COMMUNISM, CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION, PART TWO, Communist Party Military Organization

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02849A000100150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 206
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNISM
Clandestine Communist Organization
Part Two
Communist Party Military Organization
IRIS REPORT 13 FOR THE INFORMA1IOI
AND USF OF THE ADDRESSEE ONLY. 11
IS NOT to BE FURTHER DISTRI8UTEO
NIIHOUI THE PERMISSION OF THE
REEEASINO 01fICE?
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S. OFFICIALS ONLY
,Spt 11r4 - T T.:1 .
N, ote: This is an interim study. Statements.
herein should be considered in many places
to be open to question and conclusions, to be
tentative. Comments, criticisms, additions
and suggestions are earnestly solicited.
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NNOW
Securit-y- =53
CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
PART TWO: COMMUNIST PARTY MILITARY ORGANIZATION
CONTENTS
I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
"Periods" of Communist Military Activity
Types of Communist Military Effort
Military Resistance
Colonial Revolution
City Insurrection
II. COMMUNIST COLONIAL UPRISINGS
Para.
8 -10
11
11
12
13
15 - 29
Basis of the post-war insurrections 15
"Objective Conditions"' 16
Party Strength 17
Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution 18
The Safe-Base 19
Combination of Military and Political Action 20
General Role of Party Apparatus 21
"Phasing" of the Insurrection 22
Main Periods of the Insurrection 23
Period of the Military Defensive 24
.Period of the Military Offensive 25
Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing" 26
Role of Party Underground 27
B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE 30 - 38
Ideal Features 31
Compromise of ideal features 32
Advantages of base on national frontier 33
Effect of Communications 34
Military utility 35
Political utility 36
The. "Liberation Government" 37
Disadvantages of Safe-base 38
C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION 39 - 46
Who makes it 40
Policy preliminaries 41
Influence of CPSU 'and other CP's 42
Evidence of 2 decisions 43
Content of the decision 44
Importance of the "Objective Situation" 45
D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS 47 - 50
Necessity for adjustment 47
Time Lapse 48
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 Para.
Main Changes
Decentralization
Reassignment of Cadres
Discipline and Security
Purges
.Control Mechanism
Qualifications for Jobs
Underground Organization
Removal of Headquarters to Safe Base
New Organizations Created
Other Organizations Strengthened
Some Functions Dropped
Emphasis on Schooling
Communications System.
Vulnerability
E.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY
51
- 66
Initial Recruits
Si
d
51
ze an
Structure of Regular Units
Re
la
52
gu
r and Irregular Forces
C
diti
,
53
on
ons
Affecting Size of Units
S
e
i
l
54
p
c
a
Units
O
i
55
rgan
zation and Functions of Staffs: Development
Ge
56
neral Staff
R
l
f
"
58
o
e o
the
Liberation Government"
O
l
59
ver
apping and Separation of Local and Military Organizations
P
t
60
ar
y Control
P
li
61
o
tical Commissar System
P
t
64
ar
y Organization in the Military Force
66
F.
ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
67
- 90
Necessity
O
67
rganization in Safe Base Area
M
68
anpower
I
t
72
n
elligence
C
76
ommunications
Su
80
pply
A
86
rmaments
88
III.
THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
A.
OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
91
--96
Aims
T
91
ypes of Resistance
93
B.
ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE
97
- 103
Party Reorientation
I
i
7
9
n
tial Forces
,
100
C. STAFFS
104
- 105
Origins
104
Composition
105
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JLJD
Size
Types
Party Control
ORGANIZATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS
F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS
Intelligence
Tactical Intelligence
Non-Tactical Intelligence
Communications
Supplies
Para.
106
107
108
115 - 124
116
117
118
122
123
G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE 125 - 129
STRENGTH
H. USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR 130 - 134
IV. THE COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION 135
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION 135 - 139
Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolution
Factors in Success of Proletarian Revolution
B. ORGANIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT 140 - 149
143
144
145
146
147
149
C. SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT 150 - 152
"Military Work" 151
D. MILITARY PREPARATIONS 153 - 173
Party control
Propaganda support
Slogans
Testing the Mass Temper
The General Strike
The General Task
Planning organs
Service Organization
The Arms Problem
Communications
Intelligence
Transportation
E. THE INSURRECTION
154
156
157
165
171
172
Timing 175
Mobilization of the Party 176
Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters 177
Composition of Headquarters 178
Fighting Formations 182
Size of Formations 185
Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus 186
Current Preparedness 187
Conclusions 190
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V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES
Purpose of Penetration
Party Organization for Penetration
The Bolshevik Penetration Operations
Conditions for Membership in the Comintehn
Early Penetrations by the CP Italy
The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration
Anti-Military Committees
A Small Party, Penetration Operation
Penetration During World War II and Later
Greece
Denmark
Czechoslovakia
APPENDICES
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP CHINA I
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP GREECE /
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP MALAYA
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP PHILIPPINES'`'
MILITARY RESISTANCE OF CP FRANCE
THE ORGANIZATION OF CP ITALY FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917
THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1935 IN BRAZIL
SOVIET PARTISANS DURING WORLD WAR II
Para.
191 - 213
192
193
195
196
197
199
200
205
206
209
212
SELF
t- nxTrr, ?? -s
Q=1=00=TJR'lllll~l~RI~T! '?? .e~v.e ~ v
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1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
ty
g~omunist.Par
1. There has long been a need for a survey analysis of the way th m
organizes for military .action. There are many places where the Party is already engaged in
rme re a ion. Existing world tensions and unstable internal conditions may encourage re-
bellion in other areas in the near future. Non-Communist governments may have to face such
action directly: it is important to know how the action is begun and directed and to know
something of the problems that the Communists themselves face in raising, maintaining and
controlling an armed force.
2. For these reasons the present paper has been prepared. It deals with the Commu-
nist armed insurrection in advanced capitalist countries and in "backward", agrarian
("colonial") countries. A section also has been included on Communist armed resistance to
foreign military occupation. This is of interest for two reasons: (a) it supplements the infor-
mation on military organization for Communist insurrection; and (b) it shows what might be
expected to follow should non-Communist forces be obliged to occupy a foreign country in
which the Communist following is significant. 2
3. The conclusions developed in the survey are tentative. In many cases there is not
sufficient information to draw reliable conclusions: for obvious reasons the Communist Party
does not publish details on the techniques and organization of its military effort. In the case
of city insurrections in the manner of the Russian Revolution of November 1917, they have
been unsuccessful; and failures are not generally recorded in objective detail by the Commu-
nists. Much more information is available on the 'Communist-revolution in colonial countries
because they have occurred at a time of general public awareness and interest in Commu-
nist activities, and because, by their very nature, they cannot be kept secret.
4. Such shortcomings aside, it is believed that the present paper will enable its
readers to foresee more clearly what the Communists may be expected to do by way of pre-
paring and carrying out armed action. The "pattern" of organization and action cannot, of
course, be rigidly applied in every conceivable detail and there are many places where details
have been set forth to cover the actual situation in a particular country. It is hoped, however,
that alternative variations have been furnished that will suggest to the reader what he may ex-
pect in a given place, time, and set of conditions. There are natural limits to the variations
possible at any point in the pattern. The Communists are bound by conditions beyond their
control: their doctrine prescribes adherence to certain standards of organization(Parties are
modelled after the CPSU); they exchange experiences and thereby develop certain "school
solutions."
5. Two limitations have been imposed on this interim study: (a) no attention is given
to the organization of state armies in Communist countries; (b) military tactics are treated
only so far as they affect organization. The study is focused on the military organizations of
Parties not yet in power.
6. While this paper is primarily concerned with the efforts of the Communists to
organize a military force of their own, a section is devoted to penetration and subversion of
"enemy" armed services (i.e. the existing army, police force, etc. of the state). Penetration
and subversion operations of Communist Parties, especially in the city insurrection, contri-
bute directly and in a large proportion to their military potential. The organization for this
activity is discussed in greater detail, paragraph 176.
7. Several "case histories" of particular Communist military actions are appended
to the study. They should be referred to when illustrations are wanted on the application of a
"principle" as set out in the three general analyses of --
Organization for colonial revolution,
Organization for armed resistance, and
Organization for proletarian revolution.l
1 Communist military operations in conjunction with an invading Communist army have not
been considered separately in this study. It is believed that in the event of invasion by the
Soviet Union or its satellites, CP military action would fall into one of the categories dealt
with in the paper. It would, perhaps, range from resistance type operations to isolated sei-
zures of power in cities in the advanced countries. An example of such aid already exists in
the colonial areas: the help of the South Korean guerrillas to the North Korean and Chinese
Communist armies, which is discussed in paragraph 130.
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8. These three types of Comniunist arme
actions have characterized three histori
cal periods of Communist strategy. They are --
a) The period of unsuccessful city insurrections based on the Bolshevik model,
roughly from 1917 to 1935, with a rash of attempts immediately following the
Bolshevik Revolution, Insurrections were attempted in Germany in 1921 and
1923; in Bulgaria in 1923; in Hungary in 1919; in Lativa in 1924; in Finland in
1918; in China, repeated attempts until 1928; and in Brazil, in 1935.
b) The period of armed resistance to Axis occupation: in occupied Europe
from 1941 to 1944; in China, from 1937 to 1945; and in Southeast Asia, from
1942 to 1945.
c) The period of armed rebellion in colonial Southeast Asia and Greece. Al-
though the principles employed in these revolutions had been applied as early as
1928 in China, it was not until World War II that their development had reached
its height and their validity had been proved. The CP's of Indochina, Malaya,
Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and India following the war adopted them.
9. The breaking of the Communist strategy into three historical periods has largely
been the result of "objective conditions", i.e. social-political-economic factors outside the
control of the Communists, but providing them exploitable situations. The success of the
Bolsheviks in 1917 was achieved by a combination of factors that is riot likely to be repeated
again in any other country. Nevertheless, Communists in other "advanced" countries have
long been taught the "lessons" of the Bolshevik Revolution, and they include some military
tactics that would appear to be applicable to a city uprising anywhere. The special conditions
required for resistance operations are evident: the presence of enemy military forces and a
general patriotic hatred for them. There are many similarities between military resistance
and colonial insurrection. The application of the "lessons" of the Chinese Communist Revolu-
tion in colonial countries has been the main feature of the post-war period. It cannot be said
at this time that the lessons are more, or less, likely to succeed than the application of the
techniques of the Bolshevik Revolution. In Greece, the attempt failed; in Malaya, Burma,
Philippines and Indochina the attempts are apparently at stalemates. In Indonesia and India,
they have failed.
10. It is interesting to note that CP India, having unsuccessfully tried both the tactics
of the Bolshevik revolution and the tactics of the Chinese Revolution, now attempts to formu-
late a program which calls for a combination of the two. If it succeeds (and it seems doubtful
if the two types of revolution can be combined) it will be another major contribution to Commu-
nist revolutionary practice.
11. The three types of Communist military effort defined. The principles for the re-
sistance organization were develop during World War II, mainly to help the USSR in the war
with the Axis. They had limited objectives: to harass the occupying Axis armies, to. collect
intelligence for Allied use and to deny the economic potential of the country to the Axis. The
organizational structure reflected these missions. Communist resistance formations were
generally small and mobile and only in rare instances did they engage Axis military formations
head on. In two cases (Greece and Yugoslavia) the resistance military formations went beyond
these objectives and during the resistance laid the groundwork for a later attempt to seize
power. The cases examined were the Communist resistance operations of the USSR, France,
Italy and Greece. The tactics developed by the Communists would be applicable by any Com-
munist Party fighting a non-Communist occupation army.1
12. The techniques of the Communist revolution in colonial areas have developed over
the past twenty years, largely as a result of the experiences of the Chinese Communists. The
distinguishing features of the colonial revolution are:
a) the creation of a large army based on the peasantry. The army is first cre-
ated from isolated detachments of armed peasantry, but as the revolution succeeds
the number of troops increases.
A current example being the utilization of Communist guerrilla forces behind UN' lines in
Korea in direct support of the North Korean forces. See paragraph 130.
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b) the occupation and protection by this army of a safe base or bases, which be-
comes the headquarters for the Party political and military campaign, and which
is gradually expanded as the power of the Communist forces increases.
c) a long-term, sustained effort, with a slow and gradual accumulation of mili-
tary strength. The Chinese effort took over 20 years.
Case histories for the preparation and conduct of a colonial revolution by the Chinese,
Malayan, Philippine and Greek Communist Parties have been included in this study. The
tactics appear to be applicable to all Southeast Asian countries, some areas in Latin America,
the Near East and Africa.
13. The model for the city insurrection, which takes place in "advanced" capitalist
countries, is the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The highly centralized communications of an
advanced country with strong, mobile coercive forces call for tactics very different from a
resistance operation or a colonial revolution. The main features of a city insurrection are:
a) the necessity to penetrate and subvert the state coercive forces, to win them
over to the support of the Communists or to neutralize them during the seizure of
power.
b) the creation of armed detachments of workers, and obtaining the support of
the proletariat for strike action and demonstrations.
c) The close timing and coordination of the forces of the Communists. The in-
surrection must be completed in a few days, before the opposing forces have time
to rally, although the political preparation for the insurrection precedes it for
years.
The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd in 1917 was examined in detail for this study.
An account of the Brazilian Communist Revolution of 1935, which bears many similarities to
the Bolshevik model, is also included. Similar tactics would probably be employed by Com-
munists staging an insurrection in any "advanced, capitalist country", particularly in Western
Europe.
14. The general patterns of the colonial revolution, the resistance operation, and the
city insurrection are set forth in detail below.
II. COMMUNIST COLONIAL UPRISINGS
dtv
"ki
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
15. Basis of the post-war insurrections. The numerous Communist military uprisings
in the countries of Southeast Asia following the war were undertaken on the basis of several
complex factors: (a) events and conditions at home and abroad which the Parties considered
favorable for revolution (i.e., the "objective situation" in Communist parlance); (b) enhanced
political strength of the Parties and the existence of at least the nucleus of a Party military
force (i.e., the "subjective" conditions); (c) existence of a body of practical doctrine about
strategy and tactics in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries developed during the Chinese
Communist Revolution.
16. "Objective Conditions." In the eyes of the Communists the war had a profound
effect on the political and social stability and economies of the countries of Asia, on their
relations with the "imperialist" homelands in Europe, and on the world balance of power be-
tween the democratic "imperialist" countries and the Soviet-satellite "camp." The Commu-
nists thought that these effects worked in their favor, as was stated by Andrei Zhdanov at the
inaugural session of the Cominform in 1947, and they believed that the favorable trend would
go on indefinitely, eventually leading to crises in which the Parties could seize total power.
The strongest manifestation of the changed situation in Asia was the rise of nationalism, upon
which the Communists had long tried to. capitalize. Not until the end of the war, however, did
they consider the ferment strong enough and the colonial governments (and their principles)
weakened enough to capitalize fully on it.
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17. Party Strength. The Communist Parties participated actively in the anti-Japanese
resistance during the occupation. By doing so, they developed military forces, which they
were able to carry over in one form or another into the post-war, period and which provided
them with the nucleus Qf an Insurrectionary army. The Party leadership had gained valuable
experience from underground operations during the occupation, and from the military opera-
tions. Many of the Parties also emerged from the resistance with stores of arms, ammuni-
tion, and other supplies.
18. Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution Out of necessity by way of his-
torical accident, the Chinese Communists hit upon a formula for revolution that was radically
different from the "classic" Bolshevik tradition and that, by extension, seems applicable to
other Asian countries. Following an abortive uprising in the cities, they organized an army
of peasants to protect themselves against the military forces of the Nationalists; they used
the army to seize and hold an inaccessible region in the far Northwest (Shensi Province);
after consolidating their position there -- aided by the neighboring USSR--they used the army
to "politicalize" the peasantry in adjoining areas particularly through land redistribution and,
gradually, to expand their base, finally accumulating enough strength and resources to engage
and defeat the forces of the Government and to take over complete state power.
ommunis
-wav=a1Q1 Q.llu DCllll-wwnlal-- countries was developed with the following terms: ?
a) The most immediately revolutionary section of the population is not the city
proletariat, but the peasantry;
b) By raising a military-force and seizing a safe base in the countryside, the
Communist Party can begin a political-military struggle aimed principally at the
enlistment of the peasantry for the armed struggle: the principal means of, in-
ducement is the distribution of land among the poor peasants;
c) The Communist Party can begin a military struggle with limited military and
political resources because communications difficulties will impede counter-
measures by the goverrnment; l
d) By a combination of military action and political organizing among the peas-
ant masses, the Party can gradually accumulate forces large enough and suffi-
ciently seasoned to engage eventually the forces of the enemy;
e) Even a limited military struggle will tax the strength of the government,
throw its economy out of balance and, consequently, cause frictions to grow among
the social groups supporting the government and thus lead to a crisis.
19. The Safe-base, Rough terrain, dense vegetation, and primitive roads common in
"colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Asia make it possible for Communist Parties to do
what the Chinese Communists did when they seized part of Shensi -- capture a defensible area
where the military- force can be built up, trained, and sustained. Having an armed force, the
Communists can relinquish an area that proves untenable and seize another. Several small
bases can be taken simultaneously, later to be consolidated into one, or given up as conditions
and strategy dictate. It is essential, however, that some kind of a safe area be secured.
20. Combination of Military and Political Action. The main functions of the Commu-
nist military force are --
a) capture a defensible area; defend It;
b) aid in the expansion of the political basis of the revolution: facilitate land
distribution; protect organizers; attract or coerce peasants to support the insur-
rection by show of force;
1 Conversely the existence of an effective communications system will impede the efforts of
a "colonial or semi-colonial" CP to begin and sustain military operations. See the recent
complaints of CP India to that effect.
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From their experiences, a formula for revolution in what the C
t call the
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!'~/'1wrTT/'1T /rr o ter. r. Ti.T n T nMTT V
c) damage the resources of the enemy; make him operate asecurity force be-
yond his capacity to do so; weaken the morale of his troops by constant harassing
actions; disrupt his lines of communication and transport of commodities by am-
bushes, destroying roads, railroads, power and telephone lines, etc.
d) expand the safebase(s) until the opposing government is sufficiently weakened
and can be overthrown.
21. The political apparatus. of the Party is largely stripped down to provide cadres for
the military force and the supporting mass organizations. It becomes a control and servicing
apparatus for the military force: it posts cadres in key military commands, forms mass
organizations among the peasants to provide food, intelligence, and recruits for the military
force; and creates special directing organs (staffs) and servicing elements (intelligence,
courier communications, weapons and ammunition production, supply, etc.).
22. "Phasing" of the Insurrection. Because colonial Communist Parties begin their
insurrections before they have gathered preponderant political strength, and use military
action as a politicalizing instrument, they expect the struggle to be long. (The Chinese Com-
munists fought for over twenty years.) Military forces will be accumulated gradually; the
enemy is reduced by political, economic, and military attrition. Communist military opera-
tions are adjusted to tactical and political conditions prevailing at any given time. If neces-
sary, the force can be withdrawn to the safe area for long periods and confine itself to de-
fensive actions. Communist military tactics in colonial countries can be much more flexible
than in "advanced" countries, where the military effort must be quick and overwhelming, or
be crushed.
23. There are two main phases in the colonial insurrection: the military defensive,
when the Communists are trying to accumulate forces and establish productive and military
strategic safe-bases; and the military offensive when sufficient forces have been accumulated
to launch the by-then developed regular army in powerful attacks on the main body of enemy
forces.
24. The period of the military defensive is marked by the use of guerrilla tactics. It
is divided, according to a document issued by the CP Brazil entitled "Guerrilla, Arm of the
People," into three phases:
a) "Acts of sabotage and terrorism, performed by individuals or small groups
native to the region, who usually work under the very eyes of the enemy." During
this phase, the Party must organize numerous small secret groups, whose duties
consist of "sabotage of transportation, communications and supplies; the collection
of information for friendly troops pr for the guerrilla organization; and finally,
propaganda aiming at the complete revelation of the true character of the enemy
and the preparation of the people for the fight."
"Little by little, the enemy avoids the most warlike regions, moves its troops and sup-
plies over other routes, changes its depots to other places, begins to leave behind only key
garrisons or send punitive expeditions from time to time. Then the guerrillas become more
and more masters of the region, progressively armed and organized into military-type bands,
attack the remaining enemy bands, attack the remaining enemy soldiers, and finally launch
more energetic attacks on neighboring areas."
b) "Next, larger groups are formed which have a military organization and are
generally based in mountains, forests, or other relatively inaccessible regions,
whence they can launch constant attacks on the enemy."
c) "Finally, the groups of guerrilla warriors, now having available considerable
resources, are organized into a regular army and establish a definite front and
begin the occupation of the territory." _
Progress from one "phase" to another is not sharply defined: irregular guerrilla bands
continue to exist right up to the fin2kl, all-out offensive; the forces of the Communists through-
out these phases are of varying sizes and shapes; small-scale harassing operations are car-
ried on even when the military force has begun to be reorganized into a "regular army;" the
first "phase" is skipped over in some cases.
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The Brazilian document has this to say about centralized control of military operation:
"Coordination is relatively easy in the third phase of the fight, when the existence
of the regular army and of a territory dominated by it allow the full development
of a central command. In the first two phases, however, such coordination and
the establishment of the central command are extremely hard: this can, never-
theless, begreatly aided through the previous existence of an organized..Commu-
nist Party."
25. The period of the military offensive consists in (a) consolidation of Party-military
control within the safe-base area; (b) completion of the reorganization of the Communist
forces into a "regular army;" (c) expansion of the safe-base in the surrounding countryside;
(d) attacks in force on individual enemy strongholds, then on major provincial cities, then on
the national capital; (e) creation of a national Communist government and consolidation of
political and territorial control over the entire country.
26. Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing." The role of the political apparatus of the
Communist Party and its ancillary "mass" or front) organizations is adjusted to the stages
of the military strategy.
In the early stages, the Party mobilizes its military elements, organizes them into
tactical units, makes plans for the initial operations, and turns its regular committees into
military staffs.
Later, when the military forces have grown sufficiently and conditions afford an oppor-
tunity for major operations, they are organized as a separate military auxiliary, divorced
from the control of local Party committees, but still, however, under the control of the central
Party headquarters. When this happens, the political apparatus becomes primarily a serv-
icing organization for the Communist army and its operations. The civil administrations that
are set up in "liberated" areas under Party control are also aimed at supporting the military
effort.
27. In cities under enemy control, the basic function of the (underground) political
apparatus of the Party is to penetrate governmental agencies, trade unions, and other social
and political groups to agitate within them, subvert as many city dwellers as possible with a
view to raising insurrections in the cities when the final, all-out clash is feasible. The extent
to which cadres are pulled out of city organizations and sent to the field depends upon the
military requirements and priorities at any given time.
28. In organizational terms, the insurrectionary colonial Communist Party must pro-
vide for the creation and equipping of an armed force, coordination of the political and mili-
tary programs (and organizations), and constant supervision of all organizations and opera-
tions, revising plans and organizational forms in the light of "phase" requirements. The in-
surrection is organizationally fluid and complex, maturing, in case of success, into a Party
government and dictatorship.
29. The discussion which follows treats the problems faced by the insurrectionary
colonial Communist Parties in organizing and carrying on their revolutions under the follow-
ing headings:
PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE
THE DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION
ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY
ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
The discussion is based upon a study of Communist insurrections in China, Malaya,
Philippines, and Greece, and upon partial examination of the uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia,
Burma, and India. The rebellion in Greece does not fall in all details into the colonial pattern.
However, it is decidely closer to the colonial formula than to the "classic" Bolshevik pattern
of a city insurrection based on the proletariat.
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B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE.
30. The Party's choice of an area to capture and hold for the building up of its mili-
tary force depends upon chance, balance of forces, and only partly upon calculation. A base
may combine several desirable features or it may be simply the only area the insurgents are
capable of taking at the time.
31. Ideally, from the Communist point of view, a safe area would have the following
features:
a) Political value: large population, generally susceptible to the revolutionary
appeal, to be drawn en masse into the Communist army and into support activities;
b) Economic productivity: food production in appreciable excess of the basic
needs of the population; any manufacturing industry is desirable; it is also desir-
able that the economy of areas under Government control depend upon the pro-
duction of the Communist base area;
c) Military defensibility with minimum effort: a matter of immediate and neigh-
boring terrain and character of approaches;
d) Strategic location within the country: located so as to threaten enemy econ-
omy, communications lines, political resources, and military security; at the
same time, give the Communist maximum advantages for expansion into surround-
ing areas and cover for more distant expeditions.
32. The Communists are seldom able to take an area that combines all these features
ideally. They must usually be content in the early and intermediate stages of the insurrection,
with securing an area that is merely defensible and reasonable adequate in food production,
hoping to improve their position later.
33. In many cases, the Communist forces have taken areas close by a foreign country
to secure their rear. Preferably, of course, the area will be adjacent to a friendly state in
order to facilitate outside support. Thus, the Indochinese Communists concentrated in areas
adjoining neutral countries (Thailand and China), and are expected to obtain substantial assist-
ance from Communist China, as soon as possible. The Greek Communists established their
safe-base in Yugoslavia, Albania, and immediately adjacent Greek territories; one of the rea-
sons why they gave up their attempted revolution was the defection of Tito, which left their
rear exposed and deprived them of a substantial part of their logistical support. There have
been recent indications that the Communist insurgents in Burma are moving to the Northeast,
so as to be close to friendly China. The capture of Tibet by the Chinese Communists may
eventually enable CP India to set up a safe-base there.
34. An important element in the defensibility of the base area, aside from the military
strength of the enemy, is the condition of communications in the surrounding countryside. If
they are primitive (as in China), the forces opposing the Communists will find it difficult to
maneuver for effective attacks, and to coordinate operations of separated forces.
35. Uses of the safe base. The military usefulness of the safe base is that --
a) It provides a place where a military force can be built up and maintained --
recruited, equipped, trained, and indoctrinated;
b) It provides a center for the coordination of military operations: a planning,
reporting, communications, and administrative center.
Schools, hospitals and convalescent facilities; storage places for all kinds of supplies; shops
for the manufacture and repair of weapons and ammunition and other equipment are estab-
lished in the safe area. Food-is raised there on Party-controlled farms. By controlling a
share of the national food supply, the Party is able to interfere with the economy and thereby
disturb the political equilibrium of the state and the government's staying power. If the safe
base adjoins a friendly foreign country, the Communists will have access to its productive
resources and military supplies.
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36. The political utility of the safe base is that --
a) It provides a center for the establishment of a "democratic," "people's" or
"liberation" government;
b) It provides a jumping-off place for military-political expansion into sur-
rounding areas (politicalization of the peasants).
37. The "Liberation Government." The "Government" set up by the Communists in
the safe base area.has bpth a political and a practical organizational purpose. Politically, it
serves as a rallying-point for non-Communist elements opposed to the regime for various
reasons and it lends prestige and an aura of legality to the insurrection -- a distinct propa-
ganda asset. There is no question but that such a,,f*acade is useful in winning favor with non-
Communist, nationalist elements: it was amply demonstrated in China. Practically, the
setting up of a pseudo-national government,-relieves the Party of a large part of the burden
and the onus of civil administration in "liberated" areas: administrative posts can be given
to non-Communists, thereby relieving Party cadres for more important work.
The practice of creating a "government" seems confined to Parties with substantial
forces and a,proven territorial base (Greece, Chula, Indo-china). Some insurrectionary
Parties have not yet attempted it (Philippines, Malaya).
38. There are some disadvantages to the strategy of the safe-base.
(1)
The base is, perforce, unstrategically located in an area remote from the
centers of power which must finally be seized.
(2) The base is far from the centers of industrial production (arms, clothing,
other equipment).
(3) Its distance from population centers deprives the Communists of a large
section of the potentially revolutionary population, and of the services of
technicians (medicos, mechanics, communications personnel, etc.).
C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION.
39. The decision to take the Party into a military revolt is serious: it means a con-
siderable structural reorKanization of the Party, a painful readjustment in the way of living of
Party cadres and ranks, and thorny problems of raising and maintaining a military force.
40. The decision is made, of course, by the top Party leadership. For example, it was
made by the, Secretariat of the CP Philippines and then endorsed by, and put out in the name of,
the Political Bureau.
41. The Chinese Communists were forced into an insurrection by enemy action (pro-
voked by their own action, of course). In the post-war period, however, the decision has been
deliberately made on the basis of calculated prospects, and has not been forced upon the
colonial Communist Parties. In some cases, the Party leadership has simply reversed its
previous policy and has stayed in office to carry out the new policy (Greece, Malaya). In the
Philippines a bitter factional division arose between Party leaders favoring arched insurrec-
tion and those favoring continuation of "legal" methods, with the former finally prevailing and
suppressing or expelling from the Party the advocates of "legal" struggle.
42. The influence of more authoritative or stronger fraternal Communist Parties may
be a powerful stimulant to the decision in favor of armed uprising. Thus, the leaders of the
CP Greece sounded foreign Communist leaders before beginning the insurrection of,1947-1949.
The leaders of the CP Mayala canvassed Communist spokesmen of China, Great Britain, and the
USSR during 1945-1946, and, receiving no encouragement, postponed their uprising until later.
The Zhdanov statement to the Cominform in October 1947 (see above, para 2) was a striking
example of the leadership role of the CP Soviet Union. It kvas elaborated at the Second
Congress of the CP India and the Southeast Asia Youth Conference. The CP's India, Burma,
and Malaya,all adopted resolutions in favor of a more militant policy. In the Philippines, the
faction of Party leaders favoring armed action got control of the leading Party offices in May
1948,, just a few months after the Zhdanov thesis had been given general circulation.
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43. There are indications that two decisions are actually made by the Party: the first,
a preliminary decision that a "revolutionary situation" is developing and that the Party should
prepare itself to begin fighting in the not too-distant future; and a later decision to actually
begin fighting. The CP Philippines decided in May 1948 that there was a "heightening of the
revolutionary flow" and shortly thereafter carried out some reforms in the Party organiza-
tion: the decision to take to the field was not made until January 1950, when it was estimated
that a "revolutionary situation" already existed. The CP Greece, when it accepted the Varkiza
Agreement in February 1945, must have decided that a Revolutionary situation was not too far
off, for it sent most of its military cadres into camps in Albania and Yugoslavia in 1945, and
made a number of personnel and structural changes in the Party organization during the next
two years. It gave some indication of having reached a decision to begin fighting in September
1946, but did not undertake serious military operations until the summer of 1947.
44. Content of the Policy Decision. It would be reasonable to suppose that the Party
leadership would make a thorough assessment of its own capabilities and resources as part of
the basis for the decision. It is surprising, then, to discover that such is not always the case.
In its resolution of January 1950, for example, the CP Philippines treats the "objective situ-
ation" in some detail, and from the document itself, it appears that the decision was made
entirely on the basis of an evaluation of external conditions: the condition of the Party itself
is not even mentioned. Again, the CP India, during its recent crisis, issued resolutions and
discussions in which the "situation" is described as being "revolutionary," and the task of the
Party to be one of setting the masses "on the rails" of an armed uprising, but in which the
resources of the Party are not merely glossed over as being good, but actually admitted to be
at low ebb.
45. In any event, the colonial Communist Party puts more stock in the external politi-
cal, economic, and social trends than it does in its immediate resources: provided the trends
appear to be revolutionary, the Party will be ready to go ahead with an armed uprising on quite
limited political and military resources. As is shown in the resolution of the CP Philippines
of January 1950, a "revolutionary situation" has two main features: (a) conditions are not
merely bad, but (b) will continue to get worse, because the "bourgeoisie" are divided and per-
manently unable to unite and solve the crucial economic and social problems. With the
"situation" already developing towards a crisis, the best the Communist Party can do is to
aggravate the ills of the country by carrying on an armed struggle and to prepare itself mili-
tarily and politically to stage an all-out campaign when the crisis arrives.
46. The major portion of the resolution of the CP Philippines is devoted to a discussion
of the existing social, economic, and political conditions, including an estimate as to what each
of the major enemy political parties will be able to do to remedy them (conclusion, negative).
The last part of the resolution sets forth the "concrete tasks" for the Party to improve its
own organization. These "organizational, military and educational tasks" are included in the
Philippine Appendix. Briefly, they consisted of strengthening internal discipline and control,
raising the level of political understanding within the Party and its armed force, improving
the work of the Party among the peasants, and reforming the supporting services (finances,
communications, publications).
D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS
47. In addition to the arguments bolstering the decision to begin military action, the
Party also formulates a strategy and prescribes the "concrete tasks" for the implementation
of the decision.
It takes time to get the Party in shape for a military insurrection. The military force
has to be mobilized, Party cadres have to be given definite assignments, new organizations
have to be created to handle problems peculiar to military operations, old offices of no use
when the Party takes to the field have to be closed down or be put underground for "stay-
behind" operations. Security measures must be put into effect in anticipation of police sup-
pression. If a preliminary decision had been made, the Party would already have accom-
plished some of these things, and need only wind them up after making the final decision.
48. Nevertheless, there is always a "time lapse" between the making of the decision
and the beginning of major operations. The duration of the time lapse in each case studied
was a matter of months: from January to 29 March 1950 in the Philippines; from September
1946 (?) to mid-summer 1947 in Greece; and, in Malaya, from mid-March to late July 1948.
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 To some extent, the Party may be able to pick the time for beginning its major opera-
tions: the CP Philippines picked the date of the eighth anniversary of the founding of its
resistance-born army; the CP Greece seems also to have begun operations at what it consid-
ered to be the most propitious time. The CP Malaya, however, with its army in "moth-balls"
hit upon the idea of a campaign of terrorism as a means of shocking its people into action, and
is believed to have counted on having a longer preparatory period and to have been caught
short when the Government took vigorous countermeasures.
49. The main changes which the Party makes in its organization immediately prior to
the insurrection are:
Decentralization of authority to lower (Regional or District Party) organs. This
usually occurs early, in some cases (Greece and Malaya) before the making of the final de-
cision, possible as a result of a preliminary decision. In Malaya, Regional Bureaus were cre-
ated to direct all Party operations in prescribed areas, later, direction of operations passed
progressively into the hands of lower Party committees (State Committees, then District
Committees), this latter development probably resulting from increasing communications dif-
ficulties. In Greece, City Committees were given greater authority, under the supervision of
an "Instructor" from the Politburo, which had removed to the safe base. Regional Committees
in the countryside were dissolved. Military operations were directed by "area" or "regional"
commands in seven prescribed areas in "liberated" country until October 1947 when they were
replaced by Division Headquarters, presumably under a more centralized direction exercised
by General Headquarters through three regional Headquarters. In the Philippines, several
members of the Politburo were individually assigned to act as "supervisors" of the most
important of the newly created Regional Committees. Also, ,he General Headquarters of the
army was dissolved. Later, it was re-established when conditions made it feasible to begin
the reorganization of the guerrilla army into a "regular army."
Reassignment of cadres from political to military work takes place. Colonial CP's
are generally small numerically and short of completely reliable cadres. Many of them had
cadres with experience in guerrilla fighting during the resistance. But a Communist uprising
is a different matter: it lacks the unifying and disciplining appeal of patriotic resistance and
it may last a very long time. Consequently, the shortage of absolutely politically reliable
cadres means that those who are available must be carefully conserved and utilized with maxi-
mum efficiency. The "best" cadres are sent into the field and only skeleton organization are
left behind to do what they can in "enemy" areas and these are put deep underground. (A fre-
quent complaint of the CP Philippines was that its "stay behind" organizations were so far
underground that they were practically worthless; the same difficulty afflicted the city organi-
zations of the CP Greece, which were completely paralyzed by Greek police action.)
Discipline and security are greatly increased, even before the formal decision to begin
military action is made. In a period when the Party is fighting for its life, it can tolerate as
cadres only those individuals who are reliable and efficient. All others become a liability and
while they might be allowed to hang on in a less critical period, they must be purged in anti-
cipation of military action. The decision to take to the field inevitably throws up numbers of
previously satisfactory cadres who oppose the decision for one reason or another. These are
disciplined by suspension or expulsion: they are rehabilitated if possible, but are always
under a cloud.
Purges are undertaken, in extreme cases, to rid the Party of those opposed to the de-
cision to take military action.
The National Control Commission, the central disciplinary organization, is strengthen-
ed and control commissions are set up on local levels. In Greece, the Party instituted a sys-
tem of "vigilantes" to spot indications of back-sliding and inefficiency in its cadres.
Stricter qualifications for positions of leadership are instituted and readmission to the
Party or to committee positions is made more difficult.
All or part of the Party apparatus is placed underground. This move is made in anti-
cipation of repressive measures which will come as a result of the CP military operations.
In some cases the Party is forced underground as a result of government action, as in Greece.
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The Politburo and other central executive organs are moved from the city to the safe-
base, and many of the members are reassigned to the various regional organizations.
New Party organs are created, such as military staffs and support sections to direct
and control the military operations. In Malaya, Armed Forces Departments were established
in each State Committee. The Min Yuen (People's Movement) was organized. In the Philip-
pines various technical sections were created.
Other Part organs are strengthened and increased in size. In the Philippines the
National Finance Committee and the Regional Finance Committees were placed under close
cadre control. The Organizational Bureau was expanded.
Some Party functional, sections are dissolved to release cadres assigned to these
sections for reassignment to more important functions.
Increased em hasis is placed on Party schools. The cadres have to be trained for
their new tasks. (CP Philippines began training of special cadres to secure the cooperation
of other armed groups who were non-Communist.)
The communications system is strengthened. Courier service is better organized on a
more regular basis. More people are assigned courier duties and regular message centers
and lay-over places are established along courier routes. Plans are sometimes made (Philip-
pines) for getting communications equipment and trained personnel and for establishing a
wireless or land-line net.
50. Vulnerability during transition period. The Party is particularly vulnerable to
counteraction in the period between the making of the decision and the time when its forces
have been mobilized sufficiently for it to undertake a major military operation. The apparatus
of the Party is in flux and its personnel often at loose ends, doing things at which they are still
relative amateurs, and undergoing in most cases severe emotional and/or ideological crises.
The machinery for conducting and supporting military operations is still imcomplete. Its
supplies, particularly of weapons and ammunition, are likely to be limited. The propaganda
build-up and the act of recruiting are necessarily semi-overt, at least locally. Party offices
are physically being moved into the field or to safe-places for underground stay-behind opera-
tions. Party records are destroyed or moved, and are subject to capture or loss in the pro-
cess: it may be difficult for the Party's security apparatus to check the bona fides of new re-
cruits. All these factors provide opportunities for surveillance of functionaries, seizure of
records, penetration, defection, and provocation; An alert security force might very well be
able to squash a colonial insurrection before it had developed, but any action would have to be
thorough and ruthless.
E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY.
51. Recruitment of Communist military forces was simplified for Communist Parties
beginning revolutions after World War II. The nucleus of their military organization was the
wartime resistance movements which had been sponsored by them and equipped and supplied
by the Allies. As new recruits were channelled to the military forces, the Party was able to
seize and maintain a base of operations from which further political-military expansion could
be launched. Thus, there'has been first an army, and then a safe-base. The Chinese Commu-
nists learned their lesson the hard way, by experience. They organized an area by political
means alone and then organized a military force.. Not until the experience of the Long March
and the establishment of the safe-base in Shensi did they begin to utilize systematically their
military force in expansion.
52. The size and structure of the regular units of the Communist Army depends, on the
stage of development of the safe-base and the type of operations being carried out. In the be-
ginning, squads and platoons undertake guerrilla operations on a. small, loosely coordinated
scale. At that time, they live entirely off the countryside with infrequent communications with
each other. As the scale of operations grows, these small units are incorporated into larger
formations, (e.g., regiments and divisions) with regular service elements, coordinating staffs,
and comprehensive communications. As a rule, however, units are kept small, to simplify
supply and to reduce vulnerability to enemy attack.
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Three available examples of post-war colonial Communist armies--Greece, Philip-
pines, Malaya--show how resources and events influence the general organization of the army:
a. Greece. Began with rather large forces (about 10,000), well-equipped, well-'
led, and safely based. Conversion from small-Scale operations by small bands to
tactical employment of Brigades and Divisions early in the struggle. Regression
to guerrilla operations* with unfavorable conditions.
b. Philippines. Began with relatively large force? (about 10,000), already in the
field and presumably adequately equipped. Passed to impressive seizures 'of
towns in apparently battalion strength within seven months of decision and planned
conversion to orthodox ("regular army") operations in near future.
c. Malaya. Began with few forces, not adequately equipped, not fully mobilized,
and with little actual combat experience. Apparently comtemplated ambitious
operations in at least regimental strength at early date. However, unfavorable
conditions forced progressive disintegration of tactical organization and diminish-
ing operations.
53. The troops of the colonial Communist force in the beginning are "regulars" --that
is, they are full-time fighters and are, on the whole, politically "reliable.". As soon as opera-
tions are begun, efforts are made to draw in non-Communist peasants- -first, into political
and support activities, then into part-time or "irregular" fighting formations, and eventually,
into the full-time, "regular" army. Even when the build-up consists of a campaign of terror-
ism, as in Malaya, the first fighting units are select military cadres, and in every case stud-
ied, some kind of irregular fighting groups were formed later.
54. The most important general conditions limiting the size of regular formations
used tactically, and consequently, the organization of the army are:
a. Supplies. If inadequate, operations must be small and aimed at obtaining
(small raids and ambushes). If no supply organization exists, then forces must
spend time foraging and will not be able to concentrate for the time necessary for
careful planning, briefing, and.rehearsal of large operations. Heterogeneous
weapons and necessity to refit ammunition limit firepower and feasibility of large
operations.
b. Enemy tactics. Until final stage (full-scale engagement of enemy), Commu-
nist tactics are n direct 'response to enemy tactics; flight and temporary disin-
tegration at advance of superior enemy; concentration and larger tactical opera-
tions against small enemy forces and areas temporarily free from enemy.
c. Condition of leadership, extent of training; morale of ranks. For example,
the Chinese Communists had great difficulty in solving logistical problems of
large tactical deployment because leaders had been trained in small operations.
d. Terrain. Particularly difficult terrain makes use of large units impossible
or unprofitable.
55. Special and irregular units in the Communist Army are organized for two main
purposes: to serve as training organizations for combat-able men who will eventually be ab-
sorbed by the regular units and to organize non-combatants to give support to the regular
forces, In China, for example, the combat-able persons were organized in Youth Vanguards
and in Model Detachments, and many of them, when trained, were placed in units of the Field
Forces. Self Defense Detachments, made up of older men, and Women's Detachments per-
formed intelligence, medical and protective functions.
In general, the first responsibility of the special and irregular units is to aid the reg-
ular forces in military operations, engaging.. in small battles, diversionary moves, supplying
food, caring for wounded, etc. They also protect Communist Party and front organizations
and installations (Malaya), not only in the safe area, but in areas which have not yet been
secured. They are called upon to carry out occasional acts of terror, such as assassinations,
sabotage and intimidation. They take over local police authority in the early stages of consol-
idation of newly won areas. They also serve to militarize those segments of the population
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which are unqualified for regular military service, thus exerting military control over them,
and insuring their complicity in the Communist operation should there be any doubts concern-
ing their loyalty to the cause.
Formation and control of irregular units is often the responsibility of the local Party
organization in its own name (e.g., the "wide self-defense" groups in Greece), or in the name
of a controlled mass organization (e.g., "Self-Protection" squads of the People's Movement
in Malaya). Sometimes (China), the Party organization in the regular army units organizes
such units.
56. Organization and functions of staffs.
The Communist military force consists of tactical formations performing military
operations; and various staffs for planning, coordination and control, and the management of
special support and technical services required for operations.
The character of the military staff--their competence, composition, and relations with
the Party political apparatus--varies with the actual situation as it is reflected in the "phases"
of the insurrection. In the early stages, when the military force is being accumulated and is
carrying on operations of a purely guerrilla nature, local staffs, responsible for tactical
formations in a relatively small area and closely connected with corresponding organs of the
Party's political apparatus, are most essential. At this time, whatever central direction may
be given to the military forces is?likely to be quite general, and exercised through the chan-
nels of the political apparatus. The Secretariat of the CP Philippines, for example, took over
the problems of centralized direction of HMB formations, serving as a General Headquarters
for several months after the decision had been made to begin fighting. HMB units were direc-
ted by the Regional Committees of the political apparatus, and the general control over them
exercised by the Secretariat was achieved by courier correspondence and by posting members
of the Political Bureau with the Regional Committees.
Similarly, the Political Bureau of the CP Malaya is believed to have constituted itself
as a "Military High Command," while the State Committees of the political apparatus (through
their Armed Forces Departments) took over the functions of area military staffs.
57. When conditions have permitted the numerical expansion of the military force and
the acquisition of a safe base, or at least, prospects of one, it will be necessary to establish
a firm central directing staff if operations are to progress beyond the guerrilla stage and the
army to be satisfactorily serviced. Then, military operations become more technical and the
military force will have to be reconstituted as a centralized auxiliary of the Party and its di-
rection divorced to a large extent from local organs of the political apparatus.
Conversely, if conditions prevent the expansion of the military force and its utilization
in large-scale operations, direction may remain indefinitely in the hands of local organs of the
political apparatus (cf. Malaya).
58. Central direction of a (military) technical nature is achieved by the creation of a
General Headquarters, comprising a commander-in-chief, chief of staff, and varying numbers
of chiefs for particular staff functions (intelligence, supply, communications, etc.), the estab-
lishment of regular communications, and the regularizing of command channels through the
military service (from General Headquarters through area headquarters to the tactical com-
mand staffs).
The Party may also organize a Military Committee or Commission, or similar body,
at national Party headquarters for political control and coordination between the political and
military (GHQ) programs. Thus the CP Philippines organized a Military Committee of 15
members to coordinate political and military work and to plan for the future reorganization of
the HMB and the creation of its GHQ. There was a substantial overlapping of personnel be-
tween the Military Committee and the GHQ, both being manned by top leaders of the political
apparatus.
59. When a "liberation" government is created, the Communist military force oper-
ates as a nominal agency of the Communist government. Thus the CP Greece organized a
"Supreme War Council of the Democratic Army" in August 1948 to supervise the army's
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General Headquarters. It consisted of ranking Party leaders, and its purpose has been de-
scribed as an effort by the Party to water down the authority of General Markos, who was
Commander in chief of the, army, Minister of War in the "Democratic Government" and head
of the General Headquarters, and who was suspected of Titoist nationalist deviationism. As
first constituted, however, the President of the Supreme War Council was none other than
Markos.
60. The same kind of overlapping of cadres between political and military organs
occurs in the area staffs. It is sometimes difficult to tell where one leaves off and the other
begins. Thus, even in the internal correspondence of the CP Philippines, no consistent at-
tempt was made to distinguish between the (political) Regional Committees and the (military)
Regional Commands, both being designated RECO's. Such a condition is most likely to be en-
countered in the earlier stages of a colonial insurrection, when the military and political.
programs are practically one. Later, as conditions make it feasible to organize the military
forces into a separate and centralized auxiliary, there will be a more clearly defined sep-
aration between area military staffs and local organizations of the political apparatus. The
reversal of this is to be seen in Malaya, where many units of the "regular" MRLA gradually
were detached from any kind of central military direction and put under the local (District)
committees of the political apparatus.
Members of local Party committees are often given military command positions. They
may continue to hold both jobs as long as the military unit stays in the home area.
61. Party Control of the Military Organization.
The establishment of firm control over the actions and loyalties of Communist troops
in colonial insurrections is a difficult task. If the object of military operations is to facilitate
political work in these insurrections, it is also a fact that military operations tend to defeat
the political efforts. A guerrilla force must live off the countryside to a large extent and must
have general public sympathy with it to do so. However, the force is a natural haven for mere
brigands, whose activities, if not controlled with an "iron discipline," will bring discredit to
the Communist movement as a whole, and make it increasingly difficult for the force to obtain
supplies, intelligence, and recruits from the people. The guerrilla life itself tends to breed
indiscipline- -laziness, arrogance, immorality, greed, and disregard not only for life, but also
for property that the Communists may greatly need at a later point in the struggle. It tends
to develop political independence on the part of leaders, and to encourage personal, rather
than organizational loyalties. The meanness of guerrilla life and its dangers; its long periods
of inaction, and the remoteness of victory--all make for unrest in the ranks. This is partly
the reason for the exhortations the Parties make for some kind of operation, no matter how
small, every day.
In addition to the above, and numerous other factors, the Party must establish effective
controls and constantly strive to maintain morale to prevent treachery and suppress dissent-
ers. It must prevent hostile penetration and defections, and cope with cadres who opposed the
policy decision or accepted it with reservations.
62. Cultivation of discipline takes two lines: raising the political loyalty of the troops
through Marxist study and propaganda; and organizing a control-supervisory-tale-bearing
apparatus within the army. The task is the more difficult for the fact that colonial CP's
consist of a mass of political' semi-literates and a very small number of fully indoctrinated
cadres. The control and indoctrination organization must make maximum economical use of
the reliable cadres.
63. It is necessary, of course, to have military specialists in charge of military oper-
ations. But military men are often shaky in their political convictions. The Party tries to
overcome this by indoctrination, but has another solution: the Political. Commissar.
64. The Political Commissar is an agent of the Party's political apparatus, assigned
to a military command to ensure,the political reliability of the military commander and su-
pervise the political indoctrination of the troops.1 He sees to the proper application of orders
1 The institution of the Political Commissar was originated by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917
for the October Revolution and the ensuing civil war. It was used by the Red Army during
World W ar II.
'
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from higher authorities, reports on the military efficiency of the commander and his political
tendencies, and on local conditions affecting the Party's standing and operations, and super-
vises (at least) personnel assignments within the command. He may also be responsible for
local civilian Party organizations in the section of operations of the command, and for mili-
tary security and counter- intelligence.
The Political-Commissar has authority superior to that of the military commander in
all political matters, and may even interfere in purely military matters. The CP Philippines
suggested that, in the final, all-out battle, the Military Commander may take over full control,
but presumably by then the political preparation will have been completed and the military
campaign will be crucial.
According to the size and-shape of the command and availability of cadres, the Politi-
cal Commissar may work alone or with assistants. In Greece and in China, the Political
Commissar had his own staff organization. In the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, for
example, this staff was called a "Political Department" and consisted of five sections--
Organization
Education
People's Movement
Enemy Services (POW's)
Work Against Traitors (Counter-espionage)
The functions of each of the above are described in more detail in China Appendix.
The development of a Political Commissar System is illustrated in the case of the CP
Philippines (q.v.):
Political Bureau members were assigned to supervise the most important Regional
Committees and key headquarters sections (Education, Finance) with the making of
the policy decision. As the struggle developed and Regional cadres became more
competent, it was decided to recall the PB members to staff national headquarters
and to "advance promising personnel boldly." Political Commissars, however,
were to continue to be assigned to military commands until the final battle.
65. When the situation and condition of the army impose a decentralization, the local
Party organization may be expected to assume the control function over a Communist mili-
tary force in the area. This is the reversal of the practice of the Chinese Communists after
the Long March, but it is what seems-to have happened in Malaya. It may be expected in the
beginnings of resistance struggle or insurrection, but if it happens later in the struggle after
a greater centralization had been instituted, it is probably retrograde: the military force is
not being utilized to maximum advantage.
66. Another control practice is the creation of a Party organization within the mili-
tary force. It consists of cells in the lowest units, and is directed through a normal system of.
committees (company, battalion, regimental, etc.), in each case probably responsible to the
Political Commissar.
F. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
67. The Communist military effort in colonial countries can grow only by drawing to
itself popular support. In adverse circumstances, the rebel forces can break down into small
bands capable of foraging for themselves, carrying on operations that require neither commu-
nications with each other nor more intelligence than can be obtained from immediate recon-
naissance.
However, such defensive military tactics are politically sterile. For any advance to be
made, the Communists must produce larger operations by larger units, whereupon problems of
supply, manpower, communications, and intelligence will have to be met by organizations out-
side the military. Therefore the party must organize the civilian population (usually peasants
and villagers) to fulfill these needs, and also, to bring more and more people into the revolu-
tionary movement.
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68. In the safe-base area, practically the entire non-combat population is mobilized
into the fighting force itself, or into support organizations. CP China is probably the best
example of the extensive organization of civilian support groups. The support units of the
Chinese revolution were so well organized that often one individual was a member of more
than one organization. Support functions were concentrated in the Peoples' Militia (although
this organization was also responsible for some combat duties), and included Women's
Groups, Youth Groups, Self Defense Detachments (made up of older--though able-bodied--
men) and were assigned tasks commensurate with their abilities. Specialized groups growing
out of these units were formed, such as the Model Detachments, which were especially capa-
ble members of the youth groups. All of the civilian groups performed many different sup-
port functions: supply, communications, intelligence, medical work, etc. During the Japan-
ese resistance period, the activities of these groups and of the Peoples' Militia were directed
by local People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
69. In Malaya, the various civilian support organizations were grouped under the
Min Yuen (People's Movement). These included the Races Liberation Alliance, Village and
Squatter Area Committees, Peasants Union, Women's Union, and various Anti-British
Leagues and Associations. Organizationally, they were similar to the MCP. The type of
support function expected of each group was, as in China, according to their abilities. The
success of the organizations outside the safe base was, of course, considerably less because
the Communists lacked the coercive hold .on the civilian groups.
70. Most of these organizations existed within the safe base area. In areas outside
the safe-base, organization of "mass" support was achieved by local organs of the political
apparatus, by the political organizers attached to the military force, or by mixed teams, such
as the "expansion" teams of the CP Philippines (political organizers assisted by small armed
detachments).
71. In some cases, it may be profitable for the Party to organize an apparatus for
collecting and bringing money and other supplies from abroad, as the CP Greece did through
its Mutual Aid (EA) and seamen's union (OENO).
72. Manpower. The original military complement is obtained by a mobilization of the
members of the Party, from such still active guerrilla forces as it may have from resistance
warfare (e.g., the Huk in the Philippines), and/or from mobilization of controlled veterans
organizations (Malaya, Greece). The Chinese Communists obtained their original force by
drafting peasants in the name of the soviets which the Party had set up by political means.
73. Later recruits for reinforcement and replacement are obtained by forced mobili-
zation in the safe-base area, by propaganda-recruiting drives in other areas, and by transfer
from the "mass" support organizations.
"mobilization" proclamations issued by the Greek Communist "Democratic Army" promising
punishment for failure to respond). In areas outside the safe-base, roving guerrilla bands
often impress civilian youths or threaten reprisals to villages if the young men refuse to
come out for the insurrection. The Communists also try to get neutral civilians involved in
the movement by degrees, threatening to expose them should they balk at any step. The pea-
sant is forced or awed into giving a little food or making a small money contribution or giving
information on the movements of an enemy troop, and is then drawn more closely into the
work of local "mass" organizations, eventually passing into part-time "self-defense"actions,
and finally, into full-time fighting.
75. The main recruiting function of underground city organizations in enemy areas is
apparently (cf. Philippines) to recruit technical. personnel -- mechanics, drivers, communi-
cations men, medical personnel, automatic and heavy-weapons technicians, etc.
76. Intelligence. The Communist force needs information on enemy movements, iden-
tities of enemy agents, terrain, and popular sentiments for its own defense. It needs infor-
mation on the disposition of enemy forces, character of defenses of enemy installations, lo-
cation of assailable convoys, etc. for its offensive operations. (See Malaya, paragraph 65,
for items considered by the MRLA in planning an attack.)
74. Coercion is common practice. In the safe-base area, it is automatic (see the
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L U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
77. All members of the Party and its mass organizations act as informants. Their
product is channeled through whatever organizational channel may be available. Local
"mass" organizations may even have a particular person charged with collecting and trans-
mitting intelligence items.
78. Secret reporting points may be established into which information obtained by all
sources in a given area is funneled for collation and further transmission. In Greece, such
"Intelligence Centers" were organized and manned by intelligence specialists of the regular
Communist army. In Malaya, "District Information Centers" appear to have been establishes,
by the District Committees of the political apparatus, but a military representative was
stationed at them to transmit information to the nearest Communist army unit.
79. The military force itself produces intelligence by reconnaissance, command ob-
servation, and prisoner interrogation. The extent to which military intelligence is special-
ized depends upon the organizational condition of the Communist force and the magnitude of its
operations. In a centralized army, such as that of the CP Greece, the intelligence function
may be performed by a special service, with intelligence sections an integral feature of the
military staffs, and with intelligence teams attached to combat units (for reconaissance and
prisoner-interrogation).
80. Communications. For lack of technical equipment and trained personnel, the
colonial Communist military force is usually reduced to courier communications.
81. Couriers are frequently recruited from the "mass" organizations, women and
children being favored because they are less likely to excite suspicion.
82. Each political and military organization has its own courier pool. High-ranking
functionaries frequently have their own personal couriers.
83. In Malaya, and probably elsewhere, regular courier runs were organized, with a
chain of safe-resting places and message centers where messages could be delivered or
picked up.
84. Special courier services are frequently organized. The Communist military
staffs in Philippines and Greece included communications sections. In the Philippines, a
special Communications Department of the Party existed before the current uprising and
needed only expansion to make it usable for military operations.
85. Radio and telephone communications are normally beyond the capabilities of
Communist colonial forces. The CP Greece had fairly comprehensive W/T nets (W/T issued
to units down to brigades, and to battalions on special missions). The Chinese Communists
gradually developed extensive W/T and land-line systems. In the beginning of their revolu-
tion, they, had only occasional wireless communications between Juichin and the Central
Committee in Shanghai. The CP Philippines considered the establishment of a wireless net in
1950, one feature of which was a proposal,to plant a Communist in a standard broadcasting
station in Manila: he would broadcast carefully camouflaged coded messages in the course of
his regular announcements.
86. Supply. Supply of food is no great problem in a period of decentralized military
operations. Interdiction of the regular food supply. can hamper the expansion of a Communist
force, but need not mean its defeat, for the guerrillas can live off the countryside to a large
extent. When the tactical formations have been enlarged and are operating away from home,
a regular food supply service becomes essential.
87. Local "mass" organizations furnish supplies of food. See, for example, the
People's Movement in Malaya. Special production, storing, and distribution services may be
organized by the Party or the military force, usually on a local basis. The CP Philippines
planned to create "Production Departments" on a Regional Committee level and it was pro-
posed to organize "Harvest Struggle Committees" in military commands. The Greek Commu-
nists had a regular quartermaster corps, with supply trains running down from Yugoslavia
and supply service elements in tactical formations and a transport service. One of the rea-
sons for the defeat of the Greek uprising was the inability of the Communists to supply their
forces at some distance from the safe base.
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 88. Armaments. An adequate supply of -arms and ammunition is a more difficult pro-
blem for the colonial Communists. They depend to a large extent on what they can capture
from the enemy. As the CP Philippines put it, "our main source of weapons ultimately is
Washington...." In some cases the Party may have appreciable quantities of arms left over
from the anti-Japanese resistance. In Greece, the Party had free access for some time to
weaponp produced in the neighboring satellites. The CP China is expected to provide arms
and ammunition in quantity to the insurgents in Indochina when it can afford to do so, and may
do the same for the Communists in Burma.
89. The Party may be able to buy some arms in the general black market and from
corrupt Government troops. Communists in the Greek Army in the early stages of the in-
surrection there furnished some arms to the guerrillas by deserting with as many weapons as
they could carry. The CP Philippines hoped in the final stages of its revolution to be able to
subvert Government troops and get them to bring over their heavy weapons for the Party.
90. One difficulty is that the colonial Party's arms are of many different sizes and
types. This means that ammunition supply is complicated and Communist fire-power often
very limited. The CP Malaya set up armorers' shops in safe areas where disparate ammuni-
tion could be refitted and weapons repaired. Bombs, mines, and general explosives are also
manufactured by the Communists in safe areas. (The CP Philippines had a Technological
Group of specialists at its. headquarters for the production of such weapons.) The Party is
sometimes able to establish arsenals across the frontier: for example, the Buljkes camp of
the CP Greece; the Viet Minh forces in Indo-China were at one time reported to have had
shops in Thailand.
III. THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
A. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
91. Communist Parties in countries overrun by the Axis during the last War carried
on military and political resistance to the occupation forces. The Communist aims were--
(a) to render maximum assistance to the USSR by harassing her Axis enemies; (b) to strength-
en the Party for the resumption of the class struggle in the postwar period. Tactically and
organizationally, the Communist military resistance was similar to the Communist armed
uprising in colonial countries. The Parties began fighting with limited Party membership and
limited mass support. The Communist aim was to harass the enemy, not to overwhelm him,
or even, in the first stages, to attack his forces directly. Fighting formations were generally
small and were not closely controlled by a central headquarters in their operations. Guerrilla
tactics were used, and safe bases were established where possible.
92. The fighting resistance, begun by small forces, attracted numerous non-Commu-
nists who were moved by patriotism. In some countries, the Communist Party rallied so
many supporters and built up such a good military force that it was able to turn the resistance
struggle into an armed insurrection after the Axis forces had been driven out. In other coun-
tries, although unable to turn immediately to an insurrectionary effort, the Parties emerged
from the resistance with greatly enhanced political prestige and with reserves of trained
fighters who could be used in an insurrection when conditions became favorable.
93. Communist resistance was not exclusively military. The Parties also carried on
political resistance and economic sabotage:
Political resistance: agitation against the enemy; encouraging sabotage of occupation
administration by passive non-cooperation and inhibiting cooperation on the part of
those inclined to submit; stimulating minor political unrest--protest demonstrations,
slow-down movements in production, violation of commodity control procedures.
Economic Sabotage: organization of secret sabotage groups in productive centers,
utilities, etc. to damage equipment, waste materials, cause snarls in production traffic,
produce faulty materials, etc.
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Military Resistance: creation of a military force to make attacks on enemy forces,
installations, and supply lines for purposes of weakening morale of occupation troops;
to make it more difficult to realize full economic and military value of the occupation;
to make it necessary for the enemy to divert forces to militarily unproductive duties,
etc.; aid Allied armies by providing intelligence and limited tactical support.
94. In non-industrial countries, the Parties concentrated largely on military resist-
ance. It was more profitable for them to do so, and terrain and other factors made it possi-
ble to establish and hold the safe-bases necessary to substantial military operations.
95. In industrial countries the Communists divided their efforts among military,
political, and economic resistance, not only because it was most profitable in political terms
and in terms of how much it benefited the USSR, but also, because it was practically impos-
sible to build up and hold areas safe enough and large enough for serious military operations.
96. It is difficult to gauge the actual effectiveness of Communist military resistance.
There is no question but that the military and economic resistance carried out in France was
of considerable help to the Western Allies, but it is impossible to say how much of this was
owing to the Communists. The military resistance of the Soviet Partisans was probably of
even more help to the Red Army: it kept large numbers of German troops busy in protecting
duties, deprived the Germans of a large share of needed agricultural produce, interfered with
German military communications, assisted the intelligence work of the Red Army and other
Soviet agencies, and was of some use in direct tactical support of advancing Red Army forces
when the Germans retreated.
B. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE
97. In the countries where the Party concentrated on military resistance, the bulk of
the Party was put on a military footing and a single or several safe-bases were organized.
Offices of the political apparatus of the Party were transformed into central and area (mili-
tary) staffs. Most of the fighting formations were composed of "regulars" (i.e., full-time
guerrillas).
98. In occupied industrial countries, where military resistance was less exclusively
the form of resistance engaged in, only a portion of the Party was put on a military footing
and the remainder was employed in other forms of resistance action (political action, econo-
mic sabotage). Fighting units were more often made up of "irregulars" (i.e., part-time
fighters).
99. The =Party often carried on military resistance in the name of a "roof" organi-
zation ("liberation front," etc.) which included forces of non-Communist organizations. The
Party tried to get full control of such fronts. When it could not, it was sometimes obliged to
accept general direction from the (non-Communist) headquarters of the organization (Italy),
or it accepted only nominal direction, actually retaining full organizational and operational
independence (e.g., the relationship of the FTPF of the CP France to the National Council of
Resistance).
100. Initial military resistance complements were obtained in the following ways:
a. The Party set up organizing committees in the offices of the political
apparatus to mobilize able Party members: assigned cadres to take command of
military groups, arranged for arming them and sending them into military opera-
tional bases in the countryside (e.g., the "War Commissions" set up by the CP
Yugoslavia on a national and on Regional and District levels).
b. The Party dispatched individual organizers and organizing teams to the field
to take over already existing resistance formations (Greece, Italy).
c. Outside agencies sometimes assisted the Parties to set up and maintain mili-
tary resistance forces:
In the USSR, agents of the Party, Red Army, and State Security services
stayed behind or were sent into occupied areas to organize fighting resistance
units.
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In Malaya, the British and the Party cooperated to organize forces prior to
the Japanese invasion, and the British Army later sent organizing and tech-
nical advisory teams to aid the Communist guerrillas.
101. Some Parties (Yugoslavia, France, Italy) had a mobilizable nucleus of men who
had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Considerable numbers of soldiers and officers of the
state army defeated by the Axis also joined the Communist guerrilla forces in some countries
(Yugoslavia in particular).
102. Parties that had had considerable experience in underground operations (France,
Yugoslavia, Greece) had some advantage over non-Communist organizations in establishing
their first resistance bands. The non-Communists, particularly in France, were more dis-
turbed by the repressive measures taken by the occupying forces. The Communist Party,
which already had workable secret communications lines, contacts, safehouses, and cadres
who know how to work effectively and still preserve their own freedom, was able to establish
active guerrilla bands as soon as its policy made it profitable to do so. On the other hand,
in Italy, where the Party had been thoroughly repressed for years, it had not been able to
preserve its cadres and may have been unable to organize a central resistance staff independ-
ent of non-Communist organizations.
103. Additional recruits were obtained by the organizational and propaganda efforts of
underground political organs of the Party and the political resistance fronts established by it;
by the actions of the fighting units themselves; and by getting control of spontaneously formed
groups and of those organized by non-Communists. The CP France, for example, published
instructions to patriotic youths to form their own groups and carry on actions that would
quickly get the attention of regular FTPF cadres, who would then get in touch with the new
bands. One strong reason why the Party was always anxious to obtain supplies from the
Allies was the fact that adequate armaments and other supplies were a good recruiting argu-
ment.
C. STAFFS
104. The Party created staffs to control and give technical support to the combat for-
mations. Tactical formations had their own command staffs, and staffs were organized on an
area basis also, to coordinate the operations of tactical formations within the area. Staffs
were manned by Party members as far as possible, but non-Communists were also utilized in
tactical command positions, under close political supervision of Party cadres. In countries
where the Party concentrated rather exclusively on military resistance, regular organs (com-
mittees and working offices of committees) of the political apparatus were converted into
military staffs; for example, the Political Bureau, or a part of it, became a General Head-
quarters, while a Regional Committee would transform itself into a regional military staff.
In France, a central Staff and various lower area staffs were organized parallel to the politi-
cal apparatus, which was retained, but independent of it below the Inter-Region (?) level. It is
possible that a similar practice was followed by the Party in other countries where the re-
sistance effort was divided among political, military, and economic resistance activities.
The organizational pattern should not be viewed as having been mechanically applied by the
Party. The political apparatus of the Party continued to exist, trimmed down to underground
operations, in areas held by the enemy even in countries where the military resistance was by
far the most important effort of the Party. Committees of the political apparatus that were
converted to military staff duties were sometimes revamped prior to the conversion, with a
view to the most efficient utilization of specialist cadres: men were assigned and reassigned
according to their talents and the military needs of the moment. Special organizing commit-
tees were sometimes created by higher headquarters of the Party's political apparatus to go
to an area and instruct the area committee in the setting up of military staffs and to super-
vise personnel selections made by the area committee. In at least one case (Philippines), the
headquarters of the military resistance was set up and manned by a regional committee of the
Party, the reason being that that particular regional committee (Central Luzon Committee)
had assumed the leadership of the whole Party when the members of the normal headquarters
organ were arrested by the Japanese.
105. Communist resistance staffs had approximately the same composition as Commu-
nist insurrectionary staffs in colonial countries. Technical services were represented in the
General Headquarters and in lower area staffs, and in the case of large, safely-based forces,
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in higher tactical command staffs (Division, Brigade) as well. Political Commissars were
customarily attached to area and larger tactical command staffs. A typical General Head-
quarters, duplicated in most respects by higher area staffs, would have the following com-
positon:
Commander
Political Commissar
Vice-Commander
Supply Officer
Communications Officer
Intelligence Officer
Ordnance Officer
Administrative Officer
Medical Officer
D. TACTICAL FORMATIONS
106. The size, shape, and articulation of military units used tactically depended upon
particular missions, capabilities of the military resistance as a whole, and the degree to
which the Party concentrated its efforts on the military resistance form. In countries where
military resistance was most important and safe bases had been established, Brigades and
even Divisions were employed. In France, on the other hand, most attacks were made by
squads and platoons. In general, enemy strength being what it was, it was found impractical
to try to use elements larger than a Brigade in a tactical operation. The Hubalahaps of the
CP Philippines, for example, suffered a devastating loss when they concentrated large
numbers in a single area where the Japanese found it profitable to attack in force and to em-
ploy aircraft against them. Even when relatively large units were used in an operation, it was
customary to stick to guerrilla tactics, and the effect was more that of a number of small
units taking part in the operation under fairly loose control, rather than of a closely coordi-
nated action of an orthodox large unit.
107. As in the Communist colonial insurrection, there were both "regular" (full-time)
and "irregular" (part-time) units in the Communist resistance armies. In the FTPF in
France, for example, the "francs-tireurs" were people who lived outwardly peaceful lives in
the villages and towns and who came together on call to carry out operations, returning to
their homes when the mission was completed. The "partisans," on the other hand, were
people who lived in small camps in the woods and who were full-time guerrillas. The Chi-
nese Communists organized both full-time resistance forces and "irregulars" (the People's
Militia, which furnished intelligence to the regular units, did sentry duty, acted as guides and
stretcher bearers for the regulars, and carried out harassing operations against isolated
Japanese strong-points). The seizure and maintenance of a safe base does not mean the end
of recruitment and utilization of irregular forces in areas under full or partial enemy control:
the Yugoslav Partisans continued to raise part-time detachments outside the safe-base area
for harassing operations at the same time that their regular units were making larger attacks
out of the safe base. Irregular units were often organized for defense, as well as support
functions: the SAP's in Italy and the People's Militia in China stood guard while farmers
brought in their crops for the resistance; the Soviet Partisans also organized self-defense
groups. among the peasants for the same purpose. In France, the Party organized armed de-
fense groups within the organizations of the political apparatus itself to protect demonstrators,
secret installations (headquarters, safe houses, printing plants, etc.) in an attempt to relieve
the FTPF military formations of such tasks.
108. Party Control of Tactical Units. The Communists tried to draw as many people as
possible into their military resistance. many cases this meant that the ranks of the tactical
formations were predominantly non-Communist. A control problem existed. Even in coun-
tries where the Party was large, as in France, it has difficulty finding sufficient reliable
cadres to take command assignments. In some countries it was necessary to put non-
Communists in charge of large tactical formations and even on important staffs. Wherever
possible, Communists with military talents or experience were given command assignments,
but sheer military necessity dictated the utilization of able non-Communist military personnel
to the fullest extent.
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109. Control was exercised in the resistance force by the same methods as in the
Communist colonial insurrection: reliable Party members were put in charge of central and
area staffs which perforce? often contained some non-Communists; Political Commissars
were assigned to tactical formations as a check on the military commanders; an effort was
made to indoctrinate the non-Communists in Communist principles. It is interesting to note
that the Communist revolutionary line was deliberately played down in the Soviet Partisans,
while patriotism was played up: this may have been the case in other Communist military
resistance forces also, but probably to a lesser extent.'
110. Local committees of the underground political apparatus of the Party in areas of
resistance: fighting had a share in the direction of resistance formations. Details on this
relationship are lacking, but it is believed that underground political functionaries often as-
signed tactical missions to the resistance formations, took part in operational planning with
the military staffs, and when communications between the latter and higher military head-
quarters were broken, exercised general control over the units (see Soviet Partisans).
111. The tightness of centralized control varied from one country to another. Commu-
nications, availability of Party cadres, and the existence of an underground political apparatus
determined the extent of centralization of control. The development of the Soviet Partisans,
for example, illustrates the variations: they began with small isolated units under the in-
dependent control of individual commanders (Red Army stragglers, "stay-behind" or infil-
trated agents of the Soviet Government or CP); gradually banded together into "Partisan
Unions," which established communications with other groups and with the Soviet authorities
in unoccupied countries, but which did not act as tactical units; eventually came under the
control of a central staff for the Partisan forces, through area staffs set up in unoccupied
sectors of the front; and in the final stages, during the Red Army offensive, were utilized in
direct support of Red Army commands and then incorporated into the Red Army as it swept
forward.
112. Conversely, in Italy, where cadres were scarce and the political apparatus of the
Party within the country sketchy at best, the Communist resistance forces appear to have
been unable to establish a centralized direction under strict Party control and were dependent
upon Allied command-communications nets for their direction.
113. Some provision was undoubtedly made for the coordinated direction of formations
created to handle special assignments (intelligence squads and nets, terror squads, industrial
sabotage groups, etc.). In the FTPF, control of these groups was in the hands of the Political
Commissar of the Inter-Regional FTPF staff. In the Yugoslav Partisans, the underground
organs of the political apparatus in German-held areas controlled such special groups, while
others were directed by the intelligence service of the Partisan organization. In the USSR,
headquarters of several governmental agencies (NKVD, NKGB, NKO) controlled some of them,
while the political apparatus of the Party may have controlled others.
E. ORGANIZATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS
114. The groups organized for special duties were created and controlled by the Com-
munist military resistance organization directly, by underground organs of the political ap-
paratus in enemy-held areas, by auxiliaries and fronts of the Party, and, in the case of the
USSR, by agencies of the government.
The FTPF in France had its own specialist squads (Groupes Speciaux for documenta-
tion, sabotage, assassinations, reinforcements) and services a service for receiving and
caching materiel parachuted by the Allies, an intelligence service, and a technical apparatus
for making and caching materiel).
In Yugoslavia, an intelligence service was set up under the Central Committee of the
Party. It operated in liberated areas as a security service independent of the military formation,
"information centers" within the formations, and sent intelligence teams behind enemy lines.
1 The Vichy Police remarked that many people were involved in Front National activities
without knowing that it was a Communist organization: the same situation may have existed
in the FTPF.
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The Partisan commands also sent reconnaissance teams (five-man groups called "petorkas")
across the lines for tactical intelligence. The underground political apparatus of the Party in
German-held areas also organized small sabotage and terror squads.
In Italy, the terror squads called GAPS's ( ru o Azione Patriotico) were organ-
ized, but it is not known whether they were under the control of nearby partisan (Garibaldi)
formations or some other directing apparatus.
The CP Malaya organized Mobile Killer Squads (LTT's) during the Japanese occupa-
tion, but, as in the case of Italy, it is not known exactly how these terror groups were con-
trolled. (It may be guessed that the underground organizations of the political apparatus con-
trolled them, for the Party had not been suppressed in Malaya to the extent that it had in
Italy, and it had a considerable network of underground Party organizations and fronts from
which to draw recruits and maintain coordinating communications.)
F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS
;115. The Communists organized supporting functions for their military resistance
formations; Intelligence, Communications, Supply.
116. Intelligence. The Communist resistance forces needed tactical information on
the enemy for their own defense and for tactical planning, just as do the insurrectionary
forces in colonial countries. In the case of resistance, however, two additional factors in-
fluenced the extent to which the Communists engaged in and organized intelligence services:
(a) information of no immediate tactical value to the resistance was valuable to the Allies
during the war, and to a certain extent, was systematically obtained and transmitted to them,
(b) in industrial countries, such-as France, the Communist resistance needed economic,
political, administrative, and technological information to carry on rational political. and eco-
nomic resistance operations. For these reasons, extensive intelligence systems were organ-
ized by the resistance armies or other Communist organizations. The Allies sent liaison
teams into many countries to assist the Communist resistance and to receive its intelligence
product.
117. Tactical Intelligence. For the production of purely military tactical intelligence,
the Communis orces organized reconnaissance teams and set up chains of informants in the
countryside and a system of reporting places. The Party tried to "saturate" the area of op-
erations with civilian reporters, utilizing all political organizations at its disposal. For
practical purposes, this sort of intelligence collection for resistance operations was similar
to that in postwar colonial insurrections.
118. Non-tactical Intelligence. For the production of industrial, economic, political,
and strategic military intelligence, the Communists often organized special intelligence serv-
ices, consisting of secret agents and informants in key places. Thus, the People's Commis-
sariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR dispatched agents into enemy-occupied areas to
set up networks for the collection of strategic intelligence. This was in addition to the regu-
lar intelligence service of the Partisan military forces, the "Intelligence Administration" (RU)
of the central Partisan staff and the "Intelligence Sections" (RO's) of lower Partisan staffs
down to Brigade level. The latter produced intelligence of immediate utility, but also furnish-
ed information of value to the higher agencies of the Soviet Government, and this was trans-
mitted by radio and other means across enemy lines to the interested agency.
119. It has been alleged by the French Communists that their resistance intelligence
service ("Service B") furnished strategic intelligence of considerable value to the Allies.
The validity of this claim may be questioned, but it is certainly true that the French Party had
numerous channels open to it for the obtaining of such information. For example, a detailed
"Questionnaire" was prepared by the CP France for information on production and lay-out of
French chemical factories. Party members, sympathizers, members of the political resist-
ance organizations collected such information directly or from their friends, and put it into
Party channels.
120. The Communists had especially favorable opportunities for penetration of state
and enemy agencies during the resistance period, because the Germans had to employ large
numbers of the local people as interpreters and to carry on administrative and policing work.
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The Soviets made considerable use of this situation, sending agents disguised as anti-Soviets
into the various offices of the occupation authority, labor services, production control offices,
etc. The French Communists also achieved some success in this regard: Vichy police re-
cords contain many cases of policemen arrested for Communist activities.
121. In Yugoslavia, the Partisan intelligence service gradually took over political se-
curity functions in liberated areas, and even beolrethe Germans had evacuated the country,
was transformed into a state secret political police organization, later known as OZNA.
122. Communications. Communist resistance forces relied heavily upon couriers for
communications. Regular courier services were organized, either by the political apparatus
or the military force itself. The best supplied organizations had extensive radio and some-
times telephone nets. The Allies provided the equipment for communications abroad with the
liaison teams they despatched to the resistance organizations. The Soviet Partisans had reg-
ular radio communications with each other and with the Partisan staffs on the Soviet side of
the lines. They also sent messages across the line by dog, pigeon, courier, and airplane.
The Communists were sometimes able to capture enemy communications equipment and put
it to use: the Chinese, for example, had radio and land-line networks consisting largely of
captured equipment.
123. Supplies. In "backward" countries, where the Communists concentrated on mili-
tary resistance, they supplied their units in much the same way as they have been doing in
the colonial insurrections: by foraging and contributions (voluntary or extorted) by civilians,
and by capture of enemy supplies. The Allies furnished several of the Communist resistance
organizations by parachute drops and coastal smuggling. The Soviet government even landed
planes loaded with all sorts of supplies (ordnance, technical equipment, clothing, morale-
building items) in Partisan-held areas in the USSR. In some cases, the resistance forces
obtained weapons and other supplies abandoned by the defeated state armies (the British in
Malaya, the Americans in the Philippines).
124. It was customary for the Communists to set up secret weapons - producing and
repair shops. In backward countries, these were located within the safe-base area. In
France, the FTPF had special groups responsible for making arms, explosives, etc. in safe
houses and for caching them. The French Communists were also able to get civilian labora-
tories to secretly manufacture explosives, mines, booby-traps, etc.
G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE STRENGTH
125. The Communist Parties did not neglect to consider the possibilities their resist-
ante forces offered for action when the enemy should be defeated. In Yugoslavia, Greece,
Philippines, and the USSR, the Communist forces began military attacks on anti-Communist
resistance forces even before the Axis troops had been driven out of the country. In some
cases, these operations were comparatively small; in others, they represented clear attempts
by, the Party to leave itself an open field for a revolution, and were quite bloody. The Yugo-
slav Partisans, backed up by the Soviet Army, were able to complete this monopolization of
military power and to take over the government. The Greek resistance force (ELAS) also
systematically began to attack rival resistance organizations before the liberation, and was in
an excellent position to seize the government power when the Germans evacuated: such an
attempt was made shortly after the liberation, but was, frustrated by the forceful presence
and action of British troops.
126., During the liberation campaign, many of the Parties tried to complement their
regular military resistance operations by creating "people's militia" which were intended to
seize local civil administrations as soon as the enemy had abandoned them. In most countries
these Party-inspired, self-appointed police carried on brutal reprisals against people who had
collaborated with the enemy, or whom the Communists considered dangerous and therefore
'liquidated under the pretex of "collaborationism." In some countries, the Communist attempts
were quickly frustrated as Allied forces moved in in strength and liquidated the local admini-
strations. , The forces liberating Paris encountered difficulties with the Communist "militia'
that would have been much more serious had it not been for the fact that the Allied military
campaign had been so rapid and the Communist unable to make adequate preparations, and
that the non-Communist resistance organizations managed to command sufficient public sup-
port.
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127. As in Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communists resumed their revolutionary campaign
successfully when the enemy had been driven out. In China, the occupation of Manchuria by
Soviet forces checked the possibility of the Nationalist Government's re-occupying that area
and gave the Communists a decisive material advantage in the ensuing revolutionary cam-
paign.
128. In countries where the Communist resistance forces were faced with Allied oc-
cupation, rather than Soviet, the Parties did what they could to preserve their military
strength for possible future use in revolution. The CP Philippines managed to retain the
cadres of its Hukbalahap in small guerrilla bands in the mountains. The CP Greece, having
failed in its insurrection following the liberation, began shipping as many of its resistance
fighters as possible to camps established in the mountains and in the neighboring "New De-
mocracies." In France, Italy, and Malaya, the Parties enrolled as many of its fighters as
possible in controlled veterans' associations. Wherever possible, the Communists hid their
best arms away for future use.
129. The resistance veterans' associations represent a major portion of the Commu-
nist military reserves. In Malaya, the association was utilized by the Party to mobilize the
forces for the insurrection that began in 1948. In Italy, the Party-controlled veterans asso-
ciation, ANPI, has been a major factor in the general political strength of the Party; has been
utilized to spark Communist demonstrations, and its offices have been used as contact places
for Communist strong-arm elements. The local para-military organizations, such as the
Garibaldi Clubs, that made their existence felt during the unrest following the elections of
1948 and the attempted assassination of Togliatti, were recruited from ANPI members, and
ANPI may be used systematically as cover for their activities.
H. USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR.
130. The pattern of organization for Communist resistance forces has been followed in
the use of Communist guerrilla units in South Korea. To their use, however, has been added
another function: support of an invading Communist army. In deployment they most closely
resemble the resistance operations of the Chinese Communist Party, which is natural, in view
of the probable training of Korean Communists with the CCP forces. It has been estimated
that a cadre of 1700 trained personnel provided the hard core for the South Korean Guerrilla
forces, which in January 1951 reached a peak of 37,500. South Korean guerrilla units can be
classified into four broad categories, according to their functions:
a. specially organized and trained personnel infiltrated individually or as small
units;
b. irregular county and other local volunteer groups;
c. stragglers and remnants of the North Korean Army cut off from the main
body and forced to resort to guerrilla tactics for self-preservation.
d. professional bandit groups.
131. The organization) structure of the guerrilla units is not known in any detail, al-
though, as in all Communist resistance forces, it is probably very flexible. There is some
evidence which indicates the possible existence of a 1st North Korean Guerrilla Corps of
5-10 brigades, each with 10-20 battalions of approximately 100 men each. Other reports iden-
tify three guerrilla brigades (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd).
132. The guerrilla units appear to be subordinated to the regular North Korean Army
units when the latter is in an area in which the guerrillas exist. This is also similar to the
Chinese pattern. Communications are believed to pass from the General Headquarters Staff
of the North Korean People's Army, through the regular North Korean units and to the guer-
rilla groups, although direct communication between the General Headquarters and the guer-
rilla formation is not unusual.
133. In most other respects, the guerrilla operations in South Korea were standard --
their missions and tactics were similar to those in other colonial resistance operations, their
arms supply depended on capture of enemy equipment: as could be expected, only 30-40% of the
forces were equipped with arms, and supplies were either, captured, requisitioned or plundered.
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134. It is significant that immediately prior to the North Korean invasion the activity
of the South Korean guerrillas showed a marked decrease, possibly the result of a "lie-low"
signal from North Korean General Headquarters.
IV. COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION
135. Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolutions. The Communist
revolution in an advanced industrial country differs radically from the revolution in a colonial
country:
a. The class on which the Party depends for the mass of the revolution is the
class of city workers (proletariat).
b. The regime in industrial countries is technically much stronger than in colo-
nial countries: it possesses strong, maneuverable, and experienced military
forces and a comprehensive police system; it commands transport and communi-
cations facilities and can swiftly shift its forces about to squash uprisings as they
occur.
c. For these reasons, the strategy of the Communists in advanced countries is
the reverse of the colonial strategy: armed action is not undertaken in the be-
ginning of the revolution as a means of expanding the limited political basis, and
weakening the enemy by attrition, but is rather, the climax of a period of political
and organizational preparation.
d. The proletarian revolution consists of, first, the maximal organizational
build-up of the Communist Party and the accumulation of preponderant mass sup-
port; and then, the conversion of this support to an armed uprising,. in which the
places and institutions of power are seized and the regime defeated at once.
136. Success in the armed insurrection depends upon many factors, the most important
being --
a. Favorable "objective conditions;" producing mass support for the Party and
weakening the authority and power of the regime: economic dislocations (unem-
ployment, inflation, disruption of supply system), political frictions (inability of
non-Communist parties to agree on remedies of problems, factionalism within
parties and government), break down of general morale (cynicism, corruption,
defeats in war, continual pressures from abroad).
b. Preponderant political strength of the Communist Party: numerically strong
mass following; or relatively small following, but neutralization of regime's
political support.
c. Extent to which masses are convinced that a real revolution is possible and
are willing to support it (not merely general discontent which could be satisfied
by reforms). This is the measure of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda.
It involves "isolating" and "discrediting" the previously accepted leaders of the
regime and its parties and workers organizations supporting it; "exposing" all of
them as enemies of the workers and as plotting to deprive the workers of their
just rewards; setting up the Party as the only true and consistent champion of the
class; and convincing the workers that only through a revolution can the evils be
abolished.
d. Extent to which the secret Party organization within the government's defen-
sive forces has succeeded in subverting them--in neutralizing them or getting
them to come out in active support of the uprising.
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e. The large number of places (targets of the insurrection) that the Party is
capable of taking in a present-day advanced country. In addition to the above pri-
mary operations, armed groups will have also to carry out many secondary op-
erations in order to get into position to take, and then to hold, the critical objec-
tives (e.g., bridges, key buildings, intersections, etc.). Schematically, the targets
of military insurrectionary operations might be shown as follows:.
+ clryo
GENDARMERIE
?o POST
Posr
ARMY
Y way
Ce hte r
0
AIRFIEaD
o 0
0
POWER
STArIoN -
a
0 0 f r4e o 0
? ? 0
o Telegraph
0 OfP cet
0 0
No
t
0 0
0 P, 0,
0
ARSENA
ARMY
POST
0 0
0
CAP! TAL
ci rv
o KEY 0
0
0 0
POLICE
0
0
0
a
Govdrnmelt
Poi r
+ R iitway
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0
00 0
0
POLICE 0 0
NEWS- +
- - ?PAPki6
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/QCOn~$4y O.6aect//G
0
0 0 0
f . The ability of the Party to activate, deploy and coordinate the hundreds of
operational actions necessary to take and hold all of these objectives. This re-
quires the establishment of a central and many subordinate insurrectionary head-
quarters, involving the services of a large number of well grounded and politically
reliable cadres.
?MOTOR POOL
~.- BANK
? ? n 0
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137. It is difficult to say how the CP weighs these factors relative to each other when
it is making the decision for an insurrection. Outstanding advantage in one respect may per-
mit the Party to go ahead when other advantages are lacking. However, the numerical
strength of the Party is seemingly considered less important than the others: if this were not
so, the CP's France and Italy would probably have carried out insurrectionary attempts in
the postwar period. It is also unlikely that a Party would begin an uprising in these times
without having gone far in the work of subverting the government's defensive forces. If any
generalized conclusion can be drawn, it is that the Party is probably more influenced by the
weakness it sees in the regime (including the effects of systematic subversion by the Com-
munists) than it is by the "revolutionary fervor of the masses" or by the number. of armed
units it is able to muster.
The Party has no magic calculator to produce completely accurate estimates of any of
these factors. Its success rests upon the ability of the top leadership, which makes the de-
cision, which is just as prone to miscalculation as are non-Marxists, and which can fumble a
revolution when the odds are in the Party's favor, or can achieve success against adverse
conditions.
138. The degree to which the Party is able to meet these requirements for success
depends upon the preparations it makes prior to the insurrection. In periods of social stabil-
ity the Party makes long-range general preparations by way of developing its organizational
discipline, giving its cadres practical experience in general mass political and organizing
work (including the handling of large groups of people in demonstrations, etc.), training
specialists in insurrectionary tactics, etc., and by way of planting its organization in places
of strategic and tactical importance to the insurrection (key factories and plants, arsenals,
warehouses, communications centers and facilities, -etc.). When social conditions become
unstable, these long-range preparations begin to pay off: the disciplined apparatus is in a
position to exploit difficulties to best advantage and to organize the workers into revolutionary
formations.
139. Specific practical preparations for the insurrection are made also during the
period of "revolutionary calm" and are stepped up in the period of instability. These include
the selection and assignment of cadres to secret insurrectionary planning and subversion.
staffs and to skeleton military formations. Practical preparations will be discussed in
further detail.
B. ORGANIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT
140. Accumulation of mass support, with emphasis on the workers, is the continuing
occupation of the Party. In a "revolutionary situation, " the organizational groundwork laid
down begins to pay off--the Party organizations in factories and trade unions are able to win
additional workers and are able to get control of workers' organizations. This, however, is
not enough. The success of the insurrection hinges upon the organization of political support
for the CP on the broadest possible basis.
141. To secure maximum support for the uprising, therefore, the Party will make use
of some broad outside (front) organization- -one that musters other classes (peasants, lower
middle class) and that provides the Party with a headquarters that can be set up as a revolu-
tionary government if necessary. It may be an organization already in existence that the
Party has penetrated and got under its control (e.g., the Soviets in Russia), or a front organi-
zation created by the Party in non-revolutionary times, or one especially inverted for the in-
surrection (e.g., the A.N.L. in Brazil, 1935). Through such an organization the CP can at
once broaden and conceal its revolutionary appeal.
The ultimate is the seizure of power in the name of government itself, which is what
happened in Czechoslovakia. (The Party and its controlled central labor union demanded
nationalization of all industries and direct labor participation in the Government. Non-
Communist Ministers made the terrible blunder of resigning in protest, and the Communist
Ministers simply prevented their return and forced substitution of dupes and fellow-travellers.)
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142. Ideally, a usable extra-Party mass organization for the uprising would have these
characteristics:
a. Broad appeal: capable of assimilating wide sections of the population, cutting
across local and class partitions;
b. Appearance of legitimacy: the workers can be convinced that the front is the
rightful authority (e.g., the position of the soviets in Russia in 1917);
c. Strategic coverage: the front commands support in the main cities,. parti-
cularly in the capital;
d. Effective Party control over the headquarters and lower organs of the front;
e. Revolutionary aura: the front orginated in a revolutionary movement (e.g.,
the soviets arose during the February Revolution).
143. Party Control. Establishment of effective Party control over the mass revolu-
tionary organization is done from below or from above; the Party wins control over an al-
ready existing organization or creates one under its initial control. The Bolsheviks, for ex-
ample, got control of the workers' soviets by winning individual factories and being elected
by the workers as representatives to the soviet, first in the workers' districts, and then in
the major cities. The role of the Party during the resistance was very important in many
countries in securing for it control of the workers' organizations (particularly, of the leading
trade union federations in Italy and France).
144. Propaganda Support. The campaign to get control of the mass organization is
supported by the propaganda tactics of the Party. In the period of instability the propaganda
line is revolutionary in two respects; (a) it is fundamentally and clearly hostile to the exist-
ing social system and its government; (b) it is distinctly hostile to the parties and organi-
zations competing with the CP for the workers' allegiance. The attack on the regime consists
of setting up the utopian program of the Party; making demands for "reforms" that are im-
possible under existing conditions or that would lead to the weakening or dereliction of power
by the government, making open demands for a revolution.
The attack on individual rival political parties and their leaders and policies are
aimed at (a) causing them to break with the regime; or (b) to go further to the Right, thereby
"exposing" their "real" anti-labor sentiments; or (c) to make concessions further destructive
of the economy and political stability of the country.
145. Slogans. The propaganda campaign is carried on by the Communist press, by
agitation teams, calling of meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. The appeal is put out In
slogans that have vital appeal to fundamental desires of the workers ("peace," higher wages,
privileges for the workers, lower prices, abolition of wage controls, workers control of in-
dustry, production and distribution, or a greater share in economic decisions etc.)
146. Testing the Mass Temper. During the developing revolutionary situation the
temper of the masses is tested and raised by leading the workers into actions progressively
more challenging to the regime: demonstrations, small strikes, larger strikes, particularly
sit-down strikes, which give the workers a taste of taking a portion of power (property);
armed demonstrations and riots; finally, the general strike.
147. The General Strike. The Party need not specifically call for a general strike, but
it will always produce an equivalent when it tries an insurrection. (The Bolsheviks did not
call a general strike, in 1917, but the effect was the same: the insurrection itself closed
down all the factories). The leader of the CP Germany, Brandler, called off the projected
1923 revolution when he failed to get socialist support for a general strike. The CP Brazil
failed in its 1935 attempt partly because it was unable to produce a widestrike movement.
In tactical terms, a general -strike or its equivalent has the following effects:
a. It brings workers out of plants and into streets: causes confusion, impedes
police action, etc.;
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b. Organized insurrectionary forces are given an opportunity to act on the un-
organized workers, who are at loose ends;
c. Strike action at key plants is used to spark insurrectionary seizure of plants;
d. Strikes give Party a chance to observe government countermeasures (effec-
tiveness and weak spots) in action and make appropriate changes in plans and
organization and in tactics;
148. A general strike movement may be undertaken without positive preponderant
workers control. (See, for example, the October 1950 strike movement of the CP Austria.)
In some cases, a general strike may be called primarily as a test, but with the idea that if it
goes well, the movement will be carried forward to an insurrection. The ability of the Party
to carry the movement just so far, without going over into a premature uprising or without
causing serious setbacks for the revolutionary temper, is dependent upon a variety of factors
(extent of control, general temper, astuteness of CP strike leaders, capabilities of govern-
ment, etc.)
149. The General Task. It is necessary at the time of the uprising to translate the
general mass political support- -expressed in elections, strike movements, demonstrations,
etc.--into military form: the conversion of political organizations into military organizations,
the integration of masses into the skeleton military apparatus of the Party, and arming them.
The process will be described in more detail below.
C. SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT
150. The armed security services of the government are not insulated from the general
situation. The political and organizing work carried on by the Party among the workers is
supplemented by work carried on to defect the soldiers, police, sailors, genarmerie, etc.
from support of the government. It has long been understood by Communist theorists that the
armed. state services will have to be neutralized before the insurrection begins, for the
forces of the workers will be numerically and technically much inferior to those of the state.
The work of neutralizing- -either achieving an actual neutrality of the state arms, or winning
them over to active participation in the insurrection--is achieved by: building up a Party
organization within the services (as in Russia and Brazil) or getting control of the government
offices in charge of them (as in Czechoslovakia).
151. "Military Work." The building up of a Party organization in the armed and secu-
rity services has been a requirement for all Parties for many years. One of the "21 Condi-
tions" for admission to the Comintern specified that the Parties do this work, and later inter-
national resolutions and writings emphasized its importance. It is called "Military work" and
is discussed in some detail in Section V below. The following are, briefly, the essentials:
a. CP's establish an organ to direct penetration and subsequent organization in
the state forces as part of the long-range preparations (i.e., in quite stable times).
This organ is a small, secret body under top Party control and is often calledthe
"military" or "anti-military committee," "commission," "section," or "depart-
ment." The Communist youth organization is sometimes given responsibility for
military work, and always plays some part in it.
b. Organizing work in particular military commands is carried out by Commu-
nists who form secret cells and receive instructions from a responsible for the
work connected with a lower civilian Party committee (i.e., state, regional, city,
etc.);
c. The work of the organization consists of agitation and propaganda aimed at
subverting the loyalty or confidence in the state of maximum numbers of troops.
At the time of the insurrection, where the work has been effective, the Party
organization will seize command of the unit and hold it to the insurrectionary con-
trol or cause mutinies and partial refusals to obey or to carry out anti-revolu-
tionary operations effectively;
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d. the military organization may also furnish operational intelligence and arms
to the insurrection and, conversely, deprive loyal defensive forces of their arms.
e. In special circumstances, special non-Communist organizations may already
exist, facilitating the defection of armed services masses in the same way as they
do in the workers' centers (e.g., the fortuitous existence of the unit committees
and soldiers' soviets in Russia.) These special organizations need only be cap-
tured by the CP to become effective instruments of subversion.
f . In periods of enhanced CP prestige and political strength (e.g. CP France in
the immediate post-liberation period) the "subversion" can be carried out openly
through the activities of CP nuclei in armed and security forces, which may be
organized into thinly disguised fronts.
The effectiveness of military work in an insurrection was demonstrated in the Bol-
shevik revolution in Petrograd, where all but 1-2,000 of the city army garrison was neutral-
ized. Inadequate work was demonstrated in the Brazilian uprising of 1935.
152. The effect of penetration and subversion from above was clear in the Prague coup
of 1948: the Army was neutralized by the Minister of Defense, a fellow-traveler; the bulk of
the state police was neutralized, and some units were actually put at the service of the Party,
by the Communist Minister of the Interior.
D. MILITARY PREPARATIONS
153. Preparations for the military conduct of the insurrection consist of-- (a) creation
of planning, tactical coordinating, and service organs; (b) creation, arming, and mobilizing an
insurrectionary force. The latter is discussed further below.
154. Planning Organs. The Party established an organ to make concrete plans for the
insurrectionary operations--for assessing target installations and considering tactical ap-
proaches and requirements for each; for locating assembly places, communications and staff
centers; arms, ammunition, and transport centers, etc. In the early days, this was not done
until a revolutionary situation had already developed and a decision had been made for the
uprising. For example, the plans for the Petrograd insurrection of 1917 were not even begun
to be made until less than a week beforehand; plans for operations in the 1923 German project
were made during the summer, several weeks prior to the target date.
From what evidence is available, it would appear that during recent years plans for
uprisings are being made well in advance. (See, for example, the premature operations car-
ried out in Italy in 1948). Obviously, such plans could not be complete, for the course of actual
events would determine many details; however, the main outlines could easily be worked out.
155. It appears that insurrectionary plans are made by, or in close connection with,
the organ responsible for "military work" (subversion in the state services). Each major city
would require an individual operational plan; what agency of the city Party organization is re-
sponsible for,it is not known. As an hypothesis, the following is offered:
a. A specialist is designated or sent out to each major Party organization to col-
lect data and draw up a tentative operational plan. This would undoubtedly entail
discussions with certain functionaries, such as cadre (personnel) men, leaders of
the city strong-arm squads and veterans' organizations, and leaders of city dis-
trict organizations and trade union functionaries (particularly in industries im-
portant to the success of the insurrection);
b. The tentative plans are sent to national Party headquarters, where they are
considered, compared, criticized, modified by the Military Committee or com-
parable body, and probably sent to the CP Soviet Union for approval of comment.
c. Final approved plans form the basis for stand-by assignment of cadre per-
sonnel to various tactical and support staffs to be mobilized at the time of the up-
rising.
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156. Service Organization. A number of important functions must be provided for in
the operational and organizational planning for the armed uprising: arms procurement, stor-
age, and distribution; communications; transportation; intelligence.
157. The Arms Problem. Procurement, storage, and distribution of weapons in a
country with an effective police force, is a complicated problem. The number and types of
weapons needed depends upon so many factors (number of cities considered vital; number of
target installations in each; size and character of defenses, etc.) that it is impossible to
generalize. Obviously, the Party will want to arm every one of its fighters, but how many
members of a fighting formation must be armed? Can the Party depend upon every man's
furnishing his own weapon? Since this would probably be hazardous, how many weapons must
be cached away for distribution at the beginning of the uprising? Is it better to have small
caches or to have caches large enough to equip a given formation? These are some of the
problems which the CP must consider.
158. Sources of arms are --
a. weapons belonging to individuals;
b. hand-made weapons (demolitions, Molotov Cocktails, etc.);
c. government and commercial stocks seized in the first stages of the uprising
(by assault or from within);
d. disarming of enemy captured in the course of fighting;
e. distribution of weapons from secret Party caches (large quantities were ac-
quired by many CP's during the resistance and were hidden away for future use);
f . theft of weapons by Communist workmen (in warehouses, railroads, arsenals)
and by Communist soldiers.
159. The Italian services have been turning up Communist arms deposits for some
years. Most of the caches have been small (5-20 weapons); others have been large. In several
cases, weapons and ammunition sufficient to equip over a hundred men have been discovered;
many included automatic weapons, and small mortars, and some included disassembled can-
nons.
160. Choice of location of caches depends upon considerations of safety and convenience
of control on the one hand, and of the use to which the weapons will be put on the other. For
example, some of the Italian caches were in factories, for the use of the insurrectionary force
eventually to seize the factory. Other caches have been in various places of safety and con-
venience--in abandoned buildings in the country; in the grounds of a railroad station where the
Communist station master hid them after stealing them from trains passing through.
161. Tactical considerations are undoubtedly important. The Italian authorities, for
example, believe that caches were systematically made in factory grounds in the industrial
areas of the North on the theory that the factories would serve as defensible bastions in an
insurrection; whereas Party military strategists in other areas did not consider it possible
to hold out in the factories and therefore did not establish large factory caches.
162. The CP Germany is the only Party known to have organized arms procurement and
storage on a systematic basis. Plans for the 1923 uprising there included the organization of
special weapons procurement committees in each of the regions of the country. Details of the
implementation of this plan are lacking, but the project sounds very much like the "WUMBOa
(Weapons and Munitions Procurement Office) which existed in the 1920's as a part of the Kip-
penberger "Apparat." It is believed to have had a national chief, a number of regional chiefs,
and under them, local groups in charge of collection and hiding arms.
163. It is generally believed on the basis of evidence so far available, that the arms
problem in the period following the second war is handled locally: small caches entrusted to
reliable Party men in a position to take care of them. If no individual functionary of the re-
gional and national Party headquarters is specifically responsible for arms, it is, however,
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inconceivable that military planners at all levels of the Party would not take a close interest
in data on weapons that will be immediately available from the secret caches.
164. There is always the possibility that arms may be smuggled into the country by
sea or air drop from the USSR or satellites for a Party about to begin an insurrection. There
have always been rumors about such smuggling, and they may be believed by rank and file
Party members--may even be floated by the Party leaders to raise the temperature. Ruth
Fischer (Stalin and German Communism) writes that the ranks of the CP Germany believed
firmly that the Party possessed large hidden stores of arms and that large quantities would
be sent in from Russia for the 1923 uprising. The rumors in this case were empty, and the
more current ones have had no more demonstrated substance: the possibility cannot be en-
tirely dismissed, however. As a tentative conclusion it appears that the USSR would supply
arms only to CP's in adjacent territories, and would supply other CP's only in case of war.
165. Communications. An adequate communications system is essential to the success
of the insurrection: to give the signal for the simultaneous uprising in all of the key cities
and to coordinate operations thereafter.
166. The insurrectionary plan calls for the seizure in the first moments of the uprising
of the principal existing communications--either by assault from outside, or by armed Com-
munists working within them. First targets of attack are telephone exchanges, telegraph
offices, radio transmitters, teletype lines: possession of these will provide the insurrection-
ary headquarters with the means of coordinating all subsequent operations and will also de-
prive the regime of vital service. (Extensive use of radio in present day police and army
would lessen the effect of this to some extent: the government would not be so helpless as it
was in Russia in 1917.)
167. Past failures (Brazil, Germany, and to a certain extent, in Russia) of preparations
for communicating initial operational instructions by couriers and seized facilities show the
importance of having a reliable Party communications system organized ahead of time. At
least, there is some evidence that a CP would organize a W/T network in advance, consisting,
for example, of a headquarters transmitter and a number of regional nets --
Given the current availability of personnel with technical experience and easy access to radio
equipment, such a network would not be difficult for a Party to establish. It would have to be
tested occasionally, but not often and then, for periods short enough to escape locating efforts
by the authorities. Such a network would be of particular value in giving the initial operational
orders and would lessen difficulties arising from delay in seizing existing land-line and radio
centers. It may be questioned, however, that all operations could be adequately handled by a
pre-organized W/T system alone: other facilities would have to be captured.
168. The taking over of standard broadcasting stations and their utilization in issuing
Instructions and propaganda was an important factor in the Prague coup of 1948 and was easily
accomplished by the Communist Minister of Information, who controlled them in the name of
the government. A Communist high up in the post-telegraph-telephone administration (ordi-
narily government-run in Europe) could perform a similar service for the Party.
169. The radio system of air fields would probably be an important target for the in-
surrection. Party members infiltrated into the system could set up a nation-wide communi-
cations network at the service of the Party and could work havoc with air transport by
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sabotaging electronic navigation systems. This could be particularly dangerous in countries
where the government air force uses commercial fields and facilities.
170. It has been reported that one Party has considered the possibility of jamming
government radio nets. It is not known whether the idea has been implemented, or even if it is
feasible.
171. Intelligence. The regular Party organization as a whole is an information-
producing network, and at the time of an uprising all Party members would furnish military
intelligence from direct observation. In addition, various staff headquarters and fighting units
would send out individuals on scouting missions. Also, more "professional" espionage sys-
tems, consisting of secret penetration agents and informants, secure reporting facilities, and
intelligence specialists are organized by many CP's in advanced countries in non-revolutionary
times. These facilities would be of considerable value in an insurrection. Finally, there is
some evidence that the Party at this time makes room in its insurrection plan for the assign-
ment of military intelligence men to the insurrectionary staffs. It is possible that individuals
in key installations are given stand-by assignments to constitute a comprehensive military
intelligence network when the proper time arrives.
172. Transportation will be needed in the uprising. The revolutionary forces will com-
mandeer whatever vehicles they can, and this is one reason why efforts are made to get con-
trol of railroad workers' organizations, street car and bus unions. Advance preparations may
consist of locating and planning the seizure of garages and motor pools, establishing Party
transport services during non-revolutionary times, and convassing Party members to deter-
mine how many vehicles of all types will be available at the time of the insurrection and
making plans for their maximum utilization. The CP Italy, for one, has bought quantities of
motorcycles and registered them in the name of individuals. During the period between the
wars, many European CP's had bicycle and motorcycle clubs, which would be definite assets
in an insurrection.
173. The CP Brazil in 1935 included plans for the seizure of government airplanes, and
even in the more current theories of revolution in that country, now based on the colonial
pattern, importance is laid on the capture of planes--a natural emphasis considering the over-
land transport difficulties in Brazil.
E. THE INSURRECTION
174. In organizational terms, the tasks of the Party are--
a. to mobilize, arm, and deploy the insurrectionary formations at the optimum
time;
b. to establish headquarters where needed for the coordination of operations;
c. to activate the subversion apparatus within the state services.
175. Timing. There is little that can be said about timing beyond the fact that the up-
rising should be begun when Party forces are at peak strength, the workers are most ready
to come out, and the strength and morale of the regime are at low ebb. The CP cannot achieve
a "surprise" insurrection, but it can achieve partial surprise in the matter of the exact date.
A recognizable crisis is desirable, particularly if the Party can wring a claim of self-defense
out of it. Therefore, in both Czechoslovakia and Russia, first action followed a crisis pre-
cipitated by the Party itself. In Czechoslovakia, it was simply a cabinet crisis, ' provoked by
the Party. In Russia, there were several crises, the most important being: first, the engi-
neered refusal of the Petrograd soviet to permit the Government to send garrison troops to'
the Front; second, the systematic usurpation of authority by Bolshevik Commissars sent to
garrison commands and government agencies (utilities, bank, etc.). The latter finally pro-
duced government countermeasures, which the Party was able to seize upon, as "proof' of a
"plot" to overthrow the workers' soviets. The call was made for general mobilization to
"defend" the revolution.
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176. Mobilization of the Party. Party members capable of bearing arms'are organized
into fighting formations, with the exception of the cadres posted to various tactical head-
quarters. Women and others not fit for combat in, the streets are assigned to support func-
tions- -courier, scouting, driving, distributing weapons, agitating, answering telephones, first
aid, etc. Leaders will have been given specific posts- -to take command of a fighting unit, to
lead the workers in a railroad station in its seizure, to work on the staffs, etc. Assembly
points will have been previously designated for the mustering of military formations and they
will be given missions by their commanders upon assembling. (In some cases, it will have
been possible for certain units to have rehearsed their individual operation unobtrusively
beforehand). The signal for the uprising is given in various ways--a radio broadcast, des-
patching of couriers, a telephone call, a pre-arranged signal (e.g., calling of a general strike;
anticipated action of the government; a given date and time).
177. Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters. It is probable that following the
pattern of the Bolshevik Revolution, selected cadres are assigned in advance of the uprising
to establish various headquarters. The national Military Committee or its equivalent is be-
lieved to be the organ that will establish itself as the national "general staff." If a different
organ is created, it will probably include some of the members of the Military Committee,
along with the top political leaders of the Party. In the capital city, the national insurrection-
ary headquarters will probably take over local operations, either working through the Party's
city committee or utilizing it. Comparable headquarters will be set up in every city in which
it is planned to raise a rebellion, and insurrectionary centers will be established in the var-
ious sections of each city, particularly in the workers' districts. These lower headquarters
may consist simply of the city district committees of the Party on a military footing, or a
section of it, and special persons may have been previously designated to take command as is
the case in the national headquarters. Reserve headquarters may be organized to take over
in case the regular headquarters are captured, and field headquarters may be established to
direct particular important operations.
178. Composition of Headquarters. The official account of the Bolshevik Revolution,
which was the model for Communist Revolutions, states that the insurrection in Petrograd
was controlled by a "Party Center" supervising the work of a military general staff embedded
in the revolutionary headquarters of the mass organization (i.e., in the Military Revolutionary
Committee of the Petrograd soviet). It is said that individuals were assigned the following
functions:
"defense,
supply,
communications,
intelligence,
etc."
The "general staff" of the insurrectionary forces of one present-day CP is reported to consist
of --
Chief of Staff
Coordination and Action
Intelligence
Tactics
Materiel
Discipline and Morale
179. Personnel posted to various headquarters will be those most experienced in mili-
tary matters- -graduates of schools in the USSR or at home, ex-resistance leaders and veteran
of the International Brigades in Spain, and Communists with experience in state armies. Spec-
ialists from the USSR may be attached to the "general staff."
180. Representatives of Party headquarters will be posted to tactical formations in the
role of political commissars to supervise the unit commanders.
181. Insurrectionary staffs will be flexible in composition and function, whatever the
formal organization: personnel will be called into carry out duties generated by events, indi-
viduals will be shifted from one job to another and around the various headquarters as need-
ed, casuals will be utilized as they become available.
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182. Fighting Formations. It is accepted Communist doctrine that a full-scale armed
organization is impossible to maintain for a long period in a highly industrialized area. How-
ever, the Party will have at least a skeleton army (commanders and staffs) and in unstable
times may be able to maintain a police force.
Insurrectionary CP's have made use of three types of military forces: the armed
fighting groups of workers and others drawn into the uprising -- that is, military mass for-
mations -- formations of Party members, and subverted units of armed forces and police.
The ability of the Party to organize formations from among the masses depends mostly upon
the degree to which the "objective situation" has deteriorated. In non-revolutionary periods,
the government will be strong enough to prevent or break up any considerable armed groups.
In a developing revolutionary situation, however, it may not be able to do so. In Russia, the
Party found already at hand primitively organized bands of factory militia, which had grown
up on the workers' initiative during the February "bourgeois" revolution. By its organizing
and propaganda work in the factories, the Bolshevik Party gradually got control of the factory
detachments, which had a semi-official position, and developed them into a formidable fight-
ing organization under reasonably good central control. In addition to these "Red Guards" of
the Party controlled soviet, in some places, the Bolshevik Party organized detachments of
Party members. Finally, in the uprising in Petrograd, the Bolshevised units of the garrison
and the Baltic fleet joined with the workers' Red Guard.
183. The CP Germany also had made factory detachments (Red Hundreds) and "shock
troops" made up of Party members for the uprising of 1923. The CP Czechoslovakia had
factory detachments (workers' militia) and also, controlled units of the state police for the
1948 coup.
184. Communist Parties customarily have a semi-military organization for routine
defensive and occasional strong-arm duties even in non-revolutionary times. It consists of
small, partially armed groups of militants, in most cases under the control of local Party
committees (city or city district). Such groups can be the nucleus for the formation of an ex-
panding fighting organization in a developing revolutionary situation.
185. Size of formations. The Red Guard of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd was organized
on a factory basis, with "tens", squads (4"tens"), companies, (3 squads), battalions (3 com-
panies), and divisions (all the battalions in a district of the city). Most operations were car-
ried out by squads and companies, that is, by units of from 40 to 120 men. The final, big
operation, seizure of the government headquarters, was carried out by all available forces.
The Red Hundreds of the CP Germany in 1923 were also organized on a factory basis
and consisted of tens and the Hundred. Each Hundred took the name of the factory in which it
was based.
186. Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus. Subverted sections of the
state armed services are held in neutrality by their Communist organizers or are drawn
actively into the insurrection on the Communist side. The signal to act is given them by
whichever organ of the Party is responsible for military work. In Russia units were formed
out of subverted garrison regiments; the night before fighting began, the Party Organizer
called upon the Bolshevik leader of the Baltic sailors to pick 1500 reliable men and send them
to Petrograd to help the insurrection. Mobilizing orders may be taken to the units by special
.representatives of the Party headquarters (e.g., Political Commissars), who then supervise
operations undertaken by the subverted units. It was declared by the Bolsheviks that such
units were most effective when used in conjunction with workers' detachments. Mobilization
may also be achieved by direct orders from Communist agents in the command ranks of the
army or police (e.g., in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Minister of Interior despatched sev-
eral police regiments to Prague to help the insurrectionary coup there.)
187. Current Preparedness. It is difficult to judge how much of a paramilitary organi-
zation the CP's of Western Europe, particularly of France and Italy, have at this time.
Following the war, the press was full of stories about the existence in Italy of a great
Communist military organization, ready to go and with immediate access to adequate arms.
It appears now that these stories were based simply on the overt existence of former Commu-
nist resistance formations (Garibaldi formations) throughout the country and affiliated with the
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general Partisans Association, ANPI. Undoubtedly, however, the Communist veterans move-
ment is a pool of experienced fighters, many of whom could be recruited into Communist in-
surrectionary forces, and a cover for secret skeleton staffs.
In addition to the resistance veterans organizations, the CP Italy had actually organi-
ized in many places small strong-arm formations, with access to arms and under the control
of local Party committees. These were actually the nearest thing the Party had to a going
military apparatus, so far as concrete evidence goes.
188. Similar stories were circulated in France, based on the existence of the Commu-
nist resistance veterans and some other veterans groups under Party influence. Again,
evidence points merely toward the existence of skeleton staffs.
189. It is probable that skeleton military organizations for insurrection (with or with-
out concurrent Soviet military aggression) exists in both Italy and France and perhaps also in
other countries in Western Europe on the following lines:
a) secret military committees at national and federation levels of the Party and
of lower tactical command staffs (battalion, company, platoon);
b) individual Communists given assignments to take command of forces raised
in various places at the time of an uprising;
c) nuclei of special Party formations within the framework of the veterans or-
ganizations: these to mobilize and lead as many individual members of the or-
ganizations as possible at the proper time;
d) secret weapons caches to be put at the disposal of the formations;
e) local mobilization plans (designation of assembly, points, assignment of
missions to select, reliable, future unit commanders);
f) plans for expansion of strong-arm "self-defense" groups.
190. City revolutions on the Bolshevik model have become increasingly difficult to
execute. The complexities of the modern bureaucratic state makes seizure of power by a
small group of militants difficult. The technological advances of the coercive forces of the
state in firepower, mobility, and communications make it difficult to defeat detachments of
the police and the army. Furthermore, simultaneous uprisings in all major cities is a neces-
sity -- any city left in the hands of the government can be turned into a seat of government in
a relatively short time. In effect,, Communist strength in all areas will have to be much
greater than the Bolshevik strength in 1917, with correspondingly high capabilities for simul-
taneous and coordinated action. To what extent the military potential of Western European
Parties may be nurtured for the contingencies of an East-West war rather than for an in-
surrection, is an open question at this time.
V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES.
191. Purpose of Penetration. The military forces created by the Communists in re-
volutionary operations are augmented by attempts to neutralize and win over elements of the
armed forces opposing them. The coercive forces of the state represent the most powerful
potential enemy of the CP in a revolutionary situation. It is from the beginning the most im-
portant target for penetration and subversion, even in periods of revolutionary calm. Pene-
tration operations are carried out by the Party whether it is a colonial revolution, a resistance
operation or a city insurrection. The character of the city insurrection, however, makes it
absolutely essential that the penetration and subversion be successful, which means a greater
preoccupation of the Party apparatus with this task.
192. Party Organization for Penetration. When the Party is small and the penetrations
are few, such work may be conducted on a decentralized basis -- local Party.: organizations
such as District and Regional Committees have control of the penetrations as a routine matter.
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However, as the size of the operation increases or as the chances of revolution or war in-
crease, the operation is centralized in a Military Committee, an organ of the Central Com-
mittee of the Party (see above para. 151.). Broadly, the work of the Military Committee (or
Commission) is as follows:
a. Secret, high level penetrations of the armed forces and police and the govern-
ment organs controlling them. Direction of Party members making the pene-
trations.
b. Recruitment of members of the armed forces and police, sometimes secretly,
sometimes openly, depending on the local conditions. This is supported by a
propaganda campaign aimed at attracting supporters.
c. Organization of veterans groups, sporting clubs, etc. as para-military re-
serves of the Party. Attempts to gain control of non-Communist organizations
with military potential.
d. Creation of armed detachments of Party members and supporters insofar as
security will allow.
e. Study of military questions in general for use of other sections of the Party.
f . Planning of military operations for the Party, including long range plans for
insurrection.
g. Formulation of the Party line and advice to the Party press on military
matters.
While the penetration operations mounted by the Communist Party against the coercive force
of the state are primarily designed to increase the military potential of the Party either by
winning over whole units of the armed forces or by so demoralizing the members of the forces
so that they are incapable of taking strong action against the Party-instigated insurrection,
the Party also utilitizes its penetrations for intelligence purposes, both for itself and the USSR.
A summary of some of the cases of Communist penetration and subversion of the armed forces
will illustrate these points.
193. The Bolshevik Penetration Operations. The classical example of the penetration
and mass subversion of the coercive forces of the state is, of course, the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion of 1917. The subversion of one Petrograd garrison (depriving the Government of all but
1-2,000 garrison troops) was largely responsible for the success of the. Revolution. The basic
units of the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks were the Party cells in garrison and front
line Army units and in the Russian fleets. The directing organization for penetration was first
the Petrograd City Committee but after the March 1917 Revolution, this function was trans-
ferred to the national headquarters. The Party organization for penetration and subversion is
described in more detail in the case study of the Bolshevik Revolution.
194. The pattern of penetration operations of the Bolshevik Revolution, being the com-
pulsory pattern for Communist city insurrections, was followed in every attempted revolution
from that timel, and CP's which were not in advanced revolutionary situations also made con-
stant efforts to penetrate the armed forces and police services, in preparation for an eventual
revolutionary situation.
195. Conditions of membership of the Comintern. Recognition that penetration and sub-
version of the armed forces of the state are a primary task of all Communist parties was
1 The Brazilian Revolution of 1935 relied almost entirely on the Communist ability to pene-
trate and subvert key Army units - a method which proved disastrous. This is discussed
in the Brazilian case study.
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UUNTRUE U. 3. U11 FICIAL6
indicated in the 21 Conditions for membership in the Communist International drawn up at the
Second World Congress in 1920. The fourth condition states:
"Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the
army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization.
Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is nec-
essary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate
in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause,
and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.
196. Early Penetrations by the CP Italy. The illegal CP Italy in 1923 has as one of its
primary targets the penetration of the Fascist Army and Navy. The methods used and the
success of the penetration are not known in detail. The organization of the military forces of
the CP was suspended during the illegal period; however, Party records refer to the necessity
to keep alive and functioning the "directive part of the organization" (the Regional, District,
etc. Committees for military work). A circular dated 7 December 1922 outlines the tasks
and methods for the Communist penetration operation against the Italian Army:
"1. Obtain the entry of able and secure soldiers in places of great confidence.
There they must become masters of every information and data of their immediate
and superior commands in order to refer them to us.
"2. Charge others to lift the exact plans of all the buildings and areas, depots,
which are of military interest. The same must be done for the barracks and
buildings of the public safety, profiting from the fact that often soldiers are assign-
ed for reasons of public safety in the said buildings.
"3. Disseminate the local Communist printed matter, and daily writings and
those leaflets which we will transmit, thus arriving at all the strata of the Army.
"4. Soldier sympathizers must fraternize efficiently with the Royal Guard and the
Carabinieri to knock holes in that sphere, letting our propaganda enter, especially
giving it an economic character..
"5. Take over arms, munitions, explosives, consigning them to our fiduciaries;
favor outside transactions in contraband arms, etc., etc."
197. The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration. In 1925 when the German Commu-
nist Party (KPD) set up an extensive illegal apparat, they createdthe "ZER" (for ZERSETZUNG
"subversion") Section. It was one of the principle sections of the Apparat from 1925 to 1937
although two groups were created as early as 1920, according to Ruth Fischer. The ZER
Section was responsible for neutralization and subversion of the police. Later (in 1932) the
ZER Section was combined with the "Army Section" which up to that time had had similar re-
sponsibilities for the Army.
The ZER Section of the German CP Illegal Apparat carried on a steady propaganda
campaign among the police by written and oral means, made detailed intelligence studies of
their organization and established secret Communist cells within the police forces, constantly
seeking to recruit new policemen for the Party. The "ZER" Section was organized at the local
level into activist groups of from three to six persons, each group being assigned to work ex-
clusively on a single limited target -- a specific police station or dormitory. These groups
worked under strict discipline, and on a clandestine basis, all their members being normally
removed from Party membership on their entrance into this work. It was apparently a rule
that an activist group should be set up for every physical installation normally used by the
police.
198. The methods used by members of the ZER section are typical of penetration opera-
tions by Communist Parties. Police officials were ordinarily first approached through suitable
intermediaries, persons with whom the officials were known to associate. Having inconspicu-
ously obtained an introduction to the target official, the agent then planned his recruitment on
the basis of his personality and political complexion. Sometimes plain talk, sometimes a slow
program of social activity and political discussion, would be needed to convert the prospect.
Amenable officials were guaranteed Party support if they should be discharged or encounter
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any difficulties as a result of their new activities, but at the same time they were firmly
warned of consequences of betraying their mission. As a further precaution, such converted
police officers were usually required to divulge classified police information to tighten the
Party's control over them, and the cultivation of dissipation via drink or prostitutes often
provided the Party with another source of control through threat of blackmail.
199. Anti-Military Committees. As the threat of war increased in the interwar years
and as the military establishments of the capitalist powers grew, the Communists found in-
creasing need to step up their campaign of penetration of the armed forces and the supporting
industrial enterprises. Consequently, at the meeting of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928,
one of the Resolutions passed concerned "The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks
of the Communists." Organizationally, the resolution resulted in the establishment of "Anti-
Military Committees" in Parties where no Military Committees existed, and an increase in
the scope of military work where Military Committees had been formed. The functions of the
Anti-Military Committees as outlined by the resolution were:
1. Concentration on factory and trade union activity in war industries.
2. Anti-war work among the peasantry, who would comprise the bulk of the
military force in a conscription program.
3. Anti-war work among the industrial youth.
4. Anti-war work among women and workingmen's wives.
5. Anti-militarist activity; work in the Army and Navy; work among the re-
cruits and reservists and in bourgeois defense organizations, i.e., penetration and
subversion.
200. A Small Party Penetration Operation. Communist military penetrations are the
most secret of Communist activities. Therefore, details of such operations are not obtainable
in large quantity. However, from evidence obtained from several CP's, it has been possible
to construct a hypothetical case of a small Party penetration operation in the inter-war years.
201. A Comintern agent designated a Party functionary to be responsible for the mili-
tary penetration. He was to set up a Military Committee, with advice from the Youth organi-
zation and the Organization Committee, and was to run the initial penetration. Priority tar-
gets were also designated by the Comintern agent, selected in consultation with staff members
of the Red Army. The Comintern also supplied secret instructions concerning methods of
penetration, security, communications, etc. The national Party functionary then picked sev-
eral Communists who were eligible for military service and instructed them to join the regu-
lar military units: the army, navy and air force; and if possible, to volunteer for service at
one of the three or four priority geographic targets which had been selected by the Comintern.
Targets were strategic military centers, such as port cities, and key industries, shipyards,
etc. The Communist penetration agents were instructed to soft-pedal or to conceal their Com-
munist affiliations and views to prevent detection. Communications was not to be maintained
openly with any Communist headquarters; the soldiers wrote letters to girls with no known
Party affiliation and the girls forwarded the information to the Party. In some cases pseu-
donymns were assigned and information sent directly to a Party address, but in plain envelopes.
202. The first penetrations run by the Party were closely controlled by the Central
Committee. The Party enlistee was given a Party address near the military installation to
which he was to be assigned. This address was to be used only in case of emergency, such as
loss of contact. The Party member was given detailed instructions concerning his objectives
and his conduct, and if more than one Communist were in the same military units, a responsi-
ble would be designated. Agents forwarded intelligence material to headquarters; suggestions
for propaganda capitalizing on soldier grievances were sent and mailing lists compiled for
Party headquarters, which in turn mailed propaganda without revealing how the Party obtained
possession of the name.
203. More open penetrations of the reserve and auxiliary para-military units were
mounted by the Communists. In these, Communists would openly propagandize for the Party
program. They would capitalize on the hardships and inequalities of military service and
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attempt in every way to stir up trouble in the unit and demoralize both officers and men.
Here, recruitment for the Party was an open objective of the Communist agents, in contrast
to the secret penetrations in the regular military organizations.
204. A typical penetration operation was set up as follows:
--------- r -------- ------
r National
Level
Agit Prop
Commission
Military
Commission
f
Advisory Panel
District Directors
Chiefs, Women's Auxiliaries
J Youth Auxiliaries
V
Mails
Propaganda
Direct To
Non-communists
in
Services
Corps
of
Girls
Regional
Committees
(Serve as) Recruiters Open
Recruitment
U of
tc Military Reserve
sir
Secret { 000 000 000
Penetration Army Navy Air Force
and
Auxiliary Para-
Military Units
Youth
Organi-
zations
205. - Penetration during World War II-and Later. The rapid increase in the size of arm-
ies immediately preceeding and following the outbreak of World War U offered the Communists
a good opportunity to increase their penetration operations. However, the suddenness with
which the Parties found themselves engaged in military operations in the case of occupied coun-
tries and the twists and turns of the Party line prior to-the war prevented full exploitation of
their wartime penetration opportunities.
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206. KOSSA. One example of a Party which not only maintained its organization for
penetration and subversion of the armed forces, but expanded it during the war was the Greek
Communist Party. The organization, KOSSA, was of considerable aid to the Greek Party when
it launched its insurrection immediately following the war.
207. KOSSA had its roots in the "Anti-Military Bureau" formed in the mid-1920's under
the Central Committee of OKNE (Communist Youth). It underwent some reorganization prior
to the war, and followed the Greek army-in-exile to Egypt during the Nazi occupation of Greece
although its work then was relegated to second place -- military resistance became more im-
portant.
208. Immediately following the war KOSSA was reorganized and contributed substantially
to the Greek Communist Revolution. Details of its organization during this period can be
found in the Greek case study.
209. In all cases of penetration and subversion of the armed forces, the Communist
Youth organization has played an important role. In Denmark, in 1948, the military activities
of the ANJV (Dutch General Youth Movement) were centralized in a National Military Bureau.
The Military Bureau was assisted by district and sub-district leaders specifically charged
with military work. The Bureau published a newspaper and registered those ANN members
who were called up for military service. In statements drawn up by sub-district officials,
each name was marked with a figure indicating the extent the member in question was deemed
fit for any future political action. The said registration was used to establish relations among
the members being in military service and was the first step towards the formation of cells.
210. The original plan was to make the ANJV members who were to be called up for
military service take a training course beforehand specially arranged to turn them out as
"politically" fit. Owing to lack of trainers, however, this plan had to be abandoned.
211. A National Soldiers Committee also exists in the Danish CP and has as its func-
tions maintaining contact with Party members who are conscripted, and through them to prop-
agandize among non-Communist personnel. This committee has local sub-committees in
various towns.
212. The most successful example of penetration and subversion of not only the armed
forces and police, but of key governmental organs as well, is the Czech coup of 1948. Com-
munist penetration of labor, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Information, and the
Army proved to be of decisive value for the execution of the coup. The organization of the CP
Czechoslovakia to carry out the penetration and subversion is not known, although it is of
major importance as a model for the subversion of the state apparatus of an advanced capital-
ist country.
213. While it is presumed that the CP's in other advanced countries, especially France
and Italy, have well organized and functioning sections to carry out penetrations of the coer-
cive apparatus of the state, few of the details have come to light.
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE CP CHINA
CONTENTS
A. Introduction
B. Early Communist Organization for Military Activities
C. Kiangsi
D. The Anti-Japanese Operations
E. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces During the Ant-Japanese
Resistance
F. Party Organization for Military Activities During the Period of
Anti-Japanese Resistance
G. Service Organizations
H. Tactics
1. The Post-War Period
J. Chart of the Structure for Chinese Communist Party Control of
the Chinese Regular and Irregular Armed Forces Prior to 1944.
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. The Chinese Communist Party was formally organized in 1921. In 1923 negotia-
tions were begun for a Chinese Communist-Kuomintang alliance and were successfully con-
cluded in January 1924. In the autumn of 1923, Soviet advisers, headed by Michael Borodin,
began the work of refashioning the KMT organization and the Cantonese armies after the
Soviet pattern. The KMT was constituted with a Central Committee, a Politbureau, a Secre-
tariat and various Commissions. It also had a Military Commission (corresponding to the
present CCP Central Military Council), which functioned as a directing unit for the Kuomin-
tang armed forces. During this period, the Communists maintained organizational distinction
between their Party and the KMT. As a result, there were identical organs (such as an
Agricultural Commission) in both the CCP and KMT, sometimes headed by the same indivi-
dual (if he happened to be a Communist) with the same staff. However, it was not until early
1925 that the Communists organized their own Military Commission, previously having been
content to advance their aims through the Military Commission of the KMT, in which they
held membership.
2. in July 1927 the alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang ended. The
Communists established themselves in a small area in Kiangsi province and began recruiting
and training their army: Their armed forces were made up of the defected soldiers, units and.
commanders of the Kuomintang and the local peasantry, which had been rather successfully
organized by Mao Tse-tung. Scattered peasant-workers' detachments from the Kuomintang
labor corps had fled to the hills and had independently organized partisan bands. Many of
these elements were fused in 1927 and 1928 and there emerged a number of Red Armies, the
most important being the First Peasants' and Workers' Army formed by Mao Tse-tung. From
1928 to 1930 the Communists gathered strength. Their army numbered 10,000 in 1928; by
1930 it had grown to 62,000.
3. A series of annihilation campaigns was begun against the Communists by the
Kuomintang in 1930. After successfully beating off five attempts to exterminate them in
Kiangsi, the Communists succeeded in escaping and after the Long March bf 68;000 miles
(August 1934 to October 1935), arrived decimated, though not disorganized, in Shensi province
in the northwest. They set up. headquarters in Yenan and remained there recouping their
strength until they began their resistance against the Japanese in 1937.
4. The decision of the Chinese Communists to form a Red Army and establish it in a
safe base in the rural areas was not a decision which was made voluntarily. It grew out of a
number of complex factors, including the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang
Party, the Trotsky-Stalin feud, the inability of the Communists to organize the urban prole-
tariat and the success of Mao Tse-tung in establishing support among the peasantry. Com-
munist strength waned from 1927 to 1930 as a result of successive failures: (1) to seize
power in the cities with an organization based on the urban proletariat (Canton, 1927), (2) to
form peasant-based Red armies to take the cities in the name of the proletariat (Changsha,
1930) and .(3) to realize that continued alliance with the bourgeois elements in the Kuomintang
spelled disaster for the Chinese Communist Party. The minor activities which were carried
out by Mao Tse-tung in the hinterland were at this time the only positive development in the
whole bleak landscape of Chinese Communism. The now highly-touted doctrine of peasant-
protected liberated areas (nearly identical with the heretical recommendations of Trotsky)
developed as a result of the failure of the orthodox (i.e., Stalinist) doctrine.
` 5. The peasant-based Communist insurrectionary army, a feature which the Chinese
Communists were forced to accept out of necessity and desperation, has now become the
model for colonial areas. It represents a sharp contrast (though by no means a contradiction)
to the, doctrine which was being applied in advanced countries (e.g., Germany) at about the
same time. It can be expected that if colonial revolutions in other areas achieve greater
success than they presently have, they will follow rather scrupulously the insurrectionary
strategy and organization of the Chinese Communist Party.
B. EARLY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
6. Within a short time after Kuomintang and Chinese Communist collaboration was
effected, a two-pronged penetration attempt was launched to gain control of the Kuomintang
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for Soviet and Communist purposes. Penetration at the highest levels was achieved by the
influx of Soviet advisers who remodelled the Kuomintang after the CPSU. The Communists,
a short time later, launched their own efforts to penetrate and influence the Kuomintang armed
"forces from below. In March 1925 a Military Committee was set up by the Chinese Communist
Party, primarily to extend penetration of the Kuomintang. A member of the Central Commit-
tee in Shanghai was designated to be responsible for military matters. His chief duty was.
control and expansion of Communist cells in the Kuomintang and guidance of their work among
the non-Communist troops.
7. Although several references have been found indicating the existence of a Military
Section of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Secretary of the informal Military Commit-
tee, Chang Kuo-tao, claims that it was not formalized until after 1931. Whether this is true
is immaterial for this discussion; a portion of the Central Committee was charged with
responsibility for military activities (penetration) in the Kuomintang as early as 1925.
8. Some idea of the early activities of the Military Committee can be obtained from
the documents of the Soviet Military Attache seized by the Shanghai police in April, 1927. One
of these documents gives January 1927 as the date a "Military Section attached to the Provi-
sional Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP" was created. The tasks of the
Section were outlined only generally, falling roughly into two categories: organization of a
Communist Army -- with peasant and worker detachments -- and penetration of the Kuomin-
tang military establishment. Another document dated 3 March 1927, purportedly a transcript
of a meeting of the Military Section, lists eight.persons as attending, although all eight may
not have been permanent members. Five appear to have been Russians. Chou En-lai was
probably one of the Chinese present. At the meeting it was decided to dispatch a request to
the USSR for arms for 3,000 soldiers.
9. Earlier in the year (in January 1927) a meeting of the Central Committee of the
CCP had outlined a program for subversion of the Kuomintang forces. This program not only
indicated the manner of organization of Communists in the "People's Revolutionary Army"
(Kuomintang) but also set up conditions for recruiting soldiers into the Communist ranks.
The pertinent portions of the resolution follow:
"In each corps or separate division, brigade or regiment where there are 10
or mere Communists a separate nucleus may be organized. In small nuclei, the office
of a secretary and in large ones a bureau of three or five members for conducting the
work should be established. Small associations subordinated to the nucleus may be
formed, the number of whose members is not limited. ~?
"Each small association is directly subordinated to the nucleus, and the
associations have no connection among themselves.
"Each nucleus shall establish cbnnection only with the secretary of the local
Party organization and with the section to which it belongs; in relations with other
comrades and committees of the Party strict secrecy is to be observed.
"With regard to the training of Communists in the army, special attention must
be paid to separate individual instruction and to instruction of small associations.
Meetings of the nuclei and of the small associations must not be disclosed in advance.
"The question of recruiting Communists in the army: If possible, the com-
rades in the army must pay due attention to the recruiting of new members. But the
greatest caution is to be observed in this respect. Besides, the increase of the num-
ber of members of the Party is temporarily limited to the intermediate and lower
ranks of commanders and to the most -conscious among them. As regards organization
and instruction in this period of secret work the comrades must have in view only
Party organizations but not organizations of Communist youth."
10. Since the Kuomintang up to 1927 was in organizational appearances essentially a
Communist Party, it is useful to examine what information is available concerning Soviet
groups in the Kuomintang military organization.
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11. Russians from the outset dominated the Kuomintang army. This caused frequent
Chinese expressions of dissatisfaction, mostly because of the type of advice (usually more
political than military) and the incompetence of the Russians in military specialties. When
General Galen was sent from the USSR as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek he reorganized the
Whampoa Military Academy. The chief feature in the reorganization was the introduction of
the political-military system which included the establishment of a Politic .l Committee,
Political Bureau,'and political professors. This system afterwards was applied to the
Chinese Communist army. In general it followed the Soviet Manual for Political Work among
Troops.
12. The paper organization of a Soviet Advisory Group in
the People's Army
(Kuomintang) in 1925 is shown in the following chart. This scheme was submitted to the
Chief of the Soviet Group (Sinani) and bears an "approved" notation.
Chief of the Group
(Sinani)
Political Assistant
(Klimoff )
Secretariat
Interpreters
Copyist
Military Assistant
(Seifulin)
Work Work in Bureau for
among the the Army Studies
population (Schools)
Operation & Intelligence
Organization
Supplies
Sanitation
Inf antry
Artillery
Cavalry
Armored Train
Communications
Others
Aviation
(Paper organization of one Soviet Advisory Group in the
People's Army. First scheme 3rd July 1925. "Approved,
Sinani. ")
13. The following document (of about 1927) indicates that the organization of Soviet
groups in the Kuomintang had not changed substantially from 1925 to 1927. This document
goes into greater detail concerning the placement of Soviet advisers in smaller military units
and generally indicates the chain of command for the Soviet Military Political workers (the
South China Group) in Canton.
"1. The Chief (Soviet) Military Adviser is attached to the National Revolutionary
government and to the Commander in Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. He
is at the same time the Chief of the South China group who directs the whole work of
the group and is responsible for it.
"2. The Chief of the group has two assistants, one of whom is his regular substitute
and at the same time the senior Adviser of the General Staff. The other is the
assistant for political matters and the Senior Adviser of the Political Department of
the National Revolutionary Army.
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R riirity Tnfnrmatinn
"3. Each corps has a Senior Adviser who works according to the instructions which he
receives from the Chief Adviser and who directs the work of the Junior Advisers of
the army and of the Political Advisers, all of whom are subordinate to him.
from
"4. In political matters the Senior Advisers of the corps receive instructions them out
the Senior Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department
through the services of the Political Advisers who are subordinated to them. .
"5. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the Senior
Adviser of the Corps and they carry. out the latter's instructions in their units.
"6. The adviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political
matters."
14. The activity of these groups was apparently directed by the Soviet Military Attache in
Peking. For this purpose the Military Attache set up a Peking Military Center which, in
addition to the Attache, consisted of a representative of the oft he Military Section telligence
Central ofithe
Mission to China a and a representative
CCP.
15: Soon after the Kuomintang- Communist break, Soviet activities and influence in the
Kuomintang were curtailed. However,. Soviet efforts were then more intensively directed
the
toward 'the Chinese
the CCP moved to Kiangsi. Soviet advisers eare highly not known to have been
Central Committee of
with the Chinese Communists during the stay in Yenan.
C. KI ANGSI
16. While the Chinese Communist leadership in Shanghai was attempting to bolster its
waning influence in urban areas, Mao Tse-tung was building up Communist influence in the
peasant areas of Kiangsi. Although soviet areasl of short duration began to emerge in South
China as early as 1927, it was not until November 1931 that the first Soviet (at Juichin,
Kiangsi) was proclaimed. Chou En-lai came from Shanghai for the first meeting which
elected Mao chairman. The Central Committee, which was still in Shanghai in 1931, decided
that the establishment of soviet areas was its most important work. It set up military com-
mittees in every important soviet area. The Secretary of the Politburo of the local Party
organization, two or three of its important members, the provincial secretary, the top mili-
tary commander, the highest commissar and the chief of staff were to form each military
Ch' in
committee. In the Central Soviet,. Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Hsiang Ying,
Po-ku, Liu Po-ch'eng, Wang Chia-hsiang were members and at one time Chou En-lai was
Chairman. Later, Mao was Chairman, while Chu Teh and Chou En-lat were vice-chairmen.
Chang Kuo-t'ao was Chairman of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet Military Committee and
Hsia Hsi was Chairman of the Hunan-West Hupeh. These committees had free and independent
Committee,
on Central
power, except for orders from
measures to strengthen the Chinese Communistlarmed
and appear to have concentrated
forces.
17. Liaison between the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in
Shanghai and the Kiangsi Soviets was sporadic because of the difficulties in communications.
The Central Committee transmitted only general resolutions to the Soviet regime -- no
detailed directives. Some time later (the exact date is not known) the Central Committee
moved to Juichin, but its membership dispersed throughout the Communist-held areas in
South China. The real power of the Communist Party was in the hands of Chen Po-ku who
was then Secretary of the Party and Chou En-lai who was chairman of the Military Committee.
1 Chinese soviet areas were regions controlled by Communist forces where the Communists
had attempted to set up governments patterned after the Soviet Union. Except for advice
given by USSR representatives attached to the Chinese Communist Party in these areas,
Chinese soviets had no connection with the Soviet Union.
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18. The nucleus of the Communist army in the Kiangsi days was the peasant organi-
zation Mao had created in the rural areas. In May 1927 Mao had been elected the first
president of the National Peasant Federation (and dismissed from the Politburo of the CCP
in November 1927 for this activity, regarded as a "deviation"). The Kiangsi Army was
composed of many diverse and unorganized elements. 'So little information during this period
is available concerning the specific organization of the military and its relationship to the
Party, that even tentative conclusions probably are not justified. While the early experiences
and mistakes made by the Communist leadership in its military operations during this period
would shed light on Communist military operations generally, the Kiangsi army should not be
.considered as the prototype for the Chinese Communist army during the anti-Japanese period
or later. The army organization developed as a result of trial and error -- and there were
many errors.
D. THE ANTI-JAPANESE OPERATIONS
19. Next to nothing is known about the Chinese Communist Party development for
military activities during the Yenan Period. The Communists went into Yenan in 1935 a
badly mauled and decimated organization with little or no military potential. Sheer will
power kept them from disintegrating completely. Their forces numbered about 20,000. In
two years of recuperation they became a formidable force and in 1937 by agreement with
Chiang Kai-shek the Red Army was absorbed into the National Army. Only 45,000 Communist
troops were recognized, however, and designations for only three divisions. (115th, 120th and
129th) were given them. Collectively these three divisions formed the Eighth Route Army.
When "Route Army" formations were abolished something like a year later, the Eighth
Route was incorporated into the Eighteenth Group Army.
20. The remainder of the. Red partisan detachments formed the Communist New,
Fourth Army. In 1937 this army totalled 12,000 comprising four detachments. In addition,
it has been estimated that the Communist forces were augmented by the People's Militia
(Min Ping) numbering about 2,200,000. The Central Committee-of the Party remained in
Yenan and directed the operations of the armed fQrces, which were organized along the fol-
lowing lines.
E. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES DURING THE ANTI-JAPANESE
RESISTANCE
21. The armed forces of the Chinese Communists fell into three general categories:
The Field Forces, The Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia.
22. The unit designations of the Chinese Communist armies were fairly orthodox,
although strict standards were not observed for the size or functions of army units. The
squad was the smallest unit. These were organized into platoons, then companies, battalions,
regiments, brigades, divisions, and army or group army directly responsible to General
Headquarters. The command channels of the army were often enmeshed with the govern-
mental and Party organizations -(see chart, ,- J. Border Regiorr Governments were set up
in liberated areas very often by the Military Committees of the local. Party organizations
with subdivisions of Sub-region, Hsien (County), Chia (township) and Village. The provincial
Party organization followed this breakdown.
23. The Field Forces and the Local Forces made up the so-called regular troops of
the Communist army and may be considered the combat troops. The Field Forces were
usually slightly better equipped and trained than the Local Forces. The Field Forces were
moved about from one area to another as the military situation demanded and they generally
wore uniforms.
24. The Local Forces or Guerrilla Army usually confined their operations to particu-
lar (home) areas and wore plain clothes. The Local Forces as well as the Field Forces
received their orders through regular channels of command and both were supplied by regular
supply organs. The personnel of the Local Forces were drawn from the local inhabitants.
These men received the same military and political training as did the members of the field
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forces. They did not regularly engage in civilian productive work.1 The guerrilla forces
were controlled by the commander of a Region. The Commanders of separate guerrilla
detachments besides being responsible to the regional commander were, during the Japanese
War, also accountable to the local People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
The tasks of the Local Forces were threefold: First, to protect the local government person-
nel and assist the civil government in the execution of its duties; second, to protect the
"people's interests" and fight with them when the enemy entered the district; third, to co-
operate with the regulars in local operations.
25. The forms of organization of the guerrillas varied depending upon local conditions
and the tasks to be performed. The units were large or small, and there was no uniformity in
their weapons. Guerrilla units sometimes operated independently of the regulars; but for any
sizeable operation -- such as a frontal attack upon a strong point -- they were required first
to obtain the consent of the local army commander; If an opportunity for surprise action
against a strong point presented itself, they were authorized to attack without orders. The
guerrilla military organization, while based on that of the Field Army, was not quite so rigid.
Their leaders were from their own ranks, subject to the approval of -the Field Army. Except
in moments of emergency, these leaders discussed all plans with the others before orders
were issued.
26. The People's Militia (Min Ping) was composed of men and women throughout
Communist-controlled areas, selected on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance
and initiative. Unlike the two groups of regular forces, they engaged regularly in production
and performed their military duties as the occasion demanded. Every able-bodied Chinese
Communist of either sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who was not a member of the regular
army Field Forces or Local Forces (guerrilla) was a member of the People's Militia. (Most
of the members of the People's Militia were, however, non-Communist volunteers.) During
the Japanese war,.there was at each level of administration (region, district, sub-district,
county, township and village) a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolitions Section, Training Section
and Operations Section, was subordinate to the Communist military commander and the
Political Commissar of the Communist army in the region, district, etc. The People's Com-
mittee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance trained and directed the operations of the follow-
ing four groups which comprised the People's Militia:
27. The Youth Vanguards were made up of inhabitants between 16 and 23 years of age,
Their training consisted of military drill, use of weapons and first aid, as well as political
indoctrination and intelligence work.
28. The Model Detachments were male graduates of the Youth Vanguards. This group
supplied replacements to both the regular army Field Forces and Local Forces. The "local
guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from those who desired particularly
active service, should not be confused with the Local (Guerrilla) Forces above, which were
composed of full-time guerrillas. These groups, as all members of the People's Militia,
engaged. in production in addition to their military duties.
29. Self Defense Detachments were able-bodied, though usually older men who were
not members of any of the other groups. They were organized into small groups whose function
was to protect the homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties and sabotage
about
in the event of Japanese occupations. Other functions included (1) gathering information
the enemy; (2) employing measures to prevent the enemy from gaining information of their
troops, such as stationing sentries at strategic points on the roads and requiring all travellers
In Chinese Communist held areas, where nearly every inhabitant was a member of one or
more organizations of a para-military nature, the distinction between those who followed
their regular civilian pursuits and engaged in military operations only in their spare time
or as the occasion warranted, and those who were full time soldiers is important. The
People's Militia were in the former category, the Field and Local Forces in the latter.
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to present passports signed by competent authority; (3) relaying the wounded from the battle-
field back to the nearest hospital.
30. Women's Detachments consisted of able-bodied women who did not belong to the
Youth Vanguards. Their organization and functions were similar to those of the Self Defense
Detachments.
31. The People's Militia were generally considered as part-time fighters, going into
action only when their own homes and villages were threatened'or -attacked. They provided
the regulars with intelligence and supplied transport and stretcher-bearing services during
action in the vicinity of their own villages. They also acted as guides or messengers when
necessary, although their principal duty during times of inaction was the protection of the
roads and trails. They mounted a sentry service twenty-four hours a day. When the People's
Militia did participate in battle their wounded were given the same treatment as regulars,and
the dependents of casualties were given the same benefits. Special labor exchanges -- some-
times with whole villages as units -- were organized to care for the crops and the fields of
the People's Militia during large-scale operations requiring their absence for long periods.
32. During the period of resistance against the Japanese, the CCP employed the
People's Militia in active support of the regular forces to protect supply lines, for evacuation
of the wounded and in harrassing operations. As a means of escape.from Japanese raiding
forces, village inhabitants and members of the People's Militia constructed elaborate nets
of caves and tunnels. The tunnels, originally devised by individual households to escape
Japanese detection, eventually became elaborate networks within the village and later served
as underground links between villages. They were built with numerous narrow twists and
turns both on the horizontal and vertical planes, making defense a fairly easy matter. The
People's Militia used mine war effectively against the Japanese. In many areas the Japanese
were reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garrisons, since roads and paths were mined
nightly. Mine casings were received from local, primitive ordnance factories and were often
improvised from household utensils or hollowed-out stones. The Militia was also deployed
to tear down and destroy blockade walls, and to fill ditches and moats surrounding Japanese
garrisoned villages. They were instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of
Japanese. They developed special waylaying techniques, such as "sparrow warfare" whereby
they lured Japanese detachments away from their strongpoints attempting to force the detach-
ment to separate, making the smaller groups vulnerable to Communist attacks. They were
often utilized in intelligence operations, planting intelligence agents in Japanese occupied
villages and in many Japanese units.
33. A typical and perhaps theoretical table of organization of a Chinese Communist
Guerrilla Company is shown on the Chart below. It was taken from "Guerrilla Warfare" by
Mao Tse Tung published in 1937.
Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Company
Company Comdr.
Political Officer
Mobile Propaganda
Unit
Executive Officer
1st
Plat
Company Headquarters
Message Section
Administrative Section
1st Aid & Hospital Sec.
Intelligence Section
2nd r3 d
Plat Plat
Squad Squad Squad
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 Approved For Release 1/09/20: CIA-RDP78-02849A0001001%Qpi01-2
ec .leS?awYi~y
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA COMPANY
RANK
Personnel:
Arm
Company Leader
1
Political Officer
pistol
Executive officer'
1
pistol
Company Headquarters
pistol
Message Section Chief
gna
_
ministrative Sec. Ch.
1
rifle
Public Relations
rifle
Dut Personnel
2
-
- -
Barber
1
_ _
Cooks
10
Medical Section Chief
1
Asst.
1
s Nurs ng
-
Intelligence Sec. Ch.
1
rifle
Intelligence
9
HE _e
a oon ea ers
-
rifle
Squad Leaders
a ers
rifle
Nine Squads of ei ht
72
rifle
Total
122
3 Pistols, 96 rifles
NOTES
1. Each squad consists of from nine to eleven men. In case men or arms are not sufficient
the third Platoon may be dispensed with, or one squad organized as company headquarters.
2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of
primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting.
3. If there. is insufficient personnel the medical section is not separately organized. If there
are only two or three medical personnel they may be attached to the administrative section.
4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks any
member of the company may be designated to prepare food.
5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifles. If there are not enough rifles,
each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances and big swords can also be furnished.
The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions
may be assigned platoons it might be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others.
6. The strength of a company at the most may be 180, divided into twelve squads of 11 men
each. The minimum strength of a company may be 82 men divided into six squads of 9 men
each.
F. PARTY ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF
ANTI-JAPANESE RESISTANCE
34. During the period of anti-Japanese resistance, the Central Revolutionary Military
Council (sometimes called the Central Military Council, or just Military Council) was consti-
tuted as an organ of the Central Committee charged with responsibility for general, overall
direction of Communist military operations. An interlocking relationship was set up between
the Central Military Council, the Politburo and the Central Committee through the assignment
of several individuals to sit on all three organs. (Today, for example, of the 80-man Central
Committee (members and alternates) four hold positions on both the Politburo and the Central
Military Council. Mao Tse-tung heads all three,J At least three channels were utilized for
Party control of the military. All three channels were not always employed simultaneously,
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 Approved For -2
? or were they always kept separate and distinct. In the loosely organized guerrilla units, very
often a strong Party man would perform functions which in another area would be allocated to
two or three individuals.
35. Control of strictly military activities originated in the Central Military Council
and went through the general headquarters of either the Communist Army or the People's
Militia to the unit commanders in the field. A good deal of autonomy in military matters was
allowed.
36. High level political control of military units was exercised through the Political
Commissar system, which was employed in all types of forces, regular or irregular. The
Political Commissar (or Political Instructor in the smaller units) headed the Political Work
Organization. Theoretically, his authority was equal to the Commander of the military unit
on each level. In practice his authority usually exceeded that of the Commander. Generally
speaking, the authority of the Political Commissar was not limited, while the military com-
mander of a unit could not interfere in strictly political matters. According to one source
the delineation of responsibilities was as follows:
(1) All military, orders were countersigned by the Political Commissar. Orders of
the Political Departments (probably Political Affairs Committees) were issued inde-
pendently and were not countersigned by the military commander.
(2) Work among the masses, such as propaganda, organization and reconstruction,
was the duty of the political department.
(3) Helping in the establishment and expansion of armed partisan organizations was
the duty of the political department.
(4) In matters of personnel the two branches were independent in operation.
(5) Party expenses were paid by the political department.
(6) The Political Work Organization under the Political Commissar was responsible
for propagandizing, organizing and arming, the masses. It was its responsibility to
insure cooperation between the armed forces and the people.
Generally, the work of the Political Commissar and his organization was along three main
lines: (1) political work among the troops themselves; (2) work of the troops among the
people; (3) work among enemy troops and in enemy, occupied areas. These are discussed
below:
(1) Political work among the troops themselves. In existing companies, schools, and
military organs, they set up political organs to carry on normal political work. In
battalions they set up political guides to direct Party branches in the companies and
political soldiers.
(2) Work among the people. Political work among the people was likewise very broad.
In regions under military control, the Political Commissar first acted for the soviet
governments, mass organizations, local armed forces, etc. After a local government
was set up, all work was carried on in close connection with it, such as cooperation
between civil and military, military supply, recruiting, etc.
(3) Work among enemy troops in enemy-occupied areas. Ordinarily there was an
Enemy Troop Operations Section or Committee. Its work was to disintegrate enemy
troops, propaganda, and secret organizations as well as infiltration and fifth column
activity; it was charged with care of prisoners and secret work among the people and
people's groups in enemy-held areas.
37. The Party maintained its own organization in the military establishment, organiz-
ing Party cells and committees on all levels. In this way it directly controlled the basic
personnel and cadres of the military. Party Affairs Committees existed in the General Head-
quarters of the Field Army as well as in the headquarters of the Military District Forces (the
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local forces) and in the People's Militia. At the head of the Party Affairs Committee was a
secretary with one or two deputies. Party Affairs Committees generally numbered between
seven and fifteen members; the size of the military unit in which they operated was the deter-
mining factor. The Committee's main objective in military units was to expand its member-
ship among the enlisted men of the combat force. The Party Affairs Committees in the armed
forces could control only Party members. They could not directly influence officers and men
who were not Party members.
38. Interlocking control between the Political Work Organization (the Political Com-
missar and staff) and the Party Affairs Committees was usually achieved through appointment
of one individual as Political Commissar and as Secretary of the Party Affairs Committee.
In most military units the high ranking Political Work Organization personnel were largely
Party Affairs Committee members also.
39. The type of political work organization in various Chinese Communist Army units
depended upon the size, composition and activities of the unit concerned. In the most regular
armed force of the Chinese Communists, the 8th Route Army, a fairly formalized political
department existed by 1938. The Political Department of the 8th Route Army (then located in
Shansi province) was headed by Chou En-lai and contained five sections:
Organization
Education
People's Movement
Enemy Service (POW's)
Work Against Traitors (Counter-espionage).
The general functions of the various sections was probably as follows:
40. The Organization Section was apparently largely responsible for political
personnel and the selection and training of cadres. It sent organizers into rural areas, and
had some (although how much is not clear) control over the Political instructors in subordi-
nate army units.
41. The Education Section operated political indoctrination schools and classes as
well as formal schools to teach the illiterate soldiers to read and write. Most of the political
indoctrination was centered in the Anti-Japanese Clubs, which were organized in every army
company.
42. The People's Movement Section was responsible for the- organization of civilians
into semi-military groups to give aid and support to the armed forces. The exact relationship
and delineation of responsibility between this section and the Political Department of the
Headquarters of the People's Militia is not clear. There may have been considerable over-
lapping of activities, in which case the decisions ofti this Section would take precedence over
those of any section in the People's Militia, The People's Movement Section directed such
groups as the People's Self Defense Corps; the Farmer Partisans; the Farmer, Workers,
Student and Teachers Union.
43. The Enemy Services Section was responsible for the housing, feeding and
indoctrination of enemy (Japanese and Kuomintang) POW's. The Chinese Communist practice
was to treat the prisoners well, often providing them with better food than their own soldiers,
to indoctrinate them and, if the POW's desired, to allow them to return to their own lines.
They hoped (and were very often successful) that the well-treated prisoners would encourage
other enemy soldiers to defect.' If the enemy prisoner did not want to return to his own lines,
1 A NEW YORK TIMES dispatch from Korea, 15 February 1951, tells of one case of similar
treatment of UN soldiers by Chinese Communists. Thirty-seven American, British and
South Korean prisoners were allowed to return to their own lines after they had been given
a twenty-day course in Communism, good treatment, good food -- the prisoners got better
food than the Chinese troops themselves -- and instructions to spread a kind word about
Chinese and North Korean intentions in Korea. A few minutes before the released prisoners
took off from enemy positions, they were loaded down with propaganda literature written in
English and Korean.
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he was allowed to remain with the Chinese Communists. He was required to help the Com-
munists in propaganda work, such as by becoming a "shouter" (one who in battle shouts to
the enemy to defect) and in various organizations, such as the Japanese People's Anti-war
Leagues.
44. The Work Against Traitors Section was the counter-espionage organization. No
detailed information concerning its activities has been found.
45. Local governments were set up by the Military Committee and were responsible
to the Military Committee for supplies, health, and for the employing and directing of most
of the men. The basic military organization of the local governments was a self-defense
corps, also known as red guards, which was organized locally; neither officers nor men left
production to assume these duties. From the self-defense corps was chosen a portion to
constitute main body troops. These main body troops on the one hand gradually became
regulars; on the other, they undertook the duty of local fighting and, in large part, the re-
plenishing of the Red Army. They gradually got away from production. In normal times,
the main body of local armed forces undertook defense of soviet areas and relevant border
activities.
G. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
46. The service functions of the Chinese Army were organized casually and informally,
the type and extent of the organization being determined by the needs of the moment. Service
activities were generally oriented to the requirements of the Field Armies with the needs of
the Guerrilla Forces and the People's Militia receiving lower priorities.
47. Communications between units of the Chinese Communist forces were usually
severely limited by a shortage of equipment and trained operating and maintenance personnel.
At the end of the Long March in 1935 the only means of contact the Communist forces had
with the outside world was allegedly a pedal-operated radio transmitter. Previous to that,
sporadic telegraphic contact existed between the Soviets in Kiangsi and between the
Federated Soviet and the Central Committee in Shanghai before the CC moved to Juichin,
Kiangsi. Radio contact also existed between the Soviet Union and Kiangsi Soviet. With the
capture of enemy radio equipment, the Communists gradually built up a communications net,
until in 1944 the 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yenan was in communication with the
various military regional headquarters by radio at least once a day, and radio communications
existed between the Regional Headquarters and the Military Districts, and in some instances
to local regimental headquarters and intelligence stations. In addition to radio, wire com-
munications were used by the army. Field telephones and telephone wire, mostly used for
operational communication, were considered priority materials to be captured from the
Japanese and the Kuomintang.
48. One of the most important factors contributing to the victories of the Chinese
Communists was the completeness of their intelligence. The positions of the Kuomintang
were usually known, the positions of the Red Army, hiding in the hills, were nearly always
unknown. Their success in intelligence was largely the result of wholesale coverage of the
target, rather than skill in methods. Nearly every village inhabitant was a low level inform-
ant of one kind or another, reporting on enemy movements and preparedness. Agents often
penetrated enemy army units and passed information concerning enemy intentions to the
Communists. Peddlers and servants were used by the Communists to obtain access to
Japanese block houses in order to determine the number of soldiers in the fortress, the type
and location of arms -- information required before an attack could be planned. In high
level penetrations especially in the cities, the lack of portable radio equipment often pre-
vented agents from getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.
49. Supplies during the early years of Japanese occupation were augmented by the
Chinese Central Government, who furnished the Communists with some explosives, rifles,
ammunition and grain. This flow was curtailed in 1940 and halted in 1941. Thereafter, the
Communists had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their own efforts.
They fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity of arms, ammunition, medical sup-
plies and other important manufactured and imported supplies was meager. Much of the latter
was obtained as loot from defeated Japanese and Kuomintang units.
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0. 3. Or FICIIALS ONLY
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50. There are few other historical examples of guerrilla hostilities as thoroughly
organized from the military, political and economic point of view as those of the Chinese
Communists. The guerrilla forces of the Communists were clever and adaptable -- quick
to take advantage of any weakness in the enemy military position.
51. Shortage of ammunition had a noticeable effect on Chinese Communist operations.
While the Chinese Communist armies existed as a guerrilla force fighting the Japanese and
the Kuomintang, they fought small engagements of short duration. They avoided use of long
range fire and made extensive use of land mines and grenades.
52. The Staff Procedure when later applied to larger Chinese Communist units was
influenced by the early emphasis on small scale operations. Communist forces had little
experience in logistics. As a result, they were least effective in large-scale, coordinated
action. They attained a high degree of efficiency in independent operations. Their leaders
had courage, initiative and self-reliance. Their troops were highly mobile. They knew the
terrain intimately and used it to best advantage. They were able to improvise with limited
forces and equipment.
53. The Chinese Communist tactics in guerrilla warfare developed primarily as the
result of experience. Few precedents existed for this type of operation and none was directly
applicable to China. Lenin's writings on guerrilla warfare were used as a reference, as well
as. T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) and an early Chinese guerrilla tactician, Sun Tzu. Largely
from experience, partly from study, Mao formulated the general principles for guerrilla
fighting and published some of the conclusions in "The Strategic Problems of Guerrilla War-
fare" in 1937. In this book Mao outlines his strategy for defeating superior enemy forces.
Mobility, he concludes, is the most important atttibute of successful guerrilla forces. The
quick thrust, disguise, physical annihilation of enemy troops and the capture of spoils are the
aims of guerrillas. They must be prepared to fight a protracted war, avoiding the enemy if
possible, never engaging him unless it can be made certain in advance that the engagement is
to the guerrillas' advantage. Mao formulated four slogans:
When the enemy advances, we retreat.
When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them.
When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
When the enemy retreats, we pursue.
54. The objective of the Chinese Communist guerrillas was to pin down as many enemy
troops as possible in, areas of minor military importance. The Japanese tried many counter-
measures against the guerrillas, but none succeeded in stopping the constant harrassment.
Primary targets of the Communist guerrillas were supply lines, supply dumps (to obtain
weapons and ammunition) and weak and isolated enemy garrisons.
55. One account of Communist train-wrecking activities is typical of their operations.
The usual method of placing the explosive charge under the rail was used on a Japanese-
controlled rail line. When the Communists ran out of explosives, they developed a system of
pulling the inner rail spikes, especially where the train tracks curved. The Japanese then
countered by running a light train over the road ahead of the supply train, in an attempt to
locate possible sabotaged areas. The Communists, to conceal the sabotage, carved wooden
spikes, painted them iron color and inserted them in place of the removed spikes. As addi-
tional harrassment, the guerrillas organized "thieving parties." In one case two hundred
farmers were organized to devote two nights a week to anti-Japanese activities. They would,
for example, tear up and hide 10 rails and chop down 28 telegraph poles a night. The Japanese
very often offered rewards for the return of the rails. Those Chinese who earned the rewards
were executed when they returned home.
56. Many more examples of harrassment and weakening of the enemy forces by
Communist irregulars could be cited. Each case, however, was peculiar to local conditions.
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 Approved Fo -2
n
Each represented ingenuity and each was successful because the guerrillas had the organized
support of the local population. The anti-guerrilla measures employed by the Japanese and
Kuomintang -- additional security, mass reprisals, taking of hostages, etc. -- were in most
cases unsuccessful because the Communists had succeeded in enlisting the active support of
the local inhabitants.
I. THE POST-WAR PERIOD
57. After the defeat of the Japanese the Chinese Communists applied the same tactics
against the Kuomintang. As the size of their controlled areas and the strength of their mili-
tary forces increased, their military operations took on a more regular and formal appearance.
To be sure, militia and guerrilla forces were still retained, but the emphasis shifted to the
regular armed forces. Since it was not the intention of this paper to examine the organiza-
tional structure of the regular armies of Communist states (all, of course, more or less
patterned after the Soviet model), this phase of Chinese Communist. military organization has
not been investigated.
14
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 Approved For Release 1'19/09/20: CIA-RDP78-02849A0001001SW01-2
Tung-wei
u-tinges `OCh'eng-tu
LAOS
Ku-yuan
t.
Hankow 4P
S o u r H
CHINA
S E A
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Dairen
PORT AH HLR
NAVAL RASE AREA... s...,_ r. _..
PHILIPPINES
-_25
125
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CIA Reproduction
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PARTY CONTROL OF COMMUNIST FORCE
PRIOR TO 1944
CENTRAL MILITARY
COUNCIL
z
GHO
PEOPLE'S MILITIA
SUB-MILITARY
REGION COM-
MITTEE FOR
RESISTANCE
AGAINST
JAPAN
(POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION
ABOUT THE
SAME AS
18th GROUP
ARMY)
HSIEN
COMMAND
CHU COMMAND
VILLAGE
COMMAND
PEOPLES
MILITIA
UNIT
GHO
COMMUNIST FORCES
WOMEN'S
DETACHMENT
Lf-SELF DEFENSE
1DETACHMENT
LITTLE
VANGUARDS
YOUTH
VANGUARDS
MODEL
DETACHMENTS
SOLDIER'S
MEETING
H ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE
LIAISON
OFFICERS
SOLDIER'S
CLUB
YOUTH
DETACHMENT
SIMILAR POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION AS
FOR DIVISION
CHU
(TOWNSHIP)
OFFICE
VILLAGE CITIZEN'S
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
VILLAGE
GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE
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POLITICAL
COMMISSAR
POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT
I
NEW
4 th ARMY
PARTY
SECRETARY
PARTY
AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE
GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURE
BORDER AREA
COUNCIL
BORDER AREA
GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE
SUPERVISOR'S
OFFICE
ORGANIZATION
EDUCATION
PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENT
ENEMY
SERVICE
WORK
AGAINST
TRAITORS
POLITICAL
COMMISSAR
POLITICAL
WORK
ORGANIZATION
MILITARY
CELLS
PARTY
SECRETARY
HSIEN
COMMITTEE
HSIEN
COUNCIL
PARTY AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
CELLS
BATTALION
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 Approved For Release 9/09/20 : CIA-RDP78-02849A0001001S101-2
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN GREECE 1947-1949
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 Approved For Release "9/09/20 : CIA-RDP78-02849A00010001-2
of W. ". WA L
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP GREECE
A. Introduction
B. Resistance Period
C. Uprising of December 1944
D. Truce: February 1945 - 1947;
E. Uprising of 1947 - 1949
The "Democratic Army"
Origins
The Buljkes.Camp
The Rubig Camp
Recruiting
Organization
Strength
Staffs
Supreme. War Council
General Headquarters
Disposition.
Party Control of the Democratic Army
Organization of Tactical Units
Service Elements and Other Arms
Propaganda
Intelligence
Supply
Role of the Underground Political Apparatus
KKE Organization for Subversion
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE CP GREECE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. During the German occupation of Greece, the CP Greece (KKE) built up a political
and military resistance force. It has twice tried to seize power by force utilizing its resist-
ance army. The attempts were essentially on the pattern of post-war Communist revolutions
in colonial areas of Southeast Asia, but with a number of differences. The most important of
the features that set the attempts of the CP Greece apart from those of the CP's in Southeast
Asia are these:
a. The CP Greece had a larger number of experienced cadres and a more widely
spread organization. Politically, its social basis was not so narrow as that of the CP
Philippines, for example. This may have led to a miscalculation in strategy: an over-
estimate of the "ripeness" of the city proletariat and the consequent adoption of a mili-
tary strategy that was offensive at a time when it should have been primarily defensive.
b. Its military force was more experienced in actual combat than some of the
resistance-born armies in SEA (Philippines and Malaya), which had had little actual
fighting experience.
c. The first attempt, in December 1944, was made against British forces that had
immensely greater, immediately available resources to draw upon than the defense
forces of a typical colonial country in the postwar period.
d. In the second attempt, beginning in 1947, the CP's army was securely anchored on
satellite bases and received generous material support from the satellites (particular-
ly, Yugoslavia and Albania).
e. In both attempts, the CP had to face the consequences of Soviet priority of interest
in its own national welfare at the expense of Communist revolution: in 1945, the Soviets
refused to aid the CP Greece because of (temporary) unreadiness to antagonize Great
Britain; in 1948, they precipitated the break with Tito and thereby deprived the CP
Greece of needed supplies and geographic security.
f. The material and moral resources of the Greek Government were greater than
those of (at least the native) governments of SEA. The tradition of democracy was
strong in Greece; hardly exists in SEA.
g. To this was added the stabilizing effect of direct U.S. aid (Truman Plan), which not
only neutralized the disrupting effects implicit in the strategy of guerrilla campaigns
in colonial countries, but directly enabled the Government to increase the force of its
anti-Communist campaign.
B. RESISTANCE PERIOD
2. When Italian forces invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, the CP Greece (KKE) was
illegal, unpopular, and disorganized. Its leaders were in jail or in exile, and authority rested
with a "Temporary Administration" which was a tool of the Greek Police. The Party's policy
stood at first for resistance to the Italians, but from the beginning of 1941, for non-resistance,
in accord with the international Communist line of the moment.
3. The Italians were driven back, but the Germans came to their aid and occupied
Athens on 27 April 1941. They freed about 300 Communists from prison. One of them,
Georgios Siantos, proceeded to organize a Central Committee.
4. On 21 September, following the German attack on the USSR in June, the KKE
sponsored the formation of a resistance bloc of several political parties and groups called
the National Liberation Front (EAM). The EAM moved progressively under the control of the
KKE. In February 1942, the EAM announced the formation of its own military force, National
Liberation Army (ELAS).
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. 5. ELAS undertook to gather under its leadership a number of independent guerrilla
bands. It was led by a Communist named Velouchiotes, commonly called "Ares." Later, when
ELAS had expanded, command was turned over to Col. Stephanos Seraphes, a regular Greek
Army officer. At peak strength, ELAS is believed to have totaled 133,000, of which 83,000
were under arms, and the remaining 50,000 enrolled in the reserves.
6. The KKE planned to use EAM and its army to establish Communist control over the
country when the Germans had been driven out. This purpose was probably already decided
upon when, in December 1942, a secret "Panhellenic Conference" of the Party declared that
the Party's aim was "to struggle for the liberation of Greece from its slavery;"called for the
formation of a Provisional Government of the EAM groups; and agitated against the anti-
Communist groups "masquerading as resistance organizations."
7. To this end, during 1942, the KKE had consolidated its control over the EAM, and
in 1943, it used ELAS in a campaign against several anti-Communist resistance forces (most
important, EKES; EAO; PAO; EKKA), which it effectively destroyed.
8. On 10 March 1944, EAM created a "Political Committee of National Liberation"
(PEEA), which the KKE planned to have in control of the country when the British arrived.
The "ministers" of PEEA were members of non-Communist EAM organizations, except for
G. Siantos, who was Secretary General of the KKE and was slated for the Ministry of Interior.
The others, while technically non-Communists, were clearly controlled by the Party.
The PEEA was to have capped the organization already begun by the EAM in "liberated
areas," where local EAM committees had formed controlled local governments ("self-
governing committees," "People's Courts," and "National Civil Guard"). However, military
and political exigencies led to the abandonment of PEEA and qualified EAM adherence to the
Government in Exile.
9. The Germans began evacuating Greece on 11 September 1944. Inasmuch as the
KKE wanted to preserve ELAS intact, it made no serious effort to interfere with the evacua-
tion.
10. For two days, from 12 October, when the Germans left Athens, until the 14th,
when the first British contingents arrived, the KKE was in a position to seize power. The
EAM was generally popular and its rivals had been neutralized militarily. Why the Party
failed to seize the opportunity is still not known. Possible reasons are -- (a) it thought the
British forces would be larger than they were and would arrive earlier than they did; (b)
uncertainty of public opinion in Greece and abroad; (c) uncertainty of the reliability of non-
Communists in EAM and- ELAS.
C. UPRISING OF DECEMBER 1944
11. Following the liberation, the EAM refused to disband ELAS, and on 5 December
1944, began fighting the British in Athens. The rebels were quickly driven out of the city.
On 10 January 1945, a KKE conference decided by a large majority to ask for an armistice.
Fighting ceased on 15 January, and the Varkiza Agreement, providing for a general amnesty,
liquidation of ELAS, and the holding of elections, was signed on 12 February.
12. The Party's defeat in this first attempt to seize power by force of arms has been
attributed to the following:
a. failure to get Soviet support;
b. underestimation of the strength and determination of the British forces;
c. alienation of public sympathy by acts of brutality and the taking of hostages;
d. tactical error of beginning the uprising in Athens, where the Party was relatively
weak, rather than in the North, where it was strong (this due to fear of Yugoslav inter-
vention in Macedonia, using the uprising as an excuse to "assist.")
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D. TRUCE: FEBRUARY 1945 - 1947
13. The KKE undertook to rehabilitate itself politically and organizationally. ELAS
was officially dissolved and large, supplies of weapons were surrendered, but other large
arms stocks were concealed in the mountains and cities. During 1945 and 1946 as many
ELASites as possible were sent into camps in the neighboring satellites. Other military
cadres were enrolled in a veterans' organization ("Panhellenic Union of Fighters of the Na-
tional Campaign of Liberation 1941-1945"), the object of which was to ensure at least partial
political control over the ELAS veterans and to serve as a recruiting agency for a future rev-
olutionary army. ELAS veterans who went into the new Greek military, naval, and security
services were encouraged to join a secret Communist auxiliary (KOSSA). Still other military
cadres were enrolled in strong-arm "self-defense" organizations (MLA) of the Party's city
organizations.
14. The decision to engage in peaceful political activities met with resistance on the
part of some of the ELASites. It was necessary to purge a number of them who, like "Ares,"
preferred to continue the armed fight. The 7th Party Congress of October 1945 approved a
number of organizational changes designed to improve discipline. Control Committees were
to be set up at all levels down to the most important city organizations; cadres were instructed
to improve their "vigilance" against back-sliding and penetration by hostile elements; there
was a general weeding-out of incompetent and suspect cadres and stricter membership re-
quirements were laid down for Party committees; many younger cadres who had come up
during the resistance were replaced by pre-war members.
E. UPRISING OF 1947 - 1949
15. The making of the decision to resume fighting, and the events leading up to it are
obscure. It is possible that the preparatory formulations were not themselves precise, and
also, that the decision to fight was drifted into. It is even possible that the strategy to be
adopted -- whether the uprising should be on the pattern of a colonial revolution, a city in-
surrection, or a combination of the two -- was never precisely thought through.
16. During 1945 and 1946, as has been mentioned, a clear attempt was made to pre-
serve as many military cadres as possible. A number of organizational changes were made
late in 1945: lateral contact between organizations at the same level was curtailed; a "vigi-
lante" responsible for security was appointed by each Party headquarters; KKE organizations
in the countryside were dissolved and their members instructed to join the Agrarian Party
(AKE), which was intended to become the Communists' "legal and open" organization should
the KKE'be forced completely underground. Preparation for illegality occurs when the Party
expects either a violent swing to the right in the regime, or when it expects to provoke re-
pression by its own violence. It is impossible at this time to say which of these the KKE ex-
pected in late 1945.
17. In March 1946, the Communists in camps in Yugoslavia began to get regular mili-
tary instruction: they had previously been engaged in labor for the state and their instruction
had been political. Guerrilla bands began operating in the mountains of Greece. The KKE
denied any connection with them, but all during 1946 the MLA ("Self-defense") and other KKE
organizations in the cities recruited for these bands, and Party leaders referred to them with
increasing frequency, as if they were spontaneous uprisings of the people against the intoler-
able oppressions of the "monarchofascist government."
18. It may have been that the KKE hoped to'seize power with the advent of a general
political crisis. To Communist eyes there were definite signs of an approaching crisis and
the decision to take to the field may simply have waited upon events. In September 1946,
despite Communist boycott appeals, a plebiscite returned in favor of the restoration of the
Monarchy. During 1946, despite a number of cabinet crises, the regime did not.fall apart.
On 12 March 1947, President Truman appealed for aid to Greece and Turkey, and the KKE
saw the chances of economic and political ruin in Greece go flickering. The speeches and
writings of Party leaders began to refer to the necessity of forming a "free and democratic
Greece with its own government and its own status. as a state" (Porphyrogenis at a Congress
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of the CP France, 27 June 1947.) During the summer of 1947 the Government arrested
thousands of Communists. By the end of July, the Party declared itself de jure illegal and
began to pull its as yet unexposed cadres underground. The hitherto disavowed guerrilla bands
became the "Democratic Army," and on 16 July began broadcasting over the "Voice of Free
Greece." The two principal party newspapers were suppressed on 18 October, following an
editorial in favor of establishing a "free Greece with its own government" as the only way out
of the intolerable "monarchofascist domination."
19. Meanwhile, what were probably vague promises of assistance by Yugoslavia in the
spring of 1946, .were made more definite during the winter of 1946. On 24 December 1947, the
Communist radio, broadcasting from Yugoslavia, announced the formation of a "Provisional
Democratic Government of Greece" with a full cabinet, all Communists. Markos Vafiades
was Premier and Minister of War. This "Government" probably had its seat at Skoplje in
Yugoslavia, although an unsuccessful attempt was made the next day (25 December) to take
Konitsa, possibly with a view to making it the capital of the insurrectionary regime.
20. The KKE began its second insurrection with an army of about 20,000. Its forces
were well-armed and well-equipped, and they were based safely in the neighboring satellites
and "liberated areas" in the mountains of Macedonia. The KKE also had a secret auxiliary
organization (KOSSA) in the forces of the Government; an extensive underground political
organization in areas controlled by the enemy, and a terrorist organization (MLA) in the main
cities; and mass political organizations (EAM, EA, AKE) and a maritime union (OENO) which
helped to supply it with materials and recruits for the "Democratic Army."
The "Democratic Army"
21. The Democratic Army was built up largely from ex-ELASites sent into camps in
neighboring Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria during 1945 and 1946. Early in 1946, military
organizers were sent into the Greek mountains from these camps, and from Party organiza-
tions in the cities. Guerrilla bands appeared in the spring and summer. General recruiting
began in December 1947, following a mobilization proclamation issued by the Democratic
Army General Headquarters on 30 November. During the summer of 1948, although a rebel
force of about 10,000 men was defeated in the Grammos area and its remnants forced to flee
into Albania, over 15,000 guerrillas continued operations in Greece. In December 1948, the
Greek Army began a campaign which reduced the Democratic Army to scattered units. In
August 1949, a full scale attack was made on the guerrilla stronghold in Vitsi. On the 16th,
the Greek General Staff announced that all organized resistance there had been broken. Two
weeks later, Government forces launched an attack on the Grammos concentrations. By mid-
October, there were fewer than 2,000 guerrillas remaining in Greece', most of the Democratic
Army having fled into Albania and Bulgaria. The 6th Plenum of the CC/KKE decided on 9
October to abandon the military struggle, announcing this decision on the 16th.
22. Origins. The cadre of the Democratic Army consisted of proven KKE and EPON
(Communist youth members, most of them with experience in ELAS during the resistance.
Most of these, and the reserves who were recruited later by local Party and front organiza-
tions, made their way to reception centers and then, to training camps set up in the neighbor-
ing satellite countries, particularly in Yugoslavia. There they were indoctrinated, given mili-
tary training, and equipped, and assigned to temporary formations` that later were sent back
into Greece. Later, in 1947, regular recruit-forwarding systems were set up to channel re-
cruits into the satellite camps or directly to guerrilla bands already operating in the moun-
tains of Greece. During the summer of 1948, general instructions were repeatedly given over
the "Free Greece Radio" to all able Communists and sympathizers to leave the cities for the
guerrilla concentrations.
23. The Buljkes Camp. The main training camp was at Buljkes, in Yugoslavia, a few
miles ;above Novi Sad. The Buljkes Camp was fed by a number of reception centers close by
the frontiers in.A).h-) ania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. As early as May 1945, the reception center
at Koumanovo h dr.'i about 1200 persons in it. Recruits were sent from Kuomanovo to Novi Sad,
where they were joined by others from reception centers at Tetova and elsewhere. When about
4500 recruits had gathered at Novi Sad, they were sent to the main camp at Buljkes.
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24. During 1945, the Buljkes camp served simply as a center where recruits were
assembled, housed, and given political instruction. For purposes of administrative control
and political instruction, the inmates were organized into groups of 130-200. Labor brigades
were organized for work on the Yugoslav railroads, shops, and state farms. Foreign volun-
teers were put into separate brigades.. Reported were a Scandinavian brigade of 120 men, an
Italian brigade of 200-300, and a mixed brigade of 150 French, English, Dutch, Swiss, Ameri-
can, and Indo-Chinese volunteers.
25. Military instruction began in March 1946. A military training school was estab-
lished and the work brigades were given a few weapons for target practice an hour or two each
day. Some of the Greeks were attached to Yugoslav Army units for training.
26. A large number of women passed through the Buljkes camp. They were put to
work in the farms supplying the camp, and in the cordage factories, shoeshops, print shops,
etc. that supplied the camp and guerrilla units across the frontier.
27. The Rubig Camp, Albania. According to a complaint made by Greece to the
United Nations, a guerrilla training camp was set up in the spring of 1945 at Rubig in Albania,
50 miles north of Tirana near the town of Lesh, and this camp was used as a "preparatory
military training center for the higher school of partisan warfare at Buljkes." The complaint
-specified that the Albanian Government loaned the camp a 50 mm trench mortar and an
Italian machine gun for training. About 50 men received instruction in these weapons for a
two-week period during August 1945. The 300-400 inmates of the camp received 1-2 hours'
political training every morning. Practical and theoretical military instruction was given at
Rubig. A committee of former ELAS officers at Rubig was alleged to have written a military
training manual, which was mimeographed on paper furnished by the Albanian Government.
The Rubig camp was closed in October 1945, the trainees being sent to Buljkes.
28. Recruits for the Democratic Army were sent back into Greece singly and in
groups. One group, consisting of 235 men, left in closed railroad cars on 28 January 1948.
The men had been given new underwear and wool uniforms made in a shop at Buljkes. The
men were loaded into trucks at Skoplje and taken into Albania, where all equipment bearing
ineradicable Yugoslav markings was confiscated. They then walked across the frontier into
Macedonia.
29. Small replacement camps were established in Macedonia, close to the satellite
frontiers. Trainees from Buljkes and other camps were sent to these replacement centers
where they were armed and eventually reassigned to permanent Democratic Army units.
30. Recruiting. During 1945 and 1946 KKE and front organizations in the cities and
villages exerted strong pressure on local ex-ELAS fighters to join the mobilization of the
Democratic Army. The Government was pictured as being about to persecute all ex-ELAS
and EAM members as part of the "monarchofascist plot" against all "democratic" elements.
Captured guerrillas generally claimed they had been forcibly recruited. Provocation was
used in the propaganda campaign. The guerrillas would raid a village, and in the reaction
that naturally followed, young men with Communist connections or former membership in
Communist mass organizations would be convinced that their.only safety lay in fleeing to the
mountains, where they were "Sitting-ducks" for guerrilla recruiters.
31. Systems of safe houses and guides were organized to lead men recruited in
Salonika and other places to the guerrilla encampments.
32. Late in 1947 the Democratic Army began an intensive mobilization drive. Copies
are available of two mobilization proclamations that are supposed to have been issued at this
time, one by the "Democratic Army General Headquarters" dated 30 November 1947, the other
by the provincial "Democratic Army Headquarters of Eastern Macedonia-Thrace" dated 1
December 1947. These called up three "classes" of recruits -- ex-members of ELAS, the
National Civil Guard, and ETA (former ELAS supply corps) -- who were told to make their
own way to the nearest guerrilla headquarters. It was declared that guerrilla " divisions
will make a circuit of the villages and towns near the cities in order to safeguard the de-
parture of the recruits and their travel to recruiting centers." "Draft evaders" were
threatened with "proper penalties."
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33. Recruiting efforts after the outbreak of serious hostilities were largely unsuccess-
ful. Party organizations in the cities were unable to attract many reserves, and the police
interfered with the operation of the forwarding systems. During the summer of 1948, Free
Greece Radio threatened and cajoled in vain. In March the Politburo broadcast an "open
letter" to all city organizations criticising them for "vacillations and hesitations" and calling
for a "mass exodus" of recruits from the towns to the mountains. In October the City Com-
mittee of Athens (KOA) was ordered to disband and its members to report to guerrilla head-
quarters.
Organization of the Democratic Army.
34. The first guerrilla units, formed before the all-out fighting began were small
(10-25 men). In March 1946 it is believed that combat teams of 50-80 men each were organ-
ized in the areas adjoining the frontiers. These teams were divided into platoons, and the
platoons, into 2 groups each. With the arrival. in Greece and Macedonia of the Buljkes cadres,
the combat teams were organized into combat commands of 2-3 teams each. Later, more
regular formations were organized: divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and
sections. The growth of the guerrilla bands was made possible by the arrival of men from the
satellite camps, and by forced mobilization in "liberated areas" established near the satellite
frontiers. Between 29 August 1946 and 18 March 1947, seven "Area" or "Regional" Commands
were replaced by Division Headquarters. In addition to regular tactical formations, a large
number of irregular formations, called "area units" or "village units" were organized to
furnish support to the regular units of the Democratic Army. Many Democratic Army units
("independent companies" and possibly platoons) operated in areas detached from larger
commands.
35. Strength. The Democratic Army reached its peak combat strength during the
second half of 1948. Official Greek estimates of guerrilla strength follow:
June 1946
Jan. 1947
Jan. 1948
Nov. 1948
June 1949
Dec. 1949
Jan 1950
Dec. 1950
3,000
11,000
22,500
25,000
17,490
1,130
780
245
The breakup of guerrilla units is shown in the figures for November 1948, when the total of
25,000 was believed to constitute 71 battalions and 24 independent companies, in comparison
with which the total for June 1949 was distributed through 37 battalions, 18 double companies,
and 17 independent companies. Government forces always held a very large numerical supe-
riority over the Communists. They were, however, tied down to guarding utilities, property,
and maintaining public order and their own supply line, whereas the mission of the guerrilla
units was destruction and disruption; the latter plundered the country and kept supply lines
into neighboring satellites short. Furthermore, guerrilla supplies from abroad were backed
up by large officially controlled resources. They were also supported by numbers of Party
members and sympathizers within Government territory.
36. Staffs. On 27 August 1948 there was published a law of the Democratic Govern-
ment creating a "Supreme War Council-of the Democratic Army" to deal with "organization
and direction of the army and... decide the conduct of the war." As first appointed, it consisted
of eight members, with Marko's as President. When Markos, charged with Titoism and made
the scapegoat for the defeat of Grammos, was relieved, Zachariades, the Secretary General
of the Party, became head of the Supreme War Council. In April 1949 the Council had eleven
members.
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37. The General Headquarters consisted of Gousias as Military Director (after Markos
was ousted) and Bartziotas as Political Commissar. It had the following staff sections:
Operations
Headed by Kikitsas (Protopapas Sarantis) until he was replaced following Grammos
defeat of 1948.
Intelligence
3 Intelligence Centers
Organization and Armament
a. Commissioned and assigned officers'
b. 3 basic armament and ammunition "echelons" (detachments?); repair shops
Medical Service
Field ambulance, hospitals, dressing stations, a battalion of 200 doctors, nurses, and
stretcher bearers, 70% women.
Personnel (Vigilance) or Army Security
All aspects of military security. Kept personnel records. Also in charge of operations
of supply systems in satellites.
Fortifications.
Trenches, other works, bridge repair.
Engineers
Special sabotage teams, for which a pool of 30 officer specialists available. Sabotage
officers attached to divisions, brigades, battalions. Mine-laying.
Transport
2 Transport battalions (mules)
2 Motor transport companies
Enlightenment
In charge of "war correspondents." Enlightenment committees in Division and
District headquarters. Published daily news bulletin, fortnightly newspaper, monthly
magazine. Programming for Free Greece Radio.
Supply
Communications
Cryptography
39. Disposition. The General Headquarters had under its immediate control 4
Divisions, 9 Field Artillery Battalions, an Officers' School, and a Cavalry Brigade. General
Staff Headquarters were also organized for Northern Greece and Eastern Macedonia-Thrace,
and each of these had two or more divisions under its command:
General Headquarters (Vitsi-Grammos -Epirus area)
VIII Division (137, 139, 157, 159 Brigades)
IX Division (16, 108 Brigades)
X Division (14, 105 Brigades)
XI Division (18, 103 Brigades)
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General Staff/Northern Greece
I Division (138, 192, 77 Brigades)
II Division (144, 172, 126 Brigades)
III Division (22, 55 Brigades)
General Staff/Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
VI Division (20, 132 Brigades)
VII Division (350, 355 Brigades)
40. Party Control of the Democratic Army. Party control was exercised through the
channels of the military command itself,! and y a system of political commissars, who
represented the Political Bureau of the, Party. The Political Commissar in each tactical unit
worked through the office of the Personnel Directorate ("Ha"), which was responsible for
special intelligence, and also, for supervising policies, personnel, and orders of the units.
Beginning with the spring of 1948,.the Political Commissars also controlled local Party
organizations in areas in which a unit Hof the-Democratic Army operated.
r
41. Organization of Tactical Units. "Normal" organization of a Division was as
follows:
Division: 2 Brigades
Brigade: 3 Battalions.,
Battalion: 3 Rifle Companies, 1 Engineer Company
Company: 3 Platoons
Platoon: 3 Squads
Squad: 10 men
Actually, organization was seldom "normal," and numerous "double companies" counted as
battalions. Normal strength of a Company was 432, but averaged 50. Division Staffs were
similar to the General Staff in composition.
42. Service Elements and Other Arms.
a. Artillery. Six battalions of two batteries each in the area of General Headquarters.
Elsewhere, in platoons of two pieces each. At its peak, Democratic Army artillery
consisted of 7-
45 75mm guns
15 105mm guns
31 20mm and 37mm AA
38 20mm and 37mm AT
3 75mm AT
12 120mm mortars
b. Cavalry. Shortage of animals. Cavalry Brigade in Thessaly, consisting of about
200 men in two squadrons. 200-man Brigade in Vitsi. Other small troops.
c. Anti-Aircraft. Special AA troops attached to permanent headquarters, using mostly
German machine guns.
d. Transport. Mostly mule-pack. Two battalions of mountain transport and two
battalionmotor transport (total of about 100 trucks) in Vitsi. Possibly, a battalion
in Grammos.
e. Communications. Communications Battalion with about 280 messengers (couriers).
W/T provided only to brigades and higher eommands, and to battalions on special
missions.
f. Engineers. One Battalion in Grammos; one in Vitsi.
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g. Medical. Shortage of doctors. Dressing stations and field hospitals near.satellite
frontiers. Convalescent stations in safe places in mountains. Stretcher-bearers
battalion with strength of about 200 at Vitsi: apparently units detached for service
with combat brigades and battalions.
43. Propaganda. "Enlightenment" of Democratic Army troops was the responsibility
of the Political Commissars. Divisions had Enlightenment Committees; Political Commissars
of Brigades, Battalions, and Companies carried out propaganda personally or through assist-
ants. General Headquarters published daily information reports, a fortnightly bulletin, and a
monthly. Divisions and Brigades also printed propaganda. Free Greece Radio was also a
propaganda instrument.
44. Intelligence. In effect, the entire Party organization was an information-
collecting network. Systematic intelligence work was performed by --
a. Networks of informants in the Greek Government, controlled by agents who were
responsible directly to Party Headquarters (possibly, to the Agitprop Department of
the Central Committee and KOSSA);
b. Combat intelligence elements of the Democratic Army;
c. Counter-intelligence elements of the Democratic Army.
45. Combat Intelligence . Prior to the reorganization of the Democratic Army into
Divisions, (October 1947) the "Area Headquarters" set up Intelligence Centers in the country-
side to organize nets of civilian informants who reported on enemy movements and to set up
observation posts. The Intelligence Centers were manned by an officer and 7-8 men. Infor-
mation collected by direct observation and from the informant networks was sent to guerrilla
headquarters in daily situation reports. Advanced Intelligence Centers, manned by 2-3 men,
were organized in areas controlled by Government forces.
46. When the "Area Headquarters" were replaced by the Division organization, a
regular combat intelligence service called the."II Bureau" was established. It was respon-
sible for reconnaissance (observation, raids to get prisoners, road checks of travellers),
prisoner-interrogation, and the operation of the Intelligence Centers. It was organized as
follows:
Division: Intelligence Company, consisting of a staff of 3 officers and 3 Intelligence
Platoons.
Brigade: Intelligence Platoon, consisting of a staff of 2 officers, and 3 Intelligence
Sections.
Battalion: Intelligence Section, consisting of 507 men, directly under the Battalion
Commander and Political Commissar.
Combat Intelligence personnel were armed with automatic weapons and the units were
furnished binoculars.
47. Counter-Intelligence. A special security service called YSA was organized at
Buljkes in October 1947. It posted representatives with tactical units. These representatives,
who were beyond the control of unit commanders, reported on the military and political ef-
ficiency of the commanders and organized counter-intelligence networks among the troops
and the civilians in the unit's area of operation.
48. The chief of the YSA, Michael Terzis, apparently tried to usurp excessive politi-
cal functions, going so far as to challenge the loyalty of Bartziotas, for which he was rewarded
by being imprisoned as an "enemy of the people" and his organization dissolved. Its counter-
intelligence functions were taken over by the apparatus of the Personnel Directorate (IIa-
Bureau), which was a part of the II Bureau and which was expanded from mere record-
keeping to become the staff organization through which the Political Commissars operated
in tactical formations of the Democratic Army. r The intelligence functions of the II and Ha
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Bureaus overlapped to some extent: the latter, however, was primarily responsible for
economic and political intelligence and counter-intelligence, whereas the U Bureau was the
combat intelligence organization.
49. Supply. Most of the food, clothing, arms and ammunition, and technical equip-
ment of the Democratic Army came from supply dumps in the neighboring satellites.
Yugoslavia was the chief supply center. Animal and motor supply trains made regular trips
across the frontiers.
Some supplies were produced in the shops of the Democratic Army camp at Buljkes.-
Some were furnished by the Yugoslav Government. Some were sent by other satellite govern-
ments and by front organizations ("Aid to Democratic Greece Committees") in the satellites
and other countries to Yugoslavia and transhipped to the Democratic Army in Macedonia.
Democratic Army units in frontier areas freely sent foraging units across the borders
for water and wood as needed.
50. A mass relief organization called "Mutual Aid" (EA) was established by the Party.
"Responsibles" for EA were attached to the city committees of the Party underground and
were in charge of collecting food, clothing, weapons, and money from Party sympathizers.
EA branches were also set up abroad to collect from Greek expatriates. The Committees of
"Aid for Democratic Greece" were organized by fraternal CP's, which lent their own propa-
ganda and collecting facilities to the cause. Large sums of money and supplies were carried
by Communist seamen of the Party-controlled maritime union, OENO. Some was smuggled
through Greek ports, then overland to guerrilla headquarters by courier. Some was passed
into overland routes through the satellites. Communist agents at neutral ports, such as
Venice and Trieste, received money and goods brought from the United States and elsewhere
and transhipped it overland or by sea to satellite or Greek ports.
Role of Underground Political Apparatus in the Cities
51. The City organizations of the KKE went underground in July 1947. Their role in
the insurrection was to carry on propaganda, furnish recruits, supplies, money, and intel-
ligence to the Democratic Army. They also organized terror squads. The propaganda-
financial support has already been discussed in Part One of the present study ("The Com-
munist Party Underground).
52. Terror Organizations. There were two "Self-defense" organizations created in
Athens: the "Wide Self-Defense" (Mass Self-Defense -- MLA) and the "Narrow Self Defense."
The latter was under the control of the Politburo of the Party until early 1948, when it was
put under the Democratic Army. The "Wide Self Defense" was under the control of the City
Committee (KOA) of the KKE. Both organizations progressed from defensive operations to
terror work. Each had its own weapons cache.
53." Wide Self-Defense." It was originally planned that the Wide Self-Defense should
be organized by Sectors, corresponding to the areas covered by the Achtidas of the political
apparatus, and that each Sector should have two or more Sections under it, each of these with
a number of "Squares" or "Decemvirates." As it turned out, recruiting difficulties and, more
importantly, vigorous police action, ruined the plan. Of the ten proposed Sectors, the Second
never existed, the Ninth consisted solely of its chief, the First seems also to have had only
one member; the Seventh was "isolated" until the autumn of 1947, when it was combined with
the Eighth; and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth were so disorganized by police arrests that their
remnants were combined into one organization in the spring of 1948. None of the Sectors ever
had more than a handful of "boys." After May 1948, only Sectors Three and Six had any mem-
bers.
54. The Wide Self-Defense was responsible to the KKE City Committee (KOA). A
Responsible for the Wide Self-Defense was a member of the KOA, or attached to it. In the
summer of 1947 he had a staff of four. The personnel turn-over in the headquarters and the
Sectors was considerable. One Sector chief was dismissed when his ideas for action were
deemed too reckless, one was killed by the police,' one joined the rebel army, two were trans-
ferred to other organizations, many were arrested. In general, few of the Sector Secretaries
held their jobs for more than three months.
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55. Prior to the general crack-down on all Party activities in July 1947, Wide Self-
Defense groups took part in strikes, acting to protect picket lines and to beat up strike-
breakers. They also served as guards at Party installations and functions, accompanied
protest delegations, agitators, and propaganda distributors. Later, they also made plans for
beatings and assassinations of Government officials and dangerous anti-Communists (par-
ticularly, leaders of the "X" organization, a right-wing group). Few of these plans matured.
56. Narrow Self-Defense. The Narrow Self-Defense was organized by a group of men
picked at the Democratic Army camp at Buljkes for their experience in the wartime terrorist
organization, OPLA, and sent to Athens in March 1946. Each of them was assigned a sector
of the city in which a "Narrow Self-Defense" group was to be organized from members of the
Wide Self-Defense. Each sector unit was to comprise two groups, a "Surveillance Squad" and
an "Action Squad." It was their job to carry out difficult liquidations, robberies, and other
attacks of violence. The head of the Narrow Self-Defense was responsible to the Politburo
through the "Paralegal Mechanism," which was also responsible for the "Productive
Mechanism" (production of propaganda). Early in 1948 the organization was put under the
Democratic Army, and in October of that year, owing to devastating police action, the rem-
nants of the Narrow Self-Defense were collected into one group.
KKE Organization for Subversion
57. The KKE organization within the Greek Government's services was called KOSSA
("Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps"). Its purpose was to subvert and
thereby wreck the defenses of the state. It also produced some weapons and intelligence. It
was first organized following the CC Plenum of April 1945.
58. KOSSA was, of course, a very secret organization, and the details of its organiza-
tion are obscure. It consisted of cells, organized by service unit or locality (e.g., army
camp, gendarmerie post, etc.) and directed through a system of functionaries and small com-
mittees parallel to, but separate from, the underground political apparatus of the KKE. Its
headquarters organization is not surely known. At one time, it is said to have had its own
Central Committee; later, to have shed this and to have been under the control of its own
"Politburo" -- a directing triad responsible to the General Secretary of the KKE, Zachariades,
and consisting of --
Mandakis for "military instruction"
loannides for "organization"
Hadjivassiliou : for "intelligence matters"
Furthermore, KOSSA has frequently been reported to have been divided into a number of
branches for work in each of the Greek services:
KOVN: Navy
KOX: Gendarmerie
SKO: Army
KOAP: Police
KOA: Air Force
KOLS: Port Authorities
The necessity for such a break-down is far from obvious. It is believed that the KOSSA
organization in the Royal Navy was run by a "Responsible" on the city committee (KOP) for
the port of Piraeus, and the KOSSA organization in the Army was linked, through cut-outs,
with the KKE Regional and City Committees wherever troops were stationed which had KOSSA
members among them.
59. The KKE Regional and City Committees had KOSSA "Responsibles" as Committee
members, or attached to the Committees. The Responsible for a Region directed the work of
KOSSA members in service units stationed in the Region. For this purpose, there was organ-
ized in the Region a KOSSA committee, with a Secretary and a variable number of "Instruc-
tors," each of whom was responsible for KOSSA in one or more service units. The KOSSA
members of a service unit were organized into cells of 3-10 men each. The secretaries of
the cells constituted the Committee of the next higher service command. How far up the
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MINTITUL / U. 6. LS ONLY
military command echelons this organization was carried depended on the number of Com-
munists present, and the organization of the service command. It appears, however, that
there were no KOSSA Committees in units larger than the Regiment. Thus, for example,
there might be two cells in a Company. Their secretaries would constitute the Company
Committee, and the Secretaries of the Company Committees in the Battalion would constitute
the Battalion KOSSA Committee. The KOSSA Regional Committee, through its Instructors,
controlled whatever KOSSA organization existed in the Battalions, Regiments, Independent
Companies and Batteries, etc., in the Region. Lateral contact between organizations at the
same level was restricted, and contact with civilian KKE organizations (i.e., the Instructors)
was handled through couriers and cut-outs, utilizing safe-houses.
60. Party members called up for service were transferred from the political appara-
tus to the KOSSA organization in the area in which each was to serve. Letters of introduction
and other identifications were furnished transferees to enable them to join the KOSSA organi-
zation. In some cases, transfers or revival of Party membership were effected personally:
a soldier would-be vouched for by a KOSSA member of the unit who had known him before, or
investigation would be made through KKE organizations in his home.
61. KOSSA was able, in the early stage of the fighting, to engineer individual and
mass desertions (in one case, that of a whole company), partial mutinies, fake surrenders to
the rebels and subsequent "escapes" sans equipment; and to generate discontent and de-
moralization of units engaged in combat with the insurrectionaries.
A KOSSA network in the Navy was discovered in 1948 and the following acts were
attributed to it by the Greek Government:
Intelligence
Information on personnel, armament, organization, etc., of the College of Naval
Cadets.
Plans for the war emergency organization and operation of the naval mine service.
Information on the personnel, armament, operations, etc., of the LST Chios.
Secret organization and operations of the Intelligence Bureau.
Information on the organization of the Ministry of Marine.
Information on the personnel, armament of security organization of the Greek
Navy in Piraeus and the South Aegean.
Information on fleet locations and operations.
Information and plans for actual fortification of the Northern end of Aegena.
Information on personnel, armament, operations of the radio service of the Navy.
Information on the organizations of the Harbormasters in Piraeus and other ports.
Secret plans of armament and installations at Skaramanga and Palaskus.
Information on plans for defense of the Royal Arsenal at Salamis.
Defense organization of the Ministry of Marine.
Movement and operations of the destroyer Hastings in anti-bandit operations, Gulf
of Corinth.
Information on the technical equipment of the Combined Operation Headquarters Volos.
Details of the supply system of the Greek Navy and its morale.
Information and plans on installation of the Greek Navy fuel -oil storage tanks.
Organization of the work, and details of repairs made at the Royal Dockyard, Salamis.
Information and plans on installation of the Greek Navy fuel oil storage tanks. .
Information and description of living conditions of the navy crews.
Secret orders and reports of operations, motor launch #483.
Details of the operations of the naval group at Volos in the Pelson mountain area.
Secret orders, situation reports of motor launch Kalambaka.
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Secret reports of operations from the staff of destroyer flotilla.
Operations orders, destroyer Crete.
Reports from cruiser Averoff.
Information of the anti-Communist precautions of the Navy.
Report of operations and patrols of several other vessels.
Sabotage
Plans for the destruction of the machinery of the cruiser Averoff.
Plans for the destruction of the machinery of the destroyer Adrias.
Plans for the destruction of the cruiser Averoff by explosives.
Plans for the sabotage of the minesweeping squadron.
Plans for the sabotage of the school of electricians.
Plans for the sabotage of the destroyed Niaoulis by explosives.
Plans for the sabotage of the Royal Dockyard, Salamis.
Plans for the destruction by fire of two motor launches.
Plans for the destruction of machinery and equipment of the radio service.
Plans for the destruction by explosives of the floating drydock, electrical supply,
ammunition storage of the Royal Arsenal, Salamis.
Plans and execution of operation to blow up LST Alfios when she was loading ammuni-
tion (failed because the explosive was discovered prior to the explosion).
Plans and execution of the plot to destroy the destroyer Kiaoulis by explosives (failed
because the saboteur lost his nerve and failed to ignite the charges.)
Actual temporary immobilization of the destroyer Crete by placing emery in the
lubricating oil while ship was engaged in operations against the bandits in the
island of Samos.
Immobilization of the destroyer Kanaris in August 1947 due to scrap iron in the
machinery (not proved sabotage; may have been accidental).
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 Approved For Re - 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE CP GREECE
DURING THE INSURRECTION OF 1941.1949
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
POLITICAL
BUREAU
PROVISIONAL
DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT
E7 I
SUPRE~viE
WAR
COUNCIL
GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS
DEMOCRATIC ARMY
I REGIONAL I
I COMMITTEES? I
General Staff
Northern Greece
Para-legal
Mechanism
Productive
Mechanism
Narrow
Self -Defense
City Committees
Piraeus Athens Salonika
Wide
Self -Defense
Sectors
Districts
(Achtida)
Cells
(KOB'S)
STAFF
SECTIONS
General Staff
E.Macedonia-
Thrace
Brig. Brig.
Bn. Bn. 4Bn.
. Co.
.
E Co
Plat. Plat. Plat.
FSqd. Sqd. Sq1
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 1
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T^T A T r T
V
Se 1
MILITARY ORGANIZATION'OF CP MALAYA
A. INTRODUCTION
B. MCP RESISTANCE, 1941 - 1945
C. MCP INSURRECTION, 1948
The Policy Decision
Implementation of the Decision
Three-Stage Strategy
Militarization of Party
Military Mobilization
Re-organization of Party
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)
Armed Forces Department
Tactical Units
Disposition of MRLA Units
MCP Control
MCP Organizational Channels
MCP Organization within the MRLA
Auxiliary Organizations
Support and Technical Services
Supply
Arms and Ammunition
Intelligence
Courier Communications
Training
Operations
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. The CP Malaya (MCP) carried on resistance to the Japanese occupation during the
war and, since the summer of 1948, has been engaged in an armed insurrection. The follow-
ing analysis shows, in some detail how a relatively small CP in a colonial area decided to
launch an insurrection after the Chinese model (acquisition of safe base and gradual build-up
of strength), how it prepared for it, and how it has organized a fighting force and an extensive
civilian support organization to provide the fighting force with food, intelligence, recruits,
,and tactical support.
B. MCP RESISTANCE, 1941 = 1945
2. The MCP was not formally constituted until April 1930. It has always been com-
posed largely of Chinese residents of Malaya. It dominated the Malayan General Labor Union
and had numerous youth, women's, and cultural fronts and auxiliaries.
3. The MCP patterned its line of action against the Japanese after the example set by
the CP China. It formed political resistance organizations and guerrilla bands that became
known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), The latter never put up much
of a fight against the Japanese occupation, but it had a certain nuisance value and tied up
Japanese forces in police duty.
4. The British undertook to assist the MPAJA with technical advice and materiel.
Quantities of arms and ammunition were dropped by parachute to' MPAJA units, and several
teams of specialists were sent in to train and advise them.
5. The Communists exposed only a part of the MPAJA to the British. Some of their
best units and cadres stayed hidden in the jungles in "secret" formations.
6. Following the Liberation, the MPAJA was dissolved and slightly more than the
number of arms for which the British held signed receipts were turned over. Large stocks,
however, were cached away from those captured from the Japanese and from parachute drops
that the Communists claimed had been lost. The MCP organized the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army Ex-Service Comrades' Association (MPAJA ESCA) to keep together as many
of the resistance veterans as it could.
C. MCP INSURRECTION, 1948,
The Policy Decision
7. Following the Liberation, the MCP concentrated on political and organizational
work, strengthening its hold on labor and other mass elements. Its resolutions were strongly
anti-British and the hope for an eventual revolution was implicit in them, as it was in the
fact that arms had been hidden away from the resistance and that resistance veterans had
been pulled into the MPAJA ESCA. There did not- appear to be any immediate prospects for
revolution, however. Indeed, when MCP leaders sounded out Soviet, Chinese, and British
Communists on several occasions during 1946 and 1947, they were advised not to take im-
mediate. action.
8. In September 1947, however, a new line for Communist Parties in "colonial and
semi-colonial" areas was put out in a speech made to the first meeting of the Cominform by
the Soviet leader Zhdanov. He postulated a new, and very promising, "co-relation of forces"
in these areas as a result of the war: The "imperialist" powers had been weakened economi-
cally and politically at home, and were in poor shape to keep their hold on their colonies.
Furthermore, their international preeminence had been destroyed by the rise of a bloc of
Communist states, particularly, China. Meanwhile, the colonial populations had been consid-
erably "politicalized" by active participation in the resistance and the Communist Parties had
received valuable technical experience. Finally, the CP China had demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of guerrilla tactics as a political device and the possibility of building up military
force and mass strength by the correct use of relatively small initial forces.
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T _.C
9. The Zhdanov thesis was taken up by CP's of Southeast Asia. Numerous Russian
and colonial CP leaders were present at the Second Congress of the CP India (28 February -
7 March 1948), where the new line was endorsed. The MCP had on the spot at Calcutta a
delegate to the SEA Youth Conference, which had been held there just prior to the Indian
Party Congress. On 9 March, Lawrence Sharkey, President of the CP Australia, who had
attended the Congress, arrived at Singapore. He stayed there until the 20th, and was in close
touch with MCP leaders.
10. The Central Committee of the MCP held its Fourth Plenary Conference 17 - 21
March 1948. The decision to undertake armed insurrection was made at that time. The
decision was implicit in a document produced by the Conference entitled "The Present
Situation," which bore strong marks. of the Zhdanov thesis and was very similar to documents
issued by the CP's India and Burma earlier in the year. It was reprinted in full in the MCP
press in May.
Implementation of the Decision.
11. The build-up to armed insurrection was to consist of --
a) intensified labor action;
b) a campaign of terrorism;
c) armed uprising by strong guerrilla forces gathered in hills.
12. The MCP-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions rejected official
mediation offers in April. Numerous strikes were called during April and May. There were
many acts of terrorism: bombs were thrown; factories were burned, strike-breakers were
attacked and intimidated, managers were attacked, rubber trees were slashed. It was
planned to generate a general strike in July, but this was thwarted by Government action.
13. Militarization of the Party. In organizational terms, the transition from the
build-up campaign to the insurrection involved the creation of a military (guerrilla) force to
seize and hold operational bases, and a readjustment of the Party's political apparatus for
the support of and integration with a military campaign, and also to ensure existence under
the condition of illegality and government counter-measures which the campaign of
terrorism was bound to provoke. (See chart .)
14. Military mobilization. Carefully selected members of the wartime "secret"
MPAJA were organized into "Mobile Corps" groups (also called "killer squads"), which
carried out many of the acts of terrorism during the first stage. The groups had 8 - 10
members each, under the control of a local (District) MCP functionary. The identity of the
men was a closely-guarded secret.
15. The MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades' Association (MPAJA ESCA) was used to
mobilize the rest of the former resistance fighters. A meeting of the council of the Associa-
tion was held on 5 May, and District associations were instructed to re-register their
members. This was to be completed in June. On 26 June, it was estimated that 2,000 men
would accept mobilization, including 30% of the "secret" MPAJA and 10% of the "open MPAJA."
On 11. June MPAJA ESCA leaders of Selanger, Pahang, Perak, and Negri Sembilan met and
were instructed to sell their property, destroy all records, and prepare to go to the hills.
The signal for all-out mobilization was to be the anticipated outlawing of the MCP.
16. Re-organization of the Party. Internally, the MCP prepared for the insurrection
by a clean-up of its cadres and by making certain re-adjustments in its apparatus. Security
measures were also instituted in preparation for illegality.
17. On 10 May the Central Committee held its Fifth Plenary Session. A document
was issued calling for an examination of all functionaries, the expulsion of all inefficient and
"extreme democratic" elements (i.e., those who opposed the policy decision), and a tightening
up of requirements for Party jobs. Stricter qualifications were set forth for membership in
Party Committees and for re-admission to active work of cadres who had been expelled or
suspended.
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0
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18. It is interesting to note that changes in the territorial structure of the Party which
lent themselves to guerrilla operations had been made during the summer of 1947, prior to
the policy decision. The country had been divided into three regions, each supervised by a
Regional Bureau: South Malayan Bureau, 2 members; North Malayan Bureau, 2 members;
Central Malayan Bureau, 4 members. The regional Bureaus represent a break down of the
Central Committee. They have no permanent headquarters and meet only for important
discussions. The members of a Regional Bureau are posted throughout the area to lower
Party organizations. This, condition is quite similar to that in the Philippines (q. v.).
19. In the national apparatus, the following changes were made:
a. The Organization Committee ceased to exist, its functions being assumed by
the 3 Regional Bureaus;
b. A "Military High Command" was established within the Central Committee.
(It is believed that the Political Bureau transformed itself into the MHC.)
c. The Labor and Trade Union Department was dissolved.
20. Similar changes took place in lower Party Committees (State and District), with
functional offices for "legal" work being abolished and assignments being made for military
work. An "Armed Forces Department" was established early in the insurrection in each
State or Regional Committee. They constituted the staff of the MCP military organization
in their respective areas.
1 21. The charts at the end of the text show the territorial and functional changes that
were made in the MCP structure during the insurrection.
22. There are indications that the MCP expected to have until August or September
1948 to prepare for its uprising, and that it was stampeded into military action by Govern-
mentreprisals before it had fully mobilized or had made provision for necessary support serv-
ices. The Government declared a state of emergency in June, raided various MCP offices, and
I made numerous arrests. This action made it impossible to use legal organizations to con-
tinue the campaign of labor unrest and terrorism. It did not, however, break up the Party
organization itself, for most. of the best cadres had gone underground and escaped arrest.
23. MCP Military Strategy. An attempt was made in late July 1948 to establish a
"liberated" area in Kelantan, but it was quickly defeated by Government Forces. In December
1948 a plan was endorsed calling for the concentration of guerrilla forces in three main
areas: Pahang-Kelantan border; Southern Selangor; Kedah-Thailand border. From these
safe bases, the Communists were to carry out a war of movement. The rest of the country
was divided into three zones, each under one of the Regional Bureaus. Here, bases would be
temporary and operations would be small-scale.
24. The above plan having failed, a new plan of three "phases" was produced in
December 1949:
Phase 1: guerrilla warfare waged from temporary bases with the purpose of
wearing down Government strength and building up the strength of the Com-
munist forces (Malayan Races Liberation Army -- MRLA) and their mass
organization (People's Movement -- Min Yuen)..
Phase 2: expansion of the Min Yuen; intensified attacks. on "enemy" com-
munications and occupation of most vulnerable enemy bases (smaller
villages and production centers).
Phase 3: gradual assumption by Min Yuen groups of governmental control
of areas abandoned by Security Forces; establishment of permanent bases;
substitution by "war of movement" of guerrilla warfare.
25. The MCP has never been able to go beyond the first stage: no strong safe-bases
have been established and held.
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Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).
26. A variety of titles were taken by MCP State Committees for their guerrilla
forces. In February 1949 the CC adopted the official name, Malayan Races Liberation Army
(MRLA).
27. The MRLA is composed mostly of Chinese (as is the MCP), with only a sprinkling
(about 5%) of Malays, Indians, and Japanese deserters. It is believed that about one-half of
the MPAJA has joined the MRLA, but of these only about 35% received any formal or prac-
tical training during the Japanese occupation. There is a shortage of specialist personnel,
but the Chinese are naturally good mechanics and craftsmen.
28. The MRLA, headed by a "Military High Command," which is theoretically a
department of the Central Committee/MCP, comprises a number of Regimental Commands,
and smaller tactical units, loosely organized and loosely employed according to traditional
guerrilla practices. It is believed that the "Military High Command" is simply the Political
Bureau/MCP acting in a military capacity. The Regimental Commands are, similarly, the
Armed Forces Departments of the State Committees/MCP.
29. Armed Forces Department. The Armed Forces Departments, which were
established in the State Committees MCP early in the insurrectionary period (see above),
were known as State or Regional Military or Regimental Commands. The Armed Forces
Department consists of--
Party Representative
Commander
Vice-Commander.
Members of State Committees often serve as unit commanders. Where able cadres are
adequate, the Armed Forces Department may also include a Chief of Staff and a Chief of the
Party Education Department.
30. Tactical Units. The MRLA has a theoretically triangular organization, with
three each of battalions per regiment, companies per battalion, platoons per company,
and sections per platoon. It is probable, however, that this theoretical organization has
never existed in fact. "Regiments" vary in strength between 100 and 740 men. A battalion
frequently consists of 2 companies, with or without separate additional platoons. Most
operations are carried out by platoons. There are many Independent Platoons and Companies,
and Composite Units, and their strength varies widely. Units are far from stable, being
.broken down into smaller groups: for operations. One company, for example, made it a
practice to operate in sections for a month, and then to re-group for a month's training.
More recently, the Sections sent out to various areas have been broken down into groups of
three or four. This eases the food problem, which has become increasingly difficult. This
looseness of organization is, of course, dictated by conditions of guerrilla warfare in Malaya
and by the inability of the MCP to establish large bases and to recruit, equip, and train a
large enough force to make serious attacks on Government forces.
31. Disposition of MRLA Units. In March 1950, it was estimated that the total
strength of the MRLA was 3-4,000 deployed as follows:
a. Under the North Malaya Bureau:
(1) 8th Regiment, consisting of 3 companies (4,3,3, platoons respectively), under
the Armed Forces Department of the Penang-Keda Joint Committee.
(2) Until Summer 1949, when it was moved to Kelantan, the 5th Regiment, under
the Perak State Committee. A number of independent formations were left
behind.
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b. Under the Central Malaya Bureau:
(1) 2nd Regiment, consisting of 4 companies and possibly an Independent Platoon,
under the Negri Sembilan State. Committee.
(2) 1st Regiment, consisting of 2 battalions, under the Selangor State Committee.
(3) 6th, 7th, 10th Regiments under Committees for North Pahang, South Pahang,
and East Coast States.
c. Under the South Malaya Bureau:
(1) 3d Regiment, consisting of an Independent Company and the "North Johore
Brigade," under the Armed Forces Department of the North Johore Regional
Committee.
(2) 9th Regiment in Central Johore area
(3) 4th Regiment in South Johore area
Estimated numerical strength as of 31 May 1950 was distributed as shown on the attached
32. MCP Control. The MRLA is openly under full MCP control. Maximal integra-
tion of the political and military MCP apparatus-has been achieved. The control is exercised
through (a) military command channels, with the Political Bureau serving, it is believed, as
a "Military High Command;" (b) MCP organizational channels, with Armed Forces Depart-
ments of MCP State Committees directly responsible for military operations in their partic-
ular areas; (c) Party organization within the MRLA.
.33. MCP Organizational Channels. The line of control by MCP offices lies through
the Political Bureau, the three Regional Bureaus, the State Committees, and District and
Branch Committees. The area military command is actually a part of the State Committee.
As the Armed Forces Department of the State Committee, it is responsible primarily for
military operations and the MCP organization within the State's Regiment (or other MRLA
units); while the State Committee is responsible for these matters in general, and also, for
all other Party interests in the area, including the Min Yuen, secret labor work, terrorist
groups, etc. MCP District Committee members are also brought in for planning of military
operations in their areas. Thus, the following steps were taken in the planning of an attack
on a police station in Johore:
(1) Target for attack chosen at Regimental Headquarters;
(2) Representative of Regimental Command assigned to work with the company
selected to make the attack;
(3) Conference held, with the Regimental Representative, 5 leaders of the company,
and 5 members of the District Committee where the attack was to take place,
attending. District Committee members assigned task of providing food and
keeping the company informed of all relevant intelligence.
(4) Section leaders briefed.
34. MCP Organization within the MRLA. The basic Party unit in the MRLA is the
Branch, comprising the Party members within a Company or Platoon. The members of the
Branch elect two to four persons from a list nominated by the Company or Platoon Com-
mander, to form, with the unit Commander and Vice-Commander and Party Representative
(in the case of a Company), the Branch Committee/MCP. The other members of the Branch
form 3 -- 5 man cells, each with a cell leader. The cells carry out political work among the
non-Party ranks, and recruit likely candidates for provisional membership in the Party.
Branches meet once a month to discuss Party activities -- indoctrination, discipline, re-
cruitment, etc.
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Auxiliary Organizations.
35. The MCP, basing its insurrection on the peasantry, has made strenuous efforts to
organize mass (front) organizations in villages and countryside for the support of MRLA
operations. These mass organizations are known collectively as the Min Yuen (People's
Movement). The civilian groups, organized on a local'basis and controlled by the MCP
District Committees, are known variously as "Anti-British Backing-Up Society," "Racial
Liberation Alliance," "Youth Corps," "Peasants' Union," "Women's Union."
36. The functions of the Min Yuen organizations are to collect food and other supplies
and intelligence for the MRLA, to furnish recruits for MRLA units, and couriers; to carry on
agitation and propaganda; to commit sabotage and assassination of collaborators with the
Government.
37. The Min Yuen has been increasingly militarized, to expand the Party's military
capacity in general and to render direct military support to the MRLA. Min Yuen armed
units have been created --
Defense Corps: full-time fighting groups;
Self-Protection Corps: part-time groups;
Armed Work Force: MRLA elements detached for service with a Min Yuen
Organization.
38. Defense Corps are armed as fully as possible. They are, formed by the MCP
District Committees, w ich exercise general control over them. They are composed of
Sections of 6 to 10 members each. MCP District Committeemen sometimes serve as
Section Commanders according to one report. The staff of the Defense Corps consists of
Political Section
Intelligence Section
General Affairs
Main duties of Defense Corps are:
Ambush, arson on estates, cutting power and telegraph lines, sabotaging rail lines;
buying, manufacturing and repairing arms and ammunition. They also post hand-
bills and carry out other acts of propaganda.
39. Self-Protection Corps comprise Sections organized into Platoons. A Section
consists of 5 to 8 men. A Self-Protection Corps unit operates where its members live,
under. the control of an MCP District or Branch Committee. Its main functions are - -
obtaining and raising food, and other supplies; sabotage of power, telegraph, and
railway lines; destroying rubber trees and plantation buildings; posting handbills,
etc.
40. The Armed Work Force, which is either a Min Yuen unit reinforced by MRLA
personnel, or a unit of MRLA personnel posted to the Min Yuen, is a fairly new development;
part of the increasing militarization of the civilian mass organizations. It also represents a
decentralization of the formal military force (MRLA). Armed Work Force units operate
closely with the Defense Corps and are under the MCP District Committee (in rare cases,
under joint MCP District Committee - MRLA State/Regimental Headquarters).
41. District Unit. In Negri Sembilan, there has reportedly been a complete fusion at
District level of Party and Min Yuen under a "District Unit." The Political Adviser, who is
the MCP District Secretary, directs the District Unit: Under him is an Administrative
Department and an Armed Unit.
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42. The Armed Unit is headed by a Board of Command, with a Commander and Vice-
C mmander. It is organized into Sections.
43. The Administrative Department is composed of MCP District Committee members,
w th one each in control of one of five sections:
Racial Section
Organization Section
Propaganda Section
Treasury Section
Communication Section.
44. The Administrative Department is responsible for purchase, allocation, and
s orage of food, medical and military supplies; for intelligence; and for the creation and
operation of a courier net.
45. Organizational control of various MCP military units is shown on the chart at
t e end of the text.
Support and Technical Services.
46. Supply. MRLA and other full-time guerrilla units are supplied (a) by their own
ctions (raids, forced requisitions, theft); and (b) by the Min Yuen. MCP fighting units are
robably too small and too loosely connected to have had to organize much of an internal
upply system: they probably depend upon their own actions or are directly and individually
upplied by local Min Yuen organizations.
47. All the members of Min Yuen groups are, to a certain extent, collectors of food
and other supplies for guerrilla bands. A Min Yuen organization may designate a particular
erson to be responsible for collections and storage. For example, the Branch Committee
of the Batang Malacca District of the Women's Anti-British Association (a Min Yuen group)
onsisted of a Director, a Responsible for Information, and a person responsible for General
ervices ?-- recruitment, finances, food supply. Similarly, Min Yuen groups set up on an
area basis, such as the Village or Squatter Area Committees, usually have had one person on
he committee staff responsible for food supply.
48. A food procurement system of a District Unit in Negri Sembilan included the em-
loyment of at least two "middlemen," who carried orders for supplies from the "buyer" of
he District Unit to the purchasing agent of a nearby estate. The latter made purchases as
rdered, presumably concealing them in the bulk of his normal transaction, and delivered
hem to a pre-selected point where the District Unit picked them up.
49'. Food has also been reported to have been smuggled out of a Government re-
ettlement camp in tightly sealed containers hidden in pig swill, to which the camp guards
,rave understandably cursory attention. At the same camp, food has also been thrown over
he fence at selected points at night, and collected by guerrilla personnel.
50. Cultivators have also systematically been set to work by MCP District Committees
n squatter areas and in jungle clearings to grow food for MRLA and other guerrilla units.
ne cultivation unit set up by a District Committee consisted of 16 men. The cooperation
f local peasants is essential for the initial maintenance of such units until a crop has been
arvested, and for their physical security. Emergency food storage dumps are sometimes
stablished near guerrilla camps. Large stocks have been built up; considerable amounts
have been destroyed by Security Forces in the last six months. A large rice dump was
discovered in the fall of 1950 in the Bentong area. A latex tank large enough to hold 3 - 4
ons of rice had been buried with only its turret above ground, and this had been carefully
camouflaged with debris.
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51. The Government's resettlement policy aimed at clearing the squatter areas has
seriously interfereii with the guerrillas' supply system in some cases. Even more serious
has been the application (June 1950) of the death penalty to persons caught giving food or
money to the MRLA.
52. Arms and Ammunition. The MRLA has used only small arms -- Bren guns, Sten
Guns, American carbines, pistols, shot guns, hand grenades, and rifles; a few.small-caliber
mortars. Most of these weapons date from the British evacuation, the Japanese surrender,
and from the resistance period when the British parachuted arms to the guerrillas, who
conveniently "lost" some of them. Smaller quantities have been captured or stolen in the
course of the present insurrection. There is no evidence that the MRLA has received any
materiel from China or* any other foreign country.
53. Secret MPAJA units concealed large stocks of weapons in 1945. It was calculated
by ex-MPAJA leaders in 1946 that about 6,000 weapons and quantities of ammunition had been
cached. About half of these have been worn out or ruined by neglect; some have been
captured by Government forces.
54. Some MRLA units have organized specialists to make weapons and ammunition
and to refit cartridges. The Secretariat of the Johore State Committee/MCP issued instruc-
tions in July 1950 for the formation of a "Weapons Repairing Group" and a "Sabotage" or
demolitions group in each company. Increasing use was reportedly being made of mines
and hand-made bombs late in 1950. Mines are frequently made from old artillery shells.
Ammunition has been made utilizing match heads for primers, gunpowder, and locally mined
lead, with nail polish for weatherproofing. Improved techniques have been demonstrated in
refitting ammunition (use of washers, rather than tamping, to build up under-sized cartridges).
Earlier in the year, an armorer's kit was captured in Negri Sembilan. The kit would
lit into a haversack. The armorer had been renewing old ammunition and detonator caps on!
grenade fuses,
55. Substantial cash rewards are offered for weapons and ammunition turned in to
MCP organizations.
56. Intelligence. The need for extensive tactical intelligence is a particularly com-
pelling one for a guerrilla force: first, to avoid contact with superior enemy forces (and they
are almost always superior in Malaya); and secondly, for the selection of suitable targets
and development of an operational plan that makes full use of the surprise element that is
the key to guerrilla tactics. Guerrillas cannot afford to be surprised, either in the attack or
on the run. They cannot stand long on the defensive. A major premise of successful guerrilla
operation is that the guerrillas know more about local conditions than the enemy does. When
the guerrilla force is recruited from the local population, such knowledge is automatic. When
they operate away from home, they must organize an intelligence system.
57. MCP military forces are furnished information on local conditions and enemy
movements by physical reconnaisance (scouts and local guides) and informant networks set
up in village and countryside. Min Yuen and local MCP organizations are key intelligence-
producing agencies. The operation mentioned above (para. 32) in which the District MCP
and Min Yuen took part, was only partially successful, owing to "faulty intelligence" provided
by one of the MCP Branches in the area of attack.
58. An MCP document setting forth conclusions adopted in October 1950 stresses the
need for developing a comprehensive intelligence network during the period of guerrilla
warfare and also, for raising the quality of information produced and of its assessment. Im-
provement rests upon --
a) a general recognition of the importance of intelligence;
b) a program of critical study of existing methods;
c) training of professional intelligence officers and staff;
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d) development of "an intelligence network based on the foundation of people's
organizations;" "establish intelligence cells systematically and arrange work
for special intelligence personnel."
59. Information collecting is organized as follows:
a) appointment of an intelligence officer in the executive committee of a local
mass organization: he will build up "intelligence cells" and may recruit indivi-
duals as informants;
b) assignments and instructions for intelligence given to individuals by Party
personnel in areas where there is no formal mass organization;
c) agent nets: "special intelligence teams" set up by "district committee, by
state or regimental headquarters, by an independent subdirectorate, or by the
central directorate." The teams will consist of 3 - 5 men each, under a"head."
"Members of the team should be assigned to various productive centers and
enemy organs in different towns;
d) reconnaissance teams ("military affairs detection teams") set up by armed
units as needed.
60? The document stresses the security required for intelligence:
"Strict secrecy of organization must be maintained. The collection of intelligence
is comparatively complex. Hence constant vigilance and improvement of strict,
secret, organized and workable efficiency are absolutely necessary. Information
such as names, addresses, techniques, connections, variegations and other secret
data should be strictly guarded. If this is not accomplished, despite good
appearances, our work will not be effective. More stringent secrecy should be
exercised by personnel working in the midst of our enemies' camp, for example
in Government departments, military reservations and in similar locations.
Personnel working in this capacity should be given more effective orientation
in order to prevent negative results. Methods of contact between informers and
intelligence teams, intelligence liaison centers, and the general intelligence
center should be simple and, uniform."
61. Reporting.
"Each independent working unit, including state headquarters, Min Yuen working
cells and working corps which are responsible only for small districts, should
keep daily records of events happening within their territory, and in the neighbor-
hood of their district. A weekly summary, written in the form of a report, should
be rendered by the cadre of each such unit, by the secretary of state headquarters,
the leader of the MCP cell and by the leader of the Min Yuen working corps or
working cell. Such reports should be submitted regularly to district committees
of their territories or to the directorates of their units. A bi-monthly report
summarizing local intelligence should be submitted by the district directorates
to their respective state committees or state headquarters.
62. Everyone connected with the MCP in any way should collect and report informa-
ion as a matter of course.
63. Requirements. The following are the items of "normal daily intelligence"' re-
uired in addition to "special intelligence":
"a) The pronouncement and enforcement of the reactionary orders of the British
imperialists, as well as their sinful conduct in ruining the people, and their
criminal acts which exploit the people.
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b) Activities of British 'running-dogs' and `running-dog' organizations such as
the Malayan Chinese Association and its ring leaders, Dato Onn's Party and its
satellites, the Malayan Indian Associations and their adherents, reactionary
trade unions, detectives, and traitors, including spies who are working within
our midst.
It is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the spheres of activities of
such persons and organizations. We must know their names, addresses, normal
routes of travel, neighborhoods which they frequently inhabit, their habits, and
their distinctive characteristics. Clear and timely reports should be made of
such observations.
c) Peoples' reactions to British imperialists' activities.
d) The peoples' (workers, farmers and petty bourgeoisie) livelihood, their
demands and their views on the Liberation Army.
e) Manifestations of the capitalist and propertied class, their attitude toward the
British imperialists, towards the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and
toward the masses in general.
f) Movements of British imperialist military police forces, including British
troops, Gurkhas, the Malay Regiment, regular police, special police, auxiliary
police and kampong guards.
g) Enemy operations:
Encampments. Sites, size, construction underway, manpower, equipment,
regimental numbers and colors, officers in charge and similar information.
Transfers of enemy troops. Schedule, number of persons involved, and means
of trans ort.
Enemy patrols. Routes,, numerical strength, number of vehicles, equipment,
schedule, routine, special or impromptu.
Enemy ambushes. Sites, numerical strength, equipment, time, reason, objec-,
ve.
Enemy raids. Where, when, numerical strength, equipment, reason, objective,
identification of regiments involved, and result.
Enemy checkpoints. Where, when, numerical strength and regiment involved,
equipment, objective, and result.
Enemy convoys. Inspections by estate managers and detectives. Assignments
dunning dogs'. Transportation of foodstuffs and other supplies with armed
escort.
h) Interrl sentiments and manifestations of the enemy force:
Treatment of British soldiers and Malay constables, their rations and pay, and
the methods used by superior officers in dealing with their men.
Discipline of troops and their attitude towards the masses.
Relationship between officers and men, and the reaction of the force toward
officers.
The general sentiments of the enemy force regarding the war, their attitude
towards fighting, and their morale following engagements with the Liberation
Army.
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j) Enemy arms stores:
Classification of weapons into types and grades of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives.
Sites of storehouses, including types of buildings, whether timber or concrete,
conditions of windows and doors, protective measures utilized such as barb
wire fencing, wire netting and so on, whether soldiers are on guard, and if so
the number of sentries, times of changing guards, and similar information."
64. Development of professional competence. This consists of --
a) systematic organization of intelligence sources: regular meetings, study of
periodic summaries for lessons to be learned and improvement of reporting;
b) systematic verification of reports;
c) training specialized intelligence personnel to penetrate Government organs or
to establish contact with "persons who have access to information within these
enemy organs."
6~5. Example of an MCP penetration operation. A man got a job with the Security
Forces providing guides. He collected information on their plans and movements and sent
it through a relative to the MCP. It was passed up channels through the North Malayan Bureau
to the Secretary General of the Party.
66. Use of intelligence in military operations. The first item in the advance planning
of a miliLtary operation is intelligence, as is shown in the following portions of a document
outlining the plan of an attack in 1950 on a police station:
"A) The information about the enemy received thus. far and the geographical conditions
of the place."
There follows a summary of information already available on the following points:
a. Number of police posted at the station
b. Types of weapons in police hands
c. Lay-out and physical security at the Station
(1) obstacles (description of barbed wire, fences, ditches)
(2) arrangement of buildings
(3) approaches
(4) patrols: schedule, strength, arms
(5) location and arms of possible police reinforcements
d. Adjacent terrain features
(1) natural (location high ground, river); vegetation
(2) buildings
(3) roads
e. Police motor launches spotted in river.
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On the basis of an analysis of the above, additional information required to bring the
intelligence up to, date was itemized and a scouting party of three men sent out to make a
physical reconnaissance.
The operational plan for the attack was detailed and will be discussed further in the
paragraphs on "Operations" below.
For the march to the attack area, a three-man reconnaissance team was sent ahead
and provision was made for a command reconnaissance when the area had been reached.
In the review of the operation, "good points" and "weak points" of the tactical intel-
ligence were discussed. Among the latter were these:
a. inaccuracy of information on enemy arms
b. inaccuracy of information on physical defenses at the police station. Improvement
of reconnaissance was decided to be a "must."
67. Communications. The MCP has a well developed system of courier communica-
tions. tions. The regular mail has been used to transmit propaganda, but no case has been dis-
covered of Its use for secret or important messages. Several transmitting sets have been
captured, but there is no evidence that the guerrillas actually have any W/T communication.
Codes and secret inks are used in courier-handled mail. There is no indication that a regu-
lar code is used country-wide. Simple letter, number, and word substitutions are the usual
types.
68. It is believed that each MCP Committee and armed unit selects and controls its
own couriers. The Min Yuen organizations are valuable courier pools. Courier systems are
well. organized and highly secure. Cut-outs are used and couriers know nothing of the courier
system In areas outside their own. Couriers have been known to travel in groups of three or
four, with a group having at least one weapon. Long runs are broken down into stages, ter-
minating at message centers. A message center has its own staff of couriers under a Com-
munications Officer, and detailed logs are kept there. Messages to and from important
leaders are delivered or called for at message centers by the leader's personal courier, who
alone knows the leader's exact whereabouts. High-level couriers are frequently shadowed
by the leader's body-guard to prevent treachery.
69. Training. The initial cadre of the MRLA had been trained by the British just
before the Japanese occupation. Others received some training in the.MPAJA. More
practical instruction has been obtained by participation in the current fighting. Training
manuals -- reprints of Chinese and British manuals -- have been captured. Training camps'
for raw recruits have been operated. It is believed that the bulk of the training given at the
present time is unit training, recruits being given daily instruction and practical experience
through guard duty and perimeter patrol duty in their own units. Some firing practice may
be given, but the shortage of ammunition makes it likely that it is quite sketchy. Political
instruction is, of course, a continuing occupation.
Operations
70. The MCP has not been able to go beyond the first "phase" of its strategy - the
stage of terrorism,. sabotage, and small actions by small, irregular forces. Its military,
operations. have the following objectives:
a. To exhaust and demoralize the enemy's military force by continual harassing
operations (sniping, ambushes, raids).
b. To damage the enemy's military efficiency by cutting his communications.
c. To weaken the enemy's economic base by destroying his productive centers
(sabotage, raids).
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 Approved--or
d. To destroy the enemy's political base by terrorism (beatings, threats, murder,
arson, bombings); to shake popular confidence in the Government's ability to keep
order and protect its supporters (terrorism and spectacular raids).
e. To enlist active popular participation in the insurrection: drawing civilians into
small acts of violence, such as sabotage, and progressing gradually to out-and-out
guerrilla fighting.
1. To give the fighters experience in tactics and handling of arms.
jr. To get additional arms.
71. In brief, the military operations of the MCP at the present time are aimed at
weakening the enemy militarily, economically, and politically, and at the gradual development
of an experienced armed force. They are not yet aimed at engaging and defeating the enemy
in orthodox combat. As recently as June 1950, a State Committee directive stated that units
of platoon strength would normally be used in operations. Larger concentrations were to be
avoided to prevent encirclement by superior Government forces. The Company should be
used only in very carefully planned attacks on considerably inferior or off-balance enemy
forces for the purpose of (a) impressing the people, or (b) giving commanders experience
in handling larger units. Attacks in Company strength have been rare.
72. The political -- i.e., propaganda -- side of MCP guerrilla operations should not
be overlooked. Attacks are planned with a view to what effect they will have on, civilian atti-
tudes, and literature and verbal propaganda is customarily included in the execution of opera-
tions to impress the people with the strength and morale of the guerrillas, to make them
afraid to support Government policies for the retaliation that is promised to "running dogs,"
and to convince them that the Government forces are not only corrupt, brutal, and cowardly,
but also, bound to lose in the end.
73. MCP military actions include the following:
a. Ambushes: of civilian and enemy vehicles, trains, convoys; enemy patrols
and small forces
b. Raids and surprise attacks: on enemy military and police posts, railways
and roads, plantations, mines, stores.
c. Sniping: at individuals and passing vehicles and trains
d. Sabotage: destruction of rubber trees, buildings, plants, vehicles, telephone
and power lines, bridges, roads, railways.
e. Murder, beatings, bombings, booby-trapping and mine-planting.
74. Such actions are carried out by MRLA units, and the smaller ones, by Self
Protection Corps and Defense Corps, etc., groups. The latter are called upon to reinforce
MRLA units in attacks and to serve in side-actions, as covering force and communications
guards.
75. Plans for military actions, such as raids, are usually made by MRLA unit com-
manders and local MCP and Min Yuen leaders together. The latter provide local intelligence,
guides, armed couriers, scouts; and supplies.
76. Detailed operational planning goes into relatively ambitious attacks, as is shown
in the following summary of details considered in the attack on the police station that was
mentioned above, para 66:
A. Plan drawn up 17 February 1950 by the "Operational (i.e. Unit?) Command."
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(1) Intelligence. Consideration of information already available; specification
of information still to be gathered; collation of all available information on
enemy strength, terrain, etc. (Previously described above, para.; 66.)
(2) Supply and bivouac.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Break-down of individual rations.
Provision made for obtaining additional necessary supplies.
March
1) Time of departure; estimation of duration of march
2) Schedule; march order
a) spacing of units
b) rest stops
c) route markers
3) March defense.
(d) Bivouac: lay-out, defense.
(3) Attack plan
(a) Assignment of units to specific jobs: "charging units," "assault units,"
guard units, first-aid teams.
(b) Distribution of arms and ammunition: break-down by type of weapon
and function of unit.
(c) Operational map and time of attack.
(d) Command posts: designation of commanders and locations of command
posts.
(e) Communications, signals.
(f) Discipline.
(4) Booty: targets, assignments, storage.
(5) Health and Food.
(6) Withdrawal.
(7) Political Mobilization.
(a) Internal
1) Assignments;
2) Subjects (points to be made).
(b) External
1) Distribution of literature and verbal propaganda;
2) Shouting to enemy (slogans to be used);
3) Propaganda for prisoners.
B. Review held after the operation, 5 March.
(1) Operation closely and systematically analyzed in all of above aspects:
commendations and criticisms.
(2) Significance of operation
(a) Effect of enemy military operations;
(b) Effect on people;
(c) Effect on MRLA morale;
(d) Lessons: tactical and technical.
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M C P MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL
BUREAU
NORTH, SOUTH,
AND CENTRAL
MALAYAN BUREAUS
STATE COMMITTEE
DISTRICT COMMITTEE
MILITARY
HIGH COMMAND
ARMED FORCES
DEPT.
REGIMENTAL
COMMAND
-----------1 1
I "PARTY CORPS " i BATTALIONS
MIN YUEN
CELL
Civilian
Organizations
r-------1
I Peasants I
L-------J
~ Womens
I Squatter
I Area i
Others
Military
Organizations
District I
Unit
Defense
I Corps
j Self-
I j
Protection I
LI Corps
COMPANIES
PLATOONS
SECTIONS
SQUADS
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 Approved For Rel
S. Officials Only
ORGANIZATION OF THE M C P AFTER JUNE 1948
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
11-15 members
SECRETARY
GENERAL
MILITARY
HIGH COMMAND
11-
NORTH
MALAYAN
BUREAU
3 members
PENANG AND KEDAH
STATE JOINT
COMMITTEE
5-7 members
PERAK STATE
COMMITTEE
ARMED
FORCES
DEPT
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
SOUTH JOHORE
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
NORTH JOHORE
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
ORGANIZATION
DEPT
PROPAGANDA
DEPT
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
BRANCH
CELL
BRANCH
CELL
POLITICAL
BUREAU
2 members
CENTRAL
MALAYAN
BUREAU
4 members
SINGAPORE
TOWN COMMITTEE
f -----~ f--------I
I II I
L______I L_____J
CELL
SOUTH
MALAYAN
BUREAU
2 members
f NEGRI SEMBILAN
1 STATE COMMITTEE
SELANGOR
1STATE COMMITTEE
EAST COAST
1 STATES COMMITTEE
KELANTAN
1 STATE COMMITTEE
H NORTH PAHANG
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
y
SOUTH PAHANG
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
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Distribution of Communist Guerrillas - 31 May 1950
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