credentials report. And on each occasion the Assembly approved the committee's
report and honored the moratorium resolution. In 1952, however, the US resolution
approved by the committee and, thereafter, by the Assembly in committee report
form contained an additional proviso: that the GRC's credentials were valid in
terms of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.* This proviso represents a vital
discussion point in any argument of the merit of the GRC to continued UN
membership.
(In 1956 the Credentials Committee bulwarked its 1952 action by again,
through the medium of a US resolution, expressly approving the credentials of
the GRC delegation in the wake of Soviet protesting action:
On 31 October and 1 November 1956, Albania, Bulgaria, and
Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian
SSR and the USSR protested to the President of the First Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General
at the place of the People's Republic of China being wrongfully taken
Except for two occasions (1952 and 1956) discussed below, these resolutions
did not infer that the question was invalid at least as it pertained to
continued GRC membership; rather, they disclaimed the need for discussion
of it.
11-on the motion of the United States, the Committee adopted a resolution:
(1) recommending that the General Assembly should postpone for the duration
of its seventh session consideration of all proposals to exclude the
representatives of the Government of the Republic of China, and to seat
representatives of the People's Republic of China, and (2) finding that
the credentials of the representatives of the Government of the Republic
of China conformed with the provisions of the General Assembly's rules.&..
"...The General Assembly adopted the report of the Credentials
Committee, together with the recommendations contained therein."--
"Everyman's United Nations, 1954-55," 5th edition, United Nations
Department of Public Information, New York, 1956, p. 100.
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at the session by the "Kuomintang" delegation, whose credentials they
did not recognize as valid.
On 8 November 1956, in the Credentials Committee of the First
and Second Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly, the
USSR representative challenged the credentials of the representative
of the Government of the Republic of China. Statements in support
of seating the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China were also made by the representatives of India and Afghanistan.
The representatives of France, the United States and the Dominican
Republic, on the other hand, maintained that the credentials of the
representatives of China were in order. The Committee decided by a
vote of 6 to 3 to accept the credentials of the representative of
China. This decision was endorsed at a plenary meeting of the
General Assembly, on 9 November 1956, when the report of the
Credentials Committee was approved by a vote of 68 to 0, with 1
abstention.)*
By 1954 the China representation question had become so controversial that
the Credentials Committee began a purposeful delay in its meeting schedule in
contravention of its mandate to report to the General Assembly without delay.
Whereas in previous years the committee submitted its report within the first
few days of each regular session, it now took to reporting some weeks after
the session opened. This maneuver enabled the committee to take advantage
of intervening UNGA-approved US-sponsored moratorium resolutions proscribing
action on the question from year to year.
With advent of this situation in 1954 the Soviet Union undertook a new
method of attempting to effectuate the seating of the PRC in the UN. At the
opening plenary meeting of the ninth regular UNGA session, the Soviets intro-
duced a draft resolution calling for the seating of the PRC in the UN. The
US delegation thereupon introduced a counter-resolution calling for the Assembly
to disdain discussion of the Chinese U.K representation question at that session
and requesting that the US resolution be voted on before that of the Soviet
Union. The Assembly acceded to the US request and applied a moratorium on
discussion of the China question by a vote of 43 to 11 with 6 abstentions.
The Soviets tried the same maneuver in 1955, an occasion which saw India
speaking in behalf of the cause of the PRC for the first time. Nevertheless,
the UNGA in a 43-12-6 vote again approved a US-sponsored moratorium resolution.*
A third maneuver designed to subvert the successful US moratorium tactic
was attempted for the first time in 1956. On 11 November of that year, in the
wake of the unsuccessful Soviet efforts to obtain favorable action in the
Credentials Committee (described parenthetically on pages four and five) India
petitioned for inclusion of the question as an Additional Item to the agenda
of the eleventh regular session of the UNGA. The Indian petition was considered
perforce by the Assembly's General Committee, meeting to iron out the final
agenda, and it was on this occasion that the US introduced its moratorium
resolution, calling this time for rejction of the Indian request in the first
place and for a moratorium against any further discussion of the question at the
eleventh regular session in the second place.
* While this vote indicates the concurrence of the Communist bloc, the
Soviet Union and the Byelorussian SSR qualified their aye votes by
withholding approval of the committee's action endorsing the GRC
credentials. -- "Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956," Columbia
University Press in co-operation with the United Nations, New York,
1957, p. 136.
The Soviet Union did not limit itself to the Credentials Committee
or the UNGA itself in its efforts to obtain approval of the PRC by
the UN. In 1955 these other UN organs heard the question raised:
the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Com-
mission on Human Rights, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Children's Fund
executive board, the International Law Commission, the Transport
and Communications Commission, the Social Commission, the Commission
on the Status of Women, the Population Commission, the Commission
on International Commodity Trade, the Committee on Non-Governmental
Organizations, and the Security Council.
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The General Committee approved the moratorium resolution and forwarded its
recommendation to the General Assembly. There India tried to subvert the
moratorium by calling for an amendment to the General Committee report
negating its recommendation of the moratorium. This maneuver was voted down
by the UNGA in its approval of the committee report.
Despite these actions, the China UN representation question was raised
again when the Credentials Committee held its late-session meeting. However,
nothing came of this last-ditch effort.
The twelfth regular UNGA session (1957) saw a repeat of these same tactics.
India petitioned for inclusion of the question on the Assembly agenda. The
General Committee rejected the Indian bid. India tried to overturn the
committee's action with appropriate amendments to the committee's report when
it was submitted to the Assembly for approval. The Assembly rejected this
Indian effort in approving the committee report containing the US-sponsored
moratorium resolution. The question was raised again in the Credentials
Committee, meeting in December 1957, and again without success.
The same pattern was followed again in 1958 and 1959 with only slight
variations. In 1958 India's petition for inclusion of the question in the
Assembly agenda was submitted in mid-July thus meriting consideration as a
Supplementary Item to the agenda in terms of the Assembly's rules of procedure
rather than an Additional Item. Nevertheless, it still came before the General
Committee for judgement and was there again rejected. In 1959 India again
submitted her petition in mid-July with the same result.
In addition to action taken in the thirteenth regular session in 1958,
the question was also subjected to action in the third emergency special
session meeting in August of that year. This latter action was confined to
the Credentials Committee and General Assembly only, however, On 19 August
1958 the US introduced its moratorium resolution in answer to a Soviet resolution
calling for the committee to declare the GRC credentials invalid. The committee
approved the US resolution and this action was in turn approved by the Assembly
two days later.
The only variation of the 1956 regular session pattern in 1959 was In the
presentation of amendments to the General Committee report designed to overturn
the committee's approval of the US moratorium by Nepal rather than India. The
Nepalese effort fared no better. In the Credentials Committee meeting of
9 December 1959 the committee chairman ruled the Soviet effort to have the GRC
credentials invalidated out of order.
India abandoned her 1956-1959 role in the China UN representation question
last year in the wake of the Sino-Indian border dispute. India's place was
taken by the Soviet Union which petitioned for inclusion of the question on the
Assembly agenda for the fifteenth regular session. Again the General Committee
rejected the bid and again the UNGA upheld the committee-approved US moratorium
resolution, though by a narrowing vote of only 42-34-22.
In terms of the UN Charter and rules of procedure the PRO can gain entry
to the UN by only one of two methods: 1) UN approval of a PRO application for
membership as a new member nations, and 2) replacement of the GRC UN delegation
by an accredited delegation from the PRO. The Peking regime has declared time
and again it won't seek UN admission as a new member nation. Moreover, any PRO
application for new nation membership would undoubtedly be vetoed by the Security
Council. Thus, barring a specially devised method by the UNGA facilitating PRO
UN membership, the only effective avenue of approach open to those favoring PRO
inclusion in the UN is that represented-by a credentials decision declaring the
tRC credentials invalis7 and the GRC no longer worthy of representing the Republic
of China (as China is referred to in the UN Charter) in the United Nations.
Yet, even this avenue of approach can be argued to be already closed. From
all appearances the China representation question can be resolved within the
framework provided by the 8 October 1947 report of the UNGA's Sixth Committee.
This report resulted from a committee study of the Pakistani UN membership question
raised in September 1947 by Argentian on the occasion of UN approval of membership
for the new state of Pakistan. Importantly, the committee's conclusions were
expressly designed for future use only -- not for application to the Pakistan
membership question. These conclusions are twofold:
1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal
principles to presume that a State which is a Member of the organi-
zation of the United Nations does not cease to be a Member simply
because its constitution or its frontier have been subjected to
changes, and that the extinction of the State as a legal personality
recognized in the international order must be shown before its rights
and obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.
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2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the
territory and the populations which it comprises and whether or
not they formed part of a State Member of the United Nations, it
cannot under the system of the Charter claim the status of a
Member of the United Nations unless it has been formally admitted
as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.*
The GRC in and of itself thus fully qualifies for continued membership in
the UN on the basis of the first of the Sixth Committee's two conclusions --
the effectiveness and political veracity of its claim to be the continuing
legal government of China notwithstanding. And the PRC can readily be defined
as a new state in terms of the committee's second conclusion, any claim to the
contrary it may make notwithstanding. Further, under the terms of these conclus-
ions the PRC can be called upon to qualify itself for UN admission as a new
member nation if it desires membership at all.
This report of the Sixth Committee is seen to be the basis of a useful
rebuttal to the expected Communist effort to gain inclusion for the PRC in the
UN via a credentials decision by the General Assembly. Furthermore, this
report coupled with the specific validations of the GRC's credentials by the
Credentials Committee, as endorsed by the UNGA itself in 1952 and 1956 (see
pages four and five), represents a seemingly cogent argument on procedural
grounds in the General Assembly for the verity of continued GRC UN membership.
Neither the GRC credentials nor the rules of procedure against which they were
measured have changed in essence, incidentally, during the intervening years.
* "Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948," p. 40.
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