BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 3, 1959
• Content Type: PERRPT

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C
NUMBER 19
3 Atgu3t 1959
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP78-03061A0,01QOCA1Jg 1959
111, The Indus Basin Canal 'Waters Dispute
Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBF.D), has made a trip to India and Pakistan in an effort to solve
the dispute over the use of the carnal waters of the ndansss River Basin which has existed
since 1947. He has made certain concrete suggestions which both countries have
agreed to discuss in meetings In London commencing in August 1959. These waters,
the sole source of supply to their intricate canal system, are the lifeblood of
millions of people in Vest Pakistan. The Indus flows from Tibet across Kashmir into
Pakistan. Three major west-lbank tributaries, the Jhelum, the Chenab and the l;avi
drain southwest Kasshinir, converge and join the Indus in 'West Pakistan. In
undivided Punjab >unnde: British rule, 26 million arid acres were brought under
irrigation - four timers the area irrigated from the Iflie - by thirteen complex canal
systems. Most of the canal systems are now in Pakistan. The land is almost
completely dependent upon water from the canals except in the wet monsoon season.
If deprived of their use literally millions of Pakistanis would starve. Thus, this is
possibly an even greater issue than that of the sovereignty of Kasir. At the
same time, India is determined to exploit the river water for the creation of
hydro-electric power facilities in Last Punjab. Fakietan*s fear of the terrible
famine that would follow the cutting off of these waters led, In 1951, to her
accepting the good offices of the IBRD, in an effort to find a solution. Now, eight
years later, with financial assistance from the US, Britain, Canada and Australia,
division of the waters and the construction of vast engineering works, India and
Pakistan may be approaching a solution of this vital problem. Maintenance and
increase of Indo-Pakistan tension is a major Communist objective, one to which the
Communists seem to be giving higher priority since the Tibetan revolt. Such
increased tensions could quickly divert Indian attention from Tibet, promote anti-
Vest and especially anti-US attitudes, encourage renewed activity by front groups,
and provide new opportunities to local Communist parties is their efforts to gain
influence in the area.
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112. The Normalization of UAR-Jord.antan, Relation a
The UAI1 and Jordanian Covernmento have accepted a plan that prorniaea to lead
to a rapprochement between the two countries. An announcement to this effect was made
in Amman on 21 July by Arab League Seeretary -General Abda,g..i traliq 1 ssaeanmb and
Jordanian Prse atl,er Haa;ra al-Majali. Hassurnah representing President Nasir stated
that the agreed plan world result in the reopening of the VAR - Jordanian border and the
re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Questing "informed
sources, " a Reuters report from Amman said that the UAR-Jordanian agreement also
provides for suspending the vitriolic press and radio propaganda campaign of recent
months. Premier Majali said the Amman talks also endo:.raed the need to strengthen the
Arab League, a development which, he said, "would elimnase most of the causes of
existing differences among Arab states. " Jordanian--Egyptian relations never have been
good, primarily because of Icing Husayn'e refusal to become a minion of Nasir. In
response to Nasir's February 1956 power move in creating the United Arab Republic
comprised of Egypt and Syria, Kings Fay sal and llusayn countered by proclaiming the
federation of Iraq and Jordan. Nk hen Fayrsel was assaast .ted and his regime overthrown
by Qasim on July 14, 1958, King Husayn charged that both the Communists and Nasir
were implicated. Husayn broke off diplomatic relations with Cairo when Nasir
recognized the Qaatm regime. Until very recently Cairo propagandists had been
conducting a particularly vicious and unsavory campaign against ltusayrn. Jordanian medte
of course reciprocated. but did not indulge in Cairo muckralhing. The liessuoah-Majati
talks in Amman and the announcement of an agreed plan which appears to be an augury
of improved UAR-Jordanian relations comet amid indications of a hardening Arab
attitude to the internal Communist menace, Na tr's apprehension about communism's
threat to the "Arab nation" coupled with Iraqi Premier Qasim's recent actions show a
growing awareness of the Co" unist threat. The Amman agreemento represent another
Important step towards an Arab "lidartty which should be progressively more difficult
to penetrate by international communism. 25X1
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113. Indian Sponsorship of Chicom UN Membership
India has submitted to the UN, for the ninth successive year, a request that
the UN consider the question of seating the Chicoms as the China representative.
Since independence Nehru has claimed to base Indian foreign policy on the principles
of Panch Shila: mutual respect for other countries' territory; non-aggression;
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; peaeefai co-existence;
equality and mutual benefit. However, Nehru has never treated the Bloc and the West
by the same standard. India refused to vote for UN condemnation of the Soviet
suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Then, the rationale was that such condemna-
tion would not contribute to a solution,, despite the fact that international moral
indignation was the only peaceful weapon available. During the Korean War, the
Indo-China crisis of 1954, and the Chicom attack on the off-shore islands, Nehruos
version of non-alignment has meant effective support of Communist policy. In the
case of the Chicom intervention in Korea, Nehru went so far as to say that both
sides were to blame for the aggression. Nehru has thoroughly denounced all military
alliances of Asian countries with the West, whereas he has not denosnnced the Sino-
Soviet alliance. On the other hand, Nehru does not abide by the principles of Panch
Shila when political reality so dictates such as in Nepal. over which India has sought
to exercise considerable control, and in Kashmir where moral principles have been
subordinated to public emotional pressures and what India considers Its military
security. The hypocrisy of Nehru9s anti-imperialism can be seen from his failure to
characterize the USSR9s long history of aggressive acts against East Europe as
imperialism. Finally, Nehru?s approach to Tibet has been characterised by an
unwillingness of the Indian Government to use the full force of its moral suasion to
help the Tibetans. After the initial revulsion by the Indian people and the Nehru
flare-nap with Communist China, he has tried to calm the situation claiming that he can
thereby moderate Chinese-Tibetan policy. However, he is, in fact primarily
attempting to return Sino-Indian relationships to normal. 25X1
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 Annrniror! I-nr DoIonco 0fa71C.1`->L l'3 ? CIA PflD7S2f`2C 1 A(C
010014
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August 1959
114. The Manoiie Glezos ;Trial
The July 9-22 Athens espionage ty ial of Manolia G1ezoe and 1b other defendants
has en'tthe aaubjeet of a mf jor Communist propaganda campaign. Gleaoe was sentenced
to five years' !a?npri, cent, fora. years' exile, and eight years' loss of political
righta . Sias of the other defendants received sentences ranging from one year to life
imprisonment, nine were acquitted, and charges were dropped against one person.
During the woek ending 12 Sly, 17 of all. Mosacow's radio commentaries dealt witth the
trial. The vol one byr late July 1959 bad dropped to less than half this figure and may
drop furtlserr, but indications are that Cornmunist propags.ndicts in coming weeks will
continue to devote a significant volume of attention tto the Giezoe case. The trial
undoubtedly will be the subject of annual propaganda attention on Its anniversary date
and will be related to other events in other areas in futturre-Soviet propaganda offensives.
Soviet propagandists shrewdly built their campaign around the leftist G1e>1ros, a World
War U Resist ce hero who in 1941 dramatically removed a German awsastika from the
Acropolis. (Glezos was not then a Communist.) The Athens court on 22 July 1959 found
Gleags guilty of having been a contact of Conattantine Koligianniasa, a Member of the
Politburo of the Illegal Greek Communist Party (KKE) and director of a Communist
espionage nettwork in Greece. IN hen arrested, on December 5, 1958, Glecos was editor
of the neo-Corramunist paper Av hi and the organizational secretary of the Commmunisst
front United l mocratic Left$ I:DA). Glezos previously bad served a two-year prison
term for subversive activities during the 1947-48 Greek guerrilla war. Communist
propaganda alleged that Clemos was bein tried because he led the "popular" opposition
to USr missile basses in Greece. Apart from the Communist front, there vans little
sympathy for Glesos in Greece. However, in non-Communist circles in Greece and
abroad, there was trong sentiment that the prosecution 'eras based on outmoded
securitty legislation dating from 1936 which called for. Glezos' trial before a military
court. The Greek Government rejected Co amunist propaganda as "unacceptable
provocation. " Premier Karamaulie on July 10 said: "It is surprisinng that a case of
espionage threatening the security of the country., . a masse which iss being tried in
accordanei- with the exis?ing taws of the state, has caused the znobiliaation of inter-
national Co a nunisnn, " 'l'ine prosecution said that Internaticnaa Communism's propaga ndaa
about Gleaoxa' 1941 feat waas designed to "cover up its own responsibility for espionage
in Greece and to defairme Greek justice. " 25X1
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 ? Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010014-6 August 1959
115? OAS Foreign Min'im" ,rs Meeting F
.ran{' srr S
The twenty-one Republics comprising the Organization of American States
have unanimously agreed to convene a Foreign Ministers Meting in Santiago, Chile?
on August 129 for the purpose of discussing and resolving the international tensions
that have been generated throughout the Caribbean as a result of Fidel Castro?s
overthrow of Batista last January,. Recent months have seen invasions of Panama.,
Nicaragua, and the Dor ninican Republic by expeditionaryy revolutionary forces based on
or supported from Cuba and similar forces have used the territory of Honduras and
Costa Rica as bases causing serious internal problems in those countries. The U. S,
has men a leading role in convening the Meeting not only because of its desire to keep
the highly strategic Caribbean area free of fighting? but ai so because a continuation of
the tensions could seriously embarrass the Uv S. in its world position by playing into
Communists? hands. The central Ub S. position is that a continuation of direct or
indirect aggression aimed to overthrow Caribbean govermnents cannot be permitted.
Some members are expected to distract attention from the purpose of the Meeting by
introducing extraneous mattersa such as pressing for condemnation of dictators?
consideration of substantive economic motions or creation of a Convention o a Human
Rights, These and similar issues in the view of the U. S. should be reserved for the
OAS Quito Conference of Heads of Government,, scheduled for February 1960. Other
U. S. objectives at Santiago are to create an OAS Committee to continue the moral
authority of the FM Meeting for another several months and to persuade the OAS
Council to undertake the study of existing inter-American peace. mechanisms,, and
recommend improvements. 25X1
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11& Anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
-August 1959 will mark the 20th anniversary of the signing of a non-aggression
pact, complete with secret annexes, between Stalin and Hitler. This agreement
marked a complete reversal of the relations between the two countries which had
steadily deteriorated since Hitler assumed power in 1933, Hitler had decided to
invade Poland in early September. He needed Russian neutrality during this early
phase of his conquests, After Molotov bad replaced Litvinov in May 19 99, Ribbentrop,
the German Foreign Minister, was sent to Moscow to bring the negotiations to quick
conclusion. The pact was signed on 21 August 1939, and made known to the world
the next day. The secret protocols which supplemented the pact became known only
after the war through the release of captured German diplomatic dottumen?ss~ The
first protocol spelled-out the Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern
Europe including the division of Poland and the Baltic Countries. The Soviet govern-
ment agreed to pay $7, 500, 000 for an extra strip of territory. A year later, in
November 1940 further secret protocols were being negotiated between the USSR,
Germany, Japan and Italy for a division of the world, They draft of the secret protocol
says. "The Soviet Union declare* that its territorial ambitions center south of the
national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean". However,
on 18 December 1940, Hitler issued his secret directive on Operation Barbarossa, cods`
name for the Invasion of Russia. At the same time he moved German troops into the
Balkans. This put an cud to the friendly negotiations, News of the non-aggression
pact created bewilderment among the German and Rust3ian peopI ss who for years
had been exposed to anti-bolshavik and anti-fascist propaganda ruspoetivolyo The
Anti-Comintern Pact formed in 1936 between Germany and Japan was reinterpreted as
a defense measure against the Allies, 25X1
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3l'"':, trn he ae~r ~w 3oi *e .a '1'1 f nl ; 1 a :
\ujtx4t 4154
-vr g h a visit it ors: 14 to 21 Su. ay K hrn3hchev spoke on meny o nar-wma and it-,
": aw aii' c 1 tc:srxsa* in Su port of .or Yyfk '' p ticy of igs ;cpendence is Polaand"s .sttewnaa
afl'4tr , ,t'f7r his part.. p,r- aunably as a quid pre q&:) for : hrusiachev"a endorsement of
bib p `ngrarr,s, *aa^cauak2 vo.ced 1 -t.:ils.aid"s sralidaa.a itt with the "canyp of peace" on ali
Major fute.r astir l laaarars aan :lz. ding the aovtet pos#3ion on Berlin and nuclear
diaiat?n-a ent0 In a s :Lch on Z1 Juiy in Warsaa K.hr ushzhev stated ". a one cannot
deananJ that the Polish park ," In solving any question of the internal life of Potand
pureue a policy which coincides fully- with the policy of ,,he Communist Party of the
~: .
i. tai a. Each people must build ,iocialitam and advance inward corxnmw isrn by taking
crinsideratkoq its tiortai* cultural, and ldeolo ices pec;iliarities. " In none of
Ihrushchev"s spe% ches wage there any Indication of pra-saurem on the Poles to depart
trorn their independent road and Co tilka himself seernt.d determined to empbeaize #k bi
when. in a speech at b rest w welcoming hrushchev, he declared "~ a a only We are
responsible for everything . that goes on in this cvuatry. `t Perhapaa of greatest s ift-
car:-ce was Khrushc.Fitvge position on Polish Agriculture, outlined in iii=Weekly Na. 18.
Limn number 110 The Polish Road in Agriculture". In a aapeech to peasants in Poznan.
from which V esteru newsmen were barred, Khrushchev commented that while the
USSR4s ewperience proved that the Soviet collective we the best eyatem of socialist
agriculture, they could not and would not be forced on the Poliah peasant:. "Naturally,
people should not be dragged into a cooperative by force:. The cooperative in the best
forrrn of organization of the -peasant's work. the best for n-i of or anizaation of pr,)diactio+n,
and sne cannot drive a man toward a better life with a whip. " in the *perch. which was
published in the Polish and Soviet press. Khrushc ,t'i diced the moat outspoken
criticism of the commune system, yet heard Biers a high 5ovttt official, Citing the USSR',
commune experiment iChrushch.ev stated it to "the wrorgj way" to start an the "road to
socialiem0 " These statements were clearly deeig +ed for Polish internal consumption to
allay arty fear of hasty socialization of Polish agriculttux e. 25X1
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