BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 4, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

SECRET
oo~- ooh'
BI-IVEEKLY
RO
P G I A "I -I E
................
?.?.?....??.?...
?....?.????....?
DATE: 4 July 1960
254. Chances for Free Elections in Iran.
255. Japan's Crisis.
256. Soviets Appoint Spy Ambassador to Cuba.
257. Disarmament.
258. Yugoslav Views on Relations Between
Communist States.
259.
260.
Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin.
French-Algerian Negotiations.
}X1 C
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
4 July 1960
254. Chances for Free Elections in Iran
The Iranian Governrr;ent has announced that national elections will be held
after the end of the period of national mourning on 5 July and are expected to
continue over a period of about three months. At present the Senate and Majlis
(lower house) are under the Shah's control, the government, led by Prime
Minister Eqbal, being in the hands of the Melliyun (Nationalist) Party with the
Mardom (People's) Party constituting the "loyal" opposition. Iran has never held
free elections, and the Shah follows the practice of selecting candidates as he
chooses. According to the Constitution, half of the members of the Senate are not
elected but are appointed by the Shah himself. I-lowever, he has said (on June 5)
that "Th4 elections are party elections but will take place with complete freedom,. "
Thus, for the first time he has announced to the public that the elections will be
held on a party basis and that the Iranian electors (consisting of males over 20
years of age) will have a choice between Malliyun and Mardom candidates. In
passing, it is probably worth noting that both these parties were created by the
Shah about two years ago and both are controlled by him. It is possible that he
may permit some independents to participate in the elections. In summary,
although free elections are provided for in the Iranian Constitution, the Shah has
always been the predominating influence. The elections will probably take place
in an atmosphere of continuing Soviet attempts to influence the people of Iran to
rise against their "US-dominated" rulers, to organize a National Front led by the
Tudeh (Communist) Party, to overthrow the Shah (against whom they are still
conducting vicious broadcasts on their clandestine radios), to adopt a policy of
neutrality (and, of course, cooperation with their giant northern neighbor), and
to abandon both their alliance with the free world (including their membership
in CENTO) and their provision of air bases to the US.
can i ~. i vu
Guidance
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 ? r"4-9nP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD78-Q30&1A0001000200 4-6
July 1960
255. Japan's Crisis
On 20 May 060, the Lower Louse of the Japanese Diet ratified the US-
Japan Security Treaty. Although greatly liberalized (e. g. , the US pledged itself
to consult Japan before making any major changes in US troop deployment into
Japan, major changes in our equipment, or use of US bases for military combat
operations outside Japan) the new treaty is the subject of much controversy
because of the widespread pacifism in the country and the spectrum of political
differences, including bickering among factions of the majority, Liberal
Democratic Party. The vote for ratification was accomplished by the representa-
tives of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party only after
police had effected the release of the Speaker of the Lower House, who had been
imprisoned in his office for some six hous be the socialists in an effort to prevent
action on the treaty. The socialists therefore boycotted the session in which the
vote was taken on the treaty. This vote was the spark which set off the month-long
demonstrations which culminated in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's
visit. The principal participants in the violent demonstrations in Tokyo were:
the Zengakuren, a student organization so left in orientation that it has been
criticized by the Japan Communist Party; Sohyo, the largest trade union
organization in Japan, heavily infiltrated by Communists; and the Japan Socialist
Party, whose leader, Inejiro Asanurna, proclaims the US the common enemy
of Communist China and Japan. The demonstrations, which began as loosely
organized protests of the Diet vote, rapidly came under control of Communist
activists. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda broadcasts made it clear that
their objectives were defeat of the treaty and the denigration of Eisenhower.
Financial support was channeled by bank transfers from Hong Kong, by yen
earnings of "cultural troops" left in Japan for support of Communist activities,
and, probably, by couriers. A disturbing aspect of the situation was the tacit
support given the demonstrators by the traditionally anti-government press and
the leaders of various educational institutions. As a result of the crisis the Kishi
government is pledged to resign, dissolve the Diet, and call a general election.
The election, which will probably take place this fall, will be a critical test of
Japan's future orientation as well as its democratic development. Three principal
parties will he involved: the Liberal Democratic Party of Kishi, rent with
factionalism and tarnished by the tactics of the treaty vote; the Japan Socialist
Party, involved in the violent demonstrations and apparently so frustrated by
repeated defeat at the polls it has given up hope for success save through mob
action; and, the Democratic Socialist Party, formed only in 1959, professing
socialism akin to that of Western Europe and stressing the need for a responsible
opposition.
25X1C10b
Guidance
 25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
'July 1960
amiin 256. Soviets Appoint Spy Ambassador to Cuba
Press and intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Union may appoint
Sergei M. Kudryavtsev ambassador to Cuba. Although the appointment has not
been officially acknowledged, the desire to establish diplomatic relations
between the two countries has been announced, and reports indicate that the Soviet
embassy in Habana may be opened in mid-July 1960. If Kudryavtsev becomes
ambassador, his well-known connection with Soviet intelligence merits wide
publicity. The Report of the Royal Commission which investigated Soviet
espionage in Canada in 1946 clearly established documentary proof that
Kudryavtsev, from 1942 to 1945, under cover of First Secretary of the Soviet
Embassy, Ottawa, was actually an officer of Soviet Military Intelligence. Agent
files taken from the Soviet Embassy by the defector, Igor Gouzenko, showed that
Kudryavtsev, was, in fact, the man who first took charge of Soviet espionage in
Canada. In early 1943, the Soviets expanded their espionage mission there, and
Kudryavtsev was superseded as chief by Nikolay Zabotin, "Military Attache". He
continued to work under Zabotin, however, and the fact he was awarded the "Order
of the Badge of Honor" and the "Red Banner of Labor" during this period indicates
his apparent demotion meant no dissatisfaction with his work but only that the
Soviets added more senior officers to their spy staff in Ottawa. Zabotin, incident-
ally, was subsequently liquidated. Since World War It, Kudryavtsev has continued
to serve in a number of "diplomatic" assignments in sensitive areas of Soviet and
Free World relations. In February 1947, he was second ranking member of the
Soviet component of the United Nations Investigation Commission for Greece.
Later that year, he was in New York as Counselor of the Soviet delegation to the
United Nations. Because of revelations of the Canadian spy case, he was removed
from this assignment. From January 1952 until December 1955, Kudryavtsev was
stationed in .3ustria as Soviet Political Advisor to the High Commissioner. From
December 1955 until September 1957, he was Minister Counselor in Bonn. In May
1959, he arrived in Paris, his current post, with the same diplomatic designation.
Guidance 25X1 C10b
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27: 0010002000,y 1960
257. Disarmament ..
The Soviet walk-out from the Ceneva 10-nation disarmament conference is
the latest step in KKhrusiichev's breaking of relations with the Eisenhower
administration in order to denigrate Eisenhower personally, undermine the
leadership of the United States in the free world, induce splits between and among
the Western allies, and increase support from the uncommitted nations for the
Soviet disarmament proposal specifically and its role as peacemaker generally.
Khrushchev has been careful (if arrogant) in this issue, as after the Summit
failure, to assert that further action will be possible at a time subsequent to a
change of administration in the US. The Soviet Union has asked that disarmament
be included on the agenda of the next General Assembly session of the UN this
fall. Th- USSR will attempt to demonstrate that it has been the Western powers,
and particularly the US, who have refused to negotiate and who have ignored the
terms of reference of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1959.
The USS may ask for another conference on disarmament probably within the UN
framework and with changed representation possibly demanding the inclusion of
the Chin:.-se Communists. To sustain the initiative created by the submission of
their revised disarmament plan on 2 June, the Soviet Union will attempt to obtain
UN indorsement for the general features of its plan the principle of complete
and general disarmament within a definite period of time and the inclusion of
controls over the destruction of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the
initial stage of disarmament. Western tactics will be complicated by concurrent
elections in the US. There is little doubt, however, that by 1961 some kind of
disarmament conference will be scheduled. The Western nations are considering
various measures designed to expose the break-up as a political move and to
achieve a UN or multi-nation demand that the Soviet Union resume immediate25X1C10b
negotiation.
 25X1C1Oc
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
258. Yugoslav Views on Relations Between Communist States
Yugoslavia's most recent affirmation of its "se
a
ate
d
"
p
r
roa
to socialism
is contained in the 22 June issue of Komrnunist, which advocates the establishment
of the broadest form of cooperation among all "socialist" and other "progressive
forces, " without ideological and political exclusiveness, and on the basis of
equality, mutual confidence, respect and non-interference. According to the
journal, which is the organ of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
differences of opinion can be reduced only through cooperation, contacts and frank
exchange of views and experiences. The article further states that today, when
socialism is becoming a matter of practice or aspiration for the majority of
mankind, to consider this or that experience absolute from the standpoint of
ideology will only hinder the free current of progressive ideas. It is senseless to
expect that everything conform to the same pattern on the wide front of the move
toward socialism. Ideological and political exclusiveness only leads to isolation
and weakening of socialist forces and serves to expand the field of activity of the
reactionary forces throughout the world. The assertions of the "left" (i. e. , China)
that this is done in the name of the purity of Marxism-Leninism is not to the point;
the correctness of this or that policy is not appraised according to what its
advocates think about it themselves but according to the objective operation of their
policy. By this explicit formulation of its ideas on relations between "socialist"
states, Yugoslavia has again served notice on the Soviet Union and Peking not only
of its continued adherence to its own brand of communism but also of its intent
to e
" T
"
xport
itoism
to the Afro-Asian nations.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA00001000200p4F?1y 1960
259. Valerian Aleksandivich Zorin I-Aw
V. A. Z orin, a top Soviet dilomat who has specialized in Central
European affairs, is the head of the Soviet delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarma-
ment Conference, recently broken off by the Soviets. From August 1952 to March
1953 Zorin was the permanent Soviet representative at the UN. Since that time he
has been closely associated with peace and disarmament negotiations. He was a
member of the. USSR delegation to the Conference on European Peace and Security
held in Moscow in 1954 and in Warsaw in 1955. In 1957 he participated in the
London talks on disarmament, held by the Subcommittee of the UN Commission on
Disarmament. He headed the Soviet delegation to the 13th Session of the UN
General Assembly. He was present at the Foreign Ministers meeting of Warsaw
Pact nations in April 1959 and was the second-ranking Soviet delegate at the
Foreign Ministers Conference held in May and September 1959 in Geneva. Born
on 25 January 1902 in Rostov province of either Jewish or Volga German parents,
his career and character are typical-of the New Soviet Man (See Bi-Weekly
Guidance 038, Item 230). From 1922-19.32 he worked with the Central Committee
of the All-Union Komsomol; from 1935-1941 he was engaged in Party and
pedagogical work. In 1941 he was transferred to a leading post in the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and soon specialized in European affairs. He
first achieved international prominence in 1948 when, under the guise of
ambassador, he master-minded the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. From
1948-1955 he was USSR Deputy Foreign Minister serving under Molotov and A.
Vyshinsky, whose fame rested on the conduct of purge trials during the thirties
and the "organization" of Latvia and Rumania after they were absorbed in the
Soviet orbit, From 1955 to 1956 Zarin was the first Soviet ambassador to the
German Federal Republic after the resumption of diplomatic relations between
the two countries. Observers describe him as cold, hard, and evil, "less a
human being, more of a 'New Soviet Man' than either Malik or Gromyko. " 25X1C10b
Guidance
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27: _ _ _ y A00010002000y 1960
260. French-Algerian Negotiations
The French government and the FLN (National Front for Independence)
have begun negotiations to bring the six yaar old Algerian war to an end. Among
the issues at stake are: (1) The supervision which will be maintained over elections;
(2) The disposition of the French army in Algeria and the ALN (National Army of
Liberation); (3) The precise definition of the alternatives offered under self-
determination. There is opposition to these negotiations by extreme right wing
groups within France and the Europeans in Algeria both of whom aim at keeping
Algeria part of metropolitan France even in some quarters if this necessitates
the overthrow of de Gaulle. There are indications that within the ALN there are
elements which also oppose any negotiated peace which does not provide for
immediate independence. With an eye to establishing themselves in a future
Algerian republic, the Chinese Communists are wooing the FLN and the ALN
assiduously and consequently are opposed to the negotiations. However, the
majority of Algerian Moslems and most of the left and center political groupings
in France currently appear to endorse the idea of peace by negotiation. It is
doubtful that the preliminary and initial talks will result in a resolution of the
Algerian war, but there may exist flexibility in the positions of de Gaulle and the
FLN which would make ultimate agreement possible. 25XIC10b
Guidance
 25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
Attachment to Item No. Z56:
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
 25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020004-6