BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 21, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

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II, G ['10
DATE: 21 November 1960
TABLE OF CONTENTS
315.
316.
318.
319.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute as Seen by Pietro
Nenni and the PSI
India Moves Against Communist Party
CUBA: Communism's Most Prominant
Protege
Federation Internationale des Syndicates de
1'Enseignment (FISE), and World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Africa
Soviet Population Problems
The Cult of Khrushchev
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314. The no- oviet Dispute as Seen by Pietro Nenni and the PSI
Pietro Nenni's views regarding reform of the state and the building of
socialism in Italy probably always have differed in certain essentials from those
of the Italian Communists. (These differences became more evident and explicit
following the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution.) Nevertheless, the
leader of the Italian Socialist Party (as the reaction of the local Communist
Federation cited below indicates) continues to exert an influence not only on the
Italian left in general, but also on the Italian Communist Party itself.
During the month of August 1960 Avanti, the official newspaper of the PSI
(Partito Socialista Italiano; Italian Socialist Party), ran a series of articles from
its Moscow correspondent on the subject of Sino-Soviet differences in which the
latter states that the Sino-Soviet disprte can be healed only by China's complete
acceptance of the policy of peaceful coexistence., and the peaceful transition to
socialism. Nenni himself contributed a signed article to the 21 August issue of
vanti.
The following are pertinent excerpts from these various articles:
According to Nenni the argument between the USSR and China
concerning the interpretation of coexistence and detente is without doubt
among the most significant debates of our times. Its import is not limited
to the two largest Communist countries and parties but includes the
workers movement throughout the world and particularly the other
Communist countries........ Nenni goes on to say that the Chinese these,
taken as a whole negate the validity of the policy of coexistence, detente
and of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. At the May
196E meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, the
delegates were amazed at the summation of the Chinese position: "whoever
fears war fears revolution; whoever fears revolution betrays the
aspirations of the workers and of the oppressed peoples.'"..........
According to Nenni, one can find a justification for anything in Lenin;
thus, Lenin is citedi n support of the Chinese position. However, Lenin
is referring to eras and circumstances not only far removed in time, but
also having almost no connection with the reality of today which has been
radically transformed by the new element represented by the USSR,
China, the collapse of imperialism in Asia and Africa and by the basic
crises and changes which imperialism has undergone..... ... . Since the
summit, Khrushchev gives the impression that he is attempting to
synthesize the Soviet and Chinese viewpoints and reconcile the policy of
coexistence with that of the inevitability of war......... .
According to Avanti's Moscow correspondent, an extremely
significant fact can now be observed in the USSR; whereas up to a few
months ago it was unusual to find a Soviet who would admit that the
impersonal attacks of Pravda, of Soviet Russia and Kommunist against
the dogmatists and extremists were directed at the Chinese, today this
fact has become public knowledge. Z e "fact that the disagreement with
f;hina' i .'a""1Ueen made the property of the basic organs of the party and of
the country as a whole is an indication that these are not tactical
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314, (Cont. )
maneuvers but that the USSR intends to adhere to the principles of
peaceful coexistence and a peaceful transition to socialism ........ Mao
does not seem to understand that the Chinese problems can be solved
only by;,a policy of detente, and not by war, which the Chinese leaders
seem to fear far less than the Soviets. Today in China it is not difficult
in secondary party levels to hear people asserting with great assurance:
"We do not want war but neither do we fear it; if imperialism unleashes
a war it will be destroyed. It is possible that in such a conflict 200 or
300 million Chinese will be killed; however, with modern technical
means we could quickly reconstruct China and at least we would be rid
of imperialism for once and for all. " Obviously this type of reasoning
is not very profound; but didn't Mao call imperialism a "paper tiger"9
whereas Khrushchev, with far greater realism, has emphasized that
with the terrible means of destruction that man possesses today, in the
event of a war between the two blocs, there would be neither vanquished
nor victor. It appears certain that atBucharest the Communist
representatives were confronted with what might be called a confrontation
of Asian cornmun ism with European communism, separated by a com-
pletely different view of relations between East and West, between the
capitalist world and the Communist world. The differences between the
USSR and China continue to be very serious. China tends to overrate the
possibility of crises in the capitalist world, crises which the Soviets
consider possible but neither decisive nor imminent. There is no doubt
that Chinese knowledge of capitalist society is far less profound than that
of the USSR. For this reason the Soviets fear that the Chinese under-
estimation of American strength could lead to some rash act which would
have the deepest repercussions not only in Asia but throughout the entire
world........ To what degree is Khrushchev obliged to take into account
the theories of his Chinese ally? To a great extent without doubt.
To understand this point, it is sufficient to take into consideration the
weight that certain allies of the United States (far less important and less
autonomous than China) have in the Western ranks.
It has been reported that a certain Italian Communist Federation called
a meeting of Federation secretaries to inform them of the line of Sino-Soviet
differences. The meeting was prompted by requests for guidance from leaders
of Communist cells and sections, perplexed by questions from the rank and
file members who had read the Avanti articles. Instructions from PCI
headquarters were to: a) minimize rather than deny the existence of
ideological differences; b) soft-pedal the Yugoslav stand; c) affirm that the
differences are of form rather than substance; d) beware of the anti-Communist
press which is seeking to split the unity of the international workers' movement;
e) emphasize that the differenc.es_of.opinion only confirm communism7s basic ..
'emocracy without which the movement would revert to Nazi-Fascist totalitar-
ianism; and f) do not allow Party members a free rein to engage in ideological
discussions.
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21 November 1960
315. India Moves Against Communist Party
As a result of its long-standing border dispute with the People's Republic
of China, the Government of India has taken a significant step. It proposes to
amend the Criminal Law Act in order to make punishable the following: attempts
to endanger the country's security by questioning through word, sign, visible
representation, or any other means, the nation's territorial integrity or its
frontiers, and the making, publishing, or circulating of any report or rumor
calculated to disrupt the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any area adjoining
the frontiers of India. The proposed amendment, which will undoubtedly be
ratified by the next session of parliament, follows the collection of much
evidence by the Home Ministry, of activity on the part of Indians in Indian
Territory that is regarded as prejudicial to the country's security. Prime
Minister Nehru, in parliament not long ago, accused the Communist Party of
India of "unpatriotic" activity. He was apparently quoting reports that disclosed
vat tempts by Indian Communists to establish liaison with Chicom troops in Tibet.
These reports evidently also stated that Communists had distributed pamphlets
and leaflets designed to arouse disaffection among border peoples. Apart from
this amendment, which is primarily aimed against the Communists and which in
itself is considered most unusual, the Indian Government has commenced to
tighten screening of Chinese residents in the country, especially in the city of
Calcutta. Strong efforts by the Chicoms are reportedly under way to recruit
Chinese residents in the country. In West Bengal alone, for example, this effort
seems to be aimed at about 40 percent of the state's Chinese population of aroun-'
10, 000. The rest are regarded as having "strong Kuomintang leanings". The
government has reacted vigorously against this development. Of' the 40
percent of Chinese leaning toward Red China about 5 percent; .have been
''persuaded" by the Indian Government to leave. A senior executive of the Bank
of China in Calcutta is among 20 Chinese residents of West Bengal to be ordered
out of the country. An additional 10 Chinese have been given notice that they must
leave India within 90 clays. Despite the Chinese Embassy's protest against the
order, the government terminated the operating permit of the New China News
Agency (Sinhua) in New Delhi after NCNA. reports of a recent strike were found to
be "tendencious and not in accordance with the facts. If
Guidance
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 21 November 1960
u. n e u' c n e o ' i a e'b` M! W& 9& 4 iii `~' i r`' I~
anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, 7 November 1960, Ernesto "Che"
Guevara, reported actual strong man of the Castro regime (See Bi-Weekly
Propaganda Guidance #46, Item 274), was given a prominent place on the platform
with Khrushchev, Liu Shao Chi, and cther top leaders of the Communist world.
This is only one of a number of recent actions indicating the special significance
the Soviet Union attaches to Cuba. The annual series of slogans published to
commemorate the October Revolution contained, this year for the first time,,-:a
slogan on Cubs(. Item number 35 in the list conveys "warm greetings to the
heroic Cuban people, who are building a new life and selflessly defending their
national freedom and independence. " No individual Latin American country has
ever before been mentioned in the slogans. Soviet Bloc propaganda broadcasts
during the period 19 October to 1 November 1960 show a record level of attention
to Cuban affairs, rising from three percent of the total comment on all subjects
17 to 23 October to thirteen percent of this total from 24 to 30 October. The
previous high was during July 1960 and included publicity for the Moscow visit of
0idel Castro's brother Raul. During his visit to New York to attend the UNGA
session, Khrushchev gave Fidel Castro special attention epitomized in the widely
publicized photograph of Castro being given a bear hug by the Russian leader.
More substantive signs of support are the increasing number of Bloc technicians
being sent to Cuba. Recent estimates put the total of Soviet, Chinese and Czech
military and other experts, including jet aircraft pilots, now in Cuba at four
thousand. Intelligence reports indicate that among this rnmber are leading Bloc
economic experts attempting to administer remedies to Cuba's ailing economy. It
is interesting to note that Cuba is reciprocating this attention; referring repeatedr
to Khrushchev's rocket-rattling support, staging mammoth rallies to commemorate
the anniversary of the October Revolution, etc. 25X1 C10b
Guidance
 21 November 1960
Both illustrative of and highlighting the current approach of the
Communist Bloc to the new states of Africa was the Third World Conference of
Teachers, held in Conakry, Guin ea, in late July under the sponsorship of the
Federation Internationale des Syndicates de l1Enseignment (FISE), the
Communist-front international teachers union affiliated with the Communist-
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Some 273 persons repre-
senting 44 countries attended. Of the 12 African states represented, Mali sent
35 people, Guinea over 50, while the remaining 10 states sent 17. Only a small
percentage of the delegates to this so-called teachers conference were teachers.
he African delegates were by and large undistinguished minor officials of the
iU iinistrie s of Education and labor unions. The entire Communist Bloc was
,: ell-represented; all other country delegations were Communist-dominated.
611--rious action or discussion concerning the immense problems of education and
the teaching profession now facing the African states was not undertaken. For
the most part, the Conference devoted itself to propaganda speeches and
resolutions which condemned the US for aggression and imperialism; condemned
colonialism and Western European powers; praised Communist educational
systems; buttered up Guinea and Guinean officials. This follows the new line
t-)ward Africa adopted by the WFTU in the mid-1950's. Rather than urging
affiliation of African teachers organizations - professional and those that are
part of national labor movements - with FISE and WFTU, the more flexible tactic
of lending support to nationalist and anti-colonialist associations is being adopter',
whether or not they follow the Communist line. The new policy involves visits to
Communist Bloc countries, organization of seminars and so-called training 25X1C10b
courses, and the holding of international conferences in the new African states.
Guidance
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 ' November 1960
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The 1960 US Census showed a total population (including overseas forces
but excluding Alaska and Hawaii) of 179. 6 million, within 500, 000 of the previous
estimate,7of the US Bureau of the Census. By. contrast, the 1959 Soviet census
showed a population of 208. 8 million, although a USSR Central Statistical
Administration official had anticipated a #iguke of about 215 million. Since 1910,
US population has increased 93%, while the population of the area encompassed
by the present boundaries of the USSR has increased only 24% since 1913. In 1939,
Soviet population was 46% larger than that of the US, whereas in 1959 Soviet
population was only. 18% larger. A primary cause of lag in the Soviet population
is the loss of around 25 million lives (21 million of them men) in World War It,
a loss whose extent was unknown until 1959. Strictly military deaths were
probably around 10 million, half the men enlisted, while the German battle
dead including all fronts from 1939 to 1945 numbered 3.3 million (omitting the
J. 3 million Germans still missing). The margin of Russian battle losses over
German must be attributed to the operation of the Soviet political and military
system under Stalin (see Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 25 February 1956),
including the effects of the purges on efficiency, the failure to heed warnings,
party interference, the terrorization of subordinate commanders, and the blind
mass frontal attacks ordered by "Marshal" Stalin. In contrast, the poorly
equipped Czarist army lost 1. 7 million dead in World War I, fewer than the
Kaiser's forces. The mass execution of minority nationals and the deaths in the
labor camps probably accounted for most of the remaining 15 million deaths (3/4
.:)f them male). Aside from World War II casualties, other causes of population
losses include emigration (2 million), deaths and birth deficit (I. e., lag in birthz
below normal) from the Civil War period (22 million) and from the collectiviza-
tion in the early 1930's (up to 20 million), plus a large birth deficit from World
War Ii (20 million). Births would also have been higher had it not been for the
sacrifice of housing for industrialization.
In the days of the first five year plans, the losses, especially birth
deficits, were an aid to industrialization, since there were relatively few
consumers to be cared for in relation to the number of productive workers.
But since 1956, the combination of the lack of war babies with the war losses
caused an acute labor shortage, aggravated by the fact that above the age of 32,
there are only 3 men to every 5 women. The prospective increase in working-age
population amounts to only about half the 12 million increase in employment
called for in the 7-year plan, which was adopted before the extent of the losses
was known. The labor shortage has been an unacknowledged factor in the
reduction of the armed forces and of the police, the reorganization of education,
the emphasis on automation and mechanization, the attack on bureaucracy, and
the campaign against idle youth. The losses may also have contributed to the
decision for a co-existence policy. 25X1 C1 Ob
Guidance
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 319. The" l oa 2 hro g ease 106070t/27 -v IA-RDP78-0 9U%61f60 8014-5
Events after the U-2 incident, such as the presence of Marshal Malinovski
in Paris, and the appearance of articles on "collective leadership" in Soviet
party journals, led to Western speculation on the possibility that Khrushchev
might be losing his predominant position. Now that the dust has somewhat
settled, however, it seems apparent that the cult of Khrushchev is as strong as,
if not stronger than, ever. Every activity of the Soviet dictator has been given
prominance in Pravda and Izvestiya and on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev's 23
September speech at the UN was summarized on the radio 245 times, and there
were 480 supporting commentaries, adding up to greater publicity than Moscow
has ever given to a-Khrushchev speech. If we take the summaries alone, his 14
January 1960 troop-cut speech and his 21 :wily address to the Rumanian Party
Congress are the only speeches to be summarized as many times. The September
issue of Ogonyok, the Russian illustrated magazine, featured a reproduction of a
_,ainting of Khrushchev by V. A. Serov, the artistic glorifier of Lenin and Stalin,
showing Khrushchev talking to "the ordinary people" in the same kind of pose
used in Serov's depictions of Lenin. The same issue also contained a cartoon and
accompanying poem, showing a slimmed-down Khrushchev in oilskins as the
captain at the helm. In October, Khrushchev was shown in a color photograph on
Ogonyok's cover, and his picture appeared countless times on the inside pages.
Other Soviet leaders, especially Suslov, have praised ffirushchev in their speeche
and it may be noted that, as a result of the reshuffle of the Presidium in May,
Khrushchev is now the only Presidium member holding posts in more than one of
three key groups: the Central Committee Secretariat, the Central Committee
Bureau of the RSFSR, and the USSR Council of Ministers; he is a member of all
these bodies. Khrushchev himself has commented on the rumors of leadership
differences: on 8 July, in Vienna, he told a reporter, "I, as Premier of the USS1;
Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the CPSU, do not know of any
difference of opinion either within the party or within the country. " It is possible
that Khrushchev's health may have somewhat circumscribed his activities.
Party Life admitted that he was indisposed in June, and a need for rest may have
been a reason for using the Baltika rather than a TU-104. But he showed amazing
energy at the UN meetings, and there have been no recent reports of collapse.
It may be suggested that the party journal articles on collective leadership and
demonstrations of comradeship among the leadership could be largely motivated
by a desire to deflate the cult of Mao and to show solidarity vis-a-vis the
Chinese Communists.
There are differences between Khrushchev and Stalin. Stalin, with his
Marshal's uniform, his Byzantine aura, the towns named after him, and his
claims as party theoretician, projected a different image. He based his power
on a double foundation of party and state, using overt coercion. Khrushchev has
characteristically attacked Stalinism and the "cult of personality", thus putting
himself on the side of the angels, and cutting the ground from under internal and
external criticism. But, using almost exclusively the party apparatus, he has
built up his own position, steadily eliminated all rivals, and assumed supreme
power. The concept of "Big Brother" takes on, with Khrushchev, new and more
subtle significance. He does not, ordinarily, resort to terror; instead he sets
about creating a "New Soviet Man". He has developed "Newspeak" to a
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refinement hitherto undreamt of; one of his latest distortions of words is his
claim that there is "freedom" in the Soviet Empire. The fact that he has never
been elected in any free vote, that he has bloodily suppressed opposition both
inside and outside the USSR, that he is again returning to the concept of
Socialist realism in Soviet art and literature, are all ignored in Khrushchevis
propaganda.
Khrushchev frequently attempts to associate himself with the image of
Lenin. It should be noted, however, that there was nothing benevolent about
Lenin. Lenin was the man who brought the concept of undemocratic, elite
control to Marxism, who did not hesitate to use German aid, who carried out
the October revolution to anticipate the Constituent Assembly, who throttled
that assembly (the only democratically elected body in Russian history) when it
proved to have a hostile majority, who executed his political opponents or sent
them to exile or Siberia.
Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev are all alike in that they have led A
doctrinaire, minority party dedicated to controlling society, supposedly for
society's good, regardless of society's wishes. This cannot be reconciled with
freedom. If Khrushchev should die tomorrow, another "Leninist" would rise
in his place. 25X1 C10b
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