BI - WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 19, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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I9 June 19 61
Briefly Noted
Czechoslovakia as
a Model for "Peaceful" Transition: The 40th Anniversary
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was hailed by the Communist World as
the example par excellence of the "peaceful revolution" from capitalism to the
completion of a fully "socialist" state. Its special significance as a "model"
accounted for the importance accorded the Czech anniversary as compared with
those of other parties which have been celebrated this year. Antonin Novotny,
whose predelections for Stalinist methods are well-known, made a speech in
which he claimed - with typical Communist disregard for fact - that the Czech
party throughout its history had fought dogmatism- secretarianism as
vigorously as it had Social-Democratic, right wing, and revisionist elements.
In so doing, Novotny sought to convey the impression that the Czech party
has freed itself from the the dogmatic addictions which characterized it in the
past and to portray himself as a loyal and convinced supporter of Khrushchev's
current policies. Notable by their absence from this felicitous gathering were
representatives of the Communist parties of Albania and the Chinese People's
Republic.
Trial of Hungarian Church Officials: On 7 June a show trial of eleven (11)
Hungarian Church officials charged with anti-state activity began in Budapest.
The trial is the climax of a campaign to neutralize the Hungarian Catholic
Church which began in February and March with the arrest of large numbers
(some estimates range as high as 3, 000) of priests most of whom were
probably released subsequently. All but one of the men on trial "admitted"
charges that they had "recruited former students of Catholic schools and
members of Catholic youth organizations banned by the government:" in an
effort to set up a "Catholic elite youth corps" whose members would have taken
over government posts in a "Christian republic. " One priest, however, a
Piarist monk, by the name of Odon Lenard, stoutly maintained that practices
such as the writing of religious pamphlets and teaching youths the scriptures
privately could not be classified as anti-state crimes. More trials of Catholic
clergy may be forthcoming. For additional details see Press Comment and
the Current Intelligence Digest.
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s%)5. Attermath of the Military Coup in K
Background: A force of some 3, 600 Army troops and marines led by
Major General Pak Cong-hui, Deputy Commander of South Korea's Second
Army, seized Seoul on May 16 and deposed Prime Minister Chang Myon. The
leaders of the successful coup have kept President Yun Po-sun as a legal facade
while they have effectively superseded the Constitution with their own "basic
law", set up a totally military "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
(SCNB), a totally military cabinet, and a panel of civilian, academic advisors.
The SCNR proclaimed that it would restore the government to civilian control
after they have wiped out all forms of Communist subversion, eliminated official
corruption, and strengthened the national economy. It abolished all political
parties and many other organizations and imprisoned several thousand people;
the Council's "basic law" permits a wide variety of actions which were previously
illegal and also allows for much ex post facto action against former officeholders
military leaders, businessmen, union leaders and others. The principal motivat-
ing force behind these actions appears to have been a group of field grade
officers led by General Pak's brother-in-law, It. Col. Kim Cong p'il. The
general public, including the students who had unseated the Rhee regime, uncon-
vinced that the Chang regime had made significant progress on economic and
anti-corruption measures, remained passive throughout. In the name of anti-
communism and anti-corruption, however, the new regime has moved heavily
against "progressivist" intellectuals -- e. g. the teachers' union and has taken
various puritanical measures against the general public, with an as yet unmeasur.
able long-term effect.
From the US point of view important characteristics of the new rulers
of Korea are their nationalistic fervor, their impatience and their obvious
inexperience in governing and in handling public relations both domestic and
external. The prospect is that, although various factions within the military
clique now ruling will continue to wage an internecine struggle for power, the
current coup group will remain in the saddle for the forseeable future. It is very
unlikely that constitutional government and civilian rule will be restored in Korea
in the next twelve months. The relatively independent attitude toward the US
manifested by the new leaders, moreover, has presented a picture of great
interest and obvious implications to military officers in Far Eastern countries --
e. g. Vietnam and Thailand. In addition, the seemingly anti-Japanese posture of
at least some of the new leaders does not fator prospects of greater Free World
strength in Northeast Asia. ROK moves for unification on terms advantageous
to the Communists are less likely than heretofore but remain a possibility
Factors underlying this danger include: the radicalism of some of the younger
coup officers and possible reactions by the general public to present repressive
measures. 25X1C10b
(Continued)
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. 396. Vietnam as an Example of 'op
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Background: The situation prevailing today in Vietnam is ai excellent
example of wha is mant vhen the Communists refer to peaceful coexistence
between countries having differing political and social systems. In an editorial
on the Moscow Conference, in the Hanoi newspaper Hoc Tap it is stated that:
"Peaceful coexistence is precisely a form of class stru g e between two world
systems, a struggie in the political, economic and ideological fields. to
Both in a report which Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Lao Dong Party, i. e. Communist Party),
submitted to the Third National Congress of the Party in September 1960 and
in a report which he presented to the Congress on the November 1960 Moscow
C inference, he emphasized the need of overthrowing the Government of South
Vietnam by force and pointed to the steps which have been taken to accomplish
this. In outlining the two main tasks of Vietnam's revolution, Le Duan said that
"the first consists in carrying out a socialist revolution in North Vietnam and
the second in realizing the tasks of the national people's democratic revolution,
by eradicating the colonial and semi-feudal regime in South Vietnam and
realizing national reunification. " He went on to explain that "for the past six
years, the revolutionary movement in the South has been firmly maintained and
developed. To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South
Vietnam, our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers,
peasants and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front with
the worker-peasant alliance as the basis, directed against the US-Diem clique. "
Referring to the Moscow Conference, Le Duan said: "The ultimate
objective of Communist and workers parties is the construction of socialism in
the world. The transition from capitalism to socialism is a result of the struggle
between the socialist and capitalist systems, the result of socialist revolutions
and national liberation revolutions. Thus, the transition from capitalism to
socialism is a process of revolutionary and class struggle in the world as well
as in each country. Under the condition that the world is divided into the socialist
and capitalist systems, peaceful coexistence and competition is an objective
necessity. It is an important form of the class struggle between socialism and
capitalism on the international plane. Peaceful coexistence daily deepens the
contradictions of imperialism and contributes to its disintegration thus creating
favorable conditions for enlarging class struggles in capitalist countries and
stepping up national liberation struggles in colonies and dependent countries.
Lefuan emphasizes the need to encourage revolt by explaining that "the
..w...-..s ?1..G LL
(PEREDYSHKI) during which time the opposition would be lulled into a false
sense of security while the Communists conduct their subversive activities to
undermine the opposition. According to the Moscow Declaration "the policy of
peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous
action against the enemies of peace. "
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(Continued)
 396. (Cont. )
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19 June 19 61
transition from capitalism to socialism will be carried on through anti-
imperialist, socialist and national liberation revolutions. It is clear that the
present era is not an 'era when capitalism has temporarily stabilized, when
revolutionary struggles have temporarily subsided, or when capitalism will
disappear into socialism gradually or peacefully.-At present we have more
advantageous conditions than ever to step up anti-imperialist revolutions. The
struggle for achieving peaceful coexistence among countries of both systems
and the development of revolutionary movements in capitalist countries are two
closely connected aspects of the present struggle of the people of the world. "
Le Duan's statements clearly illustrate the basic Communist understanding
of peaceful coexistence as being rarely a tactic which will serve to prevent any
action on the part of the free world while the Communists continue to effect
definite gains by means of subversive warfare
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SE 19 June 1961
397. Toward a Communist Utopia - the Agro - Ci
Background: The establishment of the agricultural commune system in
Communist China has perhaps overshadowed the trend toward larger state
farming units (sovkhozes) in the Soviet Union and other Communist states.
(Poland is a notable exception.) Moving from the collective farms (kolkhozes)
to the sovkhozes is but a step toward the formation of even more "scientific"
units, proposed by Khrushchev in the Stalin era (in March 1951) the agro-cities.
Dormant for years, the scheme has recently been revived in the Soviet press.
Khrushchev proposed concentrating villages into large urban-like settlements,
which would contain large apartment buildings for housing the peasants (who
would move - or, perhaps more accurately, be moved out of their individual
farm steads) and into dining halls, stores, small industries, and other features
normally associated with urbanization. The former private plots of the
collective farm members were to be replaced by small garden plots on the out-
skirts of the new towns where they could be tilled in common by the town's
population. Already collectivization of the farmers is virtually complete in
Bulgaria and East Germany; it is in its final stages in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary; it is progressing in Rumania; however, it is getting virtually nowhere
in Poland, where the Gomulka regime has chosen not to pursue it in face of
the strong resistance of the Polish peasants. When collective farming has become
a fait accompli, the next step is to merge the collectives into larger units - a
process which effectively destroys the myth that the peasants control the collec-
tives. In Eastern Europe the merging has so far been confined to Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia, but the Hungarian authorities have indicated that they are likely
to follow as soon as they have brought the remaining private land under the
common plow. Speaking at Kalinovka in the eastern Ukraine (his birthplace) in
late 1958, Khrushchev said:
"I'm for moving people from the separate farmsteads and small
settlements into attractive villages with modern, well-built houses and
good streets and sidewalks so that all the conditions are created for a
cultured life. Each one will have a school, a hospital, a maternity
home, nurseries, and so forth... But this is not all. It is high time
that the system switched on the run from the narrowly agrarian to the
agrarian-industrial track. It is time the collective farms built their
own mills and bakeries, creameries, canneries and sugar refineries
and enterprises for the processing of flax and cotton and other types
of local raw materials. "
In their efforts to "build .socialism", the Communists have had to reckon -
both in practice and in theory - with large peasant populations whose habits and
vital interests are quite different from those of industrial workers. Collective
farms, in the Communist view, have provided a solution to one aspect of the
urban-rural conflict, giving the government political and economic control of the
peasantry. Large-scale socialized farming also offers an avenue to the Marxist
utopia of a ratA~pp big+.O &"Ag0A41giplg aIW 7$ 6IoMoll?0tl 0Ot f rences
between the town and the country. The new giant farms are one step toward that
(Continued)
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0 _ _ _. _ 19-June 1961
'398. UAR Reacts Strongly to Soviet Attacks
Background: The UAR, with surprisingly firm support from other Arab
States including Iraq), has reacted sharply to Soviet criticism of its alleged
mistreatment of local Communists. Similar Soviet complaints have been
voiced by the Soviets about the treatment of "patriots" (i. e. Communists) of
Iraq. The current Soviet attacks are a renewal of those published in articles in
the December 1960 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. The articles
were not attributed to Khalid Bakdash, former leader of the Syrian Communist
Party now in exile behind the iron curtain, but it is conjectured that he inspired
and possibly wrote them. The official daily of Cairo, Al-Jumhuriyah, wrote on
6 June that Moscow's propaganda is putting the USSR in the "imperialist camp"
and added that if Soviet leaders believe they can impose their views on the UAR
through the USSR -UAR trade agreements, "they feed on delusions. " It also said
that "f rom their recent attempt to exert pressure on us it may be readily seen
that they have been inclined to interpret our positive neutralism as some sort
of alignment with the camp they represent. In the light of this misconception they
have also imagined that they have the right to demand from us the price of
alignment and the price of submissive dependence. They obviously believed
that unless we were willing to pay the price they would have the right to take us
to task... " The Nationalist daily of Baghdad, Al Fajr Al Jadid, came to the
support of the UAR in this propaganda battle with the USSR. In an editorial
published on 7 June it states that Russia miscalculated the capability of UAR
news media to return two blows for every .axle.... Agents of Soviets do not repre-
sent Arab opinion, it points out, and Communist agents are not loyal Arab
nationals but strangers... The Attack on the UA.R, it emphasized, for the sake of
Soviet agents makes clear that Communists are loyal to no one but Russia. Some
UAR commentators have speculated that the present.Soviet attack has been timed
to coincide with the preliminary conference of "non-aligned" nations in Cairo,
originally proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia (during a visit to Cairo)
and President Nasser of the UAR. Included in the USSR attack was the allegation
that two prominent Communists were arrested and killed in UAR prisons. One..
was Farajallah Helu, former Secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party.
The UAR has long ago denied any knowledge of this matter. The other case is that
of one Riad el Turk. The UAR did more than deny his killing; on 5 June he was
allowed, alive and apparently in good health, to meet the press in a Damascus 25XlClOb
prison.
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399. More Evidence of the Communization of Cuba
Background: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, long considered the gray eminence
of the Castro regime, declared on 5 June 1961 that there would soon be formed
a single party in Cuba, the result of the fusion of Castro's 26 of July Movement
and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) - the Cuban Communist Party. Guevara
further declared that the revolutionary directorate, the associations of youth
and women, the confederation of workers, the committees for the defense of the
revolution, and the militia should be united under this single party. Such a
fusion has long been the stated objective of the PSP, and several weeks before
Guevara's statement, Carlos Raphael Rodriquez, PSP leader and editor of the
Communist newspaper, Hoy, had claimed. that the new fused party would be
formed on 2.6..Inly 19.61, the eighth` anniversary of the Castro movement's fight to
gain power in Cuba. The 'PSP. has'been the only organized political party per-
mitted to exist in Castro's Cuba. The formalization of the Communist Party's
political hegemony that the planned fusion represents, is, however, significant
evidence of the rapidly progressing full communization of Cuba. It is the
repetition of a step the Communists have inevitably taken in other satellites.
In this latter connection, an article in the April issue of Kommunist, the
official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union is worth noting. The article concerns Germany and does not even mention
Cuba. However, it begins by pointing out that the merger of the Social
Democratic Party with the Communist Farty of East Germany in April 1946
"constituted the turning point in the history of Germany and the German working
class movement." It is interesting that a few weeks after the Moscow party
organ made this statement, the Cuban Communists decided that Cuba had reached
the same "turning point. " How the Communists worked to bring about this fusion
of political parties with the Communist Party in Czechoslavakia is told in detail
in the pamphlet entitled: How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Part in the
Transition to Socialism, by Jan Kozak, Communist Member of the Czechoslovak
National Assembly Attachment to Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #65, dated
8 May 1961). He describes the struggle as the fight between the "working class"
seeking to change parliament "into one of the levers actuating the further develop-
ment and consolidation of the revolution" and "the bourgeoisie" who "tried to use
it (parliament) for the stopping of the revolution. " The struggle went on from
1945 to 1948, when, Kozak says, "an actual disintegration of the national
socialist, the people's and the democratic parties took place. Honest members
of these parties were parting with their bourgeois leadership and coming into the
ranks of the CPCS. "
Other evidence of the increasing communization of Cuba involves the most
recent developments in police state tactics. On 7 June, it was announced in
Havana that a new Ministry of Interior had been formed, and that it would be
"responsible for public order. " Under the new measure, the department of
information, the national revolutionary police, and the maritime police become
part of the new ministry. The use of such a ministry to enforce totalitarian
control might be called a classical Communist pattern, as the above-mentioned
Kozak articl(pxpnradv c poor efeasegO&f/Ylh%a~t'Af RDP egfx00t10~0400026aldez, a
3 T. (continued)
 399.(Cont.) .,rr..,.... ..,........ .., .,.,.,.,annY9nY.,~ .,
crypto-Communist, who has been head of G-2 since the early days of the Castro
government, and, as such, has been responsible for the introduction of police-
state terrorism. Among other things, he is responsible for the wide-spread
informant system. How thorough this system has become is graphically
illustrated in the 2 June 1961 issue of Vision, a bi-weekly Spanish language
magazine published in New York with hemisphere-wide circulation. Vision repro-
duced a copy of the printed form neighborhood informants are to fill out for the
officials of the "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution:' Informants are
to list all packages going into and out of apartments in their neighborhoods,
report on all young men who are not working and have no visible means of
su-pport, all gatherings of persons, all strange cars entering or leaving the
neighborhood, all persons entering or leaving apartments at abnormal hours,
and, of course, all conversations which reveal counter-revolutionary sentiments,
and reactions of people in general to decisions and measures of the regime.
Finally, it should be noted that on the same day the new Ministry of Interior
was created, a decree was issued closing all private and parochial schools in all
parts of Cuba, and confiscating their property. Education, henceforth, will be
completely controlled by the Communist-dominated Ministry of Education.
2
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25) l1ObThe United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the Neutral Countries
Background: It is no accident that, for newly independent nations, a key
step in attaining sovereignty is, in practice, admission to the United Nations.
In joining the UN, the new, small nations become the equals, in the General
Assembly, of the largest world powers. Countries which could otherwise never
make their voices heard can raise them with resonance in New York. The UN
serves as protector and sounding board for emergent nationalities. The smaller
countries have the most intense interest in a strong UN organization, able to
defend their freedom under the rule of law; this has been shown by the experience
of countries as differently oriented as South Korea (not itself a UN member),
Iran, the UAR, Lebanon, and the Congo. Not countries like these, but certain
larger powers, are apt to assert that the UN infringes on their rights.
Khrushchev cultivates neutral leaders and proposes or supports declara-
tions on such issues as human rights and immediate independence for colonies --
although human rights are least respected in the Soviet bloc, and although the
USS11 has been absorbing, not freeing territories inhabited by other
nationalities. Support for human rights declarations costs the Soviets nothing,
while their Declaration on Colonialism (like their disarmament proposals) is
designed to discredit moderate, reasoned leadership, and to create chaotic
situations which their followers can exploit. (The USSR's real feelings on the
subject of the sovereignty and equality of the small nations have been shown by
the behavior of Khrushchev in the UN, and of his subordinates in approaching
peoples over the heads of their governments. (See Guidance Items #301, #305,
#354, #355 and #378).
When it comes down to concrete measures, however, the Soviets are
usually at odds with the UN. They refuse to modify their position when opposed by
UN majorities, and when defeated, they are very bad losers. A few examples
from the Soviet record in the UN illustrate this: (1) the USSR refused to support
UN action (which it could not veto because it had not anticipated Security Council
action in a meeting which it boycotted) against Communist aggression in Korea,
-- contrary to fact and in direct conflict with basic principles of the UN Charter
with regard to collective security; 2) the USSR forcibly suppressed the revolt in
Hungary in 1956 and has rejected since that time UN requests to send an inves-
tigation team or a UN representati ve into Hungary; 3) the USSR refused to
sit., port UN actions condemning Communist China's genocide against Tibet;
4j the USSR refused to assume its share of the financial burden for UN actions
in the Congo, and more seriously, intervened unilaterally with war materiel and
other support for the pro-Communist faction while at the same time actively
attempting to sabotage all UN efforts to arbitrate disputes and to allow the
establishment of a stable Congo government; 5) the USSR has long re fused to
assume its share of the financial obligations for-the UN emergency force
maintaining a neutral zone in the Middle East -- the Gaza Strip between Israel
and its Arab neighbors.
In organizational matters, as distinct from substantive, there is an
equally clear attempt by the USSR to block the UN and check its development.
The most fami poro et or eleaaase 208 / ~a ~ D ~ 0~6~1 ~ ~y04uu0 -6 the
veto. The USS p ias ve oe measures in a ecu.ri ounce times in
(Continued)
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contrast to 7 for all of the other permanent members combined (none of which
was cast by the US). The USSR has also: 1) launched a campaign against
Secretary-General Trygve Lie, noted for his dedication to the principles of
internationalism and neutrality, and forced him out of the UN in 1957; 2) unable
to gather the 2/3's Assembly vote to pass some of its own ulterior proposals,
developed a continuing program to marshall the 1/3 minority vote to prevent
effective UN action on other proposals; 3) carried on a campaign of vilification
against Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold, charging him with violation of
the very neutrality for which he is noted, after he steadfastly held to Security
Council and Assembly instructions in the Congo; 4) proposed revision of the
office of the Secretary-General to a triumvirate representing Communist,
W e stern, and neutral blocs, with a built-in veto. This new veto would permit
the Soviets to block the actual carrying-out of any course of action voted by UN
members. As recently as 3 June, the Soviet delegation to the UN issued a
violent statement attacking Hammarskjold, who had ventured to defend his office
and his own position. The Soviet proposal for including neutral bloc representa-
tion is actually a clever attempt to enlist neutral support for weakening the UN,
thus removing an obstacle to the unrestrained exercise of Soviet pressure
tactics. Saying that there are no neutral men, Khrushchev is trying to remove
all chances of mediating 3.spu.tes, so that the rest of the world will have no
other alternatives than those of surrender or war. As Chakravarthi Narasimban,
Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs of the UN and an Indian national,
put it, only those "among the big powers who feel that the influence of the
Secretary General poses an obstacle to the unhampered pursuit of their political
interests, would... continue to attack the institution itself. " Thinking in terms..
of hostile blocs, the Soviets would replace all effective international organiza-
tion with a rigid division into three sections -- actually two, since they calculate
that the neutrals, once completely divorced from the west and deprived of UN
protection, will be unable to maintain their independence from Moscow and
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NUMBER 69
Briefly Noted
Soviet Criticism of Ilya Ehrenbur : In the June issue of the journal
of the Russian Federation of Writers, Ilya Ehrenburg, the famous Soviet
author, was criticized for assuming the "hopeless and historically doomed
task of defending and restoring moribund and modernistic ideas.... My God....
to what extent has his capitulation to decadent esthetics reached?" While
admitting that Ehrenburg had written a number of wonderful novels, stories
and verse the article deplored the fact that "in recent years his opinions
on esthetic questions have come to contradict the principles on which his
best theses are based.... he has begun to justify modernistic views and
tastes. " The article also claimed that Ehrenburg "even tried to justify"
Pasternak's withdrawal from the main stream of Soviet life.
Sentencing of Hungarian Church Officials: A 19 June communique
from the Budapest Tribunal states that "on the basis of the confessions of
the accused.... the Budapest Tribunal found Gesza tHaves and his accom-
plices guilty of forming an organization to overthrow the Hungarian People's
Republic. , .. They made preparations to change the internal order of
Hungary and restore the bourgeois system, ... to return the means of pro-
duction to private owners and restore to the Church its former property....
They set up several illegal organizations, recruiting chiefly among the
youth. They prepared and distributed a large amount of counter-revolutionary
material and established several illegal duplicating and bookbinding shops.
Sentences ranged from 2 1/2 to 12 years imprisonment and (according to
Tass of 19 June) includes subsequent deprivation of civil rights and partial
confiscation of property.
The trial constitutes the most aggressive anti-church manifestation
in Hungary since the 1956 revolution and reflects the regime's increased
confidence in its internal strength. It has been reported that other trials
have recently taken place .andthat-several priests have received prison
sentences of 5 to 7 -wars.
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5 y %, IN ME 7- 3 July 1961
Background: An editorial in the April issue of the party organ Partien
Zhivot Party Life) confirmed rumors that an opposition group had been
discovered within the Bulgarian Communist Party. According to the article,
Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, former BCP leaders who had been ousted
for revisionist tendencies, were the ring leaders. Together with Nikola
Kufardzhiev, the secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, they were
accused of organizing "faithless and distrustful" party members who "gloated
over difficulties" and who had "sold themselves to foreign agents. " Although
the editorial did not identify the "foreign agents", rumors have linked the group
with Vladimir Sindjelic, Second Secretary of the Yugoslav legation at Sofia,
who was declared persona non grata on 7 March. At that time, he was publicly
charged with having attempted to make contacts with Bulgarian citizens and with
denouncing the Bulgarian regime and its policies. It has also been reported that
these groups wrote anonymous letters to members of the Central Committee,
held conspiratorial meetings, contacted, briefed and attempted to recruit
others, proposed the organization of strikes in Bulgarian industries, wrote
pamphlets and appeals which were mailed to other party members and attempted
to organize groups in Plovdiv and Sofia. Furthermore, the group was alleged to
have addressed a letter to the Politburo in which it urged a basic change in policy
and argued that the present party leaders have not been successful in eradicating
Stalinism and that they are to blame for the serious economic failures.
Currently, the Bulgarian regime is undertaking a reorganization of its party
and government machinery, ostensibly to rectify administrative shortcomings,
particularly in the management of the economy. Todor Prakhov, Chairman of
the Central Committee of Trade Unions, has been fired and leaders in five of
Bulgaria's 30 administrative districts have also been removed. In several other
areas, party leaders have been severely criticized. The decision to air these
shortcomings, many of which have existed for years, was probably forced on the
regime by the case of the dissident group and by the latter's demanding a re-
vision of Bulgaria's economic policies.
On 6 April the party first secretary in Pleven was fired, and it was recom-
mended that the head of the People's Council also be dismissed; the charges
were not specified. On 22 April the First Secretary in Dimitrovo was fired;
on the same day Spas Rusinov, member of the Mikhaylovgrad party committee,
was ousted for "incorrect methods of work" and for violations of "state and
financial discipline" during the time, more than a year earlier, when he had been
first secretary. A local paper revealed that some time in early May the party
first secretary in Khaskovo District was ousted, and on 17 May, the Plovdiv
District People's Council Chief, Nikola Stoilev, was fired. "for having tolerated
serious shortcomings and mistakes in work. " Many of the individuals who have
been purged may have been among the "doubters" who questioned the feasibility
of the "leap forward" in the spring cf 1959.
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401. (Cont.) 3 July 1961
By suggesting that the Yugoslavs are supporting the opposition groups, the
Bulgarian regime may be attempting to play down dissension which is essentially
internal. The regime's overly ambitious economic policies of 1959-60, have
left the regime vulnerable to charges of unrealistic planning. Moreover, the
administrative reorganizing and decentralization which accompanied these
policies created widespread dissatisfaction among party members. The May
issue of the party theoretical journal Novo Vreme (New Times) confirms
speculations that the dissidents used Bulgaria's economic and administrative ills
to argue for economic reforms. The Novo Vreme article and the regime's hand-
ling of Yugoslav diplomat Sindjelic, implied that the dissidents were oriented
toward Yugoslav revisionist economic policies. The article also stated that the
regime was obliged to defend its policies against attacks by those who supported
Vulko Chervenkov, the Stalinist former party boss who was demoted in 1956
but who still holds high positions in the party.
The potentially disparate elements - "revisionists" as well as "hardliners"
in the Bulgarian party may have interpreted the Moscow Declaration and the
Albanian heresy as signs of a weakening of Moscow's control over the inter-
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.
402. UNITE8pl1ICal~hrushcliev roposes oving Headquarters to
25X1 C1 Ob Au stria
background: While in Vienna and immediately following his talks with
President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev sounded out Austrian governmental
officials on a proposal to move the UN from New York to Vienna. Chancellor
Gorvach of Austria confirmed that Khrushchev had made this proposal and said
that Austria would be happy if Russia and the United States would agree to move.
Subsequently, however, Austrian officials have expressed themselves as being
lukewarm toward the proposal and dubious over the ability of their country to
cope with the problems that would be created. The Soviet approach in Vienna was
apparently only a first step in a Soviet bloc campaign to build up pressures for
removal of the UN Headquarters from New York. Among the African and Asian
delegations now in New York the Soviets have begun to play up the problem of
discrimination as a prime reason for moving the UN away from the United
States. Similarly, the Nacvalac case and other incidents involving bloc diplomats
have been cited as reasons for leaving a country which is unable to provide
protection for foreign representatives and which does not respect diplomatic
immunity.
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 25X1 C10b 3 -,ily 1961
403. ExacA ' %6?1dcFf?a ?9, la 10e - 78-03061A~,00 (00040002-6
rsacKgrouna; During the last month, Albania has accelerated the process
of weakening its ties with the Soviet Union and strengthening its bonds with the
People's Republic of China. On 27 May an Albanian court condemned to death
four defendants, including Vice Admiral Teme Se jko. who with nine others
had been accused of plotting an armed uprising with the aid of the "Yugoslavs,
Greeks and U. S. Sixth Fleet". In reality, the trial was directed against
Khrushchev who, for the past year has been attempting to oust Hoxha and
replace him and his cohorts with leaders responsive to Soviet control. Thus,
despite its exotic billing, the trial actually was used as a vehicle for denouncing
detente policies associated with Khrushchev. Sejko and three other defendants,
were condemned to death and executed 31 May 1961. Soviet bloc reaction to the
trial is interesting. With the exceptions of East Germany and Bulgaria - each of
which referred to the trial briefly on one occasion - the Soviet Union and its
satellites maintained a frozen silence on the proceedings at Tirana.
Now, Moscow has resorted to more direct methods in order to isolate
her erring erstwhile satellite. In late May and early June, the Soviet Union
began a withdrawal of its military personnel from Albania. The USSR appears
also to be abandoning to Albania its Vlone military base. At the end of May the
Albanian military attache in Moscow hastily departed for home possibly after
having been expelled. Some of the satellites and Western CP's are apparently
following Moscow's lead in their attitude toward Albania. For example, a
Hungarian official was reported to have voiced concern over the developments
in Albania and to have told an Albanian diplomat that Hungarian aid to Albania
would be affected, The Italian Communist Party, which in April declined an
invitation to an Albanian Trade Union meeting and postponed indefinitely a joint
"peace partisans" meeting, also appears to be avoiding the Albanian comrades.
With Poland, official contacts have been almost non-existent since the departure
of the Albanian Minister to Poland in March. There are indications that
Czechoslovakia has withdrawn credit for developing nickel extraction in Albania
and the Chinese reportedly have promised to build a processing plant instead.
The Manchester Guatdian of 9 June and the London Daily Telegraph of
that date report on a violent speech delivered by Hoxha at the November
conference of World Communist Parties in Moscow in which the latter accused
Khrushchev of "brutal intervention" in Albania, stating that the USSR had put
press>re on some of the Albanian leaders in an attempt to set them against the
"
rightful leadership" of the party. According to Mr. Hoxha, the Soviet Union
delayed on a promised shipment of 5, 000 tons of wheat so that "the Soviet rats
could eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger. "
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July 1961
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Background: It was anticipated that the 20th anniversary of the Nazi
attack on Russia would be the occasion for accusations against the Western
nations and the West Germans. But the Soviets have given these accusations
extra force in connection with Khrushchev's current drive against West Berlin,
and this attack will probably grow still more strident and intensive over the
summer. Khrushchev's militant 21 June speech centered on the idea that
Britain and France had intended to "destroy the Soviet Union by the force of the
Hitler military machine, " and that even today "the aggressive imperialist
circles of the West. ..would not be averse to trying this once more now if they
found a force which they could push against the Soviet Union. " Although
Khrushchev refrained (probably in the interests of splitting NATO) from
explicitly identifying the views of all Western leaders with those of the West
German "revanchists, " he clearly intended to draw an analogy between his
conception of the situation in 1938-39 and his conception of that in 1961. Both
conceptions are false, distorted interpretations super-imposed upon a minimum
factual basis.
Both the Soviets and the Western powers erred in handling Hitler; the
difference was that between the man who pays a gangster "protection" money (the
West), and a second gangster who shares in dividing the loot (the Soviets).
Soviet claims that the West plotted to turn Hitler on the USSR are ridiculous;
Hitler could not attack the Soviets without crossing Poland and other East
European countries, and Western opinion would never have permitted their
governments to support such an attack. (Even Sir Horace Wilson and R. S.
Hudson, who attempted last minute appeasement negotiations in the summer of
1939, never discussed the possibility of a Nazi attack on the USSR, and always
insisted that the Germans must restore the confidence which had been shattered
by the annexation of Czechoslovakia.) Khrushchev's history generally overlooks
the role of Western opinion, which feared war, and dictated appeasement until
Hitler's entry into Prague left no doubt of his aggressiveness. But the appear-
ance of weakness was deceptive; Khrushchev also overlooks the force which
British, American, and French (underground) opinion gave to the Western
effort after the fall of France. (A fuller discussion of the 1939-1941 period is
contained in an attachment to this guidance item. )
In his discussion of the war itself, Sovocentrically called the "Great
Russian Patriotic War, " Khrushchev makes light of the Western contribution,
not mentioning that the British and American forces were engaged not only with
Germany but also with Japan, whose forces numbered over 6, 000, 000. The
Western and Chinese forces fought Japan for years in remote ungles, on
beaches, and in roadless mountain areas. Soviet participation in the war against
Japan lasted six days, 8 to 14 August 1945, beginning two days after the first
atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima. Khrushchev is quite right in saying that
Soviet losses were much greater than Western; they were also roughly three
times greater than German losses on all fronts (See Guidance #318, 21 November
1960). Were all these deaths necessary, considering that the Red Army had 290
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divisions in 1939, and 21, 000 tanks in 1941? (Although the Red Army had two
models larger and more powerful than those of the Germans, 19, 000 of these
tanks had been wiped out by the end of the summer. The Germans had attacked
with 3, 000 tanks.) Such practices as suicide infantry charges through minefields
to clear the way for armor help to explain the Soviet losses. As political
deputy with the forces, Khrushchev himself played a role by ordering hopeless
attacks at Kharkov in 1942.
The least factual part of Khrushchev's speech was his attack on Adenauer
and the West German military leaders. Khrushchev states: "You (Adenauer)
say that if we sign a peace treaty with the GDR you will stop at nothing. "
Adenauer never said anything of the kind. His strongest recent statement was
that made on 11 June, in connection with the Soviet proposal that the East and
West Germans should negotiate a treaty between them; Adenauer said: "This
demand we will never accept. " His position on a possible East-German-Soviet
peace treaty is the same as that of the other NATO powers: they cannot prevent
such an action. The defense of British, French, and American occupation
rights in West Berlin is another matter, but it concerns those powers and not
West Germany. Khrushchev, however, has responded to this threat which
Adenauer never made by saying that it will mean suicide for West Germany.
Just as Khrushchev seems to be the real source of threats he also appears to be
the real revanchist. He says that the new frontiers of Germany have "restored
historical justice which was violated by the forefathers of the present German
militarists. " This apparently means that the Soviet Union has won just revenge
for the aggressions of the Teutonic Knights in the 12h to 14th centuries.
Khrushchev also stresses the war guilt of the German military caste, never
mentioning the Soviet assistance to General von Seecktin evading the disarmamer
provisions of the Treaty of Versaill8s in the 1920's. But whatever the faults of
the Wehrmacht leaders, and they were many, the fact remains that this group
(and allied civilian conservatives) furnished the only element in Germany,
Communists not excepted, to attempt to remove Hitler. The honorable role of
the July 1944 plotters contrasts vividly with Khrushchev's own spineless sub-
mission under Stalin.
The recent history of militarism in Germany is as follows: In July 1948
the "Barracked People's Police) (KVP) was organized in East Germany. A year
later its strength had reached 48, 000 and, in 1950, 55, 000. In 1951 the KVP
received tanks, howitzers, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Unlike the
ordinary civil police ("People's Police"), they proved loyal to the regime when
the East German people revolted on 17 June 1953. In November 1955 all wraps
were taken off and the KVP became the "National People's Army" (NVA). This
dropping of the mask was possible because the first 101 members of the West
German Bundeswehr, which had no disguised antecedents, received their uni-
forms that month; it could be claimed in East Berlin that Bonn was the first to
have an army. By 1960, the Bundeswehr army had 160, 000 men, the NVA
71, 000. However, the former we-re mainly conscixpts serving one year only. The
NVA members were largely pre-trained in a paramilitary organization, the
"Society for Sport and Skill" (GST). Actually, the East German military strength
was doubled through such other organizations as the Border Police, the Alert
2
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NNOOF
Police, the Transport Police, and the Guard Units. Moreover, there are
party-controlled, factory-based Battle Groups (Kampfgruppen), providing
organized militia, somewhat on the Chinese model.
The Berlin crisis does indeed recall the situation on the eve of World War
II. Communist charges of West Germans"provocation" in inciting defections,
holding government and refugee meetings in West Berlin, etc. recall
Ribbentrop's charges to the Polish Ambassador that Poland had adopted a
"Peculiar attitude" in the League of Nations Minorities Commission, that Polish
students had provoked incidents in Danzig, that there had been anti-German
demonstrations in Warsaw, and that there was an "open press feud" with
Germany. Khrushchev says that Berlin is "a bone in the throat" that has to be
removed; Hitler said, "In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again
tried to solve the problems by proposing peaceful discussions. One thing was
obvious: they had to be solved. That the date of the solution may perhaps be of
little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But this date is not a
matter of indifference to us." After these problems had been solved, Hitler
said, the relationship with Poland could be changed to one of "peaceful coexist-
ence" (his words). As the Soviets try to do now, the 1`Mzis tried to make the
Western allies feel that Poland's attitude was suicidal and fanatic, and therefore
that there could be no obligation to her: Weizsacker told the French Ambassador:
"...it was inconceigable that France or Great Britain would be willing to stake
their existence in favor of their friend who had run amok, '" and he told the
British Ambassador that "Germany believed that the attitude of the Poles would
be or was such as to free the British Government from any obligation to follow
blindly every eccentric step on the part of a lunatic." Khrushchev should note 25X1C10b
 profess --an interest in the possibility of setting up controlling bodies as+ameans
of preventing certain actions which might lead to open conflict in various parts
of the world, they have, in every case, evolved a carefully worked out system
which, in effect, would nullify whatever capability such bodies may have to take
independent action in any given situation. They intend to achieve this by insisting
upon tripartite membership within the control body (1 Commfnist bloc member,
I free world member and I neutral) with each member having veto power over
the other two.
In the case of the International Control Commission for Laos, the
Communists have twice reversed their position to accommodate their current
strategic plans. The original ICC in Laos served the Communists well until its
withdrawal at the request of the Royal Government in July-August 1958. Conse-
quently, comments and propaganda from that time until May 1961 emphasized
demands for the return of the ICC to Laos. However, when it became apparent
that the Western powers were willing to have the ICC return, but also planned
to strengthen its authority to investigate reported cease-fire violations and to
make it, in fact, an effective body, the Communist position changed to use
delaying tactics to prevent the [CC's return. Thus, it was only at the insistence
of the Western powers that the Communists agreed to reconvene the ICC.
Following its arrival in Vientiane, the ICC declared that the opposing sides had
ordered their forces to observe a cease-fire. Using this statement, and in the
face of proof to the contrary, the Communists have repeatedly claimed that the
Pathet Lao/lcong Le forces are observing the cease-fire and are being attacked
by the Royal Government troops. At the same time, they have opposed all
suggestions that the ICC investigate these alleged violations. When the Royal
Laotian Government furnishes uncontested proof of continued Pathet Lao/Viet
Minh aggression against RLG positions, as was the case at Ban Pa Dong, the
Communists justify their actions by claiming that they were merely reoccupying
positions held by them prior to the cease-fire declaration and, in consequence
this does not represent any breach of the cease-fire declaration.
When suggestions are made, as they were by the French and Canadian
delegates to the Geneva Conference, that the International Control Commission
be provided with both the authority and tle means of investigating violations of
the cease-fire and of enforcing same, the Communists once again get around
this subject by claiming that any useful action which the ICC could carry out in
f
a __ _._ .. .
ht .... -1- I
Tana m;
n
r
g
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NUMBER 69
3 July 1961
ADDENDUM
19
40002-6
Item #40 4 - See Attachment entitled "Nazi-Soviet Relations (1939-1941)". Suggestec
Material for this item follows:
Documents:
Washington, 1948.
Germany. Auswartiges Amt. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941.
Germany. Auswartiges Amt. Documents on German Foreign
Policy, 1918-1945. Washington and London, continuing.
Great Britain. Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign
Policy, 1918-1939. London, continuing.
United States. Department of State. Foremen Relations of the
United States. Washington, continuing.-"
Germany. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. 8 volumes Washington
and London, 946.
Other Material:
Royal Institute of International Affairs. S_ urvey of International
Affairs, 1939-1946. 11 volumes. 1952-8.
Churchill, W.S. The Second World War. 6 volumes. 1948-53.
Ciano, G. Diario. 1946.
Clay, L. D. Decision in Germany. 1950. (Postwar)
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25X1C10b
 ADDENDUM (Cont.) 0 T_ 3 July 1961
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Item #404 (Cont. )
Some
other
Davidson, V. The Death and Life of Germany. (1959) (Postwar).
Fels, H. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: the War They Waged and
the Peace They Souk. 1957.
Hitger, G. and Meyer, A. G. The Incompatible Allies: Soviet
Relations, 1918-1941. 1953.
Langer, W. L. and Gleason, E. The Challenge of Isolation,
1937-1940 and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. 953.
Namier, L. B. Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939; Europe in Defeat;
and In the Nazi ra. 1948-1952.
McInnis, E. Hiscocks, R. and Spencer, R. The Shaping of
Postwar Germany. 1960 (Postwar).
Prittie, T. Germany Divided. 1960.
Renouvin, P. Les crises du XXe siecle: vol. 11, De 1929-1945. 1958.
S hirer, W. L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. 1960.
of the English-language books cited above have been translated into
languages. Ciano's Diario has been translated into English.
CROSS-INDEX
401. Nationalist Opposition Group in the Bulgarian Communist Party - C, H,
402. UNITED NATIONS: Khrushchev Proposes Moving UN Hquaters to
Austria - E, is, is W.
403? Exacerbation of Soviet-Albanian Relations - C, E, K.
404. Hitler, Adenauer, and the Soviets - B, C. E, O.
405. LAOS: "Ban Pa Dongu or "The Control Commission Without
Controls - As D, E, S.
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 Attachment to Item #404 UNCLASSIFIED 3 July 1961
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INMe
NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS
1939-1941
In spite of Soviet assertions, and notwithstanding a tremendous mass of
documentary and memoir information from German as well as Western sources,
no serious evidence supports the charge that the Western powers planned to
incite Hitler to attack the USSR. It is true that Neville Chamberlain, the most
important Western leader of 1938-39, was very suspicious of Moscow, and that
(unlike Churchill) he was reluctant to enter into an alliance with the Soviet
Union. Chamberlain once stated: "I can't believe that she (Russia) has the same
aims and objects as we have, or any sympathy with Democracy as such. She
is afraid of Germany and Japan and would be delighted to see other people
fight them. " His dominantmotivation, however, was an intense fear of any
world war, and consequently he seized on every possible opportunity
to avoid it. He did not think in terms of inevitable conflict, or even (unfo-_?-
tunately) of a balance of power; he was not, as the Communists were, power-
minded in his approach to diplomacy. Instead, he hoped to reach an agreement
between "reasonable men" which would preserve the status quo. This was, of
course, quite the wrong way to approach Hitler, but it was a far cry from using
the forces of the Reich to destroy the Bolshevist state. It may be hard for the
Kremlin to realize it, but the USSR was simply not then the dominant preoccupa-
tion of Western leaders.
There were two elements in the pre-World War II situation which are
often ocverlooked today, especially by Soviet propaganda. One was that Hitler
was able (like Khrushchev today) to advance certain arguments for his foreign
policy claims. Rearmament was justified as "equality", the reoccupied
Rhineland was German territory, Austria had sought Anschlus between 1918
and 1933, and most of the Sudeton people spoke German. The British and other
Western powers did not feel that there was a strong case against Hitler's
foreign policy until the annexation of the rump Czech state on 15 March 1939.
From then on, the British acted to guarantee Poland and to try to build up an
alliance to support what was left of the East European status quo. In retrospect,
this action was belated; democratic governments, because they depend on
popular support, are often influenced by plausible arguments rather than by the
rules of power politics. This misleads power-oriented dictators, who make two
different serious errors: they think the democracies are playing some deep and
devious game, or that they lack determination and will. Hitler made the latter
mistake, and Khru.shchev seems to be making both of them simultaneously.
In regard to the second error, it has been shown that once the people of a demo-
cracy do become thoroughly aroused, they become very belligerent, and they
will tend to press on until their enemies are completely defeated; their warlike
momentum may prevent them from considering a negotiated peace, which might
in some cases be a more reasonable solution.
The other forgotten factor of the thirties was that there was then a whole
row of independent nations between Germany and the USSR, of which Poland was
the most important. The West could not have encouraged Hitler to attack the
Soviet Union without sacrificing these countries, and after Czechoslovakia fell,
Western opinion would not tolerate any further sacrifice. This is why there was
never any real possibility of a deal with Hitler to annihilate the USSR. On the
other hand, these countries had all good ideas of Soviet intentions, and they and
Western opinion would not allow the Soviet Union to move Soviet forces into their
countries. If the Western governments had not respected the refusal of the Polish
government to permit the entry of Soviet troops, they would have sacrificed their
whole political position of protecting Eastern Europe against aggression.
When it became apparent in August 1939 that the Western powers could not
reach agreement with the Soviet Union, Stalin might have declared himself
neutral. This might conceivably have made Hitler hesitate to attack Poland, not
knowing what would follow. But instead, Stalin proceeded to conclude a "non-
aggression" pact with the Fuehrer. Negotiations towards this had actually begun,
at least half-initiated by Moscow, after the Nazis entered Prague on 15 March;
indeed, Stalin, in a speech as early as 10 March, had been more abusive about
the "so-called democracies" than about the "Fascist aggressors. " The non-
aggression pact announced on 21 August was distinguished from previous Soviet
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non-aggression pacts by the fact that there was no provision for denunciation
in case one of the parties attacked a third nation, and by the unusual provision
that the treaty would enter into force as soon as it was signed, i. e. , before
ratification. In other words, Stalin knew that there would be an immediate
attack on Poland. Although Molotov asserted in a speech that there was no more
in the pact "than is written in it, " a Secret Additional Protocol assured the
Soviets a share in the Baltic states, in Poland, and in Rumania, shares which
they have retained and increased since the war, Captured German documents
show that it was the USSR that proposed and wanted the secret deal. The Soviet
share in these territories was their quid pro quo for giving Hitler what is con-
side-red the goal of German diplomacy, a situation in which he could wage a
one-front war.
One cannot help but conclude that Stalin not only gained territory, bi,tt also
thought Hitler a congenial ally, and the new line seems to have been a welcome
change from the fruitless pretenses of the Popular Front. During the 1920's
there had been close cooperation between the Soviet government and the head of
the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt, and for ten years German officers were
trained with planes and tanks on Soviet territory, beyond the reach of Allied
inspection. Such German military figures as General von Blomberg, General
Freiherr von Hammerstein, the Ritter von Niedermayer, and an aide of
Ludendorff, Major Tschunke, spent prolonged periods in the Soviet Union. Some
of this activity leaked out at the time, as in the Muenchner Post of 19 Jan 1927.
The closeness of the relationahip in 1939-41 is revealed again in recently
published German documents. The Soviet Union gave the German Navy valuable
support in their campaign against British shipping by providing a base on the
Murmansk coast. On 6 September 1940, after the Germans had obtained other
bases through the conquest of Norway, Berlin sent a message to Moscow instruct-
ing the German Embassy to convey the thanks of the Reich Government. On 9
September the Embassy reported Molotov's "satisfaction that we (the Nazis)
had found useful the base placed at our disposal. " Soviet material support
flowed to Germany, the German Embassy reporting on 28 November 1940 that
"Molotov's proposal (for material assistance) considerably exceeds our expec-
tations, " and 4 January 1941, "Mikoyan's statements today... were characterized
by great cooperation and... the raw material delivery proposed by Mikoyan
represents a valuable supplement to the economic agreement in a most important
area. " In January 1941, the partners concluded trade agreements which provided
the Nazid not only with grain but also with strategic materials such as copper,
tin, nickel, tungsten, and molybdenum. A veteran German economic diplomat,
Karl Ritter, called those agreements "the biggest economic treaty complex that
has ever been concluded between two states. '" When Molotov gave a reception on
2 November 1940, the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, "and the
representatives of England and France and other countries" were placed at side
tables. The Soviet Union was prepared to sign a treaty with the three Axis
powers, carving up Asia and Africa between them. Germany was to center her
"territorial aspirations" in Central Africa, Italy was to get North and Northeast
Africa, Japan would expand southward to Eastern Asia, while for Stalin, there
was to be staking out a sphere of influence south of the Soviet Union "in the
direction of the Indian Ocean. "" On 26 November 1940, Molotov demanded that the
treaty also provide for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, for a
Soviet-Bulgarian "mutual assistance" pact, and for a renunciation of Japanese
rights in Northern Sakhalin, and the effect of this demand, especially that part
of it which would have given Bulgaria to the USSR, was to make Hitler order
"Operation Barbarossa"" on 22 December 1940. While Hitler's impatience and
megalomania were no doubt the basic reason for the attack, he might have waited
until England was defeated if it had not been for Soviet greed and blackmail
tactics. Stalin did not realize at first that he had ruffled his fellow-dictator. When
indications became too strong to be entirely ignored, Molotov was replaced as
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars by Stalin himself, evidently on
the theory that he had been the irritant; Tass issued denials of troop concentra-
tions and of strained relations; and the Embassies of Belgium, Norway, ind
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Yugoslavia were closed. Deliveries under the trade agreements continued to be
faithfully executed, at least from the Soviet side. Until the last moment, Stalin
questioned the truth of all reports that Hitler would actually attack, preferring
to believe in Hitler rather than in Churchill. Even when the attack began --
as Khrushchev disclosed in his secret speech in February 1956 -- Stalin judged
that this was provocative action by "undisciplined sections of the German army. "
In other words, he could not really believe that Adolf would do this.
Khrushchev now says that the Soviet government realized that, in concluding
the non-aggression pact, "it was striking a deal with the devil incarnate."
But this was not the way Stalin looked at the matter. For him it was, instead,
a way of sharing the spoils, of joining the side of Power.
Attachment to Item #404 U N C L A S S I F I E D (Page 3 of 3 Pages)
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040002-6